Deconstructive Religious Education

DECONSTRUCTIVE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Khosrow Bagheri NoaparastUniversity of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

Zohreh KhosraviUniversity of Al-Zahra, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The article argues that even though deconstruction has indicationsfor action in religious education, the action should be subordinatedto the notion of deconstruction as event. Three strategies can be usedin the curriculum of religious education inspired by deconstruction.The first strategy is to emphasize the spirit of religion as differentfrom the corpus of rituals. The second strategy concentrates onthe common core of religions as a basis for translatability amongdifferent religions. Finally, the third strategy deals with providingcompatibility between faith and knowledge.

The Derridean notion of “deconstruction” has been helpful with re-gard to finding better ways to understand and accomplish religiouseducation. Some have acknowledged the importance of deconstruc-tion merely in terms of recognizing and respecting differences inreligions without offering “a solution in any procedural sense of theterm” (Bergdahl 2009, 39). On the other hand, some have tried to sug-gest procedures based on deconstruction in order to achieve a moresound religious education (Miedema and Biesta 2004).

In the first section of this article, we try to give a definition ofDerridean concept of deconstruction and to show its significance forreligious education. Then, in the next section, we explore Derrida’saccount of deconstruction as event and as action. This provides a back-ground for the third section of this article in which it is argued that theprocedural view of religious education cannot be acceptable unlessit stands in a particular relation to deconstruction where deconstruc-tion is understood as event. Accordingly, even though deconstruc-tion has indications for action, the action should be subordinated tothe notion of deconstruction as event; otherwise, the action itself willmake deconstruction impossible. This article argues that, even though

Religious Education Copyright C© The Religious Education AssociationVol. 106 No. 1 January–February ISSN: 0034-4087 print

DOI: 10.1080/00344087.2011.539449

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KHOSROW BAGHERI NOAPARAST AND ZOHREH KHOSRAVI 83

Miedema and Biesta appeal to the notion of deconstruction as event,they go too far from the requirements of this notion as they try toprovide procedures for religious education. If such procedures wereto be successful, this would lead to a conception of deconstructivereligious education that might be called “preemptive.” This concep-tion is contradictory as it is explained below. In the final section, thearticle deals with what deconstruction can do in religious educationand strategies for religious education are suggested.

DECONSTRUCTION: ITS SIGNIFICANCEFOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Two main concepts that are used in this article need to be definedat the outset. These concepts are “religious education” and “decon-struction.” By religious education we mean a curriculum subject inschool whether being accomplished as teaching a formal subject mat-ter or performing a set of informal activities.

The second term, namely deconstruction in a Derridean sense,is much more difficult to define. This is because Derrida himself hasevaded giving an adequate definition for the term. Nevertheless, forthe sake of providing some clarity to the subject of deconstructivereligious education, we offer a working definition. “Deconstruction,”being primarily used in relation to texts, means a close reading thatleads to unraveling contradictions concealed in a text. Derrida is notso much concerned with finding contradictory bits of information ina text in order for showing that it is incoherent. Instead, he wants toshow how authors commit contradictions where they unwittingly givea central position to what they wanted to consider as peripheral. Sup-pose an author wants to show the superiority of “nature” to “culture.”The author’s attempt would be to show that “nature” is the originaland self-sufficient term so that “culture” cannot be thought of unless interms of “nature.” Now, a deconstructive reading of this text can showthat contrary to his or her overt intention, the author has assumed na-ture to be dependent on culture. Derrida does not, of course, ignorethe importance of author’s intent and rather takes it to be an “indis-pensable guardrail” (Derrida 1997, 158) that saves the reader fromgiving completely untenable and irrelevant interpretations. However,this does not mean a text represents its author’s intention withoutthere being contradictory implications to that intention. Thus, thereare always possibilities within a text so that it can be read in a different

84 DECONSTRUCTIVE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

way. Looking for this sort of contradictions and, hence, possibilities ina text leads to a deconstructive reading.

The aforementioned definition for deconstruction can be ex-tended from written texts to social phenomena or to texts in a broadersense. Thus, deconstruction can occur in an educational view or insti-tution. Here, again, deconstruction should be understood in terms ofinner contradictions that are deeply involved in a view or an institu-tion. What is distinctive to this definition is the focus on the inner sideof phenomena. Referring to this point, Derrida holds: “Deconstruc-tion is something which happens and which happens inside” (Caputo1997a, 9).

Surely, one might define deconstruction with emphasis on theouter side of the phenomena, namely in terms of difference and oth-erness. In this way, deconstruction is to be open to the other and whatis excluded. Deconstruction in this sense becomes an equivalent tojustice and will mean to do justice to the other. Talking about theinner and outer side of phenomena should not be understood as twodistinct standpoints because this will give an absolute sense to theinternal or the external that is not acceptable to a Derridean. Thus,the two types of talking about deconstruction should be consideredas the two sides of the same coin so that preferring one type to theother should be understood just as a matter of emphasis. One mightsay that in the external language, the main concern is justice while inthe internal language, the emphasis is on truth. The latter is explainedfurther below.

Having this in mind, we prefer to talk about deconstruction interms of interplay between the internal and external language. Thisview is significant in the realm of religious education because in almostevery religion its particular type of religious education is regarded asself-sufficient, complete, and the absolute way to salvation. Lookedat from the angle of deconstruction every type of religious educationcarries its own contradictions. While only God can be absolute, everytype of religious education takes its particular way to God as beingself-sufficient and absolute. In other words, what happens here is thatone perspective or appearance of God is understood as the whole andabsolute. That is why we said that the main concern in the internallanguage of deconstruction is on truth. Deconstructive religious edu-cation requires us to seek and remove these inner contradictions and,thereby, save every type of religious education from taking a perspec-tive as the whole or, to put in Whitehead’s terms, from committing“The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness” or the error of mistaking the


abstract for the concrete (Whitehead 1925, 64). According to White-head, a spatial point is an abstract construction, rather than being areal position, that we construct by considering the limits of real thingstoward each other. Whitehead suggested finally that even the sub-stance we observe in nature is not real rather “nature is a structure ofevolving processes. The reality is the process” (Whitehead 1925, 90).

Now, every type of religious education not only ignores that ithas constructed an abstract idea from God, the absolute, but alsoignores that there are concealed contradictions in the abstract idea.This double ignorance can show the significance of brining the Der-ridean deconstruction to the fore in the realm of religious education.By means of a deconstructive religious education, different types ofreligious education can heal their truth illusions and thereby get moreand more toward the truth of God.

DECONSTRUCTION: ACTION OR EVENT?

There is an ambiguity in Derrida’s account of deconstruction. Onthe one hand, he regards deconstruction as a strategy that involvesintervention. In this sense, deconstruction means an active engage-ment in order to subvert a structure. Derrida has given a central roleto “strategy” and “adventure” in the delineation of difference. Differ-ence is strongly associated with deconstruction: “In the delineation ofdifferance everything is strategic and adventurous. Strategic becauseno transcendent truth present outside the field of writing can governtheologically the totality of the field. Adventurous because this strat-egy is not a simple strategy in the sense that strategy orients tacticsaccording to a final goal . . . ” (Derrida 1982, 7).

The same adventurous characteristic can be said of deconstruc-tion. Thus, Derrida holds that decision and action is required fordeconstruction: “That is why I insisted on what prevents unity fromclosing upon itself, from being closed up. This is not only a matterof description, of saying that this is the way it is. It is a matter ofaccounting for the possibility of responsibility, of a decision, of ethicalcommitments” (Caputo 1997a, 13).

On the other hand, Derrida talks about deconstruction as a pro-cess, rather than a project, that occurs in a necessary and inevitableway. For this reason he not only talks about self-deconstruction ina structure, but also refers to self-deconstruction as a law: “Whatis the law of this self-deconstruction, this ‘auto-deconstruction’?


Deconstruction is not a method or some tool that you apply to some-thing from the outside. Deconstruction is something which happensand which happens inside” (Caputo 1997a, 9).

Understanding deconstruction in terms of occurrence, rather thanaction, indicates that it is not dependent on our decisions and, there-fore, is not applicable to something from the outside. Instead, it shouldbe grasped as something that is rooted in the inner contradictions of aconstruct. Only such inner contradictions make it possible that: “[t]extsdeconstruct themselves by themselves” (Derrida 1986, 123). Thus,what a deconstructive reading requires is to find out inner tensionsand contradictions of a text. Referring to his deconstructive readingof Plato and others, Derrida maintains: “It is an analysis which triesto find out how their thinking works or does not work, to find the ten-sions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity within their own corpus”(Caputo 1997a, 9). And no doubt the law of self-deconstruction is notrestricted to texts as such but is true of democracy (Caputo 1997a, 10),education, and so on.

Now, how can we remove this ambiguity and resolve the apparenttension between the two accounts of deconstruction? What does Der-rida mean by deconstruction in his final analysis? It seems that whilehe takes both action and event into account, he tends to make theformer subordinate to the latter. In other words, while deconstructionis a type of action, it is not an arbitrary action that can be conductedno matter what condition is involved in the structure concerned. Whatmakes deconstruction, as action, possible is deconstruction as event.There must be tensions and contradictions in a structure in order forus to deconstruct it. Not only that, but action should also be conductedin a timely manner or, as Derrida puts it, “in a certain way”:

The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the out-side. They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim,except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way,because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspectit. Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic andeconomic resources of subversion from the old structures, borrowing themstructurally, that is to say without being able to isolate their elements andatoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls preyto its own work. This is what the person who has begun the same work inanother area of the same habitation does not fail to point out with zeal.(Emphasis in the original, Derrida 1997, 24)

As Derrida makes clear, what makes deconstruction, as action, pos-sible and effective is the inhabiting of a structure in a certain way,


so that the concealed contradictions come to the surface. Withoutthere being any tension in a structure and without engaging withthe structure in the proper way, deconstruction will not be possible.Let us mention an illuminating case of Derrida’s own experiences.Derrida had cooperation with GEREPH (Groupe de Recherches surl’Enseingnement Philosophique); a group that decided to deconstructFrench education, and particularly the teaching of philosophy, in 1974.While Derrida declared that “deconstruction has always had a bearingin principle on the apparatus and the function of teaching in general”(Derrida 1976, 64–65), he admitted that he began to criticize Frencheducation systematically in cooperation with the Group after fifteenyears of experience in teaching and twenty-three years of public em-ployment. Derrida’s main concern in this deconstructive attempt wasthe systematic character of critique: “[I]t is the systematic characterthat matters if one does not want to content oneself with a verbal alibi,cavillings or scratchings which do not affect the system in place . . . ; itis the systematic character which matters and its effectiveness, whichhave never been attributable to the initiative of one person, and thatis why, for the first time, I associate here my discourse with the workof the group engaged under the name of GEREPH” (Emphasis in theoriginal, Derrida 1976, 62, cited in Ulmer 1985, 159).

During this cooperation, Derrida was looking for the implica-tions of deconstruction for institutional critique in education. Hisplan was to clandestinely introduce heterogeneous forces into “thescene of teaching” in order to transform the scene. Given that ed-ucational systems pretend to be homogenous in order to hide theirinner contradictions, Derrida’s strategy was to betray this pretenseand make the contradictions visible. However, as Derrida hinted atin the aforementioned passage, unless the deconstructive action isconducted in a certain way, it might be ineffective. Thus, he wasaware that the heterogeneous forces he wanted to bring into thesystem of education might turn to be ineffective and unreceivable:“The unreceivable—that which takes at a determined moment the un-formed form of the unreceivable—can, even should, at a determinedmoment, not be received at all, escape the criteria of receivability, tobe totally excluded, which can take place in broad daylight, even whilethe unreceivable product circulates from hand to hand” (Crochets104–105, cited in Ulmer 1985, 160).

According to what has been said so far, we can conclude thatwhile deconstruction as action should be subordinated to deconstruc-tion as event, it is not always clear that inhabiting a structure is done


in the proper way. Thus, what matters in rethinking education in gen-eral, and religious education in particular, in terms of deconstructionis twofold: First, deconstruction cannot prevent the development oftensions within a structure. This is because what makes deconstructionpossible in the first place is this very development of tensions. Second,given that the tensions are already at work, deconstruction as actionshould be conducted in the proper way so that it can be effective inbetraying these tensions. The second point, no less than the first one,puts a difficult job in front of a deconstructive religious education.

WHAT DECONSTRUCTIVE RELIGIOUS EDUCATIONCANNOT DO

In this part of the article it is argued that deconstructive religiouseducation can be neither preemptive nor premature. By preemptivedeconstructive religious education we mean identifying inner tensionsof education and neutralizing them from the very beginning. On theother hand, a premature deconstructive religious education ignoresthat deconstruction as action can only be a timely action.

This section of the article includes a critique of the accountMiedema and Biesta have given for deconstructive religious educa-tion. Thus, we should first give a summary of what they say aboutdeconstruction and religious education. Biesta and Miedema (Biesta2001; Miedema and Biesta 2004) have made a valuable contributionto deconstructive religious education. First of all, they define decon-struction mainly in terms of what we referred to in the first section asthe external language. In other words, Miedema and Biesta have de-fined deconstruction in terms of otherness and justice: “In its shortestand most general formula the ethico-political horizon of deconstruc-tion can be described as a concern for the other or, to be more precise,a concern for the otherness of the other” (Miedema and Biesta 2004,24). Miedema and Biesta regard the use of external language in defin-ing deconstruction so essential that they hold one cannot account forself-sufficiency unless in terms of this language. In other words, “theself-sufficiency or self-presence can only be brought about by an act ofexclusion. What gives deconstruction its motive and drive, is preciselyits concern to do justice to what is excluded” (Miedema and Biesta2004, 27).

Biesta and Miedema have aptly emphasized that deconstructionshould be understood as an occurrence rather than a position or


philosophy that can be applied, for instance, in education: “Decon-struction has to be understood as an occurrence—or even more pre-cisely: it has to be understood in its occurrence” (Biesta 2001, 45–46).Admitting that deconstruction is an occurrence rather than an appli-cation, Biesta states that talking about education in terms of decon-struction is not an application: “If from here we finally move to thequestion of education it is not . . . in order to apply deconstruction toeducation. Education is not something that is external to deconstruc-tion, just as deconstruction is not something that comes to educationfrom the outside” (Biesta 2001, 50).

Even though Biesta is right in claiming that education is internal todeconstruction, it remains to be seen whether our educational endeav-ors are properly run so that they can be considered as deconstructive.The interplay between deconstruction as event and deconstruction asaction requires us examine our educational views in terms of theircapability to properly inhabit the educational structure and play theirrole in deconstructing it. Biesta’s reason for considering deconstruc-tion as something that occurs inside education is that education dealswith the singularity of pupils: “If, to put it differently, the experienceof education is the experience of the singularity of the other, of theother as a singular being, then we can say that education has its properplace in deconstruction, just as deconstruction has its proper placein education. The relationship between deconstruction, justice, andeducation is, in other words, anything but accidental” (Biesta 2001,50).

Having given a central position to singularity in education, Biestaconcludes that religious education should always take singularity inaccount when defining its aim and take it in account when preparingthe means of religious education. As for the aim of religious education,given that according to Miedema and Biesta deconstruction requiresus to “avoid those situations which clearly block the manifestation ofthe o/Other,” they hold that, the aim of religious education shouldnot be considered as the making of religious persons: “One thing thatis likely to impede the manifestation of the o/Other, is if we woulddefine the aim of religious education as the making or productionof religious persons” (Miedema and Biesta 2004, 34). Referring tothe central position for singularity in education, Miedema and Biestasuggest that the aim of religious education should be the facilitationof personal choice from among the elements of religious tradition:“What should happen instead, first of all, is that children, students,learners are supported in making their own choices on the basis of a


real understanding of and participation in religious practices, rituals,and traditions” (Miedema and Biesta, 34).

Likewise, regarding the providing of the means to reach the aim ofreligious education, Miedema and Biesta hold that singularity of pupilsshould be the criterion used in deciding about the subject-matter ofreligious education: “This also has implications for the way in whichwe think about the role of subject-matter in religious education. Whatwould seriously impede the invention of the child, student, learner isto think of the subject-matter of religious as something that has to betransmitted, and hence has to be appropriated and mastered—if notsimply swallowed—by the learner” (Miedema and Biesta 2004, 35).

Having summarized Miedema and Biesta’s account, we are goingnow to raise some challenges to it. First of all, Miedema and Biesta’spersistence on the exclusive use of the external language in definingdeconstruction needs contemplation. Why should we hold that “theself-sufficiency or self-presence can only be brought about by an act ofexclusion”? In other words, why should the external language be abso-lutely preferred to the internal language? Such unilateral preferenceis at odds with a deconstructive view because this view underminesdichotomies including a fixed dichotomy between the internal andthe external. Thus, the unilateral preference of the external languageneeds to be subject to deconstruction instead of being an illustrationof what deconstruction is. As we mentioned in the first section, a de-constructive view requires us understand the preference of internal orexternal language as a matter of emphasis rather than as an essentialand strategic decision.

Miedema and Biesta might say Derrida himself has preferred theexternal language as they state: “One way in which Derrida tries toshow this, is by revealing that any presentation of a self-sufficient,self-identical presence can only be done with the help of somethingwhich is excluded by this very presence. He attempts to show, in otherwords, that presence cannot be present in itself, but needs the ‘help’of what is not present, of what is absent” (Miedema and Biesta 2004,25–26).

We do not want to quarrel with the fact that Derrida has stressedon difference and otherness. The point, however, is how should oneunderstand Derrida in such utterances? One option is to say he hasshown just his emphasis in this way. The other option is to claim thatthis preference is an essential strategy to Derrida and to deconstructiveprocess or view. The first option is sensible in terms of what can becalled the deconstructive perspective, whereas the second option is at


odds with this perspective even if it can be shown that Derrida hadstrategic commitments to the external language. No doubt, one canlook for the possibilities of deconstruct in Derrida’s works withoutbeing accused of heresy.

Secondly, in terms of Miedema and Biesta’s suggestions, whichare made as implications of deconstruction, it is doubtful whetherthese implications are reasonable regarding the interplay between de-construction as event and as action. In fact, as far as deconstruction asevent is concerned, it should be noted that the suggested implicationslead to a preemptive deconstruction. On the other hand, in terms ofdeconstruction as action, the suggestions are not capable of inhabitingthe structure of education “in a certain way” to be effective enoughin deconstruction. These two points will be explained further in whatfollows.

As for the first point, let us consider the suggested implications interms of what we call the preemptive deconstruction. Miedema andBiesta hold that deconstruction urges us to avoid those situations thatprevent “the other’s” manifestation. In addition, Miedema and Biestasuggest that a religious education should facilitate personal choice inreligion. Let us suppose that we were successful in providing sucha religious education. What then would be the result of this kind ofdeconstructive religious education? Surely, it is expected that “theother” can have a proper opportunity to manifest his or her capac-ities without being blocked by the totalizing pole of the opposition.This view might be called a preemptive deconstruction. However,it does not make any sense as it is in fact a contradiction in terms.It is a contradiction in terms because deconstruction is not possiblewithout there being a structure that is constructible and constructed.Preemptive deconstruction is the result of an excessive use of decon-struction as action that leaves no room for deconstruction as event.Deconstruction cannot and should not be expected to have such farreaching implications and applications. As explained in the previouspart of the article, deconstruction as action should be subordinated todeconstruction as event.

It is worth mentioning Derrida’s view on law here. Derrida arguesthat what makes deconstruction possible is a constructible structure.He holds that law, contrary to justice, is deconstructible because law isconstructible in the first place: “It is perhaps because law (droit) (whichI will consistently try to distinguish from justice) is constructible, ina sense that goes beyond the opposition between convention and na-ture, it is perhaps insofar as it goes beyond this opposition that it is


constructible and so deconstructible and, what’s more, that it makesdeconstruction possible, or at least the practice of a deconstructionthat, fundamentally, always proceeds to question of droit and to thesubject of droit” (Derrida 1992, 15). Accordingly, if something is notconstructible, then it cannot be deconstructible either. Derrida men-tions justice as an example of something, if it is something, which isnot deconstructible because it is not constructible.

In fact, in order to be deconstructible, something should be con-structed to some extent, in addition to being constructible in principle.Deconstruction always plays a secondary role; it cannot come first, norcan it be preemptive in the first place. The function of deconstructionis not to say how to avoid committing contradictions because contra-dictions are always at work; its function is only to say how to discovercontradictions. Thus, deconstructive religious education cannot playthe role of a preventive education in removing the barriers for themanifestations of “the other” from the start. Marginalizing “the other”happens in almost all types of religious education because in each typeof religious education the aim is to produce religious persons accord-ing to certain standards involving underplaying “others.” And exactlybecause this marginalization happens, deconstruction becomes possi-ble. Even though deconstruction as action is for amelioration, its roleis more remedy than prevention.

As for the second point, expressed in the question whether con-flicts can inhabit the existing structure of education, the implicationssuggested by Miedema and Biesta for deconstructive religious edu-cation are not effective in terms of deconstruction as action. In otherwords, the suggested procedures cannot inhabit the structure of cur-rent religious education in the proper way to be able to subvert it.This is because the central role Miedema and Biesta give to singu-larity in both the aim and the means of religious education cannotbe applied in the current system of education. To mention but oneimpediment to the accomplishment of this idea of singularity we canconsider the social characteristic of religion and religious education.This characteristic can be seen in both the social functions of religionand in the role played by families in religious education. Habermas(2006) has shown that religious traditions and faith communities aregaining importance in public spheres of some countries as well as inthe international arena: “In several Muslim countries, and in Israel aswell, religious family law is either an alternative or a substitute for sec-ular civil law. And in Afghanistan (and soon in Iraq), the application ofa more or less liberal constitution must be limited by its compatibility


with the Sharia. Likewise, religious conflicts are squeezing their wayinto the international arena” (Habermas, 1). Referring to the clashesthat communities of faith have caused in secular societies, Habermasstates that political liberalism neglects the fact that religious affiliationis not a personal matter that can be chosen in an individualistic way.Rooted in the family’s religious ground, faith plays an integral role inthe life of a person and might have influence on the entirety of his/herlife: “A devout person pursues her daily rounds by drawing on belief.Put differently, true belief is not only a doctrine, believed content, buta source of energy that the person who has a faith taps performativelyand thus nurtures his or her entire life” (Habermas, 8).

Now, given the social characteristic of religion and religious ed-ucation, we cannot provide an effective deconstructive education bytaking personal choice so serious that it can overwhelm both aims andmeans of religious education. At least in countries such as those men-tioned by Habermas, the role played by the religious background ofthe family is so strong that parents do not accept a child-centered reli-gious education in which personal choices of children are determinant.Miedema and Biesta hold that a deconstructive religious educationcan and should start with personal choice. If this is not the case theycall the education “technological.” This term is based on a dichotomythey draw between technological and deconstructive or individualisticeducation. Accordingly, education, and therefore religious education,is either deconstructive or technological. In the latter, there is noplace for personal choice whereas in the former the uniqueness ofthe person is the pivotal point: “When we would negate the decon-structive nature of education, and would aim to make education into atechnique, we would precisely forfeit the possibility for children andstudents to come into the world as unique, singular beings, rather thanas interchangeable units” (Miedema and Biesta 2004, 27). Meidemaand Biesta seem to believe that the deconstructive or individualisticeducation can and should be performed from the early childhood asthey use the words of “children and students” and sometimes add thegeneral term of “learners” (34).

However, the dichotomy is false or at least badly formulated. Thisis because the religious education in the early childhood cannot bedeconstructive or individualistic on both factual and logical grounds.Why this is the case is explained above and is summarized below.

If religious education for young children cannot be deconstructiveor individualistic, then childhood religious education cannot be called“technological” in the negative sense of the term. Rather, it might


be called “a prerequisite for deconstructive education.” Now, whycan early childhood religious education not be deconstructive? Asfar as factual grounds are concerned, family background is at workin introducing the child to the relevant religious life, which includesbeliefs and rituals. This introduction is based on love from the parents’side and reliance from the child’s side. Thus, this kind of education isneither deconstructive nor technological.

As for the logical grounds, deconstruction requires that a con-struction is at work beforehand, as explained above. In the case ofeducation, including religious education, this construction that is atwork beforehand can be called “socialization.” This “socialization” is aprerequisite for deconstruction.

WHAT DECONSTRUCTIVE RELIGIOUSEDUCATION CAN DO

In this section, we are going to make suggestions for a deconstruc-tive religious education. In regard of what deconstructive religiouseducation can and should do, we can again think about it in termsof both event and action. As for the former, deconstructive religiouseducation should be accomplished with patience about both intra-religious commitments and inter-religious prejudices. These are thebackgrounds against which deconstruction can occur.

The aspect of deconstruction as action is explained in more de-tail in what follows. Three strategies can be used in preparing thecurriculum of religious education. These strategies are expected to fa-cilitate and accelerate deconstructive critique in religious education.The first strategy refers to what might be called “the spirit of religion”as something different from the corpus of rituals. The second strat-egy concentrates on the common core of religions in order to providea basis for what is called “translatability” among different religions.Finally, the third strategy deals with providing compatibility betweenfaith and knowledge.

Emphasizing the Spirit of Religion

Metaphorically speaking, the organism of a religion has an easilyaccessible body and a spirit that is sought but is regarded as beinginaccessible or hard to access. The corporeal part is comprised ofdifferent kinds of rituals and the spirit is usually referred to as “God.”


The rituals can be practiced and mastered in early childhood and areusually the starting point of religious education in almost all religions.While almost all religions distinguish between the rituals and the spiritbehind these rituals, what usually happens in religious education isthat the spirit is identified with the rituals. This identification occursdue to different causes such as the concrete style of thinking in earlychildhood which is intertwined with religious reification (Goldman1966), and that the human mind is in the first place constructive ratherthan deconstructive, and so on and so forth. No matter what causesthis identification, the result, namely the occurrence of identification,paves the ground and provides the necessity for deconstruction.

Now, while the occurrence of identification is almost inevitable,religious education can facilitate deconstruction by putting emphasison the spirit of religion as something inaccessible or hard to access. Ac-cording to this strategy, a distinction between rituals as the corporealpart and God as the spirit of religion should be made in the curriculumof religious education. Along this distinction, it should be made clearthat rituals are for seeking God’s grace while the spirit of religionis not wholly accessible. This strategy can provide a room for whatMiedema and Biesta call “the otherness of God.” According to them,the person’s “search can be interpreted as deconstruction, the concernfor the openness toward the otherness of God, as the impossible, thatis, the ‘one’ who cannot be foreseen as possibility, the incalculable,the unpredictable, and the ‘one’ who cannot be completely filled in”(Miedema and Biesta 2004, 31).

Still, one should be cautious not to put the whole emphasis on theotherness of God. Again, in dealing with deconstruction, we shouldnot prefer the external language in an exclusive way. Using an internallanguage, one can talk about the familiarity of God; a God to whom onehas access. Even though it is not possible to incorporate God into one’smental apparatus, it is not deniable either that one can have partialaccess to God. Educationally speaking, achievement is important and,hence, it is inappropriate in religious education to think and feel thatGod always escapes us and that we cannot have any achievement inrelation to God. On the other hand, what is crucial in deconstructionis exactly the very paradoxical feeling that you have, and, at the sametime, have not access to God. It should be noted that what are usuallydeconstructed all the time are our achievements. Thus, achievementis necessary for deconstruction to occur. In addition, our previousachievements are deconstructed not because they were futile but inorder for gaining more achievements.


Having established a balanced relation between the external andinternal language in talking about God, we can pave the ground forstudents to move steadily from naıve realism about the rituals towardunderstanding the spirit that is hidden in or rests beyond the rituals.Therefore, deconstruction in religious education does not consist ofa nested series of null conceptions about God in a process goingnowhere. Instead, a deconstructive religious education has a positivefeature at bottom even though successive negations are involved in it.These successive negations can be thought of as an edification processby which God can be known better in each new moment.

The merit of this strategy in deconstructive religious education isthat it can inhabit the structure of religious education in a proper waybecause the distinction between body and spirit, between rituals andGod, can be fueled by almost every religion’s teachings. Let us take anexample from Quran: “And (as for) the camels, we have made themof the signs of the religion of Allah for you; for you therein is muchgood; therefore mention the name of Allah on them as they stand in arow, then when they fall down eat of them and feed the poor man whois contented and the beggar; thus have we made them subservientto you, that you may be grateful. There does not reach Allah theirflesh nor their blood, but to Allah is acceptable the guarding (againstevil) on your part . . . ” (Shakir 1995, 22: 36–37). In these verses, theritual of mentioning the name of God on camels is addressed but it isemphasized that this ritual does not mean that God wanted their fleshor blood; instead, what is required is that people guard against evil bythe inspiration they get from the name of God.

What is expected from using the first strategy in religious educa-tion is to provide a disposition in student to be tolerant. When theysee that their conceptions of God are not sacred and thus can be dis-missed and can give way to a different conception of God, this providesthem with a capacity to challenge their previous religious conceptionswithout being caught in rigidity due to religious dogmas.

Concentration on the Common Core of Religions

The second strategy in providing a curriculum of religious edu-cation is to concentrate on the common elements of different reli-gions. At first sight, this might be seen irrelevant to deconstructionbecause what is strongly associated with deconstruction is “differ-ence.” However, this association shows only the dominance of theexternal language in dealing with deconstruction. In suggesting the


second strategy, we are going again to look at religious education fromanother angle too namely the angle of internal language. Using theinternal language, we can bring to the fore the common elements ofreligions rather than the differences that separate religions from eachother.

Considering that almost every religion treats other religions inan excluding way and makes a claim on incommensurability betweenitself and its rivals, the necessity of looking for a common core be-comes clear. While incommensurability is associated with a radicaldifference which cannot be eradicated but by destruction from theoutside, deconstruction looks for a contamination of the oppositepoles and, hence, for change from the inside. The “difference” thathas a pivotal point in deconstruction is compatible with a commonground that makes the difference visible. That is why Derrida rejectspure multiplicity as well as pure unity: “You see, pure unity or puremultiplicity—when there is only totality or unity and when there isonly multiplicity or disassociation—is a synonym of death” (Caputo1997a, 13).

Religious education can provide a curriculum that addresses thecommon elements of different religions. This might be accomplishedwith or without mentioning the names of other religions. A reason towithhold from doing this is that there might be a sensitivity regardingthese names due to the same prejudice that leads to exclusivity in re-ligions. Even if it is not possible to mention the names, the procedureof highlighting the common core can be important. This is expected toprovide a disposition in educated persons to be able to communicatewith other religions’ followers. No doubt, because of the differences,this will not lead to a full understanding. In fact, deconstruction doesnot require this as it is not even possible. Deconstruction cannot makethe impossible possible. What it can do is provide a basis for possiblecommunication and then leave us in the space between the possi-ble and impossible. What the common core is expected to do is to pavethe ground for translatability among different religions with the samelimits of translation that deconstruction indicates. Religions shouldbe ready to accept the necessity of this translatability along with itsprice of confusion because God wants it: “Whether or not decon-struction is on the side of God, it is clear that God is on the side ofdeconstruction, who intervened at a crucial moment in the construc-tion of a famous tower, calling construction to a halt, disseminatingShemites tongues, and making translation necessary and impossible”(Caputo 1997b, 54).


Caputo refers here to the biblical narrative that Derrida (1985) in-troduces to conclude that translation is at the same time necessary andimpossible. According to the narrative, the people of Shem decided toraise the Tower of Babel in order to make a name for themselves andimpose their tongue on the world. But God declared war on the Shemsand decided to deconstruct their construction. God imposed his nameBabel on the tower and thereby imposed a double bind on them: theyshould translate his name into other tongues, but at the same timethey could not translate it because it is a proper name. This shows thatGod imposed confusion on the Shems. This confusion or double bindthat God imposes on them by saying: “translate me and what is moredon’t translate me” (Derrida, 102) is involved in any translation. Thus,translation is never perfect and there is always something that escapesthe translator’s effort to understand the other.

In Derrida’s view on translation, the side of the impossible ismostly emphasized in order to show the indeterminacy of translation.Bergdahl explains Derrida’s view in this regard by appealing to thecontinuous movement involved in language including the translator’slanguage: “Thus, since no language is stable and ‘at one with itself’,Derrida’s notion of translation takes us beyond calculable outcomesof communication into unknown territory. If translation is a humancondition, we are condemned—and this is, I think, the nub of hisargument—to becoming transformed by the Other because there isno return from language and because language is itself always in move-ment” (Bergdahl 2009, 39–40). No doubt, Bergdahl is right in claimingthe implication of the constant movement, but all this refers to is theside of impossibility. However, what is at stake here in explaining thesecond strategy for religious education is the side of possibility. It istrue that, according to Derrida, the differences cannot and shouldnot be reduced to the common core. It is also true that a Derrideancannot take what is called “the common core” as something stable andbeyond change. However, the crucial point is that the common coreshould not be ignored at the price of overemphasizing the differencesbecause this would lead to the pure multiplicity, which Derrida con-sidered, in the aforementioned citation, as a synonym to death. Ofcourse, we are condemned to translate, but this also shows that we arenot in full incomprehension in relation to other religions.

On the whole, according to the second strategy, the curriculum ofdeconstructive religious education should concentrate on the commoncore of religions and pave the ground for interreligious understanding.This will not only provide a point of departure for understanding but


also make differences visible. These differences need not and cannotbe thought of as something that should be dismissed. Deconstructivereligious education does not look for pure unity among different re-ligions, nor does it pursue pure multiplicity among them. Thus, whatremains for it to do is to open up the possibility of mutual understand-ing by providing the common core; a process that ends up with theimpossibility of reducing differences to commonalities.

The merit of the first strategy, which was mentioned earlier, ispresent for the second strategy too. This is because introducing com-mon elements of religions in the curriculum can be accomplished inthe current educational system. Even though there might be someresistance from the side of exclusivists, this strategy can overcome thisresistance by the application of its nameless version. In this versionthere is no need to mention the names of religions to show their com-monalities. Thus, this is a strategy that can inhabit the system and actfrom within, while, at the same time, it is expected to provide a gooddisposition for deconstruction.

Making Faith and Knowledge Compatible

Derrida (1983, 19) talks about a new Enlightenment associatedwith deconstruction. While in the old Enlightenment a clear-cut dis-tinction was drawn between faith and tradition, on the one hand, andknowledge and enlightenment on the other, Derrida emphasizes thatthe new Enlightenment rejects such a simple opposition. Accordingly,it is difficult to keep reason separate from faith and that is why therationalism of the old Enlightenment indirectly regarded the reasonitself as the subject of faith and thereby compensated the void of faithin the rationalism.

It is true that the new Enlightenment shares with its twin the desireto keep religion within the limits of reason alone. Derrida’s support ofa “messianic religion” not only presupposes the limits of reason alone,but also “permits a rational and universal discourse on the subject ofreligion” (Derrida 1983, 28). However, the new Enlightenment avoidssharp contrasts between reason and tradition. Thus, deconstructiondoes not imply infidelity to tradition; rather it combines fidelity andinfidelity in this respect: “We have gotten more than we think we knowfrom ‘tradition,’ but the scene of the gift also obligates us to a kind offilial lack of piety, at once serious and not so serious, as regards thethinking to which we have the greatest debt” (Derrida 1995, 130).


What is important in the “rational and universal discourse” ofthe new Enlightenment is to keep faith separate from dogmas. Thedogmas have led to devastating wars among religions because anydogmatic religion takes itself as the locus of absolute truth. Whatremains at this point for the dogmatic religion to do is to eradicateany other religion as the locus of absolute falsity. In the same way,reason also needs to be kept separate from dogmas that are derivedfrom absolute criteria that predict and pre-dictate and pre-validate inthe name of Enlightenment (Derrida 1983, 5).

Accordingly, deconstruction as action implies that religious edu-cation needs to provide compatibility between faith and knowledge asfar as possible. Surely, this endeavor cannot be completely successfulbecause some religions, more than others, insist on faith as somethingbeyond the realm of reason and rationality. These religions look fora religious education through indoctrination. The irony is that theyhave commitments to the old Enlightenment in a negative mannerby avoiding reason, where reason is understood as something that ispurely devoid of faith. Contrary to the strategies of looking for reasondevoid of faith and looking for faith devoid of reason, deconstructivereligious education can and should look for creating spaces in thereligious education curriculum for a more reasonable education by adouble demystification of both reason and faith. As Copley has ex-plained, indoctrination is not confined to religious education derivedfrom religions; rather it has a secular version too: “It is possible thatWestern democracies, traditionally programmed to be wary of reli-gious indoctrination, are unaware of a secular indoctrination tendencyarising from a complex of factors that accelerated after the SecondWorld War but that can be traced back at least to European Enlight-enment beginning” (Copley 2008, 31). One way of indoctrination, ac-cording to Copley, is omission. If a school curriculum omits religion,it can imply that religion is unimportant, or highly divisive, or both(Copley, 25). In order for avoiding indoctrination, Copley suggeststhat religious education should be accomplished as education aboutreligion. In other words, Copley thinks that instead of cultivating faithin a certain religion, religious education can provide students withinformation about different types of beliefs, including religious, non-religious, and anti-religious beliefs. In this way, according to Copley,religious education is saved from indoctrination and paves the groundfor informed choice among different sorts of believes. Referring tohis suggestion for religious education (RE), Copley says: “When REoperates as education about religion(s), it also follows that it should


not theoretically be a voluntary activity. It is rather a necessary pre-cursor to informed choice at some point within the individual’s storyand as their induction into the history of global cultures, especiallytheir own” (28).

Neglecting the limitations of personal choice mentioned above,Copley’s suggestion can be accomplished only in some liberal coun-tries. In countries with a dominant religion there is no chance forother religions. Then, what can be done for deconstructive religiouseducation in such countries? The strategy of making faith and knowl-edge compatible can open a way out of the impasse of the countrieswith a dominant religion. This is because, by providing a space forknowledge in faith and religious education, the strategy is expected toprovide a disposition in pupils as a basis for further deconstructions ofreligious thinking.

By making faith and knowledge compatible we mean two things.First, religious teachings, particularly rituals, should be introduced byexplaining their reasons and rationales as far as possible. In this way,students will acquire a reason-seeking mind in relation to religiousteachings and this is what can be expected to impede indoctrination.Having such a mind is the best background against which deconstruc-tion can occur.

Second, sharp contrasts between religious teachings and scientificfindings should be resolved as far as possible. An example for this typeof compatibility can be seen in the case of the well-known oppositionbetween Darwin’s theory and the religious doctrine of creation. Eventhough many have made a sharp contrast between the two views andthereby have put the religious people at the difficult choice point of“Either faith or Science,” it is not necessary to think about the twoviews merely in terms of contrast. This is because Darwin’s theory, incase of being true, can be the way in which God created the human.Why should we think that the doctrine of creation necessarily indicatesthat God created the human directly rather than indirectly through along process of development? Processes are involved everywhere inthe genesis of different things in the world. Can we say these thingsare not created by God because of the processes involved in theirgenesis? If God’s creation and process are incompatible, then why,according to the religious scriptures, God created the heavens and theearth in six days rather than just in a moment? If we can make creationand process compatible, then there is no contrast between Darwin’stheory and the doctrine of creation.


Thus, there are two ways for avoiding indoctrination in religiouseducation; first, education about religion as Copley recommends and,second, making knowledge and religion compatible as explained ear-lier. The former is an interreligious endeavor in order for providinga background for comparison and choice among religions. The lat-ter, however, is an intra-religious strategy that can be exercised evenwhere comparison and choice among religions is a taboo and, hence,is explicitly or implicitly banned.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to different predictions about the demise of religion,religion has shown to be alive and effective in our lives throughoutthe world. However, the longstanding association between religionand dogmatic thinking can lead religions to have bad and even devas-tating effects. This shows the importance of religious education andthe roles this type of education can play in changing the unpleasantimpacts of religion. Deconstructive religious education is an approachthat can save religious thinking from being trapped into dogmas anddogmatism.

Deconstruction, in a Derridean sense, should be understood interms of inner contradictions that are deeply involved in the matterand manner of a religious education. Thus, deconstruction, in the firstplace, raises concerns about the inner contradictions involved in acertain way of religious education rather than being an external threatto different ways of religious education. Even though deconstructionas action has significance in its own right, the full picture of Der-ridean conception includes the interplay between deconstruction asevent and as action. That is to say, deconstruction cannot be simplyaccomplished from the outside because there must also be inner re-quirements for deconstruction. On the whole, the external languageshould not be considered as the sole or the dominant language inunderstanding deconstruction. This point will make us cautious notto put overemphasis on “difference” in dealing with deconstruction.As there is interplay between deconstruction as action and as event,there must be interplay between the external and internal language indealing with deconstruction.

Using the standpoint of interplay, we have suggested three mainstrategies for religious education. In the first strategy, the spirit of


religious teachings is at the focal point. This makes students not tobe rigid on the rituals and the corporeal part of religion but ratherurges them to deconstruct their present conceptions of God acquiredthrough exercising the rituals. In this way, the students will look for theotherness of God but this must not occur at the price of total negationof the familiarity of God. Understood in this way, deconstruction is theprocess of edification of our conceptions of God; a process includingboth negative and positive aspects.

In the second strategy, the common core of religions comes tothe fore. Again, instead of putting the whole emphasis on differencesamong religions, their commonalities are being sought. These com-monalities, on the one hand, make the differences among religionsvisible. On the other hand, and more importantly, commonalities pre-vent us from understanding the relationship of religions in terms ofincommensurability and hence destruction. Contrary to destruction,deconstruction requires both commonalities and differences.

Finally, the third strategy urges us to provide compatibility be-tween faith and knowledge. Deconstruction in the relation betweenreason and faith leads to demystification from the both. Thus, rea-son will no longer be external to faith and thereby their relation canbe explained in terms of interplay; another piece of interplay in thereservoir of deconstruction. Providing students with this interplay inreligious education gives them reason-seeking minds, which are theengines of deconstruction.

Khosrow Bagheri Noaparast is Professor of Philosophy of Education at theUniversity of Tehran and Zohreh Khosravi is Associate Professor at theUniversity of Al-Zahra in Tehran, Iran. E-mail: [email protected]

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