Desalination as a Game-Changer in International Hydro-Politics

Desalination as a game-changer in transboundary hydro-politics Ram Avirama,b, David Katzb,* and Deborah Shmuelib

aBIT Consultancy 8 Achimeir St. Tel-Aviv, 69126 Israel

bDepartment of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel,

Haifa, 39105 Israel

*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]

Published in Water Policy 16 (2014) 609-624

ABSTRACT

This article demonstrates how the availability of sea-water desalination is important,

not just as an additional source of water supply on a national scale, but as a potential

"game changer" in transboundary hydro-political interactions. The advent of

desalination can change the nature of relations from a zero-sum game based on

resource capture to a mutually beneficial business-like relationship typical in

international commodity trade. It also allows for flexibility in policy approaches, and

challenges the advantages and disadvantages hitherto thought of as inherent in

upstream-downstream relations. This has wide ramifications for possible cooperation

and conflict over international shared water resources. This study analyzes the

possible implications of desalination on hydro-politics, and then presents a case study

of the hydro-political relations between Israel and Jordan in order to demonstrate how

different aspects of transboundary political interactions are already being affected by

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the development of desalination. It demonstrates the ways in which the option of

desalination allows states to pursue both unilateral and collaborative policies that were

not practical in the period prior to desalination. The paper concludes by emphasizing

the need for a revised analytical paradigm for analysis of hydro-politics in light of the

development of desalination.

Keywords: Desalination, Hydropolitics, Israel, Jordan, Transboundary, Water policy

1. INTRODUCTION

Until recently desalination was considered too expensive for all but the richest of countries

to be used as a primary source of water supply. However, following improvements in

technology efficiency and subsequent substantial decreases in costs (Zhou and Tol, 2005;

Ghaffour et al., 2013), today, over 16,000 desalination plants in over 150 countries produce

over 67 million m3 of water per day (IDA, 2013). It already represents a significant share of

national water supplies in a number of countries, especially in water scarce regions, such as

the Middle East. Furthermore, global desalination capacity is growing nearly exponentially

(Gleick et al., 2006; Elimelech and Phillip, 2011), and is expected to be an increasingly

important component of planned future water supplies as global water consumption

continues to grow (Shannon et al., 2008; Schiermeier, 2008; Elimelech and Phillip, 2011).

Much attention has been dedicated to the impacts (potential and actual) of desalination on

domestic water supplies. Less attention has been paid to how it affects the politics of

transboundary water resources.

International hydro-political interactions deal with the utilization or division of water

quantity, joint management of water quality, mitigation of floods, generation of

hydropower, and ecological management of shared resources. Analysis of the geopolitics of

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transboundary freshwater management has often focused on division of water quantity,

frequently treating the issue as a zero-sum game based on resource capture. Factors

affecting division of shared waters include traditional real-politik issues such as relative

military and economic power, and geographical factors such as upstream-downstream

position and resource endowments. The recent advent of desalination as an economically

viable supply of freshwater, however, challenges the reigning paradigm.

This shift emanates from several aspects of desalination that distinguish it from natural

sources of freshwater. Firstly, desalination removes, to a certain extent, the quantitative

restrictions on water supply and the stochastic nature of this supply, thus giving countries

more stability and predictability (Dreizin et al., 2007). Secondly, it allows for control over

water quality. Thirdly, the ability to choose the location of desalination facilities results in

changes to the existing network, and as a consequence may change the map of power

distribution in water politics (Feitelson and Rosenthal 2012). Fourthly, because desalinated

water is a manufactured, rather than a public good, rights to the resource are less likely to

be challenged, which may lead to its being treated as a potential commodity for exchange.

The collective consequence of these differences, as will be elaborated below, implies that

the option of desalination may significantly change major elements in the international

interaction over shared waters.

This study continues as follows: Section 2 provides a review of analyses of the international

hydro-political interactions over transboundary water resources, highlighting the aspects

that are challenged by the option of desalination as a new, sometimes primary, source of

water. It also describes the Transboundary Waters Interaction NexuS (TWINS) analytical

framework proposed by Mirumachi (2007) and later developed by Zeitoun and Mirumachi

(2008) and by Allan and Mirumachi (2010), which is used to illuminate a case study. Section

3 presents a case study demonstrating how the advent of commercially viable desalination

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technology changed the bilateral relationship between Israel and Jordan. We map the shift

in hydro-political relations between the states showing how, prior to adoption of large-scale

desalination in the region, water was a highly securitized scarce resource and, while some

cooperation existed, parties relied largely on coercive power, focusing primarily on resource

capture. With the advent of large-scale desalination, water has been treated more as an

economic commodity that served as the basis of several cooperative gestures. Section 4

presents a discussion addressing which of the impacts from the case study are generalizable

and what other factors are likely to interact with desalination capabilities to impact

transboundary water politics. Section 5 offers concluding remarks on the need for new

approaches to hydro-politics in light of the changes brought about by the possibility of

desalination.

2. ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL HYDRO-

POLITICAL INTERACTIONS

Much of the focus on transboundary water politics has been on the potential for conflict or

cooperation over shared waters (e.g., Kliot, 1994; Wolf et al., 1999, 2003; Shmueli, 1999;

Yoffe et al., 2003; Dinar and Dinar, 2003; Furlong et al., 2006; Conca et al., 2006; Gleditsch et

al., 2006; Dinar et al., 2010, Zeitoun et al., 2010; for a review of such literature, see Wolf

2007). Many have warned of the potential for conflict over scarce shared water resources,

despite somewhat limited empirical evidence for widespread intense violent conflict over

water (e.g., Yaffe et al., 2002; 2003). Others have claimed that joint scarcity may promote

cooperation (e.g., Yaffe et al., 2002, 2003; Sadoff and Grey, 2005; Conca et al., 2006).

Still others have highlighted that cooperation and conflict are not opposite sides of a

continuum, but, rather, may coexist simultaneously in coherent international water

management strategies (e.g., Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Zawahri and Gerlak, 2009).

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Therefore analysis should not necessarily view relations as being either conflictive or

cooperative, but rather in terms of relative amounts of each in any given relationship (e.g.,

Mirumachi, 2007; Mirumachi and Allan, 2007; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Zawahri and

Gerlak, 2009; and Allan and Mirumachi, 2010).

Limited empirical evidence supports the theory that scarcity can lead to conflict (Toset et al.,

2000; Hensel et al., 2006; Tir and Stinnett, 2012). Desalination, by providing additional water

quantity, then can be assumed to reduce this cause for conflict. Some empirical studies have

also found that scarcity also increases cooperation (Hensel et al., 2006). By increasing

opportunities for water exchanges, desalination may then also promote cooperation.

However, desalination is an option that can also be pursued unilaterally, and thus, increased

cooperation cannot be assumed a priori.

The transboundary water governance literature points to the role of asymmetric power in

basin politics (Waterbury, 2002; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Allan and Mirumachi, 2010).

Some researchers have claimed that disproportionate power allows parties to dictate the

terms of transboundary water sharing, in effect allowing for ‘hydro-hegemony’ (Zeitoun and

Warner, 2006). Geographic position plays a role in power distribution, with upstream

nations having the ability to unilaterally impact downstream riparians, a position

traditionally viewed as politically advantageous (e.g., Frey and Naff, 1985). Some research

has also found that upstream-downstream relationships are more conflictual (Brochmann

and Gleditsch, 2012). The option for desalination diminishes the ability of one party to

dominate relations, and reduces advantages held by upstream parties.

As is the case with scarcity, the effect of uncertainty regarding water supplies on

transboundary relations is disputed (Fischhendler and Katz, 2013). Some have shown, for

instance, the value of ambiguity in terms of getting parties to sign water-sharing

agreements, but that this same uncertainty can lead to conflicts in the implementation

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phase (e.g., Fischhendler, 2008a; 2008b). Zeitoun and Miramuchi (2008) suggests that

reducing uncertainty may provide a driver towards cooperation in transboundary water

policy. If so, again, desalination, by reducing stochasticity both in terms of quantity and

quality, should promote cooperation.

Economists have long advocated market instruments such as water trade or trade in water

intensive goods (virtual water trade) as means for reducing water conflict (e.g., Allan, 2001;

Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2005). In practice, transboundary water trade is limited. One reason is

that both sides claim rights to a shared public good, and thus are not willing to purchase it.

Desalinated water, however, is much more like a manufactured good, (for example a clearer

marginal price or involvement of private sector entrepreneurship) and thus, should be more

amenable to trade.

Mirumachi (2007) proposed an analytical framework she coined Transboundary Waters

Interaction NexuS (TWINS) which attempts to show the relative degrees of conflict and

cooperation over water in a given political relationship. She demonstrates this graphically,

presenting a two dimensional graph in which the vertical axis represents different intensities

of conflict, ranging from low to violent. The different categories in increasing levels of

conflict are: non-politicized, politicized, securitized/opportunitized, and violized. The

horizontal axis represents cooperation. In terms of increasing levels of cooperation the

categories are: issue confrontation, ad hoc interaction, technical, risk-averting and risk-

taking. Mirumachi and Allan (2007) added a third dimension reflecting the robustness of the

political economy ranging from resource capture, to resource sharing to development of

resource alternatives. The basic premise of the model is that water resources allocation and

integrative resource management take place in circumstances of asymmetric power and

circumstances in which actors enjoy different levels of economic diversity and strength, and

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that useful analysis should take into consideration the different aspects and levels at which

interaction takes place.

TWINS allows systematic analysis within and across river basins – showing relative degrees

of co-existing conflict and cooperation over time, while highlighting the transboundary

waters activism and politically expressed interests at the sub-national level (Mirumachi and

Allan, 2007). As such, we find it a useful framework in which to demonstrate the

development over time of water relations in our case study and to highlight the significance

of desalination as a factor in shifting these relations.

3. CASE STUDY OF ISRAELI–JORDANIAN RELATIONS

3.1. Shared natural water sources

Both Israel and Jordan have long suffered from a scarcity of natural water sources. Both

have less than 250 million m3 of renewable freshwater per capita per year (IWA, 2009), far

below the 500 million m3 per capita per year level commonly used as the international

standard of chronic water scarcity (Falkenmark, 1989; Lawrence et al., 2002). The primary

shared water resource between Israel and Jordan is the lower Jordan River system, including

one of its major tributaries, the Yarmouk River (see Figure 1). Syria is also upstream of the

lower Jordan River, and the West Bank is a downstream riparian. Syria and Lebanon are also

riparians to tributaries to the upper Jordan River. Both Israel and Jordan (as well as Syria)

extract most of their share of water from this basin upstream of the lower Jordan River:

Israel from the Sea of Galilee, and Jordan (and Syria) from the Yarmouk. Israel and Jordan

also share the Wadi Arava aquifer. Though the quantities utilized from this aquifer are

negligible in terms of national overall water balance, it is of significance because of the lack

of alternatives for the rural development in this region.

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Both countries have been extracting 100% of their natural renewable freshwater sources for

decades. Israel has embarked on programmes to develop new sources such as cutting

freshwater allocations to agriculture and replacing them with reclaimed wastewater, which

now accounts for over half of all water consumed by agriculture. Jordan has also tried to

meet growing demand by expanding major water projects for example the Al-Wehda dam in

the north and the Disi Aquifer system in the south. It has also begun addressing

underdeveloped and under-maintenanced infrastructure with high rates of water losses

(Ghazal, 2010). High rates of population growth in both countries, climate change, and the

need to share water with the Palestinian population all place additional pressures on the

limited freshwater resources.

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3.2. Israel and Jordan interactions over water

Two factors have served as the primary drivers of Israeli–Jordanian relations over water: 1)

the overall political climate between the two countries, and 2) the perceived needs of the

populations for freshwater, given limited supplies. The nature of the relations between the

two parties over shared water resources can be divided into four distinct periods. During the

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first, 1948–1967, relations were largely antagonistic and framed by the larger Arab–Israeli

conflict. The second period, 1967–1994, followed Israel’s capture of the northern bank of

the Yarmouk, and the bulk of the western bank of the Jordan River. During this period,

relations were cool, but ad hoc low-key coordination over water issues occurred that

avoided major confrontations. The third period, 1994–2005, was characterized by more

formal coordination and cooperation following the Peace Treaty signed by the two nations

in 1994. The fourth, post-2005, represents the period during which desalination came to

represent a major supply source. Both countries are looking to desalination as a central part

of national water supplies. Israel began operating its first large-scale desalination plant in

2005, and eight years later, desalinated water already accounted for over two-thirds of all

water consumed by the municipal sector and roughly a quarter of all freshwater consumed

overall – as such seawater desalination became a primary source (no longer marginal)

alongside the natural ones. Additional desalination capacity is already being built. Jordan,

which has access to the sea only in the southern port of Aqaba, far removed from its

population centres, is also developing desalination capacity (Mohsen, 2007). Currently

desalination in Jordan is limited to small quantities of saline water, however it is developing

larger scale seawater desalination, as well, including in a joint project with Israel, as will be

detailed later in the case study.

While significant shifts in relations occurred between all periods, the first three were

characterized by various degrees of conflict and cooperation over a fixed scarce resource. In

essence, the parties were attempting to manage a fixed amount of water, in which gains for

one party were largely seen as having to come at the expense of the other. As will be shown,

the transition to the fourth period represents a fundamental shift in which the perception of

water is gradually no longer seen as a fixed resource, and thus, relations are no longer seen

as solely a zero-sum game. Rather, the advent of desalination reduced the sense of scarcity

and granted parties flexibility in their approach to transboundary water management. In the

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following paragraphs we outline in greater depth the characteristics of the different periods.

We demonstrate the progression of these relations over the four periods using the extended

TWINS model offered by Allan and Mirumachi (2010).

3.2.1. Period 1 (1948–1967) confrontation and unilateralism

Following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, and the ensuing war, Jordan

controlled the West Bank. This meant that it had control of both banks of the lower Jordan,

and the major source of water west of the Jordan River the Mountain Aquifer (the primary

recharge zone for which lies in the West Bank, while its primary outflows lie within Israel).

Technology to pump water in large quantities from the aquifer, however, was not yet widely

developed and applied during this period. With this acquisition of territory, came also the

responsibility of supplying water to the Palestinian population of the West Bank and the

large number of Palestinians who took refuge east of the Jordan River (Haddadin, 2009).

While Jordan had control of both banks of the lower Jordan River, it was still downstream of

the upper Jordan and the Sea of Galilee, on both of which Israel, Syria and Lebanon had

upstream positions.

During the 1950s, an American sponsored initiative for a water-sharing agreement, the so-

called Johnston Mission, was negotiated between Israel and the Arab states that shared

significant water sources with Israel (Jordan, Lebanon and Syria). The agreement was

accepted by technical committees on all sides, but the Arab states eventually rejected it for

political reasons, not wanting to imply recognition of Israel (Lowi, 1993). The agreement did

serve, however, as an informal guide for water shares for each of the parties involved,

especially for Israel and Jordan (Elmusa, 1998). Following the breakdown in talks, each party

went about pursuing unilateral water development projects. The Israelis built the National

Water Carrier (NWC), diverting water from the Sea of Galilee to the central coast and

northern Negev desert, while the Jordanians built the East Ghor Canal (in 1987 renamed the

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King Abdullah Canal (KAC)) to divert water from the Yarmouk to the population centres east

of the Jordan River. The period was also characterized by sporadic acts of violence over

shared waters, including the Israeli bombing of Syrian (and Arab League including Jordan’s)

diversion works on the upper Jordan River and an unsuccessful attempt by the then nascent

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to blow up Israel’s NWC (Lowi, 1993).

In terms of the TWINS scheme, the period could be characterized as one in which conflict

was high, and cooperation was very low, that is a situation that was confrontational and

violized. In terms of political economy, the period was clearly one defined by resource

capture. This is represented by column 1 in Figure 2.

3.2.2. Period 2 (1967–1994) quiet coordination

Following the 1967 war, Israel controlled the Golan Heights, and thus both the Syrian share

of the headwaters of the upper Jordan, and a larger share of the northern bank of the lower

Yarmouk. In addition, it controlled the west bank of the Jordan River and the Mountain

Aquifer. As a result, from a hydro-strategic spatial position, Israel was clearly in a superior

position. Jordan, having lost control of the West Bank, focused its control on developing

supplies to the east of the river. During this period, Jordan acted independently of Syria and

Lebanon. Jordan still did not have official diplomatic relations with Israel, and thus, there

was no formal direct cooperation between the two. However, Israeli presence along the

Yarmouk created a need for both parties to coordinate allocation and maintenance of river

flows. While tensions were at times high, including mobilization of military forces, the two

parties did have discreet unpublicized low level meetings – the so-called ‘picnic table

meetings’ – in which locally responsible officials would coordinate certain issues such as

placement and timing of pumping from shared sources (Haddadin, 2000; 2009).

Using the expanded TWINS framework, during this second period cooperation intensity was

relatively low, with limited ad hoc and technical cooperation, while conflict intensity was no

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longer violent, but still highly securitized and politicized. In terms of political economy,

however, there was no shift from the previous period, with relations still at the resource

capture level. This is represented by column 2 in Figure 2.

3.2.3. Period 3 (1994–2005) formalized cooperation

In 1994, Israel and Jordan signed a Peace Treaty, in which water management figured

prominently. This formalized relations between the two countries regarding water, covering

issues of ‘the rightful allocations’ of quantities, water quality, storage, data sharing,

development and procedural issues (Treaty of Peace, Article 6 and Annex II). Under the

auspices of the Treaty, a Joint Water Committee (JWC) was established with representatives

from each side to meet regularly to settle outstanding issues, to allow a limited degree of

adaptive management and to discuss desires for ad hoc changes to existing policies and

proposals for new projects.

Annex II Article 3 of the Treaty calls for both parties to seek additional means to supply

Jordan 50 million m3 of water per year. There is no elaboration regarding from where the

water will be supplied, nor regarding who will bear the costs. In 1997, against the backdrop

of political difficulties between the countries, Israel agreed to supply Jordan 25–30 million

m3/year from the Sea of Galilee as an interim arrangement until desalination plants would

begin operations (Shamir, 2003). Additionally, the agreement provides an arrangement by

which Israel increases withdrawals from the Yarmouk River up to 20 million m3 in the winter

period and delivers this quantity to Jordan in the summer period, essentially establishing a

mechanism for Jordan to store winter flood waters in Israel.

The Treaty also specifies that Jordan is to get an amount of desalinated water (10 million m3)

from saline springs in the Jordan River basin. However, the supply to Jordan of this amount

was to begin independently of desalination capabilities. This official mention of desalination

refers to a relatively small quantity of water from a limited brackish source, and only as a

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future possibility (which has not yet materialized), and, as such, is not comparable to the

virtually unlimited amount of water that could be supplied from desalination of seawater.

Even at this stage, however, the potential for future desalination was already beginning to

influence parties’ willingness to share new sources of water (Haddadin, 2001; 2002).

Israel was entitled to abstract from wells in the Arava Valley (Treaty of Peace, Article IV(3)).

According to those involved with negotiations, this part of the agreement (desalination in

the north and abstraction in the south) was seen as part of mutual give and take of both

countries (Haddadin and Shamir, 2003). The potential for desalination allowed for parties to

agree to forgo shares of natural sources without reducing overall consumption. Though the

period of desalination is envisaged, it was not yet an economically feasible option, however,

the type of water exchange arrangement based on desalination conceived in the Treaty was

to be developed dramatically in practice during the next period.

Cooperation post-Treaty was clearly more substantial than in the previous periods. In terms

of the TWINS framework, there was an increase in cooperation intensity beyond merely

technical cooperation, towards taking risk-averting measures as laid out in Article 6 which

lays out the goals of the Treaty as

A . . . minimizing wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses; B.

Prevention of contamination of water resources; C. Mutual assistance in the

alleviation of water shortages; D. Transfer of information and joint research and

development in water-related subjects . . .

In terms of conflict intensity, water remained a highly charged political issue; however, there

was now a larger number of non-political issues handled by technical experts. In terms of the

political economy element, water policy was no longer exclusively focused on resource

capture, but moved towards resource sharing. Still the focus was on ‘rightful allocations’.

While this represented a significant shift in approach, it still meant allocating a relatively

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fixed resource, albeit in a more congenial and cooperative manner. This overall relationship

is represented by column 3 in Figure 2.

3.2.4. Period 4 (2005–present) desalination and flexibility

The shift to the latest era of desalination-driven relations was not as sharp of a transition as

those between the previous periods which were marked by a war and by a peace treaty

respectively. Rather, it was more gradual. The date of 2005 is used here as it represents the

year Israel began operating its first large-scale seawater desalination plant in Ashkelon.

However, equally valid claims for a start date could be made for the period just prior, when

desalination planning began, or the period just after, when desalination was providing

substantial amounts of water to the Israeli water network. The adoption of large-scale

desalination in Israel increased overall available freshwater resources and reduced

uncertainties regarding both quantity and quality of water (Dreizen et al., 2007). Regardless

of the precision of the timing of the shift, it represented a subtle but dramatic change in

approach to water issues in the region.

The shift in policy approach of both states is reflected in the Minutes of Meeting (MoM),

signed on 4 October 2004 by the Secretary General of the Jordan Valley Authority on the

Jordanian side and the Chairman of the Authority for Water and Sewage on the Israeli side.

It is also reflected in meetings of the JWC which followed (for example on 22 October 2010).

As will be explained in more detail below, an agreement dealing with desalination as part of

the Red–Dead project that was signed in December 2013 in Washington is an example at the

diplomatic level of this policy shift.

The change in discourse in Period 4 is striking. During the previous periods both parties

referred to their portion of the shared sources in terms of ‘rights’ as appears in the Treaty of

Peace. In the MoM of 4 October 2010, for the first time parties refer to ‘sold water’ when

addressing water targeted for transfer between the countries (MoM, 2010). The focus shifts

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from a discussion of rights to agreement on the quantities and price of this ‘sold water’. The

quantities as stipulated in MoM are generally subject to equality in transfer; the price Jordan

agrees to pay differs from what they previously paid for the supply of the quantities

stipulated in Peace Treaty and Israel agrees in the same manner. (MoM, 2010).

The agreement also highlights how desalination changes the geography of hydro-political

relations. Firstly, access to the sea, rather than upstream position, is now much more

important. Secondly, desalination allows for greater spatial flexibility in terms of water

supply arrangements. In the Peace Treaty, for instance, water exchanges were spatially very

limited as were the quantities exchanged. With desalination, Israel was afforded more

flexibility with its internal location of water sources, which in turn allowed it to be more

flexible in accommodating Jordan’s expressed need ‘to receive additional quantities of water

in the Northern part of Jordan’ while receiving the exchanged water in the south where

Jordan can locate its plant. (MoM, 2010) In addition, the location of the planned sources

creates a more complex interdependency between the parties.

During this fourth period the parties use desalination prices as reference prices.

The price payable by Jordan of the Table II Sold Water to Beit Zera reservoir will be

the average price payable by the Government of Israel for desalinated water

produced at the . . . [3 desalination plants] less the actual costs incurred by Jordan

for filtration treatment of the Table II Sold Water (MoM 2010, part 1.2).

Such prices are also the basis for the purchase of water by Israel from the planned Aqaba

plant. Because desalinated water is, in fact, manufactured, production costs are readily

available as opposed to the estimated marginal price of natural water. If both sides have

access to desalination, then a clear upper bound exists for water prices, making the price of

water in transboundary exchanges less subject to unilateral manipulation. This price

mechanism is significant in that it involves the private sector (as the producer) in an arena

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which was entirely in the hands of governments. While in Period 3 the transfer between the

parties was limited, Period 4 is signified by creating ‘water trade’ between them. This is not

yet a ‘water market’ but certainly a major shift in the approach to water transboundary

transfer.

While prior to the period of desalination, parties’ actions to increase water supplies would

have necessarily come at the expense of other riparians or their own future reserves,

desalination allowed the option to increase supplies regardless of natural sources. Israel

pursued its desalination capacity unilaterally. Jordan, which has long been interested in

desalinating water, indicated that, while it would prefer to do so within the framework of a

joint project to build a water conduit between the Red and Dead Seas, it would do so

unilaterally, if need be (Jordan Times, 2013; Shauli, 2013).

The MoM proposed a joint project that would provide desalinated water for Jordan and

Israel. Jordan would desalinate seawater in Aqaba, and deliver some of this water to

southern Israel, and in exchange Israel would deliver water to Jordan from the Jordan River

basin, closer to the Jordanian population centres, with Israel committing to buying 30–50

million m3 of desalinated water annually (MoM, 2010, clauses 3–7).

A project of this nature was agreed upon by both governments, as well as the Palestinian

Authority in December of 2013 as part of a pilot project for a Red–Dead Canal (Jerusalem

Post, 2013; O’Brien, 2013). The project will increase the amount of water available to both

parties, and while interdependence is increased, it is not asymmetric, as it would have been

in the case of Jordan simply buying water from Israel. While Jordan could have undertaken a

desalination project unilaterally, this joint project allows it to increase water supplies at a

lower cost (i.e., lower than what a unilateral project would have cost), both because it

obviated the need to transport water from Aqaba to the north, and, because of the

cooperative nature of the project, costs will be shared among the two countries and the

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international donor community, which is willing to support Arab–Israeli cooperation. In

addition, should a broader Red–Dead project be implemented, private sector investment

coming from all sides is anticipated. While the primary motivation for the project from a

Jordanian perspective is the prospect of additional desalinated water (JRSP, undated;

Glausiusz, 2010; Al-Ghazawy, 2013), for the Israelis it is the prospect of promoting relations

with Jordan, as seen by the use of the label ‘Peace Conduit’, ‘Peace Canal’, and ‘Peace Valley’

in documents and proclamations describing the project in Israel (e.g., Gavrieli et al., 2005;

Kedmi, 2005; Glausiusz, 2010).

Again using the TWINS framework, the level of conflict remained low with a much larger

number of non-politicized issues. Presumably it is even lower than in the post-Treaty pre-

desalination period. Now that theoretically there is no cap on the amount of water available,

critical voices on both sides – in Jordan those suggesting that Israel was perhaps not living up

to its agreements and in Israel those questioning the transfer of water to Jordan during

drought periods – have subsided. With desalination, water was further depoliticized and,

instead, commodified. The discourse shifted to one in which economic transactions play a

more important role, albeit between governments.

In terms of cooperation intensity, the advent of desalination brought about a further shift

towards more cooperation, including what Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008) called ‘risk-taking’

measures, including promotion of large-scale joint projects such as the Red–Dead Canal.

Desalination also brought about a change in the political economy of the approaches, from

what Allan and Mirumachi (2010) called ‘resource sharing’ to ‘resource alternatives’. That is,

the focus was no longer on sharing of a common resource, but rather, on generating

alternatives to this common source. This new relationship is represented by column 4 in

Figure 2.

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4. TRANSBOUNDARY HYDRO-POLITICAL INTERACTIONS IN THE ERA OF

DESALINATION

4.1. Cooperation and conflict

As seen in the case study, the potential for desalination caused a fundamental shift in policy

approaches for both the Israeli and Jordanian governments. A priori there is no way to know

if desalination will lead to more or less cooperation. It opens new alternatives for sharing as

countries feel less constrained by natural endowments. However, it also can reduce

interdependence and the need for cooperation, as countries have the option of acting

unilaterally. In the case study presented, Israel became more flexible and willing to

accommodate Jordan once it had developed significant desalination capacity. It opted to

play a more cooperative ‘leading’ hegemonic role rather than exerting power unilaterally.

Jordan, for its part, expressed a willingness to pursue unilateral action developing

desalination in Aqaba with or without Israeli cooperation; but once it committed to

desalination it was more willing to come to an agreement with Israel to reduce the costs of

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water supply by arranging water swaps. Indeed, Jordan’s ability to build the plant is to a

large degree dependent on Israel’s commitment to purchase significant quantities of the

desalinated water on a long-term basis, as this will make it viable to attract additional

funding in the financial world markets. Additionally, many donations from the international

community are being conditioned on the regional character of the project. The option of

trade transactions in desalinated water may increase economic cooperation between

riparians (Abu Hammour, 2013).

Potential for greater cooperation need not necessarily lead to more cooperation. In the case

of Israeli–Palestinian relations, for instance, Israel’s desalination capacity has yet to lead to

increased cooperation with the Palestinian Authority. Rather, in that case, it seems that it is

allowing both parties to pursue unilateral water policy. Whether desalination leads to more

or less international cooperation over shared waters, there are good reasons to believe that

it will lead to less conflict. Firstly, it lessens the overall scarcity which is believed to

contribute to conflict and increases certainty in terms of both quantity and timing of water

supplies. Secondly, it lessens interdependence on shared resources and thus detracts from a

primary casus belli among riparians. Thirdly, it widens the scope for both cooperative and

unilateral arrangements that would obviate the need for violent actions and actions that

would serve to provoke violence. As such, it also has the potential to dramatically change

the incentives for conflict and cooperation among co-riparians. The only caveat to the

conclusion that desalination should reduce conflict is if desalination facilities themselves

become a target of violence, not because of water scarcity, but perhaps in order to induce it.

4.2. Spatial dynamics

The option of desalination can neutralize or at least significantly lessen both the inherent

advantage that upstream states have over their downstream riparians and the hydro-

hegemony wielded by stronger powers over weaker ones. Coastal countries are often also

Page 20

downstream nations. Thus, they would be less dependent on the benevolence of their

neighbours and/or less compelled to make concessions in exchange for water. However,

even if upstream neighbours are those with the desalination capacity, they are likely to be

more willing to accommodate downstream riparians as a result of decreased scarcity.

Another aspect of a shift in spatial aspects of hydro-political relations is that there is now a

choice as to where water is produced, rather than being dependent on the location of rivers

and aquifers. This choice is somewhat limited to coastal areas (although desalination of

brackish inland waters also occurs). However, this may be less of a constraint than it first

appears, given that half the world’s population and three-fourths of all large cities are within

60 kilometres of a coast (UNEP, 2013). As such, geographically, desalination is well suited to

accommodate expected growth in water demand. Also, as demonstrated in the case study,

the option of desalination allows for new water swaps between geographical areas, with

desalinated water in one region being exchanged for natural water in another.

4.3. Water as an economic good

A key obstacle to the adoption of desalination as a primary water source in a large number

of states is still cost. It remains relatively expensive, especially so for agricultural uses, which

represent the majority of global water consumption. As such, to date it is an option primarily

for domestic and industrial demand, and primarily in wealthier countries. But desalination

costs are decreasing, as world demand is increasing, and so it can be expected to continue to

play an increasing role in national water policies. Furthermore, as the case of Jordan

demonstrates, even a country with a relatively low per capita income may opt for

desalination and the new economic character of its international interactions might make it

possible. Furthermore, desalination itself is a major new option for third party countries to

be involved in alleviating water scarcity.

Page 21

Despite the promotion of market mechanisms and greater treatment of water as an

economic good by economists (e.g., Allan, 2001; Fisher and Huber-Lee, 2005),

implementation of such mechanisms and policies has been limited. In part this is because

water is considered a gift of nature and a human right and in part because in many cases a

definition of rights over shared water – a prerequisite to functioning markets or trade –

remain unresolved. Desalinated waters, however, are largely seen as a product maybe even

similar to other industrial goods, and so questions over who holds legal rights to the waters

are less relevant. This may serve to depoliticize somewhat transboundary water relations.

Desalination also provides a clear upper bound for the marginal price of water supply,

something that may also help facilitate transboundary market transactions. In any case, it

provides for additional opportunities for water trading.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The widespread adoption of desalination is already causing a significant shift in

transboundary hydro-politics, and this can only be expected to increase in significance as

desalination becomes an increasingly important source of water supply. With desalination

water allocation is perceived less and less as a zero-sum game. Water scarcity is no longer

exogenously deterministic. Both quantity and quality are less stochastic. Geographic and

spatial dynamics are no longer merely a function of upstream-downstream placement.

Unilateral action is possible, but at the same time, more avenues for cooperation are

feasible and reasons for conflict are fewer. Just having the option of desalination changes

the relative bargaining power of parties and their incentives for cooperation. That said, at

the same time it may still increase the power of the economically stronger nation. The

discourse of water relations changes from one of imposing political and military might to

one of promoting national and regional economic development.

Page 22

Large-scale desalination projects are already being pursued in a growing number of

countries. Current costs make desalination a viable option primarily for industrialized

countries, and still primarily after other more cost-effective options have been exploited. As

such, the lessons of this case study are likely most applicable for parties in which at least one

party has an advanced economy, for example relations between Singapore and Malaysia or

the United States and Mexico. However, desalination is already being pursued by a growing

number of middle income and developing economies, and as costs of desalination continue

to decrease and global water demand continues to increase, we can expect a growing role

for desalination in international hydro-politics in many regions and among many types of

economies.

The impact of desalination is not relegated solely to relations between riparians. For

instance, the option of desalination will likely affect the calculus of negotiations on water

imports. This could affect, for example, hydro-politics between Cyprus and its water

suppliers in Greece and elsewhere. More broadly, by alleviating water stress in general,

desalination may also reduce more global water-related political issues, such as internal

conflicts, environmental refugees, and others. Given these changes already taking effect in

international negotiations and policy, the advent of desalination necessitates a new

approach to the analysis of transboundary water politics.

Page 23

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