Deepwater Horizon Accident

DEEPWATER HORIZON

DEEPWATER

HORIZON

ACCIDENT AND

HOW THE

INDUSTRY

CHANGED

AFTERWARDS

BY: SHELLE HABIB OLAWALE COURSE TITLE: HEALTH SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT

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SUMMARY

This report examines what caused the Deepwater Horizon accident, resulting in a massive

offshore oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. The incident was considered the largest

accidental marine oil spill in the world, and the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history

and injured 16 others. The report also explores the impact of the oil spill on the environment,

the changes made afterwards from both the oil and gas industry and the Government to reduce

the likelihood of any future loss of well and environmental habitat in the offshore drilling.

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Contents

SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2

INTRODUTION ................................................................................................................................................................ 4

THE MACONDO WELL ................................................................................................................................................ 4

THE LEAKING .................................................................................................................................................................. 5

THE CLEAN-UP ............................................................................................................................................................... 6

AFTERMATH ................................................................................................................................................................... 7

ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH IMPACT ................................................................................................................... 8

CHANGES MADE AFTER THE OIL SPILLAGE .................................................................................................................... 9

DOI’S SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS .............................................................................. 9

GOAL-ORIENTED RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATORY SYSTEMS .............................................................................. 11

IMPLEMENTATION ASPECTS OF A GOAL-ORIENTED RISK MANAGEMENT .......................................................... 12

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INTRODUTION

THE MACONDO WELL

The Macondo well is located approximately 50 miles off the coast of Louisiana in the Mississippi

Canyon region of the Gulf of Mexico. The well wasn’t intended to be under the production

phase at that time frame, it rather was intended as an exploratory well, drilled to evaluate the

existence of extractable hydrocarbons and to survey the associated reservoir structures. The

well was originally planned for a total depth of 19,650 feet. A decision was made in early April

2010 to halt drilling at a total depth of 18,360 feet and prepare the well for temporary

abandonment in order to utilize the well later for oil and gas production. According to BP’s

accident investigation report, four hydrocarbon zones had been discovered at depths ranging

from 17,788 to 18,223 feet (BP 2010, 54).

The temporary abandonment of a well which was intended to be used for production is a

standard practice. It provides the operator time to install the substantial infrastructure needed

to transport the recovered hydrocarbons to shore while releasing the expensive drilling rig for

other activities. Sealing the well to ensure that no hydrocarbon flow occurs is critical to the

temporary abandonment process. This is typically done through the use of cemented liners or

casings, along with additional cement or mechanical plugs that provide multiple barriers to

hydrocarbon flow.

On the night of April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig, located 50 miles off the coast of

Venice, Louisiana, exploded and caught fire, resulting in the deaths of eleven workers. The rig

sank on the morning of April 22, and on April 23 crews discovered oil leaking from the well’s

riser and drill pipe. Oil began reaching shore in late May. During the peak of the operations,

more than 47,000 men and women were involved in responding to and cleaning up the oil spill

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each day. This included more than 42,000 response and cleanup workers employed by BP and

its contractors, 1,600 members of the National Guard, and more than 2,400 federal employees.

The area of operations spanned the coastline from Louisiana to Florida, as well as offshore

operations from the shoreline to the site of the release; 6,400 vessels were involved in the

operations. Many workers faced potential exposure to weathered oil, oil byproducts,

dispersants, cleaning products, and other chemicals used in the cleanup process. Depending on

their assignments, these workers also faced potential hazards from extreme heat, slips, falls,

material handling, drowning, confined spaces, struck-by, fatigue, loud noises, sharp objects, and

electrical hazards, as well as bites from insects, snakes, and other species native to the Gulf

Coast region.

THE LEAKING Although BP attempted to activate the rig’s blowout preventer (BOP), a fail-safe mechanism

designed to close the channel through which oil was drawn, the device malfunctioned. Efforts

in May to place a containment dome over the largest leak in the broken riser were thwarted by

the buoyant action of gas hydrates (gas molecules in an ice matrix) formed by the reaction of

natural gas and cold water. When an attempt to employ a “top kill,” whereby drilling mud was

pumped into the well to stanch the flow of oil, also failed, BP in early June turned to an

apparatus called the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) cap. Though the leak had slowed, it

was estimated by a government-commissioned panel of scientists that 4.9 million barrels of oil

had already leaked into the gulf. Only about 800,000 barrels had been captured. On August 3

BP conducted a “static kill,” a procedure in which drilling mud was pumped into the well

through the BOP. Though similar to the failed top-kill, mud could be injected at much lower

pressures during the static kill because of the stabilizing influence of the capping stack. The

defective BOP and the capping stack were removed in early September and replaced by a

functioning BOP.

The success of these procedures cleared the way for a “bottom kill,” considered to be the most

likely means of permanently sealing the leak. This entailed pumping cement through a

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channel—known as a relief well—that paralleled and eventually intersected the original well.

Construction of two such wells had begun in May. On September 17 the bottom kill maneuver

was successfully executed through the first relief well. The second had been intended to serve

as a backup and was not completed. Two days later, following a series of pressure tests, it was

announced that the well was completely sealed.

THE CLEAN-UP The petroleum that had leaked from the well before it was sealed formed a slick extending over

thousands of square miles of the Gulf of Mexico. To clean oil from the open water, 1.8 million

gallons of dispersants. The use of the dispersant was to emulsify the oil, thus allowing for easier

metabolism by bacteria, the usage had a negative biological effect to the Gulf eco-system.

Below is an image showing how the dispersant works.

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As oil began to contaminate Louisiana beaches in May, it was manually removed. The state’s

marshes and estuaries were more difficult to clean because the topography was knit together

by delicate plant life. By June, oil and tar balls had made landfall on the beaches. Although the

usage chemical dispersants was one of the least methods used in the cleanup operation, its side

effects to the environment was the most damaging. Here is a pie-chart representation of the

methods used or attempted to clean up the oil spilled.

AFTERMATH Economic prospects in the Gulf Coast states became dire, as the spill affected many of the

industries upon which residents depended. More than a third of federal waters in the gulf were

Residual, 26.%

Evaporated or Dissolved, 25.%

Direct Recovery From Well, 17.%

Chemical Dipersant, 8.%

Naturally Dispersed, 15.%

Skimmed, 3.%Burning, 5.%

Residual

Evaporated or Dissolved

Direct Recovery From Well

Chemical Dipersant

Naturally Dispersed

Skimmed

Burning

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closed to fishing at the peak of the spill, due to fears of contamination. Few travelers were

willing to face the prospect of petroleum-sullied beaches, leaving those dependent on tourism

struggling to supplement their incomes. To reduce the economic impact, demands by Obama’s

administration made BP created a $20 billion compensation fund for those affected by the spill.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH IMPACT The Environmental impact of the oil spill was more disastrous than anyone had imagined. By

June, oil and tar balls had made landfall on the beaches of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. In

all, an estimated 1,100 miles (1,770 km) of shoreline were polluted and nearly three years later,

about 340 miles (550 km) of coast were still in need of cleanup. Coast Guard cleanup patrols

finally drew to a close in Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi in June 2013 and in Louisiana in April

2014, though crews remained available in the event that more oil spill to the reached land.

When the petroleum giant BP spilled millions of gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico, it

was the worst ever recorded oil spill disaster. To try and breakup that massive sleek crude oil

spill, a large quantity of chemical dispersant was applied to the spilled crude oil which allowed

easier cleaning of the oil offshore. The environmental disaster evolved to being a health

catastrophe when people started getting sick and dying. The dispersants used to clean up the

crude oil left behind invincible toxic chemicals which is dangerous to human health. People had

come in contact of this toxins while cleaning up the coastal beach areas or tourist visiting the

neighbouring beaches miles away from the Gulf of Mexico incident.

“More to the point, the fact that the government allows its use in certain circumstances should not mean that you should use it where it is demonstrably reckless. I mean nobody has ever dumped 1.8 million gallons of a dispersant into an ocean before. We know that dispersants generally, and Corexit in particular, are toxic. Recovery workers are getting sick from a combination of the fumes from the dispersants and the oil. You're creating a huge uncontrolled experiment with the Gulf of Mexico. (Nadler, 2010)”

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CHANGES MADE AFTER THE OIL SPILLAGE

Activities at the offshore oil and gas exploration and production are normally dangerous, which requires coordinated use of many complex (Techniques and Operations) systems, by hundreds of people working for dozens of companies. Hazards associated with offshore drilling system are categorized operation activities and factors that rates the level of safety measures that must be

applied. Some hazards are grouped under occupational safety because of their effects on

individual workers on a small scale. In contrast, system safety refers to offshore drilling hazards

that can lead to accidents on a much larger scale, involving multiple property loss, and extensive environmental damage. This chapter focuses on regulatory reform related to improving system safety.

The Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) was the federal agency primarily responsible for regulating the safety of offshore drilling at the time

of the Macondo well–Deepwater Horizon incident. After the incident, the newly formed Bureau

of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) was assigned

responsibility for regulating the safety of offshore drilling operations previously assigned to MMS.

Presently, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) is the federal entity responsible for safety and environmental oversight of offshore oil and gas operations

Since the Macondo well–Deepwater Horizon incident, DOI has undertaken several actions to improve the safety of and reduce risks associated with offshore oil and gas activities. (Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology)

DOI’S SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

The Deepwater Horizon-Macondo well incident, like major offshore accidents in other

countries, demonstrated the need for a proactive systems safety approach integrating all aspects of drilling operations that could affect occupational and system safety. In this regard, the committee commends DOI for instituting Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) in 30 CFR 250. (Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 199, Oct. 15, 2010) Implementation of SEMS began on November 15, 2011.

SEMS is a proactive, goal-oriented risk management system similar in many ways to the systems used in the North Sea by the United Kingdom and Norway and on the outer continental shelves of Canada and Australia. SEMS requires companies to develop, implement, and manage a safety and environmental management system in accordance with the American Petroleum Institute’s (API’s) Recommended Practice 75 for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities. The committee sees this development as an important step toward achieving comprehensive reform of the regulatory processes governing offshore drilling activities in U.S. waters.

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The following are advantages of goal-setting risk management systems over prescriptive regulatory systems:

Putting the focus on achieving clearly stated health, safety, and environmental objectives;

Requiring operators, drilling contractors, and service companies to document their approach to safety, in contrast to basing safety on compliance with prescriptive regulations;

Requiring operators, drilling contractors, and service companies to work together to meet safety objectives;

Formalizing and documenting the risk management procedures and responsibilities of all parties;

Providing a context for effective communication on health, safety, and environmental issues as they arise;

Providing for checks and balances for well planning and operations, especially with regard to management of change;

Allowing for the health, safety, and environmental procedures and policies of all participating companies to be incorporated into a unified health, safety, and environmental plan;

Providing the opportunity for independent assessment of well planning, drilling, and related operations and overall conformance to stated goals for health, safety, and environmental protection;

Providing a cost-effective approach to regulating the evolving technology employed by the offshore oil and gas industry, enabling a reduction in prescriptive regulations, and potentially reducing the cost of compliance for companies already familiar with similar approaches used elsewhere in the world.

While the committee strongly endorses the actions of DOI in establishing the SEMS requirements, it sees this as a first step in a long process toward achieving the capabilities required of an appropriate regulatory system for offshore drilling in the United States. An appropriate regulatory system should have the following characteristics:

Be effective in regulating both high-risk, high-consequence wells, such as those in deep water or those likely to encounter very high pore pressures, and relatively low-risk wells, such as infill wells in relatively shallow water. Provide a mechanism allowing the government to assess the risks (and the measures proposed for managing those risks) associated with the proposed well plan and a way for the government to assess the

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competence of the companies and individuals to be involved in carrying out the proposed drilling activities.

Incorporate a formal management of change process that would allow well plans and procedures to adapt to uncertainties in geology and pore pressure, to changing weather conditions, and to other factors, while keeping parties informed of ongoing changes.

Work effectively with the structure of the U.S. offshore oil and gas industry. Encourage the development and integration of a strong safety culture and safety management systems among operating companies (and joint venture partner companies), drilling contractors, and service companies.

Ensure that all drilling activities are conducted with risks reduced as low as reasonably practical.

Motivate industry to invest in technologies and processes that will further minimize risk.

GOAL-ORIENTED RISK MANAGEMENT REGULATORY SYSTEMS

A series of accidents have indicated the need for oil producing Countries and Companies to be pro-active in goal-oriented risk management of Oil and Gas Exploration and Production. Until recently, the United States depended on a primarily prescriptive regulatory system in which operators were required to demonstrate conformance with established regulations. Similar incidents have occurred over the past years to other countries, which has allowed a review of their safety policies and a proactive approach in tackling complex operations. Countries such as; The Norwegian regulatory system, which had serious accidents over an 11-year period. Among them were the blowout on the Bravo platform in the Ekofisk field in 1977 and the capsizing of the Alexander L. Kielland, a ship used as a floating hotel for Ekofisk workers, in 1980 (killing 123 of 212 people on board). Similarly, the United Kingdom and Canada were led to abandon their prescriptive regulatory approach and adopt a more proactive, goal-oriented approach to system safety by, respectively, the explosions and fire aboard the Piper Alpha production platform off Scotland in 1988 (killing 167 workers) and the sinking of the Ocean Ranger semisubmersible drilling platform off Newfoundland in 1982 (killing all 84 crew members). An important attribute of goal-oriented risk management systems is that they provide a greater opportunity for the adoption of new technology as it becomes available. For example, both in U.S. waters and abroad, several of the operating companies are using shore-based real-time operations centers to monitor offshore drilling operations continuously, although there is no explicit requirement to do so.

Goal-oriented risk-management systems require that companies responsible for compliance demonstrate to regulators that procedures for health, safety, and environmental protection are in place to achieve explicitly stated safety goals to prevent and respond effectively to all conceivable accidents. Consideration is given to elements such as redundant barriers (designed

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to minimize the likelihood of accidents) and controls (designed to provide detailed plans, procedures, and facilities for responding to accidents should they occur). In addition, industry demonstrates that its management system ensures that its personnel always have the qualifications and training necessary for performing their duties in a safe manner. Three fundamental strategies are employed in goal-oriented risk management systems to deal with drilling and safety systems: reduce the likelihood of malfunctions in system components, reduce the effects of malfunctions should they occur, and increase the detection and correction of malfunctions in system components. Different methods can be employed in the context of these three strategies to enable the designated “acceptable risks” (the explicit goals) to be realized.

IMPLEMENTATION ASPECTS OF A GOAL-ORIENTED RISK MANAGEMENT

How does Goal-oriented risk management systems work? First, as an alternative to listing explicit regulations, such systems principally rely on reaching the functional safety requirements by exploiting equipment and procedures that conform to explicit standards, guidelines, and best practice documents.

Secondly, the fundamental aspect of the regulatory system used in Norway has a high degree of dialogue, consensus, and trust between operating companies and regulators, PSA carries out drop-in audits of offshore operations utilizing its own personnel, experts from SINTEF (Stiftelsen for Industriell og Teknisk Forskning, an independent research organization), and other outside experts. If it determines that the company does not have sufficient expertise to carry out the proposed drilling plan, PSA withholds consent for an operator’s plan. Drilling operations are not allowed to proceed until PSA consents. The regulatory approaches used by the United Kingdom and Norway in the North Sea have been tailored to the structure of their governments, local industry, and labor. Applying the concept of goal-oriented risk management to the Gulf of Mexico will require similar tailoring. However, many of the concepts and documents used for the North Sea can provide valuable templates for a system structured for the United States. In addition, both the United Kingdom (HSE 2011) and Norway (PSA 2011a) have extensive, long-term R&D efforts that help industry and government regulators advance technology, management, and governance to meet current operational requirements.

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References

Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology. (n.d.). LESSONS FOR IMPROVING. In B. o. Toxicology, Macondo

Well, DeepWater Horizon Blowout (p. 112). THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS.

Nadler, J. (2010). Ban on Oil Dispersant. ABC News, The World Today.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHEA). 2011. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. OSHEA’s Role

in the Response

https://www.osha.gov/oilspills/dwh_osha_response_0511a.pdf

BP. 2010. Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report,

http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local

_assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf

Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 199, Oct. 15, 2010

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