Declaration of Tony Webster in Opposition to Respondents’ Motion for a Stay of Court's April 22, 2016 Order

8/17/2019 Declaration of Tony Webster in Opposition to Respondents’ Motion for a Stay of Court's April 22, 2016 Order

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OAH Docket No. 5-0305-33135

STATE OF MINNESOTA

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

Tony Webster,

Complainant,

v.

Hennepin County and the

Hennepin County Sheriffs Office,

Respondents.

DECLARATION OF TONY WEBSTER

IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS'

MOTION FOR A STAY OF COURT'S

APRIL 22, 2016 ORDER

My name is Tony Webster, and I am the Complainant in the above-captioned case.

1. On May 4, 2016, Hennepin County and the Hennepin County Sheriffs Office

( Respondents ) moved for an immediate stay of this Court's April 22, 2016, order, pending

appeal, with regard to the requirement that Respondents produce data responsive to my

August 12, 2015, request ( Request ) made pursuant to the Minnesota Government Data

Practices Act ( MGDPA ); and the requirement that Respondents implement a procedure to

ensure that public government data, including e-mail correspondence, is organized and stored so

that it can be easily accessed for convenient use by the public.

2.

I oppose Respondents' motion for a stay of the Court's April 22, 2016 order, as I

believe it will be unduly prejudicial to the rights of myself as a member of the public, and other

members of the public, under the MGDPA.

Respondents' Productions of Data on May 2, 2016 and May 9, 2016

3.

On May 2, 2016, Respondents made their first of five weekly productions of data

in accordance with the Court's April 22, 2016 order ( May 2 Production ). This data inspection

was conducted at the Hennepin County Government Center, Administrative Tower, 17th Floor,

OAH Docket No. 5-0305-33135

STATE OF MINNESOTA

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

______________________________________________________________________________

Tony Webster,

Complainant,DECLARATION OF TONY WEBSTER

v. IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR A STAY OF COURT’S

Hennepin County and the APRIL 22, 2016 ORDER Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office,

Respondents.

______________________________________________________________________________

My name is Tony Webster, and I am the Complainant in the above-captioned case.

1. On May 4, 2016, Hennepin County and the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office

(“Respondents”) moved for an immediate stay of this Court’s April 22, 2016, order, pending

appeal, with regard to the requirement that Respondents produce data responsive to my

August 12, 2015, request (“Request”) made pursuant to the Minnesota Government Data

Practices Act (“MGDPA”); and the requirement that Respondents implement a procedure to

ensure that public government data, including e-mail correspondence, is organized and stored so

that it can be easily accessed for convenient use by the public.

2. I oppose Respondents’ motion for a stay of the Court’s April 22, 2016 order, as I

believe it will be unduly prejudicial to the rights of myself as a member of the public, and other

members of the public, under the MGDPA.

Respondents’ Productions of Data on May 2, 2016 and May 9, 2016

3. On May 2, 2016, Respondents made their first of five weekly productions of data

in accordance with the Court’s April 22, 2016 order (“May 2 Production”). This data inspection

was conducted at the Hennepin County Government Center, Administrative Tower, 17th Floor,


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Room A1750, using one Hennepin County Windows 7 Enterprise computer. 530 emails were

produced in Microsoft Outlook. Respondents did not explain what data was being produced,

what segment of data the 530 emails represented, or how many emails Respondents had found in

total. I informed Respondents that I was available all day, but Respondents scheduled the

inspection for 1:00 p.m., so I was not able to complete my inspection of the emails produced.

There were no apparent redactions to any of the data produced.

4. On May 9, 2016, Respondents made their second production of data in

accordance with the Court's April 22, 2016 order ( May 9 Production ). This inspection was at

the same location, using the same equipment as the first inspection. 1,828 emails were produced

in Microsoft Outlook. Respondents did not explain what data was being produced, did not

provide a total number of emails Respondents had found in total, data was separated into

multiple folders without explanation, and some emails were missing email header metadata. I

contacted Respondents' attorney Daniel Rogan in the Hennepin County Attorney's Office with

these concerns, and he explained that the folder segregation had no meaning, that he could not

provide me with a total email count, and he stated he would look into my metadata concerns. He

also said he hoped to produce another approximately 300 emails the same day. I did not hear

back during the course of the data inspection on my metadata concerns, and Mr. Rogan later

informed me that the additional set of emails would not be produced that day. There were no

apparent redactions to any of the data produced.

Respondents' Claims of Purported Continuing Burden

5.

Respondents complain that performing the demanded term search, redacting

private and confidential data, and producing thousands of e-mails in five weeks is a significant

burden. Respondents' Memorandum of Law in Support of a Stay, p.3.

22

Room A1750, using one Hennepin County Windows 7 Enterprise computer. 530 emails were

produced in Microsoft Outlook. Respondents did not explain what data was being produced,

what segment of data the 530 emails represented, or how many emails Respondents had found in

total. I informed Respondents that I was available all day, but Respondents scheduled the

inspection for 1:00 p.m., so I was not able to complete my inspection of the emails produced.

There were no apparent redactions to any of the data produced.

4. On May 9, 2016, Respondents made their second production of data in

accordance with the Court’s April 22, 2016 order (“May 9 Production”). This inspection was at

the same location, using the same equipment as the first inspection. 1,828 emails were produced

in Microsoft Outlook. Respondents did not explain what data was being produced, did not

provide a total number of emails Respondents had found in total, data was separated into

multiple folders without explanation, and some emails were missing email header metadata. I

contacted Respondents’ attorney Daniel Rogan in the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office with

these concerns, and he explained that the folder segregation had no meaning, that he could not

provide me with a total email count, and he stated he would look into my metadata concerns. He

also said he hoped to produce another approximately 300 emails the same day. I did not hear

back during the course of the data inspection on my metadata concerns, and Mr. Rogan later

informed me that the additional set of emails would not be produced that day. There were no

apparent redactions to any of the data produced.

Respondents’ Claims of Purported Continuing Burden

5. Respondents complain that “performing the demanded term search, redacting

private and confidential data, and producing thousands of e-mails in five weeks is a significant

burden.” Respondents’ Memorandum of Law in Support of a Stay, p.3.


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6. As an initial matter, I was surprised to learn that Respondents sought a stay of the

Court's order, because: (a) Respondents did not raise the issue of a stay at any time during the

litigation so that it could be argued at the evidentiary hearing; (b) Respondents did not contact

me or my attorney to express any concerns of purported burden created by the Court's order, and

(c) Respondents did not contact me or my attorney to negotiate a reasonable stipulation

extending the deadline for production of data. In fact, prior to service, Respondents did not even

inform m e or my attorney that they intended to appeal, instead informing a Star Tribun e reporter.

7.

With regard to Respondents' purported burden of performing a search for data,

Mr. Rogan declared that the searches required under the Court's order have

already been

performed and that those emails have been segregated and preserved. Declaration of Daniel

Rogan ¶ 3. Mr. Rogan confirmed again via phone on May 9, 2016, that the searches were

complete. As such, there is no ongoing burden in Respondents being under an order to complete

a search that has already been completed. I would like to inspect the emails that Mr. Rogan

retrieved and segregated pursuant to the MG DPA .

8. With regard to Respondents' purported burden of having to redact data, in

actuality, Respondents made no redactions to any of the data produced at the May 2 Production

or the May 9 Production. Mr. Rogan informed me that he had hoped to produce approximately

300 emails with redactions on May 9, 2016, and then he emailed me later in the day which

included: We will not have the redacted e-mails available for you today. We have

approximately 350 that are close to being ready for review. Further, both Mr. Rogan's

declaration and the Respondents' memorandum make no mention of the exact number of

responsive emails identified, or whether Respondents deduplicated emails. Mr. Rogan would not

provide me a total number of emails via phone, either. Respondents have been given multiple

3

3

6. As an initial matter, I was surprised to learn that Respondents sought a stay of the

Court’s order, because: (a) Respondents did not raise the issue of a stay at any time during the

litigation so that it could be argued at the evidentiary hearing; (b) Respondents did not contact

me or my attorney to express any concerns of purported burden created by the Court’s order, and

(c) Respondents did not contact me or my attorney to negotiate a reasonable stipulation

extending the deadline for production of data. In fact, prior to service, Respondents did not even

inform me or my attorney that they intended to appeal, instead informing a Star Tribune reporter.

7. With regard to Respondents’ purported burden of performing a search for data,

Mr. Rogan declared that the searches required under the Court’s order have already been

performed and that those emails have been segregated and preserved. Declaration of Daniel

Rogan ¶ 3. Mr. Rogan confirmed again via phone on May 9, 2016, that the searches were

complete. As such, there is no ongoing burden in Respondents being under an order to complete

a search that has already been completed. I would like to inspect the emails that Mr. Rogan

retrieved and segregated pursuant to the MGDPA.

8.

With regard to Respondents’ purported burden of having to redact data, in

actuality, Respondents made no redactions to any of the data produced at the May 2 Production

or the May 9 Production. Mr. Rogan informed me that he had hoped to produce approximately

300 emails with redactions on May 9, 2016, and then he emailed me later in the day which

included: “We will not have the redacted e-mails available for you today. We have

approximately 350 that are close to being ready for review.” Further, both Mr. Rogan’s

declaration and the Respondents’ memorandum make no mention of the exact number of

responsive emails identified, or whether Respondents deduplicated emails. Mr. Rogan would not

provide me a total number of emails via phone, either. Respondents have been given multiple


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opportunities to inform me and the Court of the total number of emails, information that I believe

would be essential for the Court to even begin to consider any new claims of purported burden.

9. Of the emails produced at the May 2 Inspection and May 9 Inspection, there were

many emails that appeared to be duplicates of one another. I was not specifically looking to

document the presence of duplicates during my inspections, but some of the photographs that I

took during these inspections show the presence of emails that appear to be duplicates, as can be

seen by comparing the sender, subject line, date, and beginning text of the email in Microsoft

Outlook. If Respondents are truly concerned about burden, deduplication to reduce the number

of emails necessitating review is an option available to them. True and correct excerpts of

photographs taken of Respondents' computer screen, demonstrating what appears to be duplicate

emails, is attached hereto as

Exhibit 1

10. With regard to any burden of the actual production of emails for inspection, my

December 21, 2015 County inspection, May 2 Production, and May 9 Production were all at the

same location, using the same computer, using the same software. Respondents used no new or

special technology in the inspection appointments. I saw no notable system or configuration

changes, or anything else that would have added any burden. Lucie Passus, Hennepin County

responsible authority designee, informed me during the May 2 Inspection, that the room I

inspected data in, and the computer itself, are rarely used and that she doubted anyone else would

touch it. Aside from greeting me at the beginning of my inspection, checking to see if I needed

anything during the inspections, and upon me leaving, Ms. Passus nor any other County

employee were in the room with me, unburdened and free to work on other County business.

True and correct copies of photographs of the room setup photographed during the May 2

44

opportunities to inform me and the Court of the total number of emails, information that I believe

would be essential for the Court to even begin to consider any new claims of purported burden.

9. Of the emails produced at the May 2 Inspection and May 9 Inspection, there were

many emails that appeared to be duplicates of one another. I was not specifically looking to

document the presence of duplicates during my inspections, but some of the photographs that I

took during these inspections show the presence of emails that appear to be duplicates, as can be

seen by comparing the sender, subject line, date, and beginning text of the email in Microsoft

Outlook. If Respondents are truly concerned about burden, deduplication to reduce the number

of emails necessitating review is an option available to them. True and correct excerpts of

photographs taken of Respondents’ computer screen, demonstrating what appears to be duplicate

emails, is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

10. With regard to any burden of the actual production of emails for inspection, my

December 21, 2015 County inspection, May 2 Production, and May 9 Production were all at the

same location, using the same computer, using the same software. Respondents used no new or

special technology in the inspection appointments. I saw no notable system or configuration

changes, or anything else that would have added any burden. Lucie Passus, Hennepin County

responsible authority designee, informed me during the May 2 Inspection, that the room I

inspected data in, and the computer itself, are rarely used and that she doubted anyone else would

touch it. Aside from greeting me at the beginning of my inspection, checking to see if I needed

anything during the inspections, and upon me leaving, Ms. Passus nor any other County

employee were in the room with me, unburdened and free to work on other County business.

True and correct copies of photographs of the room setup photographed during the May 2


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Inspection are attached hereto as

Exhibit 2,

which can be compared to Evidentiary Hearing

Exhibit 35.

Context: The Importance, Time-Sensitivity, and Newsworthiness of the Data

11. As I have previously testified, I am conducting journalistic research into how law

enforcement agencies use biometric technologies. It was primarily through journalistic inquiry

and data requests that legislative bodies and the public first learned about law enforcement's

adoption of technologies with mass surveillance capabilities like automatic license plate readers,

cell phone tracking and exploitation technologies (like Stingray and KingFish), and unmanned

aerial vehicles (drones), and I believe biometric technologies are no different. Data that I and

others have obtained through the MGDPA and other freedom of information laws: (a) have been

repeatedly used as the basis of news reports;

1

(b) have been cited by law enforcement themselves

when advocating for changes in the law;2

and (c) have been cited by a state legislator as the

impetus for legislative consideration of the public policy and privacy implications of those

technologies.3 Law enforcement time and again adopts new technology without public discourse,

away from news media scrutiny, and shielded from legislative oversight. And without that

oversight, public safety suffers. For example, the Minnesota Chief Deputy Secretary of State

1

Abby Simons,

Minnesota legislators challenge police collection of phone data,

STAR TRIBU NE (Dec. 27,

2013), available at ; Aaron Rupar,

MPD s license plate data allows stalkers to track their victims

using public data, CITY PAGES (Dec. 11, 2012), available at ; Eric Roper,

Police

cameras quietly capture license plates collect data

STAR TRIBUNE (Aug. 12, 2012)

.

2

City of Minneapolis, Letter to Commissioner of Administration seeking temporary classification on

automated license plate reader data, Dec. 18, 2012), p. 13-14, available at

.

3

Minnesota House of Representatives. Civil Law Committee.

Introductory remarks and testimony regarding

government use of surveillance technologies and the balance of law enforcement purposes with individual

rights of privacy, (Jan. 28, 2014), at 5:16, available at .

5

5

Inspection are attached hereto as Exhibit 2, which can be compared to Evidentiary Hearing

Exhibit 35.

Context: The Importance, Time-Sensitivity, and Newsworthiness of the Data

11. As I have previously testified, I am conducting journalistic research into how law

enforcement agencies use biometric technologies. It was primarily through journalistic inquiry

and data requests that legislative bodies and the public first learned about law enforcement’s

adoption of technologies with mass surveillance capabilities like automatic license plate readers,

cell phone tracking and exploitation technologies (like Stingray and KingFish), and unmanned

aerial vehicles (drones), and I believe biometric technologies are no different. Data that I and

others have obtained through the MGDPA and other freedom of information laws: (a) have been

repeatedly used as the basis of news reports;1 (b) have been cited by law enforcement themselves

when advocating for changes in the law;2 and (c) have been cited by a state legislator as the

impetus for legislative consideration of the public policy and privacy implications of those

technologies.3 Law enforcement time and again adopts new technology without public discourse,

away from news media scrutiny, and shielded from legislative oversight. And without that

oversight, public safety suffers. For example, the Minnesota Chief Deputy Secretary of State

1 Abby Simons, Minnesota legislators challenge police collection of phone data, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 27,

2013), available at ; Aaron Rupar, MPD's license plate data allows stalkers to track their victims

using public data, CITY PAGES (Dec. 11, 2012), available at ; Eric Roper, Police

cameras quietly capture license plates, collect data, STAR TRIBUNE (Aug. 12, 2012)

.

2 City of Minneapolis, Letter to Commissioner of Administration seeking temporary classification on

automated license plate reader data, (Dec. 18, 2012), p. 13–14, available at

.

3 Minnesota House of Representatives. Civil Law Committee. Introductory remarks and testimony regarding

government use of surveillance technologies and the balance of law enforcement purposes with individual

rights of privacy, (Jan. 28, 2014), at 5:16, available at .


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testified before the Minnesota House of Representatives Civil Law committee that her office had

concerns about mass location tracking technology because some survivors of domestic violence

in the Safe at Home program have stalkers who are in law enforcement.4 As another example,

when it came to light that a cell-site simulator was used in a Baltimore homicide investigation

without a warrant—as police department policies did not require one—key evidence in the

resulting murder trial was suppressed as an unconstitutional search.

5

Legislative solutions that

required access controls, policies and procedures, and signed warrants helped address some of

these concerns in Minnesota, but that started with learning about the technologies. Even so, in

these situations, it's technology that tracks people through their vehicles and mobile devices;

now, with facial recognition biometric technology, it's about tracking people themselves. There

are no specific statutes in place dictating when and how facial recognition technology can be

used, or the data classification of most input or output data. There are many unanswered

questions, such as:

a.

Mugshots are presumptively public under law, but w hat is the data classification of a

three-dimensional map of your face? Repossession agents and personal data warehouses

obtained automated license plate reader data before that data was made nonpublic, so can

private corporations ask for facial recognition data from jails and enroll individuals into

privately-owned facial recognition systems?

b.

W hat is the data classification of a log of everywhere your face has been seen?

c.

H ow long can law enforcement retain data on when and where your face has been seen?

d.

Can law enforcement use biom etric characteristics, such as skin color as detected through

real-time camera analysis, to trigger predictive police responses with artificial

intelligence and machine learning algorithms?

4 Id.

At 1:54:50.

5

Justin Fenton,

Key evidence in city murder case tossed due to stingray use, THE BALTIMORE SUN,

(Apr. 25,

2016) , available at .

6

6

testified before the Minnesota House of Representatives Civil Law committee that her office had

concerns about mass location tracking technology because some survivors of domestic violence

in the Safe at Home program have stalkers who are in law enforcement.4 As another example,

when it came to light that a cell-site simulator was used in a Baltimore homicide investigation

without a warrant—as police department policies did not require one—key evidence in the

resulting murder trial was suppressed as an unconstitutional search.5 Legislative solutions that

required access controls, policies and procedures, and signed warrants helped address some of

these concerns in Minnesota, but that started with learning about the technologies. Even so, in

these situations, it’s technology that tracks people through their vehicles and mobile devices;

now, with facial recognition biometric technology, it’s about tracking people themselves. There

are no specific statutes in place dictating when and how facial recognition technology can be

used, or the data classification of most input or output data. There are many unanswered

questions, such as:

a. Mugshots are presumptively public under law, but what is the data classification of a

three-dimensional map of your face? Repossession agents and personal data warehouses

obtained automated license plate reader data before that data was made nonpublic, so can

private corporations ask for facial recognition data from jails and enroll individuals into

privately-owned facial recognition systems?

b. What is the data classification of a log of everywhere your face has been seen?

c. How long can law enforcement retain data on when and where your face has been seen?

d. Can law enforcement use biometric characteristics, such as skin color as detected through

real-time camera analysis, to trigger predictive police responses with artificial

intelligence and machine learning algorithms?

4 Id. At 1:54:50.

5 Justin Fenton, Key evidence in city murder case tossed due to stingray use, THE BALTIMORE SUN, (Apr. 25,

2016), available at .


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agencies responsible. Law enforcement agencies have NO incentive to volunteer information on

their operations to the legislature. The document continues with a list: Technologies that the

Legislature has become aware of — rarely due to disclosure by government agencies themselves:

Kingfish, Stingray, license plate readers, body cameras, drone surveillance, facial recognition

software. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email and attachment is attached

hereto as Exhibit 3.7

14.

In her November 25, 2015, letter to me, Kristi Lahti-Johnson described the extent

of use of facial recognition technologies by HCSO as analyzing still images or still frames from

videos against historical jail booking photos for investigative purposes (Evidentiary Hearing

Exhibit 18). Mr. Rogan suggested that based on the information in Ms. Lahti-Johnson's letter,

...the vast majority of the e-mails will have exceedingly limited usefulness... (Evidentiary

Hearing Exhibit 49).

15.

On the contrary, emails produced by Respondents in the May 2 Production and

May 9 Production indicate that HCSO is interested in much more than just using facial

recognition against still images in individual investigations. Responsive emails indicate HCSO is

considering use of real-time facial recognition against live surveillance camera streams, possibly

including those of privately-owned security cameras, and that they are doing so with the 2018

Super Bowl in mind. On information and belief, the 2018 Super Bowl is scheduled to take place

at U.S. Bank Stadium in Downtown Minneapolis, which is in Hennepin County. Respondents'

emails also indicate that HCSO is using seeking to enroll jail booking photos from other counties

Many exhibits are photographs of Respondents' computer screen, which have been optimized for printing

and filing with the Court. Because the emails were produced on Respondents' computer screen, a photograph

may not represent the entirety of a single email.

8

8

agencies responsible. Law enforcement agencies have NO incentive to volunteer information on

their operations to the legislature.” The document continues with a list: “Technologies that the

Legislature has become aware of – rarely due to disclosure by government agencies themselves:

Kingfish, Stingray, license plate readers, body cameras, drone surveillance, facial recognition

software.” A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email and attachment is attached

hereto as Exhibit 3.7

14. In her November 25, 2015, letter to me, Kristi Lahti-Johnson described the extent

of use of facial recognition technologies by HCSO as analyzing still images or still frames from

videos against historical jail booking photos for investigative purposes (Evidentiary Hearing

Exhibit 18). Mr. Rogan suggested that based on the information in Ms. Lahti-Johnson’s letter,

“…the vast majority of the e-mails will have exceedingly limited usefulness…” (Evidentiary

Hearing Exhibit 49).

15. On the contrary, emails produced by Respondents in the May 2 Production and

May 9 Production indicate that HCSO is interested in much more than just using facial

recognition against still images in individual investigations. Responsive emails indicate HCSO is

considering use of real-time facial recognition against live surveillance camera streams, possibly

including those of privately-owned security cameras, and that they are doing so with the 2018

Super Bowl in mind. On information and belief, the 2018 Super Bowl is scheduled to take place

at U.S. Bank Stadium in Downtown Minneapolis, which is in Hennepin County. Respondents’

emails also indicate that HCSO is using seeking to enroll jail booking photos from other counties

7 Many exhibits are photographs of Respondents’ computer screen, which have been optimized for printingand filing with the Court. Because the emails were produced on Respondents’ computer screen, a photograph

may not represent the entirety of a single email.


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into facial recognition databases, and discussing the future: behavioral analysis, iris scanning,

crowd iris (eye) analysis, and more.

16 .

The Minnesota Legislature has considered and passed legislation regarding

surveillance technologies during this legislative biennium. In an omnibus pub lic safety fmance

and policy bill, SF87 8 / H F 849 (2015-2016) , a prohibition on facial recognition on unmanned

aerial vehicles (U AV s or 'drones') was considered in early revisions, but was not codified into

law. Several U AV bills have been introduced this biennium, including SF 686 / H F1194 (2015-

2016), SF 685 / H F 1197 (2015-2016), and SF1299 / HF 1491 (2015-2016), each having a facial

recognition restriction. UAV s have been used in M innesota for law enforcement operations.

8

HCSO is planning to begin using UAVs imminently.

9

The Minnesota Legislature is also

considering multiple bills regarding body camera da ta classification, destruction requirements,

and regulation. HF3468 (2015-2016) prohibits use of facial recognition technology in

connection with portable recording system data, while SF 498 / H F 430 (2015-2016 ) does not.

Body cameras are in use by multiple law enforcement agencies in the state. Last year, the

Legislature passed a bill regulating automated license plate readers, SF 86 (2015-2016),

requiring destruction of data, logs of use, and written procedures. At least 30 M innesota law

enforcement agencies use license plate readers. Last biennium, a bill requiring warrants for cell

8

Minnesota Senate. Comm ittee on Judiciary, Testimony of Drew Evan s, (Mar. 13, 2015) , at 4:51:22, available

at .

9

Rochelle Olson, Hennep in County sheriff s department w ants to begin using drones this summer, STAR

TRIBUNE, (Apr. 11, 2016), available at

9

9

into facial recognition databases, and discussing the future: behavioral analysis, iris scanning,

crowd iris (eye) analysis, and more.

16. The Minnesota Legislature has considered and passed legislation regarding

surveillance technologies during this legislative biennium. In an omnibus public safety finance

and policy bill, SF878 / HF849 (2015–2016), a prohibition on facial recognition on unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs or ‘drones’) was considered in early revisions, but was not codified into

law. Several UAV bills have been introduced this biennium, including SF686 / HF1194 (2015–

2016), SF685 / HF1197 (2015–2016), and SF1299 / HF1491 (2015–2016), each having a facial

recognition restriction. UAVs have been used in Minnesota for law enforcement operations.

8

HCSO is planning to begin using UAVs imminently.9 The Minnesota Legislature is also

considering multiple bills regarding body camera data classification, destruction requirements,

and regulation. HF3468 (2015–2016) prohibits use of facial recognition technology in

connection with portable recording system data, while SF498 / HF430 (2015–2016) does not.

Body cameras are in use by multiple law enforcement agencies in the state. Last year, the

Legislature passed a bill regulating automated license plate readers, SF 86 (2015–2016),

requiring destruction of data, logs of use, and written procedures. At least 30 Minnesota law

enforcement agencies use license plate readers. Last biennium, a bill requiring warrants for cell

8 Minnesota Senate. Committee on Judiciary, Testimony of Drew Evans, (Mar. 13, 2015), at 4:51:22, available

at .

9 Rochelle Olson, Hennepin County sheriff's department wants to begin using drones this summer , STAR

TRIBUNE, (Apr. 11, 2016), available at


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phone tracking, SF2466 (2013-2014), was passed into law. Both the BCA and HCSO own cell

phone tracking equipment.

1°

17.

I believe the foregoing establishes that time is of the essence in my data request,

and that the data sought through my request will lose its relevance, newsworthiness, and ability

to effectuate oversight and change as time progresses. This week marks nine months that I have

waited for responsive data.

18. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email containing an

attachment detailing the technical specifications of Cognitec FaceVACS-DBScan with Examiner

software (which is referred to in correspondence as Cognitec Facial Examiner or Cognitec

Facial Recognition ) which states that it performs comprehensive facial image analysis by

compar[ing] images from various sources to those stored in multi-million image databases. A

true and correct copy of a photograph of this document is attached hereto as Exhibit 4

19.

In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated July 9, 2015,

confirming they use this technology, stating HCSO uses an application called Facial Examiner

published by Cognitec. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto

as

Exhibit 5

20. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated March 27, 2014,

referring to Cognitec Examiner,

where an HCSO staffer stated, This is not an application that I

want advertised to anyone other than Sheriff's Office employees. A true and correct copy of a

photograph of this email is attached hereto as

Exhibit 6

1

Abby Simons, Bill requiring warrants for cell tracking devices clears Senate 56-1, STAR TRIBUNE, (Apr. 22,

2014). Available at

1010

phone tracking, SF2466 (2013–2014), was passed into law. Both the BCA and HCSO own cell

phone tracking equipment.10

17. I believe the foregoing establishes that time is of the essence in my data request,

and that the data sought through my request will lose its relevance, newsworthiness, and ability

to effectuate oversight and change as time progresses. This week marks nine months that I have

waited for responsive data.

18. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email containing an

attachment detailing the technical specifications of Cognitec FaceVACS-DBScan with Examiner

software (which is referred to in correspondence as “Cognitec Facial Examiner” or “Cognitec

Facial Recognition”) which states that it performs “comprehensive facial image analysis” by

“compar[ing] images from various sources to those stored in multi-million image databases.” A

true and correct copy of a photograph of this document is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.

19. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated July 9, 2015,

confirming they use this technology, stating “HCSO uses an application called Facial Examiner

published by Cognitec.” A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto

as Exhibit 5.

20. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated March 27, 2014,

referring to Cognitec Examiner , where an HCSO staffer stated, “This is not an application that I

want advertised to anyone other than Sheriff’s Office employees.” A true and correct copy of a

photograph of this email is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.

10 Abby Simons, Bill requiring warrants for cell tracking devices clears Senate 56-1, STAR TRIBUNE, (Apr. 22,

2014). Available at


11/84

21. As stated, Cognitec Examiner analyzes still photographs or single frames from

video recordings, not live video in real-time. However, Cognitec also produces software called

FaceVACS-VideoScan ( VideoScan ). A true and correct copy of documentation published on

Cognitec's website at


12/84

produced an email dated July 22, 2014, discussing SecuroNet coming online with over 3,000

cameras across [Minneapolis]. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached

hereto as

Exhibit 9

24.

In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced another email dated June 3,

2015, which identified SecuroNet as an HCSO vendor, stating that they are providing

surveillance video solutions to CISA\MRIC

1 5

and, referring to the Super Bowl, stating ...we

need to hook up Securonet with Cognitec and their videoscan [sic] product. A true and correct

copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto as

Exhibit 10

25.

In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced a July 23, 2015, email, which

was a draft of a memorandum to the BCA, describing that another metro-area county was

...considering adding images for their entire county to further increase the [facial recognition]

database size and therefore effectiveness of this tool for all Minnesota Law Enforcement ... This

would include the upcoming important events like the Super Bowl. A true and correct copy of a

photograph of this email is attached hereto as

Exhibit 11.

26. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced a June 2, 2015, email, which

appeared to be a prepared speech by a member of the Hennepin County Sheriffs Office, which

discussed future possibilities of crowd iris scanning and surveillance of known offenders with

facial recognition. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto as

Exhibit 12.

27.

In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated July 22, 2014,

discussing some add-on software that performs behavior recognition using artificial

15

CISA is HCSO's Criminal Information Sharing and Analysis Unit, and MRIC is HCSO's Metro Regional

Information C ollaboration initiative with neighboring counties.

1212

produced an email dated July 22, 2014, discussing SecuroNet coming online with “over 3,000

cameras across [Minneapolis].” A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached

hereto as Exhibit 9.

24. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced another email dated June 3,

2015, which identified SecuroNet as an HCSO vendor, stating that they are “providing

surveillance video solutions to CISA\MRIC”15

and, referring to the Super Bowl, stating “…we

need to hook up Securonet with Cognitec and their videoscan [sic] product.” A true and correct

copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto as Exhibit 10.

25.

In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced a July 23, 2015, email, which

was a draft of a memorandum to the BCA, describing that another metro-area county was

“…considering adding images for their entire county to further increase the [facial recognition]

database size and therefore effectiveness of this tool for all Minnesota Law Enforcement … This

would include the upcoming important events like the Super Bowl.” A true and correct copy of a

photograph of this email is attached hereto as Exhibit 11.

26.

In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced a June 2, 2015, email, which

appeared to be a prepared speech by a member of the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office, which

discussed future possibilities of crowd iris scanning and surveillance of known offenders with

facial recognition. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto as

Exhibit 12.

27. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated July 22, 2014,

discussing “some add-on software” that performs behavior recognition using artificial

15 CISA is HCSO’s Criminal Information Sharing and Analysis Unit, and MRIC is HCSO’s Metro Regional

Information Collaboration initiative with neighboring counties.


13/84

intelligence that might be of interest. A Hennepin County Sheriff's Office employee states,

...I know this type of thing is getting to be big. A little scary but probably the next step to

surveillance. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto as

Exhibit 13

28.

In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced an email dated June 4, 2015,

with a PowerPoint presentation for the Security Industry Association Government Summit

attached, which included screenshots of several software packages in use by HCSO, including

3M BOSS license plate reader software, Geofeedia social media monitoring and analysis,

SecuroNet VideoLink, and Cognitec facial recognition software. A true and correct copy of

photographs of relevant pages of the presentation are attached hereto as

Exhibit 14

29. HCSO has increased, and intends to further increase, their use of facial

recognition. In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced an email dated September 5,

2014, in which an HCSO IT Supervisor completed a reference form supporting Cognitec on an

RFP bid for the State of Montana, stating Hope to add more images as funds become available.

A true and correct copy of a photograph of the relevant page of this document is attached hereto

as Exhibit 15.

In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced an email dated March 10, 2015,

where HCSO received a quote to increase the number of enrollees in its facial recognition

database to 2.5 million people. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this quote is attached

hereto as

Exhibit 16

30.

In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced two emails dated June 22,

2015, between two HCSO IT employees involved with implementation of HCSO's facial

recognition program. One employee emailed the other a link to a Washington Post article about

privacy considerations in commercial uses of facial recognition, and the other replied: It is all

1313

intelligence “that might be of interest.” A Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office employee states,

“…I know this type of thing is getting to be big. A little scary but probably the next step to

surveillance.” A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto as

Exhibit 13.

28. In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced an email dated June 4, 2015,

with a PowerPoint presentation for the Security Industry Association Government Summit

attached, which included screenshots of several software packages in use by HCSO, including

3M BOSS license plate reader software, Geofeedia social media monitoring and analysis,

SecuroNet VideoLink, and Cognitec facial recognition software. A true and correct copy of

photographs of relevant pages of the presentation are attached hereto as Exhibit 14.

29. HCSO has increased, and intends to further increase, their use of facial

recognition. In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced an email dated September 5,

2014, in which an HCSO IT Supervisor completed a reference form supporting Cognitec on an

RFP bid for the State of Montana, stating “Hope to add more images as funds become available.”

A true and correct copy of a photograph of the relevant page of this document is attached hereto

as Exhibit 15. In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced an email dated March 10, 2015,

where HCSO received a quote to increase the number of enrollees in its facial recognition

database to 2.5 million people. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this quote is attached

hereto as Exhibit 16.

30. In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced two emails dated June 22,

2015, between two HCSO IT employees involved with implementation of HCSO’s facial

recognition program. One employee emailed the other a link to a Washington Post article about

privacy considerations in commercial uses of facial recognition, and the other replied: “It is all


14/84


15/84

references FR instead of facial recognition, but the email was found because it includes

MorphoTrust ; and Exhibit 11, which references both facial recognition and FR . By using

multiple keywords, it ensures I was provided relevant and responsive data.

35.

Prior to inspecting responsive data, I had no knowledge that HCSO was using

three-dimensional facial recognition face-modeling software from a company called Animetrics.

In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated April 25, 2014, referencing the

software as Animetrix [sic] pose modeling . I did not request a search for Animetrics, but even

if I did, this email would not have been located because the sender spelled Animetrics as

Animetrix . However, because the email referenced Cognitec as well, the email was found.

Cognitec and Animetrics software can be integrated together. A true and correct copy of a

photograph of Respondents' screen showing this email is attached hereto as

Exhibit 19

Evidence of Respondents' Other Violations of the Data Practices Act

36. Through data produced by Respondents in the May 2 Production and May 9

Production, there is further evidence of Respondents' noncompliance with the MGDPA.

37. To summarize Items 1-3 of my August 12, 2015, request, I sought purchasing and

procurement; policy, procedural, and training; and programming data, documents, and reports.

Respondents informed me that the data produced on December 21, 2015, fulfilled Items 1-3,

later adding an additional document at the January 14, 2016, inspection. However, some of the

data produced at the May 2 Production and May 9 Production indicates that Respondents have

more data that I believe was responsive to Items 1-3. If production is stayed, I may not have the

opportunity to inspect all data responsive to Items 1-3 of my request.

38. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated May 21, 2014,

referencing IBIS mobile fingerprint scanner installation instructions. I believe any instructions

1515

references “FR” instead of “facial recognition,” but the email was found because it includes

“MorphoTrust”; and Exhibit 11, which references both “facial recognition” and “FR”. By using

multiple keywords, it ensures I was provided relevant and responsive data.

35. Prior to inspecting responsive data, I had no knowledge that HCSO was using

three-dimensional facial recognition face-modeling software from a company called Animetrics.

In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated April 25, 2014, referencing the

software as “Animetrix [sic] pose modeling”. I did not request a search for Animetrics, but even

if I did, this email would not have been located because the sender spelled Animetrics as

“Animetrix”. However, because the email referenced “Cognitec” as well, the email was found.

Cognitec and Animetrics software can be integrated together. A true and correct copy of a

photograph of Respondents’ screen showing this email is attached hereto as Exhibit 19.

Evidence of Respondents’ Other Violations of the Data Practices Act

36. Through data produced by Respondents in the May 2 Production and May 9

Production, there is further evidence of Respondents’ noncompliance with the MGDPA.

37. To summarize Items 1–3 of my August 12, 2015, request, I sought purchasing and

procurement; policy, procedural, and training; and programming data, documents, and reports.

Respondents informed me that the data produced on December 21, 2015, fulfilled Items 1–3,

later adding an additional document at the January 14, 2016, inspection. However, some of the

data produced at the May 2 Production and May 9 Production indicates that Respondents have

more data that I believe was responsive to Items 1–3. If production is stayed, I may not have the

opportunity to inspect all data responsive to Items 1–3 of my request.

38. In their May 2 Production, Respondents produced an email dated May 21, 2014,

referencing IBIS mobile fingerprint scanner installation instructions. I believe any instructions


16/84

are responsive to Item 2 of my request. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is

attached hereto as

Exhibit 20

39.

In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced an email dated January 30,

2013, which included quotation bid for iris capture and scanning technology, including a

portable and transportable digital capture system. I believe this is responsive to Item 1 of my

request. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto as

Exhibit 21

40.

In their May 2 Production and May 9 Production, Respondents produced multiple

emails which were automated update notification emails from Confluence and JIRA, two

software programs from a company called Atlassian. I use both Confluence and JIRA

professionally as a software engineer, so I am very familiar with both. Confluence is team

collaboration software, primarily used in information technology projects. It allows for

conversations, uploading and saving of electronic files, meeting notes, and has a wiki for the

posting of notes, documentation, and procedures, guidelines, instructions, or similar. ERA is

issue and tracking software, which allows information technology teams to enter in issues which

could be planning tasks, software bug reports, support requests, or similar. These issues can be

planned and tracked, and each issue supports the entry of text, conversational comments, and the

uploading of documents. Both Confluence and JIRA can be easily searched with simple

keywords or with more advanced criteria. Respondents never disclosed having this software or

capability. However, because at least some of Respondents' employees receive email alerts when

Confluence articles or JIRA issues get updated, some of that content was produced. Attached

hereto as

Exhibit 22

are true and correct copies of photographs of Respondents' screen showing

just a small sampling of Confluence and JIRA notification emails.

16

16

are responsive to Item 2 of my request. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is

attached hereto as Exhibit 20.

39. In their May 9 Production, Respondents produced an email dated January 30,

2013, which included quotation bid for iris capture and scanning technology, including a

portable and transportable digital capture system. I believe this is responsive to Item 1 of my

request. A true and correct copy of a photograph of this email is attached hereto as Exhibit 21.

40. In their May 2 Production and May 9 Production, Respondents produced multiple

emails which were automated update notification emails from Confluence and JIRA, two

software programs from a company called Atlassian. I use both Confluence and JIRA

professionally as a software engineer, so I am very familiar with both. Confluence is team

collaboration software, primarily used in information technology projects. It allows for

conversations, uploading and saving of electronic files, meeting notes, and has a wiki for the

posting of notes, documentation, and procedures, guidelines, instructions, or similar. JIRA is

issue and tracking software, which allows information technology teams to enter in issues which

could be planning tasks, software bug reports, support requests, or similar. These issues can be

planned and tracked, and each issue supports the entry of text, conversational comments, and the

uploading of documents. Both Confluence and JIRA can be easily searched with simple

keywords or with more advanced criteria. Respondents never disclosed having this software or

capability. However, because at least some of Respondents’ employees receive email alerts when

Confluence articles or JIRA issues get updated, some of that content was produced. Attached

hereto as Exhibit 22 are true and correct copies of photographs of Respondents’ screen showing

just a small sampling of Confluence and JIRA notification emails.


17/84

41. I respectfully ask the Court to deny Respondents' motion for a stay of this Court's

April 22, 2016 order.

I declare und er penalty of perjury that the forego ing is true and correct.

Hennepin County, Minnesota

Executed on May 10, 2016 s/ Tony Webster

Tony Webster

Complainant

Phone: 202-930-9200

1717

41. I respectfully ask the Court to deny Respondents’ motion for a stay of this Court’s

April 22, 2016 order.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Hennepin County, Minnesota

Executed on May 10, 2016 s/ Tony Webster

Tony Webster

Complainant

Phone: 202-930-9200


18/84

Exhibit 1Exhibit 1


19/84

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22/84

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23/84

EXHIBIT 2

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24/84

Exhibit 3

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25/84

'Tut 12162014

&27 AM

Jim Franklin

Legislative Update

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To All Sheriffs & Chief Deputies:

The following '6

a very Brief Summary of Leg,islative Items that have occurred over the past two days:

1)

Drone Hearing - I did testify at this hearing using the words (Aerial Photographic Device) (APD) as suggested by

Ramsey County Sheriff Matt Bostrom. It was clear that the Representatives and Senators recognized that there were

"emergency" uses for these types of devices, but they really want to focus on LE use for investigative purposes. Our LE

approach should be, if we are seeking evidence or investigation of a crime we need a warrant. Several other things

were evident at the hearing. They are: FAA needs to finish there regulations ASAP; there will need to be some kind of

registration of these devices; there needs to be some type of height limit on the devices; the owners will need to have

some kind of training to fly for any kind of commercial uses; the owners will need to carry insurance and be responsible

for crash/damages. I testified that this is an emerging technology and we wanted to work with legislators and others to

address the public safety and privacy concerns. Rep. Mary Liz Holberg let it be known that she is very disappointed in

the last 12 years working with LE and does not trust or believe that our efforts in the future will be forthright.

2)

Body Camera Hearing - Minneapolis PD testified as to their current program that they have started. They advised

they did have standard operating procedures written but that did not seem to satisfy Rep. John Lesch, who charged that

MPD was not fully ready to implement the program. He specifically noted that all of the data from a domestic case

would be "public data". This is not the fault of MPD, but the Legislature who made all data "public" unless otherwise

classified under MN Data Practices. If memory serves me correctly, a previous Governor suggested that MN Data

Practices Law was build backwards. All data should be considered "non-public" unless otherwise classified. If this were

the case, this would solve the Lesch concerns as noted about. There is no question we need a lot more work on the

issues of data classification for Body Cams

ACLU wants everything public

we obviously believe some things

will be public, some will be protected by current statutes, i.e. juvenile stuff, some by investigative data/warrants/court

orders etc

Much more work to be done in this area

3)

LPR Hearing - The issue of LPR is again coming up in the 2015 session. The current temporary data classification is

good until August 1, 2015 and will then expire. Some Legislators see the value of this data collection, but are concerned

over the length of time data held. We are back to asking for 130 days, Rep. Lesch and others are at zero. Bottom line is

this. the longer we hold the data. the greater the possibility of solving a crime. once the data is gone. so

is the evidence

E XHIBI T 3

Page 1 of 6

2) Body camera Hearing- Minneapolis PD estified as to their current program that they have started. They

advtsed

th ey did have standard operating procedures w ritten but that did not seem to satisfy Rep. John Lesch, \-Jho charged that

MPD,. as not fully ready to implement the program. He specifically noted that all of the data fron, a don, e tic case

would be pubHc data '1 This is not the fault of MPD, but the Legslature who made all data public unless otherwise

dassified under MN Data Practices. · f memory serves me correctly , a prev ious Governor suggested that

MN

Data

Practices Law was bui'ld backv.tards. All data should be considered non-publi c unless otherwise classified. If this

were

the case, this would solve the Lesch concerns as noted about. There is no question we need a lot n,ore work on the

issues of data classification for Body cams .......... ACLU wants everything public .......... we obviously believe son1e hings

will be publi c, some will be protected by current statutes, i.e. juvenile stuff, some by investigative data/ warrants/court

orders etc ............ Much more work to be done in this area

3) ,LPRHearing - The •ssue of LPR s again coming up in the

2015

session. The current temporary data class1flc:ations

good until August

1 2015

and

will

then expire. Some Legislators see the value of this data collection , but

are

concerned

over the length of time data held . We are back to asking for 180 days, Rep. Lesch and others are at zero. Bott.om llne Is

this. the lone:er we hold the data. the e:reater the oossibilitv of solvimr a crime. once the data i.Sl.one. so ls the evidence

EXHIBIT 3

Page 1 of 6


26/84

Tin 1

.

246/2014 6:27 MI

.

run

Franklin

•

Legislative Update

To

Carrie 1— Hil l ; e lv i landginandklaw.com

; Joe Pa g e t Ooe .pa ige t@c o. ra msey.mn.us

) ; K a the rine . jone [email protected] eod.mn.us;

Mark Wiegel [email protected]

) ; Peter J Dietzman; Randy W il ls; Richard Hodsdo n;

S andra W este rma n (S andra .wes te rmantgoc o .hennepin .mn.us

) ; Carr ie 1. Hi l l ; Peter J Dietzman; Sandra K W esterman

1

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doc20141716063856.pdf

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will be public, some will be protected by current statutes, i.e. juvenile stuff, some by investigative data/warrants/court

orders etc

Much more work to be done in this area

3) LPR Hearing- The issue of LPR is again coming up in the 2015 session. The current temporary data classification is

good until August 1, 2015 and will then expire. Some Legislators see the value of this data collection, but are concerned

over the length of time data held. We are back to asking for 180 days, Rep. Lesch and others are at zero. Bottom line is

this, the

longer we hold the data, the greater the possibility of solving a crime, once the data is gone, so is the evidence

of that crime. The ACLU testified that officers will sit conduct surveillance on political rally's, church services, doctors.

offices, and discover embarrassing things about citizens lives. I have no clue where they think we will get this kind of

staffing to carry out these projected deeds??? LE has set forth restricted standards for access and use of this data,

however Rep. Tina Liebling wants officers to get a search warrant to search the LPR data that is held at the LE offices. As

you can see, much more work needs to be done in this area.

41 Legislative Commission On Intelligence and Technology: Attached you will find a hand out that

was presented

by

Rep. Lesch in which he has proposed the introduction of this new Commission that would be patterned atter the federal

government system of having selected congressional members receiving greater amounts. of information of a variety of

topics. This concept will merit a lot

of future discussion and it does open the door for a data classification for

"intelligence" which currently does not exist

in the state of MN. On page ir3 you will note that he

has eke* singled OA

the issues of Kingfish; Stingrey; LPR; Body 'Camera; Drone and yet to come Facial Recognition. Just

I 'm Sure

will again see some kind of bill introdUced on this topic next year

F Y I

thanks

jimf

James Franklin

Executive Director

Minnesota

Sheriffs' Association

1.00 Empire Drive Suite 222

St. Paul, MN 55103

Phone: 551-451-7215x 2

Wan

kfinomnsheriffs.org

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EXH IBIT 3

Page 2 of 6

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· ,·.Le

gislative Update

· ·. · ·

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To Ca~rie · H

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~y la11ci.@mandkl

aw .com;o~ Paget (joe.

pa [email protected]

.m n.us); atherine.jo

ne [email protected]

n.us;

Mark Wiege l (in/;lrk.

[email protected]

y.mn.us);eter J Diet

zm an;Randy Willis;R

ichardHodsdon;

Sandra Westerma

n San dra:westerm

an @co.hennepin.m

nus ); Carrie

L.

Hill; Pe

te rJ Dietzman;Sa n

draK W esterman

ffi

oc20141216

063856.pdf 319 K

B)

3) L

PR H ea rin g- The

issue of LPR s

again coming up

in the 2015 se ss

ion. The current

temporary da ta

classification is

good u

nti;I August 1, 20

15 and will then

expire. Some L

egislators see the

value of this da

ta collection, bu

t afe concerned

over the le

ngth of time da

ta hetd. We are

back to asking fo

r 180 days, Rep

. Lesch and othe

rs are at lem. B

ottom line is.

this,

the longer we h

otd the data, the

greater the p os

sibifity of solving

a crime, once th

e data

is

gone,

SrO·is the evidence

of that cr

ime. The ACLU

test ified tha t ,off

icers w ill sit cond

uct surveillance

o n political rally

s, church s,erv ice

s, doctors

offices, and d

iscover ,em barra

ss ing things abo

ut citizens lives.

I have no clue w

here they think w

e w ill get this k

ind of

staffing to

carry out th ,ese

projected dee ds

??? LEhas set f

orth restricted s

tandards for acc

ess and us,e of th

is,data,

EXHIBIT 3

Page 2 of 6


27/84

EXHIBIT

Page 3

of 6

Legislative Commission

on Intelligence and

Technology

REPRESENTATIVE JOHN LESCH

Purpose of new legislative commission

w H A TT H E P R O P O S A L I S

WHAT THE P ROPOSAL IS NOT

A hill enabling the legislature's fundamental

oversight function. A function which we cannot

exigreise without the ability to review

government agency information and procedures

(the status quo).

Policy changing any data set classification.

Le

gisl

ative

o

mm

issio

n

on

Inte

llige

nce

and

Te

chn

olog

y

REPRESEN

TATIVE JOHN

LESCH

P

urpose

of new

legis

lative c

ommis

sion

WHAT

THE PROPOS

AL S

A

bill enabling th

e legislature s f

undamental

oversig

ht function. A

functio

n which we can

not

ex tcise ·

without

the

ability

to

review

/. .

go

vernment agen

cy information

and procedure

s

(the

sta

tus q

uo).

WH

AT THE PROP

OSALS NOT

Policy

han

ging

any

da ta set classific

ation.

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EXHIBIT 3

Page 3 of 6


28/84

Why an Intelligence and Technology

Commission is needed

Until data that is collected by the government is identified, it is not protected or classified under

Chapter 13. By default, the data is public and can be obtained by anyone or used to abuse power by

those in control of it.

•

The rapid pace data collection and advancing technology is creating new datasets faster than we can

classify them.

Vast amounts of government data is being collected that can enhance OR restrict the lives of

Minnesotans.

O

The legislature is responsible for oversight — to hold agencies responsible.

Law enforcement agencies have NO incentive to volunteer information on their operations to the

legislature.

•

Legislative subpoenas are ineffective to compel discovery of critical data and technology because of

the difficulty of a 2/3 committee consensus and the public nature of the proceeding.

Technologies that the Legislature has become

aware of — rarely due to disclosure by

government agencies themselves:

KINGFISH

STINGRAY

LICENSE PLATE READERS

BODY CAMERAS

DRONE SURVEILLANCE

FACIAL RECOGNITION SOFTWARE

EXHIBIT 3

Page 4 of 6

W

hy an

Intellig

ence a

nd Tec

hnolog

y

Com

missio

n

is nee

ded

0

U

ntil

data

that is collected by the

government is

identifie d, it isn

ot protected or

da

ssified

under

Chapter 13.

By

default, the data is public and can be obtained

by

anyone or used to abuse power by

tho

se

in

control of i

t.

0 The

rapid pace

data c

ollection

and a

dvancing techno

logy is creating

new datasets fas

ter than we can

classify them.

0 Vas t

amounts

of go

vernment

data

i

s

being

collected

that

can enhance

OR restrict

th

e lives

of

Minnesotans.

J The

legisiature is

re

sponsible

for o

versight -

to

ho l

d agencies respo

nsible.

D Law en

forcement agenc

ies have NO

inc

entive to volunte

er information

on their operatio

ns to the

leg

islature.

0 Legisla

tive

subpoenas

are ineffective

to

compel

disco

very of

critical

da

ta and

technology

because of

th

e difficulty of a

2/3 committee

consensus and th

e public nature

of the proceedin

g .

Techn

ologies

that the

Legisl

ature ha

s becom

e

aware

of- ra

rely due

to disc

losure

by

·

governm

ent a

gencies

themse

lves:

KINGflSH

STINGR

AY

LICENSE PLATE READERS

BODY

CAMERAS

DRONE SU

RVEILLANC

E

FACIAL

RECOGNIT

IO N SOFTW

ARE

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EXHIBIT 3

Page 4 of 6


29/84

What the proposal does:

Establishes an investigative and oversight commission - similar to the Intelligence Committee in

Congress

Consists of 3 Senators and 3 Representatives serving for 4 years, with one member of the minority

party from each chamber

Each member must take an oath

Commission may determine that a meeting is not open to the public

Commission may require law enforcement to disclose not public data

:=1 Disclosure of data outside the commission meeting is grounds for an ethics complaint and creates

liability under Minn. Stat. 13.08 by creating a cause of action and an action to compel compliance.

11 Members of the commission may issue subpoenas to compel testimony and the production of

r

eco

rds

14.4- -.1 i...:•••••-1.••••••••••••

••••-•

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••••••••--•••••

Im p o r tan ce o f O ve rsigh t

C3

Historical purpose for creating a Congressional Intelligence Committee

Li Unique pace and scale of data collection and technology must be balanced

with privacy interests and the Data Practices Act in successfully monitoring what

government agencies collect and how the collect it

Page 5 of 6

What the proposal does:

:J

Establishes an investigative and oversight commission • similar to the Intelligence Committee in

Congress

Consists of 3 Senators and 3 Representatives serving for 4 years, with one member of the minority

party

from

each chamber

·i

Each member must take an oath

:~i Commission may determine that a meeting is not open to the public

:

Commission may require law enforcement to disclose not public data

Disdosure of data

outside

the commission meeting is grounds for an ethics complaint and creates

liability

under Minn. Stat 13.08 by creating a cause of action and an action to compel compliance.

:l Members of the commission may issue subpoenas to compel testimony and the production of

records

· Importance of

Oversight

O Historical purpose for creating a Congressional Intelligence Committee

D

Unique

pace and scale of data collection and technology must be balanced

with privacy interests and

the

Data Practices Act in

successfully

monitoring

what

government agencies collect and how the collect it

EXHIBIT 3

Page 5 of 6


30/84

Considerations

Is the legislature getting the information it needs to make policy

decisions about data practices and privacy?

Is the legislature getting this information in a timely manner?

In considering a legislative oversight function,

c ertain opinions should not c arry weight.

Privacy advocates

:I aw enforcem ent or other agencies

Private sector business

W hy are these interests not relevant?

"T he proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the governm ent ' Joh n Stuart Mill

"Q uite as im portant as legislation is vigilant oversight of adm inistration ' W oodrow W ilson

Th e "F ather of the C onstitution,' James M adison, sough t to "subordinate distributions of power,' wh ere the

constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a m anner that each M ay be a check on the

other Federalist No. 51.

On this particular proposal, Ignore everyone's opinion but your own.

1 , •

:I

I P •

I

Page 6 of 6

Considerations

.J ls the legislature getting the informa

tion

it

needs to make policy

decisions about data practices a

nd privacy?

t_l

ls the legislature getting this in

formation in a timely manner?

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...,

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In considering a legislative oversight functi,on,

certain op~nions

should

not carry

weight.

•----·

. .

- .-- · • ·

· - · · . .

.. .

...

0

Privacy advocates

:J

Law enforcement or other agencies

:: Private sector business

Whv

are these Interests not relevant?

NTheproper office of a representative

assembly

s to

watch and control the government.'" John

Stuan

Mill

"Quite as m portant as egislation s vigilant oversfghtof adm inistration ' Wood

row WIison

The "Father of the Con stitution,"

JamesMadison, sought o ~sµbordinate istributions

of

power, where the

constant aim is to divide and arrange he several ffices n sucha manner that each mav

e a

oheck

r,the

other." FederalistNo. 51 . , · ·' · .

On this pa rticular proposal, Ignore eveJyO ne s

~pln ion

but

vaur

ollr(n.

EXHIBIT 3

Page 6 of 6


31/84

Exhibit 4Exhibit 4


32/84


33/84

F a c e V A C S - D 1 3 S c a n

Technical Specification

Version

4.9

Client server

Topology

•

powerful 3-tier application of database server, computation

cluster and clients

- computation cluster consists of one or more cluster

controllers and multiple computation nodes

•

communication protocol is TCP/IP

•

central cluster configuration

thews

Client applications requesting SerYILVI Own the server ere either

• Carbine,: graphical kiwi

into/taco

or

•

customer developed applications utdrig the og Hite,

integration interlace

Hgh availability

•

supports cluster configurations avoiding single points of failure

•

multiple cluster controllers (active, standby)

•

multiple hot spare nodes

•

automatic reaction to Cluster controller rir computing node

malfunction (a g hardware failure)

• dynamic cluster reconfiguration at runt nue (e

g dding

removing computation nodes

and

clutter controllers)

Database inspection

- preconfigured batch jobs for database inspection

•

cross identification to support database de duplication

(horizontal cleansing)

•

mates identification to find cases of different identities but

with the same person ID (vertical c leansing)

I

•

English

• other languages on request

Declaration of Tony Webster in Opposition to Respondents’ Motion for a Stay of Court's April 22, 2016 Order

Documents