AU/ACSC/2016 AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY DECEIVING THE ENEMY: THESE ARE THE DRONES YOU ARE LOOKING FOR by Phyllis Nixon, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements Advisors: Dr. Heather Marshall and Dr. Chris Johnson Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama June 2016 DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.
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DECEIVING THE ENEMY: THESE ARE THE DRONES YOU ARE … · MQ-1 Predator .....10 . Figure 3. OODA Loop with Physical Deception ... “drones”) in a TD role by using physical deception
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AU/ACSC/2016
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
DECEIVING THE ENEMY:
THESE ARE THE DRONES YOU ARE LOOKING FOR
by
Phyllis Nixon, USAF
A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements
Advisors: Dr. Heather Marshall and Dr. Chris Johnson
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
June 2016
DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.
ii
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In
accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the
United States government.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................... .ii TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………iii
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES.................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.i
ABSTRACT .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.ii
Deception and Combat ............................................................................................5 UAV Development and Capabilities .......................................................................6 Physical Deception ................................................................................................11 Getting Inside the Adversary's Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) .........12 Loop ...........................................................................................................................
Perception Deception .............................................................................................26 Desired Effect on an Adversary .............................................................................28
Scenario One: Special Operations Infiltration ……..…………………… 28 Scenario Two: Air Campaign…………………………………………….29
In addition to the MW UAV, Shootdown (SD) UAVs should be developed to emulate certain
fixed-wing strike aircraft. The emulated aircraft types should encompass combat aircraft
equipped with aircrew ejection seats that an adversary would be expecting to be operating in the
intended mission area. Table 6.1. depicts these airframes.
32
Fixed Wing Aircraft
US Air Force A-10, F-15E, F-16, F-35, B-1
US Navy F-18
US Marines AV-8B, F-18
Table 6.1. Fixed Wing Aircraft
The development of both MW and SD UAVs will decrease risk to aircrew and allow more
effective mission execution for the US military and its allies. Coupled with the development of
these UAVs, an examination of the proper organizational structure for TD UAV fielding and TD
UAV tactics development should be initiated to ensure the most effective use of these platforms.
33
SECTION 7: CONCLUSION
Deception has been described as the deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain a
competitive advantage.61 General Dwight Eisenhower, as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1947,
stated, “… no major operation should be undertaken without planning and executing appropriate
deception measures.”62 As demonstrated in this research, the use of deception UAVs—
specifically in physical deception to fool the “eyes and ears” of an adversary—can successfully
misrepresent reality to an adversary and cause him to expend resources, delay reactions, or react
incorrectly to tactical situations, thereby gaining an advantage in combat. While there has been
successful historic use of deception with UAVs in the electronic realm, the yet largely
unexplored use of physical deception in UAVs creates many benefits, especially against
adversaries and mission scenarios that are not impacted by electronic deception or the
development of advanced technologies such as stealth.
Despite the advancements in aircraft and tactics, low altitude flight in combat remains a
risky endeavor even against the least technologically advanced adversaries, since the simplest of
weapons can still destroy a multi-million-dollar aircraft if enemy combatants can see it and are
capable of engaging it with their weapons. Likewise, time is of the essence when a downed
aircrew is evading capture, and advancements in technology have not decreased the rescue
response capabilities significantly over the last few decades. Both of these areas will benefit
tremendously from the development and fielding of physical deception UAVs. Using UAVs in
these physical deception roles will save lives and allow more effective mission execution,
shaping overall US military operational success in future engagements.
34
Notes
1 David Ariosto, “NATO: Downed Chopper Reportedly Fired on by Rocket-Propelled Grenade,” CNN, 9 August 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/08/08/afghanistan.chopper.crash/ (accessed 13 May 2016).
2 Maj Ronald McGonigle, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) on the Future Tactical Battlefield – Are UAVs an Essential Joint Force Multiplier?,” School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS. April 1993. 21-22.
3 Lance Winslow, “Unmanned Vehicle Robotic Warfare Hide and Seek Strategies,” 18 May 2007, 72. www.worldthinktank.net/pdfs/unmannedvehiclerobotic.pdf
4 Lt Col David Glade, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations,” Occasional Paper No. 16, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, July 2000.
5 Maj Ronald McGonigle, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) on the Future Tactical Battlefield – Are UAVs an Essential Joint Force Multiplier?,” School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS. April 1993, 21-22.
6 Mark Couch, Dennis Lindell, “Study of Rotorcraft Survivability,” Aircraft Survivability 9. http://wayback.archive.org/web/20130922070835/http:/www.bahdayton.com/surviac/asnews/JASPO_Summer10.pdf (accessed 23 June 2016).
7 Joint Publication (JP) 3-58. Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, 31 May 1996. I-I, I-2. 8 James D. Monroe, “Deception: Theory and Practice,” School of Advanced Military
Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS. January 2012.110. 9 Maj R.M. Janiczek, “The New Maskirovka: ? Countering US Rapid Decisive Operations in the 21st Century,” The School of Advanced Warfighting, U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, May 2002. 10. 10 Maj Donald J. Bacon, “Second World War Deception Lessons Learned for Today’s Joint Planner,” Master’s thesis, Air Command and Staff College. Maxwell AFB, AL, December 1998. 11-12. 11 Colin Daileda, “Military Deception Fooled Hitler on D-Day, and It Still Works Today”, 6 June 2014, http://mashable.com/2014/06/06/military-deception-d-day-inflatable-tanks/#gJij4_LOA8qU 12 Ibid. 13 Martin Robertson, “Playing the Nazis for Dummies! The Army of 3ft-Fall Paratroopers Dispatched Over Northern France on the Eve of D-Day Which Caused Chaos,” Dailymail.com, 30 September 2013. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2438564/Playing-Nazis-dummies-The-army-3ft-tall-paratroopers-dispatched-northern-France-eve-D-Day-caused-chaos.html 14 Ibid. 15 James D. Monroe, “Deception: Theory and Practice,” School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS. January 2012. 16 Ibid, 43-44. 17 David A. Acosta, “The Makara of Hizballah: Deception in the 2006 Summer War,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, Jun 2007.
18 Tom Scheve, “How the MQ-9 Reaper Works," HowStuffWorks.com, 21 May 2016. http://science.howstuffworks.com/reaper.htm. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 “Drone Origins: World War II and Vietnam-era Remotely Piloted Vehicles”, Understanding Empire, 2 December 2013. https://understandingempire.wordpress.com/2013/12/02/drone-origins-world-war-ii-and-vietnam-era-remotely-piloted-vehicles/ 23 John David Blom, “Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective” Occasional Paper No. 37, Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2010 24 Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Air Force UAVs the Secret History,” The Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Arlington, VA, July 2010.,5. 25 Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Air Force UAVs the Secret History,” The Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Arlington, VA, July 2010.,25. 26 “Drone Origins: World War II and Vietnam-era Remotely Piloted Vehicles”, Understanding Empire, 2 December 2013. https://understandingempire.wordpress.com/2013/12/02/drone-origins-world-war-ii-and-vietnam-era-remotely-piloted-vehicles/ 27 Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Air Force UAVs the Secret History,” The Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Arlington, VA, July 2010.,31. 28 Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Air Force UAVs the Secret History,” The Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Arlington, VA, July 2010.,37. 29 Ibid. 30 Carlo Kopp, “Operation Desert Storm the Electronic Battle,” Air Power Australia, August 1993, http://ausairpower.net/Analysis-ODS-EW.html
31 Lt Col Robert E. Suminsby, “Fear No Evil: Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses,” Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, April 2002. 28- 29. 32 Figure 1:BQM-74 drone Reprinted from http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg82/Pages/USSLassen(DDG82)ConductsMissileExercises.aspx 33 Tom Scheve, “How the MQ-9 Reaper Works," HowStuffWorks.com, 21 May 2016. http://science.howstuffworks.com/reaper.htm 34 Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Air Force UAVs the Secret History,” The Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Arlington, VA, July 2010.,51. 35 Figure 2: MQ-1 Predator Reprinted from 162wing.ang.af.mil, (http://www.162wing.ang.af.mil/resources/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=11932, accessed 7 June 2016). 36 Figure 2: MQ-1 Predator Reprinted from 162wing.ang.af.mil, (http://www.162wing.ang.af.mil/resources/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=11932, accessed 7 June 2016). 37 U.S. Air Force, “MQ-9 Reaper,” 23 September, 2015, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx
38 Marcel P. Buis, “From the Knowledge of Understanding to Military Deception,” School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. May 2008. 39 David S. Fadok,. Air Power's Quest for Strategic Paralysis. Maxwell AFB, AL,: Air University Press, 1995. 40 Figure 3: OODA Loop Illustration courtesy of Phyllis Nixon 41 Christopher A Mouton, Jia Xu, Endy M. Daehner, Hirokazu Miyake, Clarence R. Anderegg, Julia Pollak, David T Orletsky, Jerry M. Sollinger, “Rescuing Downed Aircrews: The Value of Time,” RAND Report R-1106-AF, Santa Monica, 2015 42 General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm Evaluation of the Air War, Report to Congressional Requesters (Washington, DC, Department of Commerce, July 1996), 3. 43Col Mike Pietrucha, “Rediscovering Low Altitude: Getting Past the Air Force’s Overcommitment to Stealth,” War on the Rocks, 7 April 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/rediscovering-low-altitude-getting-past-the-air-forces-overcommitment-to-stealth/ 44 Department of the Air Force, Air Superiority Flight Plan 2030, Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team, May 2016 45 Orville F. Desjarlais, “A-10 Pilot Brings Crippled Aircraft Home,” Airman, 47 (6), 26-27 June 2003, http://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.aufric.idm.oclc.org/docview/212247422?accountid=4332
46 Col Mike Pietrucha, “Rediscovering Low Altitude: Getting Past the Air Force’s Overcommitment to Stealth,” War on the Rocks, 7 April 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/rediscovering-low-altitude-getting-past-the-air-forces-overcommitment-to-stealth/ 47Col Jim Slife “Shootdown,” Armed Forces Journal, 1 June 2007, http://armedforcesjournal.com/shootdown-solution/ 48 Department of the Air Force, Air Superiority Flight Plan 2030, Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team, May 2016 49 David Lerman, “Soldiers Fight to Save the A-10 Warthog,” Bloomberg Businessweek, 15 May 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-15/soldiers-fight-to-save-a-10-warthog-jet 50 Col Lee Pera “Personnel Recovery Strategic Importance and Impact.” Air and Space Power Journal 17, no. 3 (November-December 2012): 88. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA567478 51 AFPD 3-50. Personnel Recovery Operations, 1 June 2005. 3. 52 Rickey L. Rife “Combat Search and Rescue a Lesson We Fail to Learn,” School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 1994.12. 53 Christopher A. Mouton, Jia Xu, Endy M. Daehner, Hirokazu Miyake, Clarence R. Anderegg, Julia Pollak, David T Orletsky, Jerry M. Sollinger, Rescuing Downed Aircrews The Value of Time, RAND Report R-1106-AF (Santa Monica, CA RAND, 2015), xii. 54 Ibid,37.
55 John Marshall Groves, “A Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Role for the CV-22: It’s Coming, Get Ready,” Master’s thesis, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, AY 07-08.,18. 56 The Irish Times, Bounty Offered for Allied Pilots, 2 February, 1999, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/bounty-offered-for-allied-pilots-1.148029 57 Donald C. Daniel, Katherine L. Herbig, “Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Strategic Deception,” Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, May 1980. 49. 58 Ibid.,49. 59 Ibid.,50. 60 Ibid.,53. 61 Ibid.,5. 62 James D. Monroe, “Deception: Theory and Practice,” School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS. January 2012, 2.
Acosta, David A., “The Makara of Hizballah: Deception in the 2006 Summer War,” Master’s
Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, Jun 2007. AFPD 3-50. Personnel Recovery Operations, 1 June 2005. Anderegg, Clarence, R., Daehner, Endy M., Miyake, Hirokazu, Mouton, Christopher A.
Orletsky, David T., Pollak, Julia, Sollinger, Jerry M., Xu, Jia, “Rescuing Downed Aircrews the Value of Time,” RAND Report R-1106-AF, Santa Monica, CA, 2015.
Ariosto, David. “NATO: Downed Chopper Reportedly Fired on by Rocket-Propelled Grenade.”
CNN.com, 9 August 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/08/08/afghanistan.chopper.crash/ (accessed 23 May 2016).
Bacon, Donald J. “Second World War Deception Lessons Learned for Today’s Joint
Planner.” Master’s thesis, Air Command and Staff College. Maxwell AFB, AL, December 1998. Blom, John David. “Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective.” Occasional
Paper No. 37, Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2010.
Buis, Marcel P. “From the Knowledge of Understanding to Military Deception.” School of
Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2008.
Colin, Daileda. “Military Deception Fooled Hitler on D-Day, and It Still Works Today.”
Mashable, 6 June 2014.http://mashable.com/2014/06/06/military-deception-d-day- inflatable-tanks/#gJij4_LOA8qU
Ehrhard, Thomas P. “Air Force UAVs the Secret History,” The Mitchell Institute for Airpower
Studies, Arlington, VA, July 2010. “Drone Origins: World War II and Vietnam-era Remotely Piloted Vehicles”, Understanding
Empire, 2 December 2013. https://understandingempire.wordpress.com/2013/12/02/drone-origins-world-war-ii-and-vietnam-era-remotely-piloted-vehicles/.
Fadok, David S. Air Power's Quest for Strategic Paralysis. Maxwell AFB, AL,: Air
University Press, 1995. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm Evaluation of the Air War, Report to
Congressional Requesters (Washington, DC, Department of Commerce, July 1996) Glade, David. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations.” Occasional
Paper No. 16, Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, July 2000.
Groves, John M. “A Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Role for the CV-22: It’s
Coming, Get Ready.” US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, AY 07-08.
Janiczek, R.M. “The New Maskirovka Countering US Rapid Decisive Operations in the
21st Century.” The School of Advanced Warfighting, U.S. Marine Corps, Quantico, VA, May 2002.
Joint Publication (JP) 3-58. Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, 31 May1996. Kopp, Dr. Carlo. “Operation Desert Storm the Electronic Battle.” Air Power Australia, August
1993. http://ausairpower.net/Analysis-ODS-EW.html. Lee, Pera. “Personnel Recovery Strategic Importance and Impact.”
Air and Space Power Journal 17, no. 3 (November-December 2012): 88. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA56748.
Lerman, David. “Soldiers Fight to Save the A-10 Warthog,” Bloomberg Businessweek, 15 May
McGonigle, Ronald. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) on the Future Tactical Battlefield
Are UAVs an Essential Joint Force Multiplier?” School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS. April 1993.
Monroe, James D. “Deception: Theory and Practice.” School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 2012.
Pietrucha, Mike. “Rediscovering Low Altitude: Getting Past the Air Force’s Overcommitment
to Stealth.” War on the Rocks, 7 April 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/rediscovering-low-altitude-getting-past-the-air-forces-overcommitment-to-stealth/
Rife, Rickey L. “Combat Search and Rescue a Lesson We Fail to Learn.” School of Advanced
Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 1994.
Robertson, Martin. “Playing the Nazis for Dummies! The Army of 3ft-Fall Paratroopers
Dispatched Over Northern France on the Eve of D-Day Which Caused Chaos.” Dailymail.com, 30 September 2013. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2438564/Playing-Nazis-dummies-The-army-3ft-tall-paratroopers-dispatched-northern-France-eve-D-Day-caused-chaos.html
Scheve, Tom, “How the MQ-9 Reaper Works", HowStuffWorks.com, 21 May 2016.
http://science.howstuffworks.com/reaper.htm. Slife, Jim, “Shootdown,” Armed Forces Journal, 1 June 2007,
http://armedforcesjournal.com/shootdown-solution/. Suminsby, Robert. “Fear No Evil: Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles for Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses,” Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, April 2002. The Irish Times, Bounty Offered for Allied Pilots, 2 February, 1999, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/bounty-offered-for-allied-pilots-1.148029. U.S. Air Force, “MQ-9 Reaper,” 23 September, 2015,