, Horizon 2020 Societal challenge 5: Climate action, environment, resource efficiency and raw materials COP21 RIPPLES COP21: Results and Implications for Pathways and Policies for Low Emissions European Societies GA number: 730427, Funding type: RIA Deliverable number (relative in WP) D4.1 Deliverable name: Key concepts, core challenges and governance functions of international climate governance WP / WP number: WP4: Assessment of the adequacy of COP21 outcomes for effective international climate governance and the EU’s role Delivery due date: Project month 10 (30/09/2017) Actual date of submission: 29/09/2017 Dissemination level: public Lead beneficiary: IES-VUB Responsible scientist/administrator: Sebastian Oberthür Estimated effort (PM): 3 Contributor(s): Lukas Hermwille (WI), Gauri Khandekar (IES-VUB), Wolfgang Obergassel (WI), Tim Rayner (UEA), Tomas Wyns (IES-VUB), Florian Mersmann (WI), Damon Jones (CA), Bianca Kretschmer (CA), Mahlet Melkie (CA) Estimated effort contributor(s) (PM): 16.5 Internal reviewer: Tim Rayner (UEA)
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ThisdeliverablewillprovidethebasisforthefurtherworkunderWorkPackage4oftheproject. Inparticular,Task4.2willusetheframeworkdevelopedtoidentifygapsandopportunitieswithrespectto international climate governance in a sectoral perspective. The deliverable also provides usefulbackgroundfortheworkunderWorkPackages2and3oftheproject.Outsidetheproject,thedeliverablecouldbeusedandconsultedbythebroadcommunityofexpertsandpolicymakersinterestedintheinternationalgovernanceofclimatechange.Itprovidesabasisforidentifyingthechallenges,barriersandopportunitiesthatinternationalclimategovernancefacesandpresentsbytakingasectoralperspectiveandtherebyenablingamoretargetedapproachtoaddress-ingtheclimatechangechallengeinternationally.
3. ShortSummaryofresults(<250words)
Takingasectoralperspective,thisreport(1)identifiesthekeygovernancechallengesthatexistinter-nationallytowardsthedeeptransformationsrequiredforlow-carbonsocietiesand(2)specifiestheresultingkeygovernancefunctionstobefulfilledbymeansofinternationalcooperation(internationalinstitutions).Tothisend,thereportfirstclarifiesanumberofkeyconcepts, including international(climate)governance, internationalandtransnational institutions, institutionalcomplexesandpoly-centricity,andpresentsoursectoralperspective.Itthenderivesanumberoffunctionsthatinterna-tionalinstitutionscanfulfilfromtherelevanttheoreticalandconceptualliterature.Thisprovidesthebasisforaninvestigationintothekeygovernancechallengesandthepotentialofinternationalgov-ernancein14keysectoralsystems.Oursectoralapproachenablesasectorallydifferentiatedanddetailedanalysisofthevaryingdemandforinternationalinstitutions’performanceofgovernancefunctions.Thedemandfortheperformanceofmostgovernancefunctionsvariessignificantlyinaccordancewiththespecificconditionsandcir-cumstancesprevailingineachsystem.Incontrasttoanoverallaggregateperspectiveoninternationalclimategovernancethattreatsitasoneintegratedproblem,ouranalysisadvancestowardstakingintoaccountthemultifacetednatureofthischallengeinvariousrelevantsectorsandcontexts.Italsoleadsustorealisethatvarioussectoralsystemsneedtobefurtherdisaggregatedtogetagripontheunder-lyingproblemstructuresandrelateddemandsforinternationalgovernance;differentsectoralsystemsanddifferentpartsofsectoralsystemsrequireappropriatelyadaptedresponsesandcreatevaryingdemandsforinternationalgovernance.
1. IntroductionClimatechangeconstitutesalong-term,transformationalchallenge.Phasingoutgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsandadapting to theevolving impactsof climatechange requirea fundamental transfor-mationofoureconomiesandsocietiesataglobalscale.Thisglobaltransformationentailsasimulta-neousconversionanddeepchangeofvarioussectoralsystems,1includingenergy,industry,transport,housing,andagriculture,thatarekeytothefunctioningofoureconomiesandsocieties.Duetotheinertiaofthesocio-technicalsectoralsystemsinvolved,thenecessarytransformationimpliesalong-termtransition2overaperiodofseveraldecades.Theindividualstepstakeninthisprocesshenceneedtobealignedwiththelong-termtargetandvision.TheParisAgreementestablishessuchalong-termvisionofachievingclimateresilience,holdingglobal temperature increasetobelow2/1.5°CabovepreindustriallevelsandphasingoutGHGemission(Arts.2and4)(e.g.Scoonesetal.2015;Incropera2015;Bulkeley&Newell2015;Levinetal.2012).
Wegobeyondexistinganalysesbydisentanglingtheoverallissueintoseveralconstituentparts.Tra-ditionaltextbookanalysesofinternationalclimategovernancethatpresentclimatechangeasacol-lective-actionproblempronetofree-ridingatthelevelofstates(Barrett,2011;Keohane&Victor,2016;Luterbacher&Sprinz,2001)donotcommonlyreflectthatconditionsindifferentsectorsandsocietalsub-systemsdifferconsiderably.Aswillbe furthersubstantiatedbelow,energy-intensive industriesdifferstarklyfrominternationalfinanceandinvestmentorthebuildingssectorwhenitcomestobar-riers to decarbonisation and related opportunities. Such differences should be taken into accountwhenthinkingabouttheneedforandpotentialofinternationalcooperation.Andsuchamorediffer-entiatedanalysispromisesconsiderableinsightsintohowthe“complex”ofinternationalinstitutionsrelevantforthefightagainstclimatechangecouldandshouldbefurtherdeveloped.
Theapplicationofourframingofthegovernancefunctionsofinternationalinstitutionsinthesectoralanalysisenablesamoretargeted,differentiatedanddetailedanalysisofthevaryingdemandfortheperformanceofcertaingovernancefunctionsbyinternationalinstitutionsinspecificsectoralsystems.Whereasdemandforguidanceandsignalseemstobegenerallyhighacrosssectoralsystems,thescoreofother functionsvaries significantly inaccordancewith the specific conditionsandcircumstancesprevailingineachsystem.Ouranalysisthereforeadvancesfromanoverallaggregateperspectiveoninternationalclimategovernancethattreatsitasoneintegratedproblem,towardstakingintoaccountthemultifacetednatureofthischallengeinvariousrelevantsectorsandcontexts.Italsoleadsustorealisethatvarioussectoralsystemsneedtobefurtherdisaggregatedtogetagripontheunderlyingproblemstructuresandrelateddemandsforinternationalgovernance;differentpartsofthesectoralsystemsrequireappropriatelyadaptedresponsesandcreatevaryingdemandsforinternationalgov-ernance.
Governance can be understood as the steering of actions/behaviour through the setting of rules,standards,orotherkindsofguidelines,orthroughtargetedsupport(capacity-building,technicalassis-tanceorfinance)towardsanexplicitly“public”goal(Roger,Hale,&Andonova,2017,pp.5–6).Suchanunderstandingofgovernanceisgenericinthatitisnotlinkedtoanyparticulartypesofactors.Itdoesnotconstituteanoppositeto“government”,asgovernancemayemanatefromgovernmentsaswellasother formsof rule-setting,etc.Wewilluse the term“governance” in thisgeneric sense in thisreport.
Thebenchmarkof“adequacy”assuchencompassestwointerlinkedcriteria.Firstofall,internationalgovernanceoftheclimatetransitioncanbeconsideredadequateifitasfullyaspossibleexploitsthepotentialof thisgovernance level tocontribute toclimatemitigation, in linewith literatureon the“problem-solvingeffectiveness”ofinternationalinstitutions(e.g.Young1999;Stokke2012;Milesetal.2002).Thisrequiresamoredetailedanalysisofthepotentialcontributionofinternationalgovern-anceinindividualcasesandforparticularsub-problems,asappropriate.ItisworthnotingthatinthecontextoftheobjectivesoftheParisAgreement,problem-solvingeffectivenessshouldnotonlycoverthemitigationperspective(1.5/2°Cgoal),whichisourfocushere,butalsoadaptation(Art.2.1(b))andfinancialflowsconsistentwithlow-GHGandclimate-resilientdevelopment(Art.2.1(c)).Theachieve-mentofthe2/1.5°Cgoalisnotselectedasanappropriatebenchmark,sincethiswouldbetheresultoftheinteractionandcombinedcontributionsofdifferentlevelsofgovernance(andvariouselementsoperatingattheselevels).
Moreover,Article2.1oftheParisAgreementpositsthattheglobalresponsetoclimatechangehastobe strengthened “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty”. Ittherebyhighlightsthesecondaspectoftheadequacyofinternationalgovernance,namelythatitbeconsidered fair and socially acceptable. This requirement can partially be justified on normativegrounds,basedoncriteriaofgoodgovernance.Itcanalsobederivedfromtheeffectivenessobjectivesincegovernancearrangementsthatarenotconsideredfairandacceptablemaynotbestableandeffective.Moreover,internationalgovernancemayestablishorenshrinerelatednormativeprinciplesasis,forexample,thecasefortheprincipleofequityand“commonbutdifferentiatedresponsibilitiesandrespectivecapabilities(inthelightofdifferentnationalcircumstances)”(Art.3UNFCCCandArt.2ParisAgreement)intheclimateregime(cf.LukasHermwille,Obergassel,Ott,&Beuermann,2017).Thetwointerlinkedadequacycriteriawillespeciallycomeintoplayintheassessmentofexistinggov-ernancestructuresinTask4.2.
2.2 InternationalandTransnationalInstitutions
Internationalinstitutionscanbeunderstoodasnegotiated,dynamic,sectoralnormativesystemscon-sistingofrulesandpractices,includingdecision-makingprocedures,thatprescribebehaviouralroles,constrainactivityandshapeactorexpectations(Young1982;Young1989;Keohane1989;North1991;Simmons&Martin2002).Wefocusonnegotiated,purposefullycreatedinternationalinstitutionsbe-causeweareinterestedinthemasgovernanceinstruments.Wehenceexplicitlydonotincludewhathasbeencalled“spontaneousinstitutions”thatemergefromtheuncoordinatedbehaviourofactorsintheinternationalsystem(Young,1982).Suchnegotiatedinstitutionsusuallyhavetwoprincipalcom-ponents,namely(1)substantiverulesaddressingtheissueatstake(climatechange,worldtrade,etc.)and (2) procedural rules for making and implementing decisions, which may include develop-ment/changeofthesubstantiverules(Gehring,1994;Young,1980).Asmentioned,theycanbecon-sideredmainplatformsofinternationalgovernance.
Third,weincludeinouranalysistwotypesoftransnationalinstitutions/regimesthatfeaturenon-stateactorsastheirmembers:privatetransnationalinstitutionsfeatureonlynon-stateactorsastheirmem-bersandhybridtransnationalinstitutionshavebothnon-stateandstateactors/governmentsastheirmembers.Theemergenceandriseoftransnationalinstitutionsreflecttheemergenceandriseofnon-stateactorsininternationalpoliticsmoregenerally,includingfirms,civilsocietyorganisationsandlocalauthorities (cities,municipalities, regions). In climategovernance, transnational institutions includethegrowingnumberof“internationalcooperativeinitiatives”andtransnationalnetworks(suchasvar-iouscitynetworks,privatecertificationinitiatives,etc.)(Abbott,2012;Bulkeleyetal.,2014;Sanderink,Widerberg,Kristensen,&Pattberg,2017;Widerberg&Stripple,2016).
Inviewoftheproliferationofinternationalfora,coalitionsandnetworks,itseemsimportanttoclarifywhichofthesedoordonotqualifyasinternationalinstitutionsforthepurposesofourresearch.Asmentionedabove,weareinterestedininternationalgovernanceinstitutions.Assuch,theinstitutionsshouldconsistofidentifiablerulesandpractices(aimedataffectingbehaviour),becapableofcollec-tivedecision-makingandfulfilrelevantfunctionssuchasrule-setting,provisionsofmeansofimple-mentationorgenerationofknowledgeinpursuitofapublicgood(seealsosection3ongovernancefunctions).Soft-lawinstitutionssuchastheGroupofSeven(G7)orGroupofTwenty(G20)wouldap-peartobecoveredbysuchanunderstanding,whereaspureassociationsoffirms(suchastheInterna-tionalChamberofCommerce)wouldratherconstitutealobbythananinternationalgovernanceinsti-tution.Whileborderlinecaseswillcertainlyexist,thisunderstandingshouldenableustoavoidcon-fusing international coalitions and lobby groups with international governance institutions. Whilethereisnotnecessarilyaminimumrequirementregardingthefunctionstobefulfilled,itshouldbeusefultokeepinmindthegeneralrequirementofaconsequentialnormativecorethatformspartofthegeneraldefinitionofinstitutionsintroducedabove.
Researchoverthepasttwodecadesorsohasincreasinglyhighlightedthatinternationalgovernanceinstitutions do not operate in isolation but form so-called “institutional complexes” (Oberthür &SchramStokke,2011;Orsini,Morin,&Young,2013;Raustiala&Victor,2004).Aninstitutionalcomplexcaningeneralbeunderstoodasanetworkofthreeormoreinternationalinstitutionsthatrelatetoacommonsubjectmatter;exhibitoverlappingmembership;andgeneratesubstantive,normative,oroperativeinteractions(Orsinietal.,2013).Forexample,KeohaneandVictorhaveidentifiedaregimecomplexonclimatechangeincludingahostofprimarilyintergovernmentalfora(suchastheMontrealProtocoladdressingfluorinatedGHGs,variousminilateralforaandothers)(Keohane&Victor,2011).Suchinstitutionalcomplexesmayalsobesubdividedindifferentways,asvarioussubgroupsofinsti-tutionsmayaddressparticularsectorsorspecificgovernance functions(Oberthür&Justyna,2013;Orsinietal.,2013).
Howcouldanexistingorderordivisionoflabourininstitutionalcomplexesbesteeredorgoverned?Thepossibilityofsuchgovernanceisimmanentintheconceptsof“interplaymanagement”(Oberthür,2009)and“orchestration” (Abbott,Genschel,Snidal,&Zangl,2015).Accordingly, it is important torealisethatinstitutionalcomplexesandtheirstructuresresultfromcollectivedecision-makinginthevariouscomponentinstitutionsinthefirstplace.Hence,theycanalsobechangedandshapedthroughthecollectivedecision-makinginthevariousinstitutionsthatformthecomplex.Inaddition,onecouldconsidercollectivegovernanceofinstitutionalcomplexesthroughoverarchinginstitutionsand/orco-ordinationbetweenthecomponentinstitutions,whichhas,however,remainedtheexceptiontodate.Actionintheindividualinstitutionsthatmakeupaninstitutionalcomplexhasremainedthemajorformoftheirgovernance(Oberthür,2016).Insomecases,centralinstitutionsmayspecificallyperformanorchestratingfunctioninthisrespect.
Overall,thereisawiderangeofconceptsandtermsinuseinrelevantliteraturetorefertotherealitythat internationalgovernance invirtuallyall issueareasof internationalrelations, includingclimatechange, occurs through various fora and arrangements. Relevant catchwords include “institutionalfragmentation”,“governancearchitectures”andothers. Inthisproject,we interchangeablyemploy“institutionalcomplexes”or“governancelandscapes”asdenotingthisphenomenon.
Weunderstandsuchcomplex“sectoralsystems”asopensystems.Assuch,theyarenotstrictlysepa-ratedfromothersectoralsystems,butmayevenoverlapandbecloselyrelatedtothem.Definingthesystemboundaries foranalyticalpurposes is thereforenecessarilyarbitrarytosomeextentandre-quiresresearcherstomakeinformedchoices.Wethereforewishtoacknowledgethatalargenumberofoverlapping“sectoralsystems”couldprincipallybeidentified,alsobecausesystemsfrequentlycanbesubdividedintofurthersub-systems,dependingonthepreferencesandchoicesoftheanalyst.
Underthesecircumstances,itseemsparticularlywarrantedtoprovidefulltransparencyofthechoicesmadeand theguidingcriteria. In identifyingour sectoral systems,wepragmatically started fromanumberofestablished,widelyrecognisedsectordistinctions(asforexamplereflectedinreportingtotheUNFCCC,theEuropeanCommission,Eurostat,theUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgency,andsectordivisionsoftheIPCC).Wethenadaptedandcomplementedtheseinaccordancewithouraforemen-tionedconceptualisationofsectoralsystemsguidedbythefollowingconsiderations:(1)coverageofGHGemissions;(2)apragmaticpreferenceforlargersystems(soastokeepthenumberofsectoralsystemsmanageable);and(3)the inclusionofkeyemergingconceptsandfieldsofaction(seealsobelowsection4).
Theguidanceandsignalfunctionofinternationalinstitutionsderivesmainlyfromtheprinciplesandobjectivesonwhichtheyarecommonlybased(andhencefromthenormativedimensionofinterna-tionalinstitutions).Whilenotnecessarilyhighlightedininstitutionalandregimetheory,internationalinstitutionsareregularlyestablishedforaspecificpurpose(advancingfreetrade,protectinghumanrights,limitingclimatechange,etc.).Thispurposeiscommonlyvisiblefromprinciplesandobjectivesenshrinedintheunderlyingtreatyorstatutesand/orcanbefurtherdevelopedandspecifiedthroughsubsequentinstitutionaldecision-making.Accordingly,especiallytheobjectivescontainedintheParisAgreementhavebeenfoundtoentailstrongguidanceastheysignaltheresolveofgovernmentsacrossthe world to take far-reaching action on climate change (Bodansky, 2017; Falkner, 2016; LukasHermwilleetal.,2017;Morseletto,Biermann,&Pattberg,2016).
Thepotential,reachandsignificanceofthissignalfunctionofcontemporaryinternationalinstitutionsgoesmuchbeyondtherespectiveinternationalinstitutionperseandtheinternationallevelingeneral.Theprinciplesandobjectivesenshrined inan international institution firstof all reflect agreementamongitsmembersandestablishcollectiveexpectationsandacommitmenttothedevelopmentoftheinstitutionamongthesememberscooperatingattheinternationallevel.Withincreasedtranspar-encyandmeansofcommunicationaswellagrowingparticipationbyvariousnon-stateactorsinpro-cessesof internationalgovernanceover thepastdecades,suchagreementreachedwithin interna-tionalinstitutionscangenerateeffectsfarbeyondtheprocessofinternationalcooperationitself(evenshortofformalimplementingactivities).Itsignalstheresolveofgovernments(orothermembersofinternationalinstitutions)topursueacertaincourseofactionandhenceindicateslikelypolicytrajec-toriestobusiness,investorsandotheractorsoperatingatalllevelsofgovernance.Assuch,thesignalanddirectionprovidedhasthepotentialtohelpsynchroniseandaligndevelopmentsacrosslevelsofgovernanceandacrosstheboundariesofdifferentcountries(Kanie&Biermann,2017).Accordingly,it
Thelevelofdemandforspecificmechanismstoenhance/ensuretransparencyandaccountabilityde-pendsontheproblemathand.Forexample,“coordinationproblems”requirelessoversightandveri-ficationsinceallpartieshaveanincentivetoimplementtheinternationalrulesoncetheyareagreed.Incontrast,“cooperationproblems”involvemixedmotivesofactorsandconsequentlyanincentivetotakea“freeride”.Hence,theyareconsideredtoentailastrongdemandformechanismstoensuretransparency and accountability (Snidal, 1985). Furthermore, some activities are intrinsicallymoretransparentthanotherssothattheneedforspecificmechanismstoensuretransparencyvaries.Forexample,itisfarmoredifficulttoestablishwhetheranoiltankerreleasedoilatseathanwhetherithassegregatedballasttanksthatreducetheincentiveforreleasingoilatsea(Mitchell,1994).Finally,thedemandforspecificmechanismsforaddressingimplementationproblems(andrelatedconflicts)dependsontheincentivestructurerelevantactorsarefacing.Insomeinstances,ensuringtranspar-encymaybesufficienttoensureeffectiveimplementation.Forexample, long-standingnon-compli-ancebySovietwhalingboats inAntarcticwaterswithcatch limitsunder the InternationalWhalingConventionceasedinthe1970swhennewinspectionarrangementsensuredthatsuchnon-compli-ancewouldbedetected(Oberthür,2000).Putpositively,mechanismsensuringtransparencyandac-countabilityalsohavethepotentialthateffectiveimplementationreceivesvisibilityandacknowledge-mentandistherebyencouraged(onthebasisofpublicsupportfortheobjectivespursued).
Theprovisionofcapacitybuilding,technology(transfer),andfinancialresourcesisespeciallyrelevantinaNorth-Southcontext.Itisbasedontheinsightthatfrequentlyimplementationisdeficientbecauseofalackofthesemeansofimplementation,especiallyindevelopingcountries(Chayes&Chayes,1993).Amorerecentadditionalrationaleforprovidingsuchmeansconcerns“compensation”for lossanddamagessufferedasaresultofenvironmentallydetrimentalbehaviour.Accordingly,variousmultilat-eralenvironmentalagreementsdoengage in relevantprogrammesandhave financialmechanismsandvariousinternationalfinancialinstitutionsexisttothisend,includingtheWorldBank,severalMul-tilateral Development Banks, the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund and others(Bodansky,2010;Keohane&Levy,1996).
Therationaleforprovidingsuchmeansofimplementationthroughinternationalinstitutionsisindirect.Onemayquestionwhycapacitybuilding,technologyandfinanceshouldbeprovidedthroughinterna-tionalinstitutions–andother(bilateral)channelsdoindeedexist.However,internationalcooperationbringsatleasttwoimportantadvantages.First,itallowsdonorstocoordinateandtherebyaddressthesecond-ordercollective-actionproblemofwho isgoing toprovidehowmuch to theoveralleffort.Second,itallowstoreapefficiencygainsrootedinthefactthatsimilarissuesneedtobeandcanbeaddressedinvariouscountriesandcontextsdrawingonsimilarexpertiseandlessons(therebyreduc-ing “transaction costs”). Resources can thereby be pooled and duplication of effort minimised(Keohane&Levy,1996).
Internationalinstitutionscanenhanceknowledgeandinformationaswellaslearninginvariousways,primarily in their process dimension. They may collect and aggregate relevant data and otherknowledge(e.g.theWorldEnergyOutlookpublishedannuallybytheInternationalEnergyAgency,IEA).Actorsmayalsoestablishcertaininternationalinstitutionsmainlyforthepurposeofacollectiveap-praisalofavailableknowledge(e.g.theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange, IPCC).Ortheymayestablishparticularprocessesandbodiestothisendintheframeworkofabroaderinstitution(Parson,2003).Asmentionedabove,mechanismstoprovidefortransparencymayalsogeneraterel-evantknowledge.Whiletheseprocessesallowindividualactorstolearn,policylearningmaybepro-motedbyexchangeanddiscussionofrelevantinformationinthecontextofsuchinternationalinstitu-tions.
Wehaveherederivedfivemainfunctionsofinternationalgovernanceinstitutionsfromthegeneralliterature on international (environmental) institutions and cooperation. Accordingly, internationalgovernanceinstitutionscanprovideimportantguidanceandsignalstobothpublicandprivateactors.Theycanalsosetrulestofacilitatecollectiveactionacrossborders.Transparencyandaccountabilityprovisionscanenhancemutualtrustandensureagainst“freeriding”.Internationalinstitutionsalsoallowtoenhanceassistancetocountriesandactorsinneedbypermittingdonorstocoordinateandreducetransactioncosts.Andtheycancontributetoan improvedandcollectivelyappreciatedandacceptedunderstandingoftheproblemanditspossiblesolutionsaswellastolearningabouteffectivepolicies.Table3.1presentsthekeyfeaturesandpotentialaddedvalueoftheperformanceofthesefunctionsbyinternationalinstitutions.
Whileouranalysisismeanttocoverthemainfunctionsinternationalinstitutionscanperform,notallinstitutionsnecessarilyfulfilallofthesefunctions.Rather,differentinstitutionsmayperformvaryingmixesofthesefunctionsdependingonthespecificissuetheyaddressandthewayinwhichmembersdesignedtheinstitutioninresponse.Forexample,insuranceagainstfree-ridingwillonlyberequiredincasesof“cooperation”problems(asopposedto“coordination”problems).Also,transparencyandaccountabilitymechanismswillmost likelyrequireobligations in the firstplace (eventhoughthesecouldemanatefrombroadlyacceptedsocialnormsratherthantheexplicitprovisionsoftheinstitu-tion).Hence,theneedanddemandfortheprovisionofthesefunctionsdependsonthegovernancechallengesandconditionsfacedwithrespecttotheparticularcooperativeprojectpursued.Thisalsoimplies thatgovernance in international institutionscantakedifferent formsandvary in itsdepth,rangingfrom“shallow”exchangesofnationalexperiencestothesetting/harmonisationofcommonbindingstandards.Thereisnominimumofcorefunctionsanarrangementneedstofulfilinordertoqualifyasaninstitution.However,itmightbeworthremindingthattheoveralldefinitionofinterna-tionalgovernanceinstitutionsimpliesthattheyderivefromnegotiatednormativesystemsthatincludedecision-makingproceduresandshapeactors’behaviourand/orexpectations.
Agriculture is heavily dependent onphysical andhuman factors. The approaches that best reduceemissionsdependonlocalconditionsandthereforevaryfromregiontoregion.Bestpracticesforin-tensivecommercialfarmingsuchaspigfarminginWesternEuropeisnotofinterestforintensivesub-sistencefarmingsuchasricecultivationinSouth-EastAsia.
Tomaximisethecontributionofagriculturetoclimatemitigation,furthertechnologicaladvanceswillalsoberequired.Thepotentialofcurrentlyavailabletechnologiestoreduceemissionsislimited.Wol-lenbergetal. (2016) suggestapreliminaryglobal target for reducingemissions fromagricultureofabout1GtCO2eqperyearby2030tolimitwarmingin2100to2°Cabovepre-industrial levels.Thisglobaltargetisbasedonacomparisonofseveralmodelsformeetingthe2°Ctargetinacoherentleast-costapproachacrosssectors.Yetplausibleagriculturaldevelopmentpathwayswithmitigationco-ben-efits deliver only 21–40 per cent of this target (Havlik et al., 2014; Pete Smith et al., 2008, 2013;Wollenbergetal.,2016).Thereisparticulardemandforhigh-impact,quicklyimplementabletechnicaloptions,especiallyfornewbreedsandvarietiesthatcanbeeasilyaccessedanddonotrequirecom-pletelynewmanagementpracticesorinputs(Wollenbergetal.,2016).
Asectoraltargetandgoalsrelatedtocoreemission-causingactivitiesinthesectorcouldprovideim-portantguidancetosectoralactors,includingnationalgovernmentsresponsiblefordesigningvariousrelatedpolicies.Theimpactandfeasibilityofcleartargetsandgoalsislimitedbecause(1)thesectorcannotreduceitsemissionstozeroanytimesoonand(2)whattheowncontributiontoachievingthe2/1.5°Ctargetshouldbeishencenotimmediatelyclear.Apreliminarycontributionofthesectorcouldbetoreduceemissionsfromagricultureby1GtCO2eqperyearby2030(Wollenbergetal.,2016).Amorecomprehensivetargetforthe2°Climitcouldincludesoilcarbonandagriculture-relatedmitiga-tionoptions (Wollenbergetal.,2016).Furtherobjectives for sectoralactivities suchas fertilisation(reducing theuseof traditionalnitrogen fertiliser), emissions from ricepaddiesand from livestockcouldfurtherconcretisetheguidance,ascouldderivingnationaltargetstherefrom.
Internationalcooperationcanhelpdisseminatenewtechnologiesandbestpractisestolocalfarmers,including through the provision of financial assistance.More ambitious policymechanismswill beneededtocreateincentivesforimprovedinformationsystemsandforfarmerstousenewpracticesatlargescales.Policiessupportingmoreproductiveagriculturalpractices,financeoflow-emissionagri-culturaldevelopment,innovativemeansforvaluingcarbonreductions,anduseofgovernmentorsup-plychain incentivestomeetsustainabilitystandardsforreducedemissionswillall likelybeneeded(Wollenbergetal.,2016).Whilemanyofthesolutionsneedtobeadaptedtonationalandlocalcir-cumstances,internationalcooperationcanplayanimportantroleindevelopinganddiffusingavailabletechnologiesandprovidingtargetedfinanceandinvestment.
Thechemical industry is linked through ‘agrichemicals’which includesabroad rangeofpesticides,herbicides,insecticidesandfungicides,aswellassyntheticfertilisers,hormonesandotherchemicalgrowthagents.
4.2 LULUCF
4.2.1 Currentstatusandprospect
Landuse, land-use change and forestry(LULUCF) coversemissionsand removals ofGHGs resultingfromdirecthuman-inducedLULUCFactivities.Therateofbuild-upofCO2intheatmospherecanbereducedbytakingadvantageofthefactthatatmosphericCO2canaccumulateascarboninvegetationandsoilsinterrestrialecosystems.Anyprocess,activityormechanismwhichremovesaGHGsfromtheatmosphereisreferredtoasa"sink"(UNFCCC,2017).Landusereferstothesumtotalofactivitiesundertaken on a certain land area, including grazing and timber extraction, which release carbontrappedinterrestrialsinks,andconservationefforts,whichleadtoincreasedCO2sequestration.Clear-ingforestsforagriculturaluse,conversionofgrasslandtocroplandandabandoningcroplandorpas-turelandqualifyaslandusechangeactivities.Forestryincludesawiderangeofactivitieslikeplanting,andtendingofgrowingtrees,pestcontrol,firemanagementandwildlifeprotection(Gaan,2008).LandconvertedtocroplandisthedominantsourceofCO2,andlandconvertedtoforestlandisthedominantsink(UKDepartmentofEnergyandClimateChange,2012).
Landusechangecontributedabout11percentofglobalGHGemissionsin2010(Searchinger,2013).Forestryandlandusecontributed12percentofGHGemissionsbetween2000-2009(PSmithetal.,2014).GHGemissionsduetolandusechangeanddeforestationregisteredanearlytenpercentde-creaseoverthe2001-2010period,averagingsome3billiontonnesCO2eqperyearoverthedecade.Thiswas the resultof reduced levelsofdeforestationand increases in theamountofatmosphericcarbonbeingsequesteredinmanycountries(FAO,2014).In2014,landuseaccountedfor2.74GtCO2and3.15GtCO2eq(FAOSTAT,2014).
Deforestationisanimportantfactor.Thenetlossof129millionhectaressince1990–anareathesizeofSouthAfrica–hasbeenamajorsourceofCO2emissions(FAO,2016).Whileglobalforestcoverhasdecreasedfrom31.6percentin1990to30.6percentin2015,thenetannualrateofdeforestationhasdeclinedfrom0.18percentintheearly1990sto0.08percentbetween2010-2015.Asaresult,totalcarbonemissionsfromforestsdecreasedby25percentbetween2001and2015(FAO,2015).Ratesofdeforestationvaryfromregiontoregionaroundtheworld(Figures1and2).Todayabout30percentofEarth'slandsurfaceiscoveredbyforests(WWF,2017)andin2015twothirdsoftheworldforestswereinthefollowingtencountries:Russia(20percent),Brazil(12percent),Canada(ninepercent),UnitedStatesofAmerica(US)(eightpercent),China(fivepercent),Congo(fourpercent),Aus-tralia(threepercent),Indonesia(twopercent),Peru(twopercent)andIndia(twopercent)(FAO,2015).Deforestationoccursaroundtheworld,thoughtropicalrainforestsareparticularlytargeted.TheUSNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)predictsthatifcurrentdeforestationlevelsproceed,theworld'srainforestsmaybecompletelygoneinaslittleas100years.Countrieswithsignificantdeforestation includeBrazil, Indonesia, Thailand, theDemocraticRepublicofCongoandotherpartsofAfrica(Bradford,2015).AlthoughBrazilhasreduceditsdeforestationratebymorethan60percentsince1970,inabsolutenumbersitstaysnumberoneindeforestationwith8000sqkmin2016(Butler,2017).Nonetheless,theworld’splantedforestcover(whichaccountsforsevenpercentoftheworld’soverallforestarea),hasincreasedby110millionhectaressince1990(FAO,2015).
AnothermajorconcernisthepotentialforleakageofLULUCFprojects.LeakagereferstotheindirectimpactthataLULUCFprojectoractivityhasonthecarbonstorageorGHGemissionsinanotherareaoutside theproject. For instance, efforts to reducedeforestation inoneareamaybeoffsetby in-creaseddeforestationelsewhere.Toolstoaddressleakageincludediscounting,project-eligibilitycri-teria,andtheuseof“aggregatebaselines”.Baselines,thedevelopmentofnational,regionalorsector‘standards’havebeenoneproposedwaytoaddress leakage.Butthistool is likewisehamperedbypoorbackgroundinformationformanydevelopingcountriesaswellaspoliticalopposition(Schwarze,Niles,&Olander,2002).
Inmanycountries,implementingpolicyinvolveshightransactioncosts,mostlybecauseofpoorcoor-dination and overlapping functions amongministries, and lack of transparent financialmonitoring(Murdivarso,Brockhaus,Sunderlin,&Verchot,2012).Thereisalsoaneedtohaveclearlandtenureandland-userightsregulationsandacertainlevelofenforcement,aswellasclarityaboutcarbonown-ershiptopreventcorruption. Implementationchallenges, including institutionalbarriersandinertiarelatedtogovernanceissues,makethecostsandnetemissionreductionpotentialofnear-termmiti-gationuncertain(IPCC,2014c).
Theeffectivenessoftheaforementionedresults-basedpaymentsentailsimportantrequirementsre-garding transparency and accountability. Reference levels need to be defined as baselines againstwhichthesuccessofeffortstopreserveandenhanceforestscovercanbemeasured.Also,monitoringof actual results is required in order to verify achievements, includingmonitoring beyond projectboundariestocontrolforpossibleleakage.Providersofresults-basedpaymentstypicallyseekreliableverification(UNFCCC,2007).Remotelysenseddatasupportedbygroundobservationsarekeytoef-fectivemonitoring(DeFriesetal.,2007).
Thepowersectorisimplicatedsinceforestsareone(potentiallygrowing)sourceofbiomassforelec-tricityproduction. In the future,burningbiomass inpower stations couldbeonewayofachievingnegativeemissioniftheresultingCarboniscapturedastoredunderground(bio-energycarboncaptureandstorage–BECCS).
Wastemanagement systems in lowandmiddle-incomecountrieswhere themajorityof thewastegrowthisexpectedtocomefromby2030,continuetobeunder-developedandlargelyinefficient.
• Costsarelikelytoincrease.Globally,SWMcostswillrisetoaboutUSD375.5billionin2025fromannualUSD205.4billioncurrentlyandwillbe5timesmoresevereinlowincomecoun-triesand4timesmoresevere in lower-middle incomecountries (Hoornweg&Bhada-Tata,2012).
• Wastecollectionandrecyclingindevelopingcountriesremainslargelyunorganisedandofteninvolvesalargenumberofinformalsectorwastepickers–uptoonepercentofurbanpopu-lationor at least 15millionpeople (WIEGO, 2013). Inmany cities in developing countries,wastepickersattimesperformbetween20-100percentofallwastecollection(UNEP,2010).
Inmostdevelopingcountries,regulationsmaynotbestringentandinthecasetheyare,implementa-tionmayremainpoor.ThelackofeffectivelegislationforSWMpartiallyresultsinunclearroles/func-tionsofrelevantnationalagenciesandlackofcoordinationamongthem(Ogawa,2010).Moreover,SWM legislation in developing countries is usually fragmented, and is spread across clauses onrules/regulationsinseverallaws(e.g.,PublicHealthAct,LocalGovernmentAct,EnvironmentalProtec-tionAct,etc.).Enforcementalsoensuesviadifferentagencieswhichoftenresults induplicationofresponsibilitiesandgaps/missingelementsineffectiveSWMsystems(Ogawa,2010).
Policy and technical knowledge platforms can also help promote awareness, education, andknowledgeofavailablemeansandpromisingpoliciesforbetterwastemanagement.Aninternationaldatabaseofnationalandregionaldata,aprogressmeasurementsystem,existingfinancialopportuni-ties,relevanttechnologiesandinnovations,efficienttreatmentmethodscanalsobeusefulinparticu-larforlow-midincomecountries.InternationalResearchandDevelopment(R&D)fundingmayhelpfurtherdevelopadaptedWtEtechnologies.
Theconceptofacircularorclosedloopseconomyadvocatesatransitionfromthecurrent“take,make,dispose linear economic model” to one which is restorative and regenerative in design (EllenMacArthurFoundation,2015).It“preservesandenhancesnaturalcapital,optimisesresourceyields,andminimisessystemrisksbymanagingfinitestocksandrenewableflows,workingeffectivelyateveryscale”(EllenMacArthurFoundation,2015).Theeconomicbenefitsoftransitiontothecircularecon-omycouldamounttoUSDonetrillioninmaterialsavings(EllenMacArthurFoundation,2014).EcofysandCircleEconomyestimatethatcirculareconomystrategiescanhelpmitigatearound11-13billiontonnes of CO2e by 2030, given that production of basicmaterials generatemore than half of theworld’sGHGemissionsandonlysevenpercentofthematerialsusedbytheglobaleconomyarecur-rentlyreused(Ecofys&CircleEconomy,2016).
Whiletheconceptisthusbroad,weherefocusonrecycling,reuse,lessdemandforandefficientuseofprimary resources, including through theuseofhigherqualitymaterials, products, systemsandbusinessmodelsascoreelementsofthecirculareconomy(EllenMacArthurFoundation,2013).
Circulareconomystrategies (recycle, reuse, lessdemand forprimary resources,efficientuseof re-sources,eliminationofwaste,newbusinessmodels)canhelpmitigateemissions.Eachyear,60billiontonnesofrawmaterialsareextracted(W.Haas,Krausmann,Wiedenhofer,&Heinz,2015).About30billion tonnes represent fossil fuels or food.Constructionmaterials account for the second largestshareoftheextractedrawmaterialswherein ‘virgin’materialsareexclusivelyprioritisedandreuseoptionsarelimited(Ecofys&CircleEconomy,2016).Thelastgrouprepresentsmostoftheotheritemsofdailyuse(automobiles,appliances,chemicals,andsoon).Alargeproportionoftheseproductshaveahighpotentialforrecovery,reuseandrecycle,lifetimeextensionandsharing.Thebiggestimpactofcircular economy thus can be felt in the energy intensive industrial sector, agriculture, buildings,transport,powerandwaste.
Intheenergyintensiveindustrialsector,recyclingcanbeaparticularlypotentstrategy.Bothsteelandaluminiumare100percentrecyclablewithoutlossofqualityandwithapotentiallyendlesslifecycle.RecyclingaluminiumandsteelrequiresaroundfivepercentandathirdoftheenergyusedandemitfivepercentandaquarteroftheGHGemissionswhencomparedtoprimaryproduction(Cullen,2010;Kechichian,Pantelias,Reeves,Henley,& Liu, 2016). Similarly, currently, only14per centofplasticpackaging is recycledgloballyalthough it ispossible to recycleup to70per cent (EllenMacArthurFoundation,2016).
Someofthekeycriticismsofthecirculareconomicmodelrelatetothefactthattheconceptistoobroad, it isdifficult toassess impact, the shift tonewbusinessmodels isa largelyunderestimatedchallenge,theemphasislaidonsocialaspectsisinadequate,andthattheenvironmentalimpactmaybeoverestimated(inparticularlongershelflifeofproductsmayrequirelongerenergytocreate,solarpanelsandwindfarmsaredifficulttorecycle,andthatrecyclingalsohasanend)(Behrens,Rizos,&Tuokko,2017).
financing,keyeconomicenablers(likepricingsystemsthatsupportefficientresourcereuse,incentivesforproducersandrecyclerstocooperateacrossspecificvaluechains;andmarketsforsecondaryrawmaterials) (Bourguignon, 2016), skills, remoulding consumer behaviour and business models, andmulti-levelgovernance.Transformingthelineareconomy,intoacircularonewillentailaradicaltrans-formationofentireexistingproductionandconsumptionpatterns(Behrensetal.,2017).
Politicalbarriersexist. Intoday’sglobalisedworld, it isquitecommontohavepartsofoneproductmadeindiversegeographiclocationsincludingdifferentcountries.Closingthelooponproductsandvaluechainscharacterisedbygeographicdispersion is challenging.Moreover,moving tocircularitywouldimpactexportingcountriesthatengageinprimarymanufacturing,likeChina,whichmayturnintoapoliticalandcompetitivenessbarrier(EllenMacArthurFoundation,2014).
Relatedtransparencyandaccountabilitymeasureswouldbeneededforimplementationofanyregu-latorymechanismsagreedat the international level,andcould includereporting toolswhichallowstocktaking,confidencebuildingandmutualencouragement.
MeansofImplementation
Giventhescaleofchangeinvolvedinthetransitiontoaglobalcirculareconomy,significantinterna-tionalcooperationwillberequiredtodeveloptechnicalskillswhichremaincurrentlyabsentamongtheworkforceat large (Bergema,de Jong,Kraak,Usanov,&vanderGaast,2016).Quantifying theeconomicimpactandbenefitswillalsobeessential.
Given that the transition to a circular economy involves tremendous transformation across valuechainsandindustriesinascoreofareas, itwillbeessentialtoinitiatepolicyandtechnicaldialogueplatforms bringing together various stakeholders, in particular government and business leaders,acrosstheglobe.Involvementofbusinessleaderswillbeessentialinordertospecifyprecisecriteriaforconnectingdifferentsectors.Supportingcross-industrycollaborationwillbecritical(WEF,2016).Sharingofknowledge,bestpractises,knowhowandexpertisewith lessdevelopedcountries isalsoessentialinparticularwithmostoftherawmaterialexportingdevelopingcountriesgiventhatcircu-larityinoneregion,sayEurope,willhaveasignificantimpactondevelopingcountries(Bergemaetal.,2016).
globalpowersupplyisakeysectorfortworeasons:(1)withmaturingrenewableenergytechnologies,solutionsforzero-carbonelectricityarealreadytechnicallyavailableand(2)formanyothersectorselectrification of processes is the most promising mitigation strategy. This holds for example fortransportandemissionintensivebasicmaterialssuchassteelandcement(Ahman,Lechtenbohmer,Nilsson,&Schneider,2016).
Despite theavailabilityof low-carbonalternatives,globalCO2emissions fromelectricitygenerationhavebeenrisingatanaveragerateofaroundthreepercentannuallybetween2000and2014.Onlyafter2011hasthistrendstartedtoleveloffsomewhat.Whilegrowthinelectricitydemand(andhenceelectric output) remained largely stable, the emission intensity of global electricity has started toslightlydecreaseafter2011(IEA,2016a).Sincethelatestdataisavailableonlyfor2014,itisatthispointdifficulttoassesswhetherthistrendisrobust,althoughrecentdevelopmentswithrespecttocoalconsumptioninChinaandIndia(seemorebelow)indicatethatinfactitmayberobust.
Historically,electricityhasbeensuppliedbyfiveenergysources:coal(hardcoalandlignite),naturalgas,oil,(large)hydropower,andnuclearpower.Onlyrecentlyhaveotherrenewableenergysources(wind,solar,geothermal,tidal,andbioenergy)startedtoassumeamoresignificantshareoftheglobalpowermix.Whilethestockglobalpowergenerationcapacityisstillheavilydominatedbyfossilfuel,nuclearandlargehydropowerplants,thelion’sshareofinvestmentshasshiftedtowardsrenewableenergies in recent years, both in terms of dollars spent as well as in terms of capacities added(Frankfurt School/UNEP/Bloomberg, 2016). The followingparagraphs synthesise keydevelopmentswithrespecttoalloftheabove-mentionedtechnologies.
Coalusedtobethebackboneofthemajorityoftheworld’spowersystems.Andcoalstillisbothabun-dantaswellasrelativelycheap.Formanydevelopingcountriestherefore,investingincoalcapacitieswasconsideredaviablewayof fuellingtheirrapideconomicgrowth.Consequently,coalcapacitieswereexpandeddramatically.Ifexistingcapacitiesandonlyafractionofgenerationcapacitiescurrentlyin theplanningareutilizedto their full technical life-time, theremainingglobalcarbonbudgetwillalreadybeconsumedentirely(OttmarEdenhofer,2015).However,therearesomesignsthatthecoalboommaycometoanend. In theUS,coalconsumptionandproductionhasplummeted in recentyears,partlyduetoregulationundertheObamaadministrationandpartlybystiffcompetitionfromshalegasand renewableenergies (seebelow). In thewakeof thisdownturn,PeabodyEnergy, thelargestprivatecoalminingenterprisehadtofilebankruptcyinitsdomesticUSmarket(Reuters,2016).ThemostdramaticturnawayfromcoalwaswitnessedintheUnitedKingdom(UK).On21April2017theUKsawthefirstworkingdaywithoutcoalpowersincetheonsetoftheindustrialrevolution(Brown,2017).AlsoChinaandIndiadrasticallycuttheirrespectivecoalprojectpipelinesandChinaevenhaltedongoingconstructionsonnewcoalpowerplants(Shearer,Ghio,Myllyvirta,Yu,&Nace,2017).
Cleaninguppowersupplyis,however,onlyonestrategy.Cleanrenewableenergysupplysimplycannotoratleastnoteconomicallyrampedupfastenoughtomaintaincurrentconsumptionlevels.Thisisparticularlytrueifitisassumedthatdevelopingcountrieswillcatchuptolevelscomparabletocurrentconsumption in industrialized countries. 2°C-compatible IPCC scenario therefore generally projectsteepincreasesinenergyefficiencyontheconsumptionside(IPCC,2014a).Whileenergyefficiencyimprovementsareanessentialelementofthetransformationoftheglobalpowersector,theyhave
Thephysicalpre-conditionsforrenewableenergydeploymentdiffergreatlyacrosscountries.Corre-spondingly,differ the transformationchallengesandbarriers.Countrieswithahighshareofhydropowerforexamplehavetheadvantageinthathydropowercantypicallydispatchedflexiblytoaccom-modatevariablepowersupplyfromintermittentrenewableenergysourceslikewindandsolarpower.Forcountrieswithoutsuchendowmentsothertechnicalsolutionswillneedtobedeveloped.
Withrespecttotechnologicalaspectstheneedforstoragecapacities isoneofkeychallenges.TwodifferenttypesofstoragewillbenecessarytoensurethestabilityofpowersystemswithhighsharesofintermittentRE,particularlywindandsolarpower:(1)short-termstoragethatcansubstitutelargerotatingmassesinthermalplantswhousedtohelpbufferingvariabilityinfrequencyandvoltageinamatterofsplitsecondsuptoacoupleofminutes(ancillaryservices).Intheshorterterm,theneedforstoragecanbereducedbymakingelectricitydemandmoreresponsive(Palensky&Dietrich,2011).Currently,powerdemandislargelyinelasticanddoeshardlyrespondtoshort-termpricehikes.Ena-bledbysmartgrids(andsmartappliances)demandcouldbemanagedinordertoshiftsomeofitfrompeak loadhours tohourswith lowerdemandand/ormoreabundantrenewableenergysupply. (2)long-termstoragewillberequiredtobalanceoutseasonalvariabilityintheavailabilityofRE.Energystorage is stilldominatedgloballybypumpedhydropower. Still,both research spendingaswell asinvestmentsinbatterystoragehavebeenskyrocketinginrecentyears.Asamatterofconsequence,batterycostshaveplummetedatratessimilartothoseseeninthecostreductionsofSolarPV(IEA,2016c).
Anotherkeytechnicalchallengetobeaddressedistheupdateandre-buildofexistinggridinfrastruc-tures. Incountries thathistorically reliedon fossil fuelledpowergeneration,powerplants typicallywherebuiltatlocationsthatareclosetothecentresofelectricitydemand(i.e.majorindustrialcen-tres).Contrastingly, renewableenergygenerationunitswillbe locatedwhereverthepotentialsarehighest.This isoften in rather ruralareaswithout largeamountsofdemand.While inprototypical
Thechallengesandbarriersdifferamongcountriesalso in theway thepowersector is structured.Whileinsomecountries,thesectorisdominatedbyprivatelyownedutilities,inmanycountriesutili-tiesarestate-owned.Insomecountries,institutionallinkagesbetweengovernmentandutilitiesispar-ticularlycloseandamounttowhatUnruhhascalleda“techno-industrialcomplex”fromwhichstrongsystemicchangeresistancemustbeexpected(Unruh,2000).Increasingdeploymentofrenewableen-ergycancontributetoadiversificationoftheownershipstructureinthepowersector.Forexample,inGermanyinvestmentsinrenewableenergywerelargelydrivenbymunicipalutilities,smallenergycooperativesandevenindividuals(Schmid,Knopf,&Pechan,2016).
OneparticularexamplerelatestoinvestmentsinCCS.Oneofthekeybarriersisthatpotentialinvestorsfacesplitincentives.InvestinginCCSmayhelpto“future-proof”thesector,yetthismaycomeatsig-nificant short-term financial risks (Gaede&Meadowcroft, 2016).Also, the countries thathave thestrongestinterestindevelopingCCSarethosethathavevestedinterestsand/orlargefossilfuelre-serves.Yet,thisinterestiscontingentonambitiousclimatepolicy.Inthepast,manyofthosecountrieshaveratherfocusedondelayingaggressiveclimateaction(deConinck&Bäckstrand,2011).Astronginternationalsignalcouldhelpshiftthepoliticaleconomysothat interestandconsequently invest-mentindevelopingCCSincreases.
SettingRulestoFacilitateCollectiveAction
Therearevariouswaysinwhichthepowersectortransformationinonecountryinterrelateswiththesectortransformationinothercountries.Themostdirectinterdependencerelatestoglobaltradeandcompetition.Powersystemsareconnectedthroughmarketsforfossilfuels,aswellasglobalizedtech-nologymarketsforalltypesofenergytechnologies,includingrenewableenergytechnologiesandbat-terystorage.Sinceelectricityisanessentialinputtoalmostallindustries,theremaybeindirectcom-petitionamongcountries:ifinthecourseofasectortransformationacountryexperiences(temporary)electricitypriceincreases,energyintensiveindustriesmaymigratetoanothercountrywithlowerelec-tricityprices.Apowersectortransformationcanthusbecomeanissueofindustrialcompetitivenessforthecountry.Moreover,internationaldirectinterdependenciesmayexistintheformofmultina-tionalcorporations.However,inthepowersectorthismaybelessofanissuethanforexampleintheextractiveindustriessector.Whilesomemultinationalutilitiesexist,themajorityofthepowersectorsaredominatedbynationally operatingutilities. Last but not least, regional spill-overs exist,wherepowersystemsarephysicallyinterconnected.
Fewcountriesdominatetheseindustrialsubsectors–China,theEU,theUS,JapanandIndia.Chinaiscurrentlyoverwhelminglythelargestproducerandconsumerinallthefoursubsectorsandoneofthetopfiveimportersandexporters.Asiaisthemostimportantregionaccountingfornearly65percentofsteeluse(WorldSteelAssociation,2016),morethan75percentofglobalcementconsumption,and61percentoftotalglobalchemicalsales.ProductionanddemandishighlyconcentratedinAsia,alt-hough it isgrowing inotherdeveloping regions like theMiddleEast, LatinAmericaandAfrica.For
Trade in the ironandsteelandchemicals subsectors ishighlyglobalised:nearlya thirdofall steelproducedistraded(USDepartmentofCommerce,2016).Inthealuminiumsector,mostaluminiumproductsaretradedwithregionsorcountries.Forinstances,Chinawhichproducesnearlyhalfofglobalaluminiumisself-sufficientwhilenosinglecountryaccountsformorethan13percentoftheimportorexportmarket(Ludwig&VanHouwelingen,n.d.).However,thetradeintensityofproductsusingaluminium(e.g.cars,laptops,…)isofamuchhighertradeintensity.Finally,thecementsubsectorispredominantlyregional.Cementproductionissignificantlylocal:virtuallyeverycountryproducesce-mentandonlythreepercentofglobalproductionistradedinternationally(TheEconomist,2013).
Deepdecarbonisationpotentialanddrivers
Themodelusedby the IEA’s (2017)EnergyTechnologyPerspectives (IEA,2017a)shows thata2°CscenariorequiresglobaldirectCO2emissionsfromindustrytobereducedby44percentby2050andhalvedby2060comparedwithitsbaselinescenario.However,toreachnet-zeroCO2emissionsatthesystemlevel,by2060,whichisrequiredforabeyond+2°Cscenario,industrywouldneedtofurtherreduceitscarbonemissionsby69percentby2050and80percentby2060comparedwiththebase-linescenario(IEA,2017a).
11 Both steelandaluminiumare100per cent recyclablewithout lossofqualityandwithapotentially
endlesslifecycle.Recyclingaluminiumrequiresaroundfivepercentoftheenergyusedtoproducepri-maryaluminiumandemitsaslittleasfivepercentoftheGHGemissionswhencomparedtoprimaryaluminiumproduction(Kechichianetal.,2016).Steelmakingfromscrapusesone-thirdoftheprimaryenergyandemitsaquarteroftheemissionsascomparedtosteelmakingfromironore(Cullen,2010).However only a third of all aluminium produced today comes from old, traded and new scrap(InternationalAluminium Institute,2009). Similarly,650million tonnesof steelare recycledgloballyeveryyearoronlylessthanone-thirdofglobalproduction.
Theinnovativetechnologies,whilepromising,arethereforegenerallynotyetdeployable,financiallylessattractive,requirelongerpaybacksandmaynecessitatelongeroperationalshutdownperiodstointegrate changes in production process/existing assets. Some promising technology options maythereforeneverbecomemainstreamsolutions.
Given the disparities highlighted between regions, each economic regionmay need a low carbonroadmapincludingtrajectoriesfortheindustrialsectorswhichneedtobeembeddedwithintheotherpartsof theeconomythat formthedownstreamdemand fortheproductsof theenergy intensivesectors.Resourceefficiencylinkedtoa(global)circulareconomywillneedtobeapartofthedevelop-mentofsuchroadmaps.Coordinatingthese(sectoral)globalandregionalroadmapswithnationalde-carbonisationplans(developedundertheParisAgreement)willbearequirement.
SettingRulestoFacilitateCollectiveAction
Giventheglobalisednatureofenergy-intensiveindustries,thereisaclearrationaleforinternationalregulation(toaddresscompetitivenessandcarbonleakageconcerns).Collectiveactiontoenablethedecarbonisationofindustrialsectorscanberealisedthrough(acombinationof)different(regulatory)instruments.Regulationcouldtaketheformofcarbonpricing(beita(coordinated)CO2taxoraglobalemissionstradingsystem,e.g.throughlinkingregionaltradingsystems)or(coordinated)internationalregulationsand/orstandards.Thesecanbetargetingtheproductionprocesses(e.g.CO2emissionlim-itsper tonneofproductproduced)or theconsumptionside (limitonembeddedemissions in finalproduct;seeNeuhoffetal.2014).Shortofinternationalagreement,nationalandregionalfrontrunnerscanpavethewaytobroaderapproaches.Regulatingembeddedemissionsinfinalproductscouldhelpcreatealevelplayingfieldbetweenglobalindustrialproducersbecause‘endofthevaluechain’pricingwouldnotdiscriminatebetweenlocalandforeignproduction.
Suchinternationalcooperationwouldalsoneedtoaddressthehighcapitalcostandriskassociatedwithlargeindustrialbreakthroughtechnologies.OneoptionwouldbeR&Dcooperationthatcombinestheknowhowandfinancepresentindifferentcountriesandatdifferentstagesinthetechnologyread-inesslevel.Suchanapproachcouldmakeuseofthedifferentstagesofindustrialisationaroundtheworldtomakeuseofavailableresourcesefficiently.Whilepotentialforbuildingnewlargelow-carbondemonstrationplantsparticularlyexistsinemergingeconomies,moreadvancedeconomiescouldpi-oneercirculareconomyrelatedtechnologies.Suchinternationalinnovationprogramcouldbeimple-mented through a global industrial innovation fund in combinationwith coordinated internationaltechnologyprojects(alongthelinesoftheITERnuclearfusionproject).Leveragingprivatecapitaltoenabletheseinvestmentswillrequiretheactiveparticipationoflargenationalorregionalinvestmentbanks.
Remainingwithina2°Ccarbonbudgetrequiresmostglobalfossilfuelreservestoremainunexploited.McGladeandEtkins(McGlade&Etkins,2015)findthatathirdofoil,halfofgasandover80percentofcoalreservesshouldremainuntouchedfrom2010to2050(seefig.1).Achievingthis,however,isadauntingchallenge.In2012,theIEAwarnedthatoncurrenttrends,enoughnewfossilfuel-basedin-frastructure–mines,powerplants,pipelines,refineriesetc.–wouldcomeonlineby2017tolock-intheremainderofemissionsallowable(IEA,2012).Fossilfuelextractionandtradearewidelyperceivedascentraltoenergysecurityandeconomicdevelopment,especiallyindevelopingcountrieswithlargeunmetenergyneeds(Manley,Cust,&Cecchinato,2017;Whitley&vanderBurg,2015).Bothproduc-tionandconsumptionoffossilfuelscontinuetobewidelysubsidised.Multinationalcompaniesinthesector(s)aresignificantwealthgeneratorsandunderpinthereturnstomanypensionfundsindevel-opedcounties.Giventhiscontext,climatepolicy,atdomesticand international levels,has focusedalmostexclusivelyoncurtailingdemandforfossilfuelenergy,neglectingsupply-atleastuntilrecently.Butitisincreasinglyrecognisedthateffectiveclimatepolicyrequiresactiononboth(SEI,2015).
Governmentsownover50percentofglobalproductionoffossilfuelsthroughfullormajority-stakeownershipofproducingcompanies(Whitley&vanderBurg,2015).Nationaloilcompaniescontrol80-90per centofprovenglobaloil reserves (up from less than tenper cent in the1970s),withmostengaginginternationaloilcompaniesinavarietyofcontractualarrangements.Becauseofthisshiftingownership,internationaloilcompanieshavefocusedonhard-to-access(e.g.deepwater)andhard-to-recover (e.g. oil sands, shale oil) reserves that costmore than the current price of oil to develop(Holmes,2017).
A furtherobviouschallengerelates toequityconsiderationsandthe importanceofsecuringa ‘justtransition’ (L.Hermwille,2017).But ‘while there isgrowing interest… insupply-sideclimatepolicyoptions,theattendantequityquestionshavereceivedrelativelylittleattention’(Kartha,2016,p.1).Trillionsofdollarsin‘foregonerents’maybeatstake,constitutingasubstantialshareofGDPinmanycases(Kartha,2016).Controloverfossilresourcesisunevenlydistributedamongcountries,andoftenalsoamongregionsandindividualeconomicentitieswithinthem.Sotooarethebenefitsofexploitingthem. That some stand to losemuchmore than others from any future constraints on extraction(McGlade&Etkins,2015)constitutesahugechallengetomulti-lateralefforts.17
OnthespecificissueofFFS,thoughwidelyrecognisedasdesirablefromefficiencyandclimateprotec-tionperspectives,theirremovalalsoraisesseriousequityissues.Benefitsofsubsidyreform–particu-larly in theshort term–willbeunevenlydistributedandstronglydependentontheapproachandcomplementary(compensatory)measuresadopted(Whitley&vanderBurg,2015).Complementarymeasuresshouldaimtoimprovethecompetitivenessorviabilityofthosewhostayinthesector(s),supportthosewhowanttoleavetheindustryortodiversifyintootheractivities,andtakeintoconsid-erationthepotentialoftheprivatesectortocreatenewopportunities(Caldecott,Sartor,&Spencer,
emission endowments that are created by establishing a cap-and-trade system (‘climate rents’) ataroundUSUSD1trillionperyear.Theyarguethat‘amajorandsofarperhapsunderappreciatedchal-lengeofclimatepolicynegotiationsistodealwithwhatmaybelargestdistributionalnegotiationstheglobalcommunityhaseverengagedin’.AsKartha(Kartha,2016)notes,thisappliesevenmoretofossilfuelextractionrents.
2017;Whitley&vanderBurg,2015).FFSareparticularlyhigh intheMENAregion,wheretheyareestimatedat13per centofGDPand35per centof government revenues (Caldecott et al., 2017;Whitley&vanderBurg,2015).
The Kyoto 2 concept (Tickell, 2008) suggests a global system, implemented through the UNFCCC,wherebythebulkofGHGproductionrightsareallocatedbyregularglobalauctionopentoallbidders.ProducersoffossilfuelsandindustrialGHGswouldneedtoholdsufficientrightstomatchtheirpro-duction.AuctioningofpermitscouldcrediblyraiseasumofaboutEUR1trillionperyearforamulti-purposeClimateChangeFund,withanemphasisonaddressingtheneedsofthepoorandmostad-verselyimpacted.Theconceptwouldbeaboldre-orientationofcurrentinternationalefforts,andthusagreatchallengetonegotiate.
• Howfardoesfossilfuelextractionreallycontributetodevelopment,givendocumented‘neg-atives’ including environmental and human rights impacts, concentration of wealth andpower,Dutchdisease18andgeopoliticalinstability? Suchanassessmentcouldinformeffortstodecidehowextractioncouldbedistributedsoastomaximizedevelopmentbenefits.
• Howtodecideontheabove:basedoneconomicefficiency,ethicalprinciples,acombination,mediated by tradeable “extraction rights”? Is there a role for command-and-control ap-proaches,e.g.a‘coalnon-proliferationtreaty’?19
Asnotedabove,oneofthemainchallengesistodefinewhatactuallyconstitutesFFSs,topre-emptdenialsthattheyexist.20Then,internationalinstitutionswillbeinapositiontohelpaddressthem.AsWhitleyandvanderBurg(Whitley&vanderBurg,2015)observe,whiledomesticreformscanproceedwithoutinternationallycomparabledata,thisinformationcanfacilitatevaluablelessonlearningandevaluationofprogress,creatingpeerpressureandenablingcross-countrycomparisonsoftheeffec-tivenessofdifferentinterventionsonFFS.Theysetoutarangeofpossibleinitiatives,frommandatorytovoluntary.MandatoryreportingonFFS(followingthemodelforagriculture)isconceivable.Amongthemore voluntary proposals is to include reportingon FFS inUNFCCCNational Communications.Countrycommitments to transparencycanalsobewidenedandstrengthenedwhengovernment’salreadycommitted to reform insistonsubsidy reform inbilateralormultilateral tradeagreements(Whitley&vanderBurg,2015).
‘Pastprecedentsuggeststhatsuchcommitmentsmaynottranslateintoactualsubsidyreforms,and,evenwhentheydo,thereformstendtobevulnerabletooilpriceshocks,publicprotest,andchangesofpoliticalregime.Withoutanymechanismthattiestheirhands,reluctantgovern-ments often find it easier to renege on their voluntary commitments …’ (Asmelash, 2017;Tagliapietra,2017).
AsmelashandBirhanusuggest that itmaytakeacoregroupof ‘like-minded’countries topush formultilateral,bindingaction.Others(J.Smith&Urpaleinen,2017)seethefeasibilityofcoercionaslim-ited,andpreferpeerpressurethroughinternationalorganisationssuchasG20andAsiaPacificEco-nomicCooperation(APEC).
sidyreformprocesses,either intermsof institutionalarrangementsorcarefultiming. Itwillbe im-portant to not only increase these resources, but to also foster linkagesbetweenexisting supportmechanismsandtheprocessesofreformingFFS.
Decarbonisingtransportinindustrialisedcountrieswillnotbeanylessdifficult,buttheproblemstruc-tureissomewhatdifferent.Whileindevelopingandemergingcountriesthemaintaskistomakenewtransportcapacitiesindependentofoilproducts,transportinindustrialisedcountriesalreadyhasboththevehiclesandtheinfrastructurethatlocksinhighcarbonpractices.Thetaskinindustrialisedcoun-tries thereforewillbe toswitchexisting transportmodes.Thismeans largescale replacementofasystemthat is largelygeared towards servicingcombustion-basedvehicleswithanewsystemthatminimisestransportemissions.
• Shifttraveltomoreclimate-friendlymodes:Iftravelcannotbeavoided,policiesshoulden-courageorregulatethatlow-emissiontransportoptionsarefavouredoverhighemissionones.Forpersonaltransport,thismeanstoencouragewalkingandbicyclingforshortertravels,andpublictransportsystemsforlongerdistanceones.Policieshereoftenincludeeconomicincen-tivesanddisincentives(Roadpricing,publictransportsubsidies),andregulations(e.g.car-freezones). For freight, this canmean incentivising theuseof rail or boat transport over roadfreight,whichagainmaytaketheformofeconomic(dis-)incentiveschemes(e.g.tollsystems),butalsomakingsurethatneededinfrastructures(e.g.rail lines)areinplace.Formotorisedtransportingeneral,electricvehicleshavetobemadethepreferred,andinthemediumtermonly,option.However,torenderelectricvehiclestrulyemissions-freewilldependonthede-carbonisationofthepowersector(seesection4.5).
Technological:Technologiesassucharemostlynotaproblem,asmostinnovationsneededtofostermore sustainable transport systemsare inplace.The largestbarrierona technological level is thedevelopmentofhigh-yieldbatterysystems.However,a"techno-cultural"barriercanpotentiallybethatmanyengineersanddesignersimplicitlyfavoursystemicimprovementstoexisting,combustion-based technologiesover themore radical changesneeded for a large-scaledecarbonisationof thetransportsector.
Twootherbarriersare"techno-political"innature:Customersarecurrentlyfacedwithstandardisationproblemsinelectricalpropulsionsystems,astherearecurrentlynorealstandardssetforcharging,e.g.currents, connectors etc., which vary widely across manufacturers, countries, and even models(Pereirinha&Trovão,2016).Thislackofstandardisationmaydetercostumersfromadoptinginnova-tivetechnologiesearlyon.Theotheroneconcernsthechangeininfrastructurethatisneeded-currentinfrastructuresarestronglygearedtowardsservicingcombustionengines(fuelstationsetc.).Inordertofosterachangee.g.towardselectricalpropulsion,theinfrastructureneedstobechangedalmostcompletely.Another"socio-technical"barriertochangecanbetheabsenceofviablealternatives-asmuchdependsoninfrastructures,especiallyruralorremoteareasmayfacedifficultiesofaccess(nopublictransport,norailwaylinesforfreighttransportetc.).
Economic:Ascurrentmobilitypatternsrelyheavilyonindividualownershipofunits,replacementcostsfall towards individual users. This does impose a high economic burden to owners that especiallypoorerpeoplewillnotbeabletoafford.Anothereconomicbarrierconcernsthestate-fueltaxescanbealargesourceofincometostates,makingthemhesitanttopushtoostronglyforsun-settingfossil-basedtransportmodes.(Ontheotherhand,FFSconstitutealargeportionofmanystates'expendi-tures,sotheremaybeanetpositiveatleastinsomecases).
Linkages:Aspointedoutabove,transportandoilindustriesstronglydependononeanother.Changesinonewillverylikelyleadtochangeintheother.Thisconstitutespotentialtoswattwofliesatonce,but also double opposition by two strong incumbents. Sector-wise, the transport sector is closelylinkedtonationalpowersectors,especiallyifafuturestrengtheningoftransportelectrificationistakenintoaccount.Also,due to infrastructureneeds,anychange in the transport sectorwillhave tobeaccompaniedbyadaptingurbansettlementsandinextensionnationalinfrastructurestoaccommo-dateshiftingparadigmsintransportsystems.Therefore,commontargetsandsolutionswillverylikelybemoreeffectiveandhavehigherprobabilitiestolimitcarbonemissionsthanisolatedsectoralinsti-tutions.
Definingcommonstandardsisaclassiccollectiveactionproblemthatprofitsfromcoordination.Inter-nationalgovernancecanplayalargeroleinremovingbarriersthatarisefromalackofstandardisation.Onceastandardisset, it is likelythat itwillbeadheredtoprovidedthereissomeenforcementbynationalentities in thebeginning.On theotherhand, leavingstandardisation to theprivatesectorregimesoftenleadstodivergentstrategiesandcomplicationsinfindingacommonground(seee.g.phonecharging),butmayalsoensuecompetitionthat,inturn,furtherdrivesinnovation.
Finally, if a harmonised system for carbon pricing and a trading system is extended to nationaltransport sectors,an international registrywillneed tobe installed inorder toensure thatagreedemission limitsandthresholdsarerespected inordertoensurethe integrityof thesystem.Sucha
Currentstudiesindicatethatmanydeveloping/emergingcountriesmimicinfrastructuredevelopmentsofindustrialisedcountries,albeitatoftenamuchgranderscale(Arndtetal.,2014).Internationalco-operation,mainlybutnotlimitedtoNorth-Southcooperation,onbestpracticesthroughpartnershipssuchasLocalGovernmentsforSustainability(ICLEI)orthroughtheNon-StateActorZoneforClimateAction, would help leapfrogging such suboptimal solutions. This would include common technicalknowledge,butwouldalsoextendtoexchangesonpoliciesthathaveshownhigheffectiveness.Whilepolicieswillalwaysneedtobeshapedaccordingtonationalcircumstance,policydialogueswillprovideusefulstartingpointsfortransportdecarbonisation.
4.9 Internationaltransport(aviationandmaritime)
4.9.1 Currentstatusandprospect
Global aviation (domestic and international combined) currently produces around twoper cent ofglobalCO2emissions;globalshippingaboutthreepercent(Gencsu&Hino,2015).22Incombination,however, the internationalshippingandaviationsectorsconstituteasignificantlygrowingshareofglobalemissions;growingbyaround80percentintermsofcarbonemittedbetween1990and2010,whilegrowthofothersectors intheworldeconomywasapproximately40percent(CDIAC2013a;CDIAC2013b;UNFCCC2013cited inBows-Larkin2015). Inpart thiswasdrivenby rapidgrowth inemergingeconomies,butalsoaroseasaconsequenceofthelackofcoverageofthesesectorsinthenationalmitigationpoliciesofUNFCCCAnnexInations(Bows-Larkin,2015).Thishighgrowthislikelytocontinue.Forshipping,CO2emissionsareexpectedtoriseby50-250percentby2050undercurrentpolicies(IMO,2014).Foraviation,arangeofscenariosispossibleinwhichCO2emissionsrisebyupto515percentbetween2000and2050(Gudmundsson&Anger,2012),althoughmoretypicalfiguresarearound220percent(Bows-Larkin,2015).
Thestructureoftheaviationindustry–featuringtwodominantmanufacturersandafewkeyairlines–issomewhatconducivetodecarbonisationefforts(Bows-Larkin,2015).Majorregionalshiftsarealsonotable,withgrowthofairtravelindevelopingmarkets,notablyinLatinAmericaandAsia.Inthecaseofshipping,acomplicatedindustrystructure-manyshipbuilders,owners,operators,shippers,char-terers and end-users –makes steps to encourage decarbonisationmore problematic (Bows-Larkin2015).FollowingBows-Larkin(Bows-Larkin,2015),inthediscussionbelowwedistinguishtechnologicalaspectsfrompractice/operationalanddemand-sideaspects.
Aviation
Concernoverenergycostshasdrivendevelopmentandrelativelywidespreaddeploymentofbettertechnologyintheformofextremelyefficientgasturbineengines.Opportunitiesforongoingimprove-mentsare,however,indecline(Bows-Larkin,2015).Furthergainswouldrequireafundamentalshiftindesign,e.g.open-rotorenginesorpropfans,whichcouldcutfuelintensityperaircraftbyuptoa50percent(Akerman,2005),butwhicharecurrentlyheldbackbyhighnoiseandvibrationlevels.Newconstructionmaterialscanalsodeliverbetterfuelefficiency,butrealbenefitsonlymaterializeasthefleetrenews.Biofuelsarebeingdevelopedandmayalsooffersomebenefits.Theindustry’sowntar-gets (seebelow) suggest that combined technologicaldevelopmentsoffer aone–twoper cent im-provementinfuelefficiencyperyear(Bows-Larkin,2015)(insufficientofitselftobecompatiblewiththe2℃target,althoughrecentlyfiguresof3.7percenthavebeenrecorded(IEA,2017b).
Despitesomeencouragingrecentdevelopments,includingcommitmentsbytheaviationsectortocapnetemissionsat2020levels(principallybyoffsetting)(Gencsu&Hino,2015),progressinbothsectorshasbeenslow.ThelatestassessmentbytheIEAofprogresstowardsinterim2°Cscenariotargetsin2025warnsthatinternationalshippingis‘off-track’whileaviationshowssomeimprovementbutmoreeffort is needed (IEA, 2017b).Although lower carbonalternatives certainlyexist, phasingoutGHGemissionsentirelyinthesesectorsisadistantprospect.Mitigationpotentialsvarysignificantly:whileshippinghasmanytechnologicalandoperationaloptionsthatcouldbeeffectiveintheshorttome-diumterm,aviationdoesnot.Inthissection,weagaindistinguishtechnologicalmeasuresfrominter-ventionsbasedonchangingoperationsanddemand-sidemeasures.Webeginwithshipping.
MeetingtheIEA’s2�scenariorequirestheglobalshippingfleettoimprovefuelefficiencypervehicle-kmatanannualrateof2.3percentbetween2015and2025.Initscurrentform,theIMO’sEnergyEfficiencyDesignIndexmandatesaonepercentannualimprovementintheefficiencyoftheglobalfleetfrom2015to2025(IEA,2017b).Further improvementstoefficiency,throughawiderangeofincrementaltechnologies,manyofwhichcouldberetrofittedtoexistingships,arepossible(Moforetal.,2015).Inaddition,pioneeringwindpowertechnologies–includeFlettnerrotors,kites,andfixedorrigidsails-couldofferfuelsavingsofupto50percent(Moforetal.,2015).Regardingtherangeofalternativefuels,LNGcutstheemissionsintensityofoperationsintheshortterm,andisfavouredbythe sector as a transitional fuel; a suitable bunkering network is rapidly evolving on establishedtransportroutes(Moforetal.,2015).However,afleet-wideswitchtoLNGwouldbe insufficienttodeliver2�-typedecarbonisation,andwouldriskfurthercarbonlock-in.Biogas,biofuels,andmicro-algae are subject to the same sustainability concerns expressed about them in other sectors(Bengtsson,Fridell,&Andersson,2012).
Variousconceptsandprototypesexistforelectricandhydrogenfuelcell-poweredvessels.However,emissionsavingsdependontheprimarysourceofenergybeingused(Moforetal.,2015).Potentialforsolar-powerhasalsobeennoted(Moforetal.,2015),aswellasforalternativefuelssuchashydro-genandammonia.Developmentofhydrogenfuelcelltechnologyhasmadesignificantadvances,alt-houghsustainabilityofhydrogenproductionisacriticalissue,withalmostallcurrentcommercialpro-ductioncomingfromfossilfuels(Moforetal.,2015).Atleastinprinciple,nuclearpowercouldhaveasignificant decarbonising effect (Walsh,Mander, & Larkin, 2017), benefiting from development ofmodularnuclearreactorsinthepowersector.Todevelopsuccessfulmarinemitigation,‘itisessentialtoconsidertheinterdependenciesbetweenshipspeed,levelandpatternofdemandforservices,andtheextentandrateofinnovationinpropulsiontechnology’(Walshetal.,2017).Therateoftechno-logicalinnovationistooslow,meaningthat‘itisdifficulttoforeseehowdeepdecarbonisationcanbeachievedwithoutanimmediate,fleet-widespeedreduction;andaland-basedenergy-systemtransi-tionstronglyinfluencesshippingdemand,whichinturn,influencestheextentofrequiredlow-carbonpropulsiontechnologychange’(Walshetal.,2017).Reducingpowerrequirementsimprovesthepro-portionthatcouldbeprovidedbyrenewabletechnologies,andalsoallowsimmediatecutsinCO2tobedelivered(IMO,2014;Psaraftis&Kontovas,2013).
On thedemand-side, although investments inhigh-speed railmay serve to reducedemand for airtravel,itsroleislimitedinthataround80percentofallaviationemissionsarefromflightsover1,500km(ATAG,2014).Technological innovations,suchasvideo-conferencing,canalsoservetomanagedemandinsomecircumstances,savingtimeandmoneyforbusinessesandindividuals.
Withregardtoorganisational,structuralandbehaviouralbarriers,limitedR&Dfinancing,particularlyforinitialproof-of-concepttechnologies,isamajorfactor,togetherwithshipowners’concernsovertheriskofhiddenandadditionalcosts,aswellasopportunitycostsofrenewableenergysolutions.Historically, a lack of reliable information on costs and potential savings of specific operationalmeasuresorrenewableenergysolutionshasbeennoted(Gencsu&Hino,2015;Moforetal.,2015).Thefundamentalmarketfailureisoneofsplitincentivesbetweenshipownersandhirers,limitingthemotivationofownerstoinvestinsolutionssincebenefitsmaynotaccruetotheinvestingparty.Inves-torstendtoberiskaverse,especiallyaftertheshippingboomcollapsedin2006.Significantlevelsoffleetturnover/retrofittingmustbeachieved,themaintenanceofwhichacrossextendedperiodshashistoricallyproveddifficult(Walshetal.,2017).Sufficientlyrapidfleet-wideretrofitarguablyrequiresadequatedry-dockingservicesaroundtheworldandopportunitiesfordemonstratingnewtechnolo-gies (Walsh et al., 2017). Moreover, widespread technological uptake necessitates extensiveknowledgeexchangetoensurenewlyfittedtechnologiesareoperatedcorrectly.North-Southtech-nical co-operation and transfer of technologymaybe necessary. Early-adopterswould need to bestronglyincentivised(Walshetal.,2017).Furthermore,theshippingsector’slowpublicprofileresultsinlesssocietalpressuretochange.Ofthenon-marketbarriers,thedifferentclassesandscalesofships,themarketsandtraderoutesservedandthe lackofaccesstocapitalaresomeof thekeybarriers(Moforetal.,2015).
Thereissignificantneedforregulation(standards,rules)at international leveltoincentiviseglobal-scaleaction.Inbothsectors,globalemissionlimitscouldbeimplementedgloballybymarket-basedinstrumentssuchastaxationandemissionstrading,ormoredirecttechnologicalregulationthroughstandardsetting–oracombination.Internationalagreementtotaxaviationandshippingfuel(withrevenuespotentiallyrecycledintoresearchanddevelopmentfordecarbonisation)couldfacilitatecol-lectiveaction.Inprinciple,itisalsopossibleforstatestoremovetaxexemptionfromairserviceagree-mentsonabilateralbasis.Theemergenceofnewtechnologieswilllikelyrequireadequatestandards(agreeduponbyglobalinstitutionsandshipclassificationcompanies).Inshipping,requiringverifiedvesselefficiencyratings,takingintoaccounttheeffectofnewtechnologies,mayincentivisetheinstal-lationofsuchtechnologiesthroughenhancingthecompetitiveresalevalueofavessel.Inbothsectors,ensuringthatoffsetschemesandtheproductionofalternativefuelsadheretohighqualitystandardsiscritical,asside-effectscouldunderminetheeffectivenessofsuchmeasures.
Addressingdistributionalequity issues (esp. inNorth-Southcontext) is alsonecessary, andmaybepromotedbyinternationalagreementsthatarephasedinovertimeforcertainactors,orbyexplicitfinanceandtechnologytransfermeasures(seealsodiscussionbelow).
(Joint)R&Dforlow-carbontechnologies,involvingairlines,governmentsandotherstakeholdershasbeen recommended, particularly for new aircraft design and sustainable biofuels (Gencsu&Hino,2015).
Theliteraturenoteshowdecarbonisationofinternationalshippingcanbegreatlyfacilitatedbywiderdecarbonisationoftheeconomy.ForacountrysuchastheUK,asmuchas50percentofthetonnageimportedmaybefossilfuels(thefigurefrom2010).Changestothelevelsoffossilfuelconsumptionand thegrowth inbiomass/biofuels could thereforehavea significant impacton shippingdemand(Bows-Larkin,2015;Mander,Walsh,Gilbert,Traut,&Bows,2012).
Inter-linkagesarealsoevidentintermsofthepotentialeffectsofslowsteaming.Whilecompensationintheformofincreasedshipsizeornumberstomaintainfreightflowsmighthelpensureacceptabilityto the industry, the effects on global supply chainsmight require restructuringof some industries(Walshetal.,2017).
Atnationalandregional level,apolycentricapproachtourbandevelopmentcanhaveconsiderableadvantages. The emergingmega-cities frequently feature overtaxed infrastructures, overburdenedmunicipaladministrations,hostile-to-lifesettlementstructuresandsocio-economicallypolarizedur-bansocieties.Strengtheningsmallandmedium-sizedtownsandnetworkingthemwith largercitiescan combine the advantages of agglomeration and decentralization, allowing for better use of re-sourcesaswater, foodandenergydonothavetobetransportedover longdistances intothe fewcentres(WBGU,2016).
• Finally,low-lyingcitiesthatarefrequentlyhitbystrongstormsystemsfacethedoublechal-lenge of achieving low-emission and climate-resilient development (Huang, Busch, He, &Harvey,2015;Seto,Dhakal,etal.,2014;WBCSD,2010).
Given the central role of localisedurban strategies, a core elementof sustainability governance isgrantingcitiestherighttoself-governmentandprovidingthemwiththemeanstocharttheirownlocal
Indoingso,urbandevelopmentwillhavetoovercomeenshrinedparadigms.Mostcitiesintheworldtodayhavebeenbuiltas ‘zoned’ cities,wheredifferent typesof landuse (residential, commercial,manufacturing,service, recreational)havebeen largelykeptseparate.Anotherdominantparadigmhasbeentheequationofmobilitywith(individual)transport,withbuildingofevermoreinfrastructurefor cars at the heart of transportation strategies and policies (UnitedNationsHuman SettlementsProgramme,2013).
Whereurbandevelopmentdoesnotsufferfromalackofplanning,itoftensuffersfromplanningdoneonthebasisofhigh-emissionparadigms,suchaszoningandorientationoftransport infrastructuretowardscars.Climate-friendlyurbandevelopmentcouldprofit strongly if internationalgovernancedevelopedanewparadigmofsustainableurbandevelopment.Thisparadigmwillhavetointegratemitigationwithotherhigh-priorityurbandevelopmentobjectives.Keyelementsofsuchaparadigmshouldincludeanobjectiveofnetzeroemissionsby2050,tobeachievedthroughmeanssuchaslim-itingurbansprawl,transit-orienteddevelopment,developmentofmixed-useareas,useofrenewableenergyresourcesandothers.
The global buildings and construction sector accounts formore than half of globalwealth (GlobalAllianceforBuildingsandConstruction,2016).In2010,thebuildingssectorconsumed32percentoftotalglobalfinalenergyuse(51percentofglobalelectricityconsumption)andproduced19percentofGHGemissionsor9.18GtCO2eq(includingelectricity-related,whiledirectemissionsstoodat6.4percentoftheglobaltotal)(Luconetal.2014,p.687).GHGemissionsfromthebuildingsectorhavemorethandoubledsince1970(Luconetal.2014,p.678).MostoftheGHGemissionsinthebuildingssectorareindirectCO2emissionsthatemanatefromelectricityuseinbuildingsandareprojectedtogrowfasterthananyothersector,inparticularemissionsfromcommercialbuildings—1.8percentayearthrough2030(Knox,2015).
Populationgrowth,urbanisation,risingpercapitaincomes,andclimatechangearekeyfactorsthatwilldramaticallyimpactthissectoranddriveanincreaseofenergyuse.TheUnitedNationsDepart-mentofEconomicandSocialAffairs(UNDESA)estimatesglobalpopulationtogrowto9.7billionby2050 of which approximately 2.5 billion will be new urban inhabitants, mainly in Africa and Asia(UNDESA,2015).Urbanareaswillcomprise85percentofgrowthinbuildingenergyuseuntil2050,70per cent of them in developing countries (Diana Urge-Vorsatz, Cabeza, Serrano, Barreneche, &Petrichenko,2015).Asglobaltemperaturerises,thedemandforspacecoolingamongstwarmercoun-triesisexpectedtotriplebetween2010and2050(IEA,2013).Moreover,urbanisationistypicallyas-sociatedwithashiftfromtraditionalbiomassfuels(suchaswoodandwaste)tomoremodernfuels(suchasnaturalgasorelectricity),butalsowithgreaterpotentialforenergyefficiencymeasures.Over-all,theIPCChaswarnedthat,intheabsenceofaction,theuseofenergyinbuildingscoulddoubleorinworsecase,tripleby2050(Luconetal.,2014).Inordertomeetthe2°CobjectivesetoutbytheParisAgreement,thebuildingssectorwouldhavetoreduceenergyandprocess-basedCO2emissionsby60percentin2050comparedto2012(Dean,Dulac,Petrichenko,&Graham,2016).
EnormouspotentialforreducingenergyconsumptionandGHGemissionscanberealisedthroughret-rofittingexistingbuildingsaswellas,evenmoreso,inconstructingnewbuildings.Buildingsenvelopesarekey.AccordingtotheIEA,ahigh-performancebuildingenvelopeforexistingandnewbuildingsinOECDcountriescanreduceenergyrequiredforheatingto20-30percentofcurrentconsumptionwhileitcanboostenergysavingspotentialforcoolingbetween10-40percentinhotcountries(IEA,2013).Holistic retrofitscanresult in50–90percent finalenergysavings in thermalenergyuse inexistingbuildings,withthecostsavingsusuallysurpassinginvestments(D.Urge-Vorsatzetal.,2012).Asre-gardsnewbuildings,cost-effectivetechnologyandmaterialsnowmakeitpossibletoconstructbuild-ingsthatuse10–40percentofthefinalheatingandcoolingenergyofconventionalnewbuildingsinallworldregionsandclimatezones(D.Urge-Vorsatzetal.,2012).
LeadershipinEnergyandEnvironmentalDesigncertificationisthemostwidelyusedthird-partyveri-ficationforgreenbuildingsandensuresthatbuildingsuseonethirdlesselectricity(Knox,2015).TheWorldGreenBuildingTrends2016 study finds thatglobally, greenbuilding construction is steadilyrising,mostofthegrowthcomingfromemergingeconomiesinAsia.Smartbuildingtechnologyspend-ingisalsoexpectedtorisefromUSD6.3billionin2014toUSD17.4billionin2019(Feblowitz&Levine,2015).
Theprincipal-agentproblemisalsoimportantespeciallyinOECDcountrieswhereeitherbuildingde-velopersseektominimisecostswithout the long-term interestsofownersoroccupiers inmindorwherelandlordsmakepurchaseheatingandcoolingequipmentfortenantswithoutregardtolife-cyclecosts(Murtishaw&Sathaye,2006).Stronganddiversemarketorientedpoliciesthatcanovercomethesehurdleswillhelpincatalysingpotentiallycost-effectiveinvestments(Luconetal.,2014).Thelack
Acommoninternationalgoaloffulldecarbonisationofthesector(e.g.bythesecondhalfofthecen-tury)withtargetsdifferentiatedbyregioncouldhelptoalignthediversityofactorsinthesector.Thiscouldbeanimportantsignal“toconsumersandmanufacturers,bothtomaximiseefficiencyandtolimit the costof future changes” (IEA,2011).Awell-definedglobal carbonneutral strategy for thebuildingssectorwithdifferentiatedtargetscanprovidearoadmapforsustainablebuildingssubsectors(likeheatingandcooling,cooking,heatingwater,wherechallengesareindeedsharedacrossanumberofcountriesand/orregions)(GlobalAllianceforBuildingsandConstruction,2016).
SettingRulestoFacilitateCollectiveAction
Internationalregulationcanplayacomplementaryrolebyaddressingcompetitivenessconcerns.Suchconcernsexisttotheextentthatdecarbonisingbuildingscausesignificantnetcosts.ThisisespeciallythecaseforthemoreadvancedtransitiontoNZEBs.Havingsaidthat,manyoftheoptionsforsignifi-cantlyreducingemissionsinthesectordonotinvolvesignificantnetcosts,butevengeneratenetben-efits.Onechallengeindevelopinganyinternationalruleswillbetotakeintoaccountthewidelyvaryingconditions indifferentcountriesandregions.Anadditionalpotentialmayexistwith respect to theinternationalharmonisationofcertainbuildingmaterials.
Theprovisionofadequatemeansofimplementationcanhelpaddresssomeofthekeybarrierstothedecarbonisationofthebuildingssectoratthegloballevel.Internationaltraining,capacitybuildingandawarenessprogrammesforthelargenumberofstakeholdersinvolvedinthebuildingssectorcanhelpraiseawarenessandenhanceskillsandexpertise.Suchcapacitybuildingcanhelpinformstakeholdersin particular in low-mid income countries about otherwise overlooked affordable decarbonisationmeasures.Internationalfinancehasakeyroletoplayindeliveringtheenormousfinanceandinvest-mentrequiredtobringaboutthetransitioninthebuildingssector,inparticularamongstlow-midin-comecountries.Internationalbankscanhelppromotedecarbonisationbyprioritizinggreenbuildingsthroughsoftloans,betterinterestratesorgreenbonds(WEF2011).Multilateraldevelopmentbankscanhelpensurethat investmentsareavailable inallcountries/regions.Aparticularpotentialexistsregardingthedistributionofcleancookstovesthatcanhelpreduceemissionsinthesectoratalargescaleinmanydevelopingcountries.
KnowledgeandLearning
Policy and technical knowledgeplatforms canhelp increase information and awareness, allow thesharingofbestpractices,enablediffusionoftechnicalknow-how,developsolutionstocommoncon-cernsliketheprincipal-agentproblemandempowerpolicymakerstodevelopeffectivepoliciesand
Appliancesmakeupamajorshareofresidentialelectricitydemand:refrigerators(14percent),televi-sions(TVs)(sevenpercent),andwashingmachines(twopercent).Collectively,thesethreetypesofappliancesaccountedfor~761MtCO2ein2010(bigEE,2013a)equivalenttoabout2.5percentoftotalCO2 emissions from fuel combustion. Substantial emission reduction potential exists, if consumersopted for themostefficientmodelevery timeoneof theseappliances ispurchased.Thepotentialamountstoalmost0.5GtCO2perannumby2020(bigEE,2013a;IPCC,2014b).Thisdoesnotevencoverembodiedemissionsthatoccurintheprocessproducingandrecyclingofappliances.Forbigappliances,dependingontheemissionintensityoftheelectricityusedduringtheusephaseassociatedemissionsofproductionandrecyclingareestimatedtoamountto~20percentoftheemissionsthatoccurovertheproduct’slifecycle.ForTVsandInformationandCommunicationTechnology(ICT)equipmentthesharemaybeevengreater(GEA&IIASA,2012).Forrefrigerators,thereisanotherchallengeasmostrefrigerantsentailhighlypotentGHGsthatmayentertheatmosphereifnotrecycledproperly.23
AccordingtoUNEP’s“en.lighten”initiativelightingaccountsfor15percentofglobalelectricitycon-sumptiontranslatingintoroughlyfivepercentofglobalGHGemissions(UNEP,2016).Efficiencyim-provementsinlightinghavemadeparticularadvanceswithcostsofLightEmittingDiode(LED)lightingplungingand investmentssoaring (seebelow).Consequently,substantialenergysavingshavebeenrealizedover conventional lighting setups (145 terawatthoursorTWh in2016). Yet, these savingsrepresent only a fraction of the total remaining savings potential of an estimated 1600 TWh (IEA,2016b).
Annualemissionsarelikelytogrowfurtherinthecomingdecadesastheproliferationofappliancesincreasesindevelopingcountries.Typically,theappliancepenetrationincreaseswithlevelsofincome,butotherfactorssuchaswealth,affordabilitybutalsoculturalfactorsmayplayarole.Indevelopedcountries,thereisalmostubiquitouspenetrationofTVsandrefrigerators,butgreatervariabilityfordomesticwashingmachines.While95percentofEuropeanandJapanesehouseholdsownwashingmachine,thepenetrationrateseemstohavelevelledoffintheUSat~80percentandthereissomeindication that thismay also occur in emerging economies such as SouthAfrica andBrazil (Rao&Ummel,2017).
Even if energy efficiency improvements are realized, there further challenges that need to be ad-dressed tocurbabsoluteemissions in the sector.Amajorone is the reboundeffect:whenenergyservicesbecomemoreaffordablebecauseofefficiencyimprovements,thismayleadtoanincreaseofdemandinthesameservices.Theremayalsobeanindirectreboundeffectinthathouseholdsmayspend financial savings realized throughmoreefficientenergy servicesonother formsofemissionintensiveconsumption(Gillingham,Rapson,&Wagner,2016).
Anotherissueregardssufficiency.Sachsdefinessufficiencyinrelationtoefficiency:“Whileefficiencyisaboutdoingthingsright,sufficiencyisaboutdoingtherightthings”(Sachs,2015).Theconceptofsufficiencythusentailsrestrictionsonabsolutedemandforgoodsandservices(Samadietal.,2016).Inotherwords,theremaybeunsustainablelevelsofdemandforenergyservicesandhenceaneedtoreduceabsoluteconsumption levels. Inpractice, thiswouldmeanthat the trend toeverbiggerTVscreensormorevoluminous refrigerators is reducedandeventually reversed.While firstadvanceswith respect to sufficiencyenablingpolicieshavebeenmade (Thema,Thomas,Kopatz, Spitzner,&Ekardt,2017),theissueremainsstillamarginalone.
Thefirstwayinwhichinternationalgovernancecouldadvancethetransformationofappliancesandconsumergoodmarketswouldbe throughsignallingclearandcrediblecommitment for long-termefficiencyimprovements(guidanceandsignalfunction).Asdiscussedabove,onekeybarrieristhehighdegreeofuncertaintyfacedbymanufacturerswithrespecttodemandforenergyefficientproducts.Politicalstatementsandlong-termgoalsforenergyefficiencyimprovementsincombinationwithcred-ibleshort-termpoliciestoachievethesetgoalscanhelpreducerisksandincentivizemanufacturerstoinvest in innovatinganddiffusinghighefficiencymodels. Forexample, theEU included theoveralltargettoimproveenergyefficiencyby20percentoverbusiness-as-usualprojectionsby2020inits2020climateandenergypackage,alongsidegoalstoreduceGHGemissionsandtoincreaserenewableenergydeployment.Includinganexplicittargetforenergyefficiencyalongsideothertargetscouldpro-videtherequiredsignalforthesector(Sterk&Hermwille,2013).Analternativetosuchaninterna-tionalgoalmightbearequirementtoestablishsuchtargetsatlowergovernancelevels.
InternationallyharmonizedMEPS,efficiencylabels,informationrequirementsandmeasuringstand-ardscouldnotonlyhelptoconveyinvestmentsignalsbutwouldalsoservetofulfilthegovernancefunctionofenablingcollectiveactionandwouldhelptoaddresstheothertworemainingkeybarriersforincreaseduptakeofefficientappliances,namelylackofknowledgeandtosomeextentlackofin-terest on thepart of consumers. Efficiency labelling addresses the former.Minimumperformancestandardscanbeseenasawaytoovercomethelatterasitwouldincreasetheenergyperformanceofdefaultchoicesforthosewhohavenostronginterestinsearchingforthemostefficientalternativetoprocuringenergyservices.
What ismore, theharmonizationof labelsandstandardsmayhelp reducecoston thepartof theindustry.Ontheotherhand,acommonstandardforefficiencyassessmentsmaycreatethefoundationalsoforcommonminimumenergyperformancestandards.Butthereisalsoapotentialdownsidetoaglobalharmonizationofefficiencystandards. In thepast, thevariousefficiencystandardshaveen-gaged in competition on themost stringent efficiency labels. A harmonization of global efficiencystandardscutcurtailthiskindofcompetitionandhencecurtailanimportantdriveroftheevolutionofefficiencystandards.Giventheambivalenceofthepotentialeffectofinternationalharmonizationofefficiencylabellingandstandards,thecollectiveactionfunctionfortheappliancessectorisconsideredtobeofmediumimportance.
Thetransparencyandaccountabilityfunctionofinternationalgovernanceisonlyrelevanttotheextentthatcommonstandards (MEPS)areadopted internationally. In this case, it canhelpenforce thosestandards.
Global financial flowsgoingto low-carbonandclimate-resilientdevelopmenthavebeengrowing inrecentyearsfromUSD97billionin2009/10(Buchner,Falconer,Hervé-Mignucci,&Trabacchi,2011),toanannualaverageofUSD367billionin2013/2014,withthemajority(93percent)ofthesefundsgoingtoeffortstoreduceGHGemissionsinthreemainareas:renewableenergygeneration,energyefficiency,andsustainabletransport(Buchneretal.,2016).Althoughthetrackingoffinancialflowstolow-carbondevelopmenthasbeenimproving,awiderangeofdefinitionsandmethodologiesarestillused.However,mostdataaggregatorsreportsimilarlevelsofannualrenewableenergyinvestmentinarangeofUSD250to265billionfortheperiod2013/14.(Buchneretal.,2016;IEA,2014a;UNFCCC,2016).
Nevertheless, investmentsstill fall significantlyshortofwhat isneededtoachievenationalclimatetargetsandglobalgoals.Therearedifferentestimatesforhowmuchinvestmentisneededtoshifttheworldontoawellbelow2°Cpathway,andverylittleliteratureisavailableoninvestmentneededtoshifttoapathwayconsistentwiththegoaltolimitglobaltemperatureincreaseto1.5°C.Reportsthatusescenariosthatarenotcompatiblewiththe1.5°Climitwillthereforeunderestimatetheactualscaleofinvestmentsneeded.
Public financingtomitigateclimatechangeremainskeybecause itdirectlymobilisesand leveragesprivatesectorinvestmentandindirectlycreatesscaledupandcommerciallysustainablemarketsfor
Despite the above developments and emerging shifts that demonstrate the potential for climate-alignedinvestments,asignificantaccelerationin“shiftingthetrillions”towardsgreensourcesofen-ergy isneededtoavoidexceeding theParisAgreement’s temperature limit.Sucha transformationrequiresreformsinanumberofareas,includingforexample,disclosureofinformationaboutclimateriskstofinancialmarkets,mainstreamingrisksandimpactsassociatedwithclimatechangeintoinvest-mentdecisions,andmovingfromshort-termtowardslong-terminvestmenthorizons.Further,policyframeworksinfluencinginvestmentsintheenergysectormayneedtobereformedsothatfossilfuelexternalitiesareinternalisedintoproductionandconsumptionpractices.ThisshouldincludesettingstrongcarbonpricesandeliminatingdistortingFFSandothersupporttofossilfuels.Developingcli-mate-compatiblefinancialinstrumentsandinvestmentcriteriawillalsohelptoinforminvestmentde-cisionsthatwillcontributetowarddecarbonisationandimprovetransparencyofthosedecisions.
Inconsistentpolicysignalsbygovernmentsaresignificantbarriersforadecisiveandorderlylow-car-bontransition.TheParisAgreementhasgivenaclearsignalthatstrengtheningtheglobalresponsetothethreatofclimatechangeneedstomakefinancial flowsconsistentwithapathwaytowards lowGHGemissionsandclimate-resilientdevelopment.However,anumberofstudieshaveconcludedthatgovernments’backingandsupporttofossilfuelproductioncreateenergymarketdistortionsbysend-ingcontrarysignals to investorsthatcontinuetodependonfossil fuels (Gerasimchuketal.,2017).Clearlong-termpoliciesandsufficientregulatoryframeworksareneededtosendappropriatesignalstomarkets and investors, and to incentivize the engagement of the private sector (OECD/IEA andIRENA,2017).
Subsidiestofossilfuelproductionfurtherdistortenergymarketsbyloweringcostsofoil,coalandgasproduction,therebyencouragingfossilfuelconsumption.Thisisoneofthemainreasonswhyenergyefficiencyandcleanenergyinvestmentsstillremainlesscompetitiveinsomemarkets(Gerasimchuketal.,2017).SomestudieshavefoundthatabarrierforremovingFFS,particularlyindevelopingcoun-tries,istherisingcostofenergywhichisusuallytransferredtohouseholdconsumers,whicharemostsensitivetopricerises(Roberts,2016).However,thereareotherstudiesthatindicateeliminatingFFSdoesnotaffectallhouseholdsequallyandusually it is thehigher incomegroupsthatbenefitmostfromFFS(Coady,Parry,Sears,&Shang,2015).
Subsidiesforfossilfuelsandothermarketdistortionsthatdonotreflecttheexternalitiesofthefulleconomic,socialandenvironmentalcostoffossilfuelscaninpartbeaddressedwithmarket-basedmechanismsintendedtopricecarbonthrough,forexample,emissiontradingschemesorcarbontaxes.However,remainingbarrierstothemarketpenetrationofsuchmechanismsincludelowpricesofcar-bon and their insufficient coverage relative to global GHG emissions. Prices under carbon-pricingschemesremaintoolowinG20countriestoencourageasubstantialshifttolowcarboneconomies(Burcketal.,2017).
Lackof informationandknowledge isanotherbarrier that institutional investorsandcentralbanksface.Thoughtheawarenessandresponsivenesstoclimaterelatedrisksofassetownersandinvestorshasincreased,mostofthemstilllackin-housecapacityandexperiencetodevelopaninformedviewaboutclimatechangescenariosandstrategizeaccordingly.Moreover,manyoftheseinvestorsfinditdifficulttoincorporateclimaterisksintotheirinvestmentstrategies(EY,2016).Onestudyevenfoundthatcentralbanksdonotconsidermainstreamingclimatechangeintotheiroperationaldecisionsistheirresponsibility,withonestatedreasonbeingtheneedtoavoiddistortingthemarket(Matikainenetal.2017).
Anothermajorbarrieristhefactthatfinancialinvestorsareprioritizingfinancingshort-termliabilitieswhichhasnegativeimpactongreeninvestments,whichoftenrequirehighupfrontinvestmentcosts(MatthewScott,vanHuizen,&Jung,2017).Highperceivedrisks,limitedfinancialviabilityandlimitedlong-termcapital formbarriers for theprivatesector to invest incapital intenserenewableenergyprojects.Green investments typicallysufferhigher riskperceptionsduetoadependenceonpublicpolicyand,often,therelativeimmaturityoftechnologies,markets,andindustries,especiallyindevel-opingcountries(Frisari,Hervé-Mignucci,Micale,&Mazza,2013).However,investorsoftendonottakeintoaccountthatdelayedactionwouldhaveasignificantimpactonstrandedassets,createdbyphys-icalclimatechangeimpactsandthetransitiontoalow-carboneconomy(IRENA2017b).Anoverarch-ingchallengeisthereforehowtoleveragethefinancialsystemtosupportthelow-carbontransitionintherealeconomy.Thepublicsectorcanhelptoovercomethesebarriersthroughtheuseofpublicfinancingmechanismssuchasriskmitigationinstrumentsincludingriskpoolingandtransfer,publicconcessionalfinancingandguarantees.
Whilethereisgrowingmomentumforfinancialinstitutionstodiscloseclimaterisksintheirinvestmentportfolios to investors, the lackof coherent, comparableand standardizedapproach toassessanddiscloserisksremainsthebiggestbarrier.Inordertoaddressthisconcern,theG20in2015requestedtheFSBtoreviewhowthefinancialsectorcantakeaccountofclimaterelatedissues(TCFD,2016).The
Theabsenceofanyinternationalburdensharingmechanismorrulesregardingtheprovisionandmo-bilization of financial resources to developing countries raises the question ofwhether developedcountryPartieswithobligationstoprovidefinancialsupportfollowthroughwithdeliveryofsuchsup-port.Inordertoensurethatallindustrialisednationsprovidetheirfairshareofsupporttodevelopingcountriesinlinewiththeirhistoricalresponsibilityandcapacitytopay,thefeasibilityofdevelopingfairburdensharingapproachescouldbeconsidered.However,inpreviousinternationalnegotiations,con-tributorscouldneitheragreeontheconceptnorformulasforburdensharing.
Internationaltransparencyandaccountabilityarekeyelementsfortrackingprogressonthefulfilmentofdevelopedcountries’obligationstomobilizeandprovideclimatefinancetodevelopingcountries,aswellasfortrackingprogressonglobaleffortsofshiftingallfinancialflowsfrombrowntowardsgreeninvestments.Existingtransparencyeffortslacktwomainelementsthatcouldbenefitfromincreasedinternationalcooperation:firstly,accountingforbothsidesoftheclimatefinanceledger,includingnotonly the climate-compatible investmentsbutalso thehigh-carbon investmentsor “brown finance”going to fossil fuel extraction andproduction, formeasuring the net climate benefit (Bodnar,Ott,Thwaites,DeMarez,&Kretschmer,2017);andsecondlycoherentandstandardizedapproachesforfinancial institutionstoassessandreportclimate-relatedfinancialriskandtoprovidedisclosurere-porting.
F-gasesareusedinalimitednumberofapplications.HFCsareprimarilyusedasrefrigerants(includinginairconditioningsystemsinvehiclesandbuildings),aerosolpropellants,foamblowingagents,sol-vents,andfireretardants(TEAP,2016).Theyarereleasedintotheatmosphereduringmanufacturingprocessesandthroughleaks,servicing,anddisposalofequipmentinwhichtheyareused.PFCsareemittedasaby-productofvariousindustrialprocessesassociatedwithaluminiumproductionandthemanufacturingofsemiconductors.SF6isusedinelectricaltransmissionanddistributionequipment,includingcircuitbreakers,magnesiumprocessing,semiconductorandflatpaneldisplaysmanufactur-ing, as a tracer gas for leak detection and filler for sound-insulatedwindows (Purohit&Höglund-Isaksson,2017;TEAP,2016).
PoliticaloppositionbypartsoftheF-gasindustryhasalsobeenanimportantobstacle.Thechemicalindustry,animportantinfluenceinmanycountries,hasarguedagainstF-gascontrolsaslongasthisseemedtoleadtoalossofbusinesstothem.ThisoppositionhassoftenedandevendisappearedwiththeinvestmentcycleforF-gasescomingtoanend(andrelatedintellectualpropertyrightsexpiring)andwith the industrymakingprogresson thedevelopmentof substitutes suchasHFOspromisingfuturebusiness(andnewintellectualpropertyrights).Thisfollowsapatternalsoobservedwithre-specttotheregulationandphase-outofCFCsandotherozone-depletingsubstances.
Regulatoryhurdlesarerelativelylimited.Regulatoryframeworksexistworldwideasaresultofthreedecadesofeffortstophaseoutozone-depletingsubstances,whichespeciallyHFCspartiallyreplaced.SubstitutingF-gasesinlargepartsconstitutesasimilarchallengethatcanbuildontheexistingframe-works forCFCs andotherozone-depleting substances.Accordingly, regulations to tackle certain F-gasesexistincertaincountriesandregions,includingtheEU,Japan,theUS,Australia,Norway,Swit-zerlandandChina(Purohit&Höglund-Isaksson,2017).
Finally,differencesincapacitybetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountriesneedtobeacknowledged.PatentsonHFOprocessesandapplicationsheldbyindustryindevelopedcountrieslimitopportunitiesforawiderangeof industry indevelopingcountries(inbothproductionandconsumptionsectors).Patentchallengescreatetechnologyandlegaluncertainties(WorldBank,2015).Moreover,technolo-giespertainingtonaturalsubstances,whichareatechnicallyfeasiblealternativeandwouldhelpde-velopingcountriesleapfrogHFCsaltogether,arecostlyandprimarilyavailableinindustrializedcoun-tries(Greenpeace,2016).Overall,especiallythelimitedavailabilityoftechnologyandfinanceaswellastheoverallcostsputconstraintsoneffortstoreduceandphaseoutF-gasesindevelopingcountries.
Global rules for phasing out F-gaseswill consequently require appropriate provisions for ensuringtransparencyandaccountabilitysothatanyfreeridingcanbediscoveredandaddressed.Inthisregard,itmaybenotedthat,adangerofillicittradeinrelevantsubstancesnotwithstanding,therelevantreg-ulatedactivities(productionanduseofthesechemicals)isintrinsicallyrelativetransparent(produc-tionisconcentratedinfewlargefacilitiesanduseinlargepartoccursinproductsthatarewidelyavail-able).
It shouldbeworthpointingout thatouranalysisat this stageabstracts fromtheworldofexistinginternationalinstitutions(bothintergovernmentalandtransnational).Itdoesnotincludeorimplyanassessmentoftheperformanceofthevariousexistinginternationalinstitutionsinaddressingclimatechangeandcontributing to thegovernance functionsdistinguished.Wehavehencehereaimed toidentifyandspecify thepotentialof international institutions ingeneral tocontributetomitigatingclimatechangeinlightofthespecificchallengesandcircumstancescharacterisingthesectoralsystemsinfocus.Thisismeanttoenableustocontrastthispotentialwiththeactualcontributioninternationalinstitutionsmake,inordertoidentifythescopeforenhancingthiscontributionandtoidentifyrelatedgaps–ananalysisthatistobeconductedaspartoftask4.2oftheproject.Wehaveherenotevaluatedexistinginternationalgovernanceefforts.
ThispotentialisnotleastrootedintheneedtocompletelyphaseoutnetGHGemissionsasearlyaspossibleinthesecondhalfofthiscenturyinordertoenableholdingtheincreaseofglobalaveragetemperature towellbelow2/1.5°C,as recognised inArticles2and4of theParisAgreement.Thisopensuptheopportunityofestablishinggeneraltargetsthatcanprovidedirectguidancetoindividualactorswithinsectoralsystems.Forexample,theneedtoachievenet-zeroemissionswithinthenextfewdecadestranslatesintotheneedtoimmediatelyhaltinvestmentintofossilfuelpowerstations,aclear target providingdirect guidance to any investor. In contrast, a hypothetical target of halvingemissionswouldnotnecessarilyprovidesuchclearguidance to individual investorsaseachoneofthemmayassumethe50%reductionwouldberealisedbyothers.
Asconcernssettingrules,wefindamorevariedpicture,withthegradesinMatrix5.2spanningthefullspectrum.Inunderstandingthisgradingandtheoverallpicture,itmaybeusefultoappreciatethattheneedanddemandforinternationalregulationcanbetracedbacktoatleastthreeverydifferentsourcesthatarenotmutuallyexclusive:First,inafewsectorsinternationalcompetitionandinterde-pendenceprovideastrongandevencompellingrationaleforaninternationalburdensharingandre-assuranceof implementation (energy-intensive industries,F-gases,…)aswellas foracommonap-proach(internationaltransport).Second,insomecasestheestablishmentofinternationalrules/stand-ardsseemstoenablecooperativeactionandprogressbyactors.Forexample,internationalstandardsseemtoberequiredtoenabletheestablishmentofrelatedexchangerelationships(results-basedpay-ments)intheLULUCFsector.Similarly,labellingandcertificationmayberequiredinordertoenablethecirculareconomygivenglobalvaluechains.Third, international regulationcouldservetomakeevengovernmentsactwhomaynototherwiseseethisasapriority.Thismay,forexample,bethecaseespeciallyasregardswasteandbuildingsandwouldneedtogohandinhandwiththeprovisionofsufficientmeansofimplementation(thisthirdcasewouldinitselfleadatbesttoagradingas“medium”sinceinternationalregulationcouldhardlybeseenascrucial).Overall,thereisclearlyalowerneedanddemandfor internationalregulation insomesectoralsystems(includingwaste,urbansystems,transport,andappliances)becauseactionintheseisdrivenbyotherfactors.
Asinthecaseoftheguidanceandsignalfunction,acloserlookatthespecificneedspersectoralsys-temisrequired,takingintoaccountpotentiallydifferentsituationsasregardsdifferentcomponentsofthissystem.Anoverarching,aggregateassessment(asreflectedinMatrix5.2)cannotdojusticetothefrequentlyvaryingcharacteristicsofdifferentcomponentsof thesectoralsystems in focus.Forexample,whilemanycausesofagriculturalGHGemissionsmaynotcruciallyneedtobeaddressedbymeansofinternationalregulation(e.g.CH4emissionsfromricepaddies),reducingandmodifyinguseoffertilisermaybenefitfrominternationalrulessinceitisacomponentaffectingthecompetitivenessoninternationalmarkets.Similarly,removingFFSmaybeoneparticulararearegardingextractivein-dustriesandfinanceandinvestmentforwhichinternationalagreement/regulationmayberequired.Ingeneral,anyaddedvalueofinternationalregulationinmostcasesrelatestoparticularcomponentsandspecificelementsofasectoralsystemanditsgovernance(ratherthanthesectorasawhole;fordetails,seeMatrix5.3andtheanalysesinsection4).Ameaningfulanalysisthusneedstofurtherdis-aggregatebeyondthelevelofsectoralsystems,forwhichthedistinctionbetweendifferentsectoralsystemswouldappeartoprovideausefulentrypoint.
Overall,theapplicationofourframingofthegovernancefunctionsofinternationalinstitutionsinthesectoralanalysisrevealsitspotential,butalsosomelimitations.Itenablesamoretargeted,differenti-atedanddetailedanalysisofthevaryingdemandfortheperformanceofcertaingovernancefunctionsbyinternationalinstitutionsinspecificsectoralsystems.Itthereforeadvancesfromanoverallaggre-gateperspectiveoninternationalclimategovernancethattreatsitasoneintegratedproblemtowardsamoreappropriateoutlookthattakesintoaccountthemultifacetednatureofthischallengeinvariousrelevantsectorsandcontexts.Suchamoredetaileddiagnosisenablesustoidentifymoreappropriateandmoretargetedcuresforthedifferentaspectsofthechallenge.Italsoprovidesanopportunitytoinvestigateand take intoaccount the furtherdifferentiation thatexistswithinsectoral systems.Asdemonstratedinouranalysis,settingrules,meansofimplementationandknowledgeandlearningcaneachmeanvariousthings.Thisdifferentiationshouldbeinvestigatedsinceitrequiresappropriatelyadaptedresponsesandcreatesvaryingdemandsforinternationalgovernance.
Hence, our analysis of the demand for international governance across different sectoral systemsshouldconstituteasoundbasisforthenextstepsandtasksinWorkPackage4oftheCOP21RIPPLESproject. Itprovidessuitablebenchmarks for investigatingexisting international institutionsand thecontributiontheymaketomeetingthedemandforinternationalgovernanceidentified.Thisinvesti-gationistoenableustoidentifyremaininggapsandunderdevelopedpotentialsandtosuggestprior-itiesinthisrespect.SuchananalysisshouldprovideusefulinputandguidancetopolicymakersintheEUandbeyondforidentifyingscopeandprioritiesforactiontoimproveinternationalclimategovern-ancetoacceleratethedecarbonisationofoursocietiessoastoenhancethechancestoholdglobaltemperatureincreasewellbelow2/1.5°C,inlinewiththeParisAgreement.
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