Decline of the isolation policy in the peripheries of Europe Libya and Belarus. Comparison of experiences in returning to the international stage.
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Decline of the isolation policy in the peripheries of Europe
Libya and Belarus. Comparison of experiences in returning to the
international stage.
new internal developments?
business?new international challenges?
1. REASONS FOR THE LONG LASTING ISOLATION
LIBYA
- Country hostile to the US / West since the early 80s- Of proven involvement in terror attacks (Berlin 86, Lockerbie 88)- Supporting rebel / terror groups from different countries - Developing nuclear program, weapons of mass destruction
BELARUS
- 1996 referendum on amendments to
Constitution rejected by the US and
EU- Involvement in disapearing of opposition figures- 2004 referendum on 3rd term for Lukashenko- political prisoners
2. RECENT CHANGES IN EU, US POLICIES ON LIBYA, BELARUS
US ON LIBYA:
- country listed on a black list of terrorist supporters /removed in June 2006/ (however: still alleged involvement in armed conflicts such as in Somalia) - economic sanctions (ban on direct import and export trade, commercial contracts /lifted April-July 2004 when weapons os mass destr. returned/ (however: May 2004 IAEA report: Libya still looking for nuclear technology)- no diplomatic relations /officials visiting Libya since 2003, ambassadors exchanged in January 2009/
EU ON LIBYA:
- Political and limited economic sanctions /lifted in 2004 after compensations for Lockerbie families agreed/ (however: Libya expressed responsibility but „not being guilty”) - embargo on selling arms to Libya /lifted in 2004 on Italian request/ (however: still alleged involvement in armed conflicts such as in Somalia) - no diplomatic relations /officials visiting Libya since 2003, Qaddafi visiting Europe since 2004 (after 15 years)/
US ON BELARUS:
- Diplomatic sanctions- economic sanctions on Belarusian firms (imposed on late 2006 / early 2007) /partially suspended September 2008 when political prisoners released/ (however: new political prisoners could possibly be detained)
EU ON BELARUS:
- Diplomatic sanctions for members of the regime /suspended October 2008 when progress in elections and release of political prisoners observed/ (however: no opposition in the parliament, new political prisoners could possibly
be detained)- no high level political contacts /officials visising Belarus since 2008, Lukashenko visiting Europe since April 2009 after 14 years/
3. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS
General:
- Location on the peripheries of Europe- Great level of state control- Long lasting political isolation- Relatively high standard of life (compared to the rest of the respected sub region)- Limited role of the private sector- Low Economic Freedom Index- Corruption Perception Index- badly ranked (compared to sub regions)- Internal political stability (compared to sub regions)- Not being source of human migration
3. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, General(ANNEX 1)
Location on the peripheries of Europe, map
[SOURCE: WIKIPEDIA]
GDP (PPP) / capita
Belarus 12,300
Azerb. 8,600
Ukraine 7,300
Armenia 5,300
Georgia 4,900
Moldova 3,100
(Region average ~ 5,800)
Libya 14,500
Lebanon 13,000 Tunisia 7,900Algeria 6,700Egypt 5,900Jordan 5,300Syria 4,700Morocco 4,300
(Region average ~ 5,900)
3. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, General(ANNEX 2)
[SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FOUND, 2008]
Corruption Perception Index
• 47. Jordan 5,1• 62. Tunisia 4,4 • 80. Morocco 3,5 • 92. Algeria 3,2 • 102. Lebanon 3,0 • 115. Egypt 2,8
• 126. Libya 2,6
• 147. Syria 2,1
• 67 Georgia 3,9 • 109 Armenia 2,9 • 109 Moldova 2,9 • 134 Ukraine 2,5
• 151 Belarus 2,0 • 158 Azerbaijan 1,9
3. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, General(ANNEX 3)
[SOURCE; TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 2008]
Similarities in political systems:
- Personal charisma of the leaders- No developed party system- Importance of ideology, though ideological shifts observed
4. DIFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS
LIBYA
Countries of special interest:
US, Italy, EU
BELARUS
Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Germany, EU
LIBYA BELARUS
EU foreign policy framework related:
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995) (Libya not taking part), Union for the Mediterranean (2008) (Libya invited but very critical; not willing to take part)
European Neighborhood Policy (2004) (Belarus not taking part), Eastern Partnership (2009)(Belarus invited to take part)
4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, EU Foreign Policy Framework (ANNEX 1)
Union for the Mediterranean, map
[SOURCE: WIKIPEDIA]
4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, EU Foreign Policy Framework (ANNEX 2)
Eastern Partnership, map (originally not including Belarus)[SOURCE: WIKIPEDIA]
LIBYA BELARUS
as a regional actor:
- Independent decision maker- Influential in Africa- Aid donor- Experienced and efficient diplomacy and intelligence
- Strongly dependent on Russia in decision making- Not active as a regional political player
4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, Libya as a regional actor (ANNEX 1)
Libyan owned school of Arabic, Nouakchott, Mauritania
[PICTURE BY JĘDRZEJ CZEREP]
4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, Libya as a regional actor (ANNEX 2)
[SOURCE: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6051320.stm ]
LIBYA BELARUS
Economic importance in hydrocarbone:
Major producer and exporter of oil and gas
Major transit country for oil / gas transportation
4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, Economic importance in hydrocarbone (ANNEX 1)
North African Pipelines to Europe, map
4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LIBYA AND BELARUS, Economic importance in hydrocarbone (ANNEX 2)
Russian Pipelines to Europe, map
5. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENDING ISOLATION
LIBYA’s EXTERNALPRESSIONS (1):
- Libia’s cooperation needed for combating illegal migrations /need of lifting EU arms embargo to equip Libya’s patrolling boats/
LIBYA’s EXTERNALPRESSIONS (2):
- Economic potential of Libya’s gas and oil resources (40 billion barrels of oil and 1500 trillion cube meters of gas; only 24% of the sites being exploited) /need to lift sanctions to launch extraction projects/ (ENI / Agip- launched Greenstream in 2004)
LIBYA’s EXTERNALPRESSIONS (3):
- Impact of 9/11 /need to declare support to US war on terror/
LIBYA’s INTERNALMOTIVATIONS:
- Need of new markets- Plans to build commercial ports, expand tourism
5. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENDING ISOLATION, Libya’s external pressions (ANNEX 1)
Major migration routes to Europe, map [SOURCE: International Centre for Migration Policy Development]
BELARUS’ EXTERNAL PRESSIONS:
Russia’s plans to become direct supporter to Europe/pressure to look for new role than only a transit country/ EU’s plans to include Belarus in Eastern Partnership (to promote democracy, challenge Russia)
BELARUS’ INTERNAL MOTIVATIONS:
Bargaining game with Russia
5. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENDING ISOLATION, Belarus’ external pressions (ANNEX 1)
Russian projected oil pipeline BTS-2 (Uniecza-Primorsk), map
[SOURCE: GAZETA PRAWNA]
5. MOTIVATIONS FOR ENDING ISOLATION, Belarus’ external pressions (ANNEX 2)
Russian projected gas pipelins (Nord Stream, South Stream), map
[SOURCE: STRATEGIC FORECASTING, 2008]
6. PROSPECTS FOR BELARUS DERIVED FROM THE LIBYAN
EXPERIENCE
Negative prospects for Belarus:
Threats it uses may not exist in near future. It needs to have an economic offer, economically predictable future (like Libya).
Being an independent (like Libya) decision maker is essential for being a reliable partner.
Positive prospects for Belarus:
Rhetoric level is secondary in the process of ending isolation. No serious change of system of values is required for ending isolation (Libya welcomed back despite far more serious problems)
Chance in involvement in Eastern Partnership - related projects, developing trade route to Baltic Sea
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