UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) No. 08 CR 888 v. ) ) Judge James B. Zagel WILLIAM CELLINI ) ) DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) prepared in this case is inaccurate because the Probation Office (“Probation”) failed to account for the facts developed at trial and misinterpreted the applicable law. First, Probation erroneously concluded that profit generated from Capri’s receipt of the $220 million TRS allocation should be used as the “benefit” of the “extortion plot.” This finding resulted in 12 levels being improperly tacked onto the base offense level pursuant to § 2B1.1(1)(G). Second, Probation inaccurately determined that Stuart Levine had “substantial influence” over the TRS decision-making process, resulting in an additional 4- level increase under § 2C1.1(b)(3). Third, Probation recognized that the circumstances of the offense justified application of the minimal/minor role guideline reduction in § 3B1.2 but overstated the extent of Cellini’s role in the offense conduct and incorrectly concluded that Cellini should receive only a 2-level “minor” participant reduction under § 3B1.2(b), rather than a 4-level “minimal” participant reduction under § 3B1.2(a). Each of these errors in Probation’s advisory guideline computation will be discussed in detail below. Attached as Exhibit A hereto are certain additional errors in the PSR and in the Government’s Sentencing Memorandum (separately listed) that do not affect the advisory guideline computation. Case: 1:08-cr-00888 Document #: 990 Filed: 07/23/12 Page 1 of 24 PageID #:10208
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) ) No. 08 CR 888
v. ) ) Judge James B. Zagel
WILLIAM CELLINI ) )
DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) prepared in this case is inaccurate because
the Probation Office (“Probation”) failed to account for the facts developed at trial and
misinterpreted the applicable law. First, Probation erroneously concluded that profit generated
from Capri’s receipt of the $220 million TRS allocation should be used as the “benefit” of the
“extortion plot.” This finding resulted in 12 levels being improperly tacked onto the base offense
level pursuant to § 2B1.1(1)(G). Second, Probation inaccurately determined that Stuart Levine
had “substantial influence” over the TRS decision-making process, resulting in an additional 4-
level increase under § 2C1.1(b)(3). Third, Probation recognized that the circumstances of the
offense justified application of the minimal/minor role guideline reduction in § 3B1.2 but
overstated the extent of Cellini’s role in the offense conduct and incorrectly concluded that
Cellini should receive only a 2-level “minor” participant reduction under § 3B1.2(b), rather than
a 4-level “minimal” participant reduction under § 3B1.2(a).
Each of these errors in Probation’s advisory guideline computation will be discussed in
detail below. Attached as Exhibit A hereto are certain additional errors in the PSR and in the
Government’s Sentencing Memorandum (separately listed) that do not affect the advisory
The advisory guideline calculation set forth in the Government’s Sentencing
Memorandum is even more draconian in that it argues that Cellini is not entitled even to a 2-level
minor role adjustment. The fundamental problem with the government’s guidelines calculation
(and sentencing recommendation) is that it is based on the case that it charged in its indictment –
not the case that remains after the jury verdict.
The jury rejected the government’s contention in Count I that Cellini entered into an
“accommodation” or any other kind of agreement to interfere with the functioning of the TRS
Board. The jury also rejected the government’s contention that Cellini was a self-seeking insider
who sought to profit from his dealings with TRS. Further, the jury rejected the government’s
assertion in Count III that Cellini attempted to extort Tom Rosenberg. Instead, the jury found
that after Levine, Tony Rezko, and Chris Kelly (not Cellini) attempted to extort Rosenberg, and
after Rosenberg refused to be extorted, Cellini engaged with Levine, Rezko, Kelly, and
Rosenberg over the course of a week to control fallout that might result from Rosenberg’s
perception that he was being extorted by Levine, Rezko, and Kelly.1 Once the jury verdict is
properly understood, and not whitewashed out of the case as advocated by the government, it
becomes abundantly clear that Cellini should not be sentenced to imprisonment. He should be
sentenced to probation.
It is little wonder that the government clings so fiercely to the counts it lost at trial. After
all, these counts were the meat of the government’s case, the drama, the intrigue, and the sound
bites. The counts rejected by the jury are the basis for the government to make claims (as it
persists in doing in its Sentencing Memorandum) that this case involved Cellini’s “indifference
1 This is the only inference that can be drawn from the jury’s acquittal on Count III (attempted extortion) but conviction on Count II (conspiracy to commit extortion) and Count IV (aiding and abetting Levine’s solicitation of a bribe).
was a benefit that would be received regardless of whether payment was made, and thus it is not
a “benefit” at all for purposes of § 2C1.1(b)(2) and cannot be used to enhance the guideline
calculation.
B. The Proper Award of Capri’s Allocation Does Not Constitute Harm or Illicit Activity
It is illogical and contrary to the intention of § 2C1.1(b) that Cellini’s sentence should be
increased based on the legitimate profit Capri earned from its TRS allocation. Simply put, the
bribe Levine sought from Rosenberg was the only illegal aspect of the discussions involving
Cellini concerning Capri’s allocation; the Capri allocation itself was entirely legal and
legitimate.2 In finding that Capri’s properly awarded allocation was an illicit “benefit” that
should enhance Cellini’s sentence, Probation misapplied § 2C1.1(b)(2).
Courts interpreting § 2C1.1(b)(2) are cautious to separate costs that flow from legal
activity from costs that flow from illegal activity, allowing only the latter to be used to increase a
defendant’s sentence. In United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 366 (5th Cir. 2003), for
example, the Court reversed and remanded the case for resentencing based on its concern that the
trial court’s sentencing determination included consideration of money earned on land sales that
were disconnected from any bribes. In addition, the Court held that neither salary nor bonus
payments to bribe scheme participants could be included in the § 2C1.1(b)(2) calculation when
they were “negotiated before the bribe scheme came into being.” Griffin, 324 F.3d at 367.
Likewise, in United States v. Pena, 268 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2001), the Court interpreted §
2C1.1(b)(2) as counseling courts to “deduct the value legitimately and actually given from the
2 There is no dispute but that Capri’s $220 million allocation was the subject of the proper functioning of TRS’s internal decision-making process without corrupt intervention by Levine, Rezko, Kelly, or anyone else. (See Defense Version of the Offense at 35-36.) As Mike Bartletti testified at trial, the $220 million allocation to Capri was based on good historical five-, three-, and one-year rates of return. (Tr. 2060.)
C. The Jury Verdict and Guideline Section § 1B1.3 Counsel that Cellini Not be Punished for the Value of the Purported Benefit to be Withheld as a Part of the Attempted Extortion Because He Did Not Participate in That Attempted Extortion
According to advisory guideline § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), in cases involving allegations of
conspiracy or other jointly undertaken criminal activity, defendants are to be sentenced on “the
scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant agreed to undertake (i.e., the scope of the
specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant’s agreement).” App. Note 2, §
1B1.3. Cellini cannot and should not be punished for a part of the conspiracy in which he did
not participate. As clearly reflected by the jury’s verdict, Cellini was not involved in holding up
or threatening to hold up Capri’s allocation.3 The only way to interpret the jury’s verdict is to
find that Cellini did not participate in the aspect of the conspiracy involving attempted extortion;
he participated (if at all) in the aspect of the conspiracy involving detection avoidance.
Therefore, he should not be punished for the benefit Capri could have lost in the form of the
profits Capri eventually earned on the acquisition fees from its TRS allocation.
According to the government, on May 7, 2004, in an unrecorded call between Rosenberg
and Cellini, Cellini delivered an extortion message to Rosenberg. Because there is no recording
of the call, the only testimony as to what transpired on this call was from Rosenberg. Contrary to
the government’s assertion (and consistent with the jury’s verdict acquitting Cellini of attempted
extortion), Rosenberg’s testimony did not establish any attempt at extortion by Cellini. To the
contrary, Rosenberg testified:
Q: . . . Bill Cellini never told you that you should give a political contribution did he?
3 Indeed, quite the opposite was the case, as it was Cellini who was responsible for clearing the Capri allocation to go through in March 2004 when Levine first started to make problems for Rosenberg and Capri and when Rosenberg first sought Cellini’s help. (Defense Version at 8-9.)
Q: And he never told you that it was him that was telling you that it was held up because you didn’t make a political contribution. He was telling you he learned that Rezko and Kelly said that.
A: That’s right . . . .
Q: Okay he never told you, Tom, give a political contribution.
A: Never.
Q: Ever.
A: Never.
Q: At any conversation.
A: Never ever in 30 years I don’t think.
(Tr. 1855.) Rosenberg’s testimony supports the conclusion that Cellini was only repeating to
Rosenberg what he had learned from Levine because Rosenberg asked Cellini to find out what
he could about the Capri allocation.
The recorded May 7, 2004 call between Cellini and Levine contained no words
establishing that Cellini had delivered an extortionate message to Rosenberg. Thus, neither
Rosenberg’s testimony nor the May 7, 2004 wire intercept of Cellini’s call with Levine
contained evidence of Cellini participating in Levine’s extortion scheme. The government relied
entirely on Levine’s testimony that Cellini informed him that Cellini had delivered the message
to Rosenberg that Rosenberg had to contribute to Blagojevich if he wanted Capri to receive its
allocation. (Tr. 1434-35.) Given Levine’s track record of lies and deceptions, it is unsurprising
that the jury rejected Levine’s testimony. Cellini cannot be sentenced for attempting to extort
Rosenberg because he did not do it. The government did not prove that Cellini was involved in
attempting to harm Rosenberg – in fact, the evidence is exactly the opposite – and, accordingly,
the government is entitled to no loss amount for such attempted harm.
proposed to make an investment, TRS real estate investment policy required the managed to
provide TRS staff with detailed information describing the proposed investment.4 (Tr. 2057-58.)
Only if the proposal satisfied a laundry list of criteria and met various hurdles for rates of return
would the investment firm be permitted to proceed. (Tr. 2058.) Even then, the firm needed to
obtain an appraisal in line with what it intended to pay for any building it intended to purchase.
(Tr. 2059.) Also, as part of the approval process required for the investment of an allocation,
TRS had to generate a decision memorandum approved by the TRS Chief Investment Officer, as
well as the Executive Director, and, possibly, also approved by TRS outside consultants Callan
& Associates. (Tr. 2059.) Only after satisfying all of those prerequisites would a manager
receive an acquisition fee, and such prerequisites had to be satisfied for each proposed
investment of a portion of an allocation. Thus, there is no information by which to reliably
conclude what acquisition fees, if any, Cellini might have foreseen in 2004 that Capri was going
to receive between 2004 and 2011. In addition, in changing real estate markets, TRS had the
right and had been known to reduce amounts previously allocated to investment firms if that was
perceived to be in the best interest of TRS, meaning that it was entirely possible Capri’s
allocation would be reduced. In fact, as Cellini knew, TRS had reduced Commonwealth
allocations in the past (prior to 2004).
Probation argues that Capri’s net profit from acquisition fees related to the $220 million
allocation was foreseeable to Cellini in 2004 because “This is not a case in which the benefit was
not actually received and approximation has to be made as to what the net benefit could have
been. The benefit, the allocation, was received and invested, to the actual net gain from the
4 This information included research concerning the area in which the building was to be located, vacancy and absorption rates for the building, information as to existing leases and tenants, information about the ownership of the building and the reasons for the sale, projections as to how long the investment advisor would hold the building and its exit plan, and what it expected to receive in income and appreciation over time. (Tr. 2057-58.)
investment is the appropriate figure to use.” (PSR at 13-14:375-78.) In other words, Cellini
should have known in 2004 that Capri was going to be able to invest the entirety of its $220
million allocation and thus earn in excess of $278,000 in profit through acquisition fees on that
allocation because in 2012 we know that Capri was able to invest the entirety of its $220 million
allocation and earn in excess of $278,000 in profit through acquisition fees on that allocation.
That reasoning cannot withstand serious scrutiny.
Finally, the government and Probation have failed to establish that Cellini had any idea
how Capri was paid and what expenses it bore between 2004 and 2011, instead simply taking
that for granted. Without some actual evidence on that issue, the government cannot meet its
burden to establish a loss amount chargeable to Cellini.
E. The § 2X1.1 Conspiracy and Solicitation Guideline Overlay on § 2C1.1 Adjustments Specifically Provides that Speculative Adjustments are Not Proper
Probation’s position about the supposed harm amount also runs contrary to § 2X1.1 and
its Application Notes. Specifically, § 2X1.1(a) provides that for conspiracy and solicitation
convictions, the base-level offense for the substantive offense is to be applied, “plus any
adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with
reasonable certainty.” (emphasis added). Application Note 2 to § 2X1.1 clarifies that this
provision is aimed at eliminating any adjustments that are speculative, providing in pertinent
part:
But the only specific offense characteristics from the guideline for the substantive offense that apply are those that are determined to have been specifically intended or actually occurred. Speculative specific offense characteristics will not be applied.
(emphasis added). The Application Note goes on to provide the example of a defendant arrested
in the conspiratorial phase of a bank robbery, explaining such a defendant should not have
receive an enhancement for possible injury to others during the robbery, or the eventual robbery
of a large sum of money, since those eventualities would be speculative.
This provision lends further support to the fact that, as discussed above, no value of
payment, benefit to be received, or loss can properly be applied to Cellini’s advisory sentencing
guideline computation under § 2C1.1(b)(2). As discussed in Section I.A. above, the government
has not established that any injury to Capri was ever going to occur. Also, there is no evidence
that Cellini ever intended for Capri to lose its $220 million allocation and the profits that
allocation might generate. The only evidence of Cellini taking any action in connection with that
allocation was in February 2004, when he intervened at Rosenberg’s request to allow the
allocation to go through as planned, foiling Levine’s first attempt to hold up the allocation and
extort Rosenberg. That the jury found Cellini engaged in discussions aimed at damage control
after the fact does not establish that he intended for Capri to lose its allocation. Indeed, when all
of the wire intercept conversations are taken in context, it is clear that even in the damage control
phase, Cellini’s role was to cool down Levine and Rosenberg, which ultimately led to the
allocation going through as planned. In addition, Cellini would have had no idea what
acquisition fees, if any, Capri’s allocation might generate, or how profitable those fees might be.
Based on all of these facts, it cannot be established that Cellini “specifically intended” a
$278,359 lost benefit to Capri. In this circumstance, any adjustment based on such figures would
be speculation and conjecture. That is exactly the type of “speculative specific offense
characteristic[s]” that Application Note 2 to § 2X1.1 forbids.
II. Probation Incorrectly Imposes a 4-Level Adjustment for Involvement of a Public Official in a High-Level Decision-Making or Sensitive Position Pursuant to § 2C1.1(b)(3)
Probation erroneously concluded that a § 2C1.1(b)(3) adjustment is applicable in this
case based on confusion about the extent of Levine’s influence over the TRS Board during the
relevant time period.5 While recognizing that because Levine was only one of 11 TRS board
members, he did not have any direct decision-making authority at TRS, Probation nonetheless
concluded that the § 2C1.1(b)(3) adjustment should apply based on its determination that Levine
“had substantial influence over the decision-making process of the Board via his influence with
the executive director and the government appointees.” (PSR at 14:393-397.) In reaching its
conclusion, Probation disregards the trial evidence.
In early May 2004, the time that the Capri allocation was being held up, Levine did not
have the ability to control the TRS Board. Nor did he have “substantial influence” over the
decision-making process of the TRS Board. In fact, he was in the minority on the TRS Board
and even had concerns that he was not going to be reappointed to an additional term as a trustee,
which he discussed with Rezko and Cellini. (Tr. 873-877.) Furthermore, Levine testified that he
needed Rezko’s help in putting the Capri allocation on hold after Cellini had trumped Levine’s
extortion plan in March 2004 – in other words, Levine was incapable of holding up Carpi’s
allocation on his own. (Tr. 1322-23.)
As of early May 2004, the TRS Board had two voting blocs. One was composed of
elected teachers and consisted of five votes. (Tr. 1681.) The other bloc, consisting of Levine
and other governor’s appointees, had four votes. (Id.) This 5-4 split meant that Levine’s bloc
did not have voting control over the TRS Board. Indeed, Levine testified that even as of April
2003 (when he enjoyed a better position than he did in May 2004 by virtue of a more favorable
5-5 Board composition), he “could not control the decision-making of the TRS Board.” (Tr.
5 Probation at least resists the confusion invited by the Government’s Version of the Offense, which alleges that Levine had substantial influence over the TRS decision-making process during the relevant time period (in May 2004) by citing to events from 2001 supposedly showing Levine’s influence at that earlier time. (Government Version at 23.)
1679.) Between April 2003 and May 2004, one of the governor’s appointees resigned, further
weakening the appointee bloc and Levine’s power. (Tr. 1679.) As Levine testified at trial:
Q: So in April 2004, were there more, actually more teachers who were elected . . . then there were people who either voted with the governor’s people or who were part of the governor’s people?
A: Yes.
(Tr. 872.) Thus, as of April and May 2004, the relevant time period, Levine could not control
TRS Board decisions. This should end the inquiry as to the applicability of the § 2C1.1(b)(3)
adjustment, as Levine’s inability to control TRS voting means he lacked “substantial influence
over the decision-making process” as required by § 2C1.1(b)(3).
Probation goes on to suggest, however, that Levine had other, less formal means to
influence the TRS Board by virtue of his supposed influence with TRS executive director Jon
Bauman and the appointee Board members, his position as an evaluator of Bauman, and his
“corrupt influence with Rezko, Kelly, and Cellini who influenced government appointees.”6
(PSR at 14:396-400.) For its part, the government suggests that “in practice,” Levine had more
influence over the TRS Board then his fellow trustees because of his close relationship with
Bauman and other supposed “Cellini allies” on the Board. (Government Version at 23.)
The only meaningful allegations as to Levine’s informal influence concerns his supposed
power over Bauman. These allegations might have been relevant had they been accurate in May
2004 when the charged offense took place. However, as they were demonstrably false at that
time, they have no place in the Court’s consideration of the applicability of the § 2C1.1(b)(3)
adjustment.
6 Cellini was acquitted of Count I, which charged him with having a corrupt relationship with TRS, Rezko, and Kelly. Because Probation has failed to explain the basis for this erroneous statement, Cellini objects to its inclusion in the PSR. (See Ex. A.)
Based on the trial testimony of Levine, as of the spring of 2004, TRS executive director
Bauman was “becoming difficult” and “not as cooperative as he had been.”7 (Tr. 813.) Levine
testified that by the spring of 2004, Bauman was interested in leaving TRS to obtain a job at the
University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana. So difficult had Levine found his relationship with
Bauman to have become by that time, Levine testified that he wanted Bauman to be replaced as
Executive Director of TRS. (Tr. 813.) A case in point was a proposal Bauman had put forth in
May 2004 to change the fees TRS paid to its real estate managers. (Tr. 829.) Of this initiative,
Levine testified, “Bauman will do what Bauman wants.” (Tr. 841.)
The April 12, 2004 recorded call between Levine and Bill Cavanaugh, then fiduciary
counsel to the TRS Board is further evidence of the disintegration of whatever influence Levine
might have once had with Bauman. Levine told Cavanaugh that Bauman “was like he was
digging in his heels and nothin’ was gonna happen and, and things should happen.” Levine
continued that Bauman was “like an old lady” who “starts screaming” to let off pressure and that
he “needed to be moved.” Levine and Cavanagh discussed their opinion that Bauman was
“arrogant” and “stupid.” Levine concluded the call by telling Cavanagh that after Bauman was
moved, “[I]t’s gonna be an entirely different world.” Thus, the facts are that as of April 2004,
Levine could not tolerate dealing with Bauman, could not control Bauman, disparaged and
ridiculed Bauman to others, and preferred that Bauman left TRS.
As of early April-May 2004, Levine was not in actual or effective control of the decision-
making of the TRS Board. He had no ability to control the vote of the Board. He had a poor
relationship with Bauman and wanted Bauman to leave TRS, and he was concerned about his
7 Indeed, in the Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, it makes the point that by May 2004, Bauman “had begun to grow more independent because of his own relationship with Chris Kelly.” (Government Sentencing Memorandum at 13.)
conspiracy, one that runs contrary to the trial evidence and jury verdict, is responsible for its
underestimation of the proper adjustment for role in the offense.
As the Application Notes to § 3B1.2 specifically provide, the Court can properly consider
Cellini’s minimal participation in and knowledge of the offense both in calculating the amount of
loss or benefit for which he is responsible (as argued in Section I.B. above) and in a downward
adjustment for role in the offense. When properly understood, Cellini’s actual role in Levine’s
conspiracy, characterized as it was by an undisputed lack of knowledge and a lack of culpability,
is perfectly suited for the 4-level role reduction provided for in § 3B1.2(a).8
ADVISORY GUIDELINE CALCULATION
The correct advisory guideline calculation, based on the above, for Counts II and IV is:
Base offense level under § 2C1.1(a)(2): 12
Minimal role adjustment under §3B1.2(a) -4
Total: 8
Sentencing Range: 0 – 6 months
8 In addition to the reductions described above, specifically as to Count II, Cellini is entitled to a three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2), which provides that in the case of conspiracies, there should be a three-level reduction from the substantive offense level, “unless the defendant or a coconspirator completed all the acts the conspirators believed necessary on their part for the successful completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances demonstrate that the conspirators were about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or interruption by some similar event beyond their control.” U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2). To complete the substantive offense of extortion under color of official right, an essential element is that the defendant obtained money or property from the victim (18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 267-73 & n.5 (1991)). To obtain money from Rosenberg in this case, the alleged plan as described by Levine was for Cellini to steer Rosenberg to Levine, and for Levine to then provide Rosenberg a two-pronged choice of paying either a $2 million finder’s fee to Levine through Vrdolyak or a $1.5 million political contribution to Blagojevich. (Tr. at 965.) But after Cellini had certain conversations with Rosenberg, the alleged plan dissolved. Levine and Rosenberg never spoke, and Levine never offered Rosenberg the two-pronged choice. Consequently, the alleged coconspirators did not complete all of the acts believed necessary on their part for the successful completion of the substantive offense (the alleged extortion), and Cellini is entitled to the three-level reduction. Because that reduction applies only to Count II, which is grouped with Count IV, the reduction presently does not affect the guideline calculation but would in the event that the conviction on Count IV was thrown out.
Probation’s advisory guideline computation incorrectly imposes a 12-level upward
adjustment pursuant to § 2C1.1(b)(2) and a 4-level upward adjustment pursuant to § 2C1.1(b)(3),
and fails to adequately adjust downward 4 levels for Cellini’s minimal role in the offense
pursuant to § 3B1.2(a). The jury’s verdict did not reflect the type of full-fledged participation in
Levine’s scheme as advocated by the government and accepted by Probation. An appropriate
analysis of the facts and evidence as established at trial, as well as careful consideration of the
purpose and application of the advisory sentencing guidelines, yields the conclusion that
Cellini’s guideline level is 8, which corresponds to 0-6 months of imprisonment, and that a
probationary sentence would be a just result in this case.
Dated: July 23, 2012 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Thomas L. Kirsch Dan K. Webb ([email protected]) Thomas L. Kirsch ([email protected]) Winston & Strawn LLP 35 West Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 558-5600 (312) 558-5700 (facsimile)
The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that the following document:
DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
was served on July 23, 2012, in accordance with FED. R. CRIM. P. 49, FED. R. CIV. P. 5, LR 5.5, and the General Order on Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) pursuant to the district court’s system as to ECF filers.
EXHIBIT A: ERRORS IN THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT AND GOVERNMENT
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM THAT DO NOT AFFECT THE ADVISORY GUIDELINE
CALCULATION
I. Errors in the Presentence Investigation Report
1. Probation identifies Rod Blagojevich, Chris Kelly, Lon Monk, John Harris, and Robert Blagojevich as “codefendants” of Cellini (2), and summarizes the facts of the Blagojevich case. (6:69-79.) In fact, the government moved for a severance of the Blagojevich case from Cellini’s case, recognizing that the cases were not substantially related and were required, under the law, to be tried separately. See Dkt. No. 202. Probation’s discussion of the Blagojevich case should be deleted from the PSR.
2. Probation writes, “On advice of counsel, defendant declined to discuss the offense in presentence interviews.” (5:67-68.) In fact, the defense informed the probation office that in lieu of having Cellini answer questions about the offense during his interviews with the probation office, counsel would submit on his behalf a detailed position paper describing Cellini’s version of events. The defense made that submission on May 4, 2012.
3. Probation describes the conduct charged in Count I of the indictment. The jury acquitted Cellini of that charge, yet Probation describes such conduct as if it were proved. (7:112-141; 8:153-68.) Probation should remove this discussion from the PSR or make note of the jury’s rejection of the government’s allegations.
4. Probation includes an opinion from Agent Cain that “as members of Defendant Blagojevich’s inner circle, Rezko and Kelly had the ability to stop a TRS allocation, although it had to appear to be for a legitimate reason.” (9:193-95.) That statement reflects merely the personal opinion of a government agent and is unsupported by the evidence at trial. It should be removed entirely from the PSR.
5. Probation includes an opinion from Agent Cain about Rosenberg’s mindset with regard to Cellini’s involvement in Levine’s extortion scheme. (9:205-09.) Rosenberg did not testify to this information, and it should be deleted from the PSR.
6. Probation states that Levine increased his TRS influence “through his corrupt relationships with Rezko, Kelly and Cellini.” (14:399-400.) The jury acquitted Cellini of the charge in Count I of the indictment, which charged Cellini’s supposed corrupt influence at TRS. Thus, the statement as it concerns Cellini is unsupported by the verdict and the evidence, and Cellini’s name should be removed from this statement in the PSR.
7. Probation claims on numerous occasions that it did not receive from Cellini information regarding his health and that certain health information in the PSR is “unverified.” (19-20:578-629.) To the contrary, Probation was provided as early as May 4, 2012 with six detailed letters from Cellini’s treating physicians, which described and verified all of the medical information Cellini and his counsel provided. The error has been brought to the probation officer’s attention, and the defense believes that Probation will, by the time of sentencing, produce a supplemental medical report correcting the error and adding pertinent information regarding Cellini’s change
in health condition after the completion of the PSR, including his recent heart attack and unresolved pulmonary embolism.
II. Errors in the Government’s Sentencing Memorandum
1. With regard to the quoted language in the Introduction of the government’s sentencing memorandum, the government takes that language out of context and omits that Cellini merely was saying to Levine what Rosenberg had asked him to say.
2. The government’s statement that Cellini put at risk hundreds of millions of dollars in taxpayer funds and the retirement savings of thousands of Illinois teachers (4) has no evidentiary support. In fact, the company that Cellini was affiliated with, Commonwealth Realty Advisors, earned and distributed back to TRS in excess of $1 billion in investment returns.
3. Contrary to the government’s assertion, Cellini was not convicted of attempting to extort a political contribution from Rosenberg. (4.) He was acquitted of that charge.
4. The government accuses Cellini of lacking remorse based on two examples in the Defendant’s Version that the government contends do not adequately reflect the trial evidence. The government’s accusation lack merit, and as an aside, Cellini was careful to cite the trial transcripts in his Version of the Offense – something the government fails to do while making its own unsupported characterizations of the facts. First, the government alleges that there is no support for the assertion in the Defendant’s Version that Cellini suggested TRS award a partial allocation to Capri as part of a strategy to get Capri its full $220 million allocation. There was indeed support for that assertion. Cellini said to Levine during a May 10, 2004 recorded call that maybe Levine should award a partial allocation to Capri “and ask for a letter before . . . .” It is a fair reading of that statement that Cellini was suggesting TRS provide a partial allocation and ask for a letter further clarifying the Capri ownership issue, which Levine disputed during that same call, before providing Capri its full allocation. Second, the government takes issue with the assertion in the Defendant’s Version that Cellini was uncomfortable with the fundraising methods of Rezko and Kelly. But that is fact demonstrated by Cellini’s statements during the May 8, 2004 recorded call with Levine, during which Cellini discussed rumors of Rezko and Kelly’s fundraising. In that call, Cellini and Levine discussed that Satch Pecori withdrew from a fundraiser for Blagojevich because Pecori had heard from other road builders about “matrices” showing a correlation between political fundraising for Blagojevich and the award of state road-building contracts. Cellini told Levine that Rezko and Kelly were awarding contracts to companies in close proximity to receiving political contributions from those companies, which was something that past administrations known to Cellini had been sure to avoid. Quite clearly, as the Defense Version suggests, Cellini was expressing his discomfort with Kelly and Rezko’s fundraising efforts.
5. The government argues there is no credible evidence that Rosenberg sent Davis to Rezko. (6.) But there is credible evidence. That is exactly what Levine told Cellini repeatedly during the recorded calls that formed the basis for the government’s entire case against Cellini.
6. The government claims that the decision to help Rezko and Kelly obtain a political contribution from Rosenberg was consistent with Cellini’s prior dealings with TRS. (7.) There
is no evidence to support that assertion, and Cellini was specifically acquitted of the TRS bribery scheme charged in Count I, and there is no evidence Cellini ever asked anyone directly or indirectly associated with TRS for a campaign contribution.
7. The government argues that Cellini personally raised $400,000 for Blagojevich during a September 2002 fundraising event. (9.) In fact, Cellini was merely employed by one of several sponsors of that event. Furthermore, the government’s argument is inconsistent with its own evidence, including the testimony of Kelly Glynn, and was directly refuted by defense witnesses.
8. The government claims that Cellini pressed Bozarth to promote Bauman to TRS Chief Investment Officer and Jim Bruner as head of the TRS investment committee. (11.) There is no evidence to support those assertions. After the government filed it’s Sentencing Memorandum, Bruner told The State Journal-Resister in Springfield that the government’s allegation that Cellini engineered Bruner’s re-appointment as a TRS Trustee in 2002 was a “crock.” See “Former TRS Member Challenges Prosecutors On Cellini's Role” The State Journal-Register, July 16, 2012. Bruner added that Cellini “never asked me to do anything for him.” Id.
9. The government states that Cellini learned of TRS’s plan to alter its method for paying asset managers and argues Cellini took various corrupt steps to prevent it. (13.) There is no evidence to support the government’s assertions about the supposed steps taken by Cellini. Cellini did not attempt to prevent the alteration; he merely suggested there be a hearing concerning the alteration. Further, he did not try to have Bauman removed. In fact, Levine clearly explained in a recorded call that Bauman himself was attempting to leave TRS and move home to Champaign.
10. The government states that Cellini could and did direct Bauman to dispose of the $220 Capri allocation in various ways. (13.) There is no evidence to support that assertion.
11. The government argues that Cellini urged Bauman to increase Commonwealth’s allocation so it could invest in Senior Lifestyles. (16.) The evidence does not support this assertion. In fact, Commonwealth rejected the investment – touted by Levine and Steve Loren – after careful consideration.
12. The government argues that Cellini participated in some kind of uncharged corruption related to the Carlyle Group. (17-18.) The government’s contentions are false and have no evidentiary support. In fact, the government has been informed by Bob Kjellander and other witnesses that Cellini had nothing to do with events surrounding the Carlyle Group and there was no connection between the Carlyle Group and the dental HMO.
13. The government states that Cellini helped Pecori’s firm obtain a state road-building contract by arranging with Kelly that Pecori would host a fundraiser for Blagojevich. (18) In fact, had Pecori been permitted to testify, he would have confirmed that his firm obtained the contract before any discussion of the fundraiser, and that there was no relation between the contract and his commitment to fundraise. The government further argues that Levine and Cellini’s discussion about the Pecori situation and about Blagojevich fundraising generally revealed that Cellini engaged in political corruption for years. (19-20.) The government’s argument is a wild extrapolation unsupported by the evidence. Cellini explained in the May 8,
2004 recorded call that Pecori asked him to make an introduction to the Blagojevich people, and at Cellini’s request, Kelly agreed for Pecori to participate as a sponsor to a Blagojevich fundraising luncheon. Pecori later informed Cellini that he and his partners did not want to participate in the fundraiser because they had heard of a potential suspicious connection between fundraising for Blagojevich and the award of state contracts. Cellini told Levine that this anecdote about Pecori was an example of the “climate,” explaining that the apparent fundraising approach of the Blagojevich people was different from Cellini’s, and that administrations associated with Cellini made sure there was no link between fundraising and the award of state contracts.