Democratization Theory and Nontransitions: Insights from Cuba

Democratization Theory and Nontransitions Insights from Cuba

Darren Hawkins

Comparative Politics Vol 33 No 4 (Jul 2001) pp 441-461

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Democratization Theory and Nontransitions

Insights from Cuba

DarrenHawkins

Theories of democratization have focused on successful transitions to democracy without considering cases of stable authoritarian rule The opposite of a transition to democracy is not a transition to authoritarianism but rather the absence of a democ- ratic transition To help sort through the seemingly endless variables that are said to promote a democratic transition scholars should examine cases of stable authoritari- anism Good research design and logic require that scholars examine all outcomes on the dependent variable regime stability as well as regime change In other words countries that have undergone a transition to democracy should be compared with each other but also with countries that have not experienced such a transition

An examination of Cuba the clearest example of sustained authoritarian rule in Latin America leads to the conclusion that agent-oriented theories of democratiza- tion perform better than those that focus on structural factors Recent scholarly analyses have focused on structural pressures such as socioeconomic development economic crisis and a favorable international environment as primary causes of democratization Cuba however demonstrates that these pressures even when they act collectively are not sufficient to produce regime change The presence of strong structural forces and absence of democratization cast significant doubt on their explanatory ability At best structural factors operate only under certain conditions at worst they are irrelevant and can not distinguish between transitions and nontran-sitions

The absence of key democratizing agents inside Cuba-independent social groups and softline regime factions--seems to be a decisive factor in Cubas non- transition It is of course difficult to conclude from analysis of a single country that a causal relationship exists between the absence of democratizing agents and the absence of democratization Yet if this analysis is combined with others that show that softliners and opposition groups produce democracy it can offer important sup- port for agent-oriented hypotheses because it can help distinguish nontransitions from transitions

The absence of democratizing actors in Cuba raises important questions not addressed in studies of democratization Why d o some countries develop autonomous social groups and softline regime factions while others do not Democratization theorists have been content to show how social groups and softlin- ers produce democracy without asking how these groups evolve in the first place

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Two factors explain the absence of key democratizing actors in Cuba wily leader- ship strategies and effective repression and political norms that endow the regime with minimal levels of legitimacy These two factors are not necessarily specific to Cuba and could form the basis for new hypotheses about the absence of democratiz- ing actors in other countries

Although scholars of democratization have belatedly begun to realize the need to examine nontransitions few have conducted research and major theoretical state- ments still routinely exclude insights from them By the same token Cuban special- ists have identified some of the same obstacles to democracy that I examine here but they have not attempted to apply their findings to the broader theoretical debates about democratization The variables involved in this study are well-known to democratization theorists and many of the empirical claims are well-known to Cuban specialists What is novel is the attempt to apply democratization theories to a nontransition case and to incorporate the findings in the theoretical framework Rather than produce new hypotheses on democratization this article helps sort through existing hypotheses by examining an important case of nontransition Cuba should not be viewed as a special case that is incomparable with other cases of non- transition Three factors widely associated with democratization-socioeconomic development economic crisis and a favorable international structure-have been present in Cuba yet have failed to produce a transition However key democratizing agents are absent and their absence accounts for Cubas nontransition

Democratization Theory and Negative Cases

As democracy has proliferated around the world so have explanations of democratic transition Many theorists offer long lists of independent variables but make little attempt to relate them to one another Diamond Linz and Lipset began with forty- nine theoretical propositions which they consolidated into ten theoretical dimen- sions that affect democratic transition Viewed in aggregate democratization theo- ry resembles an inchoate shopping list of variables and complex propositions3 To be sure some authors are more parsimonious and selective and a few have even pro- duced theories that try to explain different democratization processes by relying on one or two major independent variables These more parsimonious analyses howev- er tend to highlight one or two discrete variables that fit into the broad categories offered by Diamond Linz and Lipset without rejecting other variables4

The shopping list approach arises in part from theorists failure to consider nega- tive cases of democratic transition Most democratization theories have been built on successfU1 cases a problem that has been noticed only recently Not one of the well- known wide-ranging reviews of studies of democratization prior to 1995 highlighted the problem of nontransitions5 That year Schneider noted that focusing on the simi-

Darren Hawkins

larities [among democratic countries] poses analytic problems because the lack of variation on the dependent variable can inhibit theory building If the outcome (democracy) is the same in a variety of cases then in the absence of explicit method- ological strategies such as a comparison of most different cases it is usually difficult to reject competing explanations6 At its most basic level the dependent variable in democratization theory has two possible outcomes a transition to democracy and ongoing authoritarian rule Just as theorists of war or revolution must study periods of peace or nonrevolution democratization theorists should also examine nontransitions

Yet major theoretical statements continue to ignore them For example a special issue of Comparative Politics on democratization theory in April 1997 contained several articles based on comparative case studies that focused almost exclusively on successful transitions To be sure Diamond Linz and Lipsets original study included Mexico Chile Indonesia and Nigeria all authoritarian at the time of publication However they deliberately excluded countries with no prior democratic or semidemocratic experi- ence or no prospect of a democratic opening (leading them to exclude eastern European countries that shortly thereafter became democratic)g Further their theoreti- cal discussion remained tightly focused on transitions to democracy and tended to exclude stable authoritarianism In his empirical chapter on Mexico for example Levy argued that many factors commonly associated with good prospects for democracy have been present in Mexico without promoting that resultg Yet Diamond Linz and Lipset failed to incorporate these anomalous results into their theoretical discussion

Some scholars have argued that the lack of variation in the dependent variable is not a fatal flaw and that something can still be learned10 Their argument has merit scholars have undoubtedly learned much from large comparative projects focusing on successful transitions However even those who defend a short-term lack of vari- ation recognize the benefits of variation in the long run As Collier and Mahoney concede by not utilizing the comparative perspective provided by the examination of contrasting cases the researcher forfeits a lot in analytic leverage In general it is productive to build contrasts into the research design li The time is long overdue to factor negative cases into democratization theory

Although Cuba is only a single case its regime has survived over a long time the rise and fall of many forces hypothesized to cause democratic transitions It there- fore offers scholars the opportunity to observe different values of the independent variables over time12 Comparison of Cuba and other long-lasting authoritarian regimes to democratizing countries can determine which factors distinguish transi- tions from nontransitions

Cuba in Comparative Context

Cuba offers an intriguing case of unchanging political institutions set in the midst of

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strong pressures for change In the last decade alone Cuba has survived increasing US threats and hostile actions the regional spread of democracy and democratic norms the disappearance of key international allies economic collapse widespread popular discontent and the rebirth of some independent associational life Many observers-journalists politicians activists-have forecast the collapse of the Cuban regime at least since the end of the cold war yet Cuban political institutions persist with amazingly few changes13

In contrast to the pronouncements of US politicians and Cuban-American lead- ers most scholars do not foresee a Cuban transition to democracy in the short to medium term14 Indeed even in the early 1990s when Cuba was at the height of its worst economic crisis since the revolution many scholars were predicting Castros political survival15 Which democratization variables present in Cuba have failed to produce a transition to democracy Conversely which factors absent from Cuba might have effected a transition

We must first reject the argument that Cuba is fundamentally incomparable to other countries a special case with unique forces Although Cuba undoubtedly dif- fers from other countries in important ways its distinctiveness should not be over- drawn16 Like Cuba other authoritarian regimes including Vietnam Yugoslavia North Korea China and some republics in the former Soviet Union survived the global collapse of Communism by drawing on either revolutionary legitimacy or nationalism Cuba also shares much in common with Latin America including Spanish colonization a history of US intervention a traditionally unstable political system economic underdevelopment reliance on one or two major nonindustrial exports similar levels of per capita GDP and a mixed-race population With eastern Europe Cuba shares weak civil societies relatively high levels of social development (for example high literacy rates) moderate levels of economic inequality a history of Communist rule past Soviet influence and a history of state-led industrialization

Of course Cuba like all countries has important characteristics that distinguish it in marked ways They include geographical isolation from ideologically and politi- cally similar countries a relatively recent popular revolution very high levels of repression and a charismatic leader The key question is whether these features should reasonably exclude Cuba as a comparative test case for democratization theo- ry Democratization theorists themselves do not exclude countries with high values on these variables from their theoretical claims Diamond Linz and Lipset for example make no effort to claim that countries with a history of popular revolution will be impervious to the forces of democratization Huntington does not claim that the third wave of democratization has bypassed countries with charismatic leaders The value of studying countries like Cuba lies precisely in the chance to sort the unique from the systematic and to gauge the relative validity of systematic claims by determining their accuracy despite a states uniqueness

Some might object that democratization theory was developed with authoritarian

Durren Huwkin~

regimes in mind and that Cuba a totalitarian regime falls outside its explanatory scope However Cuba in the post-cold-war era resembles an authoritarian more than a totalitarian regime especially in light of economic reforms18 The state has lost its complete control over society and the economy thus rendering Cuba similar (in regime type though not in ideology) to Latin American authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s Moreover leading democratization theorists have not hesitated to apply their theories to totalitarian regimes with only minor concessions to differ- ences in regime typeI9 Linz and Stepan for example have drawn on their earlier theories to produce a unified set of variables that tries to explain democratic transi- tions in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe as well as in southern Europe and the southern cone of Latin America In their view regime type helps determine the transitions path but does not influence whether a transition will occur

Cuban specialists have produced high quality studies but have generally failed to engage the broader theoretical debates about regime transitions20 A few scholars have compared Cuba to socialist countries in eastern Europe using an inductive comparative method to tease out factors that make Cuba different2 However they have not used their findings to modify support or cast doubt on the broader theo- ries The time is ripe for comparativists to consider Cuba and for Cuban specialists to engage explicitly broader theoretical debates

Structural Pressures and Democratizing Actors

The first prominent theories of democratization in the mid to late 1980s focused heavily on elite choice as the cause of regime change22 In response to criticisms more recent analyses have turned to changing economic and social structures as principal causes of democratization23 Cuba however presents important difficulties for structural variables it suggests that scholars too quickly abandoned their earlier emphasis on voluntarism Despite socioeconomic development economic crisis and a favorable international environment-all structural pressures associated with democratization-Cuba remains stubbornly authoritarian At the same time Cuba lacks key actors--softliners and independent social groups-that have opted for democracy in a variety of other countries

Socioeconomic Development A wide range of scholars hypothesizes that socioe- conomic development produces democracy This argument has endured for at least forty years2Wot surprisingly Diamond Linz and Lipset give some of their strongest support to this idea Overwhelmingly the weight of the evidence confirms a strong positive relationship between democracy and socioeconomic development and that this relationship is causal in at least one direction higher levels of develop-

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ment generate a significantly higher probability of democracy and of stable democ- racy25 The difficulty lies in specifying the causal chain that leads from develop- ment to democracy Huntington identifies five factors that increase as a result of development and that in turn produce democracy civic culture literacy rates resources for distribution and accommodation international influence and a middle class26 Diamond Linz and Lipset emphasize that economic development produces higher levels of social equality and improved living standards which in turn increase demands for democracy

If economic development produces democracy by reducing social inequalities and increasing literacy then Cuba is a stunning anomaly Cubas postrevolutionary achievements in socioeconomic development are well-known though they have eroded in recent years27 In 1990 the Human Development Index (HDI) ranked Cuba thirty-eighth in the world well ahead of other Latin American democratizers like Brazil (fiftieth) Ecuador (fifty-fifth) and Peru (fifty-sixth)s Cubas education sys- tem has high levels of enrollment and low student-teacher ratios and produces high literacy rates29 Further life expectancy in Cuba ranked first in Latin America from 1970 to 1991 and second (behind Costa Rica) after 199230 Although reliable data on social and economic equality is harder to come by it seems safe to say that Cuba has produced lower levels of inequality than most other Latin American countries Cubans enjoy widespread access to medical and educational systems and class dis- tinctions are less pronounced in Cuba than elsewhere in Latin America Cuba sug- gests that socioeconomic development does not automatically produce discontent and demands for political power among literate relatively equal citizens Development is not a sufficient cause of democracy perhaps because educated equal and well-off citizens are more politically agnostic than theories of social development suggest This argument echoes recent critiques of the democratic devel- opment thesis and provides supporting case study evidence As Przeworski and Limongi have shown economic development does not necessarily breed democracy and in fact any transition to democracy is independent of a countrys level of eco- nomic development31

Economic Crisis Huntington makes the concise common-sense argument that moderate levels of socioeconomic development combined with short-term economic decline have created the economic formula most favorable to the transition from authoritarian to democratic government32 In countries with moderate per capita incomes where people expect to continue to improve their lives economic recession creates the political unrest necessary to induce democratic change Examples might include Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s and Mexico in the 1990s

The hypothesis of economic decline fails in the Cuban case The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of subsidies to Cuba caused immense econom-

Darren Hawkins

ic suffering and induced a deep recession The gross domestic product fell between 35 percent and 48 percent from 1989 to 1993 real salaries dropped by 50 percent and as much as a third of the labor force was unemployed4 These macroeconomic figures can not describe the suffering of the Cuban people in the mid 1990s they often lacked everyday necessities such as adequate food electricity oil-powered transportation and prescription drugs Although Cuba has now passed through the most difficult part of the recession and is again enjoying some economic growth recovery has been slow and painful35 Of course the effects of economic crisis have not affected all social sectors equally The theoretical reasoning in this hypothesis does not require elite collapse from economic depression but rather political protest from middle and lower classes and dissension among the privileged sectors

Cuba demonstrates that economic shock is not a sufficient cause of regime change A glance at other transitions suggests that economic decline is not even a necessary cause36 Haggard and Kaufmans survey of twenty-one countries found that only eight regime transitions (either to or from democracy) were associated with economic recession37 They conclude that economic shocks can help initiate regime transitions but only when other mediating factors are present Further economic shocks do not determine whether the regime transition will be toward democracy or will simply substitute one authoritarian regime for another

International Factors Early analyses of democratic transitions downplayed the importance of international factors38 Conventional wisdom suggested that regime transition was essentially a domestic process with international forces acting at the margin Over time however analysts began to see regional patterns of regime transi- tion suggesting that some international forces were at work Pressure from the United States and Europe transnational human rights and democracy groups demonstration effects the collapse of regional hegemons and regional economic crises have been identified as some of the international factors that induce democrat- ic change

Most if not all of these forces are at work in Cuba39 Of course international pressures are not as strong as they could be and have posed a serious problem only in the past decade Until 1990 the Soviet Union sustained Cubas economy and a wide variety of leftist regimes worldwide openly admired Castros Cuba In recent years Cuba has successfully attracted some foreign investment and has found some new trading partners although it still has a long way to go in its efforts to link itself more closely to the global e~onorny~O Castro still wins some praise and respect from for- eign leaders and although his repressive policies are often condemned he is clearly not a pariah like Pinochet

At the same time Cuba faces stronger international problems than many other authoritarian regimes The United States of course has threatened Cuba for the past four decades through its trade and financial embargoes its endless propaganda and

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its attempts to isolate Cuba diplomatically These threats increased in intensity at the end of the cold war because Cuba lost its largest source of financial support and its key trading partners Although the US embargo did not singlehandedly cause Cubas economic difficulties in the 1990s it certainly exacerbated them and likely prevented a more rapid recovery Rather than ease pressure on a state that had lost its Communist allies the United States increased the level of threat by cutting off trade from foreign subsidiaries of US corporations by seeking to fund domestic opposi- tion groups and by penalizing companies in third countries that invest in Cuba Although other states refuse to follow the US lead they only partially mitigate the effects of the embargo because Cuba has relatively little to offer in terms of trade and investment opportunities

Normatively Cuba faced stronger condemnation after 199 1 than during the cold war European and Latin American countries despite their position of engaging Cuba economically have condemned the authoritarian regime for its human rights abuses and have used diplomatic methods to promote change Western hemisphere countries have issued formal statements that enshrine democracy as the only permis- sible regime type in the Americas Further they have excluded Cuba---on grounds of its authoritarian political system-from the most important hemispheric diplomatic activities such as the 1994 and 1998 Summits of the Americas and ongoing activi- ties in the Organization of American States Vigorous international nongovernmental groups have ensured that Cuban human rights abuses remain in the international spotlight and received a large boost from the popes January 1998 visit Since that visit Cuba has regained some international prestige through Castros tireless interna- tional travels and wide international visibility but most European and Latin American governments continue to press in public and in private their normative dis- approval of Cubas domestic politics In recent years even previously supportive states like Mexico and Spain have pressured Castro for change International human rights norms have strengthened and become more widely adopted especially in the Americas creating strong social pressures for change

None of these factors has produced a notable impact on Cubas political system and some may have even strengthened it As Dominguez has eloquently argued self- determination (sovereignty) is Castros only remaining achievement and is tightly bound up in Cubans identities41 For many Cubans to oppose Fidel meant to oppose national sovereignty which is the revolutions central legacy to oppose national sovereignty was to deny the very meaning of their lives42 Further the embargo enables Castro to blame the United States for domestic economic problems and to rally the population behind him to face a common enemy Cuba suggests that international pressures either have no effect at all on regime change or are mediated by other conditions capable of blunting their impact

The failure of these three structural pressures is even more puzzling because in theory they should reinforce one another Cubas economic crisis amplifies the

Darren I-a~kins

power differential with the United States and should make Cuba more vulnerable to international pressure International pressures in turn should exacerbate the eco- nomic crisis by cutting off a crucial source of investment and trade By the same token well-educated Cubans who have benefited from socioeconomic development should be interested in appealing to strong international human rights norms espe- cially in times of economic crisis when they have little voice in the government Finally economic problems that threaten to unravel Cubas social achievements should motivate Cubans who have benefited from social progress to take up political opposition Yet in practice structural pressures have not reinforced one another

Softliners In contrast to structural theories ODonnell and Schmitter have argued that no democratic transition is possible in the absence of schisms within the authori- tarian regime One of the most important divisions in authoritarian regimes is the split between softliners and hardliners43 Softliners do not necessarily believe in the principle of democratic elections but they realize that such elections are an essential feature of modern political life Strategically they believe that the best way to pre- serve the authoritarian regime in the long run is to implement a gradual process of political liberalization that can be controlled from above through new political insti- tutions In this way the regime can mollify international and moderate domestic crit- ics and avoid the risk of strong widespread opposition

The best available evidence suggests that softliners are essentially absent from the upper reaches of the Cuban regime or at least that they have little opportunity to voice their opinions44 A close reading of public pronouncements of top Cuban lead- ers reveals an absence of reform ideas and a profound silence on questions of Cubas political future45 The last high-ranking official to speak publicly in ways that sug- gested softline thinking was Carlos Aldana a politburo member who spoke favor- ably of hlikhail Gorbachevs brand of reform Communism in 1990-91 and who even suggested that dissidents might participate in parliamentary elections4h In December 199 1 however Aldana issued a rnea culpa and harshly attacked the dissi- dents His about-face did not save him he was removed from office nine months later and disappeared from view

The lack of a softline faction may also be seen in the 1996 crackdown on Cuban social scientists In the early 1990s Cuban social scientists-many of them affiliated with the Centro de Estudios sobre America (CEA)-began adopting a classic soft- line position on the need to make Cubas political institutions more participatory and democraticJ7 Their arguments caught the attention of the Cuban regime which clamped down on them In March 1996 the political bureau of the Cuban Communist Party issued a report that implied that CEA scholars were fifth-colum- nists counterrevolutionaries and imperialist pawns4Vhe regime subsequently harassed the CEA scholars into silence dispersed them to a variety of academic institutions and installed a hardliner at the helm of the CEA After this punishing

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crackdown on scholars who do not hold high level political positions it is difficult to imagine that any regime official would express softliner views even if some may secretly hold them

Social Groups In contrast to ODonnell and Schmitters focus on elites other scholars have argued that independent social groups are essential to democratic tran- sitions Although softliners may initially create small openings opposition groups must push those openings toward democracy50 Like softliners independent social groups are largely absent from Cuba Associational life in Cuba is remarkably shal- low weak and state-controlled although it is becoming less so over time51 Before 1990 only a very small number of social groups and minimal economic activity existed beyond state control In the first half of the 1990s the growth of nongovern- mental organizations was explosive 2200 of them existed by 199452 Most of them however had very small memberships and many were not entirely nongovern- mental but rather were front groups under government control53

Cuban civil society is quite weak in comparison to other countries undergoing democratic transitions and the state easily silences organized groups that stray too far into opposition54 Close observers estimate that the number of independent human rights groups actually fell fiom about 250 in 1995 to about half that number in 199855 Each of these groups has only two to four members the largest consisting of perhaps ten to fifteen members Although some Cuban dissidents have survived state repression and have benefited from international ties their resources are scarce to nonexistent and none has political influence56 It is important not to overstate the evidence an independent civil society appears to be slowly emerging Neighbors who once spied on each other for the benefit of the government now look the other way at extensive black marketeering and inform each other of the presence of gov- ernment inspectors on their streets57 Nevertheless this slow process of building bonds outside the state is still in its early stages

The Catholic church is the largest and most important independent social actor that prefers some political change It is difficult to tell how strong its preferences are however because Cuban church leaders have pursued an accommodationist strategy with Castros regime58 Certainly the church has criticized crackdowns on dissidents but it has also failed to call for large-scale political institutional change In a May 1998 article in a Catholic magazine distributed in Cuba Havana archbish- op Cardinal Jaime Ortega said But it is true that some people hope to see the open- ing of Cuba to the world more clearly defined59 The Havana-based journalist reporting the news called this vague statement the strongest public words in months from church officials

When he visited Cuba in January 1998 the pope intended to spur national church leaders into action In the time since his visit however the churchs hierarchy has carefully limited its calls for change to relatively small issues of religious fieedom

Darren Hawkins

Two key demands for example are church access to state-run media and the reopen- ing of religious schools The regime has failed to act on either demand yet Cardinal Ortega has praised Castro for a new more open and flexible attitude for the future60 On issues of real importance to the regime the church has failed to back up its change-oriented preferences with actions The only US priest in Cuba for example was apparently forced to leave nearly a year before his visa expired due to his advocacy of change-oriented positions that the church failed to support61 To be sure the Cuban church is slowly building an autonomous institution that embodies values and thought hostile to Castros regime but it remains quite weak compared to churches in other countries during authoritarian periods

Explaining the Absence of Social Groups and Softliners

The absence of democratizing actors poses a puzzling question Why are they absent especially when they have been present in so many other countries62 Scholars have been content to show how softliners and social groups produce democracy without asking where they come from or why they exist Their absence from Cuba highlights an important blind spot in democratization theory

Two factors help account for the lack of prodemocracy actors in Cuba First wily leadership and effective repression prevent individuals both within and outside the regime from demanding change Second historical experience and normative tradi- tions offer the regime minimal levels of legitimacy and help prevent social groups from developing or demanding change

Leadership and legitimacy are not of course new variables They are used here however in ways that differ substantially from the standard approach While skilhl leadership can produce smooth transitions through negotiation and pacts63 it can also forestall democratic transitions by preventing regime splits and the emergence of oppo- sition actors While Przeworski has argued that the organization of alternatives not declining legitimacy produces regime change and therefore dismisses legitimacy as a useful concept64 Cuba suggests that political norms that grant legitimacy to the regime are relevant precisely because they help prevent the organization of alternatives

Leadership Few leaders have been as tenacious and defiant in the face of difficult conditions as Fidel Castro Since the late 1980s when Cuba encountered a series of econon~ic and political difficulties Castros personal role in regime governance has increased while government institutions have lost much of their prestige and effec- tiveness To a degree unparalleled since the regimes founding Fidel Castros per- sonal role is paramount66 Although his speech has slowed and his celebrated charisma has dwindled Castro remains the preeminent figure and central decision maker in Cuban politics

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In the face of severe pressures Castro has altered his political strategies and dis- course but not Cubas underlying political institutions In recent years he has repeat- edly refused to discuss political change in Cuba and has rarely even addressed the issue At the close of Canadian prime minister Jean Chretiens visit in April 1998 for example Castro dismissed a question about Canadas calls for political change in Cuba by curtly responding Change should begin with the United States67

Since the end of the cold war Castro has mingled idealistic rhetoric with pragmat- ic policies in ways that thwart regime opposition and sidestep demands for change68 First he has purged old rivals to his leadership and has elevated a younger genera- tion into positions of power in an apparent effort to secure their loyalty to him and to the system His purges have included dramatic moments like the 1989 execution of the popular and well-known war hero Arnaldo Ochoa and more mundane leadership shakeups through changes in the cabinet and the Communist Party hierarchy69 Second Castro has relied more heavily on nationalist rhetoric and antiimperialist resentment of the United States to shore up popular support at home in the face of sagging institutional capacity70 In the wake of Communisms global collapse Castro has distanced himself from the European sources of Marxism and has instead emphasized the indigenous roots of the Cuban revolution and socialist policies Castro and other leaders have stepped up their references to nationalist heroes from past decades especially the beloved nineteenth century liberator Jose Marti and have rallied Cubans around the flag in defiance of hardline US policies Third Castro has pursued repressive strategies that ease social pressures yet prevent politi- cal opposition from developing Most important he has increased tolerance for reli- gious activity and initiated limited market-oriented economic reforms while continu- ing to repress human rights groups and other dissidents71 The increased religious tolerance offers Cubans a way to engage in social activities outside the boundaries of but without posing a direct or immediate threat to the state Economic reforms provide the same type of benefits to the regime Cubas economic reforms have been largely pragmatic yielding as little state control as possible while nevertheless offer- ing Cubans an opportunity to pursue limited independent market activity that enables them to survive the economic crisis Neither small religious groups nor small-scale entrepreneurs engage in political activities-at least in the short term- that threaten the regime as human rights groups do

In brief Castro has mixed personnel changes repression and liberalization in ways that prevent the emergence of softline factions and strong independent social groups Machiavelli of course recognized that skilful leadership could sustain authoritarian rule but this insight has been missing in recent democratization theo- ries that associate good leadership with democratic governance72 Diamond Linz and Lipset for example focus on leaders who are loyal to democratic principles and who demonstrate political courage in the face of repression ODonnell and Schmitter argue that courageous opposition leaders who seek moderation and com-

promise are essential to successful democratic transitions Leadership however has many dimensions As Cuba demonstrates it can be used to sustain authoritarian rule as well as to undermine it

Legitimacy Historical experience and widespread normative beliefs also help pre- vent the emergence of strong social groups and softliners In a review of Latin American studies of Cuba Parker concludes that the capacity of [the] regime to survive undoubtedly owes much to the legitimacy it enjoyed at outset of [the] crisis and [the] willingness of most of the population to make the extraordinary sacrifices required4 Popular revolution gave birth to the Cuban regime and the intensity of public support for regime policies in the 1960s is well documented The legitimacy that the Cuban regime enjoyed in its first three decades is especially clear in compar- ison to socialist regimes in eastern E ~ r o p e ~ Castros legendary charisma and the popularity of the Cuban revolution offered the regime a degree of legitimacy missing in most other Communist countries From this perspective it is not surprising that Cuba survived the end of the cold war with its Communist government intact even though it was the socialist country most dependent on Soviet aid

As Cuba enters its fifth decade since the revolution does the regime still retain any legitimacy The answer to this question depends in part on what is meant by legitimacy Linz defined regime legitimacy in a minimalist fashion as the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established and that they therefore can demand obedi- ence6 In this view even widely criticized regimes with poor economic records possess legitimacy if citizens can not conceptualize a better alternative

Despite a decade of economic difficulty and the rise of a postrevolutionary gener- ation Cuba appears to meet this minimal standard of legitimacy Undoubtedly the regimes legitimacy has eroded markedly especially in comparison with its high point in the 1960s Yet on the whole Cubans still believe that their political institu- tions conform to their expectations or at least that they do so better than possible alternatives Although it is impossible to measure attitudes in Cuba directly evidence of normative support for the regime can be drawn from a variety of sources First the lack of protests even in the face of widespread economic crisis suggests that the regime might retain some legitimacy This evidence is of course problematic because the lack of protests may also be a result of an efficient repressive apparatus or the emigration of dissatisfied Cubans Second the relatively low levels of blank or spoiled ballots in secret direct elections suggest continuing regime legitimacy Relatedly a large number of Cubans heeded the regimes call to vote for a unified slate of candidates in the past two elections8 Third nonscientific polls and surveys show that Cubans continue to support basic socialist programs such as free medical care and education and subsidized food and transportati~n~

Comparative Politics July 2001

Further alternatives to Castros regime probably seem unappealing to many Cubans Few Cubans would like to see Miami exiles overrun the country or the United States reassert control and even fewer would wish for the country to disinte- grate into social chaos or civil war Liberal democratic political institutions are deeply tainted in Cuba due to their association with corruption underdevelopment and poor governance during their brief existence from 1940 to 195280 Socialist authoritarianism in contrast has produced social equality and a higher standard of living although both achievements have been undermined in the 1990s The Cuban regime constantly reinforces images of a miserable prerevolutionary life through the media and the educational system To the extent that Cubans believe the argument that the revolution has improved their lives-and there is evidence that a large num- ber does-they are less interested in demanding democracy81 The current economic social and political problems in Latin America and Russia certainly do not help per- suade Cubans of the virtue of democracy

Cubas historical experiences and the resulting political norms help prevent the emergence of independent social groups and a softline faction Softliners principal argument is that the regime should have a base of popular support demonstrated through the ballot box This argument makes sense in countries with more estab- lished traditions of electoral politics as in the southern cone Cubas political tradi- tions and norms however mitigate against such an argument Before 1959 elections in Cuba were not accurate measures of public support but rather corrupt exercises in self-promotion Castro has attempted to establish other norms of appropriate citizen participation including demonstrations rallies marches and meetings of the mass organizations Although Cuba holds elections state officials actively foster the idea that party competition campaigning and other trappings of bourgeois democracy are foreign to Cubas national spirit It is of course difficult to ascertain the extent to which Cubans accept these state-sponsored norms At the same time it seems safe to say that norms of electoral competition are weaker in Cuba than in authoritarian regimes that had more historical experience with democracy The absence of such norms makes it more difficult if not impossible for softliners to argue (as they did in southern cone countries) that electoral contestation will at some point be neces- sary to perpetuate regime legitimacy

Social groups also find it difficult to gain autonomy and a sizable membership base due to historical norms and widespread political understandings about the appropriate relationship between individuals and the state After four decades of socialism many Cubans expect the state to provide for their needs and thus see little use for independent social groups engaged in self-help The Cuban regime has used the educational system and the mass media to socialize Cubans to equate social independence with subversion and counterrevolution Castros famous 1970 dic- tum-within the revolution everything against the revolution nothingw-ably summarizes the conformist and collectivist norms that the state fosters in Cuban

Darren Hawkins

society82 For many Cubans to establish autonomous groups outside the revolution is to become a traitor to the homeland Very little cultural middle ground is available for those who wish to claim autonomy from both the revolution and from Cubas enemies Cuba thus differs from many other Latin American countries (for example Chile Brazil Uruguay and Argentina) where historical norms encouraged the for- mation of independent social groups even under authoritarian rule In Cuba norms of conformity and solidarity reinforce repression to prevent the emergence of strong independent social groups

Conclusions

Thus Cuba casts doubt on the role of economic crisis socioeconomic development and international pressures in transitions to democracy while offering evidence on the role of softliners and opposition groups It is particularly important because it offers an example that can test the ability of causal factors to distinguish between transitions and nontransitions

The most striking difference in Cuba when compared with democratizing coun- tries is the absence of softliners and independent social groups Why are they absent Leadership and legitimacy are key factors that prevent democratizing agents from developing Effective leadership is often associated with smooth transitions to democracy but Cuba demonstrates that it can also maintain authoritarian rule in the face of extreme pressure Similarly although some scholars argue that the construc- tion of regime alternatives is more important than the loss of legitimacy historically rooted political norms offer the Cuban regime some legitimacy while simultaneously preventing viable regime alternatives from developing

These findings have important implications for broader theoretical debates about the relationship between structure and agency in democratization processes Many scholars emphasize one set of variables (either structure or agency) while not deny- ing that the other plays a role In this vein Mainwaring has argued that the most important dividing line in contemporary work on democracy is between those who see it primarily as a result of propitious economic social or cultural conditions and those who see it primarily as a result of political institutions processes and leader- ship83

ODonnell and Schmitters early work represents the voluntarist end of the spec- trum due to its emphasis on elite choices and the fundamental metaphor of democra- tization as a multilevel chess game In this view elites can choose democracy in a wide variety of different social political and economic circumstances Others have criticized this approach for being atheoretical and for failing to consider the ways in which structures constrain choice As Remmer put it An emphasis on voluntarism results in a neglect of [other] levels analysis and thus to the discarding of the sub-

Comparative Politics July 2001

stance of theory as derived from the analysis of politics in the rest of the world Latin America ends up being portrayed as a region in which political choices are uncon- strained by social forces or public opinion g4

Of course entirely neglecting either structures or agents would be unwise However all variables are not equally important An essential task of social scientists is to distinguish those that carry relatively more weight Cuba provides important evidence for the strength of voluntarist variables It is difficult to escape the conclu- sion that Cubas failure to democratize is fundamentally the result of human choice Further Cuba is a critical case because it can help identifj which variables best dis- tinguish between transitions and nontransitions At the same time other case studies of nontransitons are necessary to have more confidence in these results At the least Cuba demonstrates that structural pressures are insufficient to produce democracy Scholars who emphasize structural variables must do more to specifj the conditions under which structural pressures produce change Otherwise their theories are left open to ad hoc reasoning and shaky claims about special cases

An alternative to weighing the relative importance of structures and agents is to place them in theoretical frameworks in which they explicitly interact Karl adopts this view when she argues that the decisions made by various actors respond to and are conditioned by the types of socioeconomic structures and political institutions already present These can be decisive in that they may either restrict or enhance the options available to different political actors attempting to construct [or obstruct] democracy5 This perspective does not excuse scholars from determining the rela- tive importance of various causal factors Rather it reframes the analytical question Which structures place the most constraints on agents and which agents are the most constrained or empowered by structures

Contrary to widespread expectations economic crisis socioeconomic develop- ment and the international environment place relatively few constraints on elite choices In fact they can facilitate authoritarian rule Castro has used all three to help build legitimacy justify repression and rally support These structural factors provide little help in understanding how elite choices are constrained and are so indeterminate that either democratization or continuing authoritarianism is possible in the hands of determined and creative leaders

Nevertheless all structural forces are not necessarily so indeterminate Cultural norms and historically chosen paths play key roles in constraining and enabling elite choices in Cuba State-fostered norms of conformity and solidarity with the revolu- tionary project undoubtedly facilitate Castros repression and contribute to the absence of strong opposition groups Castros historic role as leader of the revolution offers the regime an important degree of legitimacy which facilitates the choice for authoritarianism Castros decision to root out softliners at an early stage also facili- tates current strategic choices for unreformed authoritarianism

Darren Hawkins

The structural hypotheses examined in this article refer largely to material forces increasing standards of living economic crisis and international threats Yet the fac- tors blocking the emergence of softliners and independent social groups are less tan- gible widespread norms and path-dependent historic choices Regime type is not necessarily a product of the material world but is rather at root a social construc- tion As constructivist scholars in international relations argue shared understand- ings (for example social norms) help constitute actors and their identities and define the realm of possible actions Within this realm actors then choose their paths in ways that are not determined by material factors like wealth and power Although normative variables are more familiar to comparativists than to scholars of interna- tional relations they are sometimes inexplicably absent from democratization theory Scholars would do well to conceptualize more clearly the difference between materi- al and social structures and to devise ways to analyze their relative importance and modes of interaction

NOTES

For their helpful comments on this article I thank Tim Power Matt Marostica Dan Nielson Donna Lee Bowen members of the Tuesday Group of the Department of Political Science at Brigham Young University and the anonymous reviewers I presented an earlier version of this article at the Latin American Studies Association Congress in Chicago September 1998 The David M Kennedy Center for International Studies at Brigham Young University provided funding for research in Cuba and Nick Robins and the Cuban Studies Institute at Tulane University facilitated that research Michael Ploeger and Jon Theobald offered valuable research assistance

1 See Karen Remmer New Wine or Old Bottlenecks Comparative Politics 43 (July 1991) 479-95

2 Larry Diamond Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset eds Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder Lynne Rienner 1989) pp xv-xvi

3 Remmer p 485 4 Some theorists have focused on specific social groups for example Sonia E Alvarez

Engendering Democracy in Brazil Women $ Movements in Transition Politics (Princeton Princeton University Press 1992) Others look only at capitalist development for example Dietrich Rueschemeyer Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D Stephens Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1992) Diamond Linz and Lipset include both types of variables among their dimensions

5 Remmer Peter H Smith Crisis and Democracy in Latin America World Politics 43 (July 1991) 608-34 Doh Chull Shin On the Third Wave of Democratization A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research World Politics 47 (October 1994) 135--70 Nancy Bermeo Rethinking Regime Change Comparative Politics 22 (April 1990) 359-77 Terry Lynn Karl Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990) 1-21 Scott Mainwaring Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation Theoretical and Comparative Issues in Scott Mainwaring Guillermo ODonnell and J Samuel Valenzuela eds Issues in Democratic Consolidation The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press 1992) pp 294-341

Comparative Politics July 2001

6 Ben Ross Schneider Democratic Consolidations Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping Arguments Latin American Research Review 30 (1995) 229 See also Gary King Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba Designing Social Inquiry Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton Princeton University Press 1994) pp 129-32

7 Comparative Politics 29 (April 1997) 8 Diamond Linz and Lipset p xxii 9 Daniel C Levy Mexico Sustained Civilian Rule without Democracy in Diamond Linz and

Lipset eds p 459 10 David Collier and James Mahoney Insights and Pitfalls Selection Bias in Qualitative Research

World Politics 49 (1996) 56-91 11 Ibid p 74 12 King Keohane and Verba pp 2 17-24 13 An interesting collection of predictions of Castros demise is summarized in Clifford E Griffin

Cuba The Domino That Refuses to Fall Can Castro Survive the Special Period Caribbean Affairs 5 ( 1 992) 2 4 4 2

14 Marifeli Perez-Stable The Invisible Crisis The Exhaustion of Politics in 1990s Cuba in Miguel Angel Centeno and Mauric10 Font eds Toward a Yew Cuba Legacies of a Revolution (Boulder Lynne Rienner 1997) pp 25-38

15 See Griffin Donald E Schulz Can Castro Survive Journal oflnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 35 (1993) 89-1 17

16 Enrique A Baloyra Socialist Transitions and Prospects for Change in Cuba in Enrique A Baloyra and James A Morris eds Conflict and Change in Cuba (Albuquerque University of New Mexico Press 1993) pp 3 8 4 3

17 Samuel Huntington The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman University ofOklahoma Press 1991)

18 Jorge Dominguez Comienza una Transition hacia el Autoritarismo en Cuba Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana 617 (Autumn-Winter 1997) 7-23

19 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press 1996)

20 See for example Baloyra and Morris eds Centeno and Font eds Jorge F Perez-Lopez ed Cuba at a Crossroads Politics and Economics after the Fourth Pary Congress (Gainesville University Press of Florida 1994) and Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed Cuba after the Cold War (Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh Press 1993)

21 Ronald H Linden Analogies and the Loss of Community Cuba and East Europe in the 1990s and Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Horst Fabian Analogies between East European Socialist Regimes and Cuba Scenarios for the Future in Mesa-Lago ed

22 Guillermo ODonnell and Philippe C Schmitter Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press 1986) 23 See for example Bermeo Karl Schneider 24 See Linz and Stepan p 77 25 Larry Diamond Juan J Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset eds Politics in Developing Countries

2nd ed (Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers 1995) pp 21-22 26 Huntington pp 65--66 27 Susan Eva Eckstein Back from the Future Cuba under Castro (Princeton Princeton University

Press 1994) pp 1 2 8 4 8 28 See United Nations Development Program Human Development Report (New York United Nations

Development Program 1990) The HDI is a better measure of socioeconomic development than GDP because it accounts for social progress in medical care education and per capita income relative to cost-of- living It thus better captures the social development to which Huntington Diamond and others refer

Darren Hawkins

29 Even in 1995 after a few years of economic crisis Cubas adult literacy rate stood at 957 percent ranking third in Latin America behind Uruguay and Argentina See the tfuman Development Report (1998)

30 For data prior to 1990 see Eckstein p 226 For data in the 1990s see the annual HDI 31 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi Modernization Theories and Facts World Politics 49

(1997) 155-83 32 Huntington p 72 33 Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege Cuba after Communism (Cambridge Mass MIT Press 1992) 34 Jorge F Perez-Lopez The Cuban Economy in the Age of Hemispheric Integration Journal oj

Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 39 (1997) 3 4 8 Carmelo Mesa-Lago Cambio de Regimen o Cambios en el Regimen Aspectos Politicos y Economicos Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana 617 (1997) 3 6 4 3

35 By official figures Cubas economy grew 07 percent in 1994 25 percent in 1995 78 percent in 1996 25 percent in 1997 12 percent in 1998 and 62 percent in 1999 See Perez-Lopez Cuban Economy p 4 and Reuters Analysis Cuba Says Growth Vindicates Socialism Dec 21 1999 36 One large-n statistical study found that economic recessions had no effect on transitions from

authoritarianism to democracy although they did contribute to the breakdown of democratic regimes Mark J Gasiorowski Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change An Event History Analysis American Political Science Review 89 (1995) 882-97

37 Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy in Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman eds The Politics of Structural Adjustment (Princeton Princeton University Press 1992) pp 319-50

38 ODonnell and Schmitter pp 17-19 39 See Olga Nazario Overcoming Political Isolation and Responding to International Pressures

Cubas New Independent Foreign Policy Cuban Studies 26 (1996) 75-96 H Michael Erisman US- Cuban Relations Moving beyond the Cold War to the New International Order in Ransford W Palmer ed The Repositioning of US-Caribbean Relations in the New World Order (Westport Praeger 1997) Archibald R M Ritter and John M Kirk eds Cuba in the International System Normalization and Integration (New York St Martins Press 1995)

40 Perez-Lopez Cuban Economy 41 Jorge I Dominguez Cuba in the International Community in the 1990s in Tom Farer ed

Bej~ond Sovereignh Collectivelv Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press 1996) pp 297-31 5 42 Ibid p 298 43 ODonnell and Schmitter pp 1 6 19 44 Juan M del Aguila The Party the Fourth Congress and the Process of Counterreform in Perez-

Lopez ed pp 30-33 It is of course difficult but not impossible to diagnose the presence of softliners in an authoritarian regime because individual leaders are under strong pressure to preserve unanimity Nevertheless softliners in other countries have floated reform ideas or quietly changed government poli- cies within their area of responsibility in ways that make them identifiable

45 I base this assessment on a review of the Cuban press in recent years Although the Cuban media often fully reproduce the text of the speeches of Cubas top leaders observers search mostly in vain for hints of reform ideas The most important media sources are Granma Juventud Rebelde Trabajadores and Bohemia 46 Schulz pp 104-5 47 See Cuadernos de ~Vuestra Americcz vols 7-12 (1990-1995) and the essays by Cuban and US

scholars in Haroldo Dilla ed La Democracia en Cuba jfel Diferendo con 10s Estados Unidos (Havana Ediciones CEA 1995) 48 Maurizio Giuliano El Caso CEA Intelectuales e lnquisidores en Cuba (Miami Ediciones

Universal 1998)

Comparative Politics July 2001

49 Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Cuba Informe del Buro Politico In Granma Mar 27 1996 50 Mainwaring pp 3 0 W 51 Dominguez Transicion Jorge I Dominguez Leadership Strategies and Mass Support Cuban

Politics before and after the 1991 Communist Party Congress in Perez-Lopez eds pp 1-1 8 52 Gillian Gunn Cubas NGOs Government Puppets or Seeds of Civil Society Cuban Briefing

Paper No 7 (Washington DC Georgetown University 1995) 53 Ibid 54 See for example Amnesty International Cuba New Cases of Prisoners of Conscience and

Possible Prisoners of Conscience (New York Amnesty International 1998) and Government Crackdown on Dissent (New York Amnesty International 1996)

55 Telephone interview with Ricardo Bofill president of the Comite Cubano pro Derechos Humanos October 15 1998

56 Damian J Femandez Democracy and Human Rights The Case of Cuba in Ivelaw Griffith and Betty N Sedoc-Dahlberg eds Democracy and Human Rights in the Caribbean (Boulder Westview Press 1997) pp 97-1 12

57 Observations based on informal interviews with middle class Cubans at their homes in Havana June 1998

58 Shawn T Malone Conflict Coexistence and Cooperation Church-State Relations in Cuba Cuba Briefing Paper No 10 (Washington DC Georgetown University 1996)

59 Reuters May 13 1998 Catholic Church in Cuba Says New Freedoms Only Go So Far Also see the various documents on the Cuban Catholic churchs web site wwwnacuborg

60 Los Angeles Times Aug 3 1998 61 Reuters US Priest Ordered Out of Cuban Parishes He Says Apr 12 1998 62 Even in comparison to other Latin American authoritarian regimes Cuba is remarkably free of

political factions and internal political debate Of the South American authoritarian regimes Chile was the most centralized under one-man rule Yet softliners still emerged early in the regime made public pro- nouncements in favor of alternative political futures and gained important influence with President Augusto Pinochet See Arturo Valenzuela The Military in Power The Consolidation of One-man rule in Paul Drake and Ivan Jaksic eds The Struggle for Democracy in Chile 1982-1990 (Lincoln University of Nebraska Press 1991) pp 2 1-72

63 ODonnell and Schmitter pp 3 7 4 7 64 Adam Przeworski Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy in Guillermo

ODonnell Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead eds Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press 1986) pp 4 7 4 3

65 Dominguez Leadership Strategies 66 Ibid p l 67 Reported in Granma Apr 30 1998 68 Eckstein pp 96-1 19 69 See Andres Oppenheimer Castrok Final Hour The Secret Ston behind the Coming Downfall of

Communist Cuba (New York Simon and Schuster 1992) 70 Rhoda Rabkin Cuban Socialism Ideological Responses to the Era of Socialist Crisis Cuban

Studies 22 (1992) 27-50 71 See Fernandez Amnesty International Human Rights Watch Improvements without Reform (New

York Human Rights Watch 1995) 72 Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince (New York Cambridge University Press 1988) 73 ODonnell and Schmitter pp 24-2748-56 74 Dick Parker The Cuban Crisis and the Future of the Revolution A Latin American Perspective

Latin American Research Review 33 (1 998) 249

Darren Hawkins

75 Linden Mesa-Lago and Fabian 76 Juan Linz The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes Crisis Breakdown and Reequilibration

(Baltimore The Johns Hopkins University Press 1978) p 16 77 In the national elections of January 1998 9835 percent of eligible voters went to the polls and

only 5 percent of those voting spoiled their ballots or left them blank In 1993 7 percent of the ballots were blank or spoiled See Granma Jan 13 1998 Perez-Stable

78 In the January 1998 elections for example 94 percent of the valid votes were cast for the unified slate See GranmaJan 13 1998

79 Alejandro de la Fuente and Laurence Glasco Are Blacks Getting Out of Control Racial Attitudes Revolution and Political Transition in Cuba in Centeno and Font eds Jorge I Dominguez The Secrets of Castros Staying Power Foreign Affairs 72 (1993) 97-107 1 confirmed these reports through informal interviews of Havana residents in June 1998

80 Juan M del Aguila Cuba Dilemmas of a Revolution 3rd ed (Boulder Westvlew Press 1994) pp 27-30

81 De la Fuente and Glasco Dominguez Secrets Marifeli Perez-Stable We Are the Only Ones and There Is No Alternative Vanguard Party Politics in Cuba 1975-1991 in Baloyra and Morris eds Wayne S Smith Cubas Long Reform Foreign Affairs 75 (1996) 99-1 12

82 Fernindez pp 99-1 00 83 Mainwaring p 326 84 Remmer p 491 85 Karl p 6

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1 Review New Wine or Old Bottlenecks The Study of Latin American DemocracyReviewed Work(s)

Democracy in Developing Countries Volume 4 Latin America by Larry Diamond Juan J LinzSeymour Martin LipsetAuthoritarians and Democrats Regime Transition in Latin America by James M MalloyMitchell A SeligsonComparing New Democracies Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and theSouthern Cone by Enrique Baloyra

Karen L RemmerComparative Politics Vol 23 No 4 (Jul 1991) pp 479-495Stable URL

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3 Review New Wine or Old Bottlenecks The Study of Latin American DemocracyReviewed Work(s)

Democracy in Developing Countries Volume 4 Latin America by Larry Diamond Juan J LinzSeymour Martin LipsetAuthoritarians and Democrats Regime Transition in Latin America by James M MalloyMitchell A SeligsonComparing New Democracies Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and theSouthern Cone by Enrique Baloyra

Karen L RemmerComparative Politics Vol 23 No 4 (Jul 1991) pp 479-495Stable URL

httplinksjstororgsicisici=0010-41592819910729233A43C4793ANWOOBT3E20CO3B2-E

5 Review New Wine or Old Bottlenecks The Study of Latin American DemocracyReviewed Work(s)

Democracy in Developing Countries Volume 4 Latin America by Larry Diamond Juan J LinzSeymour Martin LipsetAuthoritarians and Democrats Regime Transition in Latin America by James M MalloyMitchell A SeligsonComparing New Democracies Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and theSouthern Cone by Enrique Baloyra

Karen L RemmerComparative Politics Vol 23 No 4 (Jul 1991) pp 479-495Stable URL

httplinksjstororgsicisici=0010-41592819910729233A43C4793ANWOOBT3E20CO3B2-E

5 Review On the Third Wave of Democratization A Synthesis and Evaluation of RecentTheory and ResearchDoh Chull ShinWorld Politics Vol 47 No 1 (Oct 1994) pp 135-170Stable URL

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5 Review Rethinking Regime ChangeReviewed Work(s)

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Southern Europe by Guillermo ODonnell Philipe CSchmitter Laurence WhiteheadTransitions from Authoritarian Rule Latin America by Guillermo ODonnell Philippe CSchmitter Laurence WhiteheadTransitions from Authoritarian Rule Comparative Perspectives by Guillermo ODonnellPhilippe C Schmitter Laurence WhiteheadTransitions from Authoritarian Rule Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies byGuillermo ODonnell Philippe C Schmitter

Nancy BermeoComparative Politics Vol 22 No 3 (Apr 1990) pp 359-377Stable URL

httplinksjstororgsicisici=0010-41592819900429223A33C3593ARRC3E20CO3B2-Y

5 Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin AmericaTerry Lynn KarlComparative Politics Vol 23 No 1 (Oct 1990) pp 1-21Stable URL

httplinksjstororgsicisici=0010-41592819901029233A13C13ADODILA3E20CO3B2-Z

6 Review Democratic Consolidations Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping ArgumentsReviewed Work(s)

Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe by John HigleyRichard GuntherThe Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century by Samuel P HuntingtonDemocracy and the Market Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and LatinAmerica by Adam PrzeworskiCapitalist Development and Democracy by Dietrich Rueschemeyer Evelyne Huber StephensJohn D Stephens

Ben Ross SchneiderLatin American Research Review Vol 30 No 2 (1995) pp 215-234Stable URL

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23 Review Rethinking Regime ChangeReviewed Work(s)

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Southern Europe by Guillermo ODonnell Philipe CSchmitter Laurence WhiteheadTransitions from Authoritarian Rule Latin America by Guillermo ODonnell Philippe CSchmitter Laurence WhiteheadTransitions from Authoritarian Rule Comparative Perspectives by Guillermo ODonnellPhilippe C Schmitter Laurence WhiteheadTransitions from Authoritarian Rule Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies byGuillermo ODonnell Philippe C Schmitter

Nancy BermeoComparative Politics Vol 22 No 3 (Apr 1990) pp 359-377Stable URL

httplinksjstororgsicisici=0010-41592819900429223A33C3593ARRC3E20CO3B2-Y

23 Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin AmericaTerry Lynn KarlComparative Politics Vol 23 No 1 (Oct 1990) pp 1-21Stable URL

httplinksjstororgsicisici=0010-41592819901029233A13C13ADODILA3E20CO3B2-Z

23 Review Democratic Consolidations Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping ArgumentsReviewed Work(s)

Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe by John HigleyRichard GuntherThe Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century by Samuel P HuntingtonDemocracy and the Market Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and LatinAmerica by Adam PrzeworskiCapitalist Development and Democracy by Dietrich Rueschemeyer Evelyne Huber StephensJohn D Stephens

Ben Ross SchneiderLatin American Research Review Vol 30 No 2 (1995) pp 215-234Stable URL

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36 Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change An Event History AnalysisMark J GasiorowskiThe American Political Science Review Vol 89 No 4 (Dec 1995) pp 882-897Stable URL

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74 Review The Cuban Crisis and the Future of the Revolution A Latin American PerspectiveReviewed Work(s)

Cuba la Restructuracion Economica Una Propuesta Para el Debate by Julio Carranza ValdesLuis Gutierrez Urdaneta Pedro Monreal GonzalezLa Democracia en Cuba y el Diferendo Con los Estados Unidos by Haroldo DillaCuba en Crisis Perspectivas Economicas y Politicas by Jorge Rodriguez BeruffCuba Apertura y Reforma Economica Perfil Para un Debate by Bert HoffmannCuba Despues de la Era Sovietica by Miguel Garcia Reyes Maria Guadalupe Lopez de LlergoCuba y el Caribe en la Posguerra Fria by Andres Serbin Joseph TulchinEmpresas Mixtas en Cuba by Robert Lessmann

Dick ParkerLatin American Research Review Vol 33 No 1 (1998) pp 239-256Stable URL

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84 Review New Wine or Old Bottlenecks The Study of Latin American DemocracyReviewed Work(s)

Democracy in Developing Countries Volume 4 Latin America by Larry Diamond Juan J LinzSeymour Martin LipsetAuthoritarians and Democrats Regime Transition in Latin America by James M MalloyMitchell A SeligsonComparing New Democracies Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and theSouthern Cone by Enrique Baloyra

Karen L RemmerComparative Politics Vol 23 No 4 (Jul 1991) pp 479-495Stable URL

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85 Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin AmericaTerry Lynn KarlComparative Politics Vol 23 No 1 (Oct 1990) pp 1-21Stable URL

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