DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE PHILIPPINES

7/24/2019 DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE PHILIP…

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/decentralization-and-governance-an-empirical-investigation-of-public-service 1/102

DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE: AN EMPIRICAL

INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE

DELIVERY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Omar Azfar, Tugrul Gurgur, Satu Kähkönen,* Anthony Lanyi, and Patrick eagher

!"!S #enter, $ni%er&ity of aryland, #ollege Park *'orld (ank

)ecemer +, -...

Thi& re&earch /a& financed y a grant from the 'orld (ank0& 1etherland& Tru&t 2und to the !"!S#enter, $ni%er&ity of aryland3 Thi& 4a4er form& 4art of a larger &tudy that include& a &imilar re&earch effort in the $ganda3 A &ynthe&i& 4a4er /ill &ummarize finding& and analyze data fromthe t/o countrie&, a& /ell a& the re%ie/ of the theoretical and com4arati%e literature on the&e

5ue&tion&3



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tables and Figures______________________________________________________________i

Abbreviations_________________________________________________________________iii

Executive Summary_____________________________________________________________2

Chapter I: Introduction__________________________________________________________

Theoretica !"##o!itio$! o$ %ece$trai&atio$''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''(

S"))ar* o+ the #a#er'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''',

Chapter II: Structures o! "ecentrali#ed $overnance in the %hilippines__________________&'

Go-er$)e$ta Str"ct"re'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''./

Politic& and Admini&tration666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666+.Autonomou& "egion&6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666+-

Heath Ser-ice!'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''.0!m4act of )ecentralization666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666+78ertical Program&6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666+9

E%"catio$''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''.1

Go%ernance Structure6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666+:Per&onnel and "e&ource anagement666666666666666666666666666666666666666666+

Chapter III: "ata Sources_______________________________________________________2&

Chapter I(: Assessing $overnment %er!ormance____________________________________2)

Mea!"ri$2 P"3ic Ser-ice O"t#"t! a$% O"tco)e!''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''45

Aocati-e e++icie$c*'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''40Pro%"cti-e e++icie$c*'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''4,

)ecentralization and corru4tion in the Phili44ine&66666666666666666666666666666666-ea&ure& of corru4tion666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666;+#o&t effecti%ene&&6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666;7

Co!t reco-er*'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''5(

Local "e%enue Admini&tration Prolem&6666666666666666666666666666666666666666;9Sur%ey )ata on Ta< #ollection666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666;=Summary66666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666;=

Chapter (* %er!ormance Factors: Civic "isciplines__________________________________+'

Voice: Voti$2 a$% Poitica Actio$''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''0/

Voice: Me%ia a$% 6$o7e%2e'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''04

E8it'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''09

Summary666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666667.

Chapter (I: %er!ormance Factors: Intergovernmental "isciplines______________________&

Fi!ca Str"ct"re'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''(.



Loca A%)i$i!tratio$ Ce$tra O-er!i2ht''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''(0

A%;"!ta3iit*'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''(1

Summary666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666667:

Chapter (II: %er!ormance Factors: %ublic Sector ,anagement_______________________-&

Meritocrac*''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''<.

Acco"$ta3iit*''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''<0

Ca#acit*'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''<<

Chapter (III: .in/age to 0utcomes______________________________________________-1

The Ca"!e! o+ Corr"#tio$''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''<1

The Co$!e="e$ce! o+ Corr"#tio$''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''1.

>ealth6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666:+?ducation6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666:9Summary66666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666:=

Chapter I: Conclusions_______________________________________________________13

4ibliography_________________________________________________________________52

Annex_______________________________________________________________________5-



Ta3e! a$% Fi2"re!

Table 1. Description of Surveys___________________________________________________22

Figure 1. Household Opinions on Municipality riorities!______________________________2"

Table 2. #orrelation $et%een ublic Officials references and Household references for Funding riorities_____________________________________________________________2&

Table '. #orrelation $et%een ublic Officials references and Household references for

Funding riorities_____________________________________________________________2(

Table ). *hat have you done to find out about local citi+en,s preferences- percentages/______20Table ". #orrelation $et%een ublic Officials references and locano references for Funding

riorities_____________________________________________________________________20

Figure 2. #3,s #orruption ating for the hilippines________________________________'4Table &. #orruption #o5ponents and nde6_________________________________________'2

Figure '. 7d8ustability and #orruption 7cross 7gencies________________________________''

Table (. Facilities, esponses on ay5ent Delays nde6/______________________________'"

Table 0. Ta6 #ollection ercentage by rovince______________________________________'0Table 9. *hy eople :ote in ;lections______________________________________________)1

Table 14. Sources of nfor5ation on olitics_________________________________________)'

Figure ). Sources of nfor5ation on <ocal olitics and Sources of nfor5ation on <ocal#orruption___________________________________________________________________))

Table 11. robit ;sti5ates of Sources of nfor5ation about <ocal olitics on *hether

espondent Has Heard 7ny eports of <ocal #orruption_______________________________)"Table 12. robit ;sti5ates of Sources of nfor5ation about =ational olitics on *hether

espondent Has Heard 7ny eports of =ational #orruption____________________________)"

Table 1'. Does ublic 3ood Delivery 3et #overed in the Media and 7ffect :oting___________)& Table 1). olitical 7%areness 7cross Households of Different ;thnicities__________________)(

Table 1". Mobility______________________________________________________________)9Table 1&. Ho% easily can this facility ad8ust its plans to respond to suggestions of citi+ens-____"0Table 1(. 7d8ustability Measures across Surveys______________________________________"9

Table 10. Fle6ibility to eople,s Suggestions and 7uthority to be Fle6ible__________________&4

Figure ". Officials, :ie%s of Ho% Often the 5ost >ualified erson 3ets the ?ob average/ _____&2

Figure &. 7verage Meritocracy per all public officials! #riteria used in pro5otions__________&2Table 19. Meritocracy__________________________________________________________&'

Table 24. 7ccountability_________________________________________________________&"

Figure ( 7ccountability >uestions @ esponses fro5 Officials and Facilities_______________&"Table 21. #apacity_____________________________________________________________&&

Table 22. The #auses of #orruption________________________________________________&0

Figure 0. artial lot on #auses of #orruption_______________________________________&9Table 2'. ;6plaining *aiting Ti5e at and Satisfaction %ith 3overn5ent Health #linics_______('Table 2). ;6plaining #hange in Occurrence of Diseases ___________________________________("

Table 2". ;ffect of #orruption on ;ducation Delivery__________________________________((

Figure 9. The #auses and #onseAuences of #orruption in the hilippines_________________(0 7nne6 Table 1. Household Opinions on Municipality riorities! ______________________________0&

7nne6 Table 2. references of rovincialB MunicipalB and Household references on

Municipality riorities!_________________________________________________________0(

i



7nne6 Table '. #leaning #orruption erception of Households__________________________00

7nne6 Table ). #leaning #orruption erception of Municipal Health Officials______________09

7nne6 Table ". robit ;sti5ates of Deter5inants of Media Source for <ocal =e%s___________09 7nne6 Table &. robit ;sti5ates of Deter5inants of Media Source for =ational =e%s________94

7nne6 Table (. Households Cse of Health Facilities___________________________________94

7nne6 Table 0. Su55ary Means__________________________________________________91 7nne6 Table 9. The #auses of #orruption obustness #hec____________________________92

7nne6 Table 14. ;6plaining Eno%ledge of 55uni+ations at 3overn5ent #linics____________9'

7nne6 Table 11. #leaning Satisfaction %ith 3overn5ent #linic and *aiting Ti5e erceptions of Households___________________________________________________________________9)

7nne6 Table 12. ;6plaining *aiting Ti5e atB and Satisfaction %ith 3overn5ent Health #linics

obustness checs_____________________________________________________________9"

7nne6 Figure 1! Municipal Officials vs. Household references national avg./_____________9& 7nne6 Figure 2! Municipal Officials vs. Household references provincial avg./___________9&

7nne6 Figure '! Municipal Officials vs. Household references 5unicipal avg./____________9&

7nne6 Figure )! rovincial Officials vs. Household references national avg./_____________9&

7nne6 Figure "! rovincial Officials vs. Household references provincial avg./___________9& 7nne6 Figure &. artial lot ;6plaining Satisfaction and *aiting Ti5e co5posite inde6/_____9(

ii



A33re-iatio$!

A)( A&ian )e%elo4ment (ank A$SA!) Au&tralian Agency for !nternational )e%elo4ment

A" Autonomou& "egion of u&lim indanao(!" (ureau of !nternal "e%enue#A" #ordillera Autonomou& "egion#OA #ommi&&ion on Audit)( )e4artment of (udget and anagement)?#S )e4artment of ?ducation, #ulture and S4ort&)!LG )e4artment of !nterior and Local Go%ernment)O2 )e4artment of 2inance)O> )e4artment of >ealth)O@ )e4artment of @u&tice)P'> )e4artment of Pulic 'ork& and >igh/ay&

?P! ?nhanced Program on !mmunization!"A !nternal re%enue allotmentLaan Laan ng )emokratikong Pili4inoLaka& Laka& ng ?d&a1ational $nion of #hri&tian )emocrat&LAP Laan ng a&ang Pili4inoLG# Local Go%ernment #odeLG$ Local go%ernment unit!L2 oro !&lamic Lieration 2ront1L2 oro 1ational Lieration 2ront 1#" 1ational #a4ital "egion 1)2 1ational )emocratic 2ront

1GO 1onBgo%ernmental organization 1P# 1ationali&t Peo4le0& #oalitionP#G# Political #ommi&&ion on Graft and #orru4tionPP Phili44ine Pe&oPT#A ParentBTeacher #ommunity A&&ociationS?2 S4ecial ?ducation 2undSP#) Southern Phili44ine& #ouncil for Peace and )e%elo4mentS'S Social 'eather Station&T( Tuerculo&i&T??P Third ?lementary ?ducation Program$1!#?2 $nited 1ation& !nternational #hildren0& ?mergency 2und

8AT 8alueBAdded Ta<'>O 'orld >ealth Organization

iii



E8ec"ti-e S"))ar*

Thi& 4a4er4art of a larger &tudy financed y the 'orld (ankfocu&e& on the im4act of&elected in&titutional and &ocial factor& on the deli%ery of 4rimary health &er%ice& and 4rimaryeducation, under decentralized go%ernment arrangement&, in the Phili44ine&3 The 4ur4o&e of thi&

re&earch i& to &hed light on the condition& under /hich decentralization of go%ernmentalfunction& can im4ro%e 4ulic &er%ice deli%ery3 "e&earch /a& carried out through inter%ie/& and&econdary &ource&, ut mo&t im4ortantly through nine &e4arate &ur%ey& of hou&ehold&, 4ro%incialand munici4al official&, and em4loyee& of 4ulic health facilitie&, 4ulic &chool& and 4ri%ate&chool&, in -. 4ro%ince&, =. munici4alitie&, and ;.+ arangay&3

Theory* The theory of fi&cal federali&m &ugge&t that decentralization im4ro%e& 4ulic &er%icedeli%ery ecau&e of greater allocative efficiency Cmatching 4ulic good& to local 4reference&D, a&/ell a& im4ro%ed productive efficiency Cin 4art ecau&e of greater accountaility, le&& ureaucracy, and etter kno/ledge of local co&t&D, and etter cost recovery Cgreater /illingne&&of citizen& to 4ay fee& and ta<e& for im4ro%ed 4ulic &er%ice&D3 Again&t thi&, &ome ha%e argued

that decentralization may lead to local deci&ion& that ha%e ad%er&e interBEuri&dictional &4illo%er&and undermine national 4olicy oEecti%e&, and that the ad%antage& of greater authority for localgo%ernment could e off&et y elite ca4ture3 The re&earch team hy4othe&ized that /hether eitherof the&e &u44o&ed ad%antage& or di&ad%antage& of decentralization materialize de4end& on threeinstitutional disciplines! civic disciplinesB intergovern5ental disciplinesB and disciplines related

to public sector 5anage5ent. The&e di&ci4line& are defined, and rele%ant re&ult& are&ummarized, in the corre&4onding 4aragra4h& elo/3

Structures o! decentrali#ed governance in the %hilippines* The Local Go%ernment #odeCLG#D, enacted in ++ and im4lemented &ince +-, ha& increa&ed re&4on&iilitie& of all &uBnational go%ernment&F :: 4ro%ince&, 9 citie&, +7;= munici4alitie&, and o%er .,... arangay&3

"egular election& are no/ held at each le%el for oth e<ecuti%e& and legi&lati%e odie&3 >ealthe<4enditure& /ere largely de%ol%ed to &uBnational go%ernment&, although the centralgo%ernment retain& re&4on&iility for H%ertical 4rogram&I like immunization and di&ea&e control3!n education, the )e4artment of ?ducation, #ulture and S4ort& C)?#SD &till maintain&re&4on&iility for udgeting and hiring for &chool&, ut local go%ernment& no/ ha%ere&4on&iilitie& for o4eration and maintenance of &chool&, and de facto are often in%ol%ed inhiring of teacher&3 Autonomou& region&notaly the Autonomou& "egion of u&lim indanaoCA"Dha%e more e<ten&i%e re&4on&iilitie& in education, ut ha%e, intere&tingly, 4erformed5uite 4oorly in thi& areaJ AA" ha& an e&4ecially ad re4utation /ith re&4ect to corru4tion3

Assessing government per!ormance* Phili44ine& i& a middleBincome country /ho&e

4erformance in health and education ha& &ho/n &u&tantial 4rogre&& in &ome area&&uch a&immunization and 4rimary &chool attendance/ith &ome remaining /eakne&&e&, &uchmalnouri&hment of young children and 5uality of education3 The re&earch team looked at thearea& in /hich decentralized go%ernment i& &u44o&ed y theori&t& to 4erform /ellF allocativeefficiencyB productive efficiencyB and cost recovery3 7llocative efficiency /a& a44roached ye<amining ho/ /ell household preferences /ere 4ercei%ed and im4lemented y official& at 4ro%incial and munici4al le%el&3 !t /a& found that hou&ehold 4reference&mea&ured yre&4on&e& to a &ur%ey 5ue&tion aout 4referred u&e of additional local fundingre%ealed that the

+



main 4riority /a& road& and other infra&tructure rather than health and education, a44arentlyreflecting citizen&0 4erce4tion& /ith regard to ade5uacy of e<i&ting funding and the mo&t urgent&hortfall&3 unici4al official& /ere to a &u&tantial e<tent a/are of the&e 4reference&, /herea& 4ro%incial official& &ho/ed no e%idence of kno/ledge aout local demand&3 The main a&4ect of productive efficiency addre&&ed /a& corru4tion, /hich /a& /idely 4ercei%ed y official&

them&el%e& to e a 4rolem, and the&e 4erce4tion& /ere in line /ith tho&e of hou&ehold&3 'hilecorru4tion at the aranguay and munici4al go%ernment& /a& &een a& le&& 4ronounced than at the 4ro%incial and national go%ernment&, corru4tion at all le%el& of go%ernment /a& 4ercei%ed a&&u&tantial3 On another a&4ect of 4roducti%e efficiency, delay& in 4ayment& of &alarie& andallo/ance&, and hiring delay&, /ere a fre5uent 4rolem3 The one a&4ect of cost recovery

e<amined in the &tudy /a& ta< collection, /hich &ho/ed /ide %ariation among 4ro%ince&3 Thi&i& an area /here local autonomy ha& een com4romi&ed y central go%ernment con&traint&J anddi&incenti%e& to local ta< collection ha%e a44arently een created y large tran&fer& from thecentral go%ernment3

Civic disciplines are defined a& the ca4acity of indi%idual citizen&, media and 1GO& to make

their %ie/& kno/n to go%ernmenti3e3, H%oiceIa& /ell a& mechani&m& to induce official& toact accordingly C%oting and other form& of 4ulic actionDJ al&o, ci%ic di&ci4line& includemechani&m& of He<itI that in%ol%e citizen& either &/itching from 4ulic to 4ri%ate &er%ice& ormo%ing to other Euri&diction&3 Thu& %oting 4artici4ation&, rationale& for %oting, other form& of 4ulic action, moility, and choice of alternati%e &er%ice 4ro%ider& /ere &ur%eyed3 oreo%er, the&ource of information of citizen& aout go%ernment and corru4tion/hich i& a nece&&arycondition for the citizen&0 4o&iti%e in4ut into local go%ernment/a& al&o e<amined3 The data&ugge&t that civic disciplines on &uBnational go%ernment in the Phili44ine& may e &u&tantially/eaker than a&&umed y the 4roBdecentralization theori&t&3 8oting 4attern& and rationale& do notdiffer &ignificantly et/een local and national election&3 Po4ular kno/ledge of local go%ernment/a& inferior to that of national go%ernment, and there /a& le&& reliance on the media forinformation on local than on national 4olitic&3 !ndeed, citizen& relied much more on localofficial& and 4er&onal contact&, rather than on the media, for information on local 4olitic& andcorru4tionin &tark contra&t /ith much hea%ier reliance on the media for information aoutnational 4olitic&3 Thi& &ugge&t& the 4o&&iility of elite ca4ture of local go%ernment and maye<4lain /eakne&&e& in local accountaility3 One 4o&iti%e &ign /a& the large numer of 4o&iti%ere&4on&e& to 5ue&tion& aout the e<i&tence of 4olitical action in local communitie& and the&ucce&& of &uch action3

Intergovernmental disciplines are the mechani&m& of o%er&ight or udgetary con&traint&,ty4ically im4o&ed y the central Cor 4ro%incialD go%ernment& on local authoritie&, affecting thelo/er le%el&0 ad8ustability, or di&cretion to adEu&t &er%ice deli%ery to local need&3 The &tudy&ho/& that intergovern5ental disciplines 4lace tight con&traint&, oth 4o&iti%e and negati%e, onthe freedom of action of local go%ernment&3 On the 4o&iti%e &ide, o%er&ight of higher le%el& ofgo%ernment o%er lo/er one& im4o&e& /hat are 4roaly nece&&ary con&traint& to mi&u&e offund&J on the negati%e &ide, &ome of the&e con&traint& con&i&t of 4olitical interference from thecenter in the allocation of in%e&tment fund& at the local le%el3 The ad8ustability inde6 deri%ed ythe re&earch team re%ealed &ome/hat more di&cretion at the munici4al than at the 4ro%incialle%el on /hich &er%ice& to offer, ho/ many official& to hire, and ho/ much to 4ay em4loyee&, utmore authority for 4ro%incial official& to reallocate fund& among different &er%ice&3

-



"isciplines related to public sector management are tho&e internal mechani&m& and ca4acitie& atthe local le%elfor in&tance, antiBcorru4tion 4ro%i&ion&, 4erformanceBa&ed recruitment and 4romotion, and 4ro%i&ion for 4eriodic audition&that affect com4etence and hone&ty of local 4ulic &ector deli%ery3 The &tudy e<amined the&e factor& under three heading&F 5eritocracyB

accountabilityB and capacity3 'ith regard to 5eritocracy, official& inter%ie/ed claimed thatmerit and 5uality of &er%ice /ere the main criteria, although for health unit& 4er&onal connection&/ere al&o regarded a& im4ortant3 On accountabilityB fre5uency of oth internal and e<ternalaudit& i& high, a& are /ritten target&3 o&t re&4ondent&, ut to a le&&er degree in )?#S office&than in munici4al admini&tration&, &aid that an officer &u&4ected of corru4tion faced &ocial 4re&&ure to re&ign3 2inally, capacity con&traint& do not a44ear &e%ere in the Phili44ine&, althoughre&ource& of the organization& &cored /eaker in official&0 re&4on&e& than training and educationof em4loyee&3

.in/age o! per!ormance !actors to outcomes: the causes and conse6uences o! corruption*

The re&earch team found that &tati&tical analy&i& of the linkage et/een the 4erformance factor&

e<amined in the 4re%iou& cha4ter& and outcome& for health and education Coth a& oEecti%elymea&ured and a& 4ercei%ed y hou&ehold&D tended to e clo&ely a&&ociated /ith the factor ofcorru4tion3 The main linkage& re%ealed y the &tati&tical analy&i& /ere, fir&t, that HadEu&tailityIof munici4al go%ernment ha& a &ignificant 4o&iti%e effect on corru4tion, /hile reading nationalne/&4a4er& and %oting local election& ha%e &ignificant negati%e effect&3 At the &ame time,corru4tion at the local le%el ha& &ignificant negati%e effect& on hou&ehold &ati&faction /ith healthcare &er%ice&, /aiting time& at health facilitie&, and health official&0 kno/ledge of re5uiredimmunization&3 The health facilitie&0 4erformance C/ith regard to oth hou&ehold &ati&factionand /aiting time&D i&, in turn, &trongly influenced C4o&iti%elyD y the official&0 kno/ledge ofre5uired immunization&3 #orru4tion al&o had a &ignificant negati%e im4act on hou&ehold&ati&faction /ith 4ulic &chool&3

4roader implications* 'hile decentralization in the Phili44ine& ha& mo%ed &u&tantial authorityand re&ource& to &uBnational go%ernment&, thi& decentralization ha& taken 4lace /ithin theconte<t of a unitary go%ernmental &y&tem /here the hierarchy ha& much more di&cretion at u44er than at lo/er le%el&, and &tronger mechani&m& for to4Bdo/n di&ci4line than any 4re&&ure& in theo44o&ite direction3 Local go%ernment& do a44ear to e fairly a/are of local 4reference&, ut findit difficult to reak out of the 4rocedural, re&ource, and go%ernance con&traint& that im4ede theirre&4on&e3 The &ur%ey &ho/& limitation& to %oter and media attention to local go%ernment, andthi& heighten& the 4o&&iility of elite ca4ture of local go%ernmental in&titution&, including tho&ere&4on&ile for 4ulic &er%ice deli%ery3 The&e con&ideration& illu&trate the 4remi&e of the 4a4erthat decentralization initiati%e& &hould e guided le&& y &im4le 4ro and con argument& oftheori&t& ut y detailed under&tanding of the in&titutional &etting in /hich the decentralizedform& of go%ernance are e<4ected to o4erate3 The &tudy al&o &ugge&t&, ho/e%er, that centralizedadmini&trationa& in the education &ector in the Phili44ine&e<act& it& o/n 4rice in term& ofefficiency and integrity, and i& &uEect to local 4olitical 4re&&ure& de&4ite the attem4t to in&ulate itfrom them3

;



Cha#ter I: I$tro%"ctio$

A maEor a&4ect of recent economic and 4olitical reform& throughout the /orld ha& een thede%olution of 4o/er from central to local go%ernment&3 The Phili44ine& i& an im4ortant e<am4le

of countrie& that ha%e decentralized in the +.&3 The rea&on& for thi& ty4e of reform are oth 4olitical and economicF they range from accommodation of local demand& for greater autonomy,to the de&ire to increa&e democratic 4artici4ation, and on to more economic or admini&trati%eaim&, &uch a& the im4ro%ement of 4ulic &er%ice deli%ery3 Thi& 4a4er focu&e& on the latter aim,addre&&ing the 5ue&tion of ho/ /ell decentralized go%ernance /ork& in the Phili44ine& /ithre&4ect to &4ecific ty4e& of 4ulic &er%ice deli%ery3 (ut in attem4ting to an&/er thi& 5ue&tion,thi& &tudy al&o e<amine& the im4act of 4olitical and ureaucratic arrangement&, and the nature ofci%ic 4artici4ation, on the ca4acity of local go%ernment to deli%er &uch &er%ice&3

The Phili44ine& &eem& a country de&igned for decentralized go%ernance y &heer geogra4hy3 !t&:: million 4eo4le li%e on thou&and& of i&land&, the larger of /hich ha%e mountain range& and

Eungle& that effecti%ely &e4arate large 4o4ulation grou4&3 'hile the layout of the country ha&dictated &ome form of decentralized go%ernance in the 4a&t, thi& /a& not al/ay& comined /ithde%olution of 4olitical authority3 !n modern time&, the re%olution of +=9, /hen the arco&regime /a& re4laced y a democratic go%ernment led y #orazn A5uino, rought 4romi&e& ofdecentralization from the ne/ go%ernment3 The&e 4romi&e& /ere deli%ered /ith the LocalGo%ernment #ode CLG#D, enacted in ++ and im4lemented in +-B;3 The LG# &ignificantlyincrea&ed the re&4on&iilitie& and re&ource& of &uBnational go%ernment&F :: 4ro%ince&, 9 citie&,+7;= munici4alitie& and o%er .,... arangay&3+ !n addition, the LG# mandated the creation oflocal democracie& at each le%el, /ith regular election& eing held for oth e<ecuti%e& andlegi&lati%e odie&3 ?<4enditure& de%ol%ed to &uBnational go%ernment& co%ered a /ide range ofgo%ernment acti%itie&, the mo&t 4rominent of /hich /a& health3 To defray the co&t of de%ol%ed

e<4enditure&, the LG# 4ro%ided for . 4ercent of central go%ernment re%enue& collected threeyear& efore to e tran&ferred ack to &uBnational go%ernment& a& internal re%enue allotment&C!"A&D3 Pro%ince& al&o recei%ed limited ne/ ta<ing authority3

The Phili44ine& thu& 4ro%ide& an intere&ting ca&e &tudy for te&ting theoretical hy4othe&e& on theeffect& of decentralization, including the im4act of &elected in&titutional and &ocial factor&3 Thi& 4a4er 4re&ent& finding& from &uch a te&t, a&ed on the re&ult& of &ur%ey& conducted at thehou&ehold, munici4al and 4ro%incial le%el&3 The&e finding& are &u44lemented y a re%ie/ ofrele%ant legal and 4olicy document&, key informant inter%ie/& in the field, and re%ie/ of other&tudie& and data3 Thi& 4a4er form& 4art of a larger &tudy including a literature re%ie/, adecentralized 4ulic &er%ice deli%ery in $ganda, and a &ynthe&i& 4a4er that &ummarize& finding&

and analy&i& from the other 4a4er&3 Thi& re&earch i& financed y a grant from the 'orld (ank0& 1etherland& Tru&t 2und to the !"!S #enter, $ni%er&ity of aryland3

Theoretical suppositions on decentrali#ation2

+ The&e numer& change a& ne/ unit& are created or old one& comined Ciller +:D3- Thi& di&cu&&ion i& &imilar to that in Azfar, Kähkönen, Li%ing&ton, eagher and "utherford C-...D3



Thi& &ection re%ie/& the maEor argument& for Cand again&tD decentralization, for 4ur4o&e& ofclarifying the conce4tual frame/ork for the &tudy3

2ir&t, it may e hel4ful to define /hat i& meant y decentralization and /hat e%idence i& u&ed todetermine /hether a 4ulic function i& decentralized or not3 !n thi& regard, &tudent& of

decentralization generally di&tingui&h amongF

CiD centrali+ed functions, /here 4olicy, finance, and admini&tration are direct and e<clu&i%ere&4on&iilitie& of the national go%ernmentJ

CiiD deconcentrated or decentrali+ed/ functions, for /hich central go%ernment ha& fullre&4on&iility, ut admini&tration i& handled y national ci%il &er%ant& /orking out ofregional or di&trict office& C/ith the center retaining direct control o%er 4olicy andfinanceDJ and

CiiiD devolved functions, /here 4olicy, finance, and admini&tration are directly ande<clu&i%ely under the control of &uBnational go%ernment&3

The di&tinction& among centrali+ed , deconcentrated , and devolved function& tend to e lurredin reality, ut are hel4ful in identifying the le%el& of 4articular go%ernmental function&3 Thi& 4a4er Ctogether /ith it& com4anion &tudie&D deal& to &ome e<tent /ith all three ty4e& ofarrangement&, although focu&ing 4rimarily on de%ol%ed function&3 )e%ol%ed function& are ne%er 4urely under the control of &uBnational go%ernment&, /hich mu&t o4erate /ith reference notonly to local con&traint& &uch a& udgetary re&ource& and 4ro%incial charter&, ut al&o to centraldi&ci4line& emodied in national con&titution& and o%er&ight Euri&diction3 !n all three ca&e&, 4olitic& and ci%ic action can e<ert 4re&&ure in /ay& that often cro&&Bhierarchical oundarie&3

!n other /ord&, the 5ue&tion of /hether a function i& de%ol%ed doe& not come do/n to a 4urelyeitheror determination, ut to a 5ue&tion of degreeF To /hat e<tent i& a function de%ol%edMAddre&&ing thi& mean& an&/ering &e%eral more &4ecific 5ue&tion&F To /hat degree doe& the localgo%ernment unit CLG$D in 5ue&tion ha%e the admini&trati%e 4o/er to adEu&t &er%ice& and udget&to match 4reference&, to direct and &anction em4loyee& in order to im4ro%e 4erformance, andother/i&e to re&4ond to feedack and changeM >o/ com4lete i& it& 4olitical authority o%er the&earea&can it formulate a 4olicy, take charge of im4lementing it, and e held accountaleM To/hat e<tent doe& it, fi&cally, ha%e CaD ade5uate 4otential &ource& of fund& and in4ut&, and CD ahard udget con&traint that force& it to incur 4ain /hen it underB4erform& on re%enue collectionMA 4urely de 8ure an&/er to the&e 5uerie&, a&ed on a44licale legal and 4olicy document&, /illnot &uffice3 2ormal arrangement& only 4artly determine 4ractice, hence other factor& mu&t ee<amined in order to Eudge the e<tent of de facto de%olution3 A numer of 4olitical and &ocialarrangement& enter into the determination of /here authority for a gi%en matter actually lie&adetermination that may or may not e con&i&tent acro&& &uBnational di&trict& that are de 8ure uniform3

Once one ha& identified the 4articular& of the decentralized arrangement& for the health andeducation &er%ice& eing &tudied, it i& then nece&&ary to e<amine ho/ the 4olitical, legal, and&ocial frame/ork /ithin /hich decentralization take& 4lace affect& the 4ulic &ector0& 4erformance3 !t i& &ugge&ted ao%e that de%olution i& ne%er allBencom4a&&ing Cother/i&e it /ouldamount to &ece&&ionD, ut al/ay& occur& in reference to oth local and central di&ci4line&3 The&e

7



di&ci4line&&uch a& the con&titutional and legal frame/ork, local ci%ic acti%i&m, and internaladmini&trationcan e e<4ected to ha%e im4ortant effect& on the 5uality of go%ernance underdecentralization3 'hat are the&e effect&M La&t, to /hat e<tent are the&e 5ualitie& of go%ernmentreflected in /elfare outcome&, &uch a& health and education indicator&M

The analy&i& in thi& 4a4er, and in the related &tudie&, i& intended to &hed light on the %ariou&argument& 4ro and con decentralization3 'hile the&e theorie& are too &im4le to a44ly directly toa country like the Phili44ine&, the theoretical 4er&4ecti%e& can e u&eful in formulating a morefocu&ed and nuanced e<amination of the factor& influencing the 5uality of 4ulic &er%icedeli%ery3 'hat effect&, under /hat condition&, do the&e theorie& &ugge&t /e &hould e<4ect fromdecentralizationM

The theory of fi&cal federali&m &ugge&t& &e%eral rea&on& to e<4ect etter 4ulic good deli%ery atthe local le%el3 !n other /ord&, decentralization tend& to im4ro%e the efficiency of re&ourceallocation3 Thi& analy&i& relate& to oth allocati%e and 4roducti%e efficiency3

The allocative efficiency analy&i& C&ee, e3g3, Oate& +:-D hold& that local go%ernment& /ill likely

e etter ale to match 4ulic good& to local 4reference& than /ill higherBle%el go%ernment&32ir&t of all, ecau&e &uBnational go%ernment& are clo&er to the 4eo4le than the centralgo%ernment, they are thought to ha%e etter information aout the 4reference& of local 4o4ulation& than the central go%ernment C>ayek +7, u&gra%e +7D3 >ence, they aree<4ected to e etter informed aout %ariation& in demand& for good& and &er%ice&3 oreo%er,under decentralization, authority mo%e& to Euri&diction& that encom4a&& le&& &ocial di%er&ity andfractionalization, hence le&& e<treme %ariation in 4reference&3 2or the&e rea&on&, &uBnationalgo%ernment& are al&o con&idered to e more re&4on&i%e than the central go%ernment to the%ariation& in demand& for and co&t& of 4ro%iding 4ulic good&F

)ecentralized le%el& of go%ernment ha%e their rai&on d0etre in the 4ro%i&ion of good& and

&er%ice& /ho&e con&um4tion i& limited to their o/n Euri&diction&3 (y tailoring out4ut& of &uch good& and &er%ice& to the 4articular 4reference& and circum&tance& of their con&tituencie&, decentralized 4ro%i&ion increa&e& economic /elfare ao%e that /hichre&ult& from the more uniform le%el& of &uch &er%ice& that are likely under national 4ro%i&ion3 The a&ic 4oint here i& &im4ly that the efficient le%el of out4ut of a HlocalI 4ulic good Ci3e3, that for /hich the &um of re&ident&0 marginal enefit& e5ual& marginalco&tD i& likely to %ary acro&& Euri&diction& a& a re&ult of oth difference& in 4reference&and co&t differential&3 COate& +, ++-+B--D

Another &trand of the argument i& that decentralization i& thought to increa&e the likelihood thatgo%ernment& re&4ond to the demand of the local 4o4ulation y 4romoting com4etition among&uBnational go%ernment& CTieout +79D3 #om4etition among &uBnational go%ernment& i& &aidto allo/ for a %ariety of undle& of local 4ulic good& to e 4roduced, and indi%idual& are &aid tore%eal their 4reference& for tho&e good& y e<erci&ing &ome form of He<itI o4tionat thee<treme, mo%ing to tho&e Euri&diction& that &ati&fy their ta&te&3 ; Thi& i& &een to 4re&&ure &uBnational go%ernment& to 4ay attention to the 4reference& of their con&tituent& and tailor the

; 2our article& in the @ournal of ?conomic Per&4ecti%e& i&&ue of 2all +: contain an e<cellent di&cu&&ion of theTieout hy4othe&i& and it& em4irical rele%ance C!nman and "uinfeld, )onahue, u&gra%e, Nian and 'einga&tD3

9



&er%ice deli%ery accordingly, /hil&t ri&king the lo&& of ta< re%enue& COate& +9=, +:-, +JSalmon +=:J (reton +9J Nian and 'einga&t +:D3

The productive efficiency argument &tate& that local go%ernment& can 4roduce the &ame good& atlo/er co&t& than central go%ernment&3 There are a fe/ 4o&&ile rea&on& for thi&3

)ecentralization i& thought to 4romote accountaility and reduce corru4tion in go%ernmentCO&trom, Schroeder, and 'ynne +;D3 Since &uBnational go%ernment& are clo&er to the 4eo4le,citizen& may e more a/are of &uBnational go%ernment&0 action& than they are of action& of thecentral go%ernment3 )ecentralization remo%e& link& in the agency chain et/een directly electedofficial& and ureaucrat& /orking at the 4oint of im4lementation3 Thu&, not only &houldinformation aout the 5uality of 4olicy and im4lementation flo/ more freely to the local elector&under decentralization, ut citizen& can e<ert 4re&&ure on go%ernment at %ariou& 4oint& at or nearthe location of &er%ice deli%ery3 There are fe/er ureaucratic filter& et/een elected official&C/ho re4re&ent citizenBclient&D and im4lementer&F thi& al&o mean& that the 4otential forconflicting incenti%e& et/een 4rinci4al and agent& i& reduced, and monitoring i& ea&ier3

aking &er%ice& more demandBre&4on&i%e and co&t efficient through decentralization i& al&oargued to increa&e hou&ehold&0 /illingne&& to 4ay for &er%ice& C(ri&coe and Garyn +7, Lit%ackand Seddon +D, a& /ell a& their /illingne&& to 4ay ta<e&3 A related factor i& the localgo%ernment0& udget con&traint3 A hard con&traint can force go%ernment to deli%er 4ulic&er%ice& in /ay& that minimize e<4en&e /hile ma<imizing co&tBreco%ery3 Social cohe&ion al&o 4lay& a role here, hel4ing reduce failure& of coo4eration, &uch a& elite ca4ture and ethnic rentB&eeking, /hile maintaining &ocial 4re&&ure again&t corru4tion3 Thi& in turn increa&e& the 4ulic0&/illingne&& to 4ay ta<e& and fee&3

The argument& against decentralization fall into t/o main categorie&, tho&e focu&ing on nationaleffect& and tho&e concerned /ith local effect&3 2ir&t, &uBnational go%ernment& may u&e theirne/Bfound 4o/er in /ay& that e<ceed the oundarie& of rational di&triution of authority andre&ource& from a national 4er&4ecti%e3 2or e<am4le, local go%ernment may engage in 4olicymaking in area& that ha%e clear interBEuri&dictional &4illo%er&, hence /ould e morea44ro4riately located /ithin a higher le%el of go%ernment3 Thi& u&ually concern& 4ro%i&ion ofnonBlocal 4ulic good& &uch a& en%ironmental 5uality and 4re%enti%e 4ulic health inter%ention&,/here LG$ incenti%e& /ould u&ually e ad%er&e to e<4ending &carce re&ource&3 Anothere<am4le i& the ado4tion of local 4olicie& that undermine national 4olicy oEecti%e& &uch a& ano4en internal market or harmonized fi&cal 4olicy3 >ere, not only might the de%olution of ta< andregulatory authority o4en the door to irrational 4olicymaking, ut it may al&o lead to adecentralization of corru4tionhence a ri&e in o%erall co&t and a decrea&e in 4redictaility gi%en the %ulneraility of the&e area& to au&e3

The &econd maEor argument again&t decentralization concern& the 4o&&iility of elite ca4ture oflocal go%ernment C(ardhan and ookherEee +=D3 )ecentralization increa&e& the 4roaility of thi& y &haring authority and re&ource& /ith go%ernment unit& out&ide the ca4ital, many of themin rural area&, /here 4olitical re&traint& on ca4ture are likely to e /eaker3

!n the cour&e of re%ie/ing the&e y no/ /ellBkno/n argument&, and in de&igning thi& &tudyaccordingly, it ecame a44arent that /hether either the &u44o&ed ad%antage& or &u44o&ed

:



di&ad%antage& of decentralization materialize de4end& on the 4re&ence of certain institutional

disciplines3 Three kind& of &uch di&ci4line& /ere defined for the 4ur4o&e of thi& &tudyF ci%icdi&ci4line&, intergo%ernmental di&ci4line&, and di&ci4line& related to 4ulic &ector management3

• #ivic disciplines are tho&e a&&ociated /ith the ca4acity of indi%idual citizen&, media, and

nonBgo%ernmental organization& to make their %ie/& kno/n to the rele%ant go%ernmentofficial& and odie&a ca4acity &ometime& referred to a& H%oiceIand /ithmechani&m&, &uch a& %oting, that induce official& to take the&e %ie/& into account in theirdeci&ion making3 Another ci%ic di&ci4line i& that of He<itIfor e<am4le, &/itching to 4ri%ately &u44lied &er%ice&, or mo%ing a/ay from Euri&diction& /ith 4oor 4ulic &er%ice&3

• ntergovern5ental disciplines are tho&e e<erted et/een different le%el& of go%ernmentF

for e<am4le, central go%ernment o%er&ight of local go%ernment o4eration&, or udgetarycon&traint& Cor limit& to ta<ing authorityD im4o&ed y the central go%ernment on lo/erle%el& of go%ernment3 One manife&tation of &uch di&ci4line& i& HadEu&tailityIi3e3, thedi&cretion a local Euri&diction ha& to take deci&ion& in re&4on&e to local need&3

• (y disciplines related to public sector 5anage5ent are meant the /ay& in /hich each

go%ernment ody regulate& and con&train& the eha%ior of it& o/n official&F for in&tance,antiBcorru4tion 4ro%i&ion&, 4erformanceBa&ed recruitment and 4romotion, and 4ro%i&ionfor 4eriodic audit&3 Key to the effecti%ene&& of the&e di&ci4line& i& the ca4acity of ago%ernmental unit to manage it& affair&that i&, the com4etence of it& official&, and thi&in turn i& related to ade5uacy of 4ay3

2ailure of &uch di&ci4line& to o4erate might lead to an ad%er&e e<4erience /ith decentralizationJon the other hand, the &ucce&&ful o4eration& of the&e di&ci4line& are, the &tudy hy4othe&ize&,correlated /ith relati%ely &ucce&&ful deli%ery of 4ulic &er%ice&3

Summary o! the paper

The ne<t cha4ter in thi& 4a4er re%ie/& the decentralized &tructure& of go%ernment in thePhili44ine&, and ho/ the&e affect the deli%ery of 4ulic health &er%ice& and education3 #ha4ter!!! riefly &ummarize& the data &ource& u&ed in thi& &tudy3 #ha4ter !8 di&cu&&e& differenta44roache& to a&&e&&ing go%ernment 4erformance, oth in term& of out4ut&, and indirectmea&ure& of allocati%e efficiency, 4roducti%e efficiency, and co&t reco%ery3 #ha4ter& 8B8!!re%ie/ e%idence of ho/ effecti%e ha%e een the %ariou& H4erformance factor&I /hich influencethe efficiency of decentralized 4ulic &er%ice deli%eryF i3e3, ci%ic di&ci4line& of %oice and e<itJintergo%ernmental di&ci4line& &uch a& fi&cal con&traint& and their im4act on the HadEu&tailityI oflocal go%ernmentJ and factor& related to 4ulic &ector management, &uch a& meritocracy,

accountaility and ca4acity3 !n #ha4ter 8!!!, the&e 4erformance factor& are linked to health andeducation outcome&, or ho/ they are 4ercei%ed y hou&ehold&, focu&ing in thi& conte<t on thecau&e& and con&e5uence& of corru4tion3 The final cha4ter &ummarize& the conclu&ion& of the&tudy3

=



Cha#ter II: Str"ct"re! o+ Dece$trai&e% Go-er$a$ce i$ the Phii##i$e!

Thi& &ection offer& a de&cri4tion and analy&i& of the e&&ential in&titution& of decentralizedgo%ernance of the 4ulic &ector in the Phili44ine&, for 4ur4o&e& of &ha4ing the 5ue&tion& to e

a&ked of !"!S0 em4irical data and furni&hing ackground material for the &ynthe&i& 4a4er& to e 4roduced3 The material 4re&ented here i& a&ed on inter%ie/&, official re4ort&, and &econdaryliterature3 The 4a4er egin& y outlining the o%erall go%ernance &tructure under decentralization lea%ing 4ulic finance i&&ue&, admini&trati%e and o%er&ight 4ractice&, and corru4tion to latercha4ter&and then focu&e& on the main i&&ue& ari&ing for the decentralized deli%ery of 4rimaryhealth care and 4rimary education3

$overnmental Structure

)ecentralization in the Phili44ine& ha& had to confront a numer of un4lea&ant realitie&3?<treme& of cronyi&m and corru4tion at the to4 neither egan nor ended /ith the arco& regime3

oreo%er, neither the colonial 4o/er& nor the 4o&tBinde4endence go%ernment&, de&4ite their&trong tendency to centralize go%ernment 4o/er&, could truly function /ithout the coo4eration of the /ealthy landed intere&t&3 Thi& &ocial &tructure goe& along /ith an economy ri%en y large/ealth di&4aritie& acro&& cla&&e& and region&3

Thu&, not &ur4ri&ingly, de&4ite &urge& of ne/ energy and rai&ed e<4ectation& /ith the on&et ofdemocratic tran&ition in +=9 and the current round of decentralization in ++, cynici&m a44ear&again to e gaining the u44er hand3 2or e<am4le, &ur%ey& &ugge&t that /hile the 4o4ulation ofthe Phili44ine& continue& roadly to ha%e faith in change through electoral democracy, their&u&4icion& of go%ernment and their e<4ectation& of continued corru4tione&4ecially at the to4 remain &trong3 On the other hand, tradition& of local go%ernance al&o retain their %itality, and

along /ith them the tru&t that im4ortant 4rolem& can e addre&&ed y the lo/e&t le%el& ofgo%ernment C&ur%ey data 4ro%ided y Social 'eather Station&, S'SD3 The &ometime& heroicinitiati%e& of local go%ernment& at time& Eu&tify thi& faith3

olitics and 7d5inistration

!n the current era, decentralization in the Phili44ine& /a& mandated y the ne/ democraticcon&titution of +=:3 The Local Go%ernment #ode CLG#D, enacted in ++ and im4lemented in+-B;, &ignificantly increa&ed the re&4on&iilitie& and re&ource& of &uBnational go%ernment&3!n addition, it mandated regular election& for local e<ecuti%e& and legi&lati%e odie&3 The #odede%ol%ed Ha&ic &er%ice&I to local go%ernment&the&e include mo&t health &er%ice& along /ith

&uch infra&tructure 4ro%i&ion a& &chool, clinic, and local road uilding3 Local go%ernment unit&CLG$&D ha%e authority to create their o/n re%enue &ource& C/ithin firm limit&D, a& /ell a& toenter international aid agreement&3 The Pre&ident e<erci&e& Hgeneral &u4er%i&ionI of the legalityand a44ro4riatene&& of LG$ action&F thi& can e the a&i& for 4o&&ile central go%ernment&u&4en&ion of local admini&tration&3

There are :: 4ro%ince&, 9 citie&, +7;= munici4alitie&, and +,;7 arangay& in the Phili44ine&C(rillante& +=D3 $nder the LG#, the 4ro%ince& admini&ter tertiary health &er%ice& Ce3g3,



ho&4ital&D and are in%ol%ed in &ocial /elfare &er%ice& and infra&tructure 4ro%i&ion3 'herea& 4ro%ince& are en%i&ioned in the #ode a& Hdynamic mechani&m& for de%elo4mental 4roce&&e&and effecti%e go%ernanceI /ithin their com4onent local go%ernment&, munici4alitie& aree<4ected to e the 4rimary generalB4ur4o&e unit& of go%ernment and the deli%ery 4oint& for mo&t a&ic 4ulic &er%ice&3 unici4alitie& ha%e re&4on&iility for 4rimary health care, di&ea&e control,

4urcha&e of &u44lie& and e5ui4ment nece&&ary for thi&, a& /ell a& munici4al health facilitie& and&chool uilding&3 #itie& ha%e e&&entially the e5ui%alent of the comined authority of 4ro%ince&and munici4alitie&, and ha%e only arangay& a& their com4onent LG$&3 The LG# &et& u4 anincenti%e for uran munici4alitie& elonging to 4ro%ince& to otain their o/n city charter&, thu& ecoming autonomou& 4ro%inceBle%el unit&they rea4 a igger !nternal "e%enue AllotmentC!"AD &hare thi& /ay and ha%e more authority o%er their o/n ta<e&3

The arangay, the lo/e&t formal le%el of go%ernment, i& de&cried in the #ode a& the H4rimary 4lanning and im4lementing unit of go%ernment 4olicie&QI !t ha& the follo/ing 4o/er&F it canenter agreement& and do u&ine&&J it offer& agricultural, health, &ocial /elfare, &anitation,infra&tructure, 4ulic market&, and other &er%ice&J it ha& limited Eudicial Euri&dictionJ and it may

le%y ta<e& of u4 to +R of gro&& recei4t& on u&ine&&e& Cunder fi<ed limit&D a& /ell a& collect fee&CPimentel +7D3 According to one o&er%er, the arangay& /ere originally created under martialla/, and are de&igned to e largely ethnically homogeneou& C"ood ++D3 !n 4ractice, the arangay& ha%e little 4olicymaking or 4lanning ca4acity, although they ha%e &ignificant fi&calre&ource& in com4ari&on to their re&4on&iilitie&3

)ecentralization in the Phili44ine& ha& een &ignificant ut far from ea&y3 Go%ernment ecamehighly centralized early in the S4ani&h colonial 4eriod C&tarting in +7-+D, and remained &o de&4itelater effort& to fo&ter local go%ernment& and to deconcentrate or de%ol%e authority3 Local 4o/erha& traditionally een in the hand& of landlord&, e<erci&ed through 4atronBclient relation&hi4&,and aetted y cynici&m and re4re&&iona& /ell a& the de&ire y centralized regime& forcoo4erati%e local elite&3 One 4rominent 4olitical figure ha& referred to the 4reB++ localgo%ernment& a& Herrand oy&,I /ho acted on deci&ion& that /ere all made y the centerCGonzalez +:, inter%ie/&D3 $nder the LG#, go%ernor& can &till e &u&4ended y the Pre&ident,and mayor& y the go%ernor&3

The im4lementation of decentralization ha& 4roceeded une%enly3 !t a44arently 4rogre&&ed&teadily until +7, then the momentum &talled and demoralization &tarted &etting in3 Thi& /a& 4articularly true among de%ol%ed 4er&onnel in the health &ector, /ho recei%ed little &u44ortthe+7 legi&lati%e 4ro4o&al in #ongre&& to addre&& thi& y renationalizing 4art& of the health &ector/a& %etoed3 Other &ign& ha%e een more 4o&iti%e3 !n recent year&, o&er%er& ha%e &een e%idenceof inno%ation at the local le%el, a dee4ening of decentralized o4eration&, local management ecoming more 4roEectB than handoutBoriented, and increa&ing 4re&&ure for im4ro%ed 4erformance Ce&4ecially in 4ulic &er%ice&D3 Se%eral &ocial change& ha%e facilitated effecti%edecentralization3 The&e include the decrea&ing 4o/er of the landlord cla&&, uranization, thegro/th of the middle cla&&, the 4roliferation of ci%il &ociety, and the country0& democratico4ening in +=93 The go%ernment ha& al&o in&tituted the 3aling oo a/ard& for inno%ation inlocal go%ernancea 4rogram that highlight& and hel4& re4licate e&t 4ractice&3 A& a re&ult of&uch influence&, &ur%ey& &ugge&t that 4eo4le are more &ati&fied /ith local than nationalgo%ernment C(rilliante& +=, "ood +=D3

+.



The e%idence of effecti%e ci%ic 4artici4ation in local go%ernment i& mi<ed ut generally 4o&iti%e32ormally, the main local 4lanning odie& are the Pro%incial and unici4al )e%elo4ment#ouncil&3 1onBgo%ernmental organization& C1GO&D are re5uired to e memer& of the&e odie&,in order to alance 4olitician&, and there are al&o &e4arate 1GO council&3 1GO& are no/ &aid to

e %ery acti%e in local go%ernance, e&4ecially in local &4ecialized odie& C/hich al&o include&chool and health oard&D, in the 4rocurement 4re5ualification and a/ard& committee&, and the 4eace and order council& CGonzalez +:D3 O%er +9,... 1GO& throughout the country ha%e een accredited for memer&hi4 in local &4ecial odie&3 LG$ 4artner&hi4 /ith the 4ri%ate &ectori& al&o thought to e increa&ing, along /ith interBlocal coo4eration C(rillante& +=D3 On theother hand, only ;.R to 7.R of localitie& actually ha%e local de%elo4ment council& in e<i&tence3Tho&e that do function ha%e no clear organizational link to 4ulic udgeting 4roce&&e&, hence iti& hard to ha%e real HottomBu4I 4lanning a& en%i&ioned3 unici4alitie& a44ear to ha%e &trongin4ut into 4ulic &ector 4lanning, ut 1GO& ha%e little effecti%e 4o/er in 4ractice3 A &ur%ey ythe A")BGOL) 4roEect &ho/ed that a total of 7:R of LG$& had effecti%e in4ut from either 1GO& or the 4o4ulation directlyincluding in4ut through the &4ecial odie& de&igned to elicit it3

?%en mode&t formal 4artici4ation y 1GO& may e duiou&&ome mayor& are kno/n to createruerB&tam4 1GO& to &er%e on health and &chool oard& a& /ell a& de%elo4ment council&Cinter%ie/&D3

Politic& in the Phili44ine& ha& not fa%ored &trong accountaility or local con&traint& on central 4o/er3 The traditional &y&tem ha& een de&cried a& neoB4atrimonial, comining thedecentralized 4o/er of familie& and clan& /ith a centralized ureaucracy that coordinate& theim4lementation of 4olicy and di%i&ion of &4oil&3 Thi& &y&tem /a& 4erfected y arco& andcontinued under A5uino C>utchcroft +.D3 The main 4olitical formation&LAP, 1P#,Laan, Laka&, and 1)2do not command real 4arty loyalty3 Political alliance& are un&tale,/ith local election& focu&ed on local elite& and i&&ue&, and national election& 4rom4ting a&cramle y 4olitician& acro&& 4artie& to Eoin the /inning Pre&idential candidate0& 4arty3 Thi&&y&tem lead& to a &cattering of &mall 4atronage enefit& &uch a& arangay hall&, go%ernment Eo&,and ta< e<em4tion&3 Thi& centrallyBadmini&tered &4oil& &y&tem ha& traditionally undercut local 4lanning, and ha& made it difficult to im4lement decentralization fully3 The national electoral&y&tem mainly yield& #ongre&& memer& elected from geogra4hic con&tituencie& in fir&tB4a&tBtheB 4o&t conte&t&, along /ith a &mall numer elected from 4arty li&t&3 !n the la&t election, the 4artyli&t& yielded only -. re4re&entati%e& rather than the ho4edBfor 7- Cout of -9. total >ou&e &eat&D,&ince not enough candidate& met the 4arty li&t election criteria3 The Pre&ident, Senator& andlocalB council C sanggunianD re4re&entati%e& are elected at large3 One re&ult of thi& &y&temgenerally i& that minoritie& ha%e little %oice Cother than a& local maEoritie&D, e&4ecially in national 4olitic& C"ood +=, ?!$ +D3

7utono5ous egions

The Phili44ine& ha& &een t/o 4ro4o&ed autonomou& region& addre&&ed in regional referenda3 The#ordillera Autonomou& "egion C#A"D /a& reEected in t/o &ucce&&i%e referenda, then im4o&ed inmodified form y the center3 !n effect, the #A" i& not fully autonomou&, hence it i& notcon&idered a meaningful e<4eriment in regional de%olution3 Only the Autonomou& "egion ofu&lim indanao CA"D can e deemed a Hli%eI e<4eriment in regional autonomy, although

++



it i& not con&idered a &ucce&&3 The Organic Act creating A" C"e4 Act 9:;D /a& ado4ted in+=, thu& 4reBdating the Local Go%ernment #ode of ++3 Autonomy /a& reEected y theleading reel grou4, the 1L2, /hich &u&e5uently entered a 4eace agreement C+9D,e&tali&hing the Southern Phili44ine& #ouncil for Peace and )e%elo4ment CSP#P)D to o%er&eede%elo4ment 4rogram& in the region3 The 1L2 &4linter grou4 kno/n a& !L2 remain& at /ar

/ith the go%ernment3 A" contain& four nonBcontiguou& 4ro%ince& that a44ro%ed theautonomy arrangement y referendumF Lanao del Sur, aguindanao, Sulu, and Ta/iBTa/i3 !tre4licate& mo&t function& of the central go%ernment at the regional le%el3 The &alient feature& ofA" are re%ie/ed here Cthi& di&cu&&ion i& a&ed on Gutierrez and )anguilanB8itug +:, andinter%ie/&D3

A" ha& a "egional Go%ernor, "egional A&&emly, and &4ecial court& for the !&lamic andtrial minoritie&3 The Organic Act tran&fer& to the&e &tructure& the central go%ernment& 4o/er&in &e%eral area&, includingF creation of &ource& of re%enue&, uran and rural 4lanning, educational 4olicie&, and other 4o/er& of the national go%ernmente<ce4t the o%iou& one& of foreignaffair&, defen&e, cu&tom&, citizen&hi4, trade, and Eu&tice3 The go%ernor i& elected at large, the

a&&emly y 4o4ular %ote /ith ; memer& elected from each congre&&ional di&trict Cthe com4onent 4ro%ince& ha%e a total of : congre&&ional di&trict&D3 2our cainet memer& mu&tcome from indigenou& cultural communitie&3 The 4o/er& and con&traint& of the go%ernorre&emle the 4ro%i&ion& concerning the 4re&idency in the national con&titution3 "egarding fi&calaffair&, only income ta<ation i& out of ound& for A"3 !m4ortantly, A" kee4& 9.R of allinternal re%enue ta<e& collected /ithin it& order&, in contra&t to the !"A& formulaBdri%endi&triution of .R to other LG$& C&ee elo/D3 Pro%ince& and citie& /ithin the A" 4a&&.R of the&e ta<e& to the center and ;.R to A", retaining ;.R3

The region i& al&o re5uired to enact mea&ure& to 4ro%ide and e<4and health and /elfare&er%ice&, con&i&tent /ith national 4olicy3 A"& education and health 4olicie& are regarded y &ome a& failure&, &ince $1)P &tati&tic& &ho/ the region a& ha%ing the lo/e&t functionalliteracy, life e<4ectancy, and 4er ca4ita income of all Phili44ine region&3 A" /a& authorizedto create it& o/n )e4artment of ?ducation and S4ort& C)?#SD, for 4ur4o&e& of creating acom4lete and integrated &y&tem of 5uality education and an educational frame/ork &uited tothe region& need&3 >o/e%er, 4olitical 4re&&ure from local /arlord& ha& undermined attem4t& to 4rofe&&ionalize the teacher&3 A" i& not 4art of the 'orld (ank0& Third ?lementary?ducation Program CT??PD, ut doe& get te<took& funded y T??PJ there are al&o education 4roEect& &u44orted y the A)( and A$SA!)3

A" i& re5uired y the Organic Act to de%ol%e 4o/er& to lo/er le%el&, and to 4ro%ide for thi&in it& legi&lation3 ?ither it ha& not &o legi&lated or it ha& ignored it& o/n la/&, to the 4oint /herethe go%ernor& of the com4onent 4ro%ince& threatened to &ecede in the earlyBmid +.&3 Thu&,although health and education are more de%ol%ed to the regional le%el than el&e/here, thecom4onent 4ro%ince& and munici4alitie& in 4ractice ha%e le&& autonomy than other&3 Local ta<e&and local collection& of national internal re%enue ta<e& do not a44ear to amount to much/hiche<4lain& in 4art /hy A" i& &o de4endent on central money and /hy the LG$& /ithinA" ha%e &o little autonomy of their o/n3

The region i& re5uired to recognize the 4artici4ation of 4ri%ate &chool&, e&4ecially the madra&ah or !&lamic&chool3 Araic i& a com4ul&ory &uEect for u&lim& Cin all &chool&D, and o4tional for other&3

+-



A" i& regarded a& a &inkhole of corru4tion3 !t ha& more than du4licated the national&tructure& at the regional le%elfor e<am4le, it ha& created -7 de4artment&, although the OrganicAct 4ermit& only 3 Al&o, A" go%ernor& ha%e re4roduced the #ongre&&ional 4ork arrelallocation& at the local le%el, and 4roaly more &o3 ?<4enditure i& hea%ily infra&tructureB

oriented and un4lanned Cand >uman Priority ?<4enditure& 4er ca4ita e<tremely lo/D, and theregional go%ernment e&&entially reduced to a ne4oti&tic em4loyment agency3 Some &ign& of thi&are the&eF the fir&t A" go%ernor did not concede defeat in the election and u&ed thi& a& a 4rete<t to refu&e the tran&fer of go%ernment in%entory and account& Cit &eem& they /ere in factlootedD, and the &econd go%ernor /a& concurrently &ecretary of A"& t/o mo&t corru4tde4artment&, including 4ulic /ork&3 Salarie& are routinely delayed Cthi& /a& cau&e for a 4rote&t y health official& in Lanao del Sur in +Dand 4ulic em4loyee& accu&e official& in%ol%ed inloanB&harking of cau&ing the&e delay&3

Politic& i& &aid to e e%en more hea%ily 4atrimonial in indanao than el&e/here in thePhili44ine&, 4erha4& ecau&e A" ha& in&ulated local 4olitic& from national trend& to/ard

greater accountaility, and &o 4re&umaly e<4enditure leakage& enrich large family and clan&tructure&3 Al&o, the in&urgency con%eniently make& 4hy&ical in&4ection of infra&tructuredifficult for central go%ernment auditor& Cthi& i& a 4o/er &till retained y the centerD3 The hea%ycentralization /ithin A" and it& de4endency on central fund& &eem connected to thecorru4tion 4rolem3 A" recei%e& more than PP + illion in national fund& from %ariou&&ource&and thi& i& &e4arate from the !"A allotment& ke4t y the region& 4ro%ince& andmunici4alitie&3 (y kee4ing e<4enditure& in the region centralized, &haring the &4oil& /ithlegi&lator& and 4ro%incial go%ernor& in the form of 4ork arrel allotment&, and undermining the 4lanning and monitoring function&, the A" go%ernor& and their cronie& a44ear to ha%ee<tracted a &u&tantial 4ortion for them&el%e&3

7ealth Services

Primary health care i& &ignificantly de%ol%ed in the Phili44ine&, /ith &taff eing hired, fired, and 4aid Caccording to a nationallyBdefined &cale, and mo&tly /ith central grant fund&D y the localgo%ernment&3 any localitie& u&e their di&cretionary re&ource& to &u44lement the health &taff&alarie& defined y the central go%ernment, /hile other& attem4t to deal /ith fi&cal &hortfall& yhiring fe/er or chea4er health &taff3 The Local Go%ernment #ode 4ro%ide& that 4ro%ince&, citie&,and munici4alitie& are all to ha%e >ealth Officer& a& /ell a& >ealth (oard& Cthe arangay& 4ro%ide only minimal health &er%ice&D3 The im4lementing rule& for the LG# 4ro%ide for the)e4artment of >ealth C)O>D to retain &uch function& a&F admini&tering ho&4ital&, health caredeli%ery in the 1ational #a4ital "egion C1#"D, regulation and accreditation, health informationand education, &ur%eillance, and re&earch3 Training i& a Eoint nationalBlocal re&4on&iility C'orld(ank +D3 The mo&t %i&ile national acti%itie& in 4ulic health are the H%erticalI 4rogram&funded y the center, coordinated y the +9 admini&trati%e region&, and im4lemented y the 4ro%ince& and citie&F immunization, tuerculo&i&, malaria, and other& C&ee elo/D3 !n addition tothe&e di&ea&e&, cardio%a&cular di&ea&e and 4neumonia C4articularly in childrenD are maEor healthconcern&3

+;



Pulic health facilitie& in the Phili44ine& reak do/n a& follo/&F

• Pro%incial ho&4ital& C/ith 7.B+.. ed&DJ

• )i&trict ho&4ital& C-7 ed&DJ

• unici4al ho&4ital& C7B+. ed&DJ

• "ural health unit& C&taffF 4hy&ician, denti&t, 4ulic health nur&e, mid/i%e&, &anitation&4eciali&t, %olunteer&DJ

• $ran health center& C&taffF mid/ife and %olunteer&DJ and

• (arangay health &tation&3

According to the 'orld (ank C+D and other&, the health &y&tem in the Phili44ine& enEoy& arough 4arity et/een the 4ulic and 4ri%ate &ector& /ith re&4ect to e<4enditure&, numer& ofho&4ital ed&, and man4o/er3 There are aundant 4ri%ate health facilitie& at mo&t le%el&, /ith&ome a44arently u&ing medicine& taken from 4ulic health center& and em4loying moonlighting 4ulic &ector em4loyee&3 "eligiou& in&titution& are al&o in%ol%ed in 4ro%iding health &er%ice&, ut at a lo/er order of magnitude Cy one rough e&timate, aout +.RD3 1GO& are al&o %eryacti%e in &uch area& a&F communityBa&ed health 4rogram& incor4orating indigenou& medicineand u&ing re&ident& a& 4rimary health care /orker&J local health oard delieration&Jcom4rehen&i%e health care agreement& among LG$&, 1GO&, and )O> to im4lement health 4rogram&J and referral &er%ice& for ho&4ital& CGonzalez +:D3

5pact of Decentrali+ation

A&&e&&ment& of decentralization0& im4act on 4ulic health &er%ice 4ro%i&ion are mi<ed, /ithe<4ert& concerned aout deterioration in the technical 5uality and admini&tration of the 4rogram&, ut mo&t 4eo4le e<4re&&ing more 4o&iti%e %ie/&3 2or e<am4le, in an S'S &ur%ey in@une +, 7=R of re&4ondent& &aid that health care had im4ro%ed /ith decentralization, =R &aidit /or&ened, and ;R &aid it &tayed the &ame CGOL) +D3 !n the face of &candal& incentralized medicine 4rocurement, the 4urcha&e of many medicine& ha& in fact eendecentralized, and a& a re&ult many o&er%er& no/ &ay that medication& are more a44ro4riate andthere i& le&& leakage of re&ource& out of the &y&tem than 4re%iou&ly3 On the other &ide, &tudie&&ugge&t that the Phili44ine& made it& mo&t notale 4ulic health &y&tem ad%ance& in the +=.& ol&tering 4rogram& on malaria, immunization&, T(, maternal and child health, and other area& tocounter a &tagnation in health indicator& from the late +:.& into the +=.&and that thing& ha%e&lid &ince then C'orld (ank +D3

There are &e%eral dimen&ion& along /hich 4ulic health &er%ice& are &aid to ha%e declined, only&ome of /hich can e attriuted to decentralization3 Since the midB+=.&, there ha& een a dro4

in the ratio of doctor& and nur&e& to 4o4ulation, and a decrea&e in the 4ro4ortion of G)P &4ent onhealth Cdo/n to +3;R in +.B7D3 ?5uity ha& al&o &uffered, /ith half of all doctor& eing a&edin the 1ational #a4ital "egion, /here health center& &er%e an a%erage 4o4ulation of +,-.., a&com4ared to et/een -+,... and ,... el&e/here C?!$ +D3

The main concern of health e<4ert& i& that decentralization ri&k& di&ru4tion& due to lo&& of &caleand coordination, decline in technical training and 5uality, and /eak local demand for healthBrelated 4ulic good& &uch a& immunization and infectiou& di&ea&e control3 There i&, indeed, &ome

+



e%idence that LG$& are realigning the health &y&tem to meet local need&3 2rom the national 4er&4ecti%e, thi& u&ually mean& local o%er in%e&tment in ca4ital 4roEect&, under funding ofo4eration& and maintenance, inter%ention in 4er&onnel matter&, and under &4ending on &4illo%er&er%ice&3 The o%iou& tradeoff& are efficiency gain& %&3 e5uity lo&&e&, and national %&3 localhealth oEecti%e&3 The mo&t &eriou& ri&k& in%ol%e the 4otential lo&& of technical integrity5uality,

in 4art due to a&ymmetrie& et/een increa&ed local authority and lagging local ca4acity3 Thea&ence of a rou&t centerBlocal a&&i&tance mechani&m or a /ellBe&tali&hed health management&y&tem increa&e& the&e ri&k& C'orld (ank +D3 La&tly, health &taff training, traditionally 4ro%ided y the center, &uffered early in the im4lementation of decentralization, ut no/ localhealth training initiati%e& are eing carried out /ith a comination of local and national re&ource&Cinter%ie/&D3

2rom the &uBnational 4er&4ecti%e, not &ur4ri&ingly, the central go%ernment i& to lame for mo&tof the difficultie&3 The&e fre5uently in%ol%e &ome form of unfunded mandate3 2or e<am4le, et/een -. and . di&trict ho&4ital& Cout of --7 totalD uilt /ith #ongre&&ional fund allotment&CH4orkID and &u&e5uently de%ol%ed to the 4ro%ince& are no/ eing reBnationalized3 Pro%incial

go%ernor& &aid they could not afford to o4erate them3 (y one e&timate, the ho&4ital& com4ri&ed&ome 9.R of 4ulic health e<4enditure, and /ere o%eru&ed due to their &u&idized &er%ice 4ro%i&ionthere a44eared to e a 4olitical ar to im4o&ing u&er fee& Cana&an +;D3 'henthe&e ecame a 4ro%incial re&4on&iility, they acted a& a maEor drain on local finance, amongother thing& di%erting re&ource& from a&ic 4rimary health &er%ice&3 Al&o, e%en if the 4ro%ince&did in%e&t the nece&&ary fund& in them, the go%ernor& could not ea&ily claim 4olitical credit, &inceho&4ital& /ere traditionally a central re&4on&iility3 2urther, ho&4ital em4loyee& cam4aigned forrenationalization, &ince the de%olution threatened their 4ay and /orking condition&3 'ith the 4artial renationalization of the ho&4ital& under an act of #ongre&&, the center face& a com4arale&et of dilemma& Cinter%ie/&D3

Another unfunded mandate /a& the +; Uagna #arta0 for health /orker&, /hich guaranteed arelati%ely high &alary &cale3 Thi& rought de%ol%ed health /orker& into conflict /ith le&& /ellB 4aid local official& Cnotaly mayor&D, /ho cam4aigned for the return of health &er%ice& and 4er&onnel to the center3 One final &ource of local unha44ine&& /ith the central go%ernment0& rolei& the e%idence of ma&&i%e corru4tion in centralized drug 4rocurement for the 4ulic health&y&tem, mentioned 4re%iou&ly Cinter%ie/&D3(

:ertical rogra5s

Pulic health 4rogram& on immunization, communicale di&ea&e&, and malaria continue to e run 4rimarily y the central go%ernment, although the detail& of local coo4eration and &u44ortine%italy %ary3 Another 4rogram area /ith &u&tantial central Cand donorD in4ut i& family 4lanning, although thi& i& not %ertically managed a& &uch3 The %a&t maEority of LG$& offer thefull range of family 4lanning &er%ice&, though a fe/ H4roBlifeI go%ernor& and mayor& re&trict thi&to natural method&an indication that they are e<erci&ing their authority to im4lement local 4reference& Cor their o/n 4reference&D3

7 A related 4rolem, not related to decentralization, i& &elfBdealing y doctor& holding financial intere&t& in the 4harmacie& /here they &end 4atient& for 4re&cri4tion drug&3

+7



The immunization 4rogram C?P!D i& a %ertical 4rogram funded y the center and coordinated ythe +9 admini&trati%e region&3 8accine& are 4rocured centrally from '>O$1!#?2, ande5ui4ment and certain other &u44lie& al&o 4urcha&ed centrally, /hile other&, &uch a& &yringe&, are 4urcha&ed locally3 !n 4ractice, &ome %accine& are delayed in arri%ing at the local le%el, and theLG$& a& a re&ult &ometime& uy them /ith their o/n fund&3 >e4atiti& ( %accine, a 4articularly

e<4en&i%e one, i& mo&t 4rone to delay or leakage3 O&er%er& &ugge&t that there i& le&& of a threatto the 5uality of ?P! than other a&4ect& of 4ulic health &er%ice, gi%en the &u&tantial centralin%ol%ementincluding central &u44ort for maintenance of the %accine cold chain Cinter%ie/&D3

Tuerculo&i& control i& al&o %ertically admini&tered, /ith &ome function& ha%ing een de%ol%ed3The e<amination& and te&t& are done at the arangay le%el and the re&ult& &ent to the region&,/hich otain fund& for medication& from the center3 T( drug& /ere centrally 4urcha&ed until+, then delegated to the admini&trati%e region&3 The ad%antage of the latter i& that it i& fa&terto uy in &mall lot& rather than to con&olidate 4urcha&e& into large international tender& Calthough idder& are &till accredited at the center, and co&t& may e higher out&ide the ca4ital, e&4ecially inremote area&D3 Thi& 4rogram al&o &uffer& from delay and leakage 4rolem&for e<am4le, 1aga

#ity health official& re4ort 4urcha&ing a44ro<imately 7.R of their T( medicine need& /ith theiro/n fund& in order to co4e /ith delay& in deli%ery3 The malaria 4rogram i& a &imilar ca&e3 A&/ith T(, the center 4a&&e& earmarked fund& Cand &ome medication& and &u44lie&D to the region&coordinating the 4rogram, /hich in turn 4a&& re&ource& on to the citie& and 4ro%ince&3

Education

The role& of the &tate and the 4ri%ate &ector in the education &y&tem ha%e een &hifting, ande&timate& %ary3 The &tate contriution to 4rimary education ha& fallen in recent year&3According to the 'orld (ank, 4arent& contriute on a%erage oneBthird of total 4ulic elementaryeducation co&t&3 The &hare of &tate &chool& in the 4rimary education &ector ha& een e&timated toha%e fallen from 93;R in +=+B=- to -R in +:B=3 !nformal e&timate& of 4ri%ate andreligiou& &hare& of the &chooling &y&tem tend to e much higher, although greater nonB&tate&hare& in 4reB&chool, &econdary, and tertiary le%el& account for &ome of thi&3 #o&tBefficiency and5uality are /idely thought to e much lo/er for 4ulic than 4ri%ate in&titution& Cana&an -...,inter%ie/&D3

3overnance Structure

Go%ernance of 4ulic education i& centralized under the admini&tration of the )e4artment of?ducation, #ulture and S4ort& C)?#SD, ut /ith &ome Cat time& &ignificantD local in4ut3 TheLG# a&&ign& &chool uilding con&truction and re4air to the local go%ernment&, and LG$& ha%e&ho/n notale initiati%e in thi& areafor e<am4le, the go%ernor of #amarine& del Sur &aid hi& 4ro%ince /a& currently funding the e&tali&hment of -= ne/ &econdary &chool&3 >o/e%er, thecenter i& re&4on&ile for 4ractically e%erything el&e, including 4olicy, curriculum, 4er&onnel, ando4eration&3 Plan& are eing formulated for de%ol%ing education, ut a 4olitical &tumling lockcited y &ome o&er%er& i& the fact that teacher& act a& agent& of the electoral commi&&ion,counting allot& on election daythe fear i& that if they ecome local ci%il &er%ant&, they /illcome under 4re&&ure from their local 4olitical ma&ter& to mani4ulate the re&ult&3 Local

+9



in&titution& /ith a formal role in education go%ernance include the School (oard& at 4ro%incialand munici4al le%el& Cmainly for 4rogramming the S4ecial ?ducation 2und or S?2, &ee elo/D,and the ParentBTeacher #ommunity A&&ociation& CPT#A&, e&&entially the &ame a& PTA&el&e/hereD for each &chool3 Local official& &uch a& go%ernor& and mayor& are re4re&ented on the oard& and often u&e them to e<erci&e influence3 A& /ith health, there are no fee& charged

CformallyD in the &chool &y&tem, though 4arent& ha%e to uy uniform& and 4ay mode&t PT#Afee&3

)?#S i& &till &aid to e Hhighly centralized and to4Bdo/nI/ith a rigid line of authority fromthe center to +9 regional office&, +; di%i&ion office&, and -+.. di&trict office&,9 each o%er&eeing+7B-. 4ulic &chool& C4rimary and &econdaryD3 At the di%i&ion le%el, the &u4erintendant hire&teacher& and e<erci&e& other )?#S function&3 The +99 agna #arta for Pulic School Teacher& 4ro%ided that no teacher could e tran&ferred /ithout herhi& con&ent3 A& a re&ult, there i& H%erylittle room for autonomou& deci&ionBmaking at the le%el of the di%i&ion or the &chool3I )i%i&ionoffice& do not kno/ their udget& until the fund& are actually relea&ed, and the udget& 4ro4o&ed y the region& are trimmed do/n y )?#S Cana&an -...F 7D3

!n &ome re&4ect&, there i& more nationalBlocal inter4lay in admini&tration of the education &y&temthan the fact of formal centralization im4lie&3 )e facto, go%ernor& and mayor& oth a44ro%ea44ointment& and inter%ene to influence hiringe3g3, /here there i& a li&t of certified candidate&for a teacher or 4rinci4al 4o&ition, the go%ernor& /ill often determine the actual choice a&ed on 4reference& for local hiring, 4olitical con&ideration&, or &ome re5ue&t or fa%or from the candidate3Go%ernor& al&o HloyI )?#S for more &chool fund& Ca& mentioned ao%e, a + S'S &ur%eyidentified )?#S a& one of the fi%e mo&t corru4t agencie& in the Phili44ine&D3 Local &chool oard& and PT#A& ha%e taken initiati%e& to influence 4olicy and re&ource allocation C#anie&oB)oronila +D3 ?ducation i& in fact fully de%ol%ed Cto the regional le%elD in one 4art of thecountrythe Autonomou& "egion of u&lim indanao3 The go%ernment of A" re4licate&the national go%ernment in miniature, including it& o/n education de4artment3 A44arently,education i& not doing %ery /ell in A", and the regional )?#S regularly &eek& hel4 from thecentral )?#S3 A maEor 4rolem i& inter%ention y u&lim militant& in teacher hiring and otheradmini&trati%e i&&ue& Cincluding the threat of armed %iolenceD3

)?#S ha& een deconcentrating it& o4eration& to the admini&trati%e region&, and more recently tothe di%i&ion le%el Cterritorially e5ui%alent to the 4ro%inceD, /hile focu&ing on 4rimary and&econdary education and delegating the o%er&ight of technical and higher education to otherin&titution&3 To facilitate the&e change&, -- of the di%i&ion& are eing 4ro%ided /ith financialmanager& and other &u44ort under the Third ?lementary ?ducation ProEect C+9B-..;, funded y the 'orld (ankD3 "e&4on&iility for 4lanning C7Byear )i%i&ion ?ducational )e%elo4mentPlan&D and im4lementation of 4rogram& no/ &hould e at the di%i&ion office le%el, /herea& in the 4a&t the &y&tem de4ended on central initiati%e&3 )?#S i& al&o de%elo4ing a +.Byear 4lan forde%olution, ut it &till a44arently intend& to retain the 4o/er of hiring and firing teacher&again,due to their role in o%er&eeing local allotBcounting3

9 H)i&trictI a& u&ed in the education &y&tem doe& not ha%e the &ame meaning a& it doe& in the health &ector3

+:



ersonnel and esource Manage5ent

A& en%i&ioned in the Local Go%ernment #ode, )?#S choo&e& local &choolteacher& andadmini&trator& in con&ultation /ith local School (oard&3 Go%ernor& and mayor& try to influenceteacher hiring and tran&fer, ut teacher& are accountale to their 4rinci4al&, di%i&ion&u4erintendent&, and regional )?#S office&3 A& a re&ult of thi& and their legal 4rotection&,

teacher& often refu&e tran&fer&3 Local go%ernment& do &u44lement their teaching &taff& a& /ell a&teacher &alarie&3 One mayor C1aga #ityD re4orted udgeting PP +7 million Cnearly $3S3V7..,...D of the fund& under hi& control to 4ay for additional teacher&, a& /ell a& &u44lementingall teacher &alarie& y PP 9.. Caout $3S3 V-.D 4er month3 CTeacher &alarie& are &et and 4aidcentrally according to a uniform &cale that ha& ri&en fourfold o%er the +.&3D The&earrangement& in%ol%e local go%ernment& hiring H&u&tituteI teacher& to fill o4ening& /hen theyari&e, in order to a%oid delay& in central hiring3 2re5uently, the center, after a delay of a fe/year&, 4ick& u4 the&e locallyBhired teacher& C/hen they are 5ualified and certified, /hich mo&ta44ear to eD on the central 4ayroll3 There &eem& to e an under&tanding that neither &ide /illau&e thi& informal arrangement3 The 4olitic& of teacher a44ointment& a44ear Eu&t a& inten&e/hen the LG$& are doing the hiring3

1ot only hiring, ut the udgeting of financial re&ource& i& highly centralized3 A local &chool oard Hdoe& not ha%e any influence on ho/ the )?#S udget for the )i%i&ion or )i&trict office&i& allocated acro&& e<4enditure item&333I Cana&an -...F7D3 Thi& mean& that local &choolfinancing reflect& the central trend& in education funding, e3g3, a ri&e in 4ulic education fund&going to &econdary and tertiary education &ince +=9, al&o the fact that funding goe&di&4ro4ortionately to 4er&onnel acro&& the oardit i& the &ingle igge&t item in the )?#S udget, 4artly an effect of the agna #arta for Teacher& and &alary adEu&tment& in the +.&3 A&a re&ult, maintenance and other o4erating e<4en&e& tend to e neglected in the )?#& udget&,leading to &hortage& of te<took&, material&, and 5uality facilitie&3 oreo%er, /eak udgetmonitoring y )?#S lead& to under &4endingthe &y&tem i& too centralized and remote from the

&chool& to track thi& carefully C'orld (ank +9, ana&an -...D3 Thi& a44ear& to e due in 4artto failure& y )?#S to re4ort teacher de4loyment& 4rom4tly to )(, and in 4art to the fact that)?#S di%i&ion office& im4lement &chool funding re5ue&t& directly, Hin kind,I /hich im4o&e&&ome rigidity and delay in meeting &chool&0 need& C1u5ui and Soli& +D3

At the &ame time, the local &hare of education finance ha& gro/n3 There i& a maEor ta< earmark for education, the S4ecial ?ducation 2und CS?2D, /ho&e u&e& are determined y local &chool oard& under the term& of the LG#3 S?2 i& funded y a one 4ercent &urta< on a&&e&&ed 4ro4erty%alue&3 The e<clu&i%e 4ur4o&e& of the S?2 areF o4eration and maintenance of 4ulic &chool&,con&truction and re4air of &chool uilding&, education re&earch, 4urcha&e of ook& and 4eriodical&, and &4ort& 4rogram& C"e%enue "e4orter +D3 S?2 fund& ha%e gro/n y 7.3.R

&ince the LG# /a& enacted, making it an increa&ingly im4ortant &ource of education fundingC1T"# +:D3 >o/e%er, the &chool oard& are re4utedly /eak on accountaility for S?2 fund&3any of them a44arently u&e S?2 fund& to hire additional teacher& or to to4 off teacher &alarie& although thi& i& not 4ermitted under the LG#3 ore generally, LG$ e<4enditure& a& a &hare of total 4ulic education e<4enditure during +-B= e5ualed :39R, /hile S?2 funding of localgo%ernment education outlay& during +;B: totaled :=3;R3 There are re4ort& of teacher& no/getting in%ol%ed in local 4ro4erty ta< collection, in order to im4ro%e &chool funding Cana&an-...D3

+=



One analy&i& of thi& 4ulic finance data and it& im4act i& thi&F &chool di%i&ion& /hich are morede4endent on LG$& for funding tend to 4erform etter in term& of oth &tudent achie%ement&core& and 4roce&& indicator& like the cohort &ur%i%al rate and the dro4Bout rateI Cana&an -...D3The&e finding& are al&o &u44orted y arangayBle%el data collected in the early +=.&, &ho/ing arou&t 4o&iti%e link et/een the e<tent of 4rimary &chool&0 reliance on local &ource& Cincluding

the munici4al go%ernment, local &chool oard, and PT#AD and increa&ed e<4enditure efficiencyin tho&e &chool&holding enrollment and 5uality con&tant C@imenez and Pa5ueo +9D3 Onemight attriute thi& to enhanced o/ner&hi4 and monitoring of re&ource& that re&ult&, in 4art,from the LG#& 4rocedural re5uirement& for School (oard 4rogramming of S?2 fund&, andgreater local 4olitical moilization generally3 There i& al&o anecdotal e%idence that LG$& areale to con&truct &chool uilding& at a lo/er co&t than the central go%ernmentI Cdue tocommunity &u44ort, local material&, and no o%erheadD3 The )?#S School (uilding Program,im4lemented through )P'> ha& een found to di&courage LG$ initiati%e to uild &chool&, andto fo&ter de4endency on the central go%ernment and #ongre&& C#anie&oB)oronila +, ana&an-...D3 A& cited elo/ C#ha4ter !8D, a + S'S o4inion &ur%ey found )?#S to e the fifthmo&t corru4t go%ernment agencyut )P'> /a& numer one3 Thu&, go%ernance factor&,

including the much greater o44ortunitie& for corru4tion from centralized 4ulic /ork&, 4erha4&e<4lain much of the difference et/een local and centralized 4ulic /ork& efficiency3 Thi& andother e%idence cited ao%e &ugge&t that decentralization of 4rimary education i& likely to ha%e a 4o&iti%e im4act3

!n addition, there i& centralized 4rocurement of &chool te<t& and other &u44lie&, /hich almo&tine%italy &uffer& inefficiencie& and au&e&, gi%e the &cale of the undertaking3

Te<took 4ro%i&ion in the 4ulic elementary &chool &y&tem i& a truly ma&&i%e enter4ri&eQ A&&uming a +F+4u4il to te<took ratio for the +B7 4attern of enrollment of aout +.3- million 4u4il& /ith &ingle ado4tionof only one title 4er &uEect 4er grade le%el, thi& /ould in%ol%e a total of ; title& for a total of aout :+3=million co4ie& of te<took&QThe&e co4ie& ha%e to e di&triuted to the more than ;;,... &chool& in &uch a

/ay that each child &hould ha%e the right &et of te<took& for hi& &uEect& in hi& grade le%el efore the &tart ofthe &chool year3

A recent )?#S re4ort &ummarized the &ituation a& follo/&F >ere again, there i& at lea&t anecdotale%idence that centrallyB4rocured material& are ina44ro4riate and untimely, e%en if centralizationdoe& ring &cale enefit&, including acce&& to international com4etiti%e idding3 Theomud&man& office cited a maEor te<took 4rocurement &candal ari&ing from thi& &y&tem3 The 4roce&& i& e&&entially thi&F )?#S &end& a li&t of te<t& to e &u44lied, /ith a co4y to the rele%antlocal go%ernment& and PT#A&, and conduct& the 4rocurement and deli%ery3

Thi& 4icture i& changing, ho/e%er3 Some LG$& and &chool& &u44lement thi& /ith 4rocurement&of their o/n, and the Third ?lementary ?ducation ProEect i& &u44orting, among other thing& C&eeao%eD, a decentralization of 4rocurement and other management deci&ion&3 T??P i& al&o 4ro%iding fund& for &chool con&truction, through the unici4al )e%elo4ment 2und Ca centraltran&fer in&trument that &end& international money directly to the munici4alitie&D, /ith a -7RLG$ e5uity re5uirement3 There i& al&o a )?#S 4rogram CS!!2D, /hich 4ro%ide& grant& toindi%idual &chool& of PP 9.B=.,... in re&4on&e to 4ro4o&al& for im4ro%ement, and on conditionthat the &chool& &et u4 a council of 4arent& and local leader& to monitor the 4roEect&3

+



Cha#ter III: Data So"rce!

The data for thi& &tudy are deri%ed from eight &ur%ey& undertaken in =. Phili44ine munici4alitie&in the S4ring of -...3 The &ur%ey& co%ered ++.. hou&ehold&, =. munici4al admini&trator&,health official& and education official&, -. 4ro%incial admini&trator&, health official& and

education official&, +9. go%ernment health facility /orker& and +9. &chool 4rinci4al&3 Of thelatter, +++ /ere from 4ulic &chool&, the remainder from 4ri%ate &chool&3 The &am4le ofhou&ehold& re4re&ent& -. 4ro%ince&, =. munici4alitie& /ithin them, and ;.+ arangay& /ithintho&e =. munici4alitie&3

!n +9. of the arangay&, health facility /orker&, and hou&ehold& that could e matched /iththo&e health facilitie&, /ere inter%ie/edJ only 4ulic &ector health official& and facilitie& /ereinter%ie/ed3 !n the other +9. arangay&, official&, &chool 4rinci4al&, and hou&ehold& inter%ie/ed/ere related to 4ulic and 4ri%ate &chool&3 !f there /a& a 4ri%ate &chool in the munici4ality the&ur%ey team /a& a&ked to inter%ie/ a 4ri%ate &chool and a 4ulic &chool in the munici4ality,other/i&e it /ould inter%ie/ t/o 4ulic &chool&3 The &am4le thu& con&i&t& of 4ri%ate and +++

4ulic &chool&, /hich mean& there /ere 4ri%ate &chool& in out of =. C9+RD munici4alitie&3

The accom4anying tale e<4lain& in more detail the &ur%ey& admini&tered to the main grou4& ofinter%ie/ee&, the cell& containing the ty4e of data eing elicited3

-.



Ta3e .> De!cri#tio$ o+ S"r-e*!

>ou&ehold PulicAdmini&trator

Pulic Official?ducation C)?#SD Pulic Official >ealth

School Princi4al >ealth 2acility'orker

(a&icdemogra4hic& onre&4ondent andfamily

(a&ic demogra4hic&on re&4ondent




(a&ic demogra4hicon re&4ondent

>ealth care u&e

)emandre&4on&i%ene&& of&er%ice deli%ery





Kno/ledge ofimmunization&

Go%ernmentBrun 4rimary &chool&

Go%ernmentBrun 4rimary &chool&

Go%ernmentBrunhealth unit&

General 4rimary&chool information

General health unitinformation

#lo&e&tgo%ernment and 4ri%ate unit

"ole of localgo%ernment ineducation deli%ery

"ole of localgo%ernment ineducation deli%ery

Planning of &er%icedeli%ery, &u44lie& of%accine& andmedicine&

School &u44lie&facilitie& ande5ui4ment

Su44lie& of %accineand medicine&

!mmunization& of

infant&

Performance&tandard& andmonitoring of

&er%ice deli%ery

Performance&tandard& andmonitoring of

&er%ice deli%ery

Performance&tandard& andmonitoring of &er%ice

deli%ery

Performance&tandard& andmonitoring of &er%ice

deli%ery

A%ailaility of

e5ui4ment

2amily PlanningPerformance of&er%ice deli%ery

Performance of&er%ice deli%ery




Acce&& to media2unding of &er%icedeli%ery

2unding of &er%icedeli%ery




Primary &chool

Per&onnel,recruitment, &alarie&and allo/ance&




Per&onnel,recruitment, &alarieand allo/ance&

Parent teachera&&ociation

)i&ci4lining andfiring of &taff





oility

!ndi%idual 4erformancee%aluation





#orru4tion #orru4tion #orru4tion #orru4tion #orru4tion #orru4tion

Kno/ledge anda/arene&& ofgo%t3 action&

"ole of unici4alSchool (oard

"ole of unici4alSchool (oard

"ole of unici4al>ealth (oard "ole of PT#A

"ole of health unitanagement#ommittee

8oting and 4olitical action

Su44ly of te<took&and other material

Su44ly of te<took&and other material

!mmunization andfamily 4lanning

!mmunization in&chool&

Social cohe&ion"ecruitment ofteacher&

Su44lie& of %accine&and medicine&

"ecruitment ofteacher&

)ata &heetF O%erallre%enue& ande<4enditure&

)ata &heetF?nrollment rate, 1?AT 4a&& rate

)ata &heetFGo%ernment healthunit&

)ata &heetF?nrollment rate, 1?AT 4a&& rate

)ata &heetF8accination&,infectiou& di&ea&eincidence

?5ui4ment ?5ui4ment

!mmunization rate&C4ro%incial officera&ked for munici4alle%el dataD ?5ui4ment #ontrace4tion

1W++-. 1W=. unici4ality 1W-. Pro%ince

1W=. unici4ality 1W-. Pro%ince

1W=. unici4ality 1W-. )i&trict 1W+9. 1W+9.

-+



Cha#ter IV: A!!e!!i$2 Go-er$)e$t Per+or)a$ce

Thi& cha4ter e<amine& e%idence that ear& on the 4erformance of the decentralized 4ulic &ector/ith re&4ect to deli%ering 4rimary education and health care &er%ice&3 2ir&t, &ome data on the&e

out4ut& i& riefly di&cu&&ed3 1e<t, go%ernment 4erformance i& a&&e&&ed, to the e<tent allo/ed ya%ailale data, according to the criteria of allocati%e efficiency, 4roducti%e efficiency, and co&treco%ery3 Thi& di&cu&&ion re&t& chiefly on the re&earch team0& finding& regarding 4referenceBmatching and 4erce4tion& of corru4tion3

,easuring %ublic Service 0utputs and 0utcomes

#on&iderale data on health and education in the Phili44ine& are a%ailale from international&ource&3 Some of thi& data i& &ummarized here, in addition to information otained throughinter%ie/&3 "ele%ant &ur%ey re&ult& are then re4orted3

The Phili44ine&, not &ur4ri&ingly for a middleBincome de%elo4ing country, rank& in the u44er half of the Hmedium human de%elo4mentI category in the >uman )e%elo4ment "e4ort -... C$nited 1ation& -...D3 Life e<4ectancy at irth i& aout 9 year&3

1ationally, immunization rate& are aout =:R, /ith mode&t C7RD %ariation& acro&& Euri&diction&ari&ing from migrationa family may recei%e different immunization& in different location&,thu& 4erha4& mi&&ing &ome ut al&o cau&ing incom4lete record&, &ince the data are not com4iledacro&& Euri&diction3 !mmunization rate& are +R for T( and :+R for mea&le&, oth unim4re&&i%ecom4ared /ith other Hmedium human de%elo4mentI countrie&, and the numer of T( ca&e&C-7+..,...D i& higher than any nonBAfrican country &ho/n in the >uman )e%elo4ment "e4ort-...3 !t i& al&o re4orted that ;.R of children under the age of 7 are malnouri&hed C'orld (ank

-...D3

Primary &chool enrollment figure& are im4re&&i%e, /ith official e&timate& at clo&e to +..R in+=, ut there are &ignificant regional %ariation&, /ith, e3g3, =-3R in Southern indanao to+..R in #entral indanao and !loco& re4orted in +:B=3 >o/e%er, there i& &till more %ariationthan indicated y official enrollment rate&3 Only 9=R of enrolled children actually com4lete 4rimary &chool Can e&timated +..R in anila and a& little a& ;.R in other 4art& of the countryD3

Nuality %arie& /idely, /ith &ome &chool& follo/ing a multigrade &y&tem C/here teacher&handle more than one gradeD, &ome &chool& eing incom4lete or limited to grade& +B C,.. of the&e /ere counted in +9D, and &chool& &ho/ing di&4arate 4u4ilBteacher ratio& and te&t &core&

C&tandardized te&t &core a%erage& range from .3= in #entral indanao to 9;3- in ?a&t 8i&aya&D3"ural &chool& are the /or&tBoff, recei%ing fe/ in&4ection& y education official& /ho o%er&eehundred& of &chool& each3 Secondary education i& &4ottier &till, %arying in oth co%erage and5uality3 1ational &econdary &chool enrollment i& gi%en a& :=R, ut thi& figure, too, undoutedlyreflect& /ide regional %ariation&3 Official literacy &tati&tic& re4ort 7R adult literacy, ut oneBfifth of the adult 4o4ulation i& e&timated to e functionally illiterate Cana&an -..., ?!$ +,'orld (ank +9, 'orld (ank -..., inter%ie/&D3

--



The &ur%ey re%ealed a fairly &trong le%el of citizen&0 &ati&faction /ith oth go%ernment healthunit& and 4rimary &chool&> 'ith regard to go%ernment health unit&, 7-R of re&4ondinghou&ehold&i3e3, tho&e hou&ehold /ith childrenga%e a H%ery good%ery &ati&fiedI rating, /hile;:R an&/ered Hgood&ome/hat &ati&fiedIJ only ++R ga%e Ha%erage&ome/hat di&&ati&fiedI orH4oordi&&ati&fiedI an&/er&3 Of the hou&ehold& &ur%eyed C-,7-+D, only 9 had had ca&e& of 4olio

in their family, and ;;: had had mea&le&, &ugge&ting le&& than 4erfect immunization co%erage ut&till etter than that &ho/n in the com4anion $ganda &tudy3

Like/i&e, of hou&ehold& /ith children, 9+R e<4re&&ed a H%ery good%ery &ati&fiedI o4inion ofthe 4rimary &chool their children attended, /hile ;;R ga%e a Hgood&ome/hat &ati&fiedI rating,and only 7R of the rating& /ere either Hfair&ome/hat di&&ati&fiedI or H4oordi&&ati&fied3I The%ery lo/ dro4out rate re4ortedonly t/o dro4out& out of +:9 childreni& im4re&&i%e3>o/e%er, -=R of the munici4al )?#S Officer& &ur%eyed re4orted racial and ethnic ten&ion, ordi&crimination, in 4rimary &chool&, and +R cited religiou& ten&ion3

Allocative e!!iciency

Local go%ernment& are e<4ected to e clo&er to the 4eo4le they intend to &er%eJ hence, theory&ay&, local official& are more likely to reflect the 4reference& of their communitie&, and thi& lead&to greater allocati%e efficiency, i3e3, a matching et/een con&umer 4reference& and out4ut&3?%idence for thi& theoretical 4o&tulate i& e<amined elo/ y &tati&tical com4ari&on of hou&ehold 4reference& /ith 4ulic official&0 kno/ledge of the&e 4reference&3 The &ur%ey a&ked hou&ehold&F

!f the munici4alcity go%ernment recei%ed P + million, on /hich acti%ity /ould you /ant mo&t of the money &4entM

Official& /ere then a&kedF

!f thi& munici4alcity go%ernment recei%ed P + million, on /hich acti%ity do you think /ould mo&t local 4eo4le /antmo&t of the money &4entM

2igure + and Anne< Tale + &ho/ that mo&t of the hou&ehold& C;7 RD ga%e in%e&tment forinfra&tructure Ccla&&ified a& uilding ridge&, road& and canal&D a& their to4 4reference, follo/ed y ne/ Eo&, education, aid to the 4oor, health and /ater &er%ice&3

-;



Fi2"re .> Ho"!eho% O#i$io$! o$ M"$ici#ait* Prioritie!:Percentage of 4eo4le citing each &uEect a& the mo&t im4ortant, y 4ro%ince

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

other

Road, bridges, canal

New jobs

Education

Aid to poor

Health

ater, drainage

Housing

There are large difference& in hou&ehold 4reference& acro&& 4ro%ince& and acro&& munici4alitie&/ithin 4ro%ince&3 A formal te&t: re%ealed &ignificant difference& in 4reference& acro&& 4ro%ince&for all &er%ice&4rimary education, health &er%ice&, road&, ne/ Eo&, aid to the 4oor, /aterthatare demanded y more than 7R of the 4o4ulation3= A &imilar te&t for difference& acro&& &uBcountie& /ithin 4ro%ince& indicated &ignificant difference& in 4reference& for education, healthand other 4ulic &er%ice& acro&& munici4alitie& /ithin 4ro%ince& in the Phili44ine&3

Gi%en that there i& a44arently a /ide di&4er&ion in 4reference& in the Phili44ine&, and a fairamount of di&cretion on re&ource allocation y local official&, if local official& actually kne/

aout citizen&0 4reference&, then local go%ernment& might e ale to etter 4ro%ide 4ulic&er%ice& that 4eo4le actually /ant3 The a/arene&& of 4ulic official& aout the 4reference& of 4eo4le li%ing in their Euri&diction& i& therefore ne<t e<amined3 !t /a& found that in +. out of -. 4ro%ince& hou&ehold&0 fir&t 4riority i& correctly antici4ated y the munici4al official& /hoem4ha&ize infra&tructure a& the fir&t 4riority of hou&ehold& CRD follo/ed y health, ne/ Eo&,and aid to the 4oor CAnne< Tale -D3 They gi%e a lo/ 4riority to education C7RD a& com4ared tohou&ehold& C+.RD3 Pro%incial official&, on the other hand, are ale to cite the to4 4reference& ofhou&ehold& only in ; ca&e& Cthey /ould do etter y &im4ly &tating H"oad&I in all ca&e&D3

: ?3g3, for 4rimary education, a dummy %ariale /a& created to indicate /hether the hou&ehold re&4onded that themoney &hould e &4ent on 4rimary education3 The a%erage numer of hou&ehold& that re&4onded H4rimaryeducationI /a& &utracted from thi& %ariale to create a %ariale of mean ., and the latter %ariale /a& thenregre&&ed on di&trict dummie&3 The 2B&tati&tic for Eoint &ignificance of the dummie&, te&t& for the e5uality of 4reference& acro&& di&trict&3 The e&timated &tati&tic of -3.+ i& almo&t &ignificant at +R3 2or health &er%ice&, the 2B&tati&tic i& -3, /hich i& &ignificant at +R3= Tri%ial le%el& of demand make difference& in 4reference& conce4tually le&& meaningful and &tati&tically moredifficult to detect3

-



A formal te&t for a match et/een hou&ehold&0 and official&0 4reference& Cre&ult& re4orted inTale -D &ho/& that oth munici4al official& and 4ro%incial official& do antici4ate the 4reference&of citizen& a& a national a%erage /ith an im4re&&i%e 4reci&ionthe coefficient& for nationalBle%elregre&&ion& are highly &ignificant and %ery clo&e to +ut a& the 4artial 4lot& CAnne< 2igure& +B7D &ugge&t, thi& re&ult i& dri%en y the outlier Hroad&I3 unici4al official& demon&trate a

marginally &ignificant kno/ledge of 4eo4le0& 4reference& at oth the munici4al and the 4ro%incial le%el CtW+3== and +3=9 re&4ecti%elyD3 >o/e%er, 4ro%incial officer& demon&trate nokno/ledge at all of local 4reference&the coefficient i& actually negati%e3

Ta3e 4> Correatio$ Bet7ee$ P"3ic O++icia! Pre+ere$ce! a$% Ho"!eho% Pre+ere$ce! +or

F"$%i$2 Prioritie!

M"$ici#a O++icia! Pro-i$cia O++icia!

1ationalA%erage

Pro%incialA%erage

unici4alA%erage

1ationalA%erage

Pro%incialA%erage

>ou&ehold Preference&.39.

C;3D***.3+-

C+3==D*.3+

C+3=9D*.3-

C3+D***B.3-.CB+3-7D

2Bte&t ++3=+*** ;377* ;39* +:37=*** +377

AdE3 " &53 .377 .3.+; .3..; .397 .3..;

1 +. -.. :=. +. +:.

1oteF 8ariale& are difference& from the national meanJ TB&tati&tic& are in 4arenthe&i&

?<amination of the funding 4rioritie& in Tale ; &ho/& that the relati%e &ucce&& of munici4alofficial& in regre&&ion& i& largely deri%ed from a 4articular i&&ueF Huilding etter road&, ridge&,and canal&I3 A4art from that, munici4al official& al&o fail to antici4ate the need& of 4eo4le li%ingin their o/n di&trict&3 They do 4articularly adly 4redicting 4reference& for health &er%ice&, for/hich the coefficient i& large, negati%e, and &ignificant3

Pulic official&0 re&4on&e& are regre&&ed on hou&ehold&0 actual 4reference& at the national le%el, at the 4ro%incele%el, and at the munici4al le%el Cfor munici4al official&D3 At the national le%el, the com4ari&on i& et/een a%eragenational o&er%ation& for each 4riority3 8ariale& for the H4ro%incial a%erageI and Hmunici4al a%erageI regre&&ion&re4re&ent the de%iation& from the national a%erage3

-7



Ta3e 5> Correatio$ Bet7ee$ P"3ic O++icia! Pre+ere$ce! a$% Ho"!eho% Pre+ere$ce! +or

F"$%i$2 Prioritie!

Prioritie& unici4al Official&Cmunici4al a%erageD

CnB:=D

"oad, ridge&, canal .37C-3+D**

?ducation .3.+7C.3.=D

>ealth B.3:.;CB-3+D**

Agriculture !rrigation B.3..CB.3;D

Garage collection B.3.CB.3--D

1e/ Eo& B.3.;.CB.3.=D

Aid to 4oor B.3.9=

CB.39=D'ater, drainage .3;;

C+3.=D

1oteF 4ulic official&0 4reference& are regre&&ed on hou&ehold 4reference& for each 4riority ty4e /here%ariale& are difference& from the national meanJ OLS regre&&ion coefficient& are gi%en, /ith tB&tati&tic&in 4arenthe&i&3

The &ur%ey al&o a&ked 4ulic official& aout ho/ they learn aout hou&ehold&0 4reference&3 All 4ulic official& cited &ome effort& to find out local citizen&0 4reference& CTale D3 any of themCaout ;.RD choo&e to con&ult /ith community leader& and local ci%ic organization&3 Nuite afe/ al&o conduct &ur%ey& and onBfield in5uirie& Caround +7RD3 A te&t /a& carried out to &ee/hether a 4articular method ha& any 4o&iti%e im4act on under&tanding the 4reference& of citizen& y including a dummy %ariale for each in&trument in the regre&&ion analy&i&3 >o/e%er, none of the method& i& found to ha%e a &ignificant im4act on 4ulic official&0 4erce4tion of hou&eholdneed&3

-9



Ta3e 0> ?hat ha-e *o" %o$e to +i$% o"t a3o"t oca citi&e$@! #re+ere$ce! #erce$ta2e!

unici4al >ealthunici4al

Admini&trator unici4al )?#S

&ur%ey 9 +. 9

con&ultation /ith community

leader&organization& -: + ;+

onBfield in5uiry +. = -

eetingcon&ultation /ith&taff

+. +- ;

Other 9+ 9- :7

1othing . . .

'ere the&e &ugge&tion&incor4orated into

unici4alcity de%elo4ment

4lan& 9: :+ 77

Actually im4lemented 99 97 7:

1 =. =. =.

Another 5ue&tion e<amined /a& /hether the matching of hou&ehold 4reference& and official&0 4erce4tion& /a& influenced y ethnicity3 An analy&i& of thi& 5ue&tion &ho/ed that only the!locano and the 'aray grou4& had their 4reference& reflected y 4ulic official& at a &tati&tically 4erce4tile le%el3 The 4reference& of the !locano are reflected y oth munici4al and 4ro%incialofficial&3 The coefficient& 4re&ented in Tale 7 are high and &ometime& ao%e +3 The t/o large&t

grou4&, the #euano and the Tagalog, did not ha%e their 4reference& matched y 4ulic official&at &tati&tically 4erce4tile le%el&3 The re&ult& for the 'aray, ho/e%er, rely on too fe/o&er%ation& to e &tati&tically reliale3

Ta3e (> Correatio$ Bet7ee$ P"3ic O++icia! Pre+ere$ce! a$% Ioca$o Pre+ere$ce! +or

F"$%i$2 Prioritie!

M"$ici#a O++icia! Pro-i$cia O++icia!

Natio$a

A-era2e

Pro-i$cia

A-era2e

M"$ici#a

A-era2e

Natio$a

A-era2e

Pro-i$cia

A-era2e

>ou&ehold Preference& +3+.***C3=:D +37=:**C-3;7+D .39-***C-39D .3=***C93;.D -3+;*C+3;D

" &53 .3:9 .3.;+ .3.+. .3= .3.-;

1 +. -.. :=. +. +:.

1oteF 8ariale& are difference& from the &am4le mean e<ce4t for the national le%el regre&&ionJ TB&tati&tic& are in 4arenthe&i&3

!n &ummary the ao%e analy&i& of 4reference& &ho/ that information aout 4reference& of thehou&ehold& i& con%eyed to munici4al official& /ith mode&t &ucce&&4erha4& only /ith re&4ect toroad&/herea& 4ro%incial official& &ho/ no e%idence of any kno/ledge aout local demand&3

-:



Gi%en that munici4al officer& are much Hclo&erI to the 4eo4lethere are +7.. munici4alitie&/ith an a%erage 4o4ulation of 7.,... each a& o44o&ed to aout :. 4ro%ince& /ith an a%erage 4o4ulation of + millionone can &ay that there i& &ome e%idence that eing clo&er to the 4eo4ledoe& hel4 in kno/ledge of their 4reference&3

2or future re4lication& of &tudie& of thi& nature, it might e ad%i&ale to admini&ter a more&o4hi&ticated 5ue&tion to 4ulic official&, a&king their o4inion& aout the 4ercentage of 4eo4le/ho /ould /ant each ty4e of good3 Thi& /ould 4ro%ide much more detailed information tomatch citizen&0 4reference& /ith official&0 kno/ledge of the&e 4reference&3 !t may al&o make&en&e to inter%ie/ &ome central go%ernment official& to com4are their kno/ledge /ith that oflocal official&3

%roductive e!!iciency

A& mentioned earlier, &ome theorie& of fi&cal federali&m &ugge&t that decentralization &houldre&ult in an im4ro%ement in 4roducti%e efficiency, in 4art ecau&e the clo&er monitoring of local

go%ernment y the 4o4ulation i& e<4ected to 4romote greater accountaility and thu& le&&corru4tion3 The e%idence for thi& 4ro4o&ition in the ca&e of the Phili44ine& i& di&cu&&ed in thi&&ection3

Decentrali+ation and corruption in the hilippines

'ide agreement e<i&t& that in the Phili44ine& corru4tionfollo/ing the /idely u&ed definitionof au&e of office for 4er&onal gainremain& endemic, and that it& mechani&m& ha%e changedlittle in the la&t decade or &o, although there i& &ome e%idence that it declined &ome/hat Cin thedecade after the colla4&e of the arco& regime, &ee 2igure -D3 "e&4ondent& to a + &ur%ey ySocial 'eather Station& ranked the follo/ing go%ernment agencie& a& the mo&t corru4t in thePhili44ine&F

• )e4artment of Pulic 'ork& and >igh/ay& C)P'>D

• Phili44ine& 1ational Police

• (ureau of !nternal "e%enue C(!"D

• (ureau of #u&tom&

• )e4artment of ?ducation and S4ort& C)?#SD

-=



Fi2"re 4> ICRG@! Corr"#tio$ Rati$2 +or the Phii##i$e!Scale . to 9, high numer& mean le&& corru4tion

0

1

2

3

4

5

82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

Year

!ource" #nternational $ountr% Ris& 'uide 2000

I C R G C

o r r u p t i o n

I n d e x

?&timate& of lo&&e& from corru4tion in the Phili44ine& range from PP +.. million 4er day u4 to atotal of one trillion 4er year3 aEor corru4tion &candal& ha%e affected 4olitical cam4aign&, largeB&cale de%elo4ment 4roEect&, &chool te<took 4rocurement, drug 4rocurement, infra&tructure/ork&, and (!" ta< admini&tration3 Sy&tem& of corru4tion are &aid to e /ellBdefined, /ith all 4artici4ant& recei%ing fi<ed 4ercentage&3 2or e<am4le, it i& re4orted that #ongre&&men /hocontrol 4roEect&, and &ome go%ernor&, get a +.R commi&&ion on H/iredI contract&, and that 4harmaceutical com4anie& 4ay a ;.R or higher kickack on central 4rocurement& of drug& ande5ui4ment to e &ent to local health facilitie&3 ?<am4le& are al&o cited of du4licate 4roEect& orearly re4lacement of infra&tructure dri%en y graft3

The ranking gi%en ao%e contain& many of the u&ual &u&4ect&3 "e%enue admini&tration agencie&&uch a& (!" and #u&tom& face difficult challenge& e%ery/here in trying to con&train au&e&3 The

&ame a44lie& to infra&tructure agencie& &uch a& )P'>3 The mi&u&e of re&ource& in 4ulic /ork&i& e&timated et/een -. and . 4ercent3 !n 4rinci4le, the local )e%elo4ment #ouncil& 4lan 4ulic /ork& and &hould id them out, ut in 4ractice they ha%e left 4rocurement to the center,/hich 4lace& greater control in the hand& of )P'>3 A4art from the u&ual &u&4ect&, corru4tiona44ear& to e &u&tantial in tho&e office& that control 4oint& in the flo/ of 4ulic money, &uch a&regional office& of central agencie& Cdue to their role in 4roEect and financial management underdecentralizationD and the )e4artment of (udget and anagement C)(D, /hich control& therelea&e of fund& for 4ulic 4rogram&3 On 4rocurement& and infra&tructure 4roEect&, regionaldirector& are &aid to get a +.R commi&&ion, and )( officer& +7R Cinter%ie/&D3

2or the&e and other rea&on& cited ao%e, corru4tion a44ear& to remain a &eriou& 4rolem at the

local le%el, de&4ite the fact that reducing corru4tion /a& one of the original moti%e& fordecentralization3 There are more 4layer& /ith le&& coordinationcorru4tion ha& mo%ed from acentrallyBcoordinated &y&tem under arco& C/ho reined in the 4o/erful landed cla&&e& in returnfor a &take in official 4atronageD to a more decentralized &y&tem /ith fe/ o%erall di&ci4line&3any of tho&e /ith augmented re&ource& and re&4on&iilitie& in the current &y&tem, &uch a& arangay ca4tain&, ha%e little ca4acity or incenti%e to e accountale to anyoneand &oma<imize their take of the &4oil&3

-



The grand and &y&temic form& of corru4tion cited ao%e are elie%ed in large 4art to emoti%ated y 4arty cam4aign finance need&3 Petty corru4tion ha& a different rationale, and may e mo%ing in a different direction, 4erha4& e<4laining the im4ro%ement indicated y !#"G dataC2igure -D3 Pay &cale& for lo/B to midBle%el ureaucrat& com4are /ell to the 4ri%ate &ector, andindeed thi& a44ear& in &ome area& to ha%e reduced routine lo/Ble%el corru4tion dri%en y 4ay

&hortfall&3 On the other hand, &enior official& find that their &alarie& fall &hort of their li%ingre5uirement&, e&4ecially /hen one factor& in the e<4ectation& im4o&ed y the traditionalPhili44ine Hcom4adreI &y&tem, /hich re5uire& &u&tantial in%e&tment& in /edding&, a4ti&m&and the like3 Thu& the continued e<i&tence of informal 4ayment demand& in the health,education, other 4ulic &er%ice &ector& /here &er%ice& are &u44o&ed to e freemight ee<4lained y a comination of o44ortuni&m and the demand& of higherBle%el official&Cinter%ie/&D3

Another rea&on for roadly 4ercei%ed corru4tion relate& to the lack of factual inde4endence andca4acity y &ome of the main central o%er&ight odie&3 Thi& i& e&4ecially true in highly 4oliticized &ector& and /ith re&4ect to local go%ernment&, /hich often 4ro%e difficult to monitor

from the ca4ital3 2or e<am4le, the Pre&idential #ommi&&ion on Graft and #orru4tion CP#G#De<4o&e& ca&e& of au&e 4ulicly, ut i& not inde4endent, ha& no 4ro&ecutorial authority, and deal&only /ith Pre&idential a44ointee& CA&&i&tant "egional )irector or higherD3 The #ommi&&ionengage& in factBfinding and &umit& recommendation& to the Pre&ident, /ho ha& di&cretion to acton them or not3 ?%en &o, after it e<4o&ed au&e& in the u&e of di&cretionary #ongre&&ional fund&and allo/ance&, the P#G# faced a 4olitical cam4aign for it& aolition, /hich it e%entuallya%oided3 Another &uch ody i& the Omud&man, /hich doe& ha%e inde4endence and 4ro&ecutorial authority3 >o/e%er, a recent Su4reme #ourt deci&ion limited it& 4ro&ecutorial Euri&diction to official& ao%e grade -9, and in doing &o ga%e &ole authority for 4ro&ecuting lo/er official& to the )e4artment of @u&tice C)O@D, a cainet mini&try that doe& not ha%e 4oliticalinde4endence3 !n addition, there i& an !nterBAgency #oordinating #ouncil, intended to facilitatecoo4eration Ce3g3, concerning the e<erci&e of Euri&diction o%er ca&e& and the &earch for e%idenceDamong the P#G#, #OA, Omud&man, and #i%il Ser%ice #ommi&&ion3

Measures of corruption

#orru4tion manife&t& it&elf in &e%eral /ay&F through riery, the &ale of Eo&, &hirking, and thetheft of fund& and &u44lie&3 The &ur%ey& of go%ernment official& a&ked 5ue&tion& aout all the&eim4ro4rietie&3 "e&ult& are 4re&ented in Tale 93 There are re4ort& of all ty4e& of corru4tion li&tedin the tale in each kind of go%ernment office/ith the &ole e<ce4tion of no theft of &u44lie&re4orted in the munici4al education C)?#SD office3 o&t kind& of corru4tion are re4orted to emore 4re%alent in the munici4al admini&tration office than in other office&, 4erha4& due to theadmini&trator e<erting more authority and thu& ha%ing more o44ortunity to e<tract rent& C&ee2igure ;, and more on thi& &uEect elo/D3 1ineteen 4ercent of munici4al admini&trator& &tatedthat there /ere ca&e& of riery in their office in the la&t year and a full ;-R that there /erein&tance& of the theft of fund&3 (y contra&t only -3R of munici4al health officer& C>O&Dre4orted incident& of riery in their officeJ ho/e%er, +937R did re4ort the theft of fund&3

;.



Ta3e <> Corr"#tio$ Co)#o$e$t! a$% I$%e8un3

>ealthun3Adm3

un3)?#S

PulicSchool&

Pri%ateSchool&

Mea$ Stati!tic! !cae% +ro) / to .//

Pro4ortion of Peo4le 'ho Get Paid ut )on0t Sho/ $4 -379 93;; .3.. B B

Paid to Otain @o& -37 ;3=. 73.. =3=: ;3.

Theft of 2und& >a44ened in the la&t year +937 ;+397 +3-7 +3=; 3.=Theft of Su44lie& >a44ened in the la&t year +93-; +73;= .3.. +3=; 93+-

(riery >a44ened in the la&t year -37; +=3 +3-7 .3- 3.=

2re5uency of Theft of 2und& ;3=. 3. +39: +37; +3;9

2re5uency of Seeking !nformal Payment& 3 +.39= +-3.. .3- -3.

#orru4tion in the 1ational Go%ernment :3.. 93-; 9-3:: 993;7 =.3=7

#orru4tion in the Pro%incial Go%ernment 73; ;3=9 ;:39 7.397 937:

#orru4tion in the unici4al Go%ernment ;3- -3;- -3: ;93=9 9-3;-

#orru4tion in the (aranguay Go%ernment ;=39 -=3=7 --3-- -3:9 =3=

#orru4tion !nde< CWa%g3 of fir&t &e%en line&D 937 +;3== 39 -397 ;37+

Correatio$ 3et7ee$ Corr"#tio$ I$%e8 a$% Other Corr"#tio$ Mea!"re!

Pro4ortion of Peo4le 'ho Get Paid ut )on0t Sho/ $4 .3* .39* B B B

Paid to Otain @o& .3;* .3+7 .37* .39+* .3-*

Theft of 2und& >a44ened in the la&t year .39+* .3=7* .3-7* .37* .3=*Theft of Su44lie& >a44ened in the la&t year .39* .3=;* 3 .3;* .3==*

(riery >a44ened in the la&t year .379* .3=9* .3;* .37+* .3=*

2re5uency of Theft of 2und& .377* .37=* .3=:* .3;-* .3-7

2re5uency of Seeking !nformal Payment& .37;* .377* .3=+* .3.* .3+=

#orru4tion in the 1ational Go%ernment .3-- .3++ .3+ .3.. .3.

#orru4tion in the Pro%incial Go%ernment .3-+ .3-* .3+= .3-.* .3.

#orru4tion in the unici4al Go%ernment .3-* .3;-* .3;9* .3.: .3++

#orru4tion in the (aranguay Go%ernment .3.* .3-9* .3+* .3+; .3+.

Correatio$ 3et7ee$ Corr"#tio$ I$%ice!

un3 >ealth +3.. .3+: B.3.. .3.9 B.3+-

un3 Adm3 .3+: +3.. .3.: B.3+: .3+.

un3 )?#S B.3.. .3.: +3.. .3.+ .3-;*

Pulic School& B.3+- .3+. .3.+ +3.. .3-

Pri%ate School& .3.9 B.3+: .3-;* .3- +3..

#orru4tion Perce4tion of >ou&ehold& .3+; .3-+ .3-=* B.3.7 B.3+

"e&idual of #orru4tion Perce4tion of >ou&ehold& .3+: .3+= .3-* .3.+ .3+7

;+



Fi2"re 5> A%;"!ta3iit* a$% Corr"#tio$ Acro!! A2e$cie!

0

3

(

)12

15

1*

0 10 20 30 40 50 (0 +0 *0

Adjustability Index (0 to 100)

C o r r u p t i o n

I n d e x

( 0 t o 1 0 0 )

Municipal DECS

Municipal Health

Municipal Admin

P !"incial Admin

P !"incial DEC S

!n term& of the 4ulicB4ri%ate com4ari&on for &chool& there &eem& to e e%idence of a &mallamount of corru4tion in oth 4ri%ate and 4ulic &chool& /ith, if anything, more corru4tion in the 4ri%ate &ector3 !t i& difficult to &ay anything concrete /ith &uch &4ar&e e%idence, ut 4erha4& onecould &ugge&t that 4ri%ate and 4ulic &ector 4ractice& e e<amined in &ome detail efore 4ri%atization i& 4ro4o&ed a& a remedy for corru4tion3

1e<t, an inde< of corru4tion /a& created, a&ed on it& %ariou& com4onent& CTale 9D3 Thi& inde<i& correlated at .37 or ao%e /ith mo&t of it& com4onent& for oth the munici4al admini&tratorand the munici4al health officer3 Of cour&e, one /ould e<4ect it to e correlated /ith it&com4onent& &im4ly y con&truction, ut only at aout +:X.3+, a& it ha& : com4onent&, not at.37 or ao%e3 The&e high 4o&iti%e correlation& among the com4onent& of the inde< are an initialindication that thi& inde< i& mea&uring a coherent underlying %ariale3

The general 5ue&tion on Hho/ common i& corru4tion in the munici4al go%ernmentI /a& a&ked3!f the inde< /ho&e deri%ation ha& Eu&t een e<4lained i& a good mea&ure of corru4tion, it could ee<4ected to e correlated /ith the an&/er to thi& 5ue&tion3 !n fact, the indice& are highlycorrelated /ith the an&/er& to thi& general 5ue&tion at .3;- C4B%alueW.3..D for admini&trator& and.3- C4B%alue W.3..D for health official&3

'hile rea&&uring, correlation& /ithin &ur%ey& are not in them&el%e& clear e%idence of mea&uring&ome genuine underlying reality3 An&/er& to different 5ue&tion& y the &ame 4er&on may &ufferfrom indi%idual &4ecific ia&, /hich /ould create a correlation et/een an&/er& to different5ue&tion&3 !f the different mea&ure& of corru4tion really mea&ured corru4tion in the munici4al

go%ernment, one /ould e<4ect the an&/er& to e correlated acro&& &ur%ey&3 One /ould, in 4articular, e<4ect the munici4al admini&trator&0 re&4on&e& to e correlated /ith that of munici4alhealth officer&, a& they are oth re&4on&ile to the munici4al go%ernment3 The )?#S officer i&e&&entially a central go%ernment a44ointee, &o there i& no 4re&um4ti%e rea&on to e<4ect acorrelation /ith corru4tion in the )?#S office3 One /ould al&o e<4ect each 4ulic official0&corru4tion 4erce4tion to e correlated /ith hou&ehold corru4tion 4erce4tion&3 !ndeed, there i&

;-



4o&iti%e ut /eak correlation et/een the admini&trator and health officer corru4tion indice&, and et/een the&e indice& and hou&ehold 4erce4tion&3+.

(ecau&e the munici4al admini&trator&0 and munici4al health officer&0 corru4tion 4erce4tion& are oth likely to e noi&y 4erce4tion& of one 4er&on, a H4ulic official& corru4tion inde<I /a&

con&tructed comining the an&/er& of munici4al admini&trator& and munici4al health officer&3 !fthe re&ulting inde< /ere a etter mea&ure of corru4tion, one /ould e<4ect it to e more highlycorrelated /ith hou&ehold 4erce4tion& than either com4onent3 !ndeed, thi& i& found to e theca&e, a& the comined inde< i& correlated at .3-= CPB%alueW.3.+D /ith hou&ehold corru4tion 4erce4tion&3

There i& &ome 5ue&tion of ho/ good i& the mea&ure of hou&ehold corru4tion 4erce4tion& that ha& een otained3 One /ay to e<amine thi& i& to regre&& the corru4tion 4erce4tion& of eachhou&ehold on the corru4tion 4erce4tion& of all other hou&ehold& in the munici4ality3 Thi&regre&&ion 5uoted elo/ &ho/& an im4re&&i%e corre&4ondence et/een hou&ehold corru4tion 4erce4tion& and tho&e of other& in the munici4ality CtB&tat& elo/ coefficient&D3

#orru4tion>>iW3:+ Y.3:+#orru4tion >>G Y.3.99#orru4tion PO " -W.3-9C-3:D C+=37D C.3=D 1W+.9

Thi& highly &ignificant coefficient, /hich i& indi&tingui&hale from +, &ho/& a &trong correlationamong the 4erce4tion& of different hou&ehold& in the munici4ality3 !t i&, ho/e%er, im4ortant to 4oint out that a high coefficient could e generated y &ome &hared ia& among hou&ehold&3>o/e%er, the high correlation among hou&ehold& i& an im4ortant 4iece of &ugge&ti%e e%idenceaout the 5uality of the corru4tion data, and taken together /ith correlation& acro&& &ur%ey& doe&&ugge&t that the&e mea&ure& of corru4tion do mea&ure &ome underlying reality3

'hile the&e &tati&tical te&t& do &ugge&t that the information otained from re&4ondent& doe&ca4ture &ome underlying reality, they do not 4ro%ide any rea&&urance on the a&ence ofre&4ondent ia&3 !n the &ame Euri&diction different re&4ondent& may gi%e different a&&e&&ment& of the le%el of corru4tion ecau&e they like to com4lain Cthe Hgri4eI factorD, ecau&e they are frankCthe H&traightBtalkingI factorD, ecau&e they ha%e different definition& of corru4tion, Cthe H/hati&I factorD or ecau&e they are le&& likely to ha%e heard of Cor rememerD corru4tion Cthe HrecallIfactorD3 All the&e difference& /ould &ho/ u4 in re&4ondent&0 a&&e&&ment& of oth local andnational corru4tion3 1ational corru4tion i& faced e5ually y e%eryone in our &am4le, andtherefore difference& in 4erce4tion of national corru4tion mu&t, almo&t y definition, reflect &omekind of 4erce4tion ia&3 Thu&, a&&e&&ment of national corru4tion can e u&ed to clean themea&ure& of local corru4tion of re&4ondent ia&3 )ifferent re&4on&e& on other form& of &ocial 4athologie& like &ocial difference&, /ithin the &ame locality, may al&o ca4ture Hgri4ingI andH&traightBtalkingI ia&3 Other factor& like education and acce&& to media may al&o influence 4erce4tion& of corru4tion3

+. The re&earch team al&o tried to create a cleaner mea&ure of corru4tion y filtering out 4erce4tion ia& u&ing a

method de&cried elo/3 The cleaned corru4tion 4erce4tion& of hou&ehold& are correlated /ith admini&trator& andhealth official& at .3+= and .3+: re&4ecti%ely3

;;



To clean the a&&e&&ment& of localBle%el corru4tion of re&4ondent ia&, a regre&&ion of a&&e&&ment&of local corru4tion /a& run on munici4ality dummie&, a&&e&&ment& of national corru4tion and&ocial difference&J education, income and uran re&idenceJ and media acce&& and u&e CAnne<Tale ;D3 Perce4tion& of national corru4tion /ere a highly &ignificant 4redictor of 4erce4tion& oflocal corru4tion3 The coefficient of .3+7 mean& that 4erce4tion ia& could account for +7R of

the difference& in the a&&e&&ment& of corru4tion3 A&&e&&ment& of &ocial difference& /ere al&o 4o&iti%ely and &ignificantly related to 4erce4tion& of local corru4tion, 4erha4& al&o ca4turing&ome Hgri4eI ia&3 2inally, education /a& al&o a highly &ignificant 4redictor of a&&e&&ment& ofcorru4tion, &ugge&ting the e<i&tence of a H/hat i&I ia&educated hou&ehold& may definecorru4tion more roadlyor a HrecallI effect3 The mea&ure of hou&ehold corru4tion a&&e&&ment&/a& then con&tructed y taking the munici4ality mean& of the re&idual& of thi& regre&&ion3 Similar e<erci&e& /ere re4eated to clean the 4erce4tion& of munici4al health officer& and munici4aladmini&trator& Cregre&&ion& in Anne< Tale D3 The&e regre&&ion& yielded &imilar ut /eaker 4erha4& ecau&e of the much &maller &am4le &ize&e%idence of a 4erce4tion ia& among 4ulicofficial&3

#ost effectiveness

The &tudy e<amined another mea&ure related to 4roducti%e efficiency, that of pay5ent delays3Official& at health facilitie& and 4rimary &chool& /ere a&ked aout delay& in getting a ne/em4loyee on the 4ayroll, and in recei%ing their o/n &alarie& and allo/ance&3 The re&ult& CTale:D &ho/ that delay& in 4ayment& of &alarie& and allo/ance& are not uncommone&4ecially in 4rimary &chool&and that in 4rimary &chool& Cut not health facilitie&D hiring delay& are afre5uent 4rolem3

Ta3e 1> Faciitie!@ Re!#o$!e! o$ Pa*)e$t Dea*! I$%e8Phii##i$e!

Heath Faciit*

>o/ often ha& there een a delay of more than one month ingetting a ne/ health /orker on a 4ayrollM

;

!n the la&t year, /ere there any nonB4ayment& or delay ofmore than t/o /eek& in the 4ayment of your &alaryM

+:

!n the la&t year, /ere there any nonB4ayment& or delay ofmore than t/o /eek& in the 4ayment of your allo/ance&M

:

Pri)ar* Schoo

>o/ often ha& there een a delay of more than one month ingetting a ne/ teacher on a 4ayrollM

-9

!n the la&t year, /ere there any nonB4ayment& or delay ofmore than t/o /eek& in the 4ayment of your &alaryM

-.

!n the la&t year, /ere there any nonB4ayment& or delay ofmore than t/o /eek& in the 4ayment of your allo/ance&M +:

1oteF The inde< i& a&ed on the follo/ing formulaF CC.*R re&4onded ne%erDYC+*R re&4onded &ometime&DYC-*R re&4onded mo&t of the timeDYC;*R re&4onded al/ay&DD;3 The inde< i& &caled . to +..3

Cost recovery

#o&t reco%ery i& another criterion for efficiency3 Some theori&t& ha%e a&&umed thatdecentralization might lead to etter co&t reco%ery, oth ecau&e local hou&ehold& /ould e more

;



/illing, either through direct 4ayment& or through more con&cientiou& 4ayment of ta<e&, to co%er the co&t of &er%ice& etter matching their o/n 4reference&, than /ould e the ca&e for &er%ice& 4ro%ided /ithout regard for local 4reference&3 !n the Phili44ine&, the 4erformance of local ta<collection i& influenced y a range of i&&ue& related to the decentralization 4roce&&3 The&e i&&ue&are re%ie/ed here, follo/ed y &ur%ey data3

<ocal evenue 7d5inistration roble5s

'hile increa&ing local ta<ing authority, the LG# al&o con&train& local re%enue collection throughrule& on rate&, a&&e&&ment&, a44eal&, and re%enue admini&tration re&4on&iilitie& CGOL) +9B.-D3 The #ode0& limitation& on LG$ ta<ing 4o/er& al&o concern the &co4e and ty4e& of 4ermitted ta<e&, a& /ell a& rate&the&e are li&ted in the #ode and include a 4rohiition on localincome ta<e&3 !t regulate& the treatment of earmarked fund& &uch a& the S4ecial ?ducation 2und,i3e3, &4ecifying the 4ro4erty le%ie& through /hich the&e fund& are rai&ed, and rule& on thea44lication of the 4roceed&3 To a &ignificant degree, central go%ernment re5uirement&com4romi&e local re%enue autonomy3 Some of the limitation& a44ear in the LG#, ut other&

ha%e come into force more recently and ha%e a more ad hoc and 4olitical character3 An e<am4leof thi& are circular& from the )e4artment of @u&tice C)O@D and the )e4artment of !nterior andLocal Go%ernment C)!LGD e<em4ting lotterie& from local licen&ing re5uirement&a limitationon oth re%enue &ource& and 4olicy initiati%e for LG$&3 At the &ame time, the LocalGo%ernment Su4er%i&ion ureau of )!LG i& de%elo4ing a Hde%olution &core cardI to mea&ureLG$ 4erformance C(rillante& +D3 Thi& 4ut& local go%ernment& in &ome/hat of a ind, ha%ingto conform to central di&ci4line&, ut /ith re&tricted lee/ay to finance and im4lement them3

The ao%e con&traint& ha%e elicited t/o reaction& from local go%ernment&3 Some ha%ere&4onded /ith inno%ation& in moilizing and con&er%ing re&ource&3 2or e<am4le, in the healthfield, &ome LG$& ha%e organized %olunteer&, 4laced arangay health &tation& in 4ri%ate home&,

hired 4artBtime /orker&, and &olicited hel4 from donor&, 1GO&, and the 4ri%ate &ector CLoehr andana&an +D3 The &econd, roader trend ha& een a lag in local ta< collection rate&3 The LG#changed the con&traint& on local ta<e& from a more rigid &chedule &4ecifying rate& for all li&tedta<e&, to a rate ceiling3 Thi& did not &timulate careful &etting of rate& /ithin the ceiling&, a& had een antici4ated, in order to o4timize local re%enue&3 "ather, local go%ernment& tend &im4ly toim4o&e the ceiling rate& /ithout a&&e&&ing the likely re%enue con&e5uence&, /hich contriute& to&uBo4timal collection&3 A& &ugge&ted ao%e, LG$& al&o rely hea%ily on the !"A for theirre%enue need&3 Thi& tem4tation ha& 4ro%en hard to re&i&t, &ince local a&&emlie& C4roalycorrectlyD ha%e u&ually determined that 4ro4o&ing local ta< increa&e& /ould create too much 4olitical ri&k for negligile o%erall re%enue gain3 The efficiency of local ta< collection ha& &ho/na declining trend in recent year&, a& &ugge&ted ao%e, oth 4rom4ted y and adding to the dro4 in

fi&cal autonomy ratio&3 #ollection rate& o%erall im4ro%ed from the midB+=.& into the early+.&, ut a44ear to ha%e &tagnated or e%en lo&t ground &ince then Cana&an -..., ana&an+;, inter%ie/&D3

There are a numer of rea&on& for thi&3 The data needed for 4ro4er ta< a&e a&&e&&ment& areinade5uate, hence collection target& are Hgue&&timate&I and collection rate& are a&ed on fla/edmea&urement&3 Although the national #ommi&&ion on Audit C#OAD collect& data on local 4ro4erty ta< a&e&, o&er%er& &ay that the&e are not com4ared to local data in order to en&ure

;7



accurate mea&urement3 !n addition, the )e4artment of 2inance0& (ureau of Local Go%ernment2inance C(LG2D continue& to a44oint and &u4er%i&e local trea&urer&3 Trea&urer& Clike teacher&D 4lay an im4ortant role in local election admini&tration and %ote com4utation Callot& are countedin the trea&urer0& officeD, hence the 4ercei%ed need for them to e inde4endent of localgo%ernment& and 4olitic&3 Though the&e trea&urer& are 4aid locally, they are not tru&ted y local

e<ecuti%e& &ince they are out&ider& Cy de&ignD3 The trea&urer& are generally not familiar /ithlocal 4lanning 4roce&&e& and udget con&traint&, and LG$ e<ecuti%e& tend to marginalize them tothe e<tent 4o&&ile3 The trea&urer&0 4o&ition, in turn, negati%ely affect& their 4erformance of localta< a&&e&&ment&3 La&t, munici4alitie& rely &u&tantially on the community or 4oll ta< forre%enue, /hich make& them de4endent on a ta< in&trument /idely %ie/ed a& regre&&i%e andillegitimate3 Thi& i& likely to e e&4ecially true in 4oorer and le&& uranized area&, /here u&ine&& ta< recei4t& and other fee& yield relati%ely little re%enue3

A& in the ca&e of local trea&urer&, the central go%ernment ha& attem4ted to collaorate /ith localgo%ernment& to im4ro%e collection&ut /ith di&a44ointing re&ult&3 The +9 8AT la/Camending the LG#D offered LG$& a &hare of locallyBcollected 8AT, in order to encourage acti%e

local coo4eration /ith the (ureau of !nternal "e%enue C(!"D in ta< collection3 Thi& doe& nota44ear to ha%e /orked Ca 4o&&ile e<4lanation i& offered ao%eD3 Ta< collector& at all le%el& arethought to e under4aid and 4rone to corru4tion3 (!" ha& een called a Hhoted of corru4tion,Iand it& agent& are &aid intentionally to under collect in order to &aotage their &u4erior&3 Thi&,de&4ite a fe/ round& of reform aimed at cleaning u4 (!" and modernizing it& &y&tem&3#urrently, mo&t national ta<e& are collected through the anking &y&tem, and in rare ca&e&ta<4ayer& can remit to their munici4al go%ernment&ut not directly to (!" &taff3 Additionally,(!" i& deconcentrating it& o4eration& through regional office&, /hich &hould im4ro%e ta<admini&tration3 1e%erthele&&, collection& continue to &uffer, and e%a&ion i& chronic and/ide&4read3

"eal 4ro4erty ta<e& are a main&tay of local 4ulic finance, 4articularly in uran area&3 $nder theLG#, real 4ro4erty ta<e& can e im4o&ed y the local go%ernment& /ithin con&traint& defined ythe #ode and )e4artment of 2inance C)O2D regulation&3 The 4ro%ince&, citie&, and munici4alitie&conduct 4ro4erty ta< a&&e&&ment and rateB&etting, although the )O2 retain& the authority to &eto%erall rule& for 4ro4erty cla&&ification and a44rai&al, a& /ell a& for ta< a&&e&&ment3 The LG#al&o 4ro%ide& for a &4ecial 4ro4erty le%y to &u44ort education C&ee elo/D3 Pro4erty ta< re%enue&are di&triuted ;7R to the 4ro%ince&, .R to the munici4alitie&, and -7R to the arangay&3Although many of the rule& are determined centrally, the agent& /ho carry out a&&e&&ment& andcollection& are locallyBa44ointed3 #oncern& ha%e fre5uently een %oiced aout 4oliticized hiring, 4olitical interference in a44rai&al&, the lack of 5ualified local a&&e&&ment 4er&onnel, inade5uate 4ro4erty ta< record&, and the fact that the &ame local agent /ill generally &er%e a& oth a&&e&&orand collector3

Aggregate collection rate& are e&timated to ha%e remained Eu&t under 9.R during the +.&, andthe a&&e&&ed 4ro4erty %alue& them&el%e& are elie%ed to e artificially lo/3 The LG# call& for reBa&&e&&ment e%ery ; year&3 >o/e%er, local 4olitic& make& it hard to rai&e a&&e&&ment& or tocomat the tendency for local council& to cut ta<e& or create e<em4tion& for them&el%e& and theircronie&3 1ot &ur4ri&ingly, local 4ro4erty ta< roll& are generally outdated, undera&&e&&ment i&chronic, and collection& &uffer3 One rea&on for lagging a&&e&&ment& i& that Cat lea&t in &ome

;9



ca&e&D, u4dating 4ro4erty a&&e&&ment& re5uire& legi&lation, /hich face& daunting 4oliticalo&tacle&3 !n addition, the rate of delin5uency i& high in 4art ecau&e local go%ernment& cannotforeclo&e on 4ro4ertie& in 4ractice, mainly for 4olitical rea&on&3 On the more o4timi&tic &ide,&ome uran Euri&diction& ha%e u&ed HzonalI 4ro4erty %alue& to im4ro%e collection&, and localta<e& on gro&& u&ine&& recei4t& ha%e u&ually 4ro%en uoyant Cana&an +, 1T"# +:,

inter%ie/&D3

Survey Data on Ta6 #ollection

The one mea&ure of co&t reco%ery otained in the Phili44ine& &ur%ey /a& of actual ta< collectiona& a 4ercentage of e<4ected or 4roEected ta<e& CTale =D3 The&e data are a&ed on re&4on&e& from 4ro%incial official&J &ome ia&e& and inaccuracie& may thu& e 4re&ent3 1e%erthele&&, the data&ho/ an intere&tingly /ide di&4arity of re&4on&e&, ranging from Laguna Pro%ince, /here actualta<e& e<ceeded tho&e 4roEected y +R, to Ta/iBTa/i, /here actual& /ere only -;R of the 4roEected collection3 Ta/iBTa/i /a& the one 4ro%ince in the AA", notale for it& e&4ecially 4oor go%ernance C&ee #ha4ter !!D, that /a& included in the &ur%ey3

Ta3e 9> Ta8 Coectio$ Perce$ta2e 3* Pro-i$cePro-i$ce re!#o$!e! Mea$ Sta$%ar%

De-iatio$

!&aela 9 =.R 1ue%a 8i&caya ; 7R ;(ulacan ::R ;Pam4anga - =R ;Zamale& + 9R 3(atanga& ; =9R :;#a%ite ; =R :Laguna - ++R ;+ 1egro& Occidental ; .R +

(ohol ; =7R +#eu - =-R -7Samar . 3Zamoanga del Sur 7 7-R -:(ukidnon - 7R +-Ta/iBTa/i + -;R 3Agu&an del 1orte - =R ;+Surigao del 1orte + +..R 3Surigao del Sur + 9R 3i&ami& Oriental - :-R . 1#" ; =;R +

Tota 0, 1< 45

Su55ary

!n &ummary, /ith regard to allocative efficiency, it /a& found that hou&ehold 4reference& /ithregard to u&e of additional local funding re%ealed road& and other infra&tructure a& the main 4riority, rather than health and educationJ a44arently reflecting citizen&0 4erce4tion& /ith regard

;:



to ade5uacy of e<i&ting funding and the mo&t urgent &hortfall&3 unici4al official& /ere to a&u&tantial e<tent a/are of the&e 4reference&, /herea& 4ro%incial official& &ho/ed no e%idence of kno/ledge aout local demand&3 The main a&4ect of productive efficiency addre&&ed /a& corru4tion, /hich /a& /idely 4ercei%ed y official& them&el%e& to e a 4rolem, and the&e 4erce4tion& /ere in line /ith tho&e of hou&ehold&3 'hile corru4tion at the aranguay and

munici4al go%ernment& /a& &een a& le&& 4ronounced than at the 4ro%incial and nationalgo%ernment&, corru4tion at all le%el& of go%ernment /a& 4ercei%ed a& &u&tantial3 On anothera&4ect of 4roducti%e efficiency, delay& in 4ayment& of &alarie& and allo/ance&, and hiring delay&,/ere a fre5uent 4rolem3 The one a&4ect of cost recovery e<amined in the &tudy /a& ta<collection, /hich &ho/ed /ide %ariation among 4ro%ince&3 Thi& i& an area /here local autonomyha& een com4romi&ed y central go%ernment con&traint&J and di&incenti%e& to local ta<collection ha%e a44arently een created y large tran&fer& from the central go%ernment3

;=



Cha#ter V> Per+or)a$ce Factor!: Ci-ic Di!ci#i$e!

A& &ugge&ted earlier, the fa%orale outcome& &ome theori&t& ha%e 4redicted for decentralizationcan only come aout if certain ty4e& of eha%ior are 4re&ent among oth go%ernment official&

and ordinary citizen&3 2ir&t and foremo&t, there i& the notion that local go%ernment &omeho/entail& a greater degree of de facto accountaility, ecau&e of local citizen&0 H%oiceImakingtheir de&ire& Cand com4laint&D directly kno/n to local official&, or through %oting or other kind&of 4olitical action, 4re&&uring official& to enforce &uch de&ire&3 Thi& 4re&um4tion, in turn, i& a&ed on the &u44o&ition that citizen& are in fact /ellBinformed aout the 5uality of the 4ulic&er%ice& eing deli%ered3 A further theory &ugge&t& that an inducement for local 4olitician&, andthe official& &uEect to their leader&hi4, i& that 4oor 4ulic &er%ice& in their locality /ill lead toHe<itIF either u&e of alternati%e 4ri%ate facilitie& or emigrationi3e3, citizen& H%oting /ith theirfeetIand thi& in turn /ill ring unde&irale con&e5uence&, &uch a& a /eakening of the ta< a&eand reduced re4re&entation in the national go%ernment3 The %alidity of the&e three conce4t& %oting and 4olitical action, information, and e<itand their rele%ance in the 2ili4ino conte<t are

e<amined in turn in thi& cha4ter3 An additional &uB&ection deal& /ith the ethnic dimen&ion in 4olitical 4artici4ation and media u&e3

(oice: (oting and %olitical Action

Thi& &ection in%e&tigate& the &ource& of direct 4olitical di&ci4line on local and nationalgo%ernment& through election&, more &4ecificallyF iD /hether 4eo4le %ote more in local ornational election&, and iiD /hether they %ote for different rea&on& in local or national election&3The follo/ing &ur%ey 5ue&tion& /ere a&ked for that 4ur4o&eF

)id you %ote in the la&t 4re&idential election&M !f ye&, /hat factor& influenced /ho you %oted forM

)id you %ote in the la&t munici4al election&M !f ye&, /hat factor& influenced /ho you %oted forM

"e4orted turnout& are %ery high in oth local and national election&F =. and =9 4ercentre&4ecti%ely3 Among the 4o&&ile rea&on& affecting /ho to %ote for, it /a& found that characteri&&ue& are the mo&t im4ortant factor in oth local and national election& C;7R in local and -7R innational election&D3 Other im4ortant factor& are 4a&t 4erformance and agenda at the local le%el, 4roBredi&triuti%e CH4roB4oorID 5ualitie&, agenda, 4a&t 4erformance, and 5ualification& at thenational le%el3 'hile %oting on the a&i& of 4a&t 4erformance i& more 4re%alent at the local le%elC+7R %&3 R tW;37.D, &ome more &uEecti%e rea&on& for %oting religion, ethnicity, and eing 4aid y candidatethough not fre5uently re4orted a& rea&on& for %oting, are &lightly more 4er%a&i%e at the local le%el CR in munici4al election& and ;R in national election&D3 8oting for

ac5uaintance& i& al&o more 4re%alent in local election&3 (eing 4roBredi&triuti%e i& a moreim4ortant rea&on for %oting in national election&, /hich i& to e e<4ected a& redi&triuti%e 4olicie& are likely to e more effecti%e at the national le%el CTale D

;



Ta3e ,> ?h* Peo#e Vote i$ Eectio$!C&cale . to +D

Local ?lection& 1ational ?lection& tBte&t

Agenda .3.=9C.3.+.D

.3.9C.3.+.D

B.399

Political affiliation .3..-C.3..-D .3..-C.3..-D .3.9

Pa&t 4erformance .3+C.3.+;D

.3.;C.3.+.D

;37.

Paid y candidate .3..-7C.3..-D

.3..+C.3..+D

.39-

"eligion .3..9C.3..;D

.3..;C.3..-D

.3:=

?thnicity .3.;+C.3..:D

.3.-=C.3..9D

.3;

Nualificationeducation .3.:=

C.3..D

.3..

C.3.+.D

B.3==

#haracter .3;C.3.+:D

.3-7-C.3.+7D

3;

1e/de&ire for change .3.+C.3..D

.3.--C.3..-D

B+3;;

ProB4oor .3.+C.3..:D

.3+7.C.3.+-D

B:3=+

!nfluenced yofficial&local leader&

.3.+.C.3..;D

.3.+C.3..D

B+37-

!nfluenced y&4ou&efamilyfriend&

.3.;:C.3..:D

.3.9C.3..:D

B.3=:

!nfluenced y media . .3..;C.3..-D

B+3:;

Ac5uaintance .3.-+C.3..+D

.3..;C.3..-D

;3--

Po4ular .3.+9C.3..D

.3.-;C.3..7D

B+3.:

To/nmate .3..:C.3..;D

.3.+.C.3..;D

B.39:

Peo4le0& kno/ledge of local and national 4olitic& /a& te&ted y a&king them the name& of the%iceB4re&ident of the country, mayor and %iceBmayor of the munici4ality they are li%ing in3 The

re&ult& &ho/ enormou& di&cre4ancy et/een kno/ledge of local and national go%ernment&3 + 4ercent of the 4eo4le named the %iceB4re&ident correctly, /herea& only + 4ercent of the 4eo4le&ucceeded in naming their mayor or %iceBmayor 3++

++ The rea&on& for com4aring kno/ledge of the viceB4re&ident /ith kno/ledge of the mayor are al&o tellBtale3 'einitially /anted to a&k aout the 4re&ident and the mayor, ut our &ur%ey team ad%i&ed u& that &ince e%eryone kne/the 4re&ident they /ould gi%e &arca&tic an&/er& to the 5ue&tion3

.



The &ur%ey al&o in5uired aout the e<tent of 4olitical action among 4eo4le /ith the follo/ing5ue&tionF

!n the 4a&t year, ha%e 4eo4le in your %illageto/n met to re5ue&t that official& addre&& a &4ecific i&&ueM Cfor e<am4le,im4ro%ement of health 4ro%i&ion, local road&, /ater deli%ery, etc3D

o&t 4eo4le C7RD cited &uch 4olitical action in their community and more than ;;R of the&eaction& re4ortedly ecame &ucce&&ful in achie%ing their oEecti%e&3 Thi& in it&elf i& an intere&tingre&ult, and an e<amination of the determinant& of &ucce&&ful 4olitical action /ould e a/orth/hile focu& of future re&earch3

(oice: ,edia and 8no9ledge

8oting and other 4olitical action are likely to ha%e 4o&iti%e re&ult& only if a&ed on correctinformation3 Therefore, the &ur%ey in%e&tigated the &ource& of information in local and national 4olitic&3 >ou&ehold& /ere a&ked the follo/ing 5ue&tion&F

'hat i& your family0& main &ource of information aout e%ent& and 4olitic& in thi& areaM

'hat i& your family0& main &ource of information aout national e%ent& and 4olitic&M

The &ur%ey re%ealed that the 4redominant 4rimary &ource for ne/& of national 4olitic& i&tele%i&ion, /hich i& u&ed y 9R of re&4ondent& CTale +.D3 (y contra&t tele%i&ion i& u&ed a& the 4rimary &ource for local ne/& y only --R of re&4ondent&3+- "adio i& u&ed a& a &ource of othlocal and national ne/& y a44ro<imately +; of re&4ondent&, and ne/&4a4er& y ;BR3 2orlocal ne/&, hou&ehold& are far more likely to u&e friend& and family C-.R for local %&3 +R fornational, tB&tatW+.3D, and official& C+=R for local ne/& %&3 +R for national, tB&tatW+.37.D3 Theu&e of official& for ne/& aout their o/n 4erformance i& /orri&ome, a& it tend& to undermine

4olitical di&ci4line& on local go%ernment and at /or&t lead& to elite ca4ture of local go%ernment3

+- Thi& i& a highly &ignificant difference, /ith the tB&tat for u&ing T8 for local %&3 national ne/& of [+93+-3

+



Ta3e ./> So"rce! o+ I$+or)atio$ o$ Poitic!Percentage of Peo4le $&ing ?ach Source CGi%en a &ource i& u&ed, &cale . to +D

Local Politic& 1ational Politic& tBte&t for difference et/een the t/o re&ult&

Tele%i&ion

.3--+

C.3.+:D

.39;7

C.3.+D

B+93+-

"adio.3;;-

C.3.-.D.3;.:

C.3.+=D.3+

1e/&4a4er .3.;.

C.3.:+D.3.;:

C.3..:DB.39:

Official&.3+=+

C.3.+9D.3..=

C.3..;D+.37.

#i%ic A&&ociation&.3.+

C.3..7D.3..;

C.3..-D-3.

Peo4le1eighor2riend&2amily

.3+7C.3.+:D

.3..C.3..D

+.3+

!n&ide !nformation .3.+=C.3..9D

.3..-C.3..-D

-3=.

Other .3+.7

C.3..D..

-39

Total edia.37=;

C.3.-.D.3:

C.3.+.DB+93

1o Source.3+

C.3.+7D.3+9

C.3.+7D;37:

Pattern& in the &ource& of information on 4olitic& are reflected in &ource& of information on

corru4tion3 Tele%i&ion i& again, y far, the 4remier &ource of information on corru4tion innational 4olitic&3 "adio i& no/ &ignificantly more im4ortant a& a &ource of local information,/hich i& &ur4ri&ing, gi%en the larger numer of local radio &tation&3 Official& are again morelikely a& a &ource of local information on corru4tion, a& are friend& and family3 >o/e%er, a&&ho/n y 2igure , official& are le&& im4ortant a& a &ource of ne/& on corru4tion than 4olitic& /hen official& con%ey 4olitical ne/& to citizen& they might neglect to mention corru4tion3

-



Fi2"re 0> So"rce! o+ I$+or)atio$ o$ Loca Poitic! a$% So"rce! o+ I$+or)atio$ o$ Loca

Corr"#tio$

--icials

% . 1/0)3+ 0/024*

R2 . 0/+(4)

0/05

0

0/05

0/1

0/15

0/2

0/25

0/3

0/35

0/4

0 0/1 0/2 0/3 0/4

Sources of Information on ocal !olitics

(proportion of respondents usin" source)

S o u r c e s o f I n f o r m a t i o n o n o c a l C o

r r u p t i o n

( p r o p o r t i o n o f r e s p o n d e n t u s i n " s

o u r c e )

The determinant& of media u&e for local and national 4olitic& /ere e&timated and the re&ult&&ho/ed, a& e<4ected, that higherBincome and more educated 4eo4le tend to u&e media a& their&ource of ne/&3 The coefficient on uran re&idence i&, ho/e%er, counterBintuiti%ely negati%e foru&e of media a& a &ource of local ne/& CAnne< Tale& 7 and 9D3 1e<t, an attem4t /a& made toanalyze /hether the &ource of ne/& might ia& hou&ehold&0 o4inion& aout 4olitic&, y looking atthe correlation et/een information &ource and the 4erce4tion of corru4tion3 The u&e of mediaC4articularly tele%i&ion and ne/&4a4er&D a& an information &ource ha& a &ignificant and 4o&iti%e

im4act on corru4tion 4erce4tion at the local le%el3 The 4oint e&timate of .3;7; &ugge&t& that 4eo4le /ho u&e the media a& their &ource of ne/& are more likely to ha%e heard re4ort& ofcorru4tion than 4eo4le /ho rely on official& for local ne/& C4oint e&timateW.3+:D, ut thedifference& are not &ignificant3 2or national ne/&, all three &ource& of media, tele%i&ion, radioand ne/&4a4er& ha%e &tati&tically indi&tingui&hale effect& on kno/ledge of corru4tion3 Since=R of re&4ondent& u&ed &ome form of media a& their &ource of national ne/&, /e do not 4re&entregre&&ion& com4aring Hall mediaI /ith other &ource& C&ee Tale ++ and +-D3

;



Ta3e ..> Pro3it E!ti)ate! o+ So"rce! o+ I$+or)atio$ a3o"t Loca Poitic! o$ ?hether

Re!#o$%e$t Ha! Hear% A$* Re#ort! o+ Loca Corr"#tio$

Ra$%o) E++ect

Ra$%o) E++ect

?ith Pro-i$ce

D"))*

Ra$%o) E++ect

Ra$%o) E++ect

?ith Pro-i$ce

D"))*

Tele%i&ion .37;:C;3:+D***

.377C;3:9D***

"adio.3+:9C+3;+D

.3+C+39D

1e/&4a4er .39-;

C+3:=D*.39;

C+3=-D*

Local Official&.3+C+3+.D

.3+:;C.3D

.3+: C+3+-D

.3+:7 C+3.+D

#i%ic A&&ociation&B.39=CB.3D

B.379CB.3=:D

B.39-+CB.3-D

B.37:+CB.3=;D

Peo4le2amily2riend.37

C-397D***.3;

C-39;D***.3

C-39:D**.3+

C-39D**

!n&ide !nformation+3.9+

C-3;7D**

+3+9

C-37;D**

+3.:

C-3;+D**

+3++

C-3:D**Any edia

.3;7;C;3-9D***

.3;9C;3;=D***

Log likelihood B7=937 B773:; B7=3+9 B79-3+9=

#hi- -:3;.*** =:3:*** --3+:** =-3:***

1 ++-. ++-. ++-. ++-.

Ta3e .4> Pro3it E!ti)ate! o+ So"rce! o+ I$+or)atio$ a3o"t Natio$a Poitic! o$ ?hether

Re!#o$%e$t Ha! Hear% A$* Re#ort! o+ Natio$a Corr"#tio$

Ra$%o) E++ect

Ra$%o) E++ect

?ith Pro-i$ce

D"))*Tele%i&ion

.39-=C93-:D***

.37:=C73=+D***

"adio.3;=;

C;3.;D***.3;=-

C;3.;D***

1e/&4a4er .379C+37=D

.3=9C+39D*

Local Official&.3::C+3++D

.3=;.C+3+-D

Peo4le2amily2riend.3.7C.3.D

.3.-C.3.=D

Any edia

Log likelihood B7=937 B993.;

#hi- .39;*** +.;3=9*** 1 ++-. ++-.

2or media co%erage and %oting to e truly effecti%e di&ci4line& on local go%ernment& that inducethem to 4ro%ide etter &er%ice&, 4ulic official& ha%e to e a/are of media co%erage of &er%icedeli%ery and the effect of &er%ice deli%ery on %oting3 The &ur%ey a&ked 4ulic official& 5ue&tion&regarding media co%erage of 4ulic &er%ice& and the effect of 5uality of 4ulic &er%ice& on%oting3 unici4al officer& actually elie%e that munici4al &er%ice& are co%ered more often y



national than local media C7R %&3 ;=R, Tale +;D3 Pro%incial official&, on the other hand, &tatedthat oth local and national media co%er &er%ice deli%ery C7:R and 9-R, re&4ecti%elyD3unici4al officer& re&4onded that &er%ice deli%ery affect& outcome& in oth local and nationalelection& C97R and 7RD, and 4ro%incial admini&trator& e%en more &o C=R and +..RD3 !n&ummary, many munici4al and 4ro%incial officer& a44ear to elie%e that &er%ice deli%ery /ould

affect outcome& in oth local and national election&, and that it i& co%ered in local and nationalmedia3 !n general, thi& i& good ne/& for the 4otential im4act of democracy on &er%ice deli%ery, ut it i& difficult to &ay /hether it i& di&4ro4ortionately etter ne/& for decentralized &er%icedeli%ery3 !n fact, 4ro%incial official& e<4ect more media co%erage, /hich might &ugge&t thatdecentralization to a truly local le%el might dilute media attention to &er%ice deli%ery3

Ta3e .5> Doe! P"3ic Goo% Dei-er* Get Co-ere% i$ the Me%ia a$% A++ect Voti$2CPercentage of re&4ondent& an&/ering in the affirmati%eD

A++ect the

oca -ote

A++ect the

$atio$a

-ote

Loca

)e%ia

co-era2e

Natio$a

)e%ia

co-era2e

N

unici4al >ealth 7R 9R -7R ;7R :B=.

unici4al Admini&trator =R 99R 9-R 9+R :B=.

unici4al )?#S 79R R -9R .R :B=.

>ealth #linic& ;R -R ++R +:R +9.

Pulic School 7R 79R ++R -.R +.B+++

Pri%ate School 7=R 7R +-R ;+R :B

Pro%ince >ealth 7=R :R -=R :R +=B+

Pro%ince Admini&trator .R =R =R -:R +Pro%ince )?#S -9R -9R 7;R :R +

unici4al Official& 97R 7R ;=R 7R =.

Pro%incial Official& -=R 7;R 7:R 9-R +

Another i&&ue con&idered in the &tudy i& /hether media u&e, %oting, and 4olitical action arerelated to a re&4ondent0& ethnic or other &ocioBeconomic characteri&tic&3 A &et of e5uation& /eree&timated /a& run in /hich each of fi%e inde4endent %ariale&u&e of media a& the 4rimary&ource of information on local and national 4olitic&, an inde< com4o&ed of thi& mea&ure and the

fre5uency of reading ne/&4a4er& and li&tening to the radio, %oting rate&, %oting for rea&on&unrelated to 4er&onal or communal loyaltie&, and 4artici4ating in 4olitical action/a& regre&&edon maEor ethnic grou4&, income, education, and uranrural location3

A& e<4ected, income and education are &ignificant determinant& of media u&eJ education ut notincome im4ro%e& the 4roaility of %oting, and %oting for i&&ueBoriented rea&on& CTale +D3Political action i& actually more 4re%alent in rural area&3 A numer of ethnicitie& had 4erce4tileeffect& on %oting media u&e and 4olitical action Cthe leftBout grou4 u&ed a& the 4oint of

7



com4ari&on i& Hother,I com4o&ed of a numer of &mall ethnic grou4& /hich together com4ri&e++R of our &am4leD3 The Kam4angan di&4layed the mo&t ci%ic %irtue y u&ing media the mo&t,%oting, and %oting for oEecti%e rea&on&3 The >iligayon and the Surigaonon al&o u&ed mediamore often than the HotherI category and %oted more often for oEecti%e rea&on&, ut did not %otemore often3 The larger ethnic grou4&, #euano and Tagalog, re4ort u&ing media more often3

There /ere al&o a numer of other &ignificant coefficient& of different ethnicity %ariale& &ho/nin Tale +3 The coefficient& /ere generally 4o&iti%ely correlated, &ugge&ting that ethnicityaffect& different a&4ect& of ci%ic %irtue and 4olitical a/arene&& in &imilar /ay&3 One intere&tinge<ce4tion i& that 4olitical action, /hich might e communally moti%ated, i& not correlated /ith%oting for i&&ueBoriented rea&on&3

Ta3e .0> Poitica A7are$e!! Acro!! Ho"!eho%! o+ Di++ere$t Eth$icitie!So"rce o+

i$+o)e%ia

Me%ia i$%e8 Vote Vote +or

2oo%

Poitica

actio$

(icolano CnWD.3.-7

C.3;;;D.3+:=***C;3.7D

B.3=.CB+3.=;D

B.3.7-CB.3=;D

B.3;.:***CB-3=;7D

#euano CnW-9.D.3+.:**C-3;9+D

.3+.-C+3;.=D

.3;++C.37.D

.3.--C.3--D

B.3.7+CB+3.7+D

!locano CnW+.7D.3.:*C+3==;D

B.3.9CB+3+79D

B.3.;.CB+3++D

.3.:=C.3:9.D

B.3+:CB+3.=+D

!longgo CnW=;D.3+.9*C+3==7D

B.3-=;*CB+3=;.D

B.3:+=CB+37.7D

.3+-.C+37=.D

B.3-+:***CB;3:9D

Ka4am4angan CnWD.3+-***C;3;;D

.3++:*C+3:97D

.3.:.**C-3.;.D

.3-.7***C-399:D

B.3+++**CB-3.9+D

8i&aya C$n&4ecifiedD CnW7D.3+.**C-3-;7D

.3+;+**C-3.;.D

B.3+.+*CB+3=;D

.3.;C+3--9D

.3.;C.3;9=D

'aray CnW;DB.3.:

CB+3;.D.3.9=

C+3.;D.3.7=*C+3=+9D

.3.9-C.3::=D

.3-+***C93=:7D

>iligaynon CnWD.3+=7***C3-+-D

.3++:*C+3:D

B.3..CB.3=7D

.3-+**C-+7D

.3++:C-3797D

Surigaonon CnWD.3+-=***C;3;;-D

.3+:;**C-3;+-D

B.3.-**CB-3+9D

.3+:.**C--9;D

.3+-***C;3.+D

Tagalog CnW--D .3.7C.37D

.3+7-***C-3D

B.3..:CB.3+:D

.3.-C.3..D

B.+9CB+3+D

Log income.3.7***C;3:-D

.3.7***C93.:+D

B.3..=CB.377D

.3.+C+39;D

.3.=+C.37=7D

?ducation.3..;***C73.-D

.3..-**C-399D

.3..-***C-3D

.3..-**C-3+=:D

.3..+C+37.D

$ranB.3.

CB+39.;D.3.=7***C;3-:+D

B.3..;CB+3.7D

B.3.+=C.3;+D

B.3.=.*CB+37D

#on&tant CnW+-DB.3.

CB+3+-DB.3.+:

CB.3+;;D.3=-9***C3.9D

.3.+.C.3.9=D

.37=9***C:377:D

1 +.+ +.+ +.+ +.+ ::

2 te&t -39+*** :3::*** 3-*** +939-*** =737-***

"- .3.9 .3;; .3.; .3.; .3.=

1oteF ?thnic grou4& /hich re4re&ent at lea&t +R of the 4o4ulation are &ho/n3

9



Exit

An im4ortant a&4ect of He<itI i& the u&e of alternati%e facilitie& to tho&e 4ro%ided y the 4ulic&ector3 !n the &am4le hou&ehold& &ur%eyed, only R of the children attended nonBgo%ernment

&chool&3 >o/e%er, hou&ehold u&e of 4ri%ate health unit& /a& 5uite e<ten&i%e, a%eraging +R,+;

and %arying from :R in &ome 4ro%ince& to ;R in other& CAnne< Tale :D3

!n the fi&cal federali&m literature, moility of indi%idual& CH%oting /ith one0& feetD i& con&idereda& an im4ortant di&ci4line that underlie& etter 4roducti%e and Ce&4eciallyD allocati%e efficiency atlocal le%el& of go%ernment3 To a&&e&& the im4ortance of moility in Phili44ine&, the &ur%ey a&kedhou&ehold& the rea&on they li%e in their %illageto/n and the rea&on they 4lan to mo%e to another%illageto/n in the ne<t year Cif they 4lan to mo%eD3

The large&t grou4 among re&4ondent& cited em4loyment a& the 4rimary rea&on of their re&idencyC;RD, follo/ed y eing nati%e of the 4lace C-RD and eing clo&er to 4arent& or relati%e&

C+-RD3 >ealth &er%ice&educationtran&4ortation 5uality i& cited y -R of the hou&ehold& andonly + out of ++-. re&4ondent& mentioned 5uality of go%ernment CTale +7D3

+; >ou&ehold& /ere re&4onding to the 5ue&tion H!f you or a memer of your family i& &ick and re5uire& treatment,/here do you u&ually goMI

:



Ta3e .(> Mo3iit*

'hy do you li%ehereM

CR of totalD

)o you 4lan tomigrateM

CR of re&4ondent&mentioning a

4articular factorD

'hy you 4lan tomigrateM

CR of re&4ondent& 4lanning to migrateD

Parent&"elati%e& Li%e >ere+;7

C+-3.7D;=

C-=3+D

@o?m4loyment=;

C;3+-D:

C+37D-

C-3.:D

Land>ou&e O/ner&hi477

C3+D;

C73;D

>ealth Ser%ice SchoolNualityTran&4ortation

-+C+3==D

-C37-D

C39D

Nuality of Go%ernment+

C.3.D.

C.3...

C.3..D

Ance&tor&1ati%e-:-

C-3-D+=

C939-D

Li%ing ?<4en&e&:.

C93;+D+.

C93+:D+9

C+37D

Other =;

C:3;;D

C-37D;9

C;3=7D

1++-.

C+..3..D=-

C:3;-D=-

C+..3..D

?ightyBt/o hou&ehold& C:RD ha%e 4lan& to mo%e to another city3 Of +;7 hou&ehold& /ho cited 4arent& and relati%e& a& the rea&on of their re&idency, ;= of them C-=RD are among tho&e 4eo4le/ho 4lan to mo%e3 !f the ratio C-=RD i& truly re4re&entati%e of the Phili44ine&, it could &ignal ademogra4hic &hift a/ay from an e<tended family &tructure to nuclear familie&F thi& 4o&&ile &hift

might e of &ufficient im4ortance to /arrant further &tudy3 The 4rimary rea&on for 4lanning tomo%e out i& related to em4loyment C-RD and li%ing e<4en&e& C-.RD4rimarily rent increa&e&38ery fe/ cited education or go%ernment health &er%ice& a& rea&on& for mo%ing CTale +7D3

>o/ &hould the&e re&ult& e inter4retedM At face %alue one could &ay there i& %ery little e%idenceof moility dri%en y 4oor health or education deli%ery in the Phili44ine&3 >o/e%er, the a&emoility rate i& high3 One /ay of 4re&enting the theory of moility dri%ing im4ro%ement& in&er%ice deli%ery i& that /hile moility might e dri%en y other factor&ty4ically em4loyment once a family ha& decided to mo%e it choo&e& localitie& /ith etter &er%ice& or lo/er ta<e&3 ThehighBa&e moility in that ca&e could &ugge&t that moility i& an im4ortant di&ci4line3!n%e&tigating thi& hy4othe&i& i& likely to e a challenge e%en in future &tudie&, ecau&e follo/Bon

5ue&tion&, after a re&4ondent ha& re&4onded &he i& mo%ing for em4loyment, are likely to eleading 5ue&tion&3

=



Su55ary

!n &ummary, the data &ugge&t that civic disciplines on &uBnational go%ernment in the Phili44ine&may e &u&tantially /eaker than a&&umed y the 4roBdecentralization theori&t&3 8oting 4attern&

and rationale& do not differ &ignificantly et/een local and national election&3 Po4ularkno/ledge of local go%ernment /a& inferior to that of national go%ernment, and there /a& le&&reliance on the media for information on local than on national 4olitic&3 !ndeed, citizen& reliedmuch more on local official& and 4er&onal contact&, rather than on the media, for information onlocal 4olitic& and corru4tionin &tark contra&t /ith much hea%ier reliance on the media forinformation aout national 4olitic&3 Thi& &ugge&t& the 4o&&iility of elite ca4ture of localgo%ernment and may e<4lain /eakne&&e& in local accountaility3 One 4o&iti%e &ign /a& the largenumer of 4o&iti%e re&4on&e& to 5ue&tion& aout the e<i&tence of 4olitical action in localcommunitie& and the &ucce&& of &uch action3



Cha#ter VI: Per+or)a$ce Factor!: I$ter2o-er$)e$ta Di!ci#i$e!

!n 4ractice, the o4eration of &uBnational go%ernment& de4end& on di&ci4line& e<erted fromhigher le%el&3 !n &ome regard&, the&e di&ci4line& may e &alutaryfor e<am4le, o%er&ight of

&tandard& of 4ulic &er%ice& &u44lied, the a%ailaility of technical and financial a&&i&tance fromhigher le%el& Ce&4ecially to 4oorer localitie&D, and national antiBcorru4tion and auditing rule&3Other intergo%ernmental di&ci4line& that may ha%e harmful, a& /ell a& &alutary element&, includeF udgetary con&traint&, limit& on local ta<ing authority, and the e%erB4re&ent danger of e<ce&&i%e 4olitical interference andor microBmanaging from higher le%el& in area& more efficiently handledat the lo/er le%el3 The&e con&traint&, in turn, affect the aility of the local go%ernment to adEu&tto change& in local circum&tance&3 Thi& cha4ter e<4lore& &e%eral a&4ect& of the&e factor&F thefi&cal &tructure, local re%enue admini&tration 4rolem&, the central o%er&ight of localadmini&tration, and adEu&taility3 The la&t of the&e di&cu&&ion& i& a&ed on &ur%ey dataJ theother&, on inter%ie/& and documentary e%idence3

Fiscal Structure

Prior to +-, Phili44ine 4ulic finance /a& highly centralized, /ith the central go%ernmentaccounting for almo&t - 4ercent of all 4ulic e<4enditure and more than 7 4ercent of allre%enue collection3 O%er the follo/ing three year&, decentralization reduced the&e le%el& to =:3 4ercent and 39 4ercent, re&4ecti%ely3 ?<4enditure& de%ol%ed to &uBnational go%ernment&co%ered a /ide range of go%ernment acti%itie&, the mo&t 4rominent of /hich /a& health, /hichaccounted for more than 7; 4ercent of the total :3-; illion 4e&o& Ca44ro<imately V +.. millionDof de%ol%ed e<4enditure&3 o&t health &taff and a large 4ercentage of the 4er&onnel of the &ocial/elfare, agriculture and udget mini&trie&, /ere de%ol%ed to lo/erBle%el go%ernment&3 >o/e%er,/ith the e<ce4tion of &ocial /elfare, the 4ercentage of central mini&try fund& reallocated to

lo/erBle%el go%ernment& /a& often &ignificantly &maller than the 4ercentage of de%ol%ed 4er&onnel Cana&an +:D3

To hel4 defray the co&t of de%ol%ed e<4enditure&, Section -= of the Local Go%ernment #ode 4ro%ided for . 4ercent of central go%ernment re%enue& collected three year& efore to etran&ferred ack to &uBnational go%ernment& through the !nternal "e%enue Allotment C!"AD3Pro%ince& and citie& recei%ed -; 4ercent each of the total tran&fer, munici4alitie& ; 4ercent and arangay& -. 4ercent3 2or each cla&& of go%ernment e<ce4t arangay&, the !"A /a& allocated 7. 4ercent y 4o4ulation, -7 4ercent y land area, and -7 4ercent a& an e5ual &hare, re&ulting incon&iderale di&4aritie& in 4er ca4ita tran&fer&3 Pro%ince& al&o recei%ed limited ne/ ta<ingauthority o%er local natural re&ource e<4loitation, agriculture, and other u&ine&& acti%itie&,

although the a&&e&&ment a&i& for the local 4ro4erty ta< /a& reduced3

The increa&e in central tran&fer& under the LG# far out/eighed the increa&e in local re%enueauthority re&ulting from decentralization3 The !"A in aggregate increa&ed from PP +. illion in++ to o%er PP :. illion in +: Cto PP +++ illion in -...D, a fi%e to &i<Bfold increa&e in realterm& C"ood +=D3 A& a re&ult of the&e !"A increa&e&, arangay udget& ro&e from a lo/ of PP7,... to high of PP +=.,... 4er year, and &ome munici4al udget& ro&e from a& lo/ a& PP +37

7.



million to a& high a& PP million3 !m4ortantly, the &hare of the !"A in LG$ income /a& .R++, ri&ing to 9.R in +: + CGOL) +:B.+D3

Thi& gro/th in tran&fer& ha& contriuted to 4rolem& of di&triution3 Se%eral author& Ce3g3,ana&an C+: and +D and iller C+:DD re4ort mi&matche& not only in the %ertical

allocation of re&ource& acro&& le%el& of go%ernment ut al&o in horizontal allocation acro&& Euri&diction& /ithin each le%el3 The latter 4rolem i& the mo&t o%iou&3 2or e<am4le, 4er ca4itanet re&ource tran&fer i& the highe&t for citie& and the lo/e&t for 4ro%ince&3 indanao C/ith +:Rof G)P and -R of 4o4ulationD ca4tured -:3-R of !"A, ut contriuted only R of internalre%enue collection& Cana&an +D3 Per ca4ita !"A %arie& y a factor of -; time& et/een theto4 and ottom reci4ient 4ro%ince& Ciller +:D3

The ca&e that there i& a %ertical imalanceor mi&match et/een de%ol%ed re&4on&iilitie& andfundingi& a it more contro%er&ial3 o&t of tho&e in%ol%ed in or clo&ely o&er%ing localgo%ernment &ay that the !"A ha& not 4ro%en ade5uate to their need&3 O%iou&ly, local official& in 4articular ha%e an intere&t in &aying thi&3 oreo%er, according to one re&4ected 4ulic finance

e<4ert, thi& claim i& actually /rongF HQthe increment in the aggregate !"A of 4ro%ince&Q,citie&Q, and munici4alitie&Q e<ceed& the co&t of de%ol%ed function& and other mandate& e%en ifone adEu&t& &aid co&t& for inflation and 4o4ulation gro/th3I The numer& &ho/ that the 4ro%ince& in the aggregate ha%e een net /inner& from fi&cal decentralization, and indanao ha&rea4ed the large&t of the&e /indfall& Cana&an +D3

There are t/o im4ortant ca%eat& that one &hould a44ly to thi& analy&i&3 2ir&t, LG$& /ant morefle<iility than the !"A allo/&, and they tend to look on it a& one of many fi&cal &ource& that canhel4 them meet their 4articular 4reference&3 Thu&, although !"A allotment& may e<ceed the co&t&of de%ol%ed &er%ice& a& udgeted y the center or a& &4ent y local go%ernment&, mayor& andgo%ernor& %ie/ it a& inade5uate to their need&, e%en /hen they di%ert !"A fund& from de%ol%edfunction& to their o/n 4referred 4rogram&3 "ai&ing local ta<e& or im4ro%ing local ta<enforcement /ould e a 4olitically 4ainful &te4 that local go%ernment& a%oid to the e<tent 4o&&ile3 Thi& lea%e& them /ith a fi&cal ga4 in funding their 4ulic &er%ice 4rioritie&3 Localgo%ernment& ha%e made &ome attem4t& to kee4 u4 /ith gro/ing demand&, for e<am4le in +;&4ending three time& /hat /ould ha%e een needed to kee4 4ace /ith 4o4ulation gro/th andinflation, in the education &ector, ut under &4ending in the health and &ocial /elfare area&3Cana&an +9D3 oreo%er, de&4ite de%olution, national agency udget& Cin the de%ol%ed&ector&D increa&ed ;R o%erall during ++B:3 2or e<am4le, the )e4artment of >ealth C)O>D udget increa&ed +-9R in +;B:, at the &ame time a& )O> /a& de%ol%ing :7R of it& 4er&onnelto the LG$&3 !t i& not clear e<actly /hy thi& ha44ened, ut in 4art thi& re&ult& from nationalagencie& initiating maEor 4roEect&, and )O> ho&4ital& eing renationalized CGOL) +:B.+D3

Local go%ernment official& al&o fre5uently com4lain that the 4ool of !"A fund& i& ke4tartificially &mall3 ?<clu&ion& from the 4ie from /hich the .R !"A i& dra/n mean that the !"Ain fact com4ri&e& only +R of the national udget at 4re&ent3 The !"A i& &u44o&ed to 4ay forde%ol%ed function&, and legally i& com4ri&ed of .R of Hnational re%enue3 According to theterm& of the Local Go%ernment #ode, the !"A and it& allocation acro&& 4ro%ince& &hould ecalculated automatically, ut in 4ractice !"A le%el& and &haring are a44ro%ed y #ongre&&3

+ And highe&t in indanao, at :9R

7+



#ongre&& ha& reduced the &ize of the !"A o%erall y, among other thing&, redefining the re%enue 4ool and making ad hoc cut& in the allotment& for 4articular 4ro%ince& and citie&3 +7 oreo%er,#ongre&& ha& &aid it need& to cut the !"A in the current year in order to reduce a go%ernmentdeficita &te4 that /ould %iolate the LG# and the con&titution, a& claimed y &e%eral go%ernor&/ho ha%e filed &uit in the Su4reme #ourt to lock the change3 "ecent legi&lation 4ro%iding for

an !"A ?5ualization 2und /ill 4lace do/n/ard 4re&&ure on mo&t 4ro%ince&0 !"A allotment&Cinter%ie/&D3

!n &hort, the %ertical allocation of re&ource& &eem& to4Bhea%y from a local go%ernment 4er&4ecti%e3 The &econd maEor ca%eat here i& that the large di&triution of grant& ha& meantrelati%ely lo/ le%el& of local fi&cal autonomy, /hich fre5uently create ad%er&e go%ernanceincenti%e&3 O%erall, e<ternallyB&ourced LG$ re%enue& gre/ from 7; R in +== to 9:R +7C1T"# +:D3 2i&cal autonomy ratio& Cthe ratio of local o/n re%enue& to local e<4en&e&D fell inthe year& follo/ing the on&et of decentralization, from 7- to ; 4ercent in the aggregate3 )uring+-B:, the&e ratio& a%eraged 7.R for citie&, ;; R for munici4alitie&, and --R for 4ro%ince&3 A&one /ould e<4ect, regre&&ion& &ho/ a negati%e correlation et/een local ta< effort and !"A 4er

ca4ita3 )ata on local 4ro4erty and u&ine&& ta<e& for +-B; and +9B: &ugge&t that the !"A ha& substituted for local re%enueBrai&ing, thu& creating a di&incenti%e to fi&cal effort CLoehr andana&an +, ana&an +D3 One rea&on for concern here i& that fi&cal autonomy %arie&/idely acro&& the Phili44ine&3 Per ca4ita local &ource re%enue %arie& y a factor of =; time&, andfinancial autonomy ratio& %ary y . time&, et/een the 4oore&t and riche&t 4ro%ince&3 The +ratio& ranged from +3-R in aguindanao to 3-R in (ataan Ciller +:D3 !ntere&tingly, the&efactor& did not 4re%ent an o%erall ri&e in LG$ ta< effort and ca4ital outlay& from the 4reBdecentralization 4eriod until the midB+.& Cana&an +D3

!f they find them&el%e& o%erly con&trained y !"A allotment& and local re%enue&, localgo%ernment& can acce&& other facilitie&3 The maEor one of the&e i& the unici4al )e%elo4ment2und C)2D, /hich i& orro/ed or granted from international &ource& Ce3g3, the A&ian)e%elo4ment (ankD and onBlent to LG$& /ith a marku4 of +-R intere&t3 )2 funding 4ackage& are ty4ically com4ri&ed of loan, grant, and local e5uity com4onent& Cthe latter einglo/er /here 4o&iti%e e<ternalitie& are e<4ected to e high, and can include fund& controlled y#ongre&& memer&Dand a 4o&iti%e internal rate of return i& re5uired3 )2 loan re4ayment i&&ecured through an !"A interce4t arrangement C/ithin a ma<imum of -.R of an LG$0& !"A&hareD, and the u&e of local go%ernment fund de4o&it& a& collateral3 )2 loan condition& re5uire orro/ing LG$& to im4ro%e 4ro4erty ta< collection& C/hich other/i&e are not u&ually collectedD3Some local go%ernment& Ce&4ecially in indanaoD orro/ eyond their ca4acity or re4udiatetheir loan&, ut the&e ha%e een u4held in court3 The )2 o%erall amount& to le&& than +.R of!"A3 Since it& ince4tion in +=, the )2 ha& financed 4ulic market&, &laughterhou&e&,drainage &y&tem&, u& terminal&, road& and ridge&, and the like in ++. LG$& CGOL) +:B.-D3

+7 A& an e<am4le of the latter, 1aga #ity0& !"A allotment /a& cut y PP -- million, then PP - million in &ucce&&i%eyear&cut& that local official& argued /ere the re&ult of 4olitical calculation rather than a44lication of the !"Aformula3 The main e<am4le of the former i& the go%ernment0& inter4retation of the !"A 4ro%i&ion& of the #ode toe<clude cu&tom& re%enue& from the fi&cal 4ool3 Su&e5uently, a +9 amendment to the LG# re5uired -.R oflocallyBcollected 8AT re%enue& to e allocated to the !"A, a& 4art of the &hift from a &y&tem em4ha&izing cu&tom&dutie& to a 8AT &y&tem3 Since 8AT o%erall 4ro%ide& an e&timated ;.R of national re%enue&, thi& /a& e<4ected toincrea&e the !"A &ignificantly3 (ut, go%ernment and #ongre&& ha%e ke4t thi& 4ro%i&ion &ufficiently hidden andignored the fact that many LG$ e<ecuti%e& are not a/are of it3

7-



Another o4tion i& for local go%ernment& to orro/ again&t a guarantee e<tended y the LocalGo%ernment Guaranty #or4oration, a ne/ agency a&&i&ting LG$& in otaining loan&Cinter%ie/&D3

One la&t &ource of finance for local go%ernment& i& the #ountry&ide )e%elo4ment 2und&

allotment&, commonly kno/n a& H4ork,I controlled y indi%idual memer& of #ongre&&3Through thi& mean&, #ongre&& memer& re4ortedly allocate more money to certain localitie& thani& contained in the local !"A &hare3 One e&timate of the o%erall total i& PP 7. million for each of-7. memer&, or a44ro<imately PP +-37 illion Cthi& /ould amount to ++R of the total !"A in-...D3 'hile local go%ernment& and citizen& may influence the 4olitical calculu& y /hich the&efund& are allocated, in effect the&e fund& are earmarked centrally, eyond local control3 The#ongre&&ional allotment& are mainly u&ed for con&truction3 The&e 4roEect& are &aid to e fraught/ith corru4tion and are not &u&tainale, &ince they are im4lemented for 4olitical goal& /ithoutthe nece&&ary technical ca4acity, are e&&entially im4o&ed on di&trict engineer&, and u&ually fa%orcertain 4olitically connected contractor&3

.ocal Administration Central 0versight

)ecentralization in the Phili44ine& ha& ke4t in force &e%eral im4ortant con&traint& on localgo%ernment e<4enditure di&cretionand LG$& are /orking creati%ely to circum%ent them32ir&t, there are 4rocedural con&traint& on udgeting3 $nder the LG#, local go%ernment udget&re5uire formal a44ro%al y the local council and re%ie/ y the &u4er%ening le%el of go%ernment3Thu&, duly enacted 4ro%incial and city udget& mu&t e &umitted for a44ro%al y the)e4artment of (udget and anagement C)(D through it& regional office&, munici4al udget& y the 4ro%ince, and arangay udget& y the munici4ality or city3 The udget& are re5uired to e in alance, and to 4ro%ide for a 7R calamity fund3 There i& a theoretical ma<imum of 7Rfor 4er&onnel &er%ice&, although thi& a44ear& to e honored more in the reach than other/i&e3 !n 4ractice, )( re%ie/ of LG$ udget& i& 4urely formal, ut it i& &aid to create unnece&&ary delayin udget e<ecution Ce&4ecially &ince, a& &ome &ugge&t, the re%ie/ function could e done moreeffecti%ely a& 4art of the #OA 4o&tBaudit&ee elo/D CGOL) +9B.D3 Su&tantial delay& arere4orted in &uch area& a& central 4rocurement& and the relea&e of central fund& to 4ay localteacher& and 4olice3 There are al&o uniform 4rocurement rule& under the LG# a44licale to alllocal go%ernment&3 The&e 4ro%ide for com4etiti%e idding, ut al&o contain e<ce4tion& foremergencie&, negotiated 4urcha&e Cif idding fail& t/iceD, and 4er&onal can%a&& C/ithin definedlimit&D3

Second, much local funding i& tied in &ome /ay3 ?<ecuti%e Order& im4lementingdecentralization ha%e created numerou& 4artially funded and unfunded mandate&, &uch a&maintaining centrallyBfi<ed le%el& of ci%il &er%ice 4ay and enefit& for de%ol%ed or H4lantillaI 4o&ition& in the 4ulic &ector, and re5uiring counter4art or matching local fund& again&t centralgrant&3 O%erall, an e&timated =.R of local re%enue i& tied to &4ecific centrallyBdetermined udget categorie&3 Per&onnel alone account& for &ome 9.R of aggregate LG$ re%enue&, anda44ro<imately .B7R in the citie&3 !n addition, the LG# re5uire& local go%ernment& to &et a&ide-.R of their !"A &hare& for a )e%elo4ment 2und to &u44ort local 4roEect&3 )!LG no longer ha&formal authority to a44ro%e or %eto the&e 4roEect&, ut it doe& i&&ue 4olicy guideline& on /hat 4rioritie& de%elo4ment fund& &hould e &4ent on Cin recent year&, for e<am4le, gender and the

7;



en%ironment ha%e een fa%ored theme&D CGOL) +=B.;, inter%ie/&D3 Al&o, many LG$& ha%eno ca4acity to identify )e%elo4ment 2und 4roEect& and &o they e&&entially com4ile H/i&h li&t&Ifor a44ro%al y their local udget officer&3 !f the money &et a&ide for the 4roEect& i& not &4entC/hich i& often the ca&e, e&4ecially /hen the mayor i& at odd& /ith the councilD, it &tay& in a tru&tfund or continuing a44ro4riation for the &ame 4ur4o&e3 Local go%ernment& are further

con&trained in their aility to re4rogram fund& a/ay from mandated &er%ice& &uch a& 4rimaryhealth carean admini&trator in 1aga #ity cited the nece&&ity of 4ro%iding the&e &er%ice&, /hichare a44ro<imately .R free of charge, to a ma&& of mo&tly 4oor client&3+9

)ifferent mini&trie& ring di%ergent 4o/er &tructure& to their dealing& /ith local go%ernment&3)?#S i& a traditional hierarchical and centralized mini&try, /hile the )e4artment of >ealthC)O>D i& &aid to e difficult to /ork /ith in the a&ence of 4er&onal connection&3 Al&o, /ith)?#S and )O>, &u44lie& are often late, mi&&ing, or ina44ro4riatedue to the centralorganization of idding, allocation, etc3 )!LG, in facilitating decentralization, deal& only /ith the 4ro%ince& directly, 4ro%iding technical a&&i&tance engaging in dialogue to influence LG$&, andchecking that their medium and longBterm 4lanning ha%e een done C/ithout the 4o/er to re%ie/

contentD3

#ongre&&ional inter%ention in decentralization i& more o%ertly 4oliticized3 The LocalGo%ernment #ommittee e<erci&e& formal o%er&ight, chaired y the ?<ecuti%e Secretary to thePre&ident, ut i& con&idered ineffecti%e and reacti%e3 A more influential kind of inter%ention i&through the #ongre&&ional H4orkI fund&, mentioned ao%e, /hich lead& to hea%y #ongre&&ionalinter%ention in local affair&3 !n 4ractice, #ongre&& memer& do con&ult /ith local leader& eforedeci&ion& on the u&e of 4ork fund& are final, ut thi& i& /idely %ie/ed not a& an effecti%e localH%oiceI &o much a& a 4atronage hierarchy3 Al&o, all centrallyBfunded 4roEect& mu&t e endor&ed y the rele%ant memer of #ongre&& Cthi& i& referred to a& HconcurrenceID3 #ongre&& memer&a44ear mainly intere&ted in /ho doe& the 4roEectF they are &aid to rig the idding or en&ure a nonBcom4etiti%e negotiated 4rocurement, and /hen 4roEect& go a/ry, the )e4artment of Pulic'ork& and >igh/ay& C)P'>D get& lamed for faulty im4lementation Cinter%ie/&D3

All 4ulic fund& are &uEect to audit do/n to the lo/e&t le%el, according to accountaility rule&outlined in Article \! of the +=: con&titution3 >o/e%er, audit 4rocedure& are /idely 4ercei%ed e&4ecially y tho&e in%ol%ed in local go%ernmenta& eing too rigid and outdated Cthe audithandook u&ed i& o%er . year& oldD3 Thu&, /herea& the current &y&tem of e< 4o&t audit /a&meant to &im4lify matter& y re4lacing a 4re%iou& &y&tem of e< ante a44ro%al, LG$& are no/mo%ing ack/ard&, &eeking informal 4reBaudit a44ro%al of e<4enditure& in order to a%oid 4rolem& later3 The intru&i%ene&& of thi& audit &y&tem, im4lemented y the #OA, &eem& tocontradict the formal legal autonomy of local go%ernment y 4lacing a central agency in controlof local &4ending CGOL) +=B.;D3 !n it& role a& out&ide auditor, the #OA conduct& acomination of 4eriodic C/eekly and monthlyD and &4ecial e<4enditure audit& of localgo%ernment& do/n to the arangay le%el3 The #OA audit 4roce&& a44arently de4end& almo&tentirely on 4a4er trail&, /ith little or no 4hy&ical audit3 2or more effecti%e tracking, #OA 4lace&&taff at the local le%el Ce3g3, &ome 7. of them /ork in etro anilaD3 !n +=, o%erall #OA audit&u&4en&ion& and di&allo/ance& amounted to PP 39= illion and +3-: illion re&4ecti%ely C#OAAnnual 2inancial "e4ort +=D3 LG$& al&o ha%e internal auditor&, in addition to 4ro%iding the

+9 Thi& i& not to &ugge&t that the mandate i& unde&irale, only that it con&train& o4tion&3

7



local council& /ith monthly financial re4ort&3 !t i& unlikely that local council& e<erci&e effecti%eo%er&ight of udget& and e<4enditure& y their go%ernment& and &uordinate LG$&, &ince fe/council memer& a44ear to under&tand the udgetary and e<4enditure figure& they are 4ro%idedCinter%ie/&D3

Local go%ernment& ha%e thu& faced a range of con&traint& to their &ol%ency and freedom ofaction, ut ha%e often found /ay& around them3 #i%il &er%ice hiring and 4ayroll i& an area /herethe&e i&&ue& ha%e ari&en &tarkly3 2or e<am4le, the national &alary &cale& for de%ol%ed em4loyee&&ometime& create udget crunche& and 4ay di&4aritie& et/een de%ol%ed and local official&3'here the central &alary &cale i& too lo/, &ome 4ro%ince& ha%e &u44lemented de%ol%ed ci%il&er%ant 4ay out of local fund& in order to alle%iate the di&4arity3 !n other ca&e&, the LG$& ignorecentrallyBmandated ci%il &er%ant 4ay increa&e& ecau&e they cannot afford them or /i&h to &a%ere&ource& CLoehr and ana&an +D3 Local go%ernment& ha%e al&o made their %oice& heard ina44ointment& of go%ernment em4loyee& that are nominally under full control y the center3 2ore<am4le, in the ca&e of 4olice 4er&onnel and &chool 4rinci4al&, in 4ractice the central de4artment&umit& a li&t of name& Ccandidate& mu&t e localD to the mayor, /ho e<4re&&e& a 4reference3 The

fa%ored candidate H4ay& re&4ect&I to the local 4olitician&, and the go%ernor then endor&e& thea44ointment3 2or o%iou& rea&on&, thi& ha& rought local 4olitic& into the a44ointment 4roce&&e&3!n the ca&e of mandatory de%ol%ed 4o&ition&, local go%ernment& a44ear to face no realcon&e5uence& if they fail to make the re5ui&ite a44ointment&3 O4ting not to fill &uch 4o&ition&enale& LG$& in e&&ence to create fi&cal &ur4lu&e& to e de4loyed el&e/here Cunu&ed 4lantillafund& re%ert to the local general fundD3 !n &ome ca&e&, local go%ernment& hire tem4oraryHcon&ultant&I to fill ci%il &er%ice need& 5uickly and /ith minimal ureaucratic inter%ention3 !t i&not clear to /hat e<tent local go%ernment& com4ly /ith affirmati%e action rule&the&e re5uireeligile minoritie& to recei%e a fi%e 4oint onu& on their ci%il &er%ice e<amination &core&, and callfor the a44ointment of cultural minoritie& /here they e<i&t in the #ordillera and A"Cinter%ie/&D3

O%erall, &ince decentralization egan to take hold, the allocation of re&ource& a44ear& to ha%e ecome more re&4on&i%e to local need& Ce3g3, le&& funding for go%ernment 4er&onnel, more foreducation, ut a 4ercei%ed decline in health &er%ice&D3 Of cour&e, the Hlocal need&I thatdi&cretionary fund& often &er%e are tho&e of the go%ernor& and mayor&for ine<4en&i%e 4roEect&that /in them ea&y credit and 4olitical ad%erti&ing o44ortunitie& Ce3g3 /aiting &hed& for u& 4a&&enger&D3 Thi& &ugge&t& a continuing 4artici4ation ga43 A &ur%ey of a fe/ 4ro%ince& foundthat no more than oneBthird of LG$& are im4lementing in%e&tment 4lan& de%elo4ed /ithmeaningful citizen 4artici4ation3 Local in%e&tment 4lan& remain hea%ily 4olitical andinfra&tructureBoriented CGOL) +9B.;D3 The &ame could e &aid for national 4roEect&in&ome, the &ignoff of mayor& and arangay& i& re5uired, ut not in other&3 A& &tated ao%e, fe/Local )e%elo4ment #ouncil& are acti%e, and there i& little 4rior con&ultation /ith nationalagencie& on their 4lan& and udget&3 1GO in4ut i& al&o not a& &u&tantial a& many /ould ho4e,and official& u&ually do little to encourage it3 Thi& i& in 4art ecau&e mo&t 1GO& &umit toneither audit &crutiny nor 4lanning coordination y go%ernment3 1GO& al&o find it more difficultto /ork /ith localitie&, e&4ecially arangay&, than the center, due to traditional mentalitie& 4re%alent on the local le%el3 >ere, the oEecti%e of increa&ing local 4artici4ation throughdecentralization run& u4 again&t the old 4atronBclient culture3 (arangay& are a &ource of %ote&and &o get their /ay /ith mayor&, for e<am4le gaining 4rotection for local e<tortion racket& that

77



e<tract rent& from &5uatter&3 Thi& i& al&o /orrying ecau&e arangay& no/ ha%e &u&tantiallymore !"A fund& than 4re%iou&ly, ut only relati%ely minor dutie& and e&&entially no re5uirementto de%elo4 4lan&hence little accountaility3

Ad;ustability

Our analy&i& of decentralized go%ernance in the Phili44ine& mu&t egin /ith an a&&e&&ment of it&e<tent3 The Local Go%ernment& Act doe& 4ro%ide a fair amount of formal authority to localgo%ernment, ut it i& im4ortant to a&&e&& /hether thi& i& orne out in fact3 !n order to e%aluatethe e<tent of adEu&taility in different go%ernment office&, the &ur%ey a&ked 4ulic official& t/okind of 5ue&tion&3 The fir&t one in5uire& aout the e<tent to /hich official& are ale to re&4ond to 4eo4le0& &ugge&tion&F

!n general ho/ ea&ily can you adEu&t in thi& 4ro%incemunici4ality&choolhealth clinic the 4ro%i&ion of 4ro%incialmunici4al educationhealth &er%ice& to re&4ond the &ugge&tion& of local 4eo4leM

The &econd &et of 5ue&tion& e%aluate& the authority of official& to hire or fire &taff, to decide on

the &alarie& of 4er&onnel, to reallocate fund& among &er%ice&, and to offer different &er%ice&3

The re&4on&e& of the %ariou& go%ernment office& and facilitie& to the fir&t of the&e 5ue&tion& i&&ho/n in Tale +93 On the a&i& of the&e an&/er&, an adEu&taility inde< i& created, a&ed on a/eighted a%erage of the an&/er& C&ee note to Tale =D3 Thi& inde< re4re&ent& the aility of localofficial& to make and im4lement deci&ion& /ithout the a44ro%al of, or &u44ort from, a highergo%ernment agency3 A& /ith the aggregate corru4tion inde<, the adEu&taility inde< i&normalized on a &cale from . to +..3 !t i& found that 4ro%incial and munici4al official& con&iderthem&el%e& to ha%e &imilar fle<iility to re&4ond to local demandJ the large&t difference &ho/n i& et/een 4ulic and 4ri%ate &chool&3

Su55ary

!n &ummary, thi& re%ie/ of intergo%ernmental arrangement&, and &u44orting data analy&i&, ha&&ho/n that intergovern5ental disciplines 4lace tight con&traint&, oth 4o&iti%e and negati%e, onthe freedom of action of local go%ernment&3 On the 4o&iti%e &ide, o%er&ight of higher le%el& ofgo%ernment o%er lo/er one& im4o&e& /hat are 4roaly nece&&ary con&traint& to mi&u&e offund&J on the negati%e &ide, there i& 4olitical interference from the center in the allocation ofin%e&tment fund& at the local le%el3 The ad8ustability inde6 deri%ed y the re&earch teamre%ealed &ome/hat more di&cretion at the munici4al than at the 4ro%incial le%el on /hich&er%ice& to offer, ho/ many official& to hire, and ho/ much to 4ay em4loyee&, ut more authorityfor 4ro%incial official& to reallocate fund& among different &er%ice&3

79



Ta3e .<> Ho7 ea!i* ca$ thi! +aciit* a%;"!t it! #a$! to re!#o$% to !"22e!tio$! o+ citi&e$! 1o3 of re&4on&e&J adEu&taility inde<J &tandard de%iation in 4arenthe&e&

Ca$$ot a%;"!t Ca$ a%;"!t

7ith 2reat

%i++ic"t*

Ca$ a%;"!t

7ith !o)e

%i++ic"t*

Ca$ a%;"!t

ea!i*

A%;"!ta3iit*

I$%e8N

unici4al >ealth ; ; ; ;

:3;-

C-39D :unici4alAdmini&trator

- + - 7+=:3;

C+=3-7D:

unici4al )?#S + 7 -9 ==;3:7

C--37.D=.

>ealth #linic& . 7= +=;3:

C-.3+9D+7=

Pulic School + +. ;9 7+:3;

C-;3=+D=

Pri%ate School . +7 9 -==:3:9

C+73+;D

Pro%incial >ealth . ; = =:73

C-37D+

Pro%incialAdmini&trator

. = + ==;3;;

C+939:D+:

Pro%incial )?#S . - ; +=:3:-

C--3=.D+

unici4al>ealthAdm

9 = +;==;3;

C-+37D -;=

Pro%incial>ealthAdm

. 9 +7 :3;

C-.379D =7

AdEu&taility inde<WC#an adEu&t /ith great difficultyYC-*#an adEu&t /ith &ome difficultyDYC;*#an adEu&t ea&ilyDD;

An&/er& for &4ecific ty4e& of adEu&taility CTale +:D &ho/ that all the office& and facilitie& claimthat they are ale to a large e<tent to take 4eo4le0& &ugge&tion&3 On &ome other mea&ure&, &uch a&im4lementing 4eo4le0& &ugge&tion&, fle<iility in allocation of fund&, of fle<iility in hiring orfiring 4er&onnel, the &core& are much /eaker3

2or further com4ari&on& among different agencie&, the mean o&er%ation& &ho/n in Tale +: aretran&formed, for all the Hfle<iility mea&ure&,I into indice& deri%ed in &imilar fa&hion to theadEu&taility inde<, and di&4layed in Tale +=J there i& al&o a correlation et/een an a%erage ofthe&e mea&ure& and adEu&taility to 4eo4le0& &ugge&tion&3 ?<amination of the&e indice&, /hichhighlight difference& among the re&ult&, &ho/& &ome/hat more di&cretion at the munici4al le%el

on /hich &er%ice& to offer, ho/ many official& to hire, and ho/ much to 4ay em4loyee&3>o/e%er, 4ro%incial official& ha%e more authority to reallocate fund& among different &er%ice&3An e&4ecially &triking, if not &ur4ri&ing contra&t, i& et/een the 4ulic and 4ri%ate &chool 4rinci4al&3 Another intere&ting re&ult i& the relati%ely high mean %alue& for the munici4al healthofficer and the munici4al admini&trator, &ugge&ting that they ha%e &ignificant ut not com4letecontrol o%er hiring, firing and re&ource allocation3

7:



Ta3e .1> A%;"!ta3iit* Mea!"re! acro!! S"r-e*!mean %alue of re&4on&e&

Heath

Ci$ic!

Pro-i$cia

Heath

M"$ici#a

Heath

Schoo Pro-i$cia

DECS

M"$ici#a

DECS

A 6e*

CnW+7=D CnW+D CnW:D CnW=+D CnW+=D CnW=.D

Take 4eo4le0& &ugge&tion& ;37- ;3-9 ;3; ;3+- ;39; ;37+ ;3: +Fnone, -F&ome,;Fmo&t, Fal/ay&

Take 4eo4le0& &ugge&tion&into 4lan

-3:: ;3.. -39 -3: +Fnone, -F&ome,;Fmo&t, Fal/ay&

Peo4le0& &ugge&tion&im4lemented

;3.= ;3.. -3= -3=7 -3: -3:. -3; +Fnone, -F&ome,;Fmo&t, Fal/ay&

2le<iility in allocation offund&

-3+9 -3-. +37 +377 +3+ +Fnone, -F&ome,;Fmo&t, Fal/ay&

2le<iility in hiring 4er&onnelCnumerD

-3. -39. -3+9 -3-+ -3; +Fnone, -F&ome,;Fmo&t, Fal/ay&

2le<iility in hiring 4er&onnelC4er&onD

+3-; -3. -3: +377 -37 -3-= +3= +Fnone, -F&ome,;Fmo&t, Fal/ay&

2le<iility in deciding on&alary le%el

-3;: -3:9 -39 +Fnone, -F&ome,;Fmo&t, Fal/ay&

2le<iility in firing 4er&onnel ;3.7 ;3++ +37 +3: +3. -3+: +Fnone, Fal/ay

2le<iility in offering any&er%ice&

-3;- ;3.= +3:+ -3;= +Fnone, -F&ome,;Fmo&t, Fal/ay

7=



Ta3e .9> Fe8i3iit* to Peo#e@! S"22e!tio$! a$% A"thorit* to 3e Fe8i3eunle&& other/i&e indicated, adEu&taility indice&* for &4ecific categorie&J &tandard de%iation& in 4arenthe&e&

unici43>ealth

unici43Admini&t

rator

unici43)?#S

>ealth#linic&

PulicSchool

Pri%ateSchool

Pro%incial >ealth

Pro%incialAdmini&tr

ator

Pro%incial )?#S

unici4>eathAd

m3

Pro%ince>ealthA

dm

fle<iility in

allocation of fund&

;:3=-

C-73:-D

+=3;;

C-.3:D

9;3+9

C-:3=+D

793=9

C;.3.=D

;+37=

C-=3-:D ;:3=- 9.3.+fle<iility in hiring

4er&onnelCnumerD

93-.C-3+D

9379C;;3.7D

.3-C;73=7D

+,:7C.3.9D

=39+C-3-D

;=39.C+=3.D

9=39;C;3;.D

;=39.C+3:D

993== 7;39-

fle<iility in hiring 4er&onnel C4er&onD

7;3;=C;:3++D

9=3;=C;-3+D

-37.C;:3=:D

:3;=C+3+D

9;3+9C;+3--D

:73C;.3++D

93+C;-3;D

9.3== 93;;

2le<iility indeciding on &alaryle%el

7=3-;C;73+D

7739C+3:D

=3+7C;=3;.D

7.3=C.39.D

7:3+. 37:

fle<iility in firing 4er&onnel in firing 4er&onnel

:.3-7C7399D

=93:+C;;39D

;.3..C93++D

73;7C+3;9D

93==C+:39=D

9=3-C=3::D

==3-C;;3-+D

+73:C;:39D

:=3= :=3;;

fle<iility inoffering any&er%ice&

73C-37D

-;3:7C-3=-D

;3=9C.3+D

73 ;3=9

A%erage

adEu&taility

9-3++

C--3.D

9-3:

C+=3=D

;+3..

C--3==D

:3;=

C+3+D

+.39;

C--39-D

973;+

C--3+;D

7;3=

C+=3+:D

9=3.

C-;3.9D

;:3:-

C-+3.D9-37 9+3.+

#orrelation ofa%erageadEu&taility /ithadEu&taility toPeo4le0&Sugge&tion&

.3. B.3+. B.3+- B.3+; B.3.+ .3.9 .3;+ .3;- .3-: .3.9 .3--

1min : := =. +7= =+ ;- + +: += =. +

1ma< : : =. +7= = + +: + =. +

7



Cha#ter VII: Per+or)a$ce Factor!: P"3ic Sector Ma$a2e)e$t

'ithin each &uBnational admini&tration, there i& a &et of incenti%e&, internal con&traint&, andca4acitie& that contriute to the effecti%ene&& of 4ulic &er%ice 4ro%i&ion3 @u&t a& in the conte<t

of national 4ulic admini&tration, tran&4arent &y&tem& of accountaility, &er%iceB and 5ualityBoriented incenti%e&, com4etent &taff, and re&ource& of a44ro4riate 5uantity are all nece&&arycondition& for efficient deli%ery of &er%ice& that match the 4ulic0& need&3 )ecentralization can 4o&e &e%ere challenge& to tho&e attem4ting to gear u4 &uBnational in&titution& to their ne/ ta&k&3Thi& &ection &ugge&t& &ome mea&ure& of the&e characteri&tic& of 4ulic &ector management for thePhili44ine& office& and agencie& &ur%eyed3

To e<4lore different facet& of 4ulic &ector management, mea&ure& of meritocracy, accountailityand ca4acity /ere con&tructed, along the &ame line& a& the indice& of corru4tion andaccountaility already de&cried, tran&forming re&4on&e& into a &cale that range& from . to +..32or ye& and no re&4on&e&, the follo/ing tale& &ho/ the 4ercentage /ho &aid ye&3 "e&4on&e& to

fre5uency 5ue&tion&, /ith re&4on&e& of Hne%er, &ometime&, often, al/ay&I /ere &caled u&ing aformulaF

Percentage &aid ne%er * . Y

Percentage &aid &ometime& * + Y ;Percentage &aid often * - Y

Percentage &aid al/ay& * ;

!t &hould e noted that in thi& and the follo/ing cha4ter, /here the econometric analy&i& i&clo&ely related to the mea&ure& deri%ed here, the focu& i& &olely on the munici4alBle%el office&

and facilitie&3

,eritocracy

Official& on all le%el& a&&erted that the mo&t 5ualified 4er&on got a 4o&ition mo&t of the timeC2igure 7DJ and the mo&t im4ortant criteria for 4romotion& /ere alleged to e 5uality of &er%ice,merit, and tenurealthough, a& &ho/n in 2igure 9, the&e re&ult& /ere &tronger for the health thanthe education &ector3 >o/e%er, 4romotion& in the health &ector /ere allegedly a&ed more&trongly on family, 4olitical and 4rofe&&ional connection& than /a& the ca&e in the education&ector3 2or all official&, a nonBtri%ial numer of re&4ondent& did mention /orri&ome rea&on& like rie& C7RD, gift& C;RD, ethnicity C++RD, religion C+;RD, 4olitical C7RD, and family connection&

C;9RD3 !n general the le&& decentralized education &ector /a& re4ortedly more meritocratic thanthe health &ector, or the admini&trator0& office3

The meritocracy inde< /a& a&ed on a numer of &uEecti%e 5ue&tion& a&ked of the munici4alhealth officer and the munici4al admini&trator3 A& /ith corru4tion, there are 4re&um4ti%e rea&on&to &u&4ect an&/er& to &uEecti%e 5ue&tion& aout meritocracy in hiring and 4romotion& from&enior officer& /ho, after all, make the&e deci&ion&3 !ndeed, the a&e %alue& on &ome re&4on&e&

9.



&eem im4roaly high, for e<am4le, for 4romotion deci&ion& allegedly made on the a&i& ofmerit and 5uality of &er%ice CTale +D3

Fi2"re (> O++icia!@ Vie7! o+ Ho7 O+te$ the )o!t "ai+ie% Per!o$ Get! the o3 Ca%erageD

2/( 2/* 3 3/2 3/4 3/(

!ubcount%unicipal Health

istr ictro6ince Health

!ubcount% unicipal Education

!ub$ount%unicipal Education

All -- icials

ean 1.ne6er, 2.so7eti7es, 3.7ost o- the ti7e, 4.alw a%s

Fi2"re <> A-era2e Meritocrac* #er a #"3ic o++icia!: Criteria "!e% i$ #ro)otio$!a%erage of re&4on&e& according to 5ue&tion &cale*

0 1 2 3

8ualit% o- ser6ice

7erit

tenure

relationship w ith super6isor

pro-essional connections

political connections

-a7il% connections

religion

gender

ethnicit%

gi-t

9 0.not at all i7portant, 1.so7ewhat i7portant, 3.6er% i7portant

Education

Health

There /a& no /ay of checking the authenticity of the re&4on&e& other than to note, for e<am4le,the 4o&iti%e ut in&ignificant correlation et/een the admini&trator and the health officerre&4on&e&3 2or thi& rea&on, and ecau&e of an o%erla4 et/een the conce4t& of meritocracy andcorru4tion, meritocracy i& u&ed 4rimarily a& a rou&tne&& check for &e%eral regre&&ion& in the

9+



follo/ing cha4ter0& analy&i& of corru4tion3 2uture re4lication& of thi& &tudy might &ur%ey at lea&tt/o officer&one &enior and one Euniorin each office to generate more reliale data on&en&iti%e management 5ue&tion& like meritocracy in hiring and 4romotion&3 Thi& /ould al&o 4ermit im4ortant te&t& to e carried out on the reliaility of the data3

Ta3e .,> Meritocrac* un3>ealth

un3Adm3

un3)?#S

>eath#linic&

PulicSchool&

Pri%ateSchool&

Mea$ Stati!tic! Ci$%ice! )ea!"ri$2 a-era2e re!#o$!e!

(e&t Nualified get the @o 993- 9939: ::3- B B B

)eci&ion& (a&ed on "elation&hi4 /ith Su4erior& =3;+ 7+3. -:3- 77379 3=: 7-3..

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Nuality -3=; :3.7 93-7 -3-- -39: =+3;;

)eci&ion& (a&ed on erit =:3+; 73:= .3- =:3:= ;3.. =3..

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Political #onnection& 3=: 73;. +3+: ;3;; -3+7 +39:

)eci&ion& (a&ed on 2amily #onnection& ;93.= ;+3-- +-3.= ;;3;; ;73;; -.3..

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Profe&&ional #ollection& :3-9 9;3- ;3;; 77379 93;; 739:

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Tenure =-3 =-3-= =-37. =3 =3.. =.3..

)eci&ion& (a&ed on "eligion +;37. 3-= 73- :3:= +39: 3;;

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Gender +3:: +;3.= 3+: =3= +3.. --39:)eci&ion& (a&ed on Gift& 3:. -37; -3.= -3-- ;3;; 73;;

)eci&ion& (a&ed on (rie ;3.; +39 -3- +3++ 93.. 3..

)eci&ion& (a&ed on ?thnicity +.377 +.377 =3;; 3 93.. +.39:

eritocracy !nde< 9937- :-3: =+39+ :=3-- =-377 973=:

Correatio$ 3et7ee$ Meritocrac* I$%e8 a$% Other Meritocrac* Mea!"re!

(e&t Nualified get the @o .37* .37:* .3:-* B B B

)eci&ion& (a&ed on "elation&hi4 /ith Su4erior& B.3+; B.3+9 B.3-=* .3+= B.3-=* .3-;

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Nuality .37=* .3-7* .3.= .3=+* .37+* .3:-*

)eci&ion& (a&ed on erit .397* .3;;* .37:* .3==* .3;7* .3:=*

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Political #onnection& B.37:* B.37+* B.37* B.37;* B.3;9* B.3-:

)eci&ion& (a&ed on 2amily #onnection& B.37.* B.3;:* B.3.* B.37;* B.3;* .3.-

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Profe&&ional #ollection& .3.; B.3.= B.3-=* .3+ B.3+; .3+:

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Tenure .3.* .3.; B.3+; .379* .3.; .3-:)eci&ion& (a&ed on "eligion B.3;* B.37* B.39* B.3.: B.37;* B.3+;

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Gender B.3-. B.3;:* B.37+* B.3.9 B.37+* B.3+;

)eci&ion& (a&ed on Gift& B.3-* B.3+* B.39-* B.37+* B.3;9* B.3-=

)eci&ion& (a&ed on (rie B.3-. B.37* B.377* B.3.9 B.39* B.3;-

)eci&ion& (a&ed on ?thnicity B.3+9 B.3-=* B.37.* .3+- B.3+* B.3-+

Correatio$ 3et7ee$ Meritocrac* I$%ice!

un3 >ealth +3.. .3+- B.3.+ .3- .3. B.3;;

un3 Adm3 .3+- +3.. .3-:* .3+- B.3+- B.3+:

un3 )?#S B.3.+ .3-:* +3.. .3. B.3++ .3.7

>ealth 2acilitie& .3- .3+- .3. +3.. .39: B

Pulic School& .3. B.3+- B.3++ .39: +3.. B

Pri%ate School& B.3;; B.3+: .3.7 +3..Correatio$ ?ith Ho"!eho% Re!#o$!e!

#orru4tion Perce4tion of >ou&ehold& .3+- B.3.9 B.3;+* B.3- .3.+ .3;7

"e&idual of #orru4tion Perce4tion of >ou&ehold& .3.7 B.3.9 B.3+: B.3.: B.3;-* B.3;

*)eri%ation of indice& i& de&cried on 437:3

9-



Accountability

The ne<t %ariale of intere&t i& accountaility3 Thi& too ha& &e%eral dimen&ion&F the fre5uency ofaudit& and e%aluation&, feedack from e%aluation&, &ocial 4re&&ure again&t corru4tion C/ould anofficer &u&4ected of corru4tion face 4re&&ure to re&ignD, and the e<i&tence and enforcement of

/ritten target&3 A& Tale -. &ho/&, the fre5uency of internal audit& i& %ery high and thefre5uency of e<ternal audit& and e%aluation& i& al&o 5uite high for oth health and admini&trator&0officer&3 'ritten target& e<i&t in all munici4alitie& and are re4ortedly enforced /ith a &core of =3The mean %alue of the accountaility inde< i& therefore 5uite high3 A large numer ofre&4ondent&, ranging from a 9 &core in )?#S office& to 97 in munici4al admini&tration office&&aid that an officer &u&4ected of corru4tion /ould face &ocial 4re&&ure to re&ign3 Pri%ate &chool&at :+ &cored highe&t3 The inde< i& al&o highly correlated /ith it& com4onent&, &ugge&ting it doe&ca4ture &ome underlying reality3 +:

'hile the re&earch team had &ome concern& aout the 5uality of the accountaility data, a& 4ulicofficial& might not /ant to e frank aout an&/er&, the&e concern& /ere tem4ered y the

oEecti%e 4hra&ing of the 5ue&tion&3 "e&4ondent& might feel le&& comfortale aout e<4licit lie&to a 5ue&tion like H'ere you audited in the la&t yearMI than they /ould to &uEecti%e 5ue&tion&like H>o/ accountale i& the munici4al go%ernmentMI or H>o/ often doe& the e&t 5ualified 4er&on get the EoMI3 !n other conte<t&, it i& found that oEecti%e 5ue&tion& are le&& &uEect to ia&F the &uEecti%e 5ue&tion aout &ati&faction /ith go%ernment health &er%ice& &eem& to ha%e a&ignificant Hgri4eI ia&, ut the more 4reci&e 5ue&tion on /aiting time doe& not3 !t i& al&onotale that there tended to e a&&ociation& among fre5uency of audit, &ocial 4re&&ure& to re&ign/hen corru4tion /a& di&co%ered, and the authority to fire C2igure :DJ the latter %ariale i& acom4onent of HadEu&taility,I ut i& thought to relate clo&ely to the climate of accountaility in a 4articular office or agency3

+: The inde< doe& not include &ocial 4re&&ure again&t corru4tion, /hich i& al&o taulated in Tale -.3 The rea&on fore<cluding thi& %ariale from the inde< i& that it conce4tually &ome/hat different from, and i& not highly correlated/ith the inde< com4onent&3

9;



Ta3e 4/> Acco"$ta3iit*un3

>ealthun3Adm3

un3)?#S

>ealth#linic&

PulicSchool&

Pri%ateSchool&

Mea$ Stati!tic! i$%ice! )ea!"ri$2 a-era2e re!#o$!e!

2re5uency of Audit CinternalD =;3;; +3+ B B .3.. 7.3..

2re5uency of Audit Ce<ternalD 7=3:= 973=- B B 73.. :3;9

Social Pre&&ure Again&t #orru4tion 9379 973+ 93-7 B 77379 :.3=;2re5uency of ?%aluation 773;; 739 773- 9=3-= :73.+ 7;3:

(eing !nformed Aout ?%aluation "e&ult =.3+: :737 =73.. 9:379 939. :+39:

'ritten Target& ?<i&t +..3.. +..3.. :3: :3+: :39

'ritten Target& ?nforced ==39+ =-37. ::37 73+ 9=3.

Accountaility !nde< :=3+: :+3= =.3:; :=3:- :;3.= :.3=7

Correatio$ 3et7ee$ Acco"$ta3iit* I$%ice!

2re5uency of Audit CinternalD .37:* .39* B B .3:9* .3=*

2re5uency of Audit Ce<ternalD .39:* .3:-* B B .39.* .3;*

Social Pre&&ure Again&t #orru4tion B.3.. .3.7 B.3. B B.3+- B.3--

2re5uency of ?%aluation .3-:* .39=* .3* .39* .3+- .3;*

(eing !nformed Aout ?%aluation "e&ult .3* .37;* .3;9* .399* .3;* .3;:*

'ritten Target& ?<i&t B B B .3;* .37* .3;*

'ritten Target& ?nforced .3;;* B .3:.* .3:9* .3:;* .39;*Correatio$ 3et7ee$ Acco"$ta3iit* I$%e8 a$% Other Acco"$ta3iit* Mea!"re!

un3 >ealth +3.. .3.9 .3.= .3+7 .3.- B.3+-

un3 Adm3 .3.9 +3.. B.3+7 B.3++ B.3.: .3.7

un3 )?#S .3.= B.3+7 +3.. .3.: B.3.; B.3.;

>ealth 2acilitie& .3+7 B.3++ .3.: +3.. B.3;7 .37

Pulic School& .3.- B.3.: B.3.; B.3;7 +3.. .3+7

Pri%ate School& B.3+- .3.7 B.3.; .37 .3+7 +3..

Correatio$ ?ith Ho"!eho% Re!#o$!e!

#orru4tion Perce4tion of >ou&ehold& .3. .3.; B.3.+ .3+. B.3.= B.3-+

"e&idual of #orru4tion Perce4tion of >ou&ehold& B.3.: .3. B.3+. B.3.; B.3.: B.3-7

*)eri%ation of indice& i& gi%en on 43 7:

Fi2"re 1 Acco"$ta3iit* "e!tio$! J Re!#o$!e! +ro) O++icia! a$% Faciitie!

0: 20: 40: (0: *0: 100:

All

unicipal

ro6ince

;acilit%

audited

social pressure to resign

ha6e authorit% to -ire

9



Capacity

#a4acity i& often cited a& a key con&traint to effecti%e &er%ice deli%ery follo/ingdecentralization3 >o/e%er, ca4acity con&traint& do not a44ear to e too &e%ere at the munici4alle%el in the Phili44ine&3 2or 4ur4o&e& of thi& &tudy ca4acity /a& mea&ured a& a comination of

training, education and in&titutional re&ource& and mea&ured ca4acity at 9: out a 4o&&ile +.. forthe munici4al admini&trator& office and :: for the health office CTale -+D3 The )?#S Office&cored =; and 4ri%ate &chool& out&cored 4ulic &chool& y == to :3 The high numer& oneducation reflect the fact that ::R of admini&tration and health officer& had com4leted college3Training i& al&o fre5uent, ranging from 7: in munici4al admini&tration office to =: in the )?#SOffice in the 4ulic &ector3 Pri%ate &chool& at . &cored highe&t3 Thi& inde<, too, i& highlycorrelated /ith it& com4onent& ut one /ould e<4ect it to e correlated at aout .3;; &im4ly ycon&truction a& it ha& only ; com4onent&3 There i& no 4erce4tile correlation et/een ca4acity atthe munici4al admini&tration and health office3 !ntere&tingly, ca4acity in 4ulic and 4ri%ate&chool& /a& correlated at 3;., /hich &ugge&t& that con&traint& of 4o%erty and geogra4hy mightaffect 4ulic and 4ri%ate &ector 4ro%i&ion of education in &imilar /ay&3

Ta3e 4.> Ca#acit*un3

>ealthun3Adm3

un3)?#S

PulicSchool&

Pri%ateSchool&

Mea$ Stati!tic! I$%ice! )ea!"ri$2 a-era2e re!#o$!e! !cae% / to .//

Training of ?m4loyee& ::3+ 7:3- =939: =+397 =37=

?ducation of ?m4loyee& =-3 :-3;9 B B B

"e&ource& of the !n&titution :.3-7 9=3 :+3-7 9739 =93=+

#a4acity !nde< :93= 9:3+ =-39. :;39- ==3+

Correatio$ 3et7ee$ Ca#acit* I$%e8 a$% Other Ca#acit* Mea!"re!

Training of ?m4loyee& .37:* .39-* .3:-* .3=+* .3*

?ducation of ?m4loyee& .39=* .3:+* B B B

"e&ource& of the !n&titution .3:7* .3=.* .3:9* .3=:* .37*

Correatio$ 3et7ee$ Ca#acit* I$%ice!un3 >ealth +3.. .3.9 B.3+; .3+= .3--

un3 Adm3 .3.9 +3.. .3+9 .3.9 .3;.*

un3 )?#S B.3+; .3+9 +3.. .3.9 B.3--

Pulic School& .3+= .3.9 .3.9 +3.. .3;.

Pri%ate School& .3-- .3;.* B.3-- .3;. +3..

Correatio$ ?ith Ho"!eho% Re!#o$!e!

#orru4tion Perce4tion of >ou&ehold& B.3.- .3.7 .3-;* B.3.7 B.3.9

"e&idual of #orru4tion Perce4tion of >ou&ehold& B.3+. B.3-* .3. B.3.- B.3-

97



Cha#ter VIII: Li$Ka2e to O"tco)e!

A key i&&ue to e addre&&ed in thi& 4a4er i& /hether, and to /hat e<tent, %ariou& in&titutionalfactor&the di&ci4line& relating to ci%ic 4artici4ation, intergo%ernmental con&traint&, and 4ulic

&ector managementaffect the 4ercei%ed 5uality of 4ulic health and education &er%ice&, andultimately health and education outcome& them&el%e&3 A& re&ult& &ho/ed that for the Phili44ine&corru4tion 4layed a key role in the&e relation&hi4&, the di&cu&&ion elo/ i& organized around thi&theme3 (ecau&e of the econometric /ork re5uired for thi& in%e&tigation, 4ro%incialBle%elo&er%ation& ere e<cluded, ecau&e of their relati%ely &mall numer3 2urther, ecau&e it i& onlyhealth deli%ery /hich ha& een truly de%ol%ed in the Phili44ine&, the data focu&e& 4rimarily onre&4on&e& from munici4al admini&trator& and munici4al health official&3

The Causes o! Corruption

Thi& e<amination of the linkage of 4erformance factor& to outcome& egin& /ith looking at the

effect& of tho&e factor&, taking into account demogra4hic %ariale&, on corru4tion3 The follo/ing&te4 of the analy&i& /ill e to focu& on the effect& of corru4tion on the health and educationoutcome&3 !n determining the cau&e& of corru4tion at the munici4al le%el, the effect& of thefollo/ing %ariale& /ere e<aminedF a&ic demogra4hic factor& &uch a& education, income anduran re&idenceJ federali&t di&ci4line& &uch a& %oting, media e<4o&ure and moilityJ the le%el ofdi&cretion enEoyed y munici4al admini&trator& and health officer&, and management 4ractice& intheir office&3+= The econometric method& u&ed to deri%e the re&ult& &ho/n in Tale -- arede&cried in (o< +3

Bo8 .: Eco$o)etric Metho%! "!e% i$ Deter)i$i$2 Ca"!e! o+ Corr"#tio$

Three mea&ure& of corru4tion are u&ed a& a de4endent %ariale3 >ou&ehold re&4on&e& on corru4tion /ere

cleaned of 4erce4tion ia& u&ing e5uation :3+ CAnne< Tale ;D3 Pulic official&0 4erce4tion& of corru4tion,u&ing an&/er& to &4ecific 5ue&tion& aout different corru4t 4ractice& in the munici4al health and admini&trationoffice&, /ere cleaned of 4erce4tion ia& u&ing e5uation& 3+ and 3- CAnne< Tale +.D, and then comined intoone inde<3 "e&ult& are 4re&ented u&ing each inde<, ecau&e it i& &im4le&t to inter4ret the im4act of aninde4endent %ariale on a de4endent %ariale if the t/o %ariale& re4re&ent the an&/er of different re&4ondent&3>o/e%er, if oth indice& are noi&y mea&ure& of corru4tion, a more 4reci&e mea&ure of corru4tion could ecreated y merging the t/o indice&3 Thi& doe& rai&e concern& aout re&4ondent ia&, a& the de4endent %ariale/ould then &hare a &ource /ith all inde4endent %ariale&, ut ecau&e care ha& een taken to clean the data of

4erce4tion ia&e&, the re&ult& ha%e &ome %alidity3

The regre&&ion& in Tale -- u&e munici4al le%el data on the =. munici4alitie& /e &am4led3 The fir&t t/oe5uation& +.3+ and +.3- u&e hou&ehold corru4tion 4erce4tion& a& the mea&ure of corru4tion3 The fir&t e5uationi& a /eighted lea&t &5uare& e&timation /ith the /eight& e5ual to the numer of o&er%ation& in the munici4ality3

Thi& numer doe& not %ary much acro&& munici4alitie&, making thi& e5uation 5uite &imilar to OLS3 "ou&t&tandard error& are 5uoted3 OLS i& ea&y to inter4ret ut i& 4roaly not the a44ro4riate e&timation method ecau&e of 4o&&ile 4ro%inceBle%el effect&3 The &econd e5uation +.3- i& a random effect& e&timation thate<4licitly take& the&e into account3 Like/i&e, e5uation& +.3; and +.3 u&e 4ulic official&0 re4ort& oncorru4tion a& the de4endent %ariale, and +.37 and +.39 u&e a merged %ariale a&ed on the other t/o %ariale&3

+= 2or tho&e /i&hing to analyze clo&ely the re&ult& 4re&ented in thi& cha4ter, Anne< Tale gi%e& the &ummary ofmean& for the %ariale& e<amined3

99



Ta3e 44> The Ca"!e! o+ Corr"#tio$Corr"#tio$ )ea!"re Corr"#tio$

Ho"!eho%

Corr"#tio$ P"3ic

O++icia!

Corr"#tio$ Mer2e%

?&timation method 'LS"ou&tStd ?rr

"andom?ffect&Pro%ince

'LS"ou&tStd ?rr


'LS"ou&tStd ?rr


+.3+ +.3- +.3; +.3 +.37 +.39

"ead Local 1e/&4a4er .3-.:**-3--

.3+=7+37=9

.3.9-+3.-7

.3.=+3+

.3--**-3-+

.3-=*+3=9

"ead 1ational 1e/&4a4er B.3-.:**+3-

B.3+-+3+==

B.3+-7*B+3=+

B.3++9B+37::

B.3;7**B-3:;

B.3-7B+37+:

8ote in Local ?lection B.3=-***B-3:.;

B.3-=**B-3+:-

B.3++B+37:

B.3+:;B+3-.

B.39-***B-3:+:

B.37;;**B-3+;7

8ote in 1ational ?lection .3;--+3;:

.3-:.+3.=9

.3.;:

.3-7B.3..+B.3..9

.3;-=+3+.:

.3-.7

.3979

igrate if >ealth Ser%ice& Poor B.3.=9B.3:-

B.3.;7B.3-9=

.3.++

.3+;.3.;9.37.

B.3.7:B.3;

.3.;7

.3-+-

Log P# ?<4enditure 73-9.3. :3+3-. B.3.;B.3;-- B-3+=B.37= 3...37+ 39;.37:=

?ducation .3++.3::

.3.+-

.3..3;=+**-3;+=

.3;:**-3-

.37+*+3:-9

.3;.+3.;=

$ran B+3**B-3;=:

B+37**B-3;+-

B+3.9B.3-=+

B.3.:7B+3;79

B+73+**B-3.

B+3=*B+3=:9

Social )ifference& .3+:;*+37

.3+7++3-+:

B.3.:.B+3;:+

B.3.=-B+37=

.3+.

.3=

.3+99+3...

AdEu&taility .3+=+3+

.3+=:+37-:

.3.79

.3=:+.3..39:9

.3-9*+3::;

.3-;=+37.

Accountaility .3.;.3;-.

.3.

.3;:..3.7-.39:.

.3.:.

.3=7:.3.=-.39.

.3+-:

.3:

AntiBcorru4tion attitude& -3;77.3+-

-37=.3;=

B.3.=;*B+39=7

B.3.:7B+3;79

;3+7;.3.-

+3==.3:

)elayed 4ayment& B.3+=7B+3.=

B.3+B+3-=.

.3.9

.3+.+.3.;9.3;;

B.3+-B.37-+

B.3+7B.3=+.

" &5 /ithin .3+7 .3-- .3-.

" &5 et/een .379 .3; .377

" &5 .3;9 .3; .3-9 .3-7 .3;= .3;7

1 =. =. =. =. =. =.

One /ellBkno/n hy4othe&i& aout corru4tion i& that /hen 4ulic official& enEoy more di&cretion,they ha%e greater o44ortunitie& to demand rie&, and may ecome more corru4t a& acon&e5uence3 Thi& idea /a& formalized y Klitgaard0& famou& formula

#orru4tionW)i&cretion [ Accountaility Y ono4oly

'e egin /ith the fir&t of the&e %ariale&di&cretion3 2or 4ur4o&e& of thi& &tudy, di&cretion i&mea&ured y adEu&taility a& re4orted y 4ulic official& and therefore i& e&t analyzed u&ing thehou&eholdBle%el data a& the de4endent %ariale3 A 4o&iti%e effect of adEu&taility on corru4tion i&found CTale --D ut it i& only &ignificant at -.R3 The coefficient of .3+= mean& that a one

9:



&tandard de%iation increa&e in adEu&taility lead& to an increa&e in corru4tion of ;, or +9 th of a&tandard de%iation3 'hile the coefficient i& not &ignificant at con%entional le%el& in thi&e5uation, it doe& ecome &ignificant /hen the comined corru4tion inde< i& u&ed and &ur%i%e& anumer of rou&tne&& check& de&cried elo/3 A& the &catter 4lot at the ottom right hand corner of 2igure = &ho/&, there i& no one o&er%ation that i& dri%ing thi& relation&hi4 et/een

adEu&taility and corru4tion, and remo%al of the one influential o&er%ation on the far left /ouldmake the relation&hi4 much &tronger3 (ureaucratic accountaility a& 4ro<ied y the 4ulicofficial& re&4on&e& on audit& and e%aluation& ha& no 4erce4tile effect on corru4tion ut 4oliticalaccountaility&ee elo/&eem& im4ortant3

Fi2"re 9> Partia Pot o$ Ca"!e! o+ Corr"#tio$

i3 #orru4tion on reading local ne/&4a4er&coe- . /2)1)12+(, se . /13555+01,t .2/15

e < c o r 2=

p

@

e<read=loc >? @33/14+2 5*/3)3+

51/32+1

5)/5(+4

ii3 #orru4tion on reading national ne/&4a4er&coe- . /3503++*2, se . /12)542(, t . 2/+

e < c o

r 2=

p

@

e< read=nat>? @3)/*254 43/3)33

4+/(44+

(5/10(1

iii3 #orru4tion on %oting in local election&coe- . /(3205134, se ./243*4413, t . 2/5)

e < c o r 2=

p h

> ? @

e< 6ote=loc > ? @2*/0+3 21/4)43

4*/1))3

52/)542

i%3 #orru4tion on adEu&tailitycoe- . /25*512*1,se . /1530(25*,t .1/()

e < c o r 2=

p h >

? @

e<adjus=po >? @45/(*) 33/430*

52/2()1

5(/04(1

Of the ci%ic di&ci4line&, four%oting in national and local election&, and reading local andnational ne/&4a4er&re4re&ent Klitgaard0& HaccountailityI and moility i& a negati%e indicatorof Hmono4oly3I3 8oting in local election& ha& a clear negati%e im4act on corru4tion a& re4orted y hou&ehold&, /hile reading national ne/&4a4er& ha& a le&& rou&t im4act on corru4tion3

"eading local ne/&4a4er& a44ear& to increa&e corru4tionF /hile a 4lau&ile &tory might e told for in&tance, local ne/&4a4er &ale& may ri&e during corru4tion &candal&to e<4lain thi&, thi&re&ult i& ad hoc and un&ati&fying3 The&e federali&t %ariale& are e&t analyzed u&ing the 4ulicofficial data, /hich i& no/ re4orted3

'hen 4ulic official&0 re4ort& on corru4tion are u&ed a& the de4endent %ariale the &ignificanceof mo&t %ariale& fall&, 4erha4& due to more noi&e in the de4endent %ariale, and the " - dro4&from .3;9 to .3-9 C?5uation& +.3; and +.3, Tale --D3 8oting in local election& i& only

9=



&ignificant at -.R3 "eading national ne/&4a4er& al&o a44ear& to reduce corru4tionF thecoefficient i& &ignificant at +.R u&ing /eighted lea&t &5uare& and remain& &ignificant at -.R ifrandom effect& are u&ed3 The effect of reading local ne/&4a4er& ecome& in&ignificant utremain& of the /rong &ign3 The effect of adEu&taility ecome& im4erce4tile, ut thi& may edue to &ome re&idual Hgri4eI factor ia&ing the coefficient do/n/ard&4ulic official& /ho like

to com4lain /ould com4lain aout oth corru4tion and aout their lack of authority3

One 4o&&ile rea&on for /eak and in&ignificant re&ult& in e5uation& +.3+B+.3 i& mea&urementerror in the de4endent %ariale3 )o the re&ult& ecome &tronger if one u&e& the He&tI mea&ure of corru4tion that can e con&tructed /ith the data C&ee (o< +DM The fit of regre&&ion& +.37 i& infact etter than e5uation& +.3+ and +.3;, and the fit of the random effect& e5uation +.39 i& etterthan +.3- and +.33

8oting in local election& i& highly &ignificant CtW-3:-, 4B%alueW.3..=D in the /eighted lea&t&5uare& e5uation C+.37D, and remain& &ignificant at 7R in the random effect& &4ecification3 Thi&could e a 4otentially intere&ting 4iece of e%idence on the relation&hi4 et/een democratization

and corru4tion if it corre&4onded /ith cro&&Bcountry finding&3 >o/e%er, re&ult& ondemocratization and corru4tion are mi<ed, /ith Trei&man C-...D finding an im4erce4tilecontem4oraneou& effect, ut Knack and Azfar C-...D finding a &ignificant relation&hi43 "eadingnational ne/&4a4er& i& &ignificant at 7R in 'LS ut only at -.R if random effect& are u&ed3AdEu&taility i& no/ &ignificant at +.R in /eighted lea&t &5uare&, ut only at -.R if randomeffect& are u&ed3 Thu&, all the re&ult& do &eem a little &tronger if the He&tI mea&ure of corru4tioni& u&ed3

There i& one negati%e re&ult /orth talking aout3 1o e%idence could e found of an im4act ofHmono4olyI on corru4tion3 The 4otential moility of hou&ehold& a& mea&ured y a re&4on&e tothe 5ue&tion I'ould you mo%e if the 5uality of go%ernment health &er%ice& /a& 4oorMI ha& no 4erce4tile effect in any of the &i< regre&&ion& re4orted in Tale --3 "ou&tne&& check& failed to 4roduce large difference& in the re&ult&3+

2inally, the team /a& concerned that &ome 4articularly o4timi&tic re4ort& on the a&ence ofcorru4tion in certain munici4alitie& might e dri%ing the re&ult&3 The corru4tion %ariale /a&therefore HtruncatedI or HflattenedI y u&ing a nonBlinear tran&formation

#orru4tionCtruncatedDWma<CB+., #orru4tionD

+ "ou&tne&& check& /ere 4erformed on the re&ult& in Anne< Tale ++3 OLS and 'LS oth might gi%e undue

/eight to outlier& if error term& are not normally di&triuted3 Therefore, a rou&t regre&&ion C++3+D /a& e&timated,/hich i& more a44ro4riate for many other di&triution& of the error term&3 T/o %ariale& of intere&t, %oting in localelection&, and adEu&taility at the local le%el actually ri&e a little in &ignificance, reading national ne/&4a4er& dro4&&lightly3#a4acity and meritocracy /ere added to the e5uation Cregre&&ion& ++3- and ++3;D3 The&e %ariale& /ere not includedin the core &4ecification ecau&e the %ariale& may e endogenou&3 !n fact, ca4acity i& &ignificant, ut the re&earchteam doe& not /ant to inter4ret the coefficient or &ignificance le%el literally ecau&e of endogeneity concern&3eritocracy i& not &ignificant3 Adding the&e %ariale& to the e5uation reduce& only &lightly the &ignificance le%el&on our %ariale& of intere&t3 'hen the t/o %ariale& that ne%er ha%e a tB&tati&tic ao%e + are dro44ed, mo&t of the&ignificance le%el& on the %ariale& of intere&t actually ri&e3

9



'hen thi& %ariale i& u&ed a& the de4endent %ariale, the re&ult& change only im4erce4tily38oting in local election& remain& &ignificant at +R, and reading national ne/&4a4er& andadEu&taility remain &ignificant at +.R3

!n &ummary, intuiti%e and rou&t re&ult& /ere found linking lo/ le%el& of corru4tion to %oting in

local election& and reading national ne/&4a4er&3 The&e re&ult& /ere con&i&tently &ignificant for%oting in local election& and often marginally &ignificant for reading national ne/&4a4er&3 2oranother %ariale of intere&t, the le%el of di&cretion or adEu&taility enEoyed y local official&, there&ult& confirmed the theoretically 4redicted 4o&iti%e relation&hi4 et/een adEu&taility andcorru4tion3 "eading local ne/&4a4er&, ho/e%er, had a counterintuiti%e 4o&iti%e effect oncorru4tion 4erce4tion&3 2inally, Hmono4oly,I a& mea&ured Cnegati%elyD y the 4otential moilityof hou&ehold&, had no 4erce4tile effect on corru4tion3

The Conse6uences o! Corruption

The la&t &tage of thi& analy&i& /a& to e<amine the effect of corru4tion, a& /ell a& other factor&, on

health and education &er%ice&3 The main te&t, follo/ing the 4re%iou& analy&i&, concern& &e%eraldifferent mea&ure& of health &er%ice& 4ro%ided y local go%ernment&F kno/ledge of re5uiredimmunization&J hou&ehold re&4on&e& on &ati&faction and /aiting timeJ and an&/er& to 5ue&tion&a&ked of 4ulic official& on increa&e& in immunization& and decrea&e& in infectiou& di&ea&e&3

Health

2ir&t, an oEecti%e, if im4erfect, mea&ure of 4erformance /a& u&edF official&0 kno/ledge ofre5uired immunization&3 Thi& /a& a&ed on re&4on&e& to te&t of kno/ledge 5ue&tion&admini&tered a& a 4art of the &ur%ey3 !mmunization& for mea&le&, (#G Cty4hoidD, )PTCdi4htheriaD and OP8 C4olioD are re5uired for infant& in the Phili44ine&3 The %ariale i& a&ed onthe numer of the&e di&ea&e& mentioned y the health officer inter%ie/ed at the health facility3

Point& /ere not &utracted for mentioning other %accination&a numer of official& includedhe4atiti& in their re&4on&e&3

Anne< Tale +. &ho/& e&timate& of the determinant& of correct re&4on&e& to the kno/ledge5ue&tion3 Thi& e5uation i& e&timated at the arangay le%el3 (ecau&e the mea&ure i& moreoEecti%e than other mea&ure& u&ed, the effect& of oth hou&ehold and 4ulic official&0 4erce4tion& of corru4tion on the kno/ledge %ariale are e<amined3 The effect of hou&eholdcorru4tion 4erce4tion& i& &ignificant in /eighted lea&t &5uare& Cregre&&ion +-3+D ut onlymarginally &ignificant if the random effect& e&timator i& u&ed Cregre&&ion +-3-D3 The effect of 4ulic official&0 4erce4tion& of corru4tion are clearer and highly &ignificant Cat +RD in oth the'LS and the random effect& e&timation3 $n&ur4ri&ingly, if one u&e& the comined inde< on

corru4tion, the effect remain& highly &ignificant at +R3 -. !ncome /a& al&o &ignificant in theregre&&ion, /ith more correct re&4on&e& in munici4alitie& /ith richer hou&ehold&3 )elay& in&alary 4ayment& at the munici4alut not the facilityle%el al&o &eemed to ad%er&ely affectkno/ledge, 4erha4& due to the drain of the mo&t 5ualified 4er&onnel3

-. The coefficient of [.3- mean& that a oneB&tandardBde%iation increa&e in corru4tion reduce& kno/ledge of re5uiredimmunization& y 737 or +th of a &tandard de%iation3

:.



1e<t, the u&er& of go%ernment &er%ice&i3e3, hou&ehold& /ere a&ked aout oth their&ati&faction /ith go%ernment &er%ice& and a &ome/hat more 4reci&e 5ue&tion on /aiting time3"ea&&uringly, the an&/er& to the&e 5ue&tion& are negati%ely correlated /ith each other, and aninde< com4o&ed of oth 5ue&tion& /a& al&o u&ed3 !ndice& on &ati&faction and /aiting time /erecreated after filtering out the 4ro4en&ity to com4lain, u&ing e5uation& =3+ and =3- CAnne< Tale

++D3 Perce4tion& of national corru4tion, /hich are meant to ca4ture the Hgri4eI ia&, are only&ignificant for the &ati&faction 5ue&tion3 Thi& &ugge&t& that it might e etter to a&k 4reci&e rather than &uEecti%e 5ue&tion& to minimize re&4ondent ia&3 Of cour&e, 4reci&e 5ue&tion& may ca4turele&& rele%ant information, &o it may e e&t to a&k oth 4reci&e and general 5ue&tion&, /hich i&/hat i& done here3 The e&t mea&ure may /ell e a&ed on oth mea&ure&, and thu& a thirdmea&ure a&ed on oth &ati&faction and /aiting time /a& con&tructed3 !f the mea&ure /ere etter,one /ould e<4ect the e5uation 4redicting it to ha%e a etter fitJ indeed the fit of the e5uation forthe com4o&ite inde< i& %i&ily etter than for either com4onent C.3- rather than .3+ or .3-D3

The re&ult& on the determinant& of 4erformance mea&ure& a&ed on hou&ehold re&4on&e& are 4re&ented in Tale -;3 The&e e5uation& are e&timated at the arangay le%el3 Thi& i& the e&t /ay

to e&timate the e5uation, ecau&e hou&ehold& /ere a&ked to rate the 5uality of health &er%ice& intheir arangay health facility3 Out of a 4otential +9. arangay& in /hich health facilitie& /ere&ur%eyed, -: /ere lo&t due to mi&&ing %alue& on &ome %ariale, lea%ing +;; o&er%ation& /ith/hich to e&timate thi& e5uation3

:+



Ta3e 45> E8#ai$i$2 ?aiti$2 Ti)e at a$% Sati!+actio$ 7ith Go-er$)e$t Heath Ci$ic!Sati!+actio$ 7ith

Go-er$)e$t Heath Ci$ic

?aiti$2 Ti)e Sati!+actio$?aiti$2 Ti)e

'LSC/Wno3 of o&

in mun3D

"andom?ffect&

CGrou4FPro%inceD

'LSC/Wno3of o& in

mun3D

"andom?ffect&

CGrou4FPro%inceD

'LSC/Wno3of o& in

mun3D

"andom?ffect&

CGrou4FPro%inceD

+;3+ +;3- +;3; +;3 +;37 +;39

$ran.3-::

C.3.:DB.37:

CB.3+:;DB.3-=9

CB.3-DB.3;.+

CB.37D.3.7

C.3;9=DB.3.9

CB.3+:-D

?ducation C>>DB.3..

CB.3;+=DB.3.7=

CB.3;;DB.3.-7

CB+3.==DB.3.+:

CB.39;.D.3..7

C.37.9DB.3..-C.3--+D

LogCincome 4er ca4itaD C>>DB;3;=

CB+3-DB+3:7

CB.37D+3+7

C+3:=D*.3=

C.3:79DB.37.7*CB+3::D

B.3-=7CB+3+-D

Su44ly of edicine C#LD.3-.+

C-39=.D***.3-+9

C-39-D**B.3.;=

CB-3:-+D***B.3.;

CB-3.9;D**.3.-+***C;37+;D

.3.-.***C-39D

Log of 1umer of Per&onnel at the

#linic C#LD

B73;=

CB+3:.7D*

B73=7

CB+3;=9D

-37=

C-3;:+D**

+3=

C-3=-D**

B+3..-***

CB-3=+-D

B.3:***

CB-3=7DKno/& the "e5uired!mmunization& C#LD

.3.;=C.3+7D

.3.;7C.3.=D

.3.-:C-3.-.D**

.3.+=C+3.=7D

B.3..7CB.3.9D

B.3..7CB.3=+-D

Allocation of 2und& y the 1ational Go%t3 (a&ed on >ealth"elated #riteria CPOD

B.3=;CB.3779D

B.3=7=CB.3:D

.3-7=C.3=7.D

.3++;=C.3;D

B.3++:CB.3+-D

B.3.7CB.3:..D

2reedom to AdEu&t CPOD.3+-

C+39.7D*.3.=

C.3=7D.3..:

C.3=+D.3..:

C.3..D.3..7.3:;D

.3..+C.3+-;D

2reedom to AdEu&t C#LD.3.+:

C.3-;D.3..+

C.3.-7D.3.+-

C.399-D.3.+:

C+3+=;DB.3..-

CB.3;7DB.3..C.3:D

Accountaility CPODB.3.++

CB.3+.=D.3.;

C.3;.-D.3.

C-3+9D**.3.:

C+3==:D**B.3.+

CB+3-DB.3.+.

CB+3.9D

Accountaility C#LD.3.+

C.3=:-D

.3.=

C.3=7D

B.3.+7

CB+3..:D

B.3.+

CB.3=;=D

.3..

C+3++=D

.3.++

C+3:79DSocial Pre&&ure again&t #orru4tionCPOD

.3.=.C-3.+=D**

.3.-C-3.+9D**

B.3..9CB.3=-D

B.3..CB.379+D

.3..9*C+3.+D

.3..9*C+3:D

#orru4tion at the unici4al Le%elCPOD

B.3-;.CB+3-=D

B.3+9+CB+3.9.D

.3.C+37-D

.3.+C+3;=+D

B.3.-**CB+37D

B.3.--*CB+3=+7D

)elay in Salary Payment& CPODB.3.=

CB.3:7.DB.3.97

CB.3:+DB.3.+=

CB.399DB.3.-

CB+3+.;D.3...

C.3..:D.3..7

C.3-D

)elay in Salary Payment& C#LDB.3+.

CB+3:9DB.3.

CB+39D.3.+9

C+3-.7D.3.-7

C-3.+.D**B.3.+.*CB+3:77D

B.3.++**CB-3+.D

#on&tantB;3;=:

CB.3+9;DB+739:

CB.39:;DB+-3+;

CB-3=D**B:3.+

CB+37-D;3-9

C+377D+3:

C.37D

1 +;; +;; +;; +;; +;; +;;

2CC+7,++:D -3-9*** -3.9*** -3:;***

#hi S5uare C+7D -3+* -:37=** +37;***"- /ithin .3+- .3+= .3-.

"- et/een .3; .3- .39

"- o%erall .3+ .3+: .3- .3-+ .3- .3-9

:-



#orru4tion i& found to ha%e a negati%e ut in&ignificant effect on oth &ati&faction and /aitingtime3-+ #orru4tion doe&, ho/e%er, ha%e a marginally &ignificant effect on the com4o&ite inde< a&ed on oth &ati&faction and /aiting time in oth the /eighted lea&t &5uare& and the randomeffect& e5uation3 Another %ariale that a44ear& to matter i& the &u44ly of medicine&, /hich&ugge&t& un&ur4ri&ingly that deci&ion& at the munici4al le%el or higher are rele%ant to the 5uality

of &er%ice& that health facilitie& can 4ro%ide3 The numer of 4er&onnel, ho/e%er, ha& a negati%eand &ignificant effect, 4erha4& reflecting ne4oti&m and o%erBem4loyment in the go%ernment3Alternati%ely, more 4er&onnel could 4ro<y for greater demand for health &er%ice& in den&ely 4o4ulated area&, /hich may lead to 4oorer &er%ice3

1e<t a &erie& of rou&tne&& te&t& on the finding& /ere conductedJ the&e are 4re&ented in Anne<Tale +-3 2ir&t, a rou&t regre&&ion /a& e&timated3 A& can e &een from the 4artial 4lot in Anne<2igure 9, there are a numer of outlier& dragging do/n the magnitude of the coefficient oncorru4tion3 A& e<4ected, oth the magnitude and the &ignificance of the coefficient on corru4tionri&e in a rou&t regre&&ion3 The &ignificance of the corru4tion %ariale increa&e& con&ideralyand it i& no/ &ignificant at -R3 1e<t, the e5uation i& e&timated u&ing munici4ality random

effect& and the &ignificance le%el dro4& only &lightly3 'hen ca4acity i& added a& a de4endent%ariale, it 4ro%e& in&ignificant and corru4tion remain& &ignificant at +.R3 The e5uation i& thene&timated u&ing a left truncated corru4tion %ariale and the re&ult& remain %irtually unchanged3!n &ummary, corru4tion i& &ho/n to ha%e a marginally &ignificant and rou&t effect on the 5ualityof health &er%ice& a& 4ercei%ed y hou&ehold&3

2inally, /hat in 4rinci4le may e the e&t mea&ure& of health &er%ice&increa&e& inimmunization rate& and decrea&e& in infectiou& di&ea&e&are e<amined3 >o/e%er, the data on/hich thi& e<amination i& a&ed are unfortunately not Hhard dataI ut rather a&ed on the re4ort&of health officer& &caled et/een + Cfell a lotD and 7 Cincrea&ed a lotD3 The re&earch teame&timated e5uation& of oth change& in immunization rate& and di&ea&e incidence for mea&le&,di4htheria, tuerculo&i& and he4atiti&3 The e5uation& on di4htheria, tuerculo&i& and he4atiti& hada 4oor fit and the 2Bte&t of Eoint &ignificance of all regre&&or& /a& in&ignificant3 Thi& i&concei%aly due to 4oor data on the de4endent %ariale, though other e<4lanation& are 4o&&ile3#orru4tion had the e<4ected &ign in mo&t of the&e regre&&ion&, ut like other %ariale& /a&in&ignificant3 A& /ith other %ariale& u&ed in thi& 4a4er, one /ould e<4ect an inde< made from&e%eral noi&y %ariale& to 4erform etter than each com4onent3 Therefore, a com4o&ite inde< ofhealth 4erformance /a& created and u&ed in the regre&&ion&3

'e u&e three %ariale& in the &et of regre&&ion& 4re&ented in Tale -F increa&e& inimmunization&J decrea&e& in mea&le&J and a com4o&ite inde< com4o&ed of increa&e& inimmunization&, and decrea&e& in mea&le&, he4atiti&, tuerculo&i& and di4htheria3 !n the&eregre&&ion& run at the munici4ality le%el, -- hou&ehold&0 corru4tion 4erce4tion& are u&ed,follo/ing the 4reference for u&ing de4endent and inde4endent %ariale& from different &ource& tominimize 4erce4tion ia&3 #orru4tion ha& a marginally &ignificant effect, retarding increa&e& inimmunization, ut thi& effect i& only &ignificant at -.R in the random effect& &4ecification3 Theeffect of corru4tion on decrea&e& in mea&le& i& &ignificant at +.R in oth the 'LS and the

-+ !t i& &ignificant at the -.R le%el in regre&&ion& +;3+, +;3; and +;33-- T/o o&er%ation& from a 4otential =. /ere lo&t due to &ome mi&&ing %ariale&3

:;



random effect& regre&&ion, ut corru4tion i& only &ignificant at -.R in the regre&&ion u&ing thecom4o&ite inde<3

Ta3e 40> E8#ai$i$2 Cha$2e i$ Occ"rre$ce o+ Di!ea!e!I$crea!e i$

I))"$i&atio$

I$crea!e i$

I))"$i&atio$

Ra$%o)

E++ect

Decrea!e i$

Mea!e!

Decrea!e i$

Mea!e!

Ra$%o)

E++ect

Heath

Per+or)a$ce

Heath

Per+or)a$ce

Ra$%o)

E++ect

+73+ +73- +73; +73 +737 +739

$ran93+=

C.397D93:=

C.3:+D+-3:9C+3-.D

+-3+.C+3.=D

=3-C+3D

=39+C+3;D

?ducation C>>D.3=

C-3.;D**.3=9

C-3+.D**B.3;9

CB.3:9DB.3;-

CB.39:D.3

C+3+D.37

C+3:.D*

LogCincome 4er ca4itaD C>>DB37

CB+3.DB3;=

CB.3D.37+

C.3.+DB.3+7

CB.3.+DB+.3==

CB+3=7D*B++3;=

CB+3=7D*

8ote in Local ?lection& C>>DB.3+7

CB.3:DB.3+

CB.399D.3-=

C+3.9D.3-:

C+3.=D.3+.

C.399D.3.

C.39=D

"ead 1ational 1e/&4a4er&B.3;+

CB+3D*.3;.

CB+3=D*B.3;7

CB+3::D*B.3;

CB+3:D*B.3++

CB+3;+DB.3+;

CB+3-=D

"ead Local 1e/&4a4er&.3-:

C+3-+D.3-=

C+37:DB.3;-

CB+3:9D*B.3;;

CB+379D.3.+

C.3.:D.3.+

C.3.:D

Li&ten "adioB.3.9

CB.39-DB.3.9

CB.37D.3.

C.3:.D.3.

C.3::D.3.;

C.39D.3.

C.37=D

Go to Pri%ate #linic& C>>DB.3.:

CB.3=DB.3.=

CB.39.D.3;

C+3=7D*.3;

C-3.:D**.3.9

C.397D.3.:

C.3:-D

?thnic Polarization C>>D.3++

C.3;D.3+-

C.3+D.3;

C-37;D**.3;

C-3=-D***.3+7

C-3+-D**.3+7

C+3:7D*

Su44ly of !mmunization C#LDB.3.+

CB.3+.DB.3.-

CB.3-.D.3.9

C.3-D.3.-

C.3+:DB.3.+

CB.3+.DB.3.-

CB.3-DLog of 1umer of Per&onnel at the #linicC#LD

+-3:C+3=9D*

+-3.C+37.D

=3-:C.3=-D

=3=C.3=:D

39C.3==D

3=.C.3=D

Kno/& the "e5uired !mmunization& C#LD.3+9

C.37D.3+7

C.3:D.3-

C-37D**.3-

C-3;.D**.3-7

C-3:9D***.3-9

C-37+D***Allocation of 2und& y the 1ational Go%t3(a&ed on >ealth "elated #riteria CPOD

-3=.C.3:7D

-39C.399D

B.3-:CB.3.9D

B.37+CB.3++D

377C-3+9D**

3;7C+39:D*

#a4acity CPOD B.3-=CB.3=D B.3-9CB+3.+D B.39CB+3+D B.39CB+37+D .3.;C.3+D .3.;C.3+=D

2reedom to AdEu&t CPOD.3.-

CB.3++D.3.;

C.3+=D.3-

C+3-+D.3-=

C+3;.D.3+

C+3:D*.3+

C+37D

2reedom to AdEu&t C#LDB.3--

CB+3=9D*B.3-;

CB+3+=DB.3.9

CB.3-9DB.3.:

CB.3;.DB.3.

CB.3;7DB.3.7

CB.3;=D

Accountaility CPODB.3;.

CB+3;=DB.3;-

CB+3;D.3.;

C.3+.D.3.-

C.3.:DB.3.

CB.3-.DB.3.7

CB.3;;D

Accountaility C#LD.3.

C.3;9D.3+.

C.37+D.3+;

C.37D.3+

C.37=D.3+-

C+3.+D.3+;

C.39D

)elay in Salary Payment& C#LDB.3-7

CB+3=.D*B.3--

CB+37DB.3+;

CB.399DB.3+;

CB.3:-D.3.

C.3;:D.3.

C.3;=D

#orru4tion at the unici4al Le%el C>>DB.3;+

CB+3:;D*B.3;.

CB+37DB.3.

CB+3.D*B.3.

CB+3=-D*B.3+9

CB+37-DB.3+:

CB+3;7D

Theft at Go%ernment #linic& C>>DB.3;+

CB+3==D*

B.3;-

CB+3;-D

.3-

C.39=D

.3-=

C+3..D

B.3++

CB.3+D

B.3+-

CB.3::D

#on&tant9.379C+3+9D

73;.C.3;D

B93:;CB.3.=D

B+3::CB.3.-D

93:C+3-;D

7.3-7C+3-+D

1 := := := := :=

2C-+,79D -3;9*** ;3=-*** -3+9**

#hi6S5C-+D -3=;* +3:*** ;+37*

"- /ithin .3-7 .3;; .3-

"- et/een .39 .39. .37+

"- o%erall .3;9 .3;7 .3; .3; .3;9 .3;9

:



#orru4tion al&o a44ear& to ha%e an effect on health outcome& through kno/ledge of re5uiredimmunization& y health official&3 ?arlier, it /a& re4orted that oth hou&ehold and 4ulic official 4erce4tion& of corru4tion had a negati%e effect on kno/ledgeJ here, it i& found that kno/ledgedoe& im4ro%e outcome&3 Kno/ledge i& in&ignificant in the regre&&ion of increa&e& inimmunization&, ut it i& highly &ignificant in the regre&&ion& of decrea&e& in mea&le& Cat 7RD and

the regre&&ion of the com4o&ite health inde< Cat +RD3 !n &ummary, there i& rou&t and &ometime&&ignificant e%idence of a direct im4act of corru4tion on health outcome&, &uch a& increa&e& inimmunization and decrea&e& in mea&le&3 2or decrea&e& in mea&le&, &trong e%idence /a& found ofan indirect effect of corru4tion on im4ro%ement& in outcome& through etter kno/ledge amonghealth center &taff of re5uired immunization&3

1o e%idence, ho/e%er, /a& found that any of the di&ci4line& on local go%ernment lead to anim4ro%ement in the 5uality of &er%ice through mechani&m& other than the le%el of corru4tion38oting in local election&, reading local ne/&4a4er& and li&tening to the radio ha%e no 4erce4tileinde4endent effect on mea&ure& of health 4erformance3 "eading national ne/&4a4er& ha& a 4er%er&e negati%e effect3

;ducation

1e<t, the effect of corru4tion and other factor& on education deli%ery i& analyzed3 'e u&e t/omea&ure& of education outcome&F the a%erage 4u4il &core on the national elementary attainmentte&t C1?ATD, and a &uEecti%e rating y hou&ehold& of their &ati&faction /ith the 5uality ofeducation3 The mea&ure of corru4tion u&ed here i& from the re&4on&e& of the munici4al educationC)?#SD officer3

The media inde<a comination of the fre5uency of u&ing media and u&ing media a& the 4rimary &ource of information on 4olitic&a44ear& to ha%e a 4o&iti%e im4act on 1?AT &core&3

>o/e%er, there are &eriou& concern& here aout the direction of cau&ality4eo4le might readne/&4a4er& more often in area& /ith etter educationand the re&ult &hould e taken /ithcaution3

Social difference&an inde< com4o&ed of the an&/er& to 5ue&tion& aout /hether difference& inethnicity, religion, landholding& etc3 di%ide 4eo4leha& a negati%e im4act on 1?AT &core&3#orru4tion ha& a arely 4erce4tile im4act on 1?AT &core&3

:7



Ta3e 4(> E++ect o+ Corr"#tio$ o$ E%"catio$ Dei-er*NEAT SCORES SATISFACTION ?ITH SCHOOLS

?LS CLUSTER RANDOM

EFFECT

?LS CLUSTER RANDOM

EFFECT

edia !nde<

.37:+***

C-3:--D

.37:9***

C;3-D

.3=7***

C;3.7D

B.3.;+

CB.3;+=D

.3.;

C+3+;=D

.3..

C.3.;7D

8oting !nde<B.3.+.

CB.3.:7D.3.++

C.3.+:DB.3.;

CB.3+;D.3.=

C.3=+-D.3+.-

C.3=D.3.7

C.3=D

Log !ncome.3-:

C+37.-D.3-;=

C+37.;D++39=*C+39:D

.3.;C.3;-;D

.3.-C.3;--D

B.3-=CB.3.:+D

!ne5uality.3-+:

C+37D.3-+

C+3--D++39=+C+3;-D

B.3-.CB.3.D

B.3-.CB.39--D

B3=-*CB+3=7.D

?ducationB.3.:

CB.37.DB.3.::

CB.3:+9D.3.:+

C.3+:DB.3.-

CB.3;9DB.3.;

CB.3-=7DB.3+.

CB.3.7-D

$ranB.3-.=

CB.3;;DB.3-+:

CB.3-=-DB+-3-7;C+39;9D

B.3+-9CB.3=7D

B.3++CB+3-;D

B;3;+=CB.3::D

Social )ifference&B.3+..*CB+3=:7D

B.3+..**CB-3-:;D

B.3.7=CB.39.D

.3.;7C.3-+:D

.3.;;C.39;-D

.3.;C.37:;D

#orru4tionB.3.:

CB+3-D

B.3.==

C+39-D

B.3+-

CB+3;.+D

B.3;.-**

C-3+9.D

B.3;.**

CB-3;+;D

B.39;;***

C-399D 1 :. :. :.

2 te&t 93-;** -3=** -3.* +3+:

#hi &5 +=3=;* +-3.

"- .3- .3- .3+ .3+ .3. .3+;

2or the &uEecti%e mea&ure of &ati&faction /ith education, ho/e%er, corru4tion ha& a clearnegati%e im4act3 A one &tandard de%iation increa&e in corru4tion in the )?#S office reduce&&ati&faction y almo&t +; of a &tandard de%iationa &ignificant effect3 Thu&, de&4ite thein&ignificant effect of corru4tion on the 1?AT &core&, the re&ult& of the &econd regre&&ion clearly&ugge&t that corru4tion doe& in fact undermine education deli%ery in the Phili44ine&3

:9



Su55ary

Summarizing the main thread of rea&oning in thi& cha4ter, it ha& een &ho/n, fir&t, thatHadEu&tailityI of munici4al go%ernment ha& a &ignificant 4o&iti%e effect on corru4tion, and

reading national ne/&4a4er& and %oting local election& ha%e &ignificant negati%e effect&3 At the&ame time, corru4tion at the local le%el ha& &ignificant negati%e effect& on hou&ehold &ati&factionand /aiting time& at health facilitie& Ccom4o&ite inde<D, health official&0 kno/ledge of re5uiredimmunization&, and health 4erformance, /hich in turn i& &trongly influenced C4o&iti%elyD y theofficial&0 kno/ledge of re5uired immunization&3 The&e relation&hi4&, /ith re&4ect to health&er%ice&, are illu&trated in 2igure 3

Fi2"re ,> The Ca"!e! a$% Co$!e="e$ce! o+ Corr"#tio$ i$ the Phii##i$e!

::

AdEu&taility "ead 1ational 1e/&4a4er&

8ote Local ?lection&

Corr"#tio$

Sati&factionB'aiting Time

Kno/ledge ofre5uiredimmunization&

>ealth Performance



Cha#ter I: Co$c"!io$!

The 4ur4o&e of thi& &tudy i& to e<4lore the e<tent to /hich, and /ay& in /hich, the e<4erience ofthe Phili44ine& /ith decentralized go%ernment corre&4ond& /ith the theorie& 4redicting net

enefit& Cor 4o&&ily net co&t&D from decentralization3 ore 4reci&ely, the &tudy i& aimed atfinding factor& that enhance, or detract from, the decentralized deli%ery of 4rimary education andhealth care in the Phili44ine&3

)ecentralization and de%olution of go%ernmental re&4on&iilitie& ha%e had a far more &u&tantialim4act on health care than on education, /hich remain& the re&4on&iility of the centralgo%ernment )e4artment of ?ducation, #ulture, and S4ort& C)?#SD de&4ite im4ortant local 4artici4ation in certain area&3 >o/e%er, e%en in health care, the central go%ernment retain&re&4on&iility for certain H%erticalI 4rogram& related to immunization and di&ea&e 4re%ention3And the &tudy ha& de&cried a %ariety of admini&trati%e and 4olitical con&traint& that limit theautonomy of local go%ernment&3

A &ignificant %ariale 4ermeating all le%el& of go%ernment in the Phili44ine& i& the 4re&ence ofdifferent ty4e& of corru4tion, /hich remain& a &eriou& 4rolem de&4ite &ome e%idence ofim4ro%ement in recent year&3 !n &ummarizing the conclu&ion& of the &tudy, one &hould ear inmind that the argument in fa%or of decentralization a&&ume& that the %ariou& Hfederali&tdi&ci4line&I%oice, e<it, media, accountaility/ork to reduce corru4tion in go%ernment /henmore re&4on&iility i& de%ol%ed to the local le%el3

The 4a4er fir&t looked at the outco5es of 4rimary health and education &er%ice& in thePhili44ine&, and foundnot &ur4ri&ing for a middleBincome country&u&tantial 4rogre&& in&ome area& and remaining /eakne&&e& in other&3 >ou&ehold& e<4re&&ed preferences for

additional funding to go into road& and infra&tructure rather than health and education, reflectingtheir 4erce4tion& /ith regard to the ade5uacy of e<i&ting funding and the mo&t urgent &hortfall&3unici4al official& /ere to a &u&tantial e<tent a/are of the&e 4reference&, /herea& 4ro%incialofficial& &ho/ed no e%idence of kno/ledge aout local demand&3

On productive efficiencyB corru4tion /a& /idely 4ercei%ed y official& them&el%e& to e a 4rolem,and the&e 4erce4tion& /ere in line /ith tho&e of hou&ehold&3 'hile corru4tion at the aranguay andmunici4al go%ernment& /a& &een a& le&& 4ronounced than at the 4ro%incial and national go%ernment&,it /a& &till &u&tantial o%erall3 On another a&4ect of 4roducti%e efficiency, delay& in 4ayment& of&alarie& and allo/ance&, and hiring delay&, /ere a fre5uent 4rolem3

The one a&4ect of cost recovery e<amined in the &tudy /a& ta< collection, /hich &ho/ed /ide%ariation among 4ro%ince&3 Thi& i& an area /here local autonomy ha& een com4romi&ed y centralgo%ernment con&traint&, and di&incenti%e& to local ta< collection ha%e a44arently een created ylarge tran&fer& from the central go%ernment3

The data &ugge&t that civic disciplines on &uBnational go%ernment in the Phili44ine& may e&u&tantially /eaker than a&&umed y the 4roBdecentralization theori&t&3 8oting 4attern& andrationale& do not differ &ignificantly et/een local and national election&3 Po4ular kno/ledge of

:=



local go%ernment /a& inferior to that of national go%ernment, and there /a& le&& reliance on themedia for information on local than on national 4olitic&3 !ndeed, citizen& relied much more on localofficial& and 4er&onal contact&, rather than on the media, for information on local 4olitic& andcorru4tionin &tark contra&t to much hea%ier reliance on the media for information aout national 4olitic&3 Thi& &ugge&t& the 4o&&iility of elite ca4ture of local go%ernment and may e<4lain

/eakne&&e& in local accountaility3

The &tudy &ho/& that intergovern5ental disciplines 4lace tight con&traint&, oth 4o&iti%e andnegati%e, on the freedom of action of local go%ernment&3 On the negati%e &ide, &ome of the&econ&traint& con&i&t of 4olitical interference from the center in the allocation of in%e&tment fund& at thelocal le%el3 The ad8ustability inde6 deri%ed y the re&earch team re%ealed &ome/hat more di&cretionat the munici4al than at the 4ro%incial le%el on /hich &er%ice& to offer, ho/ many official& to hire,and ho/ much to 4ay em4loyee&, ut more authority for 4ro%incial official& to reallocate fund&among different &er%ice&3

?<amination of public sector 5anage5ent factor& in the Phili44ine& 4roduced no &triking e%idence of

&e%ere 4rolem&3 'ith regard to 5eritocracy, official& inter%ie/ed claimed that merit and 5uality of&er%ice /ere the main criteria, although for health unit& 4er&onal connection& /ere al&o regarded a&im4ortant3 On accountabilityB fre5uency of oth internal and e<ternal audit& i& high, a& are /rittentarget&3 o&t re&4ondent&, ut to a le&&er degree in )?#S office& than in munici4al admini&tration&,&aid that an officer &u&4ected of corru4tion faced &ocial 4re&&ure to re&ign3 2inally, capacity

con&traint& do not a44ear &e%ere in the Phili44ine&, although re&ource& of the organization& &cored/eaker in official&0 re&4on&e& than training and education of em4loyee&3

The final &ection of the 4a4er dealt /ith the linkage et/een the 4erformance factor& e<aminedin the 4re%iou& cha4ter& and outcome& for health and education, oth a& oEecti%ely mea&uredand a& 4ercei%ed y hou&ehold&3 The main linkage& re%ealed y the &tati&tical analy&i& /ere,fir&t, that HadEu&tailityI of munici4al go%ernment ha& a &ignificant 4o&iti%e effect on corru4tion,/hile reading national ne/&4a4er& and %oting local election& ha%e &ignificant negati%e effect&3At the &ame time, corru4tion at the local le%el ha& &ignificant negati%e effect& on hou&ehold&ati&faction /ith health care &er%ice&, /aiting time& at health facilitie& and health official&0kno/ledge of re5uired immunization&3 The health facilitie&0 4erformance Ci3e3, hou&ehold&ati&faction and /aiting time&D i&, in turn, &trongly influenced C4o&iti%elyD y the official&0kno/ledge of re5uired immunization&3 #orru4tion al&o had an im4act on hou&ehold &ati&faction/ith 4ulic &chool&3

Thu&, /hile decentralization in the Phili44ine& ha& mo%ed &u&tantial authority and re&ource& to&uBnational go%ernment&, thi& decentralization ha& taken 4lace /ithin the conte<t of a unitarygo%ernmental &y&tem /here the hierarchy ha& much more di&cretion at u44er than at lo/erle%el&, and &tronger mechani&m& for to4Bdo/n di&ci4line than any 4re&&ure& in the o44o&itedirection3 Local go%ernment& do a44ear to e fairly a/are of local 4reference&, ut find itdifficult to reak out of the 4rocedural, re&ource, and go%ernance con&traint& that im4ede theirre&4on&e3 The &ur%ey &ho/& limitation& to %oter and media attention to local go%ernment, andthi& heighten& the 4o&&iility of elite ca4ture of local go%ernmental in&titution&, including tho&ere&4on&ile for 4ulic &er%ice deli%ery3 The&e con&ideration& illu&trate the 4remi&e of the 4a4erthat decentralization initiati%e& &hould e guided le&& y &im4le 4ro and con argument& of

:



theori&t& ut y detailed under&tanding of the in&titutional &etting in /hich the decentralizedform& of go%ernance are e<4ected to o4erate3 The &tudy al&o &ugge&t&, ho/e%er, that centralizedadmini&trationa& in the education &ectore<act& it& o/n 4rice in term& of efficiency andintegrity, and i& &uEect to local 4olitical 4re&&ure& de&4ite the attem4t to in&ulate it from them3

=.



Bi3io2ra#h*

Agra, Alerto #3 C+:D #o5pendiu5 on <ocal 7utono5y and <ocal 3overn5ent 1992G199( 3 Phili44ine#o4yright, C+:D3

Agra, Alerto #3 C+:D The hilippine artyG<ist Syste5! 7 list roportional epresentation Sche5e of

;lecting OneGFifth of the Me5bers of the House of epresentatives. Phili44ine #o4yright, C+:D3

(ardhan, Prana and )ili4 ookherEee, ?<4enditure decentralization and the deli%ery of 4ulic &er%ice&in de%elo4ing countrie&, !?) )i&cu&&ion Pa4er, (o&ton $ni%er&ity, +=3

(atalla, ?ric, The Social #ancerF #orru4tion a& a 'ay of Life, Phili44ine )aily !n5uirer, Augu&t -:, -...3

(auti&a, Arnell (3 C+;D ules and egulations 5ple5enting the <ocal 3overn5ent #ode of 1991.

(rillante&, Ale< ( C+=D H)ecentralized )emocratic Go%ernance $nder the Local Go%ernment #odeF AGo%ernmental Per&4ecti%eI hilippine ?ournal of ublic 7d5inistration. 8olume \L!!, @anuaryBA4ril +=, 1umer +] - 43 ;=B7:

(rillante&, Ale< (3 C+6D H)oing Thing& )ifferentlyF !nno%ation& in Local Go%ernance in thePhili44ine&,I mimeo3

(ri&coe, @ohn and >ar%ey Garn3 +73 H2inancing 'ater Su44ly and Sanitation under Agenda -+3I =atural esources Foru5, +C+DF 7B:.3

#anie&oB)oronila, aria Lui&a C+6D HPre&ent Practice and Po&&iilitie& for 'ider LG$ and #ommunityPartici4ation in the !m4ro%ement of (a&ic ?ducation at the Local Le%el&F Local School (oard&and ParentBTeacherB#ommunity A&&ociation&,I mimeo3

#ommi&&ion on Audit, H+= Annual 2inancial "e4ort of Local Go%ernment& rovincesB #itiesB

Municipalities/I 8olume !!!, Local Go%ernment Audit Office3

#ommi&&ion on Audit C#OA +=D H+= #OA Annual "e4ort3I

)e4artment of !nterior, Phili44ine&, <ocal 3overn5ent #ode of 1991, "e4ulic Act 1o3 :+9.,)e4artment of !nterior and Local Go%ernment, anila, ++3

)onahue, @ohnJ TieoutM Or not TieoutM The market meta4hor and the America0& de%olution deate3@ournal of ?conomic Per&4ecti%e&, 2all +:3

The ?conomi&t !ntelligence $nit C?!$ +B-...D H#ountry ProfileF Phili44ine&3I

GOL) ProEect C+D Hth "a4id 2ield A44rai&alF Syno4&i& of 2inding&3I

GOL) ProEect C+=D HA Promi&ing StartF The 2ir&t 2i%e ear& of )e%olution of the Phili44ine Pulic>ealth Sy&tem,I 1o3=B.

GOL) ProEect C+=DHLocal Go%ernment $nit and the -. Percent )e%elo4ment 2und,I 1o3 =B.;

GOL) ProEect C+:D H To/ard& "eforming the unici4al )e%elo4ment 2und,I 1o3 :B.-

=+



GOL) ProEect C+:DH"e&ource Allocation !malance& $nder )ecentralization,I 1o3:B.+

GOL) ProEect C+9DH!&&ue& in Local Go%ernment 2inanceF (udgetingI CGOL)D 1o3 9B.

GOL) ProEect C+9D H!&&ue& in Local Go%ernment 2inanceF 2inancial anagement,I 1o3 9B.+

GOL) ProEect C+9cD H!&&ue& in Local Go%ernment 2inanceF Local !n%e&tment Planning,I 1o39B.;

GOL) ProEect C+9dD H!&&ue& in Local Go%ernment 2inanceF Local Ta<ation and Other "e%enueGeneration,I 1o3 9B.-

GOL) ProEect C+9eDH!&&ue& in Local Go%ernment 2inanceF "e%enue Sharing and Grant&,I 1o3 9B.7

Gonzalez, ?leanor 3 C+6D H)ecentralization and Political Partici4ation in the Phili44ine&F ?<4erience&and !&&ue& in Societal Tran&formationI !n&titute for Po4ular )emocracy,I mimeo3

>ayek, 2riedrich3 +73 HThe $&e of Kno/ledge in Society3I 75erican ;cono5ic evie%, ;7F 7+B;.3

>utchcroft, Paul )3 HOligarchs and #ronies in the hilippines State! The olitics of atri5onial

lunderI "e%ie/ Article&3

!nman, "oert and )aniel "uinfeld3 )e&igning ta< 4olicie& in federali&t economie&F An o%er%ie/,@ournal of Pulic ?conomic& +93

BBBBBBBBBB3 +9 a3 HThe Political ?conomy of 2ederali&m3I !n )enni& ueller, ed3, erspectives on

ublic #hoice3 #amridgeF #amridge $ni%er&ity Pre&&3

BBBBBBBBBB3 )e&igning ta< 4olicie& in federali&t economie&F An o%er%ie/, @ournal of Pulic ?conomic&,+9 3

BBBBBBBBBB3 "ethinking 2ederali&m, @ournal of ?conomic Per&4ecti%e&, 2all +:3

@imenez, ?mmanuel and 8icente Pa5ueo C+9D H)o Local #ontriution& Affect the ?fficiency of PulicPrimary School&MI ;cono5ics of ;ducation evie%, 8ol3+7, 1o3 , ;::B;=93

Knack, Ste4hen and Omar Azfar, Are Larger #ountrie& "eally ore #orru4tM 'orld (ank, P"'P 1o3-:.3

Lit%ack, @ennie and @e&&ica Seddon3 +3 H)ecentralization (riefing 1ote&3I 'orld (ank !n&titute'orking Pa4er&, The 'orld (ank3

Loehr, 'illiam and "o&ario ana&an C@anuary +D H2i&cal )ecentralization and ?conomic ?fficiencyand ?%aluation3I !## 4a4er3

ana&an, "o&ario G3 C+;D H(reaking A/ay from the 2i&cal (indF "eforming the 2i&cal Sy&tem,I P!)S 4a4er3

BBBBBBBBBB3 C+:D HLocal Go%ernment 2inancing of Social Ser%ice Sector& in a )ecentralized "egimeFS4ecial 2ocu& on Pro%incial Go%ernment& in +; and +I P!)S )i&cu&&ion Pa4er Serie& 1o3:B.

=-



BBBBBBBBBB3 C+D H!m4act of Local Go%ernment #ode and Pro4o&ed Amendment& on Aility to 2inance!nfra&tructureF To/ard& a 2rame/ork for LG$ 2inance,I mimeo3

BBBBBBBBBB3 C-...D HThe "ole of ?ducation )ecentralization in Promoting ?ffecti%e SchoolingF ThePhili44ine&,I mimeo3

iller, Tom C+:D H2i&cal 2ederali&m in Theory and PracticeF The hilippines #aseI $SA!) ?conomi&t&'orking Pa4er& Serie& no3 3

yrdal, Gunnar C+9=D H#orru4tion it& #au&e& and ?ffect& H 44 ;:B7= 7sian Dra5a. 1e/ ork,Pantheon,

1ational Ta< "e&earch #enter C1T"#D C+:D H 7 Survey on the Ta6ing and Other evenueGaising

o%ers of <ocal 3overn5entsI 8olume + ?<ecuti%e Summary3

1olledo, @o&e 13 C+7D The ;ducation 7ct of the hilippines 7nnotated 3 Phili44ine #o4yright3

1olledo, @o&e 13 C+D The 190( #onstitution of the hilippines. Phili44ine #o4yright3

1u5ui, >one&to and "omeo Soli& C+D H(udget, 2inance ] !nformation Sy&tem&F A&4ect& of)ecentralizationI #anadian >igher ?ducation Grou4 TA 1o3 ;+++7BP>!3

Oate&, 'allace3 C+D3 HAn ?&&ay on 2i&cal 2ederali&m,I ?ournal of ;cono5ic <iterature, \\\8!!, ;3

BBBBBBBBBB C+:-D3 Fiscal Federalis5, London, >arcourt, (race, @o%ano%ich3

BBBBBBBBBB3 C+9=D3 HThe Theory of Pulic 2inance in a 2ederal Sy&tem3I #anadian ?ournal of ;cono5icsB

!, 1o3+3

Pa4er 4ro%ided y S'S, eginning /ith H+3 (a&ic ?ducation in the Phili44ine&F An O%er%ie/3I

Pimentel, A5uilino N3 C+D The $arangay and the <ocal 3overn5ent #ode. Phili44ine #o4yright,C+D3

"e4ulic of The Phili44ine&3 7n 7ct roviding for 7n Organic 7ct for The 7utono5ous region in Musli5

MindanaoB "e4ulic Act 1o3 9:;

"e4ulic of The hilippines 7n 7ct roviding for 7n Organic 7ct for The #ordillera 7utono5ous

egionB "e4ulic Act 1o3 9:993

"e4ulic of the Phili44ine&, <O#7< 3O:;=M;=T #OD; of 19913 "e4ulic Act 1o3 :+9.

HThe "e%enue "e4orterI3C+D anila, Phili44ine&3 8ol3 1o3 "" B++, The P" Serie&3

"ood, Ste%en C+=D Decentrali+ationB De5ocracyB and Develop5ent. Go%ernance and Local )emocracyCGOL)D ProEect3

"ood, Ste%en C++DH ssues on creating an autono5ous region for the #ordilleraB =orthern hilippinesI.

;thnic and acial Studies 8olume + 1umer 3

=;



Tieout, #3 +793 HA Pure Theory of Local ?<4enditure&3I ?ournal of olitical ;cono5y, 9F +9B-3

Tran&4arency !nternational, -...3 #orru4tion Perce4tion& !nde<,htt4F///3tran&4arency3dedocument&c4i-...c4i-...3html

Trei&man, )aniel, The #au&e& of #orru4tion, @ournal of Pulic ?conomic&, @une -...3

$nited 1ation& C-...D3 Hu5an Develop5ent eport 2444. 1e/ ork, O<ford $ni%er&ity Pre&&3

'orld (ank C+D3 HPhili44ine& )e%olution and >ealth Ser%ice&F anaging "i&k& and O44ortunitie&I3!#"OG"AP>!#S "e4ort 1oF +-;; P>, Ty4eF S?#

'orld (ank C+9D H Staff A44rai&al "e4ort "e4ulic of the Phili44ine& Third ?lementary ?ducationProEectI 'orld (ank "e4ort 1o3 +7===BP>3

'orld (ank C-...D3 7ttacing overty! *orld Develop5ent eport 2444J2441. 1e/ orkF O<ford$ni%er&ity Pre&&3

=



A$$e8A$$e8 Ta3e .> Ho"!eho% O#i$io$! o$ M"$ici#ait* Prioritie!:

Percentage of 4eo4le citing each &uEect a& the mo&t im4ortant, y 4ro%ince-;

4ro%ince"oad,

ridge&,canal

'ater,drainage

?ducation >ealth >ou&ing

S4ortcom4le<" ecreation

#enter

Agriculture !rrigation

Garagecollection

1e/ Eo& Aid to 4oor

+CnW;D

:3;+C-3:D

3;.CB+3D

39=CB.3+=D

=39.C.3..D

;3-;C.3.7D

.3.. 3;.C+3.D

.3.. +3.9CB;37:D

;3--CB-3:D

-CnW+D

93;C+37+D

3:9C.3-D

-3CB;3+D

+-3-.C.3:.D

.3.. .3.. .3.. .3.. 3==CB+37D

:3;-CB.3;;D

;CnW9:D

+3.CB;3+D

+3CB39;D

+.37C.3.9D

+.37C.3D

+93+=C-3+D

+3C.3+=D

.3.. .3.. =39CB.3;=D

-;3==C-3=D

CnW9.D

;.3..CB.3:7D

73..CB+3+D

-+39:C-3+D

=3;;CB.3.:D

=3;;C+3D

.3.. .3.. .3.. ++39:C.3;;D

;3;;CB-3-D

7CnW-:D

;3:-CB=3;+D

++3++C.3D

+3=-C.399D

:3+CB.3-;D

.3.. .3.. .3.. .3.. ++3++C.3+;D

-39;C-3;;D

9CnW+D

:3;+CB937D

-3CB-3;D

+:3.:C+3+7D

:3;+CB.3;+D

-3-CB.3-=D

-3;C.37.D

.3.. .3.. -93=;C-3;:D

-+37C-3.;D

:CnW7+D

+;3:;CB3-9D

73==CB.3:7D

+739=C+3.:D

3=.C.3-=D

3=.C+37D

.3.. .3.. :3=C+3=D

;3-CB-3;+D

+73::C+3;:D

=CnW-.D

73:-CB-37;D

3..CB+37:D

+3..C.3::D

;3..C;3:7D

.3.. 93..C+3+D

.3. .3.. +3..C.3:7D

93..CB.3:D

CnW9:D

-;3==CB-3.-D

.3.. +.37C.3.:D

:39CB.3;D

.3.. .3.. 3=C.3=D

+3C.379D

++37C.3-D

-=3;9C;377D

+.CnW;:D

;73+C.3.=D

73+CB.3:D

.3.. -+39;C+3.D

-3:+CB.3+7D

-3:.C.377D

.3.. .3.. =3+.CB.3=D

737CB.3==D

++CnW::D

.3-7C+3.;D

+.3;C.37:D

++39C.3+D

:3=.CB.3-9D

+3;.CB+3.D

.3.. .3.. .3.. +-3.C.3:.D

:3;-CB.3;;D

+-CnW+D

7+3--C-3++D

:3;-CB.3-9D

3=:CB+37:D

-3CB-37-D

-3;CB.3-=D

.3.. 3:9C+39:D

.3.. .3.. .3..

+;CnWD

793;C3-9D

37=CB.3;-D

+3=C+3-:D

+3.:CB:3.=D

.3.. +3.:CB.3+9D

-3+-C.3+.D

.3.. =37+CB.39-D

.3..

+CnW77D

:3-:C+3==D

:3-=CB.3;-D

3.CB.3-D

3.C.3+-D

.3.. .3.. .3.. .3.. 3.CB.3;+D

.3..

+7CnW-=D

;73+C.3+;D

-+3;C+397D

;37:CB+3=9D

.3.. ;37:C.3+;D

.3.. .3.. :3+C+3;+D

+.3:-C.3.:D

.3..

+9CnW-D

-93-.CB+3-.D

++3+C.39=D

3:9CB+39D

:3+CB.3;7D

-3;;CB.3;+D

-3;C.3=D

-3;C.3+:D

.3.. ;73:+C;3;D

:3+7CB.3;=D

+:CnW-D

7:3+C-3;D

++3+C.39D

.3.. 3:9CB+3+7D

-3;=CB.3;+D

-3;C.3=D

.3.. .3.. 37-CB.3+:D

:3;-CB.3;=D

+=CnW+D

;937C.3-:D

3==CB+3.;D

-3;CB;3+=D

3:9C.3-7D

.3.. -3C.37.D

-3C.3+D

.3.. 3:9CB.3++D

:3;-CB.3;;D

+CnW-D

.3=C.3:=D

+3-=C+3.=D

:3+CB.3:9D

-3;=CB-39.D

-3;CB.3;+D

+3;=C.3=D

37;C+397D

.3.. :3+CB.3:=D

3::CB+3+D

-.CnW9;D

-.39CB-39D

-=37:C;37-D

+-3:.C.37D

3:9CB+3-D

+37CB.3:D

;3+:C.3=:D

;3+=C.37D

.3.. ++3++C.3-+D

37-C.3--D

Total;97

C;3:RD=

C=3.RD+.=

C+.3-.RD+

C=37RD;;

C;3+-RD+;

C+3-;RD-+

C+3=RD:

C.399RD+.

C+.3-RD-

C=39RD

tBte&t- ++ C+-D 7 C9D 7 C9D = C=D CD +- C+-D += C+D 7 C7D 7 C7D C7D

2Bte&t-7 739C.3..D

-3-9C.3..D

+,.-C.3;D

.3=:C.3:+D

-3.=C.3..D

+3.C.3;9D

+3:C.3.D

+37.C.3+=D

.3=9C.3:9D

;3+:C.3..D

2Bte&t-9 =3+.C.3..D

-3+-C.3..D

-3.+C.3.+D

-3.C.3..D

+3;7C.3+D

+3;-C.3--D

.3:-C.397D

-39C.3.9D

;3=C.3..D

;37+C.3..D

-; tB&tati&tic& in 4arenthe&i& te&t& the hy4othe&i& that the 4ercentage of 4eo4le con&idering an i&&ue to e the mo&tim4ortant i& different than the mean acro&& all other di&trict&F =- are &ignificant at 7R out of ;.. ca&e&3- numer of time& the tB&tati&tic& te&ting the e5uality of 4ro%incial 4reference& /ith national 4reference& i&&ignificant at 7R C+.RD-7 the 2C=.,:=D &tati&tic re&ulting from an 2Bte&t from a regre&&ion of the difference of each %ariale from the meanagain&t dummy %ariale& for all munici4alitie& i& &ho/n3 The 4B%alue i& in 4arenthe&i&3-9 the 2C=-,:9D &tati&tic re&ulting from an 2Bte&t from a regre&&ion of the difference of each %ariale from the meanagain&t dummy %ariale& for all 4ro%ince& i& &ho/n3 The 4B%alue i& in 4arenthe&i&3

=7



A$$e8 Ta3e 4> Pre+ere$ce! o+ Pro-i$cia M"$ici#a a$% Ho"!eho% Pre+ere$ce! o$

M"$ici#ait* Prioritie!:Perce$ta2e o+ #eo#e citi$2 each !"3;ect a! the )o!t i)#orta$t 3* #ro-i$ce

Pro%ince Pro-i$cia O++icia M"$ici#a O++icia! Ho"!eho%!

+ "oad(ridge "oad(ridge C7:3+RD "oad(ridge C:3;+RD

- B "oad(ridge C99399RD "oad(ridge C93;RD; "oad(ridge "oad(ridge C.3..RD Aid to the Poor C-;3==RD

"oad(ridge C+3.RD

>ealth "oad(ridge C7.3..RD>ealth C7.3..RD

"oad(ridge C;.3..RD?ducation C-+39:RD 1e/ @o& C++39:RD>ealth C=3;;RD

7 Aid to 4oor >ealth C+..3..RD Aid to the Poor C-39;RD>ealth C+3=-RD

9 Social Ser%ice& "oad(ridge C;;3;;RD>ealth C;;3;;RD

1e/ @o& C-93=;RDAid to the Poor C-+37RD?ducation C+:3.: RD"oad(ridge C:3;+RD

: B "oad(ridge C7.3..RD

Aid to the Poor C+73::RD?ducation C+739=RD"oad(ridge C+;3:;RD

= "oad(ridge 1e/ @o& C7.3..RD >ealth C;;3..RD"oad(ridge C--3..RD 1e/ @o& C+3..RD

"oad(ridge 1e/ @o& C.3..RD Aid to the Poor C-=3;9RD"oad(ridge C-;3==RD 1e/ @o& C++37RD

+. "oad(ridge "oad(ridge C;;3;;RD "oad(ridge C;73+RD

++ B "oad(ridge C=;3;;RD "oad(ridge C.3-7RD

+- 'ater)rainage "oad(ridgeC+..3..RD

"oad(ridge C7+3--RD'ater)rainage C:3;-RD

+; ?ducate LocalGo%ernment

"oad(ridge C-73..RD 1e/ @o& C-73..RD

"oad(ridge C793;RD 1e/ @o& C=37+RD

+ >ealth "oad(ridge C:73..RD "oad(ridge C:3-:RD>ealth C3.RD

+7 1e/ @o& "oad(ridge C7.3..RD 1e/ @o& C7.3..RD

"oad(ridge C;73+RD'ater)rainage C-+3;RD 1e/ @o& C+.3:-D

+9 "oad(ridge "oad(ridge C;;3;;RD 1e/ @o& C;73:+RD"oad(ridge C-93-.RD

+: >ealth "oad(ridge C;;3;;RD "oad(ridge C7:3+RD

+= 1e/ @o& 1e/ @o& C9939:RD "oad(ridge C;937RD 1e/ @o& C3:9RD

+ Social Ser%ice& 1e/ @o& C9939:RD "oad(ridge C.3=RD

'ater)rainage C+3-=RD 1e/ @o& C:3+RD

-. B >ealth C.3..RD 'ater)rainage C-=37:RD"oad(ridge C-.39RD 1e/ @o& C++3++RD>ealth C3:9RD

=9



A$$e8 Ta3e 5> Cea$i$2 Corr"#tio$ Perce#tio$ o+ Ho"!eho%!2i<ed ?ffect

CGrou4F unici4alityD:3+

"ead Local 1e/&4a4er B.3.;

CB.3:=D

"ead national 1e/&4a4er B.3.+CB.3;;D

Li&ten "adio.3.;

C.3D

'atch T8.3+

C.3-7D

2ollo/ Local ?%ent&B.3.-

CB.3::D

2ollo/ 1ational ?%ent&.3.;

C.3=DKno/ ayor8ice ayor8icePre&ident

B.3.+CB.3;+D

8ote a&ed on ?thnicity.3.7

C+3D*Perce4tion of 1ational #orru4tion

.3+7C:3;+D***

Perce4tion of Social )ifference&.3.9

C-3..D**

Social !nitiati%eB.3.+

CB.3-D

#ulture Again&t #orru4tion.3.-

C.3.D

$ranB-3.-

CB.3=-D

?ducation.3+9

C;3-=D***

LogCincome 4er ca4itaD.3:;

C.39.D

>ome O/ner&hi4.3+7

C.3.9D

2emaleB;39:

CB+3-=D

AgeB.3.7

CB.37D

#on&tant3-

C+3.+D

1 =.

2C+=,:+.D 73;***

"- /ithin .3+;

"- et/een .3+.

"- o%erall .3+-

=:



A$$e8 Ta3e 0> Cea$i$2 Corr"#tio$ Perce#tio$ o+ M"$ici#a Heath O++icia!

>ealth officer& Admini&trator&

3+ 3-

OLS OLS

?ducation.3+7

C+3+D.3.=

C-3+;D**

LogCincome 4er ca4itaD+3:-

C.3=:D;3.+

C+3+9D

>ome O/ner&hi4.3.

C-379DB.3.;

CB.3;9D

Perce4tion of 1ational #orru4tion.3.9

C+379D.3.:

C+3.9D

AgeB.3+9

CB+37-DB.3++

CB.37;D

2emaleB.3=7

CB.3;DB;3-

CB.379D

#on&tant

B-.3+-

CB+3+D

B+93;=

CB.3::D 1 :7 ::

2C:,9:D +3=7* ;39***

AdE "- .3+; .3.

A$$e8 Ta3e (> Pro3it E!ti)ate! o+ Deter)i$a$t! o+ Me%ia So"rce +or Loca Ne7!

Me%ia

Ra$%o) E++ect

Me%ia

Ra$%o) E++ect

?ith Pro-i$ce

D"))*

?ducation.3.+.

C3-+D***

.3..

C;3:=D***

Log CincomeD.3.-C+37-D

.3+C-3;:D**

$ranB.3-9=

CB-3;:D***B.3+=:

CB+39=D*

Age.3..:C+3;D

.3..=C+399D*

2emaleB.3.;+CB.3-+D

B.3.:7CB.37-D

Log likelihood B9.;3-+ B7:9377

#hi- ;+3.;*** .3.:***

1 +.+ +.+

==



A$$e8 Ta3e <> Pro3it E!ti)ate! o+ Deter)i$a$t! o+ Me%ia So"rce +or Natio$a Ne7!

Me%ia

Ra$%o) E++ect

Me%ia

Ra$%o) E++ect

?ith Pro-i$ce

D"))*

?ducation .3..C3.7D***

.3..C;3=9D***

Log CincomeD.3-;=

C3.+D***.3-

C3.;D***

$ran.3.+=C.3+:D

.3.+;C.3+-D

AgeB.3..-CB.3;=D

B.3..-C.3;;D

2emale.3..:C.3.7D

.3.=C+3.7D

Log likelihood B9:3:. B99.3:;

#hi- 7+3=+*** :3-;***

1 +.+ +.+

A$$e8 Ta3e 1> Ho"!eho%! U!e o+ Heath Faciitie!I+ *o" or a )e)3er o+ *o"r +a)i* i! !icK a$% re="ire! treat)e$t 7here %o *o" "!"a* 2o

Pro-i$ce

re!#o$%e$t!

2o-er$)e$t

heath "$it

#ri-ate

heath "$it

rei2io"!NGO

r"$ "$it

!&aela = :R +R +R 1ue%a 8i&caya - 9:R ;+R .R(ulacan :. 7:R ;;R +RPam4anga 9- 9.R ;R .RZamale& -= 9+R ;-R .R(atanga& - :+R -R .R#a%ite 79 7:R -:R .RLaguna 7. 7-R --R .R 1egro& Occidental :. =R +R +R(ohol - 9R +:R .R#eu = :R -+R .RSamar - =9R +R .RZamoanga del Sur ++- ==R :R +R(ukidnon 79 =R :R .RTa/iBTa/i -= =R ++R .RAgu&an del 1orte - :9R +-R 7RSurigao del 1orte - =9R +-R .RSurigao del Sur - :9R -+R .Ri&ami& Oriental - 7R 7R .R 1#" :. 9;R -.R +R

Tota ..4/ 10R .,R .R

=



A$$e8 Ta3e 9> S"))ar* Mea$!

M"$ici#a Le-e %ata8ariale O3! Mea$ St%>

De-iatio$

Mi$ Ma8

#orru4tion >ou&ehold =+ .3=9. +=3.9= B-3: ;3-;

#orru4tion Pulic Official& =. B.379: +.3 B+3= ;-3.+

#orru4tion #omined =+ .37: -;3;9. B3;- 793.:

"ead Local ne/&4a4er& =+ +:3:. +=377; . =.3:+

"ead 1ational ne/&4a4er& =+ -93=: -3+.: . =.

8ote in Local ?lection& =+ :3;+ +73.; ;73:+ +..

8ote in 1ational ?lection& =+ =739: ++39= 7. +..

Log !ncome Ce<4enditureD =+ 93;-- .3:9 3=- :3-9:

?ducation =+ 93+=+ =377+ -. 9=3+=

$ran =+ .3=+- .3;-. . +

Social )ifference& =+ 7;3:= -73::= . 93-

igration if health care 4oor =+ +=3-= +73:9 . 9.3:+

AdEu&taility =+ 9-3;. +93:.7 +;3;; +..Accountaility =+ :3=; +3;. -7 +..

AntiBcorru4tion attitude& =+ .3:. .3;.7 . +

)elay in 4ayment& =+ 93:. +;3++- . 99399

Bara$2a* Le-e Data8ariale O3! Mea$ St%>

De-iatio$

Mi$ Ma8

Sat3 /ith go%ernment health &er%ice& - B+3.79 +3+7; B=;3=. -3:+

$ran +7 .3.9 .3+ . +

?ducation ;.+ :3;= +399+ +-3:-: =93;9

Log !ncome C?<4D ;.+ 93;7= .39-7 +3;+ =3...

Allocation of >ealth #rit3 +7 +37.; .39: . ;

Su44ly of edicine& +7: 9:3=:7 +3+= +9399: +..

Log ?m4loyment #L +7= +3;=- .3;: .3=;9 ;3.++

AdEu&taility #L +7= :3; +3+- . +..

Accountaility +7= :=3:+ +39+= . +..

Social Pre&&ure again&t corru4t ;.+ 93; ;93 . +..

#orru4tion >ou&ehold -=- .3:;+ +:3; B-3: ;3-;

#orru4tion Pulic Official ;.+ B.37= +.3=; B+3= ;-3.++

#orru4tion #omined -=+ B.3.;: -;3--. B3;- 793.:;

Kno/ re5uired immunization& -9 9:3:. -+3+-; -7 +..

)elayed 4ayment& #L + ++3 -3:- . +..

.



A$$e8 Ta3e ,> The Ca"!e! o+ Corr"#tio$ Ro3"!t$e!! ChecK Corr"#tio$ )ea!"re Corr"#tio$ Mer2e%

Ca#acit* A%%e% Mi2ratio$ a$%

Acco"$ta3iit*

Dro##e%

Corr"#tio$

Le+t

tr"$cate%?&timation method "ou&t

"egre&&ion'LS"ou&tStd ?rr


'LS"ou&tStd ?rr


"ou&t"egre&&ion

++3+ ++3- ++3; ++3 ++37 ++39

"ead Local 1e/&4a4er .3-:*+3=-

.3-9.**-3..7

.3-9*+3:7-

.3-9.**-3.:7

.3-9+*+3:7

.3-:*+3++

"ead 1ational 1e/&4a4er B.3--7*B+3=.+

B.3-+**B-3-.+

B.3+9=B+3.

B.3;;=**B-37-=

B.3-*B+397

B.3-7*B+3=+

8ote in Local ?lection B.3:-7***B;3.:=

B.399***B-3;+

B.39=***B-39;:

B.39;***B-3+-

B.37=;**B-3;:

B.3:-7***B;3+.

8ote in 1ational ?lection .3;=+

+3-7=

.3;-=

+3.;

.3--

.3:

B.3;+9

+3+7=

.3--7

.3:+

.3;=+

+3-:+igrate if >ealth Ser%ice& Poor B.3.-7

B.3+7=B.3.:;B.37--

.3.-

.3+7.

Log P# ?<4enditure -37:.3;:=

73...3:.=

73=-.3:7:

39.3:-:

37..39+7

-37=.3;=;

?ducation .37++39.:

.37-*+39=7

.3--+3+7

.3.+37=

.3.++3+;7

.37++39-;

$ran B-+3;***B-3=.;

B+93+.**B-3+9;

B+93+7**B-3.:7

B+73+**B-3--

B+73+B+3=;

B-+3;***B-3=;;

Social )ifference& .3-;:**-3;-

.3.-

.3:7.3.;.3=..

.3++.+3..

.3+.=

.37-.3-;:**-3;99

AdEu&taility .3-9:*

+3=.9

.3-=

+39..

.3--

+37;7

.3-9;*

+3=+

.3-;*

+39=.

.3-9:*

+3=-

Accountaility B.3.-B.3-9;

.3+9

.3=:.3-.:+3--;

B.3.-B.3-99

AntiBcorru4tion attitude& B.3+:B.3.7;

+3-9.3-;+

B+3+.9B.3+;9

B+3.+B.3=:-

B.3+..B.3.;

B.3+B.3.7;

)elayed 4ayment& B.3--B+37+

B.3.7B.3-;+

B.3.:B.3-;

B.3+-9B.37+

B.3+:+B.3-+

B.3--B+39.:

#a4acity B.3;-**B-3.:=

B.3;+**B-3+:9

eritocracy .3.=7.3

.3-+;+3-

" &5 /ithin .3- .3+=

" &5 et/een .3= .39.

" &5 .3+ .3;= .3; .3;9

1 =. =. =. =. =. =.

+



A$$e8 Ta3e ./> E8#ai$i$2 6$o7e%2e o+ I))"$i&atio$! at Go-er$)e$t Ci$ic!?LS

7$o>o+

o3! i$

)"$>

Ra$%o)

E++ect!

Gro"#:

Pro-i$ce

?LS

7$o>o+

o3! i$

)"$>

Ra$%o)

E++ect!

Gro"#:

Pro-i$ce

?LS

7$o>o+

o3! i$ )"$>

Ra$%o)

E++ect!

Gro"#:

Pro-i$ce

+-3+ +-3- +-3; +-3 +-37 +-39

$ran B+3.=B.3-9

.3=B.3--=

.3=+9

.3--=.39.3+-9

B+3.77B.3-=-

B.3:--B.3+=:

?ducation C>>DB.3.=9B.3:

.3+.7B.397

B.3.--B.3+;7

B.3.7:B.3;:7

B.3.+B.3.=7

B.3.99B.3--

LogCincome 4er ca4itaDC>>D

93=;-3.

:3.=+37.

939.-3.7;

:3799-3+9-

93-3.-.

:3-:-3.-

Allocation of 2und& y the 1ational Go%t3 (a&ed on>ealth "elated #rit3 CPOD

.3=;

.37+B+3+:+B.39;=

.3+:

.3.=.B+3+B.3=.7

.377.

.3;.+B+3;9B.3:9+

Su44ly of edicine C#LD.3-=:;3-9

.3-:-39;

.3-7;-3=9-

.3+:-3+=

.3-:9;3+9:

.3-;=-379

Log of numer of 4er&onnel at clinic C#LD

B737B+3=

B+3.B.3.7

B93+;B+3:++

B;3-=B.3:-

B73;.B+3:+

B+37B.3;:

Social Pre&&ure again&t#orru4tion CPOD

B.3.-B.39.+

B.3..9B.3+;

B.3.+=B.3+=

B.3..:B.3+7=

.3.-7B.37;7

B.3..9B.3+-9

#orru4tion at theunici4al Le%el C>>D

B.3-.B-377+

B.3-.B+3=:-

#orru4tion at theunici4al Le%el CPOD

B.37-B;3+-

B.377B;3;;9

#orru4tion at theunici4al Le%el CPOY>>D

B.3--;B;3;=

B.3--B-3==7

)elay in Salary Payment&CPOD

B.3+;B;39.

B.3;-;B-3+:.

B.3;-.B;3.:

B.3-9B+3:;+

B.3;-B3.9

B.3-7B-3.;=

)elay in Salary Payment&C#LD

.3+;-+39

B.3+.++3=+

.3+.:+3;7.

.3.:+3--:

.3+-=+379=

.3+..+3

#on&tant

+:3;

.3=7-

+93.: +:3:

.3==.

+739

.3:..

+:3.:

.3=7-

+;3--

.37== 1 +-: +-: +;7 +;7 +-: +-:

2C+.,++9D 3:=*** 73*** 93=;***

#hi S5uare C+.D -.3-7** -3;*** -7397***

"- /ithin .3+ .3-. .3+=

"- et/een .3-; .3++ .3-.

"- o%erall .3-+ .3+: .3-; .3+= .3- .3+

-



A$$e8 Ta3e ..> Cea$i$2 Sati!+actio$ 7ith Go-er$)e$t Ci$ic a$% ?aiti$2 Ti)e

Perce#tio$! o+ Ho"!eho%!

Sati!+actio$ ?aiti$2 Ti)e

=3+ =3-

2i<ed ?ffect

CGrou4F(arangayD

2i<ed ?ffect

CGrou4F(arangayD

?ducationB.3.+

CB.3-+D.3.+

C.3:7D

LogCincome 4er ca4itaD.3.+

C.3.+DB.3+

CB.3=-D

>ome O/ner&hi4:3;-

C-3D***B+3.;

CB-3-D**

Perce4tion of 1ational #orru4tionB.3.9

CB-39D***.3..

C.37D

AgeB.3.:

CB.3:9DB.3..

CB.3-+D

2emale.3-

C.3.DB.39=

CB+3-:D

#on&tant :=3C=3;.D***

;:3+-C--3;;D***

1 ;- -9

2C9,9;-D -3=;*** +39:

"- /ithin .3.; .3.-

"- et/een .3.. .3.+

"- o%erall .3.+ .3.+

;



A$$e8 Ta3e .4> E8#ai$i$2 ?aiti$2 Ti)e at a$% Sati!+actio$ 7ith Go-er$)e$t Heath

Ci$ic!Ro3"!t$e!! checK!

?ith ca#acit* Le+t tr"$cate% corr"#tio$

-aria3e

Ro3"!t

re2re!!io$

Ra$%o)

E++ect!Gro"#:

M"$ici#ait*

?LS

7$o>o+ o3!i$ )"$>

?LS

7$o>o+ o3!i$ )"$>

Ra$%o) E++ect!

Gro"#:Pro-i$ce

+3+ +3- +3; +3 +37

$ran.3+.9.3;:

.3.;.

.3+-9.3+.-.3;7

.3.7C.3;99D

B.3.9CB.3+:+D

?ducation C>>D.3..+.3+7

.3..:

.3:.7.3...3+.

.3..7C.37D

B.3..-C.3-.=D

LogCincome 4er ca4itaD C>>DB.3+:*B+3999

B.3-=-B+3+:

B.37:;*B+3;9

B.37.;*CB+3:9D

B.3-=;CB+3++-D

Su44ly of edicine C#LD.3.-;***

;3;-.3.+7**

-3;.9.3.-+***

;37:+.3.-+***C;37+;D

.3.-.***C-3-D

Log of 1umer of Per&onnel at the#linic C#LD

B+3..***B;3.=9

B.3=7***B;3.9

B+3.-;***B-3.

B+3..***CB-3=+D

B.3***CB-3=7-D

Kno/& the "e5uired!mmunization& C#LD

B.3..B.39.:

B.3..B.3.=:

B.3..7B.3-7

B.3..7CB.3==D

B.3..7CB.3:-D

Allocation of 2und& y the 1ational Go%t3 (a&ed on >ealth"elated #riteria CPOD

B.3+-.B.3=:

B.3.--B.3+=-

B.3.B.3:-.

B.3++9CB.3.9D

B.3.CB.39D

2reedom to AdEu&t CPOD.3..;.37+.

.3..;

.3;-+.3..9.3.=

.3..7.3:-.D

.3..+C.3+..D

2reedom to AdEu&t C#LD.3..+.3-:7

B.3...B.3.=:

.3..;

.3;=B.3..-

CB.3;;DB.3..C.3:-D

Accountaility CPODB.3.+B+3.7

B.3..B.3:9

B.3.+9B+39.;

B.3.+CB+3-D

B.3.+.CB+3.9D

Accountaility C#LDB.3.+;-3.::

.3.+.+39

B.3..+3.7

.3..C+3+.7D

.3.++C+3:7-D

Social Pre&&ure again&t #orru4tionCPOD

.3..7+37.:

.3..7+3;:=

.3..9*+3;

.3..9*C+3=+D

.3..9*C+3:=9D

#orru4tion at the unici4al Le%elCPOD

B.3.-=**B-3;9

B.3.-*B+3977

B.3.-+*B+3:..

B.3.-*CB+39-D

B.3.--*CB+3:9.D

)elay in Salary Payment& CPOD.3.-.*+3.=

.3...

.3.7.3..-B.3+-=

.3...C.3..:D

.3..7C.3-D

)elay in Salary Payment& C#LDB.3.+7***

B-3+7B.3..9B+3-:-

B.3..B+39;+

B.3.+.*CB+3:77D

B.3.++**CB-3++.D

#a4acity.3.+.+3.-;

#on&tant-3;

+3-:

+37

.3:=-

;3.

+3==

;3-9

C+377D

+3:

C.37-D 1 +;; +;; +;; +;; +;;

2C+7,++:D /ith ca4acity C+9,++9D 3;*** -3:+*** -3:;***

#hi S5uare C+7D -:39;** +3-:***

"- /ithin .3+; .3-.

"- et/een .3-+ .39

"- o%erall .3- .3- .3- .3-9



A$$e8 Fi2"re .: M"$ici#a O++icia! -!>

Ho"!eho% Pre+ere$ce! $atio$a

a-2>

A$$e8 Fi2"re 4: M"$ici#a O++icia! -!>

Ho"!eho% Pre+ere$ce!

#ro-i$cia a-2>

A$$e8 Fi2"re 5: M"$ici#a O++icia! -!> Ho"!eho% Pre+ere$ce! )"$ici#a a-2>

A$$e8 Fi2"re 0: Pro-i$cia O++icia! -!>

Ho"!eho% Pre+ere$ce! $atio$a

a-2>

A$$e8 Fi2"re (: Pro-i$cia O++icia! -!>

Ho"!eho% Pre+ere$ce!

#ro-i$cia a-2>

7

coe- . /14)1, se . /0*02, t . 1/*(

e <

p u b l i c o - - i c i a l p r e - r e n c e s > ? @

e< household pre-erences> ? @/3442

/5*43

/3*5)

/)*+5

coe- . /2((*, se . /141(, t . 1/**

e< household pre-erences > ? @/30+0 /254

/3+52

/*(4)

coe- . /)5)5, se . /2+)2, t . 3/44

e < p u b l i c o - - i c i a l p r e - e r e n c e s > ? @

e< household pre-erences > ? @*/0)3 25/(1+

*/)241

2)/(*35

new jobs

agricultgarbage

sports

educat/

housing

water

health

aid to p

road

coe- . /2((*, se . /141(, t . 1/**

e < p u b l i c o - - i c i a l p r e - e r e n c

e s > ? @

e< household pre-erences > ? @/30+0 /254*

/3+52

/*(4)

coe- . /)41*, se . /224(, t . 4/1)

e < p u b l i c o - - i c i a l p r e - e r e n c e s > ? @

e< household pre-erences > ? @*/0)3 25/(1+

+/(221

2*/2353

new jobs

agricult

garbagesports educat/

housing

water

health

aid to p

road



A$$e8 Fi2"re <> Partia Pot E8#ai$i$2 Sati!+actio$ a$% ?aiti$2 Ti)e co)#o!ite i$%e8

i3 A%ailaility of medicine&coe- . /021342(+, se . /00(+3+(4, t . 3/1+

e < s a t w a i t 2 > ? @

e< 7edic > ? @51/23 42/2342

4/2+(4+

2/)0(25

ii3 #orru4tioncoe- . /0244)2)*, se . /012*1*55, t . 1/)1

e < s a t w a i t 2 > ? @

e< cor2=po > ? @1(/**) 2+/52+)

4/14(52

2/*+33(

iii3 1umer of 4er&onnel at clinic Clog&Dcoe- . 1/002504*, se . /305**5*2, t . 3/2*

3/((+32

DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Documents