Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: Can Engagement Moderate China's Strategic Competition with America?

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Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: CanEngagement Moderate China’s StrategicCompetition with America?Xiaoting Liaa East China Normal UniversityAccepted author version posted online: 01 May 2015.

To cite this article: Xiaoting Li (2015) Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: Can Engagement ModerateChina’s Strategic Competition with America?, International Interactions: Empirical and TheoreticalResearch in International Relations, 41:3, 480-508, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1006728

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International Interactions, 41:480–508, 2015Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0305-0629 print/1547-7444 onlineDOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1006728

Dealing with the Ambivalent Dragon: CanEngagement Moderate China’s Strategic

Competition with America?

XIAOTING LIEast China Normal University

Can US engagement moderate China’s strategic competition withAmerica? This study indicates that the answer is a qualified yes.Under unipolarity, a rising state may face both incentives to reachan accommodation with the hegemon and to expand its ownstature and influence against the hegemonic dominance. Theambivalence of its intentions is structurally induced and reflectsits uncertain stake in the hegemonic order. Consequently, a strat-egy of engagement may help the hegemon to promote cooperationover competition in dealing with an ascending power, but it doesnot necessarily eliminate the structural incentives for the compe-tition. Against this theoretical backdrop, this study utilizes bothqualitative and quantitative research to demonstrate that China’sreaction to American preeminence has long been marked by a pro-found ambivalence. Specifically, the findings suggest that while USengagement has some restraining impact on China’s competitivepropensity, Beijing will continue to hedge against American hege-mony, as its capabilities grow, by solidifying its diplomatic andstrategic association with the developing world.

KEYWORDS Asia, peace, security

With the proverbial rise of China, the future of the US-led global orderhas become a subject of intense debate among the scholarly community.To some, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States are des-tined for conflict because China’s burgeoning material power will inevitablysharpen its ambitions and lead Beijing to challenge the US primacy in the

Address correspondence to Xiaoting Li, School of Advanced International and AreaStudies, East China Normal University, A-406 Science Building, 3663 N. Zhongshan Road,Shanghai 200062, China. E-mail: [email protected]

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world order (Friedberg 2011; Mearsheimer 2001, 2010). Others are moreoptimistic, on the grounds that China’s growing integration into the interna-tional system will likely increase Beijing’s affinity with the prevailing orderand dampen its revisionist aspirations (Fingar 2012; Foot and Walter 2011;Johnston 2003, 2008). Still others steer a middle course, observing that theSino-American relationship is a complex mixture of both cooperative andcompetitive elements and that the pressing task today is to expand coop-eration and limit competition (Lieberthal and Wang 2012; Shambaugh 2013;Sutter 2012).

Fundamentally, this debate reflects the deep uncertainties surroundingan old and recurring question in international politics—that is, can a ris-ing state foster a constructive relationship with the hegemon (or the leadingstate in the system) over the long run? As a rule, rising states have uncer-tain intentions because new capabilities may create new aims and interests.In particular, as will be addressed in the following, China has long regardedAmerican hegemony with a profound ambivalence; accordingly, PRC strate-gies often serve the seemingly paradoxical purposes of both accommodatingand undercutting US predominance.

Of course, the ambivalence of intentions does not necessarily provean insuperable obstacle to the pursuit of cooperation. After all, from1972 onward, successive US administrations have adhered to a strategy of“engaging” China, despite the vast ideological differences between the twonations. More recently, prominent US officials have reiterated Washington’scommitment to broadening political and economic exchanges with the PRC,so as to elevate cooperation above competition (Clinton 2012; Kerry 2014).However, when governments may tout the efficacy of a policy as a matter offaith, scholars have to evaluate the issue in terms of competing propositionsand evidence. This study is a tentative attempt to explore how and to whatextent US engagement might help to moderate China’s strategic competitionwith America (that is, a competition aimed at countering US primacy).

Theoretically, this study derives from a basic tenet of classical realism—that is, while seeking power, states also value prudence in internationalpolitics. Under unipolarity, a rising state may thus face both incentivesto reach an accommodation with the hegemon and to expand its ownstature and influence against the hegemonic dominance. The ambivalenceof its intentions is structurally induced and mirrors its uncertain stake in thehegemonic order. An engagement strategy may help the hegemon to buildtrust and advance cooperation with an ascending power, thereby restrainingthe latter’s competitive propensity. But it does not necessarily eliminate thestructural cause of the competition.

These theoretical expectations, moreover, accord largely with the com-plexity of China’s reaction to US predominance since the end of the Cold War.On the one hand, Beijing welcomes US engagement and seeks to developpractical and continuous cooperation with Washington. Yet, on the other,

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Beijing views American hegemony and intentions skeptically and persists inbuilding a diplomatic and strategic partnership with the developing world,which signals China’s dissatisfaction with the US/Western-dominated worldorder. Empirically, therefore, I use PRC leadership travel to other devel-oping nations—including all countries not belonging to the Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—as an indicator ofChina’s strategic competition with America. As will be seen, such state visitsare part and parcel of Beijing’s efforts to extend its strategic leeway againstWashington. My quantitative findings suggest that while US engagement hassome positive effect in keeping Chinese competition at manageable levels,it does not overwhelm the structural incentives that lead Beijing to hedgeagainst American hegemony in the first place.

This study proceeds as follows. The first section contemplates why thestructural contradiction between hegemonic dominance and rising powerbreeds strategic competition and why a strategy of hegemonic engagementmay soften, but not resolve, the contradiction. Against this theoretical back-ground, the second section details the enduring ambivalence of Chineseforeign policy vis-à-vis US primacy and discusses the possible effect ofengagement in inducing Beijing to stress cooperation over competition. Thethird section explains why PRC leadership travel to the developing worldconstitutes a plausible, first-cut indicator of China’s strategic competition withAmerica, while the fourth section presents a research design for testing com-peting hypotheses about the variation in that competition. The results of thequantitative test are analyzed in the fifth section. The last section concludesby suggesting some implications for future research.

THE PROMISE AND LIMITATION OF HEGEMONIC ENGAGEMENTWITH RISING POWER

To realists, it is a structural feature of international politics that “overwhelm-ing power repels and leads others to balance against it” (Waltz 1997:916).The hegemonic dominance in the international system, in other words, isin itself a cause for anxiety, resentment, and competition, especially to therising states with natural ambitions of rewriting the rules governing the sys-tem (Gilpin 1981:187). However, while seeking greater power and influence,states are also known to value prudence as the supreme virtue (Morgenthau1948 [1978]:11). Under unipolarity, it is assuredly imprudent to confront theAmerican hegemon directly, for the following reasons.

First, given the preponderance of US power, other states can reap littlebenefit from traditional balancing strategies, through either an arms race orthe formation of a military alliance against the hegemon. Such strategiesare not only costly and futile but likely to provoke hegemonic reprisalsand thereby put the reckless challenger in immediate jeopardy (Brooks and

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Wohlforth 2008; Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999; Mowle and Sacko 2007;Wohlforth 1999).

Second, as a geographically insular country with a reputation for rela-tively benign intentions, the United States is not seen by most other states asa deadly menace (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Walt 2005). Rather, it is a leadingprovider of global public goods, such as economic openness, stability, andsecurity, which benefit most countries and enable their development (Gilpin1981; Ikenberry 2011).

Third, while the current international system reflects many of the hege-mon’s interests, it is also an open, integrative, and rule-based order thatprovides abundant common benefits and opportunities. Consequently, mostnations prefer to pursue their interests within this system, rather thanchallenge the hegemonic leadership that undergirds it (Ikenberry 2011).

Thus, realistically, unipolarity requires other countries, including risingstates, to accommodate the hegemonic primacy, instead of rocking the boatto their own detriment. Yet, on the other hand, it is equally imprudent for anascending power to submit to the status quo with resignation. Internationalpolitics, after all, is a self-help arena wherein states are never certain ofeach other’s intentions (Mearsheimer 2001:30); hence, they need to preparefor all eventualities. To begin with, there is no guarantee that the hegemonwill always use its colossal power constructively or act benignly toward ris-ing states (Ikenberry 2002, 2011; Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999; Monteiro2014). For fear of losing its primacy, the hegemon might thwart the riseof a potential competitor by active containment or even preventive wars(Mowle and Sacko 2007; Schweller 1999). If an emerging power has dissim-ilar ideologies and political institutions to those of the hegemon, it mightperceive an even greater threat from the latter and thereby feel constrainedto counterbalance it (Lemke 2004:65).

Furthermore, the hegemon may experience a relative decline over time,especially if a rising state is able to achieve sustained economic growth at afaster rate. Under the circumstances, the hegemon may act more belligerentlytoward the emerging competitor (see previous), but it may also choose toretrench from its systemic commitments and even negotiate some leadership-sharing arrangements with the newcomer (Schweller and Pu 2011:68–69;for an extended discussion, see Monteiro 2014). In either case, prudencerequires the ascending power to strive in advance to expand its own statureand influence in the system, which has the implicit effect of competingagainst and/or countering the hegemonic dominance, as an insurance againstwhatever future developments. That is, with the diplomatic and strategicleverage gained from this endeavor, a rising state will be in a stronger posi-tion either to withstand a hegemonic assault if push comes to shove or todrive a hard bargain when the hegemonic retrenchment occurs.

Thus, it is unsurprising that today’s emerging powers (not just China)invariably pursue a hedging strategy vis-à-vis the hegemon—that is, avoiding

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direct confrontation with America but meanwhile preserving some indepen-dence of action and preparing favorable conditions for possible systemicchanges in the long run. Though short of organizing a formal anti-US coali-tion (which, as argued earlier, is too risky under unipolarity), this hedgingstrategy aims at fostering a network of political and economic relationshipsthat serves as a protective shield (and a strategic lever too) for the risingstates, maximizing the latter’s ability to act autonomously in the internationalarena regardless of changes in the hegemonic position or temperament (Foot2006; Schweller and Pu 2011; Tessman 2012). In essence, the ambivalentintentions of those “hedgers” are structurally bred because their rising powermakes the prospect of the current hegemonic order uncertain in the firstplace and, relatedly, leaves them with an uncertain stake in the status quo.

Against this backdrop, engagement becomes a sensible strategy forthe hegemon to deal with the ascending powers in some important ways.According to leading US officials, engagement aims to strengthen politicaland economic associations with a rising state (in this case, China) and solidifyits stake in the existing international system, through three mechanisms: pro-moting trade, broadening interactions through international institutions, andincreasing high-level leadership contacts (Clinton 2012; Zoellick 2005). Fromthe standpoint of international relations theory, these mechanisms serve thevital purposes of building trust and advancing cooperation, as elaborated inthe following.

First, the expansion of economic and trade linkages helps deepen inter-state understanding and create a common interest in preserving amicablerelations, thereby dampening the prospects for interstate rivalry and conflict.1

Second, as a rule, international institutions help states to improve com-munication, reduce uncertainty, and ease the management of their disputes.2

Promoting collaborative work through international institutions, therefore,helps the hegemon to allay other states’ concerns about its arbitrariness andbolster their faith in the legitimacy of the prevailing order (Ikenberry 2002,2011). Moreover, by welcoming a rising state into more international insti-tutions, the hegemon not only satisfies the newcomer’s desire for status (bygranting it a “place at the table” of systemic governance) but also fetters itwith greater responsibility for the provision of systemic services. Overall, thismay help fortify an ascending power’s stake in systemic stability as well ascollaboration with the hegemon (Ikenberry 2011; Larson and Shevchenko2010; Mastanduno 1997).

Third, face-to-face leadership contacts often prove critical to alleviatingstates’ mistrust of each other’s intentions (Holmes 2013). As a rising state

1There is a voluminous literature on this topic. For a classical study that supports the trade-promotes-peacethesis, see Russett and Oneal (2001); for a classical rebuttal, see Barbieri (2002).2Again, there exists a huge literature on this subject. For two classical studies, see Keohane (1984) andRussett and Oneal (2001).

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normally craves respect and higher status, the hegemon may utilize top-levelleadership visits and dialogues both to convey its respect for the newcomer’sascending status and to induce the latter to behave cooperatively in exchangefor higher status (Larson and Shevchenko 2010). This may be a key factorthat increases an emerging power’s satisfaction with the prevailing order andhence reduces its conflictual propensity (Tammen et al. 2000).

In sum, through engagement, the hegemon may forge a closer relation-ship with a rising state for the pursuit of mutual gains, thereby restrainingthe latter’s competitive proclivities. It is unclear, however, whether this strat-egy will eventually resolve the contradiction between the old bottle ofhegemonic dominance and the new wine of rising power: For, while engage-ment may help keep their strategic competition at manageable levels, it doesnot eliminate the structural cause of the competition.

In the long term, despite its elevated position and stake in the existingsystem, an ascending power may still conclude that it could do even betterunder an alternative world order designed and governed by itself (Schwellerand Pu 2011:51). This prospect becomes more likely today because manyrising states have idiosyncratic norms and institutions at odds with the nor-mative foundation of the current hegemonic order (Kupchan 2014). Finally,as argued earlier, even if the hegemon has perfectly benign and coopera-tive intentions, an emerging power still has to prepare for the remote but notunlikely prospect of hegemonic retrenchment, so that it could fill the vacuumof systemic leadership as much as possible when the critical moment comes.When the hegemon’s intentions are perceived as less than benign, it becomesa strategic necessity for a rising state to hedge against the not-impossibleprospect of hegemonic conflict.

As shown in the next section, such ambivalence of intentions has largelyunderlain China’s reaction to US predominance since the end of the ColdWar.

CHINESE AMBIVALENCE AND US ENGAGEMENT

Since 1978, successive PRC administrations have placed a premium on inte-grating China into the international system, for the sake of the country’slong-term development. Pragmatically, this also requires Beijing to build aconstructive relationship with the United States, which is the primary archi-tect and maintainer of the system. In the sober-minded opinion of Chineseleaders and elites, American support is critical to China’s efforts to modernizeits economy, participate in global affairs, acquire higher status, and managesensitive disputes with neighboring countries. Thus, accommodation with thehegemon serves China’s interests far better than confrontation (Deng 2008;Goldstein 2005; Roy 2003; Shambaugh 2013; Sutter 2012).

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Accommodation, however, does not imply contentment. On thecontrary, since the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, China’s leaders have long per-ceived a grave “America threat.” Deng Xiaoping, for example, asserted inlate 1989 that the United States and the West were waging a “smokelessworld war” against the socialist states as well as the entire developing world(Deng 1993:344–345, 348). Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the ChineseCommunist Party (CCP) and president of the PRC (1989–2003), kept warningthat US and Western “hostile forces” sought to destabilize and dismemberChina and that Beijing must brace itself for a long-term struggle againsttheir schemes (Jiang 2006, Vol. 1:134–135, 280; Vol. 2:197, 422–423; Vol. 3:8,83, 139, 450). In November 2011, Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao reiterated thecharge against the “hostile international forces,” stressing the “gravity andcomplexity” of this struggle.3

Meanwhile, although China achieves spectacular development underthe prevailing world order, Beijing retains a profound skepticism of UShegemony. In his political reports to the CCP’s national congresses in1992–2002, Jiang Zemin repeatedly described “hegemonism” (a euphemismfor US predominance) as a threat to world peace and stability and stressedChina’s support for multipolarity. More significantly, Jiang called for theestablishment of a new, “fair and just” international order that inherentlyrejects US/Western supremacy (Jiang 2006, Vol. 1:242–243; Vol. 2:39–41;Vol. 3:566–567). In 2007–2012, the goals of setting up a new, “fair and just”international order and of “democratizing” international politics, both signal-ing Chinese dissatisfaction with American hegemony, continued to occupy aprominent place in the CCP’s foreign policy thinking.4

Nonetheless, under unipolarity, it is too risky to incur the hege-mon’s focused animosity, by adopting an overt counterbalancing postureagainst it (see earlier discussions). Accordingly, most countries prefer toemploy subtler strategies of countering and constraining US primacy, such asstrengthening bilateral and multilateral coordination against American preem-inence (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Tessman 2012). China appears no exceptionto this rule. As early as the mid-1980s, when frustrated with alleged signsof US hegemonic arrogance, Deng Xiaoping had proposed to widen China’sstrategic maneuvering room by forging closer collaboration with the devel-oping world (Leng et al. 2004:819, 829, 935, 977). After the Tiananmen crisis,which caused Sino-American relations to sink to a record low, Beijing madea conscientious effort to cultivate other developing nations diplomatically, tobuffer the PRC against US pressures (Qian 2003:255–257).

3See Hu’s speech to the CCP’s Central Committee, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-01/01/c_122522635.htm.4See Hu Jintao’s political reports to the CCP’s 17th and 18th congresses, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html.

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Indeed, in Beijing’s visions, building a diplomatic and strategic partner-ship with the developing world holds the key to the construction of a newworld order. Historically, great powers often produce the ideological divi-sions of the international system that in turn compel them to form divergentalliances (Braumoeller 2012). Admittedly, the current system is buttressedby a US-led coalition of advanced liberal democracies, for which China’sauthoritarian development model exerts little appeal. In the abstract, thosedeveloped states may endorse the goal of restoring multipolarity and restrain-ing American hegemony, due to their intermittent frictions with Washington.But they are unlikely to support any PRC attempts to revise the existing inter-national order substantially, as long as Beijing appears to play for the otherteam.

Hence, as the self-proclaimed “largest developing nation,” China haslong regarded the developing world, which provides pivotal support forBeijing in many global forums (for example, by voting against US/Westernattempts to condemn China’s human rights record), as its staunchest ally ininternational politics (Jiang 2006, Vol. 1:313–314; Vol. 2:373). As Jiang Zeminstated bluntly at a conference of PRC ambassadors in August 1998:

We need not only rich friends, but poor friends as well, because poorfriends often prove more reliable at critical moments. Thus, while devel-oping relations with major powers, we need to strengthen cooperationwith developing nations too, which are more important to us. (Jiang 2006,Vol. 2:205).

In August 1999, Jiang again stressed: “Strengthening solidarity and coop-eration with the Third World countries remains always the cornerstone ofChinese foreign policy,” especially with regard to Beijing’s cherished goal ofreforming the prevailing, US/Western-dominated world order (Jiang, 2006,Vol. 2:372–373).

To better engage those “poor friends,” Jiang laid particular empha-sis on leadership diplomacy, himself visiting over 50 developing countriesas president of the PRC. During those visits, Jiang invariably accentu-ated upgrading the collaboration between China and the developing worldagainst US “hegemonism” and for the establishment of a new internationalorder (Jiang 2006, Vol. 1:528–529; Vol. 2:402–403, 405–406; Vol. 3:239–241).Afterward, Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao followed suit, signaling through sim-ilarly high-profile visits that China could generate enough leverage in thedeveloping world against American predominance (Medeiros 2009, chap-ter 6; Sutter 2012, chapter 12). More recently, the new PRC administrationled by President Xi Jinping has gone further down this well-trodden pathof Chinese leadership diplomacy in cultivating such regional powers asArgentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, all literally located in Washington’s strategicbackyard (Oppenheimer 2014).

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Admittedly, like other “soft-balancers” against the United States, Beijinghas hitherto refrained from founding formal military alliances with othercountries, to avoid antagonizing Washington directly (Brooks and Wohlforth2008:72–75; Walt 2005:121–123). But the strategic implications of China’sdiplomatic activism in the developing world have long been a cause forconcern in Washington. As a Pentagon report noted in November 1998:“Although China has no plan to lead a faction or block of nations in directlychallenging the United States, its international political activities . . . aredesigned to achieve the same result.”5 In other words, if China decides inthe future to convert those international relationships into a formal anti-UScoalition, much of the necessary groundwork will already have been laid.

Still, to this day, most PRC elites seem to agree that American unipolaritywill not end anytime soon and that China still has to develop practical andcontinuous cooperation with the United States on a wide range of issues(Fingar 2012; Sutter 2012, chapter 6). Accordingly, Beijing has long wel-comed US engagement, as a means of expanding cooperation and limitingdisagreements. After the Tiananmen crisis, Deng Xiaoping promptly sug-gested that strengthening dialogues and exchanges was the only way ofimproving Sino-American relations (Leng et al. 2004:1296–1300, 1304–1305;see also Deng 1993:330–333, 350–351). In July 1993, Jiang Zemin also averredat a conference of PRC ambassadors that stabilizing and improving the Sino-American relationship was vitally important to China’s development; hence,Jiang advocated responding positively to the overtures of the US admin-istration in engaging China, while remaining on guard against American“hegemonism” (Jiang 2006, Vol. 1:312–313).

Indeed, in November 1993, during his first summit with US President BillClinton, Jiang took the initiative to pledge that “China will not engage in anarms race, or organize military alliances, to threaten US security.” Agreeingwith President Clinton that the two countries still shared many common inter-ests in promoting world peace and development, Jiang urged holding moreleadership summits in the future, to reduce misunderstanding and resolvedifferences in a timely manner (Jiang 2006, Vol. 1:333–334).

In 1994, the Clinton administration formally unveiled its strategy of“comprehensive engagement” with China. In October 1995, President Clintontold Jiang Zemin in person that American policy toward China was “notconfrontation, but cooperation; not isolation, but integration; not contain-ment, but engagement,” which impressed Jiang deeply and reinforced hisdetermination to seek greater cooperation with the United States and tointegrate China further into the international system (Jiang 2006, Vol. 2:203;Zhong 2006:135–136, 267–274). Thereafter, US engagement seemed to havesome positive impact on Chinese foreign policy behavior. According to Susan

5See the US Department of Defense, Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic ofChina, available at http://www.fas.org/news/china/1998/981100-prc-dod.htm.

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Shirk, former deputy assistant secretary of state in the Clinton administration,two engagement mechanisms—promoting top-level leadership contacts andbroadening interactions through international institutions—were particularlyimportant in this respect.

To begin with, the exchange of state visits between Jiang Zemin andPresident Clinton in 1997–1998 left Jiang “personally invested in his rela-tionship with President Clinton and in improving relations with the UnitedStates” (Shirk 2007:266). Afterward, when confronted by sudden diplomaticcrises (for example, US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in1999, and the EP-3 collision incident in the South China Sea in 2001), thePRC leadership invariably sought to prevent escalation and preserve cooper-ation with Washington (Jiang 2006, Vol. 3:447–448; Tang 2009:197, 328–339).In the Asia-Pacific area, until fairly recently, Sino-American cooperation hadactually constituted a significant feature of the regional order, even on theultrasensitive Taiwan issue (Huang and Li 2010; Shambaugh 2005, 2013; Shirk2007).

Meanwhile, Washington supports China’s inclusion in more and moreinternational institutions (Clinton 2012). In Shirk’s (2007:267) view, “[m]akingChina a member of all important multilateral forums enhances the prestige ofChina and its leaders, as well as giving them a strong sense of responsibilityfor maintaining world order.” In reality, closer Sino-American interactions ininternational institutions appear to have nudged Beijing in a more construc-tive direction on a wide range of global and regional issues (Foot and Walter2011; Johnston 2008; Kent 2007; Medeiros 2007; Shirk 2007).

In short, given the complexity of China’s reaction to American pri-macy, we face two broad possibilities: (1) since China harbors enduringmisgivings about US hegemony and intentions, it will likely persist inhedging/competing strategically against American predominance; (2) on theother hand, if Beijing is pragmatic enough to welcome US engagement andexpand cooperation, it will also likely keep competition within controllablebounds in the meantime. The next section will explain why PRC leader-ship travel to the developing world may serve as a plausible indicator ofChina’s strategic competition with America and present two main hypothesescorrespondingly.

LEADERSHIP TRAVEL AS AN INDICATOR OF STRATEGICCOMPETITION

In a pioneering study, Kastner and Saunders (2012:165) argue that China’sdiplomatic priorities could be partially inferred from where its leaders travelabroad, for the triple reasons that such travels are politically salient, involvea significant commitment of Chinese government resources, and herald theexpansion of Beijing’s political, economic, and diplomatic collaboration with

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other countries thereafter. Corroborating this argument, the preceding analy-sis shows that Beijing has long put leadership diplomacy at the forefront ofits efforts to bolster the PRC’s stature and influence in the developing worldagainst American hegemony.

In reality, China’s gains from this endeavor may include: (1) greaterinternational support for Beijing’s positions in global and regional affairs,(2) stronger relationships to protect Chinese access to overseas markets andenergy sources (so as to offset any possible deterioration in US-China rela-tions), (3) restrictions on US options toward the countries that benefit fromcloser ties with China, and (4) tentative security cooperation that may lay thefoundations of future alliances (Goldstein 2005; Medeiros 2009; Nathan andScobell 2012; Shambaugh 2013; Sutter 2012). As a RAND study concludes,these developments have produced complications in and constraints on USinteractions with many developing nations (Medeiros 2009:211–212).

Viewed in this light, PRC leadership travel to the developing world hasthe implicit effect of countering US primacy both symbolically and sub-stantively. Hence, it may be considered a plausible, first-cut indicator ofChina’s strategic competition with America. Based on original data collectedby myself (see the next section), Figure 1 graphs the annual number ofChinese leadership visits to developing/non-OECD and developed/OECDstates respectively in 1982–2012.

Evidently, in the last three decades, China’s top leaders (defined asthe president and the premier in this study) have displayed a muchstronger interest in visiting developing nations. The Tiananmen crisis in1989 marks a veritable turning point in this respect. In 1982–1988, thePRC president/premier paid 40 visits to developing states and 28 visits to

FIGURE 1 Chinese leadership travel to the developing and developed countries, 1982–2012.

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developed states; in other words, 58.8% of Chinese leadership travel wasdirected toward the developing world, with approximately five to six vis-its per year. By contrast, in 1989–2012, the number of PRC leadershipvisits was 267 for developing countries and 117 for developed countries;in other words, 69.5% of Chinese leadership travel was targeted at thedeveloping world, with approximately 11 to 12 visits annually (compar-atively, there was little change in the yearly average of visits to OECDcountries for the 1982–1988 and 1989–2012 periods). This development cor-responds closely with Beijing’s aforementioned foreign policy objective, afterTiananmen, of seeking greater solidarity with the developing world againstUS “hegemonism.”

Nevertheless, there are some interesting variations in this pattern.In 1996–1998, when US engagement acquired unprecedented momentum,culminating in the exchange of state visits between Jiang Zemin andPresident Clinton, there was a steep decline in PRC leadership travel to thedeveloping world. In marked contrast, in 1999–2001, when Sino-Americanrelations were strained once again, China’s top leaders resumed their diplo-matic activism in visiting other developing countries. After President GeorgeW. Bush’s visit to China in early 2002, however, the US-China relationshipimproved rapidly, with a corresponding, drastic reduction in Chinese lead-ership travel to the non-Western world. Similar declines in PRC leadershipdiplomacy also occurred after 2006, when President Hu Jintao paid a success-ful visit to the United States; and after 2009, when President Barack Obamavisited China.

Those zigzag changes suggest that US engagement may have some-thing to do with the adjustments in China’s diplomatic priorities. Indeed,Jiang Zemin indicated as much in his keynote address to the CCP’s 16thcongress in November 2002. While continuing to extol solidarity with thedeveloping world, Jiang conspicuously assigned a lower priority to this oldtheme of PRC diplomacy. Instead, he paid foremost attention to “improv-ing and advancing relations with the developed countries,” with a viewto expanding cooperation and managing differences appropriately (Jiang2006, Vol. 3:567).6 In other words, Jiang affirmed indirectly that in Chineseforeign policy, the necessity to engage the West (primarily the UnitedStates) sometimes prevailed over the necessity to engage the developingworld. Thus, if US engagement does induce Beijing to value cooperationwith Washington, China will likely moderate its strategic competition withAmerica, as manifested by fewer PRC leadership visits to the non-Westernworld.

To realists, however, a rising state’s challenge to the hegemonic order islargely a function of its relative capabilities to do so. Accordingly, in the long

6Note that in 2007–2012, Hu Jintao made similar statements in his political reports to the CCP’s 17th and18th congresses, which are available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html.

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run, US engagement may not be enough to dissuade China from seekingto undermine American predominance. On the contrary, as its capabilitiesgrow, Beijing might still expend an increasing effort in solidifying its diplo-matic and strategic association with a broad variety of developing nations, asmanifested by more PRC leadership travel to the non-Western world.

Quantitatively, when an outcome phenomenon of interest may beaffected by several explanatory factors, it is often helpful to determine the rel-ative impacts of those competing factors through statistical analysis. To beginwith, I posit the following two hypotheses:

H1: The more powerful China becomes vis-à-vis America, the more likely itsleaders will visit the developing world.

H2: The more China is engaged by America, the less likely its leaders will visitthe developing world.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To examine these hypotheses, I use time-series, cross-section data onChinese leadership travel to the developing world in 1990–2012 (see theappendix available online). In other words, the unit of analysis is the targetcountry-year. Methodologically, this approach enables us to address severalhighly pertinent questions. First, since the PRC leadership never singles outany particular developing countries as Beijing’s preferred partners, we needto examine whether the passage of time leads to more Chinese leadershipvisits to any and all developing nations. Second, given the varying charac-teristics of individual states, we have to explore whether the PRC leadershipwill, over time, more likely visit some countries than others. Finally, the cen-tral purpose of this study is to evaluate the time-series effects of such causalvariables as the growth of China’s relative power or various mechanisms ofUS engagement with China.

I collect original data from the authoritative Xinhua Monthly Report(Xinhua Yuebao), a journal published by the Xinhua News Agency that pro-vides timely accounts of the PRC leadership’s domestic and internationalactivities. I choose 1990 as the beginning year because it signified to Beijingthe beginning of post-Cold War US hegemony.

My data focus on the two topmost leaders of China, the president (whoserves invariably as the CCP’s general secretary) and the premier, who nor-mally direct Chinese foreign policy. Other top civilian leaders, such as theSpeaker of the National People’s Congress and the Chairman of the NationalPolitical Consultative Conference, have little influence over the relevant pol-icymaking process (Nathan and Scobell 2012:49). Accordingly, as observedby Kastner and Saunders (2012), the president/premier’s travel abroad isperhaps the best indicator of China’s diplomatic priorities.

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Meanwhile, my research design differs from the work of Kastner andSaunders (2012) in two aspects. First, it broadens the temporal domain,as their study deals only with the period 1998–2008. Second, it appraisesthe causal impact of key explanatory factors over time, whereas their studyestimates such impact on a state-by-state, but not year-by-year, basis.

As mentioned earlier, I conceptualize the developing world as compris-ing all countries that are not OECD members. If a state joins the OECD withinthe 1990–2012 period, I code it as a developing state until the year of itsOECD admission. Because China’s leaders never visit any country that has noformal diplomatic relations with the PRC, I exclude any country-year obser-vations wherein the concerned state maintains no diplomatic relationshipwith Beijing, to avoid inflating the data unnecessarily.

Within the developing world, the PRC leadership may have a specialaffinity with authoritarian states. This is not only because birds of the samefeather tend to flock together but because countries with domestic institu-tions dissimilar to those of the United States may share a common interestin counterbalancing Washington (Lemke 2004:65). Thus, I create a subsetof data that includes autocracies alone, to explore whether US engagementreduces the likelihood of Chinese leadership travel to this particular groupof countries, which are more likely to side with Beijing in an anti-Americanstruggle. I regard a state as an autocracy in a given year if, according to theFreedom House’s annual Freedom in the World Survey, it is considered “notfree” in that year (such states are invariably coded as “autocracies” by thewidely used Polity IV data set too).

Dependent Variable: Chinese Leadership Travel

My dependent variable is a dichotomous measure—that is, whether ornot the PRC president or premier visits a developing nation in a givenyear (0 means no leadership visit, 1 otherwise). I choose this measurebecause neither of the two leaders will visit the same country twice in a yearand because they rarely visit the same country in the same year. Regrettably,I am unable to ascertain the number of days spent by the Chinese leaderson each trip, because Xinhua Monthly Report does not always supply thisinformation.

Like Kastner and Saunders (2012), my primary data exclude leadershipvisits made solely for the purpose of attending a multilateral internationalmeeting in a particular developing nation, for two reasons. First, such“sideline” trips often do not involve a significant commitment of Chinesegovernment resources (for example, economic aid and investment com-mitments); hence, they are perhaps of secondary importance in Beijing’sefforts to cultivate the developing world. Second, such visits are actuallyquite sparse: Due to the well-known Chinese penchant for ceremony andprotocol, only 4% of all PRC leadership travels to developing countries in

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1990–2012 occurred in a multilateral context without being accompanied bya formal visit by the Chinese president/premier to the concerned countriesin the same year (see the appendix). Consequently, in a separate robustnesstest, I find that the inclusion of those visits does not affect the results of thedata analysis, which is consistent with Kastner and Saunders’s (2012) earlierdiscovery on the same count.

Independent Variables

To measure China’s relative power vis-à-vis America, I create a variable,CU Relative Power, which is the annual Sino-American GDP ratio (in cur-rent US$, from the World Bank database). For robustness tests, I use theannual ratio of military spending between China and the United States asan alternative measure, based on the Military Expenditure Database of theStockholm International Peace Research Institute (http://milexdata.sipri.org).Unsurprisingly, those two measures are in fact highly correlated with eachother (the Pearson’s r is .94).

I choose not to utilize the Correlates of War (COW) project’s NationalMaterial Capabilities (v4.0) data set because its measure of national powermay have greatly overestimated China’s relative capabilities. For example,according to this data set, the PRC’s material power has exceeded that of theUnited States since 1996, which is not a very credible estimation.

I also create the following variables to approximate the three princi-pal mechanisms of US engagement with China—expanded trade, increasedinteractions through international institutions, and more high-level leadershipcontacts.

The first variable, CU Trade Dependence, is the ratio of China’s annualtrade with the United States to China’s GDP in the same year. The tradeinformation is taken from the COW Bilateral Trade (v3.0) dataset (Barbieriand Keshk 2012). I obtain China’s annual GDP data (in current US$) fromthe World Bank database. Regrettably, there are no reliable data on China’sdependence on foreign direct investment from the United States annu-ally, due to the PRC’s inconsistent financial reporting standards before itsaccession to the World Trade Organization.

The second variable, CU Joint IGOs, refers to the number of the sharedmembership of China and the United States in intergovernmental organiza-tions (IGOs) in a given year. This is a widely adopted measure of the extentof interactions between two nations through international institutions, basedon the COW Intergovernmental Organizations (v2.3) dataset (Pevehouse,Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004).

The third variable, US Visits, is a dummy variable indicating whether theUS president or vice president visits China in a given year (0 means no suchvisit, 1 otherwise). This information is also from Xinhua Monthly Report. Forrobustness checks, I create a dummy variable indicating whether the PRCpresident, vice president, or premier visits the United States in a given year.

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Admittedly, the measures for the independent variables (especially rel-ative power and trade dependence) change only incrementally, though thetrend is toward an increase over time. Nonetheless, Beijing habitually paysclose attention to the trends in its relations with other countries (for example,see Christensen 2006). Thus, these measures may still matter considerably toBeijing’s perceptions of its relative power position, and of how it is beingengaged (for example, even one more shared IGO membership breeds moreregularized interactions with Washington in international institutions).

Control Variables

Several competing explanations of Chinese leadership travel require attentionhere.

First, Beijing’s diplomatic activism in the developing world derives alsoin part from its desire to secure access to overseas markets and strategicresources, especially oil (Medeiros 2009:148–149). To approximate the eco-nomic significance of a country to China, I use three controls, adopted firstby Kastner and Saunders (2012): (1) Population, which is the natural logof a country’s population in a given year, as recorded in the Penn WorldTable Version 7.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012); (2) Bilateral Trade,which is the natural log of a country’s annual trade with China (basedon the COW Trade dataset); (3) Oil-Richness, which is the natural log ofa country’s proven oil reserves in a given year, based on the InternationalEnergy Statistics database of the Energy Information Administration of theUS Department of Energy (http://www.eia.gov/countries/data.cfm). The logfunction is necessary for reducing the high level of variance in the raw data.

For robustness tests, I also control for a country’s annual GDP and/orGDP per capita, which are, unsurprisingly, highly correlated with the coun-try’s population and trade with China. Thus, using these alternative measuresdoes not change the results. Regrettably, due to the lack of reliable data,I am unable to control for the annual investment flows between China andanother country, or a country’s annual production of other natural resourcesthat might pique Beijing’s attention.

Second, while welcoming US engagement, China has long sought tobroaden its political and economic contact with the West at large, whichmight have decreased Beijing’s interest in the developing world over time,leading to more PRC leadership travel to OECD states and fewer visits todeveloping nations. Thus, I create two controls: (1) CW Trade Dependence,which is the ratio of China’s annual trade with OECD countries to China’stotal foreign trade in the same year (based on the COW trade dataset); and(2) CW Visits, which is the total number of PRC leadership visits to OECDcountries in a given year (see the appendix).

Third, since the mid-1990s, China has not only joined more internationalinstitutions but sponsored some intergovernmental organizations within the

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non-Western world (for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organizationand the China-Africa Forum). Given the well-known coordination effectsof IGOs, this might have helped Beijing to coordinate policies with otherdeveloping nations without the trouble of leadership visits. Thus, I createa control, CD Joint IGOs, which is the shared IGO membership of Chinaand another developing state in a given year (based on the COW IGO dataset).

Fourth, China’s preoccupation with regional security challenges mighthave reduced its incentives for competition with America in other parts ofthe world. Thus, I create a control, Local Challenges, to indicate the num-ber of China’s territorial disputes in a given year. In reality, Beijing alwaysregards sovereignty and territorial integrity as a vital national interest, andthe settlement of each dispute requires a significant commitment of Beijing’sattention and resources. This information is from Fravel’s (2008:46–47) dataon China’s territorial disputes since 1949 because the Issue Correlates of Warproject has not included China yet. I code a territorial dispute as closed afterChina signs a boundary agreement concerning that dispute.

Fifth, if the PRC is bent on challenging US preeminence, Beijing wouldfind it easier to recruit allies from among the countries that are at odds or atleast not closely associated with Washington. Thus, I create three controls,adopted also by Kastner and Saunders (2012): (1) Rising States, a dummyindicator of whether a country is a member of the Group of Twenty but notsimultaneously a member of the original Group of Seven (1 if yes, 0 oth-erwise); (2) US Ally, a dummy indicator of whether a country has a formalmilitary alliance with the United States in a given year (0 if no alliance,1 otherwise); and (3) US Sanction, a dummy indicator of whether a countryis the target of US economic sanctions in a given year (0 if no sanctions,1 otherwise). The information about alliances and sanctions is taken fromthe COW Alliances (v4.1) data set (Gibler 2009) and the Peterson Institutefor International Economics (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 2007; Hufbauer,Schott, Elliot, and Muir 2012) respectively.

In robustness tests, I use two alternative measures of a country’s politicalassociation with the United States: (1) Affinity of Interest, a widely adoptedindex of the affinity of nations based on the similarity of voting in theUN General Assembly in a given year (Gartzke 2006; Strezhnev and Voeten2013); and (2) US Troops, a dummy indicator of whether the United States sta-tions at least 1,000 troops in a country in a given year (1 if yes, 0 otherwise),as recorded in Kane’s (2006) data set on global US troop deployments.

Finally, I control for a country’s geographical proximity to China bycreating a dummy variable, Asia, to indicate whether the country is locatedin Asia (1 if yes, 0 otherwise).

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Methodology

Since my dependent variable takes binary values, I employ logistic regres-sion as the method of estimation. I control for time dependence in the databy utilizing two alternative corrections—the spline method of Beck, Katz,and Tucker (1998) and the cubic polynomial method of Carter and Signorino(2010). The addition of year-dummies, as recommended by those two meth-ods, helps to assess the possibility that there might exist other year-specificfactors influencing Chinese leadership diplomacy that are not accounted forby the main explanatory variables.

Typically, a PRC leadership visit to a foreign country requires exten-sive preparations over a long time. As a result, any leadership travel thatoccurs in a given year is plausibly planned according to Chinese assess-ments of changes in key explanatory factors in a previous year. Thus, I lagall explanatory variables by one year, except those that are time invariant(for example, G-20 states or US alliances).

All computations of the data are completed by using Stata version 10.

FINDINGS

Before running the models, I first conduct a test of collinearity among theexplanatory variables, by using the collin (Collinearity diagnostics) programdesigned by the UCLA Academic Technology Services (http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/ado/default.htm). The results show that China’s relative power,measured by either GDP or military spending, is highly collinear with itstrade dependence on the United States and its preoccupation with localchallenges. Theoretically, this is hardly surprising because a flourishing Sino-American trade relationship has been a major cause of China’s economictakeoff, and much of Beijing’s military spending is directed at counteringlocal security threats. Once the relative power variable is dropped, however,all other explanatory variables are below the threshold of collinearity.

To avoid biasing the results of statistical analysis, I run the prelimi-nary models without including the relative power variable, which I use inlater models (reported in the following). In fact, this by no means obviatesthe causal importance of relative power in influencing Chinese leadershipdiplomacy. Instead, later models highlight this causal effect more clearly.7

In Table 1, Model 1 and Model 2 present the findings of the preliminarymodels.

As expected, two of the three US engagement mechanisms, the Sino-American IGO interactions and US presidential visits to China, display a

7All models control for time dependence with the application of splines. Using Carter and Signorino’s(2010) cubic polynomials produces similar results.

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TABLE 1 Logit Analysis of Chinese Leadership Travel to the Developing World, 1990–2012

ExplanatoryVariables

Model 1:All Developing

WorldModel 2:

All Autocracies

Model 3:All Developing

WorldModel 4:

All Autocracies

CU relative power —- —- 17.32 (5.50)∗∗∗ 34.88 (9.98)∗∗∗∗

CU Tradedependence

−8.80 (7.38) 1.30 (13.65) —- —-

CU joint IGOs −.15 (.045)∗∗∗∗ −.175 (.089)∗∗ −.22 (.05)∗∗∗∗ −.29 (.10)∗∗∗

US visits −.50 (.23)∗∗ −.96 (.43)∗∗ −.46 (.24)∗ −1.06 (.45)∗∗

Population .31 (.08)∗∗∗∗ .38 (.16)∗∗ .31 (.08)∗∗∗∗ .37 (.16)∗∗

Bilateral trade .42 (.07)∗∗∗∗ .26 (.14)∗ .40 (.07)∗∗∗∗ .23 (.14)∗

Oil-richness −.01 (.01) −.0003 (.017) −.01 (.01) .002 (.017)CW trade

dependence−1.05 (1.11) −1.87 (1.89) 1.08 (.93) 1.77 (1.61)

CW visits −.03 (.04) .05 (.07) −.05 (.04) .02 (.07)CD joint IGOs −.01 (.02) −.01 (.03) −.01 (.02) −.01 (.03)Local challenges −.42 (.11)∗∗∗∗ −.58 (.21)∗∗∗ —- —-Rising states −.06 (.36) −.26 (.77) −.07 (.36) −.28 (.77)US ally −.21 (.25) −.01 (.94) −.21 (.25) −.02 (.94)US sanction −.25 (.25) −.34 (.36) −.26 (.25) −.34 (.36)Asia .18 (.21) .57 (.38) .21 (.21) .61 (.38)Pseudo R2 .19 .18 .18 .18N 1904 643 1904 643

Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.∗∗∗∗p < .001, ∗∗∗p < .01, ∗∗p < .05, ∗p < .1, two-tailed tests.Splines dropped for space limitations.

statistically robust effect in restraining PRC leadership travel to the devel-oping world as well as fellow autocracies.8 Intriguingly, China’s tradedependence on America fails to manifest any statistically significant impacton Beijing’s diplomatic activism in this regard. Possibly, given the high levelof Sino-American economic interdependence, China has become “too big tocut off” for Washington, which decreases the utility of trade dependence asan instrument for influencing Chinese foreign policy.

Other findings are equally interesting. Consistent with China’s image asa mercantile, market-hungry power, the PRC president/premier are signifi-cantly more likely to visit a developing nation, or an authoritarian state, thathas a large population and/or a booming trade relationship with the PRC.However, whether a state possesses large oil reserves has no appreciableinfluence on the likelihood of Chinese leadership travel to that country—adiscovery also made by Kastner and Saunders (2012).

Meanwhile, China’s widening economic and diplomatic contact with theWest does not significantly impact Beijing’s diplomatic activism toward thedeveloping world. Likewise, the increased IGO interactions between China

8In robustness tests, I find that PRC leadership visits to the United States, used as an alternative measureof Sino-American high-level contacts, also reduces significantly the likelihood of Chinese leadership travelto the developing world.

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and other developing nations demonstrate no statistically robust influenceon the PRC leadership’s travel decisions. Arguably, these findings conveya double message: (1) China’s growing connections with the West do notnecessarily diminish the strategic importance of the developing world toChinese foreign policy; and (2) to Beijing, US engagement is a weightierfactor to reckon with than China’s interactions with any other Western ornon-Western states.

Furthermore, China’s preoccupation with territorial disputes does makeits leaders significantly less likely to visit the developing world or fellowautocracies. Indirectly, this finding also points to a strategic necessity forBeijing to cultivate American support for the settlement of security conflictsin East Asia (Sutter 2012:134–135). Geographical proximity, however, provesunimportant: As China gradually becomes a global power, Beijing obviouslyno longer restricts the focus of Chinese diplomacy to Asia alone.

Finally, like Kastner and Saunders (2012), I also find that the PRCpresident/premier have no visible interest in visiting a country that is eitheran emerging power, a target of US sanctions, or a formal ally of Washington.In robustness tests, whether a developing state has a lower affinity of inter-est or fewer defense links with America has no statistically significant impacton Chinese leadership travel, either. This finding corresponds with some USexperts’ observation that since the 2000s, Beijing has become more cau-tious in approaching controversial regimes that are at variance with theUnited States (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008; for a similar view, see Sutter2012:597). Under unipolarity, as argued earlier, prudence requires China toavoid an overt challenge to the American colossus, despite Beijing’s latentrevisionist aspirations.

Yet, on the other hand, China’s growing relative capabilities mightwell have stiffened Beijing’s resolve to hedge against American hegemony.In Table 1, Model 3 and Model 4 present the results with the incorporationof the relative power variable and with the exclusion of two aforementionedvariables that are highly collinear with it.

As hypothesized, China’s burgeoning relative power exhibits a strongand highly significant effect in stimulating PRC leadership travel to the devel-oping world as well as fellow autocracies.9 In other words, a materiallystronger China becomes more proactive in competing against US primacyand expanding its own stature and influence internationally. Nonetheless, itis worth emphasizing that in Model 3 and Model 4, the two key mechanismsof US engagement continue to play a salient role in constraining Beijing’sdiplomatic activism in this regard. Meanwhile, there are continuing indica-tions that Chinese diplomacy is not yet driven by a virulent anti-Americanism:

9The results remain the same if we use China’s annual military spending as an alternative indicator of itsrising military power. Unsurprisingly, this variable is also highly correlated with the annual Sino-AmericanGDP ratio (the Pearson’s r is .97).

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As in previous models, the PRC president/premier are far more likely to visita developing country because of its economic significance to China, ratherthan on account of its political relationship with the United States.

At this point, however, a perceptive reader might ask: Since the Chineseleadership visits to developing nations have, on average, increased over timeanyway, could this trend be driven mainly by the passage of time (similarto the thesis that “the longer you know somebody, the more likely you willvisit his/her house”), rather than by other explanatory variables? Typically,in quantitative international relations (IR) scholarship, the problem of tem-poral dependence can be resolved either by the introduction of splines orcubic polynomials (as already applied in previous models) or by employing atime variable, such as the widely used indicator of the continuance of peaceyears between one state and another (see Senese and Vásquez 2008:60, 71).Adopting this latter approach, I create an alternative “year” variable, by cod-ing the beginning year in each target country’s interactions with China as1 within the 1990–2012 period.10 As this variable proves insignificant anddoes not affect the causal significance of others in all models, the validity ofprevious findings remains unimpaired.

In an additional robustness check, I also assess the possibility thatUS military presence in East Asia may have increased China’s distrust ofAmerican intentions, thereby leading Beijing to hedge against US predom-inance more vigorously. Using Kane’s (2006) data on global US troopdeployments, I create a control variable, US-Asia Troops, which is the annualnumber of US troops stationed in East Asia. This variable, however, appearsinsignificant in all models, perhaps because, until the 2010s, US militarypresence in the region had been overall declining and was not perceived byBeijing as a grave security concern.11

To illustrate the substantive effects of key explanatory variables, Table 2reports the impact on the predicted probability of PRC leadership travelby each variable that remains statistically significant in Model 3 and Model4 respectively when all other variables are held at their mean values. Dueto space limitations, I only examine the results as each variable changesfrom its minimum value to its maximum value, but other analyses (based onrepresentative values or one-standard-deviation increase in the values) areavailable upon request.

10Nevertheless, if a state experienced a rupture in its diplomatic relations with China during this period, Icode the year of the reestablishment of such relations as 1 again.11Similarly, controlling for China’s annual involvement in a militarized interstate dispute (MID) againstthe United States does not change the results, possibly because: (1) most Sino-American MIDs in1990–2010 were lower-intensity conflicts (that is, not involving the actual use of force); and (2) after expe-riencing such a conflict, Beijing usually sought to improve its relations with Washington subsequently (forexample, see Shirk 2007 and Tang 2009).

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TABLE 2 Predicted Probability of Chinese Leadership Travel, 1990–2012

Model 3 (All Developing World) Model 4 (All Autocracies)

ExplanatoryVariables Min Max

Prob. Change(% Change) Min Max

Prob. Change(% Change)

CU relativepower

.021 .141 .120 (+5, 700) .010 .385 .375 (+3, 750)

CU joint IGOs .329 .028 −.301 (−91) .546 .026 −.520 (−95)

US visits .056 .036 −.020 (−36) .076 .028 −.048 (−64)

Population .013 .198 .185 (+1, 400) .009 .157 .148 (+1, 530)

Bilateral trade .000 .429 .429 (+42, 900) .014 .178 .164 (+1, 200)

Within the 1990–2012 period, when China’s relative power peaks vis-à-vis America, the probability of PRC leadership travel to the developing worldand to fellow autocracies rockets up by 57 times and 37.5 times respectively.This does not mean, however, that US efforts to engage China are use-less. At the zenith of Sino-American IGO interactions (as measured by theirjoint IGO membership), the likelihood of a Chinese leadership visit to thedeveloping world and/or other authoritarian states shrinks by 91% and 95%respectively. US presidential visits to China have a remarkable constrainingeffect in this direction too. In the wake of such a visit, the probability of PRCleadership travel to the developing world and to fellow autocracies dwindlesby 36% and 64% respectively.

Meanwhile, the likelihood of PRC leadership travel is also heavilyswayed by a country’s economic significance (or market potential) to China.When a developing and/or authoritarian state happens to have the largestpopulation among its peers, the probability of a Chinese leadership visit tothat state increases by 14 times and 15 times respectively. Similarly, when adeveloping or authoritarian country’s trade volume with China reaches thehighest level, the probability of a PRC leadership visit surges by 429 timesand 12 times respectively.

In sum, this study indicates that the relationship between an ascendingChina and the American hegemon is manageable to some extent but maybecome increasingly competitive over time. Theoretically, this is because arising state may have wider aims and interests stemming from its enhancedrelative capabilities and because those aims and interests are not alwayscompatible with the existing hegemonic order. Consequently, a strategy ofhegemonic engagement may help expand cooperation and limit competition

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with an emerging power, but it does not necessarily set the permanentboundaries of the latter’s revisionist aspirations.12

This is not to say, however, that China and the United States are boundto become outright adversaries. The costs are simply too high for both coun-tries and indeed for the world. This probably explains why both Beijingand Washington have persistently emphasized the necessity for promotingdialogues and cooperation, to build more bridges between the two nationsand erode the ground for unlimited competition and conflict (Kerry 2014).Indirectly, this study provides both a testimony to the progress that has beenmade in this direction and a reminder that more arduous work still needs tobe done in the future.

CONCLUSION

Can US engagement moderate China’s strategic competition with America?This study indicates the answer is a qualified yes. Under unipolarity, a risingstate may face both incentives to accommodate the hegemonic dominanceand to expand its own strategic leeway against the latter. Consequently,engagement may help the hegemon to promote cooperation over com-petition in dealing with an ascending power, but it does not necessarilyoverwhelm the structural incentives for the competition. Against this theo-retical backdrop, this study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative researchto demonstrate that China’s reaction to American primacy has long beenmarked by a profound ambivalence. Specifically, the findings suggest thatwhile US engagement has some restraining impact on China’s competitivepropensity, Beijing will continue to hedge against American hegemony, asits capabilities grow, by solidifying its diplomatic and strategic associationwith the developing world.

The endurance of competition, however, does not imply that conflict isinevitable. In fact, facing the reality of rising power, realist theory does notuniformly predict catastrophe or recommend containment: To classical real-ists, the future is always unwritten, and so wise diplomacy matters (Kirshner2012:65–66).13 Despite China’s impressive development to date, for example,it is far from certain that the PRC will achieve parity with the United Statesin economic, military, and technological strength for the foreseeable future

12Note, for example, Beijing’s growing assertiveness in handling maritime disputes with Japan and someSoutheast Asian countries and its unilateral declaration of an air defense identification zone in the EastChina Sea in late 2013.13Intriguingly, in July 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry made a similar point during the US-ChinaStrategic and Economic Dialogue, by emphasizing that Sino-American rivalry is not inevitable but dependson both sides’ policy choices. Accordingly, he voiced US concerns with particular aspects of Chineseforeign policy in a more forthright manner (Kerry 2014).

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(Beckley 2011). Many PRC elites seem to realize this too and hence preferto keep China committed to peaceful development, by working with ratherthan against America (Bader 2012:122–123; Sutter 2012:149–150). As notedrecently by a renowned Singaporean expert, those “doves” still hold consid-erable sway in opposition to an aggressive, nationalist approach in Chineseforeign policy (Mahbubani 2014).

Under the circumstances, sustained US engagement helps to strengthenthe moderate Chinese groups and individuals by signaling that Americanintentions toward China are not inimical and that there is much room forpromoting mutual understanding and benefit. Within this context, a belliger-ent Chinese posture toward America will appear less appealing or defensiblein domestic debates. Engagement, in other words, reduces the likelihood ofconflict by preventing the formation of a strong consensus among the rulingelites of an emerging power that the hegemon constitutes an unappeasablethreat, a consensus that is a foremost necessary condition for balancing orconfrontational behavior (Schweller 2004).

Meanwhile, Washington should also conduct a candid and straightfor-ward dialogue with Beijing, to tackle the apparent inconsistencies in China’sgrand strategy on its own terms. What, for example, does the PRC want byespousing a new, “fair and just” international order, despite its deepeningenmeshment in the current global system? What aspects of the existing orderwould Beijing wish to change, and in what ways (that is, through gradualreform or drastic overhaul)? And, last but not the least, what changes maylook permissible to Washington, and what would overstep the red line ofAmerican tolerance? Such a dialogue would help both sides to assess eachother’s strategic intentions with rigorous objectivity and to act upon the solid-ity of fact, rather than upon wishful thinking or misjudgments, in formulatingfuture policies.

For future research, this study suggests that China’s interactions withthe developing world (and how those interactions relate to the ups anddowns in US-China relations) warrant a deeper exploration. As argued ear-lier, a prudent rising state may choose not to overturn the existing worldorder by brute force but by covert competition. If that is the case, then itmay not be possible, as some scholars contend, to maintain the current,largely Western-dominated system with a larger role for China (Ikenberry2011:344–345; Nathan and Scobell 2012:356). For, conceivably, Beijing mightwork quietly with other developing nations to reduce the magnitude of USor Western supremacy, to prepare step by step for an ultimate systemic trans-formation. A recent study, for example, presents systematic evidence that asAfrican and Latin American countries trade more with China, they becomemore likely to side with Beijing in voting on the UN General Assembly’scountry-specific human rights resolutions, which are often a major point ofcontention between the West and the rest (Flores-Macias and Kreps 2013).It will be interesting, then, to examine how China interacts with like-minded

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developing states in pivotal global institutions over time, to advance policyobjectives that are at variance with Western preferences. The first step is tobe on the lookout.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank John Vasquez, Paul Diehl, Mark Nieman, GennadyRudkevich, Michael Colaresi, and three anonymous reviewers for manyinsightful comments and suggestions for improving this study. I alsothank Xiaohong Zheng, Huaren Jin, and my mother for their generousresearch support. The appendix and replication files are available on theInternational Interactions Dataverse page at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/internationalinteractions.

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