Deliberate Force NATO's First Extended Air Operation

Occasional Paper

June 1998

Deliberate Force: NATO's First Extended Air Operation

The View from AFSOUTH

David L. Dittmer Stephen P. Dawkins

The Center for Naval Analyses

The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is a private, nonprofit, federally funded research and development center that does analyses for the Department of the Navy. The Occasional Paper series is published by CNA, but the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CNA or the Department of the Navy.

About the authors

Dr. David Dittmer, a senior research analyst at CNA, was the CINC's CNA field representative in London during the Deliberate Force operation. At the beginning of the air operation, Dr. Dittmer was assigned to the CINC's staff in Naples to conduct the analysis that led to this paper. In his 24 years at CNA, he has served in 10 CNA field assignments, including two tours each at Sixth Fleet and CINCUSNAVEUR. Prior to his most recent field tours, Dr. Dittmer held management positions at CNA/Washington as Department Director for Air Warfare and Program Director for Systems Plan- ning.

Mr. Stephen Dawkins, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer, served as the Political Advisor to Admiral Smith in Naples and accompanied him to Bosnia. Mr. Dawkins' prior assignments included 3 years as the international affairs advisor to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in the Pentagon; a prior tour of duty in Naples as political advisor to earlier CINCs; and other Foreign Service assignments to U.S. embassies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, and at the Department of State. At present, he is a consultant to CNA and the Association of the U.S. Army.

Cleared for Public Release: Distribution urtlimited. For copies of this document, call the CNA Document Control and Distribution Section (703) 824-2943

Deliberate Force: NATO's First Extended Air Operation

The View from AFSOUTH

David L. Dittmer Stephen P. Dawkins

Center for Naval Analyses 4401 Ford Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268

Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

In t roduct ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Events o f ear ly summer 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Se izure of S rebren ica and Zepa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Deny F l ight degradat ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

London Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Act ion on UN-dec la red safe havens . . . . . . . . . . . 9

NAC dec is ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Bu i ld ing conf idence:

toward a NATO-UN MOU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 London Conference imp lementat ion . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Mov ing toward agreement on the MOU . . . . . . . . . 14

P reparat ion for en forcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

A i r s t r ikes beg in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Sara jevo market exp los ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

A i r s t r i ke p lann ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Cr i t ica l agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

A i r s t r i kes of August 30 and 31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Dea l ing w i th Serb Genera l M lad ic . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

NATO a i r s t r i kes cont inue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Bombing pause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Bombing pause of September 1 -5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Pol i t ica l cons iderat ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Summary to date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

M i l i ta ry cond i t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Who speaks for the Serbs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

iii

Resumpt ion o f a ir s t r i kes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Ear ly lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Rap id React ion Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

S t r ike p lann ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

TLA_M at tack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Cessat ion o f hos t i l i t i es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 72-hour pause : eva luat ing compl iance . . . . . . . . . 41

Ba lance sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Fo l low-on pause : w i thdrawa l and ver i f i ca t ion . . . . . 43

Conc lus ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Append ix : De l iberate Force pr inc ipa ls . . . . . . . . . 49

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Acknowledgments This account of Operation Deliberate Force resulted from a

request by Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, to chronicle the events of a unique episode in peace enforcement. It focuses on capturing the key events and lessons learned from this NATO air operation while the operation was in progress and still fresh in the minds of the principals involved. Sources used were primarily the personal recollections of the authors, who were on the AFSOUTH staff at that time, as well as the recollections and notes of senior staff.

The authors wish to gratefully acknowledge both the unique access provided by the CINC and his unflagging enthusiasm for reviewing the numerous iterations of this paper. Also, the CINC's Executive Assistant, Captain Howard A. Petrea, USN, and Commander James Carr, USN, offered invaluable assistance during the writing of the initial version at the CINC's Headquarters in Naples, Italy. We also benefited from the careful review and recommendations given by Captain Robert D. Maslowsky, then Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Policy, and Requirements on the CINC's NAVEUR staff in London.

CNA's field representative to the Commander , Carrier Group Eight during Deliberate Force, Dr. Annette M. Matheny, provided valuable data and insights. Her perspective, based on her experience aboard the carrier USS Theodore Roosevel t during the air strikes, was of particular value to the authors. Finally, the authors owe a debt of gratitude to Richard Brody for his review and his ideas on how to bring a proper structure to this paper.

The authors are responsible for the approach taken in researching the course of Deliberate Force and for any errors in the text.

Summary From August 30 until September 19, 1995, the Southern

Command of NATO, Allied Forces South, in Naples, Italy, directed air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets in Bosnia- Herzegovina. Allied air forces flew a total of 3,515 sorties by nine countries, with losses of only one aircraft and no crew. This was NATO's first extended air operation. The purpose of this paper is to document the chronological account of the air operation, Oper- ation Deliberate Force, for the historical record.

The political transformation from a UN peacekeeping operation to a NATO peace-enforcement operation worked with sur- prising smoothness because both UN and NATO commanders understood NATO command and control doctrine. Superior human leadership, however, proved to be the essential catalyst that brought success. When the NATO bombing operation stopped, the warring factions in Bosnia agreed to stop the war and to separate their armies. The Dayton Peace Accords followed. The same NATO officer who commanded the air operation, Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., USN, also commanded ~Joint Endeavour' - - the joint combined coalition operation in Bosnia that followed. This continuity of command impressed the parties on the ground and encouraged them to cooperate with the Implementation Force. As one Serb said, "Admiral Smith said he would bomb us, and he did. Now he says he wants peace, and we have to believe him."

The foundation for NATO's political mandate stems from a series of events. First, the UN Security Council stated its view that a peacekeeping operation could resolve the conflict in Bos- nia. Opposing that view head-on was Admiral Smith's belief that only peace enforcement would succeed. At this point, most NATO countries agreed with the admiral. The gap was closed, progres- sively, on the UN side by French General Bernard Janvie~, Force Commander, UN Peace Force, who started with the UN mandate. He gradually moved to the NATO mandate once interna-

tional diplomatic pressures forced the UN to recognize the futility of strictly "defensive" operations.

Milestones along the way were the London Conference of July 1995, and the bombing operation and its cessation, which were followed by the Dayton peace conference in November. A powerful force in moving NATO to the bombing was a series of brutal offensives by the Bosnian Serb Army against the UN safe areas of Srebrenica, Gorazde, Zepa, and, eventually, Sarajevo. Demonstrating the compelling force of world public opinion, the August 1995 market bombing--portrayed in color on CNN worldwide was the trigger that moved NATO to conduct often- sire military operations to stop the Serbs.

The bombing operation, Deliberate Force, highlighted long- standing natural tensions between the United States and its Allies who had troops on the ground in Bosnia. Because no Amer ican troops were on the ground in Bosnia at that time, the Allies were not convinced, at first, that the Amer icans would take into account the threat to the deployed allied soldiers--soldiers who could have been hit in the air strikes or taken hostage by the Serbs. In addition, tensions within the UN command structure, stretching from New York through Zagreb to S araj evo, required additional attention. After the fall of Srebrenica, the international communi ty realized that specific action was required. The early role of the UN's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) proved crucial as it brought together the UN and NATO commanders . Their new level of confidence in work ing together paid enormous dividends in the events to follow. After the fall of Sre- brenica, the international communi ty realized that specific action was required.

This paper focuses on the short period from July through September 1995, the time leading up to and including Deliberate Force. The period merits study to capture important lessons that will undoubtedly face senior military commanders and political leaders again and again as NATO and U.S. forces are called to trouble spots overseas.

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Introduct ion

After nearly 4 years of war in Bosnia, the NATO Allies launched a bombing operation in August 1995 against the Bos- nian Serbs that led to the Dayton Peace Accords and the cease- fire that endures today. The decisive use of air power in NATO's first extended air operation provided critical support to Allied diplomacy. The war r ing factions then accepted the Dayton f ramework for a political settlement. The division of responsibility here is clear: the Allies accepted responsibility to stop the fighting, and the warr ing factions accepted the responsibility to forge a political settlement.

This report chronicles the key events leading up to and occurring during Operation Deliberate Force, from events immediately preceding the mortar shelling of Sarajevo of August 28, 1995, through the air strikes that concluded the operation. We begin with a discussion of the situation on the ground in Bosnia before the air strikes. Then we review guidance from the London Conference of July 21, 1995, and the Memorandum of Under- standing of August 10, 1995, between CINCSOUTH and Force Commander UN Peace Force 1 (UNPF). We discuss the preparations by NATO and the RRF 2 for responding to Bosnian Serb hostile actions, and follow with an account of the three weeks of air and artillery strikes conducted under Operation Deliberate Force. Of special interest is the interplay of the principal partic- ipants, and the negotiations with Bosnian Serb authorities held throughout the period leading up to the cease-fire of October 1995.

1. The UNPF was the senior UN command HQ, located in Zagreb, Croatia, and headed by French Army General Bernard Janvier.

2. The Rapid Reaction Force of British, French, and Dutch artillery included 155 and 105ram howitzers, as well as heavy mortars.

Events of ear ly summer 1995

Seizure of Srebrenica and Zepa

Bosnian Serb seizure of the UN safe enclave of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995, followed by Serb capture of the UN safe area of Zepa shortly thereafter, precipitated the chain of events that led to Allied commitment to use decisive military force. The mission was to oppose future Bosnian Serb offensive action. UN Resolu- tion 819 had earlier delineated limited safe areas within Bosnia- Herzegovina that were decreed to be safe from armed attack.

At the time of the Srebrenica attack, the CINC 3 was aboard the U.S. Sixth Fleet flagship, USS LaSalle, reviewing plans to withdraw the UN Force from Bosnia if so ordered. He had previously discussed a close air support (CAS) option with the UNPF commander General Janvier, French Army, but the talks were exploratory.

Because of the need to protect strike aircraft, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft were added to the strike packages following the June 2, 1995, downing of USAF Captain O'Grady by a Serb surface-to-air missile. The limited number of SEAD aircraft, however, prevented a full-time CAS presence over Bosnia-Herzegovina. On Monday, July 10, 1995, following discussions with General Janvier throughout Sunday afternoon and evening, AIRSOUTH placed a full SEAD and CAS package airborne over the Adriatic beginning at 0600. 4 The purpose was to be ready on Monday to respond to a call for CAS. Meanwhile, Janvier warned the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) not to proceed beyond a point designated on the road on which they were moving toward Srebrenica. The BSA ignored the demand and advanced beyond that point. However, UN authorities did not

3. Admiral Smith will be referred to as "the CINC" throughout this paper.

4. All times are ]ocal.

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authorize CAS, although the UNPROFOR 5 HQ Sarajevo had renewed its earlier request (made on Sunday, July 9). The Spe- cial Representative of the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Yasushi Akashi, then asked AIRSOUTH to extend the CAS airborne presence, which AIRSOUTH did until mid-afternoon of July 10. This extension, however, made it difficult for the air crews of Deny Flight, the NATO plan enforcing the UN no-fly zone in Bosnia, to respond to a late-afternoon call to fly because of crew rest requirements.

On Tuesday, July 11, AIRSOUTH renewed the same plan for air presence over the Adriatic, but was forced to place aircraft on ground alert because SEAD aircraft were running beyond crew limits. About 1200, the CINC learned that General Janvier was going to approve LTG Rupert Smith's ~Blue Sword" request for CAS, thus "turning the key." This action would result in the required "dual key "6 approval of CAS.

Based on this information, the CINC ordered AIRSOUTH to prepare to launch, then called General Janvier to confirm that he was contemplating approval of Blue Sword. Janvier stated that he was taking the request to Akashi, and that following his meeting with Akashi he planned to call the CINC to seek an offi- cial request for CAS. Janvier called the CINC back shortly thereafter to officially pass his request for NATO CAS. A package of U.S. SEAD aircraft and Dutch CAS aircraft reached Serb positions by 1400 local time. Although NATO responded as quickly as could be expected under the circumstances, the authorization for CAS proved too late to influence the situation. This episode underlined the UN's reluctance to coordinate air power to influence events on the ground, and even to understand the capabili- ties of NATO air power. Moreover, serious differences between

5. The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was located in Sarajevo and commanded by British Army Lieutenant General, Sir Rupert Smith.

6. Dual key indicates requirement of approval by both UN and NATO.

NATO and the UN on the concept of safe areas, such as Sre- brenica, and the use of CAS and air power to deter the Serbs on the ground continued to plague cooperation. Once AFSOUTH took control of air operation tasking and the UN no longer had a mandate for tactical decisions, the air operation functioned in a more coordinated fashion.

The fall of Srebrenica led to the additional loss of the Muslim enclave of Zepa. These well-publicized events turned Allied attention to Gorazde and reinforcement plans for defend- ing this UN safe area, thought to be next in line for a BSA attack. The United States judged the French plan for defense of Gorazde--involving only 1,000 troops backed by U.S. helicopter lift and helicopter gunships--as tactically unsound and refused its support. The CINC repeated his earlier proposal for a more robust use of air power (see the next section) as the cornerstone of the defense of Gorazde, an approach that touched on dual key and proportionality issues. General George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), supported the CINC's approach as a good starting point for protecting Gorazde. The London Conference of July 21, which would bring together senior political and military leaders, would convene shortly thereafter to take on the longer-term problem.

Deny Flight degradation

Throughout the summer, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) watched the growing Bosnia and Kra- jina Serb integrated air defense systems (IADS) become an unacceptable risk to Deny Flight. Two options were apparent:

Expand Deny Flight rules of engagement so that NATO aircraft could attack the IADS

Restrict Deny Flight operations.

Because NATO and the UN could not reach agreement on expanded rules of engagement (ROE), NATO temporar i ly restr icted no-fly-zone operations. The CINC had tried to

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resurrect no-fly-zone enforcement by expanding Deny Flight. The idea was to include ~single key" SEAD and attacks on airfields and aircraft on the ground for violators of no-fly zones. The CINC proposed that the UN concur. General Janvier declined, explaining that he lacked authority to expand the air ROE to include ground targets. He said he needed a new United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), beyond UNSCR 816, to attack airfields and aircraft on the ground.

The CINC had reviewed the expanded approach earlier, using "offset" targets. In November 1994, when the Muslim enclave at Bihac came under Serb attack, no Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) were on the ground to direct the air strikes. NATO therefore had no choice but to hit targets outside Bihac that would hurt the BSA. However, UNPROFOR rebuffed such discussions, saying the mission would become peace enforcement, not peacekeeping. The UNPROFOR lacked the broader UN mandate it believed was required to expand its operations from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. At this stage the UNPF required new political guidance if the Allies wished to stop the BSA.

When a Serb missile shot down Captain O'Grady, the public saw graphic evidence that aircraft were not immune to Serb attacks. Before June 2, AIRSOUTH had relaxed its escort policy for aircraft remaining outside known areas of surface-to-air missile (SAM) coverage. After the O'Grady shootdown, however, any aircraft flying over Bosnia required full SEAD cover. A full SEAD package required around 14 aircraft armed to neutralize SAM sites, including jamming planes and missile shooters armed with HARM missiles to home in on air defense radars.

The BSA employed an effective early warning system, with most of its SAM systems located in the Banja Luka area of northwest Bosnia. AIRSOUTH agreed that flying combat air patrol (CAP) into the Bahia Luka area to prevent BSA aircraft from launching would entail unacceptable risk. First, the Serbs' radar could detect NATO aircraft in time to avoid launching their own

aircraft; second, our aircraft were in a dangerous SAM environment; and finally, the paucity of NATO SEAD assets l imited the t ime NATO could cover Ban ja Luka wi th CAP. Thus , any attempts to deter f l ights would have failed.

This debate wi th in NATO over Deny F l ight effectiveness became heated. Some Allies did not want the ~feeble" BSA air force to show up NATO; others expressed concern about the domestic political impact on their own Air Force budget. After weighing the options, the CINC held fast to his conviction that NATO would not fly near Banja Luka unti l the Serb IADS could be neutral ized.

The issue came to a head in mid Ju ly when two BSA aircraft were observed by NATO a i rborne ear ly -warn ing a i rc ra f t (NAEW) coming out from and return ing to Banja Luka. Given the gap in NATO's combat air patrol in the Banja Luka area, the BSA could use this field. The CINC sent a message to General Janvier request ing his concurrence to str ike Bahia Luka. The CINC saw three choices:

Strike the Banja Luka airfield and its aircraft to prevent further violations.

Conduct a full SEAD operation to negate the SAM threat, thus allowing CAP to cover Banja Luka.

Accept the l ikelihood that Serb violations of the UN's no- fly zone would continue.

The CINC's message request ing expanded use of air power again pushed the political l imits of the level of mi l i tary force NATO could employ in Bosn ia . Genera l Janv ie r ' s act ions reflected his need for further political guidance from the UN. The stage was now set for the London Conference.

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London Conference

Act ion on UN-dec la red safe havens

The London Conference of July 2 I, 1995, convened after the fall of the Srebrenica and Zepa UN enclaves with the goal of saving Gorazde from the Bosnian Serbs. Ambassadors and foreign and defense minister-level dignitaries f rom the Un i ted States, United K ingdom, France, Russia, Germany, NATO, the UN, and the European Un ion met in London to formulate a strategy.

The Conference leaders issued a warn ing to the Bosn ian Serbs that an attack on Gorazde would meet with a substantial and decisive response. They prepared a decision sheet stating a determination to employ air power to deter a Serb attack on the Mus l im city of Gorazde. This appeared to the C INC to be a possible template for de fend ing other UN safe areas--Bihac, Saravejo, and Tuzla. After the London Conference and while awaiting NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) and NATO Mil- itary Commit tee guidance, General Jou lwan directed the C INC, in conjunction with General Janvier, to begin planning for zones of action (ZOAs) and to develop target lists for Gorazde, Sara- jevo, Tuzla, and Bihac.

Meanwhile, a four-member delegation from the United States, United Kingdom, and France headed by U.K. Air Chief Marshall William Wratten and including U.S. Deputy Com- mander in Chief, European Command, General James Jamer- son, traveled to Belgrade the evening of July 23 to deliver to General Ratko Mladic, the BSA commander, the ultimatum set forth by the London Conference two days earlier. Air Chief Mar- shall Wratten reiterated the Allies' objective to promote a peace- ful settlement and relieve human suffering, but stated that they had reached a turning point with the BSA capture of Srebrenica and Zepa. Air Chief Marshall Wratten stated that General Mladic must clearly understand what the Allied response would be if he attacked Gorazde.

General Mladic explicitly refused the ultimatum, stating, "I have received the message and reject it." He then launched a 90- minute harangue on Balkan history, culture, and politics, in which he claimed that the Allies gave partial treatment to the Muslims and that the Bosnian Serbs "will not be defeated." The threat of mil itary action delivered by the delegation did not change his position.

NAC decisions

Fo l low ing the London Conference on Ju ly 21, the NAC directed SHAPE to prepare plans to imp lement the warn ing to the Bosn ian Serbs issued at the Conference. Deputy SACEUR passed this task to the Director, International Mil itary Staff. On Ju ly 25, in a 13-hour session, the NAC met to formulate decisions for deterring attacks. The NAC reaff irmed as the cornerstone p lann ing document the NATO HQ communique of August 1993. This document provided operational options for NATO use of air power in Bosnia, based on the later NAC decision of April 22, 1994. The latter author i zed C INCSOUTH to initiate air attacks in response to heavy weapons attacks on any of the safe areas, and to cont inue the attacks until NATO and the UNPF judged the miss ion complete.

A renewed BSA threat to Gorazde qu ickened the pace of events. The NAC agreed that the following incidents wou ld initiate an Allied response:

BSA concentration of forces or heavy weapons and other military preparat ions that, in the common judgment of NATO and UN military commanders , presented a direct threat to Gorazde

Direct BSA attacks on Gorazde.

Under s t rongU.S, prodding, the Allies in the NAC agreed on a set of triggers and targets for NATO air strikes if the Bosn ian Serbs ignored the London Conference warn ing not to attack Gorazde . The NAC author i zed at tacks on IADS and other

I0

"fielded forces," described as Option 1 targets, in Bosnia and Serb-occupied Croatia, and attacks on a wider range of targets described as Option 2.

Option 2 included command and control facilities, supply depots, munitions sites, radar and SAM sites, and force concentrations. Further, the NAC tasked the NATO military authorities to prepare for authorization of Option 3 (military-related infrastructure) targets.

In view of mounting Serb threats to Sarajevo and Bihac, the NAC invited the NATO military authorities to consult with UNPF and formulate proposals on how the NAC decisions might apply to these safe areas. The question was whether the "Gorazde decision" would be effective in other UN safe areas. The CINC said he thought it would. AIRSOUTH believed that Bihac offered too few Option 1 or 2 targets, and that NATO air power could not cause enough damage in a short period to stop the BSA. The CINC believed that Bihac should be included, but that we would have to move quickly to Option 3 targets there. Eventually, Gorazde became the model for all three UN safe areas.

A major issue, both at the London Conference and in Brus- sels, was to get the UN key out of the hands of UN Special Rep- resentative of the Secretary General Ambassador Akashi. However, the Allies could not agree on the details. NATO political authorities wanted the key to go to LTG Rupert Smith, Com- mander, UNPROFOR, because he had requested CAS during the assault on Srebrenica, although he had been denied. General Janvier did not want Rupert Smith to hold the key and neither did Paris, because such a major change in military strategy required a corresponding change in political authority. The French military in Paris supported the CINC's desire to move the authorizing UN key down to UNPF, General Janvier. In the meantime, the British backed off from elevating Rupert Smith's responsibility. The result was that the lack of agreement at political levels in London and Brussels sent a signal of no confidence

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in Akashi's limited UN mandate. It also showed disarray among the Allies. Akashi resolved the issue when he received approval from the Secretary General to turn over the UN key to General Janvier. The transformation process from UN peacekeeping to NAT0 peace enforcement had begun.

On August 1, 1995, the NAC reconvened, primarily to direct the NATO military authorities to define, in coordination with UNPF, ZOAs for the three other safe areas: Sarajevo, Bihac, and ~z la . At this time, SHAPE delegated execution authority for NATO air actions to COMAIRSOUTH.

The NAC guidance of August 1 acknowledged the following as major difficulties: (1) the safety of friendly forces, (2) the risk that UNPROFOR troops would be taken hostage, (3) attacks on troop concentrations that would result in high casualties, and (4) the delegation of authority for Option 3 targets. In all, it was a positive NAC meeting, attended by seven ambassadors (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Denmark) and lower-ranking diplomatic representatives from the remaining NAC member nations.

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Bui ld ing conf idence: toward a NATO-UN MOU

London Conference implementation

On July 27, a meeting was held in Zagreb to coordinate air planning based on the political decisions handed down by the recent London Conference and NAC decisions. Present were: the CINC; his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General J.B. Carter; Lieu- tenant General Michael Ryan, Commander, AIRSOUTH; Vice Admiral Donald Pilling, COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH; General Janvier; his deputy, Major General Barry Ashton; British Royal Marine Major General David Penneyfeather, who led the RRF planning staff; and other UNPF officers.

General Janvier was astonished by the CINC's air plan for protecting Gorazde. The general believed that the CINC's ZOAs, targets, and triggers deviated from the guidance for a graduated approach. The CINC countered by stating that a piecemeal plan would not work--that it would not break the BSA's will and that flexibility of response and target selection required the large ZOAs. A wider zone provides more targets, plus the ability to track and target in-depth reinforcements and the concentration of ground forces. It was evident that the large gap between NATO and UNPF positions required further attention.

The next day, July 28, General Janvier cabled the UNPRO- FOR commander, General Rupert Smith, to provide guidance for his planning meeting with General Ryan on July 29. General Janvier explained that ZOAs cannot be so large as to include half of Serb-controlled Bosnia as NATO had proposed; that targets must be chosen to reduce the direct threat against UN troops (presumably Option 1 targets only); and that graduated response does not mean escalation from Option 2 to Option 3 targets. General Janvier also told General Smith that he, Janvier, did not want to be pushed into decisions that would commit the UN to an "act of war" against the Bosnian Serbs. No political authority existed to move UN forces from peacekeeping to peace

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enforcement, said General Janvier. He felt that a change in the scope of military operations would require a change in the scope of his political mandate from the UN.

Concurrently, General Janvier received direction from the UN Secretary General in New York to:

Begin preparations for defining ZOAs, with NATO concurrence

Agree on criteria for identifying factors that would trigger NATO responses

Formulate proposals on use of air power in Saravejo and Bihac in addition to Gorazde

Take necessary measures to protect UN personnel from retaliation and hostage-taking.

Also on July 28, General Janvier attended a meeting in Brussels between UN Assistant Secretary Genera] for Peace- keeping Kofi Annan and Assistant Secretary General for NATO Affairs Anthony Cragg. The meeting addressed a number of issues on air strike planning. On the Gorazde ZOA, they agreed that it should be larger than the 20-km exclusion zone, but not as large as proposed by the CINC. Air operations could not begin without General Rupert Smith's concurrence, but they did not reach consensus on the authority required to stop air strikes. NATO believed that if the keys were turned on, they should remain on until they had achieved their military objectives. The NAC decision provided for "temporary suspension" in situations where friendly forces faced danger, but NATO felt these would be exceptional cases. This interpretation was unacceptable to the UN, which believed that General Janvier should be able to judge when cont inuat ion of o f fens ive operat ions became counterproductive.

Moving toward agreement on the MOU

On August 2, the CINC, General Ryan, and Admiral Pilling met in Zagreb with General Janvier, Major General Ashton, and

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Major General Penneyfeather to work toward a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The CINC suggested that the previous NAC decision sheet might be sufficient for the purpose and that an MOU would not be required. General Janvier stated that he needed an MOU, since he worked for the UN and not the NAC, so discussion of a MOU draft proceeded. They agreed that Gen- eral Ryan and General Rupert Smith would develop the target list, with General Carter and General Ashton responsible for the MOU, pushing toward a goal of signing in a week. General Rupert Smith supported an early intensive air operation, but General Janvier hesitated to accept NATO's large ZOAs. Gen- eral Janvier was wary of losing control once air operations began and of not being able to stop the bombing once it started.

Meanwhile, General Joulwan offered strong support to the CINC's position and agreed with the need for a large ZOA. In addition, General Joulwan opposed General Janvier's position that attacking Option I and 2 targets meant a declaration of war against the Bosnian Serbs. NATO officials saw limited air operations as a way to achieve limited objectives: to protect UN safe areas, safeguard UN forces, and block ethnic cleansing. General Joulwan pointed out the potential difficulty of getting political approval for the broader range of Option 3 targets.

On August 10, the CINC, along with Generals Carter, and Ryan, and AFSOUTH/AIRSOUTH planners and intelligence staff met with General Janvier and General Ashton in Ploce, Croatia, to complete the MOU between CINCSOUTH and Gen- eral Janvier. The latter was now more amenable to the CINC's ZOA concept than in previous meetings. This change followed General Janvier's and Ambassador Akashi's visit to the NAC, NATO's governing body in Brussels. The NAC hoped to get its formal agreement soon on the ZOAs and on target sets for all four of the safe areas (Gorazde, Sarajevo, Bihac, and Tuzla).

However, General Janvier presented a letter, ~Consequences of Air Operations," as an annex to the MOU. The letter acknowledged a potential UNPROFOR mission change from

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peacekeeping to peace enforcement, a situation that might bring about a request for NATO assistance during an UNPROFOR withdrawal. The CINC, however, refused to accept the letter as an annex to the MOU but said that if such a letter was desired, he would forward it separately up NATO channels.

On receiving the letter, General Joulwan expressed concern about its tone and substance: linking air actions for the protection of safe areas with UN withdrawal was contrary to political guidance from the UN and NAC. General Joulwan's response expressed his disagreement with the substance of the letter.

Preparation for enforcement

Meanwhi le , the balance of forces on the ground began to change. On August 4, the Croation army launched an offensive along four routes to regain Krajina Serb territory in the northwest. The 14rajina Serb army never received any substantial support f rom the BSA or the Yugos lav army and was totally defeated by August 7. The Croats followed up this stunning success with attacks against Serb areas in Bosnia.

On the evening &August 12, Generals Carter and Ryan flew to Rome to brief Mr. Tony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and his team on the status of peace enforcement. General Ryan briefed the air plan to Mr. Lake, highlighting General Rupert Smith's willing role in brokering the ZOAs and target list. Although General Janvier had yet to approve the ZOAs and target list, General Ryan speculated that he would agree to both. Mr. Lake expressed satisfaction at the progress made in meeting General Janvier's concern over political authority for expanded air operations.

Following up on the NATO-UN MOU, General Janvier sent a letter to General Mladic on August 14. The letter underlined the steps that the UN and NATO had taken for greater security of the four UN safe areas in Bosnia. The letter formally notified General Mladic that Serb military action would be met with a firm and rapid response by NATO air power. The response would

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not necessarily be proportional or limited to the immediate area of the safe haven under attack. It further stated that a negoti- ated political settlement was out of the question until all Serb attacks on safe havens ceased.

[NOTE: A tragic accident occurred on the morning of August 19, when three American officials of the U.S. Peace Plan Delega- tion to Sarajevo died on the Mt. Igman road southwest of Sara- jevo. Their armored vehicle slid off the rain-soaked road and plunged down the mountainside.]

General Rupert Smith visited with General Mladic near Pale on August 22 and 25. The first of these meetings lasted 5 hours and was businesslike. General Smith broached a number of items, including the U.S. peace initiative and the lifting of BSA restrictions on access to and from Gorazde and Sarajevo. On the question of a role for outside forces, General Mladic foresaw a role only for UNPROFOR, not for the RRF or NATO. The second meeting, held on the evening of August 25, proved more difficult. General Smith added a broader range of topics including Croat- ian army support of the Bill (Bosnian Muslims) and political difficulties holding back the peace initiatives. General Mladic asked that the UN stop using Mount Igman for RRF build-up, but was rebuffed by General Smith.

On August 23, the CINC met with Generals Rupert Smith, Ashton, Penneyfeather, and others at the Croation port of Split to discuss preparations for military actions. Members of the CINC's party included U.S. Generals Carter, Ryan, and Burns.

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Air strikes begin

Sarajevo market explosion

On the morn ing of August 28, 120-ram mortar shells hit near the outdoor market in central Sarajevo, killing 38 civilians. The incident was an indelible violation of the UN mandate to maintain the security of the safe areas, and the capstone act trig- gering the unleashing of NATO air retaliation against the Bos- nian Serbs. Prel iminary reports based on radar fixes placed the origin of the attack along the confrontation line in BSA territory, although the BSA denied firing any weapons at that time. Some Allied officers believed that the Mus l ims fired the mortar rounds at their own people and b lamed it on the Serbs to launch the NATO air operation against them. An earlier explosion in the open market in February 1994 had led to international condem- nation of the BSA. Then, some UN officers believed that the Bos- nian Mus l ims had dropped a 120-ram mortar round into that market from an adjacent building and b lamed the Serbs for the resulting carnage.

When CNN showed live coverage of Sarajevo civilians lying in pools of blood caused by this latest mortar attack, the CINC immediately telephoned his liaison officer to UNPF HQ, Air Commodore Mike Rudd in Zagreb. The admiral instructed Rudd to inform UNPF that if the Serbs had fired the mortal he would seek UNPF concurrence to begin bombing operations. Rudd replied that he would so inform the UNPF HQ, but added that General Janvier was away on leave.

The CINC then contacted General Rupert Smith, who accepted responsibility for determining the origin of the mortar rounds. Throughout the day, the CINC kept General Joulwan informed.

Ambassador Akashi issued a statement of dismay at the brutal murder of civilians and declared that strong action would be taken when UN commanders determined responsibility for the attack.

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Air strike planning

Throughout the afternoon and evening of August 28, the CINC conferred with General Rupert Smith. Around 0200, Gen- eral Smith confirmed by telephone his conviction that the mortar rounds had come from a Serb unit. General Smith then decided to turn his key authorizing the beginning of air operations in accordance with the earlier NATO-UN MOU, but he requested a 24-hour delay to enhance the safety of his forces and to consult with General Ryan on refining the target list. General Janvier would not return to Sarajevo from leave until the 29th.

USS Theodore Roosevelt, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, had been scheduled into Rhodes for a port call on August 29. As air strike planning progressed, the CINC directed the carrier to the Adriatic, but for security reasons directed that it not issue a port cancellation notice. Thus, operational security was maintained to mask the carrier's movement toward Bosnia. This gave General Smith time to pull back his UN ground forces to reduce the risk that they would be taken hostage by the Serbs.

Both the CINC and General Smith wanted to lay out as an objective BSA compliance that would be measurable. They agreed that this would mean no more shelling of safe zones, and that BSA heavy weapons must be moved outside the 20-km exclusion zone. Although they knew the latter was unverifiable, they agreed that "out of sight, out of mind" would suffice for the moment. That is, if the BSA were not shooting and could not be seen, commanders would assume that the Serbs were complying until a more stringent verification regime could be put in place.

The AIRSOUTH staff worked with UNPROFOR and RRF planners in Sarajevo throughout the night of August 28, devel- oping a plan for beginning air strikes at 30 0001Z (0201 local time). The plan entailed striking the eastern IADS first with SEAD, then, after aerial refueling the SEAD package, attacking the BSA's repair facilities at night to minimize civilian casualties. By this time, it would be first light and NATO aircraft could fly against heavy weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone.

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All hoped that the weather would cooperate during the day (August 29) preceding the attack that night, so that reconnaissance aircraft could obtain early targeting data. Weather officers promised good light for the night of the first strike. The CINC and General Janvier also needed to approve the final target list.

General Janvier's rapid return on August 29 posed a potential complication. Would he attempt to alter the planning or might he see this as General Rupert Smith's responsibility? The CINC continued to work with General Smith and let the latter inform General Janvier. General Joulwan concurred with the air strike plan and asked to be informed of General Janvier's reaction to the time and target list upon his return to headquarters in Zagreb. General Joulwan expressed concern for the safety of Gorazde and Tuzla as the strikes on Sarajevo began. The CINC informed the general that General Ryan would also build an air tasking message (ATM) and target sets for these other two safe areas.

On August 29, General Ryan continued to refine the target list. The first hurdle was the French concern that one target in the Sarajevo suburb of Hadzici was too close to a French position. Thus, one of the Serb barracks complexes was removed from the list. General Smith also asked that a BSA barracks be deleted from the list. This request was consistent with the long- standing UNPROFOR policy of not attacking Serb military personnel, as opposed to facilities. The CINC agreed.

Critical agreement

Around 2030 the CINC was at a hotel in Crete conducting a meeting with U.S. Navy admirals stationed in Europe. From the hotel, the CINC contacted General Janvier directly on target selection, having been unsuccessful earlier in engaging him through General Rupert Smith. The CINC told Janvier that his delay in approving the list was endangering his pilots and that they needed to begin briefings soon but still had no approved list. General Janvier initially said he was still studying the list, but

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the CINC said he had studied it enough and wanted a decision. Janvier then said he wanted to remove all but five targets; his rationale was that we were going too far outside Sarajevo. The CINC pointed out in strong language that they had agreed to the targets and to the rationale for the larger zones of action. The CINC said further that he would attack the five targets General Janvier proposed to approve, but would immediately release a letter up the chain of command pointing out that Janvier had abrogated his part of the MOU.

Finally, Janvier said he wanted to call the CINC back in 10 minutes because he needed to confer more with his staff. Fearing a wait considerably longer if the telephone conversation were suspended, the CINC replied, '~No, these phone connections are bad. I want your answer now." Janvier then relented, asking only that the three remaining barracks complexes not be hit. The CINC agreed, sent the execution order for air strikes to com- mence at 30 0001Z (0201 local), and departed Crete for Naples at 2200 local Crete time on August 29. The word "barracks" referred to large military complexes that included troop barracks. The troop billeting barracks themselves were never targets. The motor pools, repair facilities, and storage areas were the natural aimpoints. These were later placed back on the target list.

A i r strikes of August 30 and 31

NATO HQ in Brussels announced on the morning of August 30 that NATO aircraft had bombed Bosnian Serb military targets in response to BSA attacks on the UN-declared safe area in Sarajevo. The air strikes were in coordination with the UN's RRF firepower position on Mt. Igman to protect UNPROFOR in Sarajevo. RRF art i l lery included long-range 155-mm guns, 105-ram artillery, and heavy mortars. The RRF conducted its fire missions in accordance with July 21, 1995, London Confer- ence and subsequent NAC decisions, and in coordination with the Secretaries General of the UN and NATO. The MOU of

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August 10, 1995, between the UN and NATO set the conditions for the strikes.

NATO pilots flew more than 300 sorties against 23 separate targets the first day. The initial strikes against the components of IADS proved successful. The Serbs did not fire back with any radar-guided SAMs. However, a man-portable SAM downed a French Mirage 2000 aircraft. AFSOUTH launched an extensive combat search and rescue (CS&R) effort to locate the two-man crew, but without success. Nobody knew at the time that the Serbs had taken them captive. Extensive search and rescue operations continued for several days. U.S. helicopters with special operations forces on board made several attempts to locate and rescue the downed French airmen, but without success. The Serbs released them some weeks later after exhaustive negotiations between the French chief of defense and General Mladic.

NATO aircraft struck fixed targets of military significance, including ammunition and supply depots. In addition, CAS was available to UN ground forces. The Combat Air Operations Center in Vicenza, the Air Operations Center in Sarajevo, and the Tactical Air Operations Center located in a hotel in Kiseljak, a Croat-majority town 12 miles west of Sarajevo, all ensured strike coordination.

During this time the RRF and the air operation worked closely together. After two days, UN HQ in New York realized that the RRF was carrying out counter-battery fire missions. UN HQ ordered it to stop, explaining that the RRF could not be used in an "offensive" role.

Deal ing with Serb General Mladic

On August 30, General Janvier immediately notified Gen- eral Mladic that the mortar attack from BSA positions surround- ing Sarajevo was in contravention of the July 21 London summit, and referred to his letter to General Mladic of August 14, reiter- ating the NAC decisions. Janvier announced that NATO had launched the air strikes to prevent further shelling of Sarajevo,

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and that they would continue unti l NATO and the UN were convinced that the threat of addit ional BSA attacks were eliminated.

Later on the same day (August 30), General Janv ier followed up his ear l ier le t ter wi th a second le t ter to Genera l Mladic. The second letter stated that the following three condi- t ions be met before NATO would consider ha l t ing the NATO strikes:

Cessation of all attacks and threats of attacks by the Bos- n ian Serbs aga ins t the four safe areas of Sara jevo, Gorazde, Tuzla, and Bihac

Complete withdrawal of all heavy weapons from a 20-km exclusion zone around Sarajevo, subject to verification of full Bosnian Serb cooperation

Immediate and complete cessation of hostil it ies throughout Bosnia.

F reedom of movement for ground and air traffic was not required in this init ial proposal, but would be included later. General Janvier confirmed to Mladic that air attacks would con- t inue unt i l he received a positive response and warned that broken agreements would restart the air strikes.

Senior NATO commanders would later criticize General Janvier because of his second letter. In the first place, he had laid out conditions that were neither part of the mandate nor part of the MOU. Also, his letter was not coordinated with NATO, thus NATO now found itself in the difficult position of facing new conditions for ceasing the bombing. This fact became a point of disagreement later when General Mladic met with General Janvier. In the transit ion process from UN peacekeeping to NATO peace enforcement, such problems were inevitable. Experienced commanders proved, however, that they could resolve these issues as they arose.

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In the early evening of August 31, General Janvier contacted the CINC to request a 24-hour suspension of air strikes. General Janvier wanted to meet with General Mladic to discuss conditions for halting NATO strikes as set forth in General Jan- vier's second letter of August 30. The process continued to move toward a NATO peace-enforcement operation.

General Mladic responded to General Janvier's proposal by letter on September 2, conditionally accepting some of the demands, but making counter-demands. General Mladic agreed that the BSA would not conduct or threaten attacks on the safe areas, except in self-defense, and requested an immediate and complete cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of the former Bosnia Herzegovina. The Serbs would withdraw their heavy weapons, but only under conditions agreed upon by the warring parties. General Mladic also expected General Janvier to organize a meeting between the commanders of the warring parties to define the terms of agreement. He further demanded an immediate end to the NATO air and RRF attacks. Neither the UN nor NATO accepted General Mladic's response. (An account of this is in the next section.)

Following the NATO strikes on August 30, General Janvier informed General Momcilo Perisic, Serbian Chief of the General Staff of the Army, that the evidence showed the Serbs had fired the mortar round into the Sarajevo market. Janvier stated his intention to continue the air strikes until the UN and NATO were satisfied that the threat of future BSA attacks had been eliminated. Janvier enclosed for Perisic a copy of his initial letter to General Mladic sent earlier in the day (August 30), and solic- ited Perisic's help in bringing about compliance.

NATO air str ikes cont inue

NATO air strikes continued for a second day (August 31), with more than 242 sorties flown. Revisiting some of the targets of the previous night, General Ryan said he had only roughly one and a half days of targets remaining depending on the weather.

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He notified General Rupert Smith of the new targets. General Smith did not want to hit targets in the Gorazde and Tuzla sets, but did not oppose the IADS-West inclusion. The decision to hit IADS was solely an AFSOUTH decision to be made by the CINC. The latter additions had the appeal of causing the BSA to fear that NATO was expanding the operation. General Ryan sought and received the CINC's approval to bomb two bridges near Gorazde that could be used for BSA troop movement.

One part of the MOU covered the IADS. The main point was that an initial NATO air attack against the Serbs would require General Janvier or General Smith to turn his key. However, the CINC could then strike at any IADS within the area of operations without further "agreement or concurrence" of the UN ground commanders. Thus, the UN had no authority to negate a strike against IADS. The CINC's responsibility was only to notify General Janvier of the intended actions so that UN commanders would continue to be informed of the ongoing air operations.

After NATO strikes against the IADS-East, General Ryan expressed concern that the Serbs were moving their western IADS to the south to threaten NATO aircraft proceeding into the eastern ZOA. In addition, NATO, with General Janvier's prior approval, was preparing to strike Serb targets near Tuzla, the Muslim city in north central Bosnia. For these reasons, the CINC decided to attack the Serb western IADS as well.

Given the paucity of targets and the necessity of keeping pressure on the Serbs, UNPROFOR was asked to suggest additional targets. General Rupert Smith did so 12 hours later by providing lists of specific lines of communications (LOCs, e.g., bridges and chokepoints) outside the city. He wished to keep BSA forces from moving east toward the Muslim city of Gorazde on the Drina River, so they could not use Gorazde as a hostage. Later, he added bridges near Sarajevo. Striking them had the effect of funneling the BSA heavy weapons out of Sarajevo along observable routes.

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The planners had developed a wide range of target sets that included multiple aimpoints. An example would be the Pale Ammunition Depot (a target), which included ~X" number of bunkers, each of which became a designated mean point of impact (DMPI) or aimpoint. The UNPF, however, did not want to bomb BSA troop barracks. There had been several ~barracks" on the list. These were, in fact, military camps that included barracks but also legitimate targets such as storage areas for vehicles and maintenance sheds. To get around the reticence on barracks, General Ryan redefined the targets to comply with a legitimate description of barracks for troops and other sites. General Janvier and the CINC later approved these redefined targets.

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Bombing pause

Bombing pause of September 1-5

On the evening of August 31, General Janvier sent a request to the CINC for a 24-hour suspension of air strikes. General Ryan wanted to delay the suspension until 0400 local time on September 1 to enable one additional strike package to take advantage of a break in the weather. The CINC agreed to a suspension but only after the early morning strike of Septem- ber 1. Plans were set to recommence strikes at 0400 local time on September 2 if General Janvier did not succeed in his talks with General Mladic. The CINC hoped the pause would permit General Mladic to observe the damage and to reth ink his response to General Janvier.

Late on August 31, General Joulwan approved a bombing halt, provided it did not affect other missions, and congratulated the CINC on the success of air operations to date. The General also relayed Mr. Akashi's satisfaction with AFSOUTH support of UN forces and Mr. Akashi's commitment to continuing air strikes if General Mladic failed to respond to General Janvier's conditions. As General Joulwan's subordinate, the CINC never allowed a bombing pause without first checking with him. A mis- understanding did arise over an "extension" of the pause beyond 72 hours, while the CINC checked with General Janvier. At that moment, press reports incorrectly stated that General Joulwan had not agreed to any pause.

During the lull, AIRSOUTH flew reconnaissance missions over Sarajevo to monitor compliance with UN and NATO demands. NATO also conducted CAS, CAP, SEAD, and CSAR operations in accordance with existing rules of engagement. AIRSOUTH maintained a strike package on 3-hour alert and prepared for the order to resume strike operations.

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Pol it ical considerations

Before the break in air strikes, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and his military assistant, Lieutenant Gen- eral Wesley Clark, contacted the CINC. They also wanted a pause. Holbrooke expressed his concern that the Allies might go too far and create a situation wherein President Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader, would be forced to support the BSA.

The CINC opposed a long pause, so it was agreed to pause only during the time Janvier was negotiating. At one point, late in the evening, Holbrooke called the CINC and said he thought Janvier was going to make a breakthrough during his meeting with Serbian military head General Perisic. Holbrooke knew of discussions between Serbian Foreign Minister Milan Mituti- novic and Perisic which suggested that Mladic was backing down. The CINC again agreed not to restart bombing before the Janvier-Mladic meeting ended, and extended the pause beyond 0400 on September 2. However, the NATO staff had the distinct impression that Clark and Holbrooke were pushing for a longer pause, not directly associated with Janvier and his negotiations.

Summary to date

A summary of operations up to the lull of September 1-5, showed 635 sorties flown, 436 of which were strike sorties. At the beginning of air operations, the CINC tasked General Ryan, AIRSOUTH, to refine the traditional battle damage assessment analysis in terms of success criteria. General Ryan then presented a process that defined success as a percentage of destruction of a facility's ability to function. Total destruction was not the goal. Rather, success meant rendering a facility incapable of supporting the Serb war effort--for example, destroying 65 or 75 percent of a structure or rendering a radar site incapable of operation.

General Janvier and the CINC approved nine new targets after the onset of the initial strikes. General Janvier, however,

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still wanted to withhold strikes on Serb barracks complexes and the Hadzici mil i tary repair depot in the Sarajevo suburbs because the depot was near French troops. On August 31, Gen- eral Ryan also sought to include the IADS-West as targets because the approved new targets put NATO air in this IADS- West threat area. NATO also attacked BSA IADS in the south- western ZOA to lessen the air threat, destroying the Sokolac SAM site and early warning radars. These attacks also damaged the Serb command, control, and communications (C3) nodes.

Military conditions

On September 2, General Janvier informed General Mladic that the latter's response to Janvier's letter of August 30 was unacceptable to both the UN and NATO. Although General Mladic's assurance of no further attacks on safe areas was wel- come, his conditions for the withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons was rejected. Also, General Mladic's response on freedom of movement offered no change from the current impasse. How- ever, General Janvier said that his political authorities would support a further temporary suspension for an undetermined period, beyond the 24-hour suspension, subject to the following conditions:

No attacks on safe areas

Total withdrawal of heavy weapons, to be evaluated at 2300 local time on September 4

Freedom of movement and unrestricted airport access for UNPROFOR and humanitarian organizations.

General Janvier also told Mladic that he would instruct the Bos- nian Muslims to show restraint in their military activities in the Sarajevo sector.

General Janvier told General Mladic that if compliance by midnight, September 4, local time, was not satisfactory, strikes would resume immediately. General Janvier forwarded a copy of this communication to General Perisic in Belgrade, noting that

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General Mladic's stance was unacceptable, and again sought Belgrade's influence to ensure cooperation. General Rupert Smith followed up on General Janvier's letter with another to General Mladic on September 4, which defined heavy weapons, gave instructions for their removal, and outlined the withdrawal routes. General Rupert Smith expected types and quantities of heavy weapons to be provided to him by 2300 local time on Sep- tember 7.

Who speaks for the Serbs?

On September 4, Mr. Akash i received a letter f rom Mr. Nikola Koljevic, Bosn ian Serb Vice President, stating that the Bosn ian Serbs officially accepted the provisions presented by Genera l Janvier and that heavy weapons w i thdrawa l wou ld start that day. Later in the day, President Milosevic contacted Mr. Akashi to state that he and Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadz ic concurred with Vice President Koljevic's letter and that they had all agreed to w i thdraw the heavy weapons. Dur ing the conversation, Mr. Akash i challenged Vice President 14ol- jevic's authority to make commitments , but was assured by Mr. Milosevic that he had such authority. Koljevie represented the Ban ja Luka Serbs, as opposed to the hard-line faction in Pale represented by Karadzic and Krajisnik.

Further doubt was cast on Vice President Koljevic's authority to speak for the Bosnian Serbs when, on September 4, Gen- eral Mladic sent General Janvier a rambling four-page refusal to withdraw heavy weapons around Sarajevo. It further attacked General Janvier's integrity and denounced the "one-sided treatment" of all Serbs by the Allied powers. The AFSOUTH staff chose to put aside Mladic's extreme response and to focus on the more reasonable Milosevic-Koljevic response. This approach worked. The CINC never dealt with Mladic post-Dayton, but he met with senior Serb officials and with President Milosevic many times.

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At 1500 local time on September 4, Vice President Koljevic again contacted Mr. Akashi with the news that he and President Milosevic had just talked with General Mladic. The latter explained that he had written his long rejection to General Jan- vier before learning of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's Supreme Command's decision to accept the proposal. Vice Pres- ident Koljevic said General Mladic has told him that he accepted the conditions posed by General Janvier. General Mladic's earlier rejection letter should be viewed merely as "personal corre- spondence" that did not represent a Bosnian Serb political decision. Mr. Akashi then told Vice President Koljevic that Gen- eral Mladic must take three actions to stop the air strikes:

State in writ ing that the BSA would take immediate steps to comply.

Immediately talk with General Rupert Smith.

Meet with General Smith to work out the details of heavy weapon withdrawal, freedom of movement, and unrestricted use of the Sarajevo airport.

The CINC and General Janvier talked by telephone the evening of Labor Day, September 4. General Janvier saw two options:

If no immediate progress, recommence strikes that night at 050100 local time.

Re ly a bit longer on Vice President Koljevic's initiative and postpone a final decision until the midd le of the next day.

Genera l Janvier responded that the bombing delay was jus- tified because: Vice President Koljevic's letter to Mr. Akash i jus- tified the delay; Presidents Milosevic and Karadz ic had agreed to w i thdraw; recent evidence showed some heavy weapons movement away f rom Sarajevo; and the weather was not clear enough to conf i rm or dispute this movement . Additionally, Genera l Jan- vier spoke with both Presidents Milosevic and Karadzic at 2300 local time on the 4th. They told him that the Serbs were carrying

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out their withdrawal orders. At 0100 local time, September 5, the CINC and General Janv ier decided that the picture was inconclusive. They agreed to a delay and to confer via phone at 0730 local time the next morning to compare observations.

On the morning of September 5, NATO reconnaissance assets had ample time and clear enough weather to observe that Serb heavy weapons were not leaving Sarajevo. The CINC and General Janvier concurred that Bosnian Serb forces had again failed to comply. It was evident that the Bosnian Serb political authorities did not control General Mladic.

The Bosnian Serbs had fallen well short of compliance. The resumption of air strikes was unavoidable, and General Ryan received orders to execute strikes beginning at 051300 local time. General Janvier expressed his profound appreciation to the CINC for the UN and NATO forces' mutual cooperation and ability to work together.

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Resumption of air strikes

Early lessons

It was now clear that the first phase of the air strikes was not intense enough to achieve the Allied objective of Bosnian Serb compliance to the UN and NATO conditions. The focus of attacks had been l imited, to avoid collateral civil ian damage. AFSOUTH now restated NATO conditions to end the air operation:

No Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo or other safe areas

Heavy weapons withdrawal from the Sarajevo exclusion zone according to a t imetable

Immediate and complete f reedom of movement on the ground and in the air for UN and NATO forces and personnel, as well as for non-government organ izat ions doing humani tar ian work

Immediate and unrestr icted use of the Sarajevo airport.

A big question was who spoke for the Bosnian Serbs. Senior AFSOUTH staff believed that General Mladic probably should not be granted the spotlight, but obviously could not be isolated from the process. A fur ther quest ion was how to marginal ize General Mladic in the future. Would it not be better to deal with the Bosnian Serb civilian author i t ies in Pale? Also, what evidence or act ions should be precondit ions for suspend ing air strikes? If the Bosnian Serb leaders stated their intent to comply, NATO would need to verify those statements.

Experience from the first phase of bombing suggested that strikes should not be halted too soon. Looming concerns included the BSA's l imited compliance followed by non-compliance, and the risk that the Allied nations would lack the will to restart air strikes. Bombing pauses are risky and require an analysis of the consequences. UNPROFOR's withdrawal from close contact with the Serbs dur ing the summer reduced the threat of Serbs tak ing

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UN soldiers hostage and permitted more aggressive action against the Serbs. The offensive power of the RRF also gave UNPROFOR a military force that could be employed against the Serbs if UN New York authorized offensive fires. By taking pru- dent precautions on the ground and coordinating political efforts with military action, the bombing pauses proved helpful.

Rapid Reaction Force

Initially, NATO had been able to integrate CAS with RRF artillery fire in the Sarajevo area to suppress BSA shelling, but by this time UN New York had directed the RRF to cease often- sire operations. A consideration here was UN New York's concern that UNPROFOR was using the RRF in a proactive offensive role. Again, the transformation from UN peacekeeping to NATO peace enforcement required clarification.

Early in the air operation, the RRF had targeted Serb heavy weapons in the Sarajevo area. The RRF and NATO aircraft had cooperated well in locating, targeting, and striking these heavy weapons. The results, however, were not that effective. After the pause, the CINC determined that, despite criticism from some sources, attempting to strike individual heavy weapons was futile for several reasons:

Many were located in civilian areas, and collateral damage would have been unacceptable.

Sarajevo was no longer being shelled by the BSA; hence, striking heavy weapons would likely result in resumed shelling by the BSA.

Finding heavy weapons, even those that could be struck without fear of unacceptable collateral damage, ranged from difficult to impossible.

Hea-~y artillery is difficult to locate and is difficult to destroy with counter-battery artillery fire or air power. Some observers who were unqualified to judge failed to understand the difficulty of locating and actually destroying heavy weapons.

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As previously explained, the CINC and General Janvier could not use the RRF for offensive operations. NATO continued air attacks on fixed BSA C3 sites and direct military support complexes with the goal of achieving the specified level of damage previously developed by General Ryan in his new BOA criteria. At this time, a joint Muslim-Croat offensive in the west was threatening the Serb city of Banja Luka. Consequently, the air strikes added to Serb concerns. With the recent addition of LOCs to the approved target list, multiple chokepoints and bridges that could be used by the BSA became targets. LOCs were targeted for two principal reasons:

To restrict possible BSA reinforcement

To force the withdrawal of heavy weapons out of Sarajevo via roads the Allies could monitor.

Strike planning

On September 5, German Air Force photo reconnaissance offered evidence of the location of the downed French Mirage 2000. The CINC concurred with General Ryan's request to send a CSAR team to the vicinity. On the nights of September 6, 7, and 8, CSAR missions were conducted in unsuccessful attempts to locate and rescue the downed aviators. On the final attempt, the CSAR team orbited for about 30 minutes. The Serbs, however, had set a trap and were waiting. Serb ground fire hit one of the MH-53J helicopters, injuring two crewmen. Further CSAR attempts were postponed pending additional intelligence.

The CINC and General Janvier met on September 7 to plan the way ahead. General Janvier was in general agreement with the CINC's and General Ryan's target selection. In fact, UN New York criticized General Janvier for approving certain targets and his use of the RRF offensively in the early stage of the operations. Neither the CINC nor General Janvier believed there was any political support, either in UN New York or in the NAC, for Option 3 targets at this time. They agreed to search for more Option I and Option 2 targets. It was clear that General Mladic's

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threshold for pain was high; he might choose to wait out the bombing. In an attempt to respond to Mladic's fear of the Bill Army taking advantage of a Serb decision to withdraw, diplomatic efforts sought to guarantee to him that the Muslim forces would not attack the BSA in the Sarajevo area if he withdrew his heavy weapons.

In the belief that the BSA had redeployed its SAMs from northwest Bosnia to positions that threatened NATO aircraft flying to and from the eastern IADS, General Ryan planned to launch a systematic attack on the IADS-West sector targets after midnight on September 8. He requested USAF stealth F- 117s to operate in this high-threat environment. However, Ital- ian authorities denied the request for basing in Italy because of their displeasure at being denied membership in the Contact Group of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Germany. Italy later joined the Contact Group.

Weather continued to limit air operations. As of September 8, AFSOUTH judged that only slightly over a week of targets remained, given the current intensity of air operations. The prospect of continued instransigence by the Bosnian Serbs at the end of the time had to be faced. Choices included finding more Option 1 and 2 targets or escalating to strike the BSA economic base through Option 3 targets.

General Janvier and the CINC conferred on striking the large Kosmos SAM repair factory in Banja Luka that was on the IADS-West target list. They agreed it should be deleted from the target list, as it might be seen as an Option 3 target by UN New York and the NAC. Further, General Janvier requested that the IADS-West attack be delayed for 24 hours to permit an assessment of the outcome of that day's meeting in Belgrade between Presidents Milosevic and Karadzic and General Mladic. The CINC agreed to delay that attack, but continued strikes against other approved targets.

Following several more days of air strikes, including attacks on IADS-West, General Mladic informed General Janvier that

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he was now ready to accept conditions. On September 10, General Janvier traveled to Belgrade to meet with General M]adic, President Milosevic, and General Perisic, and sought a pause in the air strikes. The CINC concurred, but limited the bombing halt only to targets in the vicinity of Sarajevo and insisted on continuing with air strikes elsewhere. General Janvier agreed that his intention was not to negotiate with General Mladic, but to determine his position and the political guarantee the BSA required for the Bill not to attack during and after withdrawal. General Janvier felt this might be the last opportunity for an agreement by the BSA.

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TLAM attack

Genera l Janvier began his session with General Mladic, conducted main ly through FRY Foreign Minister Milutinovic, during the early afternoon on September I0. General Janvier was accompanied by a communicat ions team that was in direct contact with the C INC through his liaison officer, Air Commo- dore M ike Rudd in Zagreb. This team gave the C INC the capa- bility to hold Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) strikes scheduled for that evening if negotiations with General Mladic were going well. About mid-afternoon, the C INC learned that Janvier believed that the meet ing with Mladic was going poorly. On hearing this, Air Commodore Rudd instructed the communi - cations team to pass a note to General Janvier reminding h im of the impend ing TLAM strike.

[NOTE: Actually, TLAM had been scheduled for the previous night, but General Jou lwan directed a postponement so he could make the necessary political notifications for TLAM use. Despite the 24-hour delay, some NAC ambassadors compla ined later that they had not been notified in t ime prior to the conduct of the strikes. The reason is that CNN broadcast the news before ambassadors could notify their own governments.]

NATO Secretary General Claes convened a NAC meeting on September II. Several representatives expressed concern that the use of TLAM cruise missiles marked an escalation of air operations and that NATO might now have moved into Option 3. Some believed that the t iming for using TLAM may have been tied to the failure of the meet ing between General Janvier and General Mladic and to an isolated BSA attack on Tuzla that had occurred shortly before. The French representative accused the C INC of failing to coordinate the use of TLAM with General Jan- vier.

Vice Admira l Norman Ray, Deputy Cha i rman of the Military Committee, replied that the t iming was unrelated to these two events, and that TLAM was merely the best weapon to strike the

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key lADS net near Banja Luka without risking NATO aircraft. Its use was strictly within NAC guidance for Option 2. Although General Janvier had stated that he was satisfied that he had been informed, the CINC was directed to write a letter to SACEUR for forwarding to Secretary General Willy Claes, so that the matter could be put to rest.

In retrospect, the TLAM strike proved effective in convinc- ing the Serbs that NATO was committed to escalating the air war. Press coverage, though inaccurate, also helped by suggest- ing that the CINC had acted on his own authority. This, combined with growing public discussion of the possible use of F-117 stealth strike aircraft, created doubt in the Serbs' minds about what they might face next.

General Janvier's assessment of his four-hour meeting with General Mladic was blunt: unsuccessful. General Mladic stated he would not remove heavy weapons; he threatened to attack UNPROFOR and demanded that air strikes cease. FRY officials in Belgrade were unable to persuade General Mladic to comply. The CINC and General Janvier agreed that a way must be found to guarantee Bill behavior in a withdrawal and that NATO and the UN could not continue to separate the peace process from the air strikes. On this last point, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke held the same view. Again, they ruled out attacking the Serb heavy weapons in the Sarajevo area because they were too close to civilian areas.

During this period (September 9-12), Admiral William Owens, the U.S. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held several conversations with General Perisic, FRY Chief of Staff, to decide how to persuade General Mladic to withdraw his weapons. General Perisic stressed to Admiral Owens that the bombing only served to escalate the conflict, and would result in a change in the regional balance of power. General Perisic sought immediate cessation of the bombing. He said that General Mladic would not act unless (1) the bombing was halted, and (2) NATO guaranteed that the Bill would not attack BSA forces

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near Sarajevo after the heavy weapons were withdrawn. Admi- ral Owens reassured General Perisic that he would work to raise the awareness of such guarantees if the Serb heavy weapons were removed.

As of midday on September 13, General Ryan had only about 40 aimpoints to be hit before completing the Option 1 and 2 approved target lists. He and the CINC ruled out air strikes in the northwest ZOA because the combined Croat-Muslim offensive had moved so fast on the ground that it was no longer clear which side controlled which territory. The CINC had to decide whether to continue bombing Option 2 targets or to seek political authority to attack Option 3 targets. He thought the first to be wasteful because it would expose air crews for little benefit, and that the latter would probably not be endorsed by higher authority. Additionally, commanders doubted that attacking Option 3 targets would bring the Bosnian Serbs to compliance. Everybody hoped that General Mladic would soon succumb to the bombing. The BSA began to show signs of a crumbling resolve.

Nevertheless, the CINC sought guidance from General Joul- wan on whether to consider Option 3 targets. General Joulwan spoke to the NAC. Secretary General Claes told him that there was no consensus for Option 3 approval by either the NAC or the UN Security Council. General Joulwan communicated to the CINC that he would continue to push for Option 3 approval in case a future suspension did not hold, but that the CINC should

search for more Option 1 and 2 targets.

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Cessation of host i l i t ies

72-hour pause: evaluating compliance

Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke found a cease-fire agreement nearly in place upon his arrival in Belgrade. He notified General Janvier on the morning of September 14 that Serb leaders had met in Belgrade to sign a "Framework Agreement for a Cessation of Hostilities within the Sarajevo Total Exclusion Zone." The framework agreement, signed by President Karadzic, Vice President Koljevic, Speaker of the Pale Assembly Momcilo Krajisnik, and General Mladic, and witnessed by Serbian Presi- dent Milosevic, appeared to constitute a commitment to abide by the three conditions set forth in General Janvier's letter of Sep- tember 3.

General Janvier sought approval from the CINC for the suspension of operations throughout Bosnia, proposing an initial pause of 72 hours beginning 2200 local time the evening of Sep- tember 14. General Janvier proposed that a further extension of 72 hours could follow if significant signs of heavy weapons withdrawal were observed during the first bombing halt. The CINC sought and received authority to agree to the pauses, but continued with the less provocative Deny Flight mission during the halt in air strikes. He emphasized that General Mladic must be instructed to begin compliance immediately, and that if General Mladic's actions did not warrant a continuation of the pause, NATO would resume strikes without warning.

General Janvier instructed General Rupert Smith to imple- ment the agreement in consultation with the Bosnian Serb commanders. General Smith was told to demonstrate flexibility in preserving this unique opportunity for settlement, but not to compromise on the terms of the agreement. However, unim- peded road access and opening of the Sarajevo airport was an absolute condition to be achieved in the first 24 hours. After Gen- eral Janvier and the CINC had coordinated further, they issued a joint press statement on the following day (September 15). The

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statement indicated that they would reassess the degree of compliance after the first 72 hours and would announce either a further extension or a resumption of strikes at that time.

In a September 14 letter, General Smith informed General Mladic of the 72-hour suspension of bombing and of the continuation of non-provocative air missions. In addition, the letter instructed General Mladic on how to withdraw his heavy weapons. The definition of "heavy weapon" now included artillery, howitzers, and mortars 76-mm and above, and air defense weapons of 20-mm and above. The Sarajevo exclusion zone was defined to be 20 km in radius, excluding a zone of 3-km radius around Pale. The Han Derventa-Skrajnik route was designated the route of extraction for ease of monitoring. Special instructions were provided for partial ly destroyed or broken down weapons. General Smith asked to meet with General Mladic to coordinate progress.

Balance sheet

At the t ime of the pause, 307 of 344 of the Opt ion 1 and Opt ion 2 a impoints of 55 targets had been hit. Not more than 48 to 72 hours o f "make work" air tasking remained. The Serb [ADS West sector had been either struck or over run by the Croat- Mus l im offensive. NATO believed that the BSA had four operational SA-6s, thought to be in the Ban ja Luka areas.

On the first day (September 15) it was too early to assess compliance, but overall it appeared promising; General Rupert Smith achieved Bosnian Serb cooperation at the local level. However, he was unable to contact General Mladic by midday, and General Mladic's deputy, General Zdravko Tolimir, stated he lacked authority to concur in the broader definition of heavy weapons. In addition, Bosnian Muslim government authorities showed little support for the agreement because it would mean that they too would face restriction on their heavy weapons in the Sarajevo area.

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By the evening of the second day of the pause, September 16, heavy weapons movement had not significantly materialized. The BSA had issued an order to begin weapons movement at 1430 local time, but then rescinded it. The CINC asked that Bel- grade be contacted and told that withdrawal was not satisfactory. Also, he had been unaware of the refusal of the Muslim Bill to register its heavy weapons, a lack of cooperation that threatened to unravel the cease-fire agreement. On the positive side, the CINC recommenced the Provide Promise humanitarian air- lift to Sarajevo, with the first flight arriving at the newly opened airport on the afternoon of September 16.

On September 17, General Janvier met with Mr. Holbrooke and others to discuss his meeting with President Milosevic and General Perisic in Belgrade the previous day, and with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia in Zagreb the morning of September 17. General Janvier summarized the Muslim-Croat advance in northwest Bosnia, attributing their success in part to the air strikes on the BSA C3 nodes. Mr. Holbrooke expressed concern that the fall of Banja Luka would force President Milosevic to reinforce the BSA and undermine the peace process. On the future for NATO air operations, Mr. Holbrooke emphasized that he would not hesitate to recommend resuming the strikes if the heavy weapons were not moving out of Sarajevo. The night of September 17 marked the end of the 72-hour pause and would bring a decision. The CINC and General Janvier planned to speak at 2030 local time to determine the next steps.

Fol low-on pause: w i thdrawal and veri f icat ion

Judging that the Bosnian Serbs had demonstrated initial compliance with the conditions set in the Framework Agreement of September 14, the CINC and General Janvier announced at the "decision hour" the suspension of air strikes for an additional 72 hours. They pointed out that:

Bosnian Serbs had not attacked any safe areas in the past 72 hours.

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Freedom of movement on routes to Sarajevo had been dramat ica l ly inc reased w i th convoys proceed ing on routes from Kiseljak, Hadzici, and Kaupac-Mount Igman, and civilian vehicles on the Butmin blue route. Addition- ally, the Sarajevo airport had opened to unrestr icted traffic with 20 flights to date.

The Serbs had w i thdrawn 66 heavy weapons , and another 156 were under French escort.

A new Mus l im offensive in nor thwest Bosnia threatened progress on the agreement. In addit ion, the Serbs launched a shoulder-f i red SAM at two NATO F-15s at 1755 local t ime on September 17. The inc ident occurred 20 k i lometers south of Sarajevo. General Rupert Smith filed a protest for this act of bad faith. In a letter the following day, Bosnian Serb Brigadier Gen- eral Miletic acknowledged the a l legat ion and at t r ibuted the firing to an undiscipl ined individual. The Serbs said they would take measures to prevent future occurrences. There were none.

NATO expected a total withdrawal of the BSA heavy weapons. Although the number held by the Bosnian Serbs remained unknown, a common es t imate was around 300. Thus , the roughly 220 weapons reported out or on the way out at the time seemed satisfactory. General Rupert Smith's criterion of "unseen and unheard" was more or less adopted as a measure of removal. The BSA agreed to remove the air defenses from approaches to the Sarajevo a i rport and eventual ly complied, but not before some flights resumed. The CINC again expressed concern over the Bi l l failure to l ist its heavy weapons.

Verification of compliance continued as the halfway point of the second 72-hour pause passed. Progress was deemed satisfactory for the present. NATO believed that the greatest problem would be ensur ing that compliance cont inued beyond the first 144 hours of the bombing pause. NATO would rely on reconnaissance and overhead intell igence, weather permitt ing. The UN soldier on the ground would be indispensable for verifying compliance but would invite hostage-taking. Additionally, the BSA

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opposed full freedom of movement for the UN, as UNPROFOR soldiers had previously reported BSA positions and intentions to the Muslim forces. Despite these restrictions, UN soldiers provided the required confirmation of compliance.

On the evening of September 19, just 24 hours before the end of the follow-on pause, NATO and UN commanders judged compliance by the Bosnian Serbs as satisfactory. Freedom of movement on the land routes posed no problems, and the "air bridge" operations at Sarajevo airport were proceeding. Recon- naissance confirmed heavy weapons movement under French Army escort; 231 weapons had been removed, with 24 hours to go. The CINC met with General Janvier and General Rupert Smith in Sarajevo the following day to judge progress. Their solid and trusting relationship, formed over the course of the past several months of hard debate and decision, was a major factor in the successful merg ing of UN and NATO resolve.

At the end of the 144 hours of the bombing pause, at 2200 local time on September 20, the C INC and General Janvier concluded that the Bosnian Serbs had complied with the conditions

Deliberate Force NATO's First Extended Air Operation

Documents

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