Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada CRTI 07-0103RD: Full Scale RDD Experiments and Models Dr. Lorne Erhardt Group Leader, Radiological Analysis and Defence Defence R&D Canada – Ottawa Public Security S&T Summer Symposium 16 June 2009
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Defence Research andDevelopment Canada
Recherche et développementpour la défense Canada Canada
CRTI 07-0103RD: Full Scale RDD Experiments and Models
Dr. Lorne ErhardtGroup Leader, Radiological Analysis and Defence
Defence R&D Canada – Ottawa
Public Security S&T Summer Symposium16 June 2009
Defence R&D Canada • R & D pour la défense Canada
Presentation Outline
• Radiological Terrorism
• RDD Hazard Overview
– What are the major hazards?
• RDD Experimental Work
– What do we need to study, why and what we’re doing.
– Full-Scale RDD Experiments and Models
• Conclusion
Defence Research andDevelopment Canada
Recherche et développementpour la défense Canada Canada
Introduction: Radiological Terrorism
Defence R&D Canada • R & D pour la défense Canada
What is Radiological Terrorism?
• Radiological terrorism is the use of radioactive material to cause harm
• “Harm” could be a lot of things:– Death
– Acute effects: Radiation sickness
– Chronic effects: Increased cancer risk
– Economic effects: Contamination
– Psychological effects
• The amount and type of harm that a radiological weapon can inflict depends greatly on the design of the weapon
Defence R&D Canada • R & D pour la défense Canada
Types of Radiological Weapons
• For a radioactive source to be dangerous, it must be put into a configuration that allows people to be exposed to it (accidentally or maliciously)
• There are two main types of radiological weapons:
– Radiological Exposure Devices• Source deployed in order to irradiate people; Simplest
form of radiological attack
– Radiological Dispersal Devices• Radioactive sources dispersed by explosive or non-
explosive means
Defence Research andDevelopment Canada
Recherche et développementpour la défense Canada Canada
RDD Experimental Work:
Objectives and Relevance
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Why are we studying RDD effects?
• Effectiveness of radiological dispersal devices subject to debate
– "Dirty Bombs" Much More Likely to Create Fear than Cause Cancer
• American Institute of Physics, www.aip.org
– Radiological attacks constitute a credible threat
• Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org
• Strategies to protect first responders, the public and critical infrastructure against RDDs must be made in the planning stage, not in the early period just after an attack.
• The development of guidelines for first responders dealing with radiological terrorism incidents requires experimentally verified data on the effects of RDDs.
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What do we need to determine?
• For atmospheric dispersion (and other hazard assessment) codes we need the “Source Term”– Particle size distribution and spatial distribution
• We must understand:– Mechanism for material break-up
• Melting, vaporization, solid fracture
– Energetic mechanisms for spatial distribution• Buoyant rise, fragment throw
– Modifications to source term• Agglomeration, shock sintering, secondary aerosolization
• Many time and distance scales involved• This all depends greatly on the design of the device
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• Pre-detonation– External hazard, maybe some contamination
• Detonation gives:– Small particles “respirable” < 10 µm
• CAN/UK/US RDD modelling workshop held in November 2008 in Albuquerque NM– Input from a variety of subject matter experts
– Defined best approaches for both the modelling and experimental programs
• Modelling effort has focused on evaluation of existing relevant codes, moving on to best practices for integration– Modelling of experimental configuration is just beginning
(Canada and UK)
• Experimental parameters defined after last workshop– Safety of experiments is first priority, but must maintain
relevance to the RDD problem
– Indoor source term experiments to focus on modelling gaps and to test the defined outdoor experiments
Defence R&D Canada • R & D pour la défense Canada
Conclusions
• Radiological terrorism involves getting a radioactive substance into a configuration where it can cause harm
• RDDs produce different particle sizes leading to different hazards
• To fully characterize the hazard you need to determine the “Source Term”– This is difficult due to the great dependence on:
• Device design • Material properties
• CRTI 07-0103RD: Full Scale RDD Experiments and Models is addressing these issues– Extensive experimental program is designed to fill gaps in and
validate the modelling effort– International collaboration including UK and US participants– Will result in an ability to quickly evaluate emerging threats
• Already has resulted in increased understanding of relevant issues