Denzin_Symbolic Interaction Ism and Ethnomethodology

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SYMBOLIC INTERAC TIONISM A N D ETHNOMETHODOLOGY:

A PROPOSED SYNTHE SIS *

N O RM A N K . D E N Z I N

University of CaU forma, Berkeley

The basic theoretical and methodo logical assump tions of symbolic interactionism and ethno-

methodo logy are compared and points of synthesis are proposed. Similarities between the

two orientations are noted, and these are seen to involve the problems of social organization,

methodo logy, socialization, deviance, social control, face-to-face interaction, and the analysis

of science as a social enterprise. It is suggested that these perspectives offer a much needed

view of how individuals are shaped by and, in turn, create elements of social structure. Be-

cause of their emphasis on the subjective side of social life, interactionism and ethnom ethod-

ology warrant serious consideration for their contributions to an alternative view of the

individual and his social arrangem ents. Areas of empirical inquiry relevant to both points

of view are stressed a nd a number of hypotheses are offered for future research . Such

research, it is proposed, will shed light on what are now taken b y m any as irreconcilable

differences between these perspectives.

THE development of a theoretical per-spective appropriate for the joint analy-sis of social psychological and socio-

logical problems has long concerned thesociologist. The methodology that wouldpermit such an analysis has also remainedan issue. Although various alternatives havebeen offered, ranging from the use of modelstaken from economics and psychology tostructural-functionalism, none has proven

completely satisfactory. My intent is totake two perspectives in contemporary so-ciology, one old and one relatively new, andto examine their potential for meeting theabove issues. Specifically, I shall examinesymbolic interactionism and ethnomethod-ology. Because both focus in some way onthe individual, they provide a view of socialorganization that may be termed subjectiveand social psychological in nature. Analysisof the degree of convergence between the

two should permit an expanded treatmentof how individuals are linked to, shap)ed by,and in turn create social structure. Thesetwo perspectives are especially relevant to

* I am ind ebted to a nu mbe r of colleagues andstudents for their critical reactions to earlier ver-sions of this essay, and especially to Herbert Blumerfor his critical remarks. I am also grateful for thecomments and criticisms of Howard S. Becker, CarlJ. Couch, Harold Mark and the students in my 426seminar on deviance at the University of Illinois.

What follows is my proposed synthesis of inter-actionism and ethnomethodology. This is not in-tended as an essay expressing widespread consensus

the abo ve prob lem s because they also ppose special views of methodology.

THE PERSPECTIVES DEFINED

The ethnomethodology of Garfinkel (196and Cicourel (1968) proposes an analysisthe routine, taken-for-granted expectatiothat members of any social order regularaccept. Basic to this perspective is the

tem pt to s ha rp ly dis tinguish scientific froeveryday atcivity. The problems of penetraing eve ryd ay persp ec tives and giving thesociologica l e xp lan atio ns ar e repeatedly dressed and the method of documentary anysis is set forth as a preferred strategy.ab idin g con cern, how eve r, is w ith the retionship between everyday, taken-for-grantmeanin gs , an d th e o rganization of themeanings into routine patterns of interactio

Symbolic interactionism takes as a fund

mental concern the relationship between div idu al co nduct an d forms of social orgaiza tion . T h is persp ec tive ask s how selvemerge ou t of soc ial str uc tu re and socsituations.

Both perspectives posit a link between

person and social structure that rests onrole of s)anbols and common meanings.

th is ex ten t t he y s ha re a grea t deal in c

mon with the structural-functional persp

tive. Lo ca ting the un it of analysis in

individual and interaction separates mactionism and ethnomethodology from ot



SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 923

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

The interactionist assumes that humanbeings are capable of making their own

thoughts and activities objects of analysis,that is, they can routinely, and even habitu-ally, manipulate symbols and orient theirown actions towards other objects. A great

deal of human conduct is of this routine na-ture. Once the meanings of objects have beenagreed upon, conduct can flow along linesof custom, t rad itio n, and ri tual.

Because humans also possess the ability to

self-consciously direct their own activities,the interaction proces s may be classified intothose behaviors that are routinely organizedand those that are actively constructed in a

self-conscious and in terpretat ive fashion(Blumer, 1966:537-538). Granted this as-

sumption, a fundamental empirical questionbecomes the identification of the shiftingmodes of interpretation that characterize the

interaction process. Clearly, interaction can-

not be so grossly divided into either inter-pretative, or noninterpretative elements.There are many levels and shades of differ-ence between these two, and the extent to

which ac tion and objects move between thesepoints rem ains to be identified.

Man's environment does not consist of ob-

jects which ca rry intrin sic meaning . Socialobjects are "constructs, and not self-existingentities with intrinsic na tur es " (Blum er,1966:539). Objects consist of any event thatone can designate in a unitary fachion and

around which one can organize action. The

meaning of an object resides not in the objectitself but in the definitions brought to it,

and hence m us t be located in the interaction' process.

These meanings typically derive from a

Rroup or organized interactional perspective.Human life is group life, and concerted ac-

tion arises out of the ability of persons to be

objects of both their own activity and other's.Joint actions, which represent the genericJwm of all interaction, rest on the ability of

the human to grasp the direction of the actsJt others (Blum er, 19 66 ). For consensuallies of action to emerge there must exist a

common community of symbols. Because the

^nnitions of certain objects within a group's

perspective are subject to continual negotia-° > at least certain features of group life

are subject to negotiation and change. The

basic object for all interaction is the self.

Because the self carries a multitude of differ-ing interpretations, shifts in these definitionsoften give group life its changing character.

When selves are consensuaJly defined, sta-

ble patterns of action will be observed. At

the heart of group life lies a series of sodal

selves that have been lodged in that struc-ture. Through the process of self-lodging,humans translate crucial features of theirown identity into the selves, and into the

memories and imaginations of relevantothers. In this way Cooley's proposition thatthe other exists in "our imaginations of him"

comes to life. By lodging the self in interac-tion, and in the selves of others, a reciprocalbond is created, and the firm foundations for

future relationships are established. Self-

lodging stands in distinction to what Goff-man (1959) has termed the process of pre-

senting a self. It is certainly the case thatselves hav e to be presented, but at some pointin the cycle of recurrent interactions, the selfmoves from the presentational to the lodgingphase. Central to self-lodging are variationson Cooley's notion of the looking glass self,

which posited a three-fold process of presen-tation, identification and subjective interpre-tation. Cooley profoundly noted that upon

the presentation of a self, the person took ona sense of pleasure or displeasure based on

his interpretations of the other's reactions.This suggests that the self is a continuallyevaluated object—an object that rests on

affective-emotional reactions and criticisms.I t is not an object devastated through criti-cism, nor is it a calculated and plannedobject.

This view suggests that one motivationalfeature of human conduct is the self-lodging

process. Humans return to those interac-tional quarters where the most basic featuresof their selves have been lodged. This ex-

tends Foote's (1951) proposition that identi-fication of self and other provides the basisof motivation. The self-lodging hyp>othesissuggests that after the identification processhas been negotiated, a recurrent pattern of

identification arises which rests on the re-

ciprocal definitions given the lodged selves.Once identification has been established, it

ceases to become problematic. The resf)ectiveselves now offer their own vocabularies and



92 4 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

grounds for identification. In this way moti-vation becomes an interactional process sub-ject to finely graded phases. The self and itsinterpretations are grounded in interaction,and as selves become lodged, the styles of,and reasons for, interaction become ritualizedand subject to the firm rules of tradition andcustom.

This conception suggests that human in-teraction may not be as rational and cogni-tively directed as some theories suggest. Ifpersons return to those quarters and settingswhere crucial aspects of the self have beenlodged, then their actions cease to be di-rected entirely on either the most rational ormost effective grounds. Self-lodging mayplace a wedge between the most economicalor rational selection of a goal. The wedgerests on the affective bond between the selfand its relevant others, and this bond canjustify actions grounded in custom, love,hate, jealousy, or profound respect.

Empirical indicators of self-lodging includevariations on personal names, styles ofspeech, modes of dress, and the use of spe-cial gestures and body movements. Names(Hughes, 1952:130-144; Stone, 1962: 86-118) provide convenient clues to the degreeof knowledge and involvement each personhas with the other. As naming moves fromformal titles to variations on either the title,or the first name, greater self-lodging maybe inferred. This is similarly the case withvariations on speech, dress, and gesturing.E^ch person develops his own style which be-lies an attempt to lodge certain portions ofthe self in the interaction. Another indicatorof self-lodging is the degree of involvement,often time- or topic-wise in conversation. Tothe extent that any encounter represents ver-bal communication, each person's involve-ment in the conversation can be charted bythe frequency of utterances. In this sensedominating or contributing to a conversationbecomes akin to lodging a portion of the selfin that interaction. As an additional hypothe-sis, I suggest that persons judge interactionsto be satisfactory or unsatisfactory in termsof their success at self-lodging. If valued por-tions of the self are not lodged, recognized,and reciprocated, a dissatisfaction concerningthat encounter is likely to be sensed.

It must be noted that joint actions cannotbe resolved solely into individual lines of

action. When persons come together for thepurpose of accomplishing a task, exchanginga greeting, eating a meal, or making love, theobserved behavior involves more than theintention s an d meanings brou ght into thesituation. The term "interaction" suggests acentral feature of all joint actions—an emer-gent qu ality th at ma y no t ha ve existed be-fore the parties came together. The fittin'^togeth er of indiv idua l line s of action providesthe basic feature of the joint action. Indi-viduals fit lines of action together by identi-fying t he a ction they ar e going to engage in,and then by fitting these definitions aroundthe other's definitions and interpretations.Hence, the joint action becomes more thanth e m ere ju ggling of definitions— it is thefitting of disparate, conflicting, and oftenincomplete plans of action into a package of

meanings th at , at leas t for th e moment ofactivity, provide the basis of interaction.This feature of the joint action suggests thatinteraction ma y h ave a v ariable career. Ob-servers can not photograph the beginningphases of an encounter and assume thatagreements reached in that phase will remainunchange d until the end. T he career of ajoint action is contingent on the events thatoccur during its life time. While participantsm ay initia lly agree on definitions, rules ofconduct, and images of self, these definitionsmay be so vague as to permit conflictingpoints of view to later emerge to challengethe en tire basis of jo int act ion. On other oc-casions, joint actions may be interrupted aswhen a diild is brought into a marriage. Theentry of this new object demands renegotia-tion , reloc ation of selve s, and perhaps eventhe adoption of an entirely different perspec-tive so that joint action can continue.

A fundamental concern of the interaction-ist h as b een w ith the cond itions that giverise to new perspectives, new points of viewand new lines of ac tio n. A ny social world(M ead 192 7:7 5-8 5) is sustained by the for-m atio n of a per spec tive th at embodies thebasic forms of thinking and acting commonto that world. It was in the face of conflict,or the confrontation of divergent perspec-tives that Mead located change and creativeactivity. When an old perspective failed topro vide ans wers, n ew po ints of view wereseen as emerging. This simple point provideaM ead (1 91 7:5 3- 83 ) with his basic doctrine



S YMB OLIC INTER AC TIONIS M 925

for the scientific method. Unlike everydayman, who could be satisfied with faulty, in-

complete, and contradictory perspectives, the

scientist deliberately sought out conditions,events, and activities that challenged previ-ously accepted inte rpre tation s. In the dialec-tical process of confrontation, analysis and

resynthesis of perspectives. Mead lodged the

basic features of science.By placing emphasis on confiict and on

situations which demand new interpretation.Mead anticipa ted sub seque nt state me ntsconcerning the positive functions of confiict(e.g. Coser, 1956). He also offered a viewof social groups w hich stressed (T hra she r,1927) the functions of confiict in the forma-tion of self-conscious group perspectives.Mead hypothesized that unless collectivitiesmet with challenges, distinctive elements of

a group structure were unlikely to occur.An additional feature of the joint actionmust be noted. I suggest that all forms of

interaction rest on some combination of the

following rules: (1) civil-legal codes thatexist to protect the owners of objects, as wellas the objects; these would include laws pro-

hibiting violence to the self, or property, and

are commonly u pheld by sp>ecific authorities;(2) rules of etiquette, which exist to sustainthe ceremonious occasions of interaction

(Goffman, 1959, 1963); these rules find theirway into etiquette books and cover problemsof dress, introductio n, leave-ta king ritua ls,etc.; and (3) those rules which display the

distinctive na tu re of enduring social relation-ships; these are relational rules of conductwhich often derive from civil-legal, or politecodes, yet they serve to redefine and oftenmake irrelevant other presc ription s. Suchwould be the case for rules sanctioning loudor profane language among co-workers, op>en

states of undress among the married, andwhite collar thef t. Re latio na l ru les defineIJOW the self is to be presented, and displaythe forms that self-lodging is to take. Agree-ment touse nicknam es, to swear on occasion,fo steal behind an employer's back, or to

Ignore certain clothing rules indicates the

ways in which selves have moved beyond the

presentational phase into various degrees of

••eciprocal lodging. A complete interactionalstudy would include all three categories of

ûl and its central concern would be theto which persons actively construct

their own meanings for taken-for-grantedstandards of conduct. The distinctive natureof many social relationships is representedin their relational rules which m ake prob lem-atic events other collectivities assume, and

take for granted rules that other's argue over.

The Methodological Assumptions of

Interactionism

Because human interaction involves be-

havior of both the covert and overt variety,and because the meanings attached to ob-

jects often change during an encounter, the

interactionist endeavors to relate covertsymbolic behavior with overt patterns of

interaction. This additionally demands a

concern for the unfolding meaning objectsassume during an interactional sequence.

The usual strategy is to work from overtbehaviors (Mead, 1934:1-8) back to the

meaning attached to those behaviors and

objects. This feature of interactionist meth-odology suggests that behavioral analysesalone (see for example Webb, et al., 1966)

are insufficient to establish valid explana-tions of human conduct. Similarly, an analy-sis of the meanings, or definitions held by

a set of persons and carried into a real or

proposed interaction will not supply the

needed link between those S3rmbols andinteraction. Thus, our first methodologicalprinciple asserts that covert and overt formsof conduct must be examined before an

investigation is complete. Because this prin-ciple suggests that meaning shifts duringinteraction, a basic problem for research is

the identification of interpretational phases.Studies must be conducted which determineat which point during an encounter objectscease to be negotiated.

A second principle focuses on the selfas an object and a process. The investigatoris directed to examine behavior from the

perspective of those being studied, and he

must indicate the shifting meanings and

statuses assigned the self. At certain timesthe self ceases to be a negotiated object,assumes an agreed upon iheaning, and inter-action then turns to other concerns. Thismay be observed in many ritual encoimterswhere the basic activity lies above the self,

or in the interaction process. Social games,routine work, and even participation in a



926 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

religious ceremony represent such occasions.By making the self a central object of study,analysis can quickly establish what is takenfor granted and what is problematic for therespective interactants. A conunitment tothis principle permits the researcher to es-cap)e the fallacy of objectivism which is thesubstitution of the scientist's perspective forthose studied.

Taking the role of the acting other leadsto a third principle. Th e researcher m ust linkhis subjects' symbols and meanings to thesocial circles and relationships that furnishthose perspectives. Unless meanings arelinked to larger social perspectives, analysisremains largely psychological. This suggestsa two-step process for any study; meaningsat both the individual and interactionallevels must be examined.

A fourth methodological principle directsresearchers to consider the "situated aspe cts"of human conduct. If behavior occurs withinsocial situations and if the meaning attachedto those situations infiuences subsequent be-havior, then the situation becomes a dimen-sion of analysis. Four components of thesituation may be distinguished: the inter-actants as objects, the concrete setting, themeanings brought into the situation and thetime taken for the interaction. Variations

in behavior can arise from definitions giventhe respective selves, the other objects thatconstitute the situation (e.g. furniture, light-ing), the meanings and definitions for actionthat are held before interaction occurs, andthe temporal sequencing of action.

The situation as an intrusive variable can-not be ignored. The entry of alien others,the failure of mechanical equipment (Grossand Stone, 1963), or shifts in levels of mu-tual involvement, all relate to interaction

as a situated process. In this way concretesituations become both places for inter-action and objects of negotiation. It is im-possible to separate the two from situationalanalysis.

Because the interaction process is charac-terized by both stability and change, a fifthprinciple demands that research strategies becapable of refiecting both aspects of grouplife. Research methods can be judged bytheir ability to yield both kinds of informa-

tion. Because of the interaction between theobserver and his environment, we mention

pare nthe tically tha t th e act of making ob-servations becomes symbolic and subject topersonal bias and even ideological prefer-ence.

For the interactionist the preferred con-cepts ar e sensitizing. Th is does n ot mean thatoperationalization is avoided—it merely sug-gests that the point of operationalization isdelayed until Uie situated meaning of con-cepts are discovered. At this point standardmethods of observation can be employed. An-oth er featur e of this proc ess is the use ofmultiple methods of observation. Commonlytermed triangulation, (Webb, et. al., 1966)this directs the researcher to utilize differenttools in the observational process. This strat-egy assum es tha t no single method can ad-equately treat all the problems of discoveryand verification. Each method has restric-tions , and if several different methods arecombined in the same study, the restrictionsof one are often the strength of another.

The triangulation process assumes the fol-lowing elements: a series of common databases; a reliable sampling model that recog-nizes interaction; a series of empirical indi-cato rs for each d at a ba se ; a series ofhypK)theses; and a continual reciprocationbetween data and hypotheses.

A final m ethodo logical princip le relates to

theory. Formal theory (Simmel, 1950) is acomm on goal of inte rac tion ist research. Al-though historically, or situationally, specificprop ositions a re recognized, propositions withthe greatest universal relevance are sought.This assumes that human affairs, whereverthey occur, rest on the same interactionalprocesses. Formal theory, in this sense, ex-tends Merton's view of middle-range theoryto a position that calls for soundly groundedempirical propositions of an all-ipclusive,

universal nature. (See Glaser and Strauss,1967). Properly speaking, the interactionisthas not achieved this goal; interactionism re-

mains a perspective or conceptual frameworkand is not a theory in the strict meaning of

the term.

ETHNOMETHODOLOGY

/ T he ethn om ethod olog ist directs attention

V to the question of how a social order is poss'-

i b l e . Fo r G arfinkel (19 67 ) the answer mergea Durkheimian concern for large coUectiv



S Y MBO LI C I N TERA CTI O N I S M 92 7

representations with a n interactio nist concep-tion of the rules, norms, and meanings thatmembers of any sodal order daily take forgranted.

These rules, which any bonafide memberof a sodal order is aware of, include the fol-lowing assump tions: (1 ) interaction flows ina temporal sequence and statem ents in a ny

encounter cannot be understood without ref-erence to the actual flow of ev en ts; (2 ) per -sons in any situ ation will talk abo ut ma nythings that are only tacitly recognized, ifat all; ( 3) n orm al backgrou nd affairs a ndconditions in any situation are taken forgranted and typically go unchallenged duringan encounter; (4 ) once a situation is defined,this definition h olds for th e dur atio n of theencounter; (5) any object present in thesituation is what it is presented as being;

(6) the meanings given an object on oneoccasion will hold for future occasions, sug-gesting that definitions of one set of inter-actants will be the same as those any otherperson or persons would develop were theyin the same situatio n; (7 ) inte racta ntsidentify and attach meaning to objects bythe use of s tand ard te rm s, S5mibols andlabels; (8) while persons base theirdefinitions of situations on their own bi-ographies and past experiences, any discrep-

ancies th at w ould arise in a n encounterbecause of variations in biography or ex-perience are held in abeyance. In short, sit-uations are defined through the process ofinteraction; therefore, persons will often feela degree of conflict betirfeen their public andprivate def initions. ' »A basic interest of the ethnomethodologist

has been the penetration of normal situationsof interaction to uncover these taken forgranted rules. This is typically phrased in

terms of how one could disru pt norm al sod alevents so th at an y perso n's concep tion of thenormal, real, and the ord ina ry would bechallenged. In Garfinkel's stu dies (196 7:54 )ê common strateg y has been to designquasi-experimental field studies in whichwee conditions are created. First, the situa-OD is structured so th at the subject studied' ould not in ter pret it a s a g am e, an experi-l nt, a deception, or a play. Second, the s ub-ject is given insufficient tim e to recon stru ct

^ situation in his own term s. Th ird , he is've no aid in forging new defin itions .

At several points Garfinkel reports experi-ments which meet the above three conditions.On one occasion students were asked to playas boarders in their own homes; on another,they were told to overpay and underpay forobjects purchased in a store; in one experi-men t medical students were given d iscrepantinformation regarding an application for

medical school; and in another study stu-dents were told to violate the usual rules oftick-tack-toe.

In all of these studies, which Garfinkel in-sists are only exploratory and illustrative, itwas found tiiat persons who act as "every-day experimenters" find it difficult to chal-lenge the routine rules of interaction. Feel-ings of distrust, hostility, anger, frustration,and persecution were reported by his studentexperimenters. The focus of interaction was

soon lost when the "experimenter" attitudewas assumed, and for all practical purposesthe students were unable to carry on normalinteraction. Garfinkel explains this inabilitywith the concept of trust, which he definesas one's assumption that all others he en-counters will share the same expectations anddefinitions of the situation and that the otherperson will act on the basis of these assump-tions, even in problematic situations.

This concept suggests that when one or

more interactants are forced to distrust theother, the normal background features of thesituation suddenly become problematic, andthe organization of joint action soon col-lapses. These experiments represent small-scale studies concerning the basis of collec-tive behavior. They also offer data on theinterpretational phases of encounters.

Another broad concern of the ethno-methodologist has been with the routineproductions of persons in social organiza-

tions. The basic h3^thesis guiding thesestudies, which have ranged from analyses ofmental health clinics, to hospitals, policedepartments, juvenile courts, and suiddeprevention centers, is that members of anysocial organization develop a sp>edal per-spective for handling their clients. It isargued that the perspectives of any givenorga nizatio n will be sufficiently differentfrom any similar organization to make com-parisons between such agencies problematic.

Ethnomethodological studies have sug-gested that (1) organizations perpetuate



92 8 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

themselves through time by generatingfictitious records; (2) comparable organiza-tions differ in the meanings they assignto the same events (e.g. birth, death, mentalillness, cured, etc.); (3) the production oforganizational records is basically an inter-actional process based on ru mo r, gossip, over-

heard conversations, discrepant informationand biographically imperfect bookkeeping.Cicourel (19 68 ), for example, noted tha tagencies created to process juvenile delin-quency routinely produced delinquents bypiecing together long series of conversationsbetween the predelinquent, his parents, thearresting officer, the counselor, and the judge.The sum total of these conversations, trans-lated into official reports, represented theorganizational documentation that a delin-quent act had or had not occurred. And (4)in piecing together these organizational re-ports it was found that members routinelyrelied on open-ended categories to classifycases. W ha t Garfinkel (1 967 : 73-75 ) callsthe "et cetera clause" refers to this tendencyof p>ersons to fit events into a pattern thatcomplements their on-going action.

It is important to note that these studiesamplify the research of interactionists on thelabeling process. Becker (1963) has sug-gested that deviance does not reside in social

acts, but must be traced to definitions thatarise during interaction. Cicourel's researchsuggests that deviance may be as much or-ganizational as interactional in nature andmust be related to the working perspectivesof members of social control agencies. Gar-finkel's studies propose that disruptions ofeveryday perspectives can create feelings ofdistrust which become translated into deviantlabels.

In several senses the ethnomethodologist

has merged the interactionist's concern withdeviance with the study of social organiza-tion and social relationships. Their studiescross-cut the analysis of civil-legal, politeinteractional and relational rules.

These studies suggest an additional pointof convergence. Traditionally, interaction-ists have employed a conception of the or-ganization that stresses the interpretationsgiven to positions in a division of labor work,noting that the key to an organization lies in

its informal structure. This has led to the

propo sition (H ug hes , 1956) th at besideevery task division of labor rests a moralhierarchy of positions which dictate how per-

sons are to relate. A typical interactioniststu dy of social o rgan ization begins with theformal str uc tur e an d then de tails how moraland ideological variations transform that

stru ctu re into a going conc ern of social re-lationships (e.g., Strauss, et al., 1964). Thiscomplements the ethnomethodologist's strat-egy but suggests that the formal structurecannot be ignored.

Per hap s the most imp ortan t claim of theethno me thodo logist is the s tatem en t that theprod uc tion s of th e soc iologist are similar tothose in e ver yda y life. Th is echoes the con-cern of Mead and others for distinguishingscientific from everyday activities.

T he ethno me thodo logist's argument in-volves the following points. First, all sociolo-gists ar e (or should b e) concerned with de-picting the taken-for-granted affairs of actorsin any social order. The sociologist will findthat he is forced to make decisions regardingthe rela tions hip betwee n his concepts andhis observations. In making these decisions,he will no te t h a t unc lassifiable instances ap-pea r, th at coding sch emes become too nar-row, that statistical tests are inappropriate,or th at obs erva tions bea r li ttle, if any, re-

lationship to central concepts and hypoth-eses. In the p roce ss of decid ing when anobservation fits or does not fit a conceptualcategory Garfinkel (1967:78-79) suggeststhe sociologist make use (even if uncon-scious ly) of the doc um enta ry method ofanalysis. In applying this method it will befound th a t a ny ins tan ce of classifying anobservation rests on the earlier discussed as-sum ptions of d aily inter actio n. That is,events will be placed in a temporal sequence,

certain statements will be ignored, and com-mon voc abula ries will be assumed. If themethod of d a ta collection res ts on inter-views, it is argu ed th at the researcher mustgive att en tion to t he intera ction that occursbetwe en himself an d the responde nt. In thisconte xt G arfinkel (19 67 ) a nd Cicour '(196 7) sugg est th a t wh ile it is commonl)assunxed that interviewers and respondentsachieve a "rapport" during the interview,thi s hyp othe sis is pr oble ma tic. D ata gat êred via interview s an d questionnaires a



SYM BO LIC IN T E R A C T IO N IS M 929

viewed by the ethnomethodologist as col-

laborative products created by the sociolo-gist and his subject. To understand suchproductions demands a knowledge of the

routine meanings held by subjects.At the heart of the ethnomethodologist's

position lie a series of assumptions takenfrom Schutz (1963). For Schutz there ex-

isted an impenetrable barrier between thescientific and the everyday conceptions of

reality. The fundamental conflict betweenscientific and everyday conceptions arose,Schutz argued , ( 19 63 :32 5-3 26 ) from the

fact that the scientist could never fully, com-

pletely, and accurately enter into the "hereand now" world of everyday man. The an-

swer was to construct rational models of

action that actors in everyday life wouldnever fully live up to. Schutz 's (1963:340-

341) everyday actor becomes a rational con-struct manipulated by the sociologist.

The adoption of these assumptions can be

seen in recent statements by Garfinkel and

Cicourel. At several points Garfinkel (1967:262-283) elaborates the differences betweenscientific and everyday rationalities. On

other occasions Garfinkel and Cicourel de-

liberately construct models of everydayman which rest on a social game perspective.This model is one attempt to construct a

series of rationalities that would permit the

analysis of everyday action.

CRITICISM OF BOTH P ERS P ECTIVES

Before offering a synthesis of these per-

spectives, a review of their problematic fea-

tures is necessary. Interactionism has beencriticized on meUiodological and theoreticalgrounds.

Theoretically, critics have challenged the

metaphorical basis of the drama turgical viewwWch they suggest is alien to the interactionprocess because it gives man an unattractivemotivational commitment—that is, to ever^ support for a presented self. On othergrounds it has been suggested Jh at interac-^ j e so vague on the self as a concept

empirical observations cannot be

& S . Indeed, interactionists are vague"iemselves on the causal status of this con-

and Kuhn (1964:6 1-84) has identified

nine different variants within the per-spective on this dimension.

This criticism refiects a general dissatisfac-tion with the perspective because it offers too

few concrete hypotheses. Compounded withthis issue is the nature of interactionist re-

search. This problem was raised earlier and

possible strategies for improving such re-

search were suggested.Some have suggested that interactionisnT

offers an excellent view of social relationshipsand social groups but fails to adequately;'treat larger forms of sodal organization. In

my judgment this criticism is largely mis-

placed because it ignores the long line of

research on the sodology of work and organ-izational settings stimulated by Hughes. Sim-

ilarly, the study of collective behavior withininteractionism offers a perspective for the

analysis of mass society (e.g., Blumer, 1957;

Klapp, 1964; Couch, 1968).

Ethnomethodology has been criticized forits phenomenological bias which on occasionhas restricted its practitioners from treatingthe relationship between individual defini-tions and larger social units (Coleman, 1968:

128). Others have suggested that the per-"

spective does not suitably treat the role of

the self in interaction and some have notedthat there is no clear demonstration of how

taken-for-granted assumptions operate in

daily interactions (e.g., Swanson, 1968:

122-124) . The failure of the ethnomethodol-ogist to precisely indicate the nature of the

documentary method has also raised criti-cisms (Coleman, 1968; Hill and Crittendon,1968).

Collectively I would yiticize both perspec-»tives for their failure to clearly indicate the

source of meanings and definitions. In adcff-

tion, they as yet offer no firm strategies for

measuring the interaction process. In defenseof each, I would suggest that they offer a

view of human conduct that recognizes the

complex role of interaction in shaping activ-ity. They point to important distinctionsbetween the interpretative and noninterpreta-tive elements of conduct, and Garfinkel'sstudies offer experimental strategies for iuz

ture research. The persistent treatment of

scientific and everyday activity within bothframeworks offers a fresh perspective on the

sociology of knowledge, and this is especiallythe case with Garfinkel's analysis of scien-tific rationalities.




A VIEW OF SOCIAL ORGA NIZATION

A N D T H E I N T E R A C T I O N P R O C E S S:A PROPOSE D SYNT HE SI S

If face-to-face interaction is characterizedby shifting modalities of interpretation, thena major p>oint of convergence between ethno-

methodology and interactionism is the treat-ment of the meanings given to social objects.

The Interpretational Process

This suggests several hypotheses concern-ing the movement of objects from interpre-tative to non-interpretative roles. The firstsuggests that any event challenging normalinterpretation creates pressures to bring thatevent into the flow of interaction. When anobject is taken out of its non-interpretative

status and held up for consideration, frus-tration and groping will be observed at a rateproportionate to the importance assignedthe object. Thus some objects can be quicklysettled upK>n if the y o ccupy a re lative ly lowposition in the interaction. T his would be thecase with breakdowns in mechanical equip-ment at sociable gatherings; they can eitherbe replaced with other objects, or ignored.

A second hypothesis suggests that the fun-damental objects for any interaction in-

volve those that must be negotiated over.In short, taken-for-granted objects will notaccount for the complete variance in be-havior. Those objects which are accordedexplicit interpretative status will significantlydetermine the flow of events. On the otherhand, taken-for-granted objects cannot beignored, and I would hypothesize that ob-jects in this class receive earliest attentionin any encounter. Once their meaning canbe taken-for-granted, they cease to operate

as problematic elements.The nature of the interaction process is

such that a complete a priori classificationof objects cannot be given. Earlier I sug-gested that the self represents the most sig-nificant object for interpretation. To thisshould be added the meanings brought intothe situation and perhaps the situation aswell; although the situation, in a concretesense, is likely to contain the greatest pro-portion of non-problematic objects.

The problem of meaning still remainsvague in both F>erspectives. As a point of

self-repo rts me asured in term s of the pec tations for action th at are brought ithe interac tions (e.g., M cH ugh , 1968). Flowing G arfinkel, such expecta tion s woinclude assumptions concerning who wasing to be present, the length of time tospent, the types of selves one was going

present, the degree of knowledge held abothe occasion , and th e ty pes of objects twere going to be encountered. Once the intaction begins, overt activities could be linkto the shifts in meaning that the participawere constructing as they interacted.

In this way interaction could be measurby the frequency of joined actions. Temergent effect of interaction would be rresented by the frequency of disrupted plaof action; that is, how frequently parti

pants had to alter plans of action brouginto t he enc oun ter. In ter ac tio ns could thbe e xam ined in t erm s of their emergent quities. Those that flowed basically along nint erp reta tiv e lines would be judged emergent, and so on.

Deviance, the Labeling Process and Ag

of Social Control

Because interactionism and ethnometho

ology have focused on the deviance and labing process, an ad ditiona l series of hypothecan be offered. If Garfinkel's conceptiontrust is redefined to specify those situatiowh ere two or mo re ac tors assume that other will abide by decisions mutually agreup on , the n v iola tion s of t ru st become vitions of these agr eem ent s. E xamples woinclude entrusting another with a dark secabout the self, withholding salient informtion from outsiders, or simply continuing

interact along consensual lines. Breakdowin jo int actio n could be p arti ally tracedbreakdo wn s in the trust-ta king attitude would be vividly displayed in the betraprocess t ha t cha ract erizes interactions tween normals and persons defined as mtally ill (e.g., Sampson, Messinger and To(1962 :88-96) .

A first hypothesis emerges: continuedlations of trust create strains in the relatioship w hich culm inate in att ribu tion s of d

ance directed toward the trust-violator, ^suggests that only certain breakdowns m



SYM BOL I C I NT E RACT I ONI SM 931

lead to a greater proportion of deviant labelsthan would violations of polite-interactionaland dvil-legal codes. Thu s a failure to a bideby rules of deference an d d em ean or, refusals

to act in terms of an agreed upon division oflabor, or leakin g of cruc ial info rma tion tooutsiders would represent significant con-

cerns around which tru st w ould have to besustained.If the labeling process is raised to the or-

ganizational level, the readiness of memberswithin social control agendes to validate adeviant label would vary by their perceptionof the degree of trust-violation attr ibu ted tothe potential devian t. Th at is, the e xtent to

which the m emb er of a social relati ons hipcan validate a claim of trust -vio latio n in-creases the readiness of members of social

control agencies to accept and process thepotential deviant. This hypothesis must beconditioned by the fact that social controlagencies con tinu ally m onitor the ir dev ian tpopulations in terms of the ability of thosepopulations to meet perceived organizational

needs. As Cicourel (1968) indicates, thismonitoring process serves collective organ-

izational needs as well as the concerns ofindividual members. When these concernsconverge with the a ttr ibu tio ns of dev iance

among mem bers of so da l relation ships,greater rates of labeling would be expected,suggesting that members of social controlagencies may turn away valid instances ofdeviance simply because they do not meetthe needs of the orga niza tion. On the oth erhand, deviants ma y be c reated by such a gen-cies when valid attributions of deviance are

not given within the social rela tion ship. T hi swould be especially so when members of thesocial rela tion ship ar e in conflict w ith th e

social control agency. Current examples in-clude police mon itoring of gh etto are as , andNice enforcement of drug abuse laws amongcollege you th. In these instance s the labelin gprocess becomes a p olit ica l and ideological

issue with members of social control agenciesresponding more to political demands than tosocially validated instances of deviance.

Relationships, Socialization and theof Interaction

Returning the discussion to sodal relation-

flicting definitions of the salient objects intheir environment. If a wife persists in di-

recting interaction around objects which ahusband regards as taken-for-granted, con-sensus may soon collapse and joint actionbecomes problematic. A sense of dissatisfac-tion with the interactional partner may be

created which soon eventuates in reciprocalalienation; this in turn produces a situationof deviance attribution. The outcome may bedivorce.

Another area of mutual concern is the lan-

guage of interaction. It appears that at leasttwo languages, one silent, and one vocal,characterize the interaction process. On thesilent level, rules regarding body spacing,gesturing, the control of body noises, andaromas, and the ordering of words can be

observed (Sommer, 1968). These often re-main unstated, and represent the "back-ground expectancy set" of the interactants.

On the vocal level, prescriptions concern-ing proper address, naming, tone of voice,

and choice of vocabulary are observable.These represent the overt aspects of interac-tion and their expression displays the salientfeatures of the silent dialogue (Goffman,1963).

If interaction involves both languages,

then ethnomethodology and interactionismprovide a perspective for analyzing the con-tingencies of face-to-face encounters. An im-portant line of investigation becomes theproblem of socialization. How are persons

taught rules that are seldom vocalized? Howare sanctions brought to bear upon perceivedviolations of the silent language? At whatpoint in the socialization process are childrenassumed to be responsible for their silentbehaviors?

These questions are cross-cut by a particu -lar image of socialization. Contrary to sometheories which regard socialization as a dis-continuous learning process into well-defined

roles, ethnomethodology and symbolic inter-actionism suggest that socialization is never-ending, and often involves more of what isnot said than what is stated (e.g., Olesenand Whittaker, 1968; and Clausen 1968:130-181). Socialization thus represents anubiquitous feature of all interactions—the

apprehension of another's perspective sothat joint action can occur. Indeed, if in-




the role-taking process. If success at jointaction is measured by the ability of personsto fit lines of action together, then this suc-cess represents the quality of the ongoingsocialization process.

The Study of Social Organization

Because both perspectives provide a sim-ilar view of the interaction and socializationprocess, they offer a powerful strategy fororganizational analysis. The following pointscan be indicated. First, organizations becometerritories of interaction that are focusedaround complex spoken and unsp)oken lan-guages. These languages represent the salientorganizational concerns, often work-related,and they offer prescriptions for action thatfrequently run counter to formally statedorganizational goals. Each organizationalrole position can be seen as having its ownspecial language, both silent and vocal. Thislanguage will communicate special socializa-tion strategies which are daily tested andreafi&rmed through interaction. These lan-guages will tend to cluster within, and in-deed give focus to, special social orders thatexist hand-in-hand with other social orders.The organization is then conceived in termsof competing perspectives and social orders,each of which rests on its own language. Thesum of these languages represents the or-ganization's collective perspective. The sumof the social or moral orders becomes thebehavioral representation of the organization.

In this way organizations are broken downinto interactional units, each of which offer

sf>ecial ways of thinking and acting. It be-comes difficult to speak of one organization,or one organizational perspective. An organ-ization represents a multitude of shifting andcompeting languages and social orders: asocial order that is held together, if at all,by a few very salient symbols such as univer-sity X, or mental hospital Y. The name ofthe organization perhaps represents the onlysalient symbol all participants would agree

upon.

duct and the development of sociolomethodology. The scientist is judged bability to challenge accepted perspectivthat is by his ability to be self-consciinte rpre tativ e. De velop m ents in scienflect growth stimulated by this challen

stance. In this way Mead partially apa ted Th om as K uh n' s notion of thedigm model of scientific developmeequal importance was Mead's ability to rate the rationalities of scientific cofrom the per spe ctive s of everyday po int mo re fully elaborated by Garfinhis analysis of the forms of rationality see Blumer, 1931). A hyp>othesis whichslightly coun ter to th e M erton ian an

sonian image of scientific behavior em(Kaplan, 1964:855-857). Scientific cois so imbued with elements from everlife that unless the scientist self-conscidirects his activity in terms of the nodiscovery, his behavior is unfavojudged. The norms of the scientific intion parallel those of other enterprises,notably art, theology, and philosophy (Sson, 1968:123). Consequently, Me(195 7) four norm s of universalism , conism, disinterestedness and organized skcism are not unique to science.

In th is way M ead and Garfinkeoi)ened the way for a more open discouthe value-free problem. It is now impoto view science as other than a value-enterprise— a positio n sim ilarly reachGouldner (1 962 ) and Becker (19 67).be no oth er way if the assu mp tion thence as a human enterprise is granted.

sequently, the scientific norms of rationwh ich include (1 ) official n eu tra lity the meaning of ob ject s; (2 ) an irrelefor the real w or ld; (3 ) an indifferechronological time; (4) perfect commutio n: (5 ) sta nd ards of publicity , nCHins that are imperfectly realized (Sson , 19 68 : 12 3) . Th is is the thrust ofinkel's crit iqu e of m od em sociolog

^•^sociologist's belief in a perfect system

tionalities has led him further away froworld of socia l ev en ts. The sociolog



SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 933

own conduct—most notably his inability

make sound observations, to reliably code

documents, to conduct face-to-face interviews

and so on. ^The thrust of ethnomethodology and inter-

actionism becomes clear—the sociologist can

never ignore the interactional features of hisown conduct. Interactionis m and ethnometh-odology offer some recipes for correctiveaction. They may be stated as hypotheses.

If the sdentific observer is subject to in-]

teractional demands, and hence less thanjperfect as a recorder of social events, then I

multiple observers and multiple methods,}which overcome one another's restrictive bi-|

ases, become the most valid and reliable/

strategies of observation. This suggests that:;i^,Pfi ^n thff

principle will vield data that are more reli-able and valid than an investigation that is

not soTased. ^ "

Because the scientist brings unique inter-pretations to bear up)on his own conduct, a

major source of variance in any investigationbecomes the nature of these interpretations.Specifically, this predicts that two experi-

menters, for example, will produce differentfindings to the extent that they conceivetheir role differently (see Friedman, 1967).This would also hold for interviewers, coders,and unobtrusive observers.

Third, the interaction process between an

observer and a subject must be examined for

its effect on the data. Whenever interactionis emergent, observational encoun ters becomenoncomparable ev en ts for purposes of collec-

tive analysis. If an encounter proceeds alongtaken-for granted lines, which is a measureof the degree of nonemergence, similar ob-

servational encounters could be pooled for

collective analysis. This proposition directsinvestigators to record carefully the nature0 the interaction process with a spedal eye

to events that they judge to be unique withineach encounter.

Additional hypotheses could be offered,

out space res trict s their elabo ration. Thebasic point is that both interactionism and

logical principles of symbolic interactionismdiscussed earlier. The documentary method,as a strategy of pointing to empirical in-

stances of theoretical concepts, can be easilymerged with the use of analytic induction,sensitizing concepts, the method of role tak-

ing, and the strategies of linking individualperspectives with larger sodal units.

Similarly, Garfinkel's use of the quasi-experiment in natural field settings can be-

come a model for more rigorous studies of

face-to-face encounters. This is especially so

if recent findings on experimenter effect and

subject perceptions are incorporated into the

experimental design (e.g., Friedman, 1967).

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