dba ISPC, Inc.A. Mr. Scott financed the purchase of water conditioning equipment with ISPC. On September 21, 2007, Mr. Scott purchased a water conditioning system from Easton Water

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

JAMES L. SCOTT,

Appellant

V.

INDEPENDENT SAVINGS PLANCOMPANY, dba ISPC,

Appellee

Case No. 14-0930

On Appeal from theMiami County Court of Appeals,Second Appellate District

Case No. 2013-CA-19

APPELLEE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JURISDICTION

Miriam H. Sheline (0018333)mshelinena proseniors.orgPRO SENIORS, INC.7162 Reading Road, Suite 1150Cincinnati, Ohio 45237Tele: (513) 458-5509Fax: (513) 345-4169

Attorney for AppellantJames L. Scott

Brigid E. Heid (0047142)bheid kcpmlaw.comCARLILE PATCHEN & MURPHY LLP366 East Broad StreetColumbus, Ohio 43215Tele: (614) 228-6135Fax: (614) 221-0216

_Attorney, for AppelleeIndependent Savings Plan Company,dba ISPC, Inc.

( .... ..

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONALQUESTION OR A MATTER OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST........... 1

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ................................................................... 2

A. Mr. Scott financed the purchase of water conditioning equipmentwith ISPC . ............................................................................................................... 2

B. Mr. Scott defaulted and ISPC obtained judgment in Florida, whichwas satisfied in Florida . .......................................................................................... 3

C. Mr. Scott filed suit in Ohio to declare the Florida judgment voidand for other affirmative relief ................................................................................ 4

D. The Appellate Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of ISPC ...................... 5

III. ARGUMENT IN OP.POSITION TO PROPOSITIONS OF LAW .................................... 5

Proposition of Law 1: Ohio's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,R.C. §2329.021, et seq. as interpreted by the 2nd District Court of Appealslimiting the court's jurisdiction to only foreign judgments which are registered isan unconstitutional invasion of judicial powers .................................................................. 5

Proposition of Law 2: A judgment issued in a foreign jurisdiction against an Ohioresident where the court in that jurisdiction had no personal jurisdiction over theOhio resident is void and entitled to no presumption of validity ........................................ 6

Proposition of Law 3: A forum selection clause does not give a foreign Statepersonal jurisdiction over a non-resident consumer. The court is required tocomplete a minimum contacts analysis ............................................................................... 7

Proposition of Law 4: Courts are required to apply the clear language of the HomeSolicitation Sales Act, R.C. § 1345.02 mandating the seller fill in the correct dateof cancellation . .................................................................................................................. 10

IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 13

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I. THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONALQUESTION OR A MATTER OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST.

The Ohio Supreme Court "will grant a motion to certify only if there is a substantial

constitutional question or if the case is of public or great general interest." Noble v. Colwell, 44

Ohio St. 3d 92, 94, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989); Section 2(B)(2)(e), Article IV of the Ohio

Constitution. This case involves neither.

Appellant James Scott purchased a water conditioning system for his home and stopped

making payments on it roughly a year later. After attempts to get Mr. Scott to make payments

were unsuccessful, Appellee Independent Savings Plan Company (ISPC) filed suit in Florida

pursuant to the forum-selection clause contained in the parties' financing agreement. Mr. Scott

did not appear or respond to the complaint, so a default judgment was entered against him. More

than a year after ISPC satisfied the Florida judgment through a bank garnishnlent in Florida, Mr.

Scott filed suit against ISPC in Ohio alleging ISPC violated the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices

Act (CSPA) by including a forum-selection clause in the financing agreement and pursuing

litigation against him in Florida. Mr. Scott also argued that ISPC violated the Ohio Home

Solicitation Sales Act (HSSA) because an incorrect date was filled in on the three-day notice of

cancellation. Mr. Scott demanded, among other things, that the Florida judgment be declared

void.

The issues presented in this case are not novel. Ohio's Full Faith and Credit Clause and

the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) require Ohio courts to recognize

and enforce foreign judgments unless the judgment was obtained by fraud or the issuing court

lacked jurisdiction. These laws provide constitutional protections to Ohio citizens who contend a

foreign judgment is void. The lower courts acted appropriately when they declined to find the

Florida judgment was void and unenforceable under Florida law.

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While Mr. Scott argues that including forum-selection clauses in consumer agreements is

a matter of public or great general interest and should be prohibited, the agreement here is

governed by Florida law and such clauses are routinely enforced in Florida unless the

enforcement would be unreasonable or iuljust. Contrary to Mr. Scott's suggestion, the rights of

an Ohio consumer are not abdicated by virtue of a forum-selection clause in a consumer contract.

Rather, those rights are just asserted in a different forum. Here, the Florida forum was reasonable

and provided Mr. Scott with an adequate opportunity to be heard.

Further, the appellate coui-t's application of the HSSA did not remove protections that are

afforded to consumers under the Act. Rather, the court recognized that Mr. Scott had been

adequately informed of his cancellation rights, despite the inclusion of an incorrect date, and

therefore, there was no deceptive practice. Implicit in the court's finding was the recognition. that

where the alleged technical violation has no bearing on the parties during the course of their

transaction, but was instead an afterthought in conteniplation of litigation, there should be no

finding of a deceptive act.

There is nothing unusual about this case, nor is there a need to address constitutional

issues or clarify misunderstood law. For the reasons set forth below, this Court should decline

jurisdiction.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

A. Mr. Scott financed the purchase of water conditioning equipment with ISPC.

On September 21, 2007, Mr. Scott purchased a water conditioning system from Easton

Water Solutions, LLC. Mr. Scott financed his purchase through ISPC, a Florida company, and

that same day signed a credit application with ISPC, entitled "ISPC Open-End Credit

Application and Agreement" (the "ISPC Agreement"). (R.1 Complaint ¶¶7-9 and Ex. A, ISPC

Open-End Credit Application and Agreement).

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The ISPC Agreement contains both a choice-of-law provision stating that Florida law

governs the transaction and a forum-selection clause designating venue as Hillsborough County,

Florida. (R. 1 Complaint Ex. A, pp. 3-4) The ISPC Agreement contains on the first page a notice

of right to cancellation:

YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION ATANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESSDAY OF THIS TRANSACTION. SEE THE "BUYER'S RIGHTTO CANCEL" ON THE BACK OF CUSTOMER COPY OFDISCLOSURES. ALSO SEE THE COPIES OF THE "NOTICEOF CANCELLATION" ATTACHED HERETO.

Easton filled in the "Transaction Date" and the "Cancellation Deadline" as the same day Mr.

Scott signed, "9-21-07." (R. I Complailit Ex. A, p. 1)

B. Mr. Scott defaulted and ISPC obtained judgment in Florida, which wassatisfied in Florida.

The water conditioning system was installed in September 2007, and Mr. Scott made

payments to ISPC for more than a year. (R. 29 Judgment Entry, p. 9, fn. 24) At no time did Mr.

Scott attempt to rescind his contract, nor did he make any effort to return the system.

ISPC called Mr. Scott numerous times about his failure to pay, but the account remained

delinquent. Finally, ISPC filed suit in Hillsborough County, Florida, and on January 30, 2010,

Mr. Scott was personally served with a summons and the complaint. (R. 1 Complaint ¶15 and

Ex. B) The summons notified Mr. Scott that he "must appear in court on the date specified in

order to avoid a default judgment" and the appearance may be "in person or by attorney." (R. 1

Complaint Ex. B) The summons also states that the pre-trial conference could be rescheduled for

"good cause" and with "prior court approval." Id.

Mr. Scott took no action and made no effort whatsoever to contact ISPC or the court. He

did not make a request to reschedule the pre-trial conference (as provided for in the summons) or

to appear by telephone. He did not retain an attorney to appear on his behalf, nor did he take any

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action to oppose the complaint. Consequently, the Florida court entered a final judgment against

Mr. Scott on February 10, 2010, in the amount of $5,673.63, plus interest. (R. 1 Complaint

Ex. C)

After the court entered the judgment, ISPC engaged in further communications with Mr.

Scott in an effort to come to a payment arrangement to satisfy the Florida judgment, but to no

avail. (See R. 1 Complaint ¶20) Six months later, on August 16, 2010, ISPC filed a writ of

garnishment against any Florida branch of Fifth Third Bank where Mr. Scott had an account.

(See R. 1 Complaint ¶21) The bank garnished Plaintiffs account in the amount of $11,918.98.1

(R. 1 Complaint ¶23) and at the conclusion of the garnishinent proceedings, ISPC received

$6,315.39 in satisfaction of its judgment, and the balance of $5,603.59 was returned to Mr. Scott.

(See R. 1 Complaint ¶27; R. 24 Notice of Filing Discovery Material, ISPC Payment History

0009-10)

C. Mr. Scott filed suit in Ohio to declare the Florida judgment void and forother affirmative relief.

On December 1, 2011, nearly two years after the Florida court entered a judgment against

him, Mr. Scott filed a coinplaint in Ohio raising four causes of action: (1) violations of the Ohio

CSPA, (2) violation of the Ohio HSSA, (3) malicious prosecution, and (4) abuse of process. (R.

1 Complaint ¶¶30-51) Mr. Scott's complaint asks the court to: (1) declare the Florida judgment

"void ab initio" and unenforceable on the grounds the Florida court had no personal jurisdiction

over the Plaintiff;" (2) declare "the selection of forum and choice of law provisions are

unenforceable;" (3) declare that all of "Defendant.'s conduct...violated the CSPA;" (4) award

"actual and treble damages under the CSPA;" (5) order that the underlying contract be rescinded;

i Fla. Stat. § 77.19 permits a bank, as garnishee, to retain up to twice the amount of the writ of garnishment.

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and (6) award punitive damages for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. (R. 1 Complaint

pp. 8-9)

D. The Appellate Court affirmed summaiy judgment in favor of ISPC.

The trial court granted summary judgment to ISPC and dismissed all of Mr. Scott's

claims and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court found Mr. Scott could not

collaterally attack the Florida judgment because the Florida court had jurisdiction over Mr. Scott

pursuant to a valid forum-selection clause, and therefore, the judgment was not void. The court

of appeals also found that because Mr. Scott's CSPA claims were based on the forum-selection

clause and the resulting Florida litigation, they, too, failed. Finally, the court found that even

though the wrong date was filled in on the ISPC Agreement, the Agreement still informed Mr.

Scott that he had three days to cancel. Thus, the court held, the incorrect date was not a violation

or a deceptive act under the HSSA.

II:I. ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

Proposition of Law 1: Ohio's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, R.C.§2329.021, et seq. as interpreted by the 2nd District Court of Appeals limiting thecourt's jurisdiction to only foreign judgments which are registered is anunconstitutional invasion of judicial powers.

Mr. Scott's first proposition of law relates to the appellate court's suggestion that the only

way for Mr. Scott to collaterally attack the Florida judgment is through Ohio's Uniform

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, R.C. §2329.021, et seq. (UEFJA).

The UEFJA is intended to satisfy the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution,

which requires the State of Ohio to recognize a valid foreign judgment and give the judgment

"the salne faith and credit as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they

are taken." Holzemer v. Urbanski, 86 Ohio St.3d 129, syllabus, 712 N.E.2d 713 (1999); R.C.

2329.027. The UEFJA provides a. procedure by which foreign judgments can be enforced in the

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same manner as judgments of Oliio's courts of general jurisdiction by filing a certificate of the

foreign judgment with the clerk of courts for the county in which enforcement of the judgment is

sought. Dressler v. Bowling, 24 Ohio St. 3d 14, 15, 492 N.E.2d 446, 448 (1986). It also permits a

judgment debtor to collaterally attack and vacate a foreign judgment. R.C. 2329.022

Together, the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the UEFJA provide constitutional and

statutory protections to Ohio citizens who contend a foreign judgment is void. The appellate

court's application of these two laws did not invade the judiciary or deprive Mr. Scott of due

process. Indeed, despite the court's statement that it would presume the Florida judgment was

valid because Mr. Scott did not follow the procedure set forth in the UEFJA, the court did not

actually treat the judgment as such. Rather, like the trial court, the appellate court proceeded to

evaluate whether the Florida judgment was, indeed, valid (i.e. whether it was procured by fraud

and whether the Florida court lacked jurisdiction) and entitled to be recognized under the Full

Faith and Credit Clause. Both courts correctly found that the judgment was valid because the

Florida court had jurisdiction. Despite the appellate court's statement, there was no invasion of

or limitation on the cour-t's authority or jurisdiction.

Proposition of Law 2: A judgment issued in a foreign jurisdiction against an Ohioresident where the court in that jurisdiction had no personal jurisdiction over theOhio resident is void and entitled to no presumption of validity.

Mr. Scott's second proposition of law simply reiterates long-standing law that the lower

courts properly applied in this case. It is well-settled that "[w]hen a judgment was issued without

jurisdiction...it is void and is subject to collateral attack." Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of

Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶25, citing Coe v. Erb, 59 Ohio St. 259, 271,

52 N.E. 640 ( 1898).

Here, the courts below found that the forum-selection clause in the ISPC Agreement gave

the Florida court personal jurisdiction over Mr. Scott, and therefore, the Florida judgment was

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not void. There was no misapplication or misunderstanding of the law on this point. The second

proposition of law does not raise a constitutional issue, nor is it a matter of public or great

general interest and the Court should decline jurisdiction.

Proposition of Law 3: A forum selection clause does not give a foreign Statepersonal jurisdiction over a non-resident consumer. The court is required tocomplete a minimum contacts analysis.

Mr. Scott's third proposition of law improperly asks this Court to declare forum-selection

clauses contained in consumer contracts per se unenforceable. Such a broad declaration is

unnecessary and contrary to Ohio law. While this Court has recognized that forum-selection

clauses are less readily enforceable against consumers, they are still enforceable. See Preferred

Capital, Inc. v. Power Engineering Group, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 429, 2007-Ohio-257, ¶8, citing

Information. Leasing Corp. v. Jaskot, 151 Ohio App.3d 546, 2003-Ohio-566, 784 N.E.2d 1192,

¶13 (emphasis added). Indeed, the consumer nature of the clause is only one of three factors used

by Ohio courts to determine whether a forurn-selection clause is valid in Ohio. See Kennecorp

llloytgage Brokers, Inc. v. Country Club Convalescent Ilosp., Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 175, 610

N.E.2d 987 (1993). The other two factors consider whether there is evidence of fraud or

overTeaching and whether enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable and unjust. Id.

Further, when determining whether a foreign court has personal jurisdiction, Ohio courts

must review the foreign state's own laws for determining personal jurisdiction. Litsinger Sign

Co. v. Ana. Sign Co., 11 Ohio St. 2d 1, 5-6, 227 N.E.2d 609 (1967); Speyer v. Continental Sports

Cars, Inc., 34 Ohio App.3d 272, 518 N.E.2d 39, paragraph one of the syllabus (10th Dist.1986).

Here, the Florida court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Scott under Florida law. Forum-

selection clauses are presumptively valid under Florida law. See Am. Safety Casualty Insurance

Co. v. Mijaa°es Golding Co., 76 So. 3d 1089, 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), citing Corsec, S.L.

v. VMC Int'l Franchising, LLC, 909 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).

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In Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So.2d 437, 440 (Fla. 1986), the Florida Supreme Court held

"Florida courts should recognize the legitimate expectations of contracting parties" and that

"forum-selection clauses should be enforced in the absence of a showing that enforcement would

be unreasonable or unjust." However, "the test of unreasonableness is not mere inconvenience or

additional expense." Id. at n.4. Rather, "the enforcement is unreasonable only when the

designated forum amounts to `no forum at a11. "' Am. Safety, 909 So.2d at 947 (emphasis in

original). The burden of proof is on the party "seeking to escape his contract" who must show

that "trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for

all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court." Nlanrique at 440, n.4. As a result of the

forum-selection clause in the parties' contract, personal jurisdiction was valid in Florida, leading

to the Hillsborough County court entering judgment against Mr. Scott.

The issues in this case are comparable to the issues presented in Hawkins v. Integrity

House, Inc., llth. Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-120, 2009-Ohio-5893. In Hawkins, the plaintiff,

Hawkins, wliile living in Ohio, signed a contract to send his daughter to a boot camp for troubled

teens offered by Integrity House in the state of Utah. Id. at ¶3. The contract contained a forum-

selection clause designating Utah courts as the proper forum for resolving disputes. Integrity

House sued Hawkins in Utal1 for breach of contract for nonpayment and served him with

summons in Ohio. Id. at ¶5. Hawkins did not file an answer or otherwise defend and the Utah

court subsequently entered a default judgment against him. Id. When Integrity House attempted

to domesticate the Utah judgment in Ohio, Hawkins filed a counterclaim asking the court to

declare the Utah default judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at ¶6. The trial court

grarlted summary judgment to Integrity and dismissed Hawkins' complaint, finding that "the

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forum-selection clause is valid and enforceable [under Utah law], and the Utah court had

personal jurisdiction over [Hawkins]." Id. at ¶8.

The appellate court in Hawkins reasoned that because the consumer contract contained an

express choice of jurisdiction and choice of law provision, "the question of whether the Utah

court had personal jurisdiction over appellant must be decided under Utah law." Id. at ¶8. The

appellate court upheld the trial court's finding that the forum-selection clause was valid and

explicitly rejected Hawkins' contention that Ohio public policy preveiits asserting jurisdiction

over consumers through the use of forum-selection clauses. Id. at ¶31. This Court declined

jurisdiction to hear Hawkins' appeal of the case, dismissing the appeal "as not involving any

substantial constitutional question." Hawkins v. Integrity House, Inc. Case No. 09-2311, Entry

(Mar. 10, 2010). Hawkins' memorandum in support of jurisdiction included a proposition of law

remarkably similar to Mr. Scott's third proposition of law: "Forum-selection clauses within

consumer contracts, do not, in and of themselves, confer personal jurisdiction over Ohio

consumers." Hawkins v. Integrity House, Inc., Case No. 09-2311, Memorandum in Support of

Jurisdiction of Appellant Hawkins (Dec. 29, 2009).

Forum-selection clauses contained in consumer contracts do not abdicate the rights of

Ohio citizens where the citizen is not denied his day in court. See e.g. Caa°nival Cruise Lines, Inc.

v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (forum-selection clause in a consumer form contract is enforceable

unless fundamentally unfair). Here, Mr. Scott was not denied his day in court, nor was the

forum-selection clause in the parties' agreement the result of fraud or overreaching.

Because the forum-selection clause was enforceable under Florida law, there was no need

to complete a minimum contacts analysis. Like Hawkins, this case does not involve a substantial

constitutional question, nor is it a matter of public or great general interest. The lower courts

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correctly determined that the Florida court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Scott, and

therefore, judgment was not void. The Court should decline jurisdiction.

Proposition of Law 4: Courts are required to apply the clear language of the HomeSolicitation Sales Act, R.C. §1345.02 mandating the seller fill in the correct date ofcancellation.

Mr. Scott's final proposition of law involves a routine claim under the HSSA for an

alleged technical violation that had no bearing on the transaction between the parties, but was an.

afterthought in contemplation of litigation. It was only after the Florida judgment was fully

satisfied that Mr. Scott filed suit in Ohio and first raised the issue of the three-day notice.

The HSSA gives a buyer the right to cancel a home solicitation sale until rnidnight of the

third business day after the day on which the buyer signs an agreement or offer to purchase. R.C.

1345.22. This notice of the buyer's right to cancel, must appear on all notes or other evidence of

indebtedness given pursuant to any home solicitation sale. Id. Here, there is no question that the

ISPC Agreement (in addition to the actual purchase agreement Mr. Scott entered into with

Easton), contained the following on the first page:

YOU, THE BUYER, MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION ATANY TIME PRIOR TO MIDNIGHT OF THE THIRD BUSINESSDAY OF THIS TRANSACTION. SEE THE "BUYER'S RIGHTTO CANCEL" ON THE BACK OF CUSTOMER COPY OFDISCLOSURES. ALSO SEE THE COPIES OF THE "NOTICEOF CANCELLATION" ATTACHED HERETO.

Easton, lio`vever, filled in the "Cancellation Deadline" as the saine date the parties signed the

agreement - "9-21-07." (R. 1 Complaint Ex. A, p. 1) Despite this incorrect date being listed,

there is no dispute that Mr. Scott was otherwise informed of, and was given, the three days to

cancel the agreement, which he chose not to do. The technical violation had no bearing on Mr.

Scott's decision to enter into the contract for the purchase of the water conditioning system and

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was never at issue between the parties. As the appellate court found, under such circumstances,

there should be no finding of a deceptive act.

Additionally, though not addressed by the appellate court, the trial court correctly found

that the HSSA claim was a compulsory counterclaim and should have been raised in Florida, or

alternatively, was time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Both the Ohio and Florida

Rules of Civil Procedure govern when compulsory counterclaims must be brought. See Civ. R.

13(A) and Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.170. This Court has held that "[a]ll existing claims between opposing

parties that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence must be litigated in a single lawsuit

pursuant to Civ. R. 13(A), no matter which party initiates the action." Rettig Enters. v. Koehler,

68 Ohio St.3d 274, at ¶1 of syllabus, 626 N.E.2d 99 (1993). To determine whether claims arise

out of the same transaction or occurrence, "courts most frequently utilize the 'logical relation

test,"' and under that test "a compulsory counterclaim is one which `is logically related to the

opposing party's claim where separate trials on each of their respective claims would involve a

substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court. "' Id. at 278, citing Staff

Notes (1970) to Civ.R.13 and quoting Gr•eat Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286

F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1964).

Mr. Scott's HSSA claim alleging an error in the completion of the 3-day notice of

cancellation is directly related to the ISPC Agreement, which was the subject of the Florida

litigation. Thus, the time for Mr. Scott to raise this claim was either prior to or in response to the

Florida action. By not raising these counterclaims at the appropriate time, Mr. Scott has now

waived them. Mr. Scott was notified by the Florida court that he had the right to contest the

claims and to dispute venue. His failure to take any action until two years later operates as a

waiver of these compulsory counterclaims. Alternatively, as the trial court found, Mr. Scott's

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HSSA claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in the Ohio CSPA, R.C.

§1345.10(C). See Loveday v. Wolny, 9th Dist. Medina No. 2617-M, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS

3037, *12 (July 16, 1997).

In short, ISPC obtained a valid judgment in a Florida court under Florida law. Many

months later, after failed attempts to satisfy the judgment voluntarily, ISPC obtained a writ of

garnishment and garnished Mr. Scott's bank account through a Florida branch of his bank.

Although ISPC did not take action to domesticate the Florida judgment in Ohio, nothing

prevented Mr. Scott from domesticating the judgment here in Ohio and raising any defenses and

counterclaims under Ohio law. Mr. Scott also could have sought relief in a Florida court under

Florida law by opposing the claim, filing a motion for relief from judgment or pursuing his

appellate rights. Mr. Scott took none of these actions and, instead, waited nearly two years after

judgment was entered to file this action in Ohio.

The courts below properly found that Mr. Scott's claims fail because he is asking an Ohio

court to now declare a valid Florida judgment unenforceable in Florida, which is antithetical to

the Full Faith and Credit doctrine. Now that the Florida judgment has been fully satisfied under

Florida law, the judgment no longer exists and neither an Ohio court nor a Florida court can

vacate the judgment.

Mr. Scott's failure to act does not now create a constitutional question or matter of public

or great general interest. The satisfaction of the judgment in Florida necessarily brings an end to

the controversy. Once the contract was reduced to judgment and the judgment fully satisfied,

there is nothing left for a court to vacate, cancel or rescind. Any violation of the three-day notice

had no bearing on the parties during the course of their transaction, but was instead an

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afterthought in contemplation of litigation. Therefore, the lower courts were correct in

concluding Mr. Scott has failed to state a claim for violation of the HSSA.

IV. CONCLUSION

This case does not involve a constitutional question, nor does it involve a matter of public

or great general interest. Mr. Scott purchased a water conditioning system and stopped nzaking

payments on it a year later. ISPC exercised its rights under the parties' financing agreement and

obtained a judgment against Mr. Scott in Florida pursuant to a valid forum-selection clause. The

judgment was not void and has been fully satisfied and Mr. Scott's failure to timely act does not

now create a basis for this Court to accept jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should decline jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

CARLILE PATCHEN & MURPHY LLP

4

By: 9^5 ^ ^.Brigid E. Heid 047142)bheid(c^cpmlaw.com366 East Broad StreetColumbus, Ohio 43215Phone: (614) 228-6135Fax: (614) 221-0216

Attorney f'oN AppelleeIndependent Savings Plan Company,dba ISPC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the foregoing Appellee's Memorandum InOpposition To Jurisdiction was served by regular U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, this 3rd day ofJuly, upon Miriam H. Sheline, Attorney for Appellant, at Pro Seniors, Inc., 7162 Reading Road,Suite 1150, Cincinnati, Ohio 45237.

)L,Brigid E. (®04714TJL^d

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