DANAHER Moral Enhancement and Moral Freedom

MoralEnhancementandMoralFreedom:ACritiqueoftheLittleAlex

Problem

ByJohnDanaher

[ForthcominginHauskeller,M.andCoyne,L(eds)MoralEnhancement:Critical

Perspectives,PhilosophySupplement(CambridgeUniversityPress)]

Abstract:Acommonobjectiontomoralenhancementisthatitwouldundermine

ourmoralfreedomandthatthisisabadthingbecausemoralfreedomisagreat

good.MichaelHauskellerhasdefendedthisviewonacoupleofoccasionsusingan

arrestingthoughtexperimentcalledthe'LittleAlex'problem.Inthispaper,I

reconstructtheargumentHauskellerderivesfromthisthoughtexperimentand

subjectittocriticalscrutiny.Iclaimthattheargumentultimatelyfailsbecause(a)

itassumesthatmoralfreedomisanintrinsicgoodwhen,infact,itismorelikelyto

beanaxiologicalcatalyst;and(b)therearereasonstothinkthatmoral

enhancementdoesnotunderminemoralfreedom.

1.Introduction

Humanityfacesaseriesofexistentialchallengesoverthenextcentury:

climatechange,malevolentartificialintelligence,theproliferationofnuclearand

bio-weaponry,tonamebutafew.AccordingtoIngmarPerssonandJulian

Savulescu,oneofthereasonswhywefindourselvesontheexistentialprecipice

isbecauseourtechnologicalcapacitiesfarexceedourmoralones.1Theyargue

thatmoralbioenhancementtechnologiesmightbeneededtoredressthebalance

andpullusbackfromthebrink.

1Persson,I.andSavulescu,J.UnfitfortheFuture:TheNeedforMoralEnhancement(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2012)

Theirargumenthasattractedalotofcriticism.Oneofthemostpersistent

isthatusingdrugsandotherbiomedicalinterventionstoimprovemoral

behaviorwillundermineour‘freedomtofall’,i.e.ourfreedomtodogoodorevil

(whatIcall,fromhereonout,our‘moralfreedom’).JohnHarriswasthefirstto

launchthiscriticism2andheandPerssonandSavulescuhavesloggeditouton

thetopiceversince.3Othershaveoccasionallyenteredthefray(e.g.Sparrow

2014)topassjudgmentandoffernewinsights.4

Oneofthemoreinterestingcontributionstothe‘freedomtofall’-debate

hascomefromMichaelHauskeller.5Usinganarrestingthoughtexperiment

derivedfromAnthonyBurgess’snovelAClockworkOrange,Hauskellerdraws

ourattentiontotheaxiologicalintuitionsunderlyingthe‘freedomtofall’

objection,andmakesapassionatepleafortheviewthataworldwithmoral

freedomandtheoccasionalbaddeedisbetterthanaworldinwhichpeopledo

goodthingsbutlackthefreedomtofall.

Inthischapter,IcarefullyreconstructandevaluateHauskeller’s

arguments.Istartbydiscussinghis‘LittleAlex’thoughtexperimentand

formalizingtheargumentthathederivesfromit.Ithenproceedtocritically

2Harris,J.‘MoralEnhancementandFreedom’Bioethics25(2011):102-111.3Harris,HowtoBeGood:ThePossibilityofMoralEnhancement(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016)andHarris,J.‘MoralBlindness–TheGiftoftheGodMachine’9(2016):269-273;Persson,I.andSavulescu,J.‘Enharrisment:AReplytoJohnHarrisaboutMoralEnhancement’Neuroethics9(2016):275-77;andPersson,I.andSavulescu,J.‘MoralBioenhancement,FreedomandReason’Bioethics9(2016):263-268.4Sparrow,R.‘BetterLivingThroughChemistry?AReplytoSavulescuandPerssonon‘MoralEnhancement’’JournalofAppliedPhilosophy31(2014):23-32.5Hauskeller,M.‘The“LittleAlex”Problem’ThePhilosophers’Magazine,62(2013):74-78;andHauskeller,M.‘Isitdesirabletobeabletodotheundesirable?MoralBioenhancementandtheLittleAlexProblem’CambridgeQuarterlyofHealthcareEthics,forthcoming–availableat:https://www.academia.edu/18809315/Is_It_Desirable_to_Be_Able_to_Do_the_Undesirable_Moral_Bioenhancement_and_the_Little_Alex_Problem

evaluatethekeypremisesofthatargument.Ifirstevaluatethemoralintuition

thatHauskellerusestomotivatehisclaim,namely:thataworldwithgood

outcomesbutnomoralfreedomwouldbeworsethanaworldwithmoral

freedomandtheoccasionalbaddeed.Drawinguponlessonslearnedinthe

debateabouttheexistenceofGodandtheproblemofevil,Iarguethatmoral

freedomlacksintrinsicvalue:itsmerepresencedoesn’tmaketheworldbetter

orworse.Instead,moralfreedomisanaxiologicalcatalyst:somethingthat

makesgooddeedsbetterandbaddeedsworse.Ithenturntothequestionof

whethermoralenhancementwouldinfactundermineourmoralfreedom.

Lookingatcommontheoriesoffreewillandresponsibility,Iarguethatmoral

enhancementmaynotundermineourmoralfreedomandcouldevenonsome

occasionsincreaseourmoralfreedom.ThenIlookatthemorepolitical

dimensiontofreedom,whichHauskellerdrawsuponinhisargument,and

suggestthatmoralenhancementneednotunderminepoliticalfreedomandmay,

infact,increaseit.

BeforeIgetunderway,Ineedtosayawordortwoabouttheterminology

Iuseinthischapter.Aswillbecomeclearlateron,oneofthemajordisputesin

themoralenhancementdebateisaboutwhatexactlycountsasa‘moral’

enhancement.Ononeinterpretation,amoralenhancementwouldinvolve

improvinganindividual’smoralvirtueandmoralreasoning.Itwouldinvolve

creating“peoplewhoaregoodanddowhatisright,fortherightreasons”.6On

otherinterpretations,moralenhancementislargelyaboutsecuringpreferred

moraloutcomes,irrespectiveofthereasoningorvirtuesofthepeople

implicated.Inotherwords,itinvolvesensuringenhancedconformitywithmoral

norms,notnecessarilyenhancedmoralvirtueandreasoning.Inthischapter,I

willfavourthelatterinterpretationofmoralenhancement.Itismoreinclusive

andfitsbetterwiththeargumentHauskellerdefends.

6DeMeloMartin,I.andSalles,A.‘MoralBioenhancement:MuchAdoAboutNothing’Bioethics29(2014):223-232,224.

Ontopofthis,thereisalwayssomeuncertaintyintheenhancement

debateastowhatinterventionscountas‘enhancements’.Onabroad

interpretation,anenhancementisanyinterventionthatimprovesthehuman

conditionrelativetoitspre-existingstate.7Onthisview,theinventionofthe

wheel,literacy,politicalreform,andbetternutritionwouldallcountas

enhancements.Onanarrowinterpretation,anenhancementisabiomedicalor

technologicalinterventionthatdirectlytargetsandtriestoimprovesome

functionofthehumanbrainorbody.Onthisview,drugs,brainimplants,and

othertherapeuticinterventionswouldcountasenhancements.Proponentsof

enhancementfrequentlystressthebroaderinterpretation8inordertohighlight

thecontinuitybetweennewandoldformsofenhancement,andtoreduce

oppositiontonewerinterventions.Opponentstypicallyfavouranarrower

interpretation,tryingtodrawprincipleddistinctionsbetweennarrowandbroad

enhancements.Inthischapter,Iwillfavourthenarrowerinterpretation.The

primaryreasonforthisisthatifoneistounderstandthedebateaboutthe

freedomtofallobjectiononemustbewilling,ifonlyforthesakeofargument,to

drawadistinctionbetweenbiomedicalformsofmoralenhancementandmore

traditionalformssuchasmoraleducation.

Finally,Iwillusetheterm‘moralfreedom’intwodistinctsenses.Forthe

majorityofthearticle,Iwilluseittorefertoourcapacityforfreewillandmoral

responsibility.Inotherwords,Iwillassumethatinordertohavemoralfreedom

wemusthavethecapacitytoexerciseourfreewill(whateverthatrequires)and

beheldmorallyresponsibleforwhatwedo(whateverthatrequires).Inthe

penultimatesection,however,Iwilladoptamorepoliticizedsenseoftheterm

‘moralfreedom’,whichfocusesonliberalandrepublicanconceptionsof

freedom.9Inotherwords,Iwillholdthatwearemorallyfreeifwearefreefrom

7Buchanan,A.BeyondHumanity?TheEthicsofBiomedicalEnhancement.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2011).8SeeforexampleHarris,J.EnhancingEvolution(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007)andBuchanan,BeyondHumanity.9List,C.andVallentini,L.‘FreedomasIndependence’Ethics126(2016):1043:1074

interferenceand/ordominationbyothers.Thereissomeoverlapbetweenthese

conceptionsoffreedom,buttheyaredistinguishableincertaininstances.

2.UnderstandingtheLittleAlexProblem

Hauskellerusesathoughtexperimenttointroducehisversionofthe

freedomtofallobjection.ThethoughtexperimentcomesfromAnthony

Burgess’s(in)famousnovelAClockworkOrange.Thenovelissetinan

unspecified,dystopianfuture.Ittellsusthestoryof‘Little’Alex,ayoungman

pronetoexuberantactsofultraviolence.Capturedbytheauthorities,Alex

undergoesaformofaversiontherapyinanefforttoridhimofthistendency

towardsultraviolence(thetherapyisknownas‘Ludovico’sTechnique’inthe

novel).Heisgivenmedicationthatmakeshimfeelnauseousandthenrepeatedly

exposedtoviolentimagery.Hiseyesareheldopeninordertoforcehimtoview

theimagery.Thetherapyworks.Onceheleavescaptivity,hestillfeelsviolent

urgesbutthesearequicklyaccompaniedbyfeelingsofnausea.Asaresult,heno

longeractsoutinviolentways.Thetherapyhasenhancedhismoralconformity.

Thenoveltakesanambivalentattitudetowardsthisconformity(and

eventuallyAlexrelapsesintohisultraviolentexuberanceafterasuicideattempt).

Oneofthecharacters(aprisonchaplain)suggeststhatAlexisnottrulygoodasa

resultofthetherapy.Inordertobetrulygood,Alexwouldhavetochoosetodo

thegood.Butduetotheaversiontherapy,thischoiceistakenawayfromhim.

Theinducednauseaeverytimehehasaviolentthoughteffectivelycompelshim

todothegood.Indeed,thechaplaingoesfurtherandsuggeststhatAlex’s

inducedgoodnessisnotasvaluableashisnaturalbadness.Itisbetterifaperson

canchoosetodothebadthanbeforcedtodothegood.ThisiswhatHauskeller

callsthe‘LittleAlex’problem.Andhedescribesitlikethis:

ThisiswhatIcallthe“LittleAlex”problem…itinvitesustoshareacertain

moralintuition(namelythatitisinsomeunspecifiedwaybadorwrongor

inhumantoforcepeopleintogoodness)andthustoaccepttheensuing

paradoxthatundercertainconditionsthebadisbetterthanthegood—

becauseitisnotonlysuggestedthatitiswrongtoforcepeopletobegood

(whichisfairlyuncontroversial)butalsothattheresultinggoodnessis

somehowtaintedanddevaluatedbythewayithasbeenproduced.10

Thisdescriptionoftheproblemhintsatanargument,onethatcanbeexpressed

inmoreformalterms.Itstartswithapremisestatingthecoremoralintuition

andusesthistocritiquethepracticeofmoralenhancement.ThisishowIwould

reconstructthatargument:

(1)Itisbettertohavemoralfreedom,i.e.thefreedomtodothebad(and

tooccasionallyactonthatfreedom),thantobeforcedtodothegood.

(2)Moralenhancementtakesawayourmoralfreedom.

(3)Therefore,moralenhancementis,insomesense,amorallyinferior

wayofensuringmoralconformity.

Thisformulationisalittlebitloose(thederivationoftheconclusionfromthe

premisesisnotstraightforwardorwatertight),butIthinkitcapturesthegistof

Hauskeller’sinterpretationofthefreedomtofallobjection.Overtheremainder

ofthechapterIwillevaluatethetwopremisesofthisargument.

3.IsMoralFreedomIntrinsicallyValuable?

Thefirstpremiseoftheargumentisthemostinteresting.Itmakesa

seeminglyparadoxicalandcontentiousaxiologicalclaim.Itstatesthatthe10Hauskeller,The‘LittleAlex’Problem,75.

freedomtodobadissuchanimportantgoodthataworldwithoutitisworse

thanaworldwithit.Tobemoreprecise,itstatesthatonsomeoccasions,and

undercertainconditions,weshouldpreferitwhenpeopledobadthingsthan

whentheydogoodthings.

OneofthemoreimportantfeaturesofHauskeller’scontributiontothe

freedomtofalldebateisthewayinwhichhedrawsattentiontothisaxiological

claim.Now,IhappentothinkthatthisaxiologicalclaimisfalseandI’mgoingto

defendmyviewbyfirstshowingthatinordertoacceptpremise(1)you

probablyneedtobelievemoralfreedomisanintrinsicgood(i.e.thatitsmere

presenceaddsvaluetotheworld),andthenbyarguingthatitisimplausibleto

supposethatmoralfreedomisanintrinsicgood.Instead,Iarguethatweshould

viewitasanaxiologicalcatalyst,i.e.somethingthataddstoboththemoralvalue

anddisvalueoftheworldandhencesomethingwhosevaluecannotbeassessed

independentlyfromthewayinwhichitisused.

Whythinkthattheargumentpresupposesthatmoralfreedomisan

intrinsicgood?Hauskellerhasaparticularconceptionofthevaluehierarchyof

differentpossibleworldsthatheusestoexplainhisview.Inhisoriginalarticle

onthetopic,Hauskellersuggeststhatanyproponentofthe‘freedomtofall’-

argumentmustacceptsomethinglikethefollowingvaluehierarchyasbetween

differentpossibleworlds:

BestWorld:Aworldinwhichwearefreetodobadbutchoosetodogood

(i.e.aworldinwhichthereisbothmoralconformityandmoralfreedom)

2ndBestWorld:Aworldinwhichwearefreetodobadand(sometimes)

choosetodobad(i.e.aworldinwhichthereismoralfreedombutnot,

necessarily,moralconformity)

3rdBestWorld:Aworldinwhichwealwaysdogoodbutarenotfreeto

dobad(i.e.aworldinwhichthereismoralconformitybutnomoral

freedom)

WorstWorld:Aworldinwhichwearenotfreeanddobad(i.e.aworldin

whichthereisneithermoralconformitynormoralfreedom).

Inhismorerecentpaper,heproposesasimilarbutmorecomplexhierarchy

featuringsixdifferentlevels(thetwoextralevelscapturedifferencesbetween

‘sometimes’and‘always’doinggood/bad).Inthatpaperhenotesthatalthough

theproponentofthe‘freedomtofall’argumentmustplaceaworldinwhich

thereismoralfreedomandsomebadaboveaworldinwhichthereisnomoral

freedom,thereisnocompelling,watertightargumentinfavourofthishierarchy

ofvalue.Itisreallyamatterofmoralintuitionsandweighingcompetingvalues.

Hauskeller’sintuitionsleadhimtofavourtheworldwiththefreedomto

(sometimes)dobadovertheworldofmoralconformity.

Canweunderstandthisintuitionatadeeperlevel?Itseemsthatthere

mightbemuchtolearnherefromthedebatebetweenatheistsandtheistsover

theproblemofevil.Asiswell-known,theproblemofevilisthemostfamous

atheologicalargument.Itcomesinavarietyofforms.Theseareusuallybroken

downintotwomainfamilies:(i)thelogicalproblemofeviland(ii)theevidential

problemofevil.11TheessenceofbothversionsisthattheexistenceofGodis

incompatiblewiththeexistenceofanygratuitousorunnecessaryevil.The

reasoningisasfollows:Godisamaximallypowerful,morallyperfectbeing.

Givenhismoralperfection,hewouldnotallowforeviltooccurunlessitwas

somehownecessaryforagreatergood.Givenhismaximalpower,itispossible

forhimtointervenetopreventunnecessaryevilfromoccurring.Atheiststhen

claimthatthereisevidence(certainorhighlyprobable,dependingonhow

strongtheywanttheargumenttobe)thatgratuitousevilsoccur.Theyconclude,

therefore,thatGodmustnot(orishighlyunlikelyto)exist.

11Onthedifferentproblemsofevil,seeMackie,J.L.(1955).EvilandOmnipotence.Mind64(1955):200-212;Plantinga,A.God,FreedomandEvil.(GrandRapids,MI:Eerdmans,1977);andRowe,W.‘TheProblemofEvilandSomeVarietiesofEvil’AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation16(1979):335-341.

Theistshaveavarietyofresponses.Theyoftenhighlightourepistemic

ignoranceaboutvalueonagrand,cosmicscale.12Theythentrytoconstruct

‘theodicies’or‘defences’thateitherjustifyhowGodmightallowaseemingly

gratuitousevilacttooccur,orintroduceprimafaciejustificationsthatcannotbe

easilysecond-guessedorchallenged,givenourepistemiclimitations.Themost

popularofthesetheodicies/defencesarethosethatfocusonfreewillandmoral

responsibility(i.e.moralfreedom).Theviewsharedbyproponentsofthese

theodiciesisthatfreewillandmoralresponsibilityaregreatgoodsandtheir

beinggreatgoodsiswhatjustifiesGodincreatingaworldwithsomeevilinit.

Accordingtooneofthemostinfluentialformulationsofthisview,itisnot

logicallypossibleforGodtocreateauniversewiththegreatgoodofmoral

freedomwithoutalsoallowingforthepossibilityofthatfreedomsometimes

(possiblymanytimes)beingusedforilleffect.13Theingenuityofthisisthatit

allowsfortheiststoremaincommittedtotheviewthattheyliveinauniverse

createdbyamorallyperfectbeing–i.e.inauniversethatis,ultimately,thebest

ofallpossiblewords–whiletoleratingevildeeds.Inessencethen,theyare

ascribingtoHauskeller’sintuitionthataworldwithmoralfreedominitis,

somehow,betterthanaworldwithout.

Iwouldsuggestthatthemostplausiblewaytomakesenseofthisshared

intuitionistobelievethatmoralfreedomis,somehow,intrinsicallyvaluable,i.e.

thatitsmerepresence(irrespectiveofhowitisused)addstothevalueofthe

universe.Butwhyisthisthemostplausiblewaytomakesenseoftheintuition?

Couldn’titsimplybethecasethatmoralfreedomisnecessaryforsomeother

goods?Perhaps,butIthinkitisdifficultforHauskelleroratheistproponentof

thefreewilltheodicytosustainthisviewalongsideaconsistentbiastowards

worldswithmoralfreedom.Sometheistshavetendedtoviewfreewillasa

12ForexampleBergmann,M.‘SkepticalTheismandRowe’sNewEvidentialArgumentfromEvil’Nous35(2001):278-296.13Plantinga,God,FreedomandEvil.

necessaryinstrumentalgoodformoralresponsibility,14butthisdoesnotgetus

awayfromthenotionthatmoralfreedomisanintrinsicgoodsinceresponsibility

ispartandparcelofmoralfreedom.Otherstendtobeabitcageyandsimply

suggestthat,forallweknow,itmightbelinkedtoothergoods.Butthisisa

difficultargumenttomakewhenyoudonotknowwhattheseothergoodsare

andyetstillbelievetheytrumpotherknowngoods.Ifyouaregoingto

consistentlyrankaworldinwhichthereismoralfreedom(andsomeevil)overa

worldinwhichthereisnomoralfreedom(andmuchgood)–inotherwords,if

youaregoingtoacceptthatthereissomegoodinaworldinwhichpeople

exercisetheirmoralfreedomtodotremendousevil–thenitseemslikeyou

simplymustbecommittedtotheviewthatthereissomeintrinsicmoralmagicto

moralfreedom:thatwhenitispresentitautomaticallyupsthevaluetothe

world.Tobeclear,thisdoesnotmeanthatadvocatesofmoralfreedomneedto

believethattheintrinsicgoodofmoralfreedomtrumpsallothergoods,orthat

therecouldbenootheroutweighingintrinsicgoods.Theymightstillbelievethat.

Butinordertomaintaintheirconsistentbiastowardworldsinwhichthereis

moralfreedom,itmostplausibletobelievethatitisbecausemoralfreedomhas

intrinsicvalue.

TheproblemIhavewiththisisthatmoralfreedomdoesn’tseemto

functionlikeanintrinsicgood.Thereareacoupleofwaystogettothis

conclusion.Somehavetriedtodosobyarguingthatitisintrinsicallyneutral.

DerkPereboom15hasdefendedthisviewintandemwithhisgeneralfreewill

skepticism,andSteveMaitzenhasdefendeditspecificallyinresponsetofreewill

theodicies.16Theessenceofbothoftheirclaimsisthatinmanycasesofmoral

evaluation,thefreedomtodobaddoesnotaddtotheassessedvalueofanaction.

Itseemstofunction,instead,asamorallyweightlessconsideration,andnotjusta

14Swinburne,R.TheExistenceofGod2ndEdition.(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004).15Pereboom,D.,FreeWill,EvilandDivineProvidence.InDoleandChignell(eds).GodandtheEthicsofBelief(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.,2005)16Maitzen,S.‘OrdinaryMoralityImpliesAtheism’EuropeanJournalforPhilosophyofReligion2(2009):107-126.

morallyoutweighedone.Togiveanexample,supposethereisaviolentcriminal

whohasexercisedhismoralfreedomandsavagelymurderedtenpeople.Surely,

wedon’tthinkthatthefactthathemurderedthemfreelyspeaksinhisfavour?

Hisactisverybad,pureandsimple;itisnotslightlygoodandverybad.

Thereissomethingtothisargument.Itdefinitelyfeelsrighttosaythat

themurderer’sfreedomdoesn’taddanyintrinsicgoodtohisactions(itdoesn’t

counterbalancesomeofthedisvalue).Butitalsofeelswrongtosaythatitis

axiologicallyneutral.Comparetwocases:(i)amurderersavagelykillstenpeople

whileexercisinghismoralfreedom;and(ii)amurderersavagelykillstenpeople

withoutexercisingmoralfreedom(becausehehadsomebraintumourthat

underminedhismoralreasoning,orhewascompelledtodosobyothersat

gunpoint).Bothoutcomesarebad,butwhichcaseisworse?Ithinktheansweris

obviously(i)becausethereisnoexcusingfactorpresentinthatcase.This

suggestssomethinginteresting.Itsuggeststhatmoralfreedommakesabaddeed

muchworse.Thus,moralfreedomseemstobemakinganaxiologicaldifference;

itisnotneutral.Wecanseethishappeningintheotherdirectiontoo.Compare

thefollowing:(iii)amulti-millionairedonates90%ofhismoneytosomecharity

byexercisinghismoralfreedom;and(iv)amulti-millionairedonates90%ofhis

moneytosomecharitybecausehisaccountantmadeacalculationerror.The

outcomesarebothgood(assumethis,forthesakeofargument),butIam

confidentinsayingthatcase(iii)isclearlybetterthan(iv).Again,thepresenceof

moralfreedomseemstobemakingthedifference.

Thesethoughtexperimentssuggesttomethatmoralfreedomisneither

intrinsicallygood,norintrinsicallyneutral.Itis,instead,anaxiologicalcatalyst:it

makesgoodthingsbetterandbadthingsworse.Itexaggerateswhatevervalueis

alreadypresent(positiveornegative).This,inturn,leadstotheconclusionthat

premise(1)oftheLittleAlexArgumentisflawed.Aworldwithmoralfreedom

andoccasionalbadisnotnecessarilybetterthanaworldwithoutmoralfreedom.

Becauseitisanaxiologicalcatalyst,wecannotusemoralfreedomtorankand

orderworldsrelativetooneanother.Thevalueofmoralfreedomcanonlybe

determinedinconnectionwithhowitisexercised.Ifitisexercisedtogood

effect,thenaworldwithitis,indeed,abetterworld;butifitisexercisedtoill

effect,itmakesthingsworse.Thissignificantlyundercutsthe‘freedomtofall’

objection.Ifmoralenhancementtechniquesworkasadvertised,theywould

simplybepreventingmoralfreedomfrombeingexercisedinwickedways.They

would,consequently,bemakingtheworldabetterplace,withouttakingaway

somethingthatisintrinsicallygood.

Thisargumentmightnotbeplausibletoall.Fortunately,evenifyoucling

totheviewthatmoralfreedomisanintrinsicgood,itdoesnotfollowthatyou

oughttorejectallformsofmoralenhancementonthegroundsthatthey

underminemoralfreedom.Asmentionedearlier,moralfreedomcouldbean

intrinsicgoodanditcouldbeoutweighedorcountermandedbyother

goods/badsincertaincases.Thisis,again,somethingthathascometotheforein

thedebateabouttheproblemofevil.Whentheistspressthelineaboutmoral

freedomprovidingsomeGod-justifyingexcusefortheoccurrenceofevil,atheists

pushbackbypointingtoparticularlyegregiousformsofevilthatresultfrom

moralfreedom.Takethecaseofaremorselessserialkillerwhotorturesand

rapesyounginnocentchildren.Arewetosupposethattheirfreedomtodobad

outweighsthechild’srighttoliveatortureandrape-freelife?Istheworldin

whichtheserialkillerfreelydoesbadreallyabetterworldthantheoneinwhich

heisforcedtoconform?Itseemsprettyunlikely.Thisexamplehighlightsthefact

thatmoralfreedommightbeintrinsicallyvaluablebutthatincertain‘high

stakes’casesitsintrinsicvalueisoutweighedbyothermoralconsiderations,

particularlytheneedtoensuregreatermoralconformity.

Itisperfectlyopentothedefenderofmoralenhancementtoarguethatits

applicationshouldbelimitedtothose‘highstakes’cases.Thenitwillalldepend

onhowhighthestakesareandwhethermoralenhancementcanbeapplied

selectivelytoaddressthosehighstakescases.Thethingthatisnoticeableabout

PerssonandSavulescu’scaseformoralbioenhancementisthatitislinked

directlytohighstakescases.Theyarguethatthefutureofthehumanracecould

beonthelineunlessweenhanceourmoralconformity.Iftheyareright,thenthe

stakesmightbehighenoughtooutweightheputativeintrinsicvalueofmoral

freedom.Thatsaid,theburdentheyfacewhenmakingthiscaseissignificant

sincetheyarenotsimplyarguingthatweoccasionallyinterferewiththemoral

freedomofspecificindividuals;theyarearguingthatweinterferewithevery

agent’smoralfreedom.

4.IsMoralEnhancementReallyIncompatiblewithMoralFreedom?

WhataboutthesecondpremiseoftheLittleAlexArgument?Thispremise

claimsthatmoralfreedomisincompatiblewithmoralenhancement,i.e.thatif

weensuresomeone’sconformitythroughatechnologicalinterventionlikemoral

enhancement,thentheyarenotreallyfree.Howpersuasiveisthis?Italldepends

onwhatyouunderstandbymoralfreedomandhowyouthinkmoral

enhancementworks.

Let’sstickwithideathatmoralfreedomisthecapacitytoexercisefree

willandtobearesponsiblemoralagent.Therearemanydifferenttheoriesabout

whatthisrequires.Theyvarydependingonwhethertheythinkfreewilland

responsibilityarepossibleinacausallydeterministicuniverse,andwhetherthey

thinkweliveinsuchauniverse.Wecandividethemintotwomaincategories:(i)

libertariantheoriesoffreewill(whichholdthatfreewillisonlypossibleif

humansaresomehowexemptfromcausallydeterministiclaws)and(ii)

compatibilisttheoriesoffreewill(whichholdthatfreewillispossibleevenif

humansarenotexemptfromcausallydeterministiclaws).Thereisalsoa

positionknownas‘freewillskepticism’,butwecansafelyignorethatheresince

afreewillskepticwillhavenotruckwithargumentsaboutthegoodofmoral

freedom.Now,itisnotgoingtobepossibletorevieweverytheoryoffreewill

withinthetwomaincategoriesinthespaceofthischapter,butwecanreview

someofthem,andbydoingsowecanseethatmoralenhancementmaybeless

likelytounderminemoralfreedomthanyoumightfirstsuspect.

Letusstartwiththelibertarianaccountsoffreewill.Thesecanbefleshed

outinacoupleofdifferentways.Onecanadoptanagentcausalistapproach,

whichholdsthatthewayinwhichagentscausesomethingtohappenisdistinct

fromthewayinwhicheventscauseothereventstohappen.Agentsareprimary,

suigeneriscausesofeventsintherealworld.Theydonotsitdirectlywithinthe

ordinarychainofcausation.Humanbeingsareagentsandsocancausethingsto

happenwithoutbeingcausallydeterminedtodoso.Thisviewobviouslyfacesa

numberofconceptualandphilosophicalchallenges.Itisprettydifficultto

reconcilethefactthatcertainaspectsandfeaturesofhumanagencyareclearly

constitutedinanevent-causalistnetworkofbrainactivitywiththeclaimthat

humanagencycauseseventsinadistinctive,suigenerismanner.Consequently,

itisdifficulttoknowexactlywhatanagentcausalistwouldsayabouttheLittle

Alexcase.TheymightbeinclinedtoshareHauskeller’sviewthatAlexisbeing

forcedtobefree(perhapsbecausetheaversiontherapyblocksthepathwayto

agentcausation),buttheymightbemoreoptimistic.Afterall,ifallformsof

moralenhancementwilloperateonthecausalnetworksinsidethehumanbrain,

itispossiblethatthe‘agent’(whoisseparablefromthosenetworks)is

unaffectedbytheenhancementprocess.

Asimilaranalysisappliestoevent-causalistlibertarianviews,suchas

thoseadvocatedbyKane17andBalaguer.18Theseviewsdonotpositasuigeneris

agentwhositsoutsidetheordinarycausalflowoftheuniverse.Theyacceptthat

weare(toaconsiderableextent)constitutedbyourbrainsandthatourbrains

usuallyfollowdeterministicpatternsofcausation.Theysimplyarguethatthere

areoccasionalmomentsofindeterminism(whatBalaguercalls‘torndecisions’)

andthatourstatusasfreeandresponsibleagentsistiedtothesemomentsof

indeterminism.Balaguer’sview,forinstance,isthatoncertainoccasions,the

causalenvironmentinwhichthehumanagentoperates(whichincludestheir

brainandsurroundingcontext)isinastateofequilibriumatthemomentprior

tothechoice–noordinarycausalfactorcan‘makeadifference’towhetherone

optionischosenovertheother.Atthosemoments,thehuman‘will’operatesand

itisatthesemomentsthatweexercisefreechoice.

17Kane,R.TheSignificanceofFreeWill(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1996).18Balaguer,M.FreeWillasanOpenScientificProblem(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2010)

Again,thisviewhascertainconceptualandphilosophicalproblems,but

letussetthosetothesideandconsiderwhatitmeansformoralenhancement.

Ontheonehand,aproponentofanevent-causalistlibertarianismmightremain

optimisticaboutmoralfreedom.Enhancementtechnologiesmightintervenein

thecausalnetworksofthebrainbuttheymayleaveopenthepossibilityofthere

being‘torndecisions’andourmoralfreedomcouldcontinuetobegroundedin

thosemoments.Ontheotherhand,theymightfearthatenhancement

technologieslikeLittleAlex’saversiontherapyreducethenumberoftorn

decisionsthetypicalhumanfaces.Itcouldbe,forallweknow,thatbeforehis

aversiontherapy,everytimeLittleAlexwasfacedwiththeoptionofcommitting

anactofultraviolencehewasfacingatorndecision:hisbrainwasperfectly

equilibratedbetweencommittingtheactandnot.Hewasexercisinghismoral

freedomoneachsuchoccasion.Theaversiontherapythenchangedthecausal

equilibrium,tippingthebalancedecisivelyinfavourofnotcommittingviolence.

Thiswouldeliminatefreewill.Thenagain,theoppositecouldalsobetrue.

Perhapsbeforetheaversiontherapythecausalnetworkwithinhisbrainwas

tippeddecisivelyinfavourofcommittingultraviolence.Theaversiontherapy

thenworkedbybringingitbacktoamoreequilibratedstatewherehiswillcould

makethecriticaldifferencebetweendoinggoodanddoingevil.Inotherwords,

perhapstheenhancementtherapyworksbyopeningupmoreopportunitiesfor

torndecisions.

Theoverallpointhereisthatitisverydifficulttosay,intheabstract,

whetherlibertarianmodelsoffreewillareunderminedorconstrainedbymoral

freedom.Becausetheyholdthatthewill(ortheagent)issomehowseparate

fromthecausalmechanismsoftheuniverse,itispossiblethattheyare

unaffectedbymoralenhancement.And,eveniftheyareaffected,theymightbe

affectedinapositiveway.Alotdependsontheparticularitiesoftheindividual

case.

Othertheoriesoffreewillandmoralresponsibilityarecompatibilistin

nature.Theyclaimthatmoralfreedomispossiblewithinadeterministiccausal

order.Deterministiccausationbyitselfdoesnotunderminefreedom.What

mattersiswhetheranagent’sactionsareproducedbytherightkindofcausal

mechanism.Therearemanydifferentaccountsofcompatibilistfreewill,but

someoftheleadingonesarguethatanagentcanactfreelyifthecausal

mechanismproducingtheirmoralchoicesisreasons-responsiveand/orproduces

actionsthatareconsistentwiththeircharacterandhigherorderpreferences

(FischerandRavizza1998;Dworkin1988;Frankfurt1972).19

Moralenhancementcouldunderminecompatibilistfreewillso

understood.Itmaychangethecausalsequenceofactionfromonethatis

compatiblewithmoralfreedomtoonethatisnotcompatiblewithmoral

freedom.IntheLittleAlexcase,theaversiontherapycauseshimtofeelnauseous

wheneverheentertainsviolentthoughts.Thisisdefinitelyinconsistentwith

someversionsofcompatibilism.Fromthedescription,itseemslikeAlex’s

characterisstillaviolentoneandthathehashigher-orderpreferencesfordoing

badthings,it’sjustthatheisunabletoexpressthoseaspectsofhischaracter

thankstohisnausea.Heisthusblockedfromactingfreelyaccordingtohigher-

orderpreferenceaccountsoffreedom.Similarly,itcouldbethattheaversion

therapymakeshimlessresponsivetocertainkindsofreasonsforaction.This

mightundermineareasons-responsiveaccountofmoralfreedom.

But,again,thedevilwillbeinthedetail.Themodalityoftheenhancement

willbeallimportant.Somemodalitiesmightbeperfectlyconsistentwith

compatibilisticmoralfreedom:theymightchangeanincompatiblecausal

sequenceintoacompatibleone.Inthisrespect,aversiontherapyishardlythe

onlygameintown.Someagentsmightdesirethegoodatahigher-orderlevel

19Dworkin,G.TheTheoryandPracticeofAutonomy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress1988)Fischer,JMandRavizza,M.ResponsibilityandControl(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).Frankfurt,H.Freedomofthewillandtheconceptofaperson.JournalofPhilosophy68(1971):5-20

andbethwartedfrompursuingitbylower-orderimpulses.Amoral

enhancementtechnologymightworkbyblockingtheselowerorderpreferences

andtherebyenablingmoralfreedom.Ifwebelievethatchemicalcastrationcan

countasatypeofmoralenhancement,thenthisisarguablyhowitworks:by

blockinglower-orderpreferencesforsexualmisdeeds.Othermodalitiesofmoral

enhancementmightworkbychanginganagent’sabilitytoappreciate,process

andrespondtodifferentreasonsforaction.Thiswouldimprovetheirreasons-

responsivity.Althoughnotwrittenwithmoralenhancementinmind,Maslen,

PughandSavulescu’spaper(2015)onusingDBStotreatAnorexiaNervosa

highlightssomeofthesepossibilities,showinghowneurointerventionsthatare

directlymediatedthroughhigher-orderbrainfunctionsmightbepreferableto

thosethatarenot.20

Ontopofthis,thosewhoclaimthatmoralfreedomisunderminedby

enhancementmustdealwiththecaseinwhichanagentfreelydecidesto

undergoanenhancementtreatmentatT1thatwillcompromisetheirmoral

freedomatT2.Mosttheoriesofmoralfreedomacceptthisasacaseinvolving

genuinemoralfreedom.Theyviewitasacaseinvolvingapre-commitmentto

beinggood.Tousetheclassicexample,theindividualwhochoosestoundergo

theprocessislikeOdysseustyinghimselftothemastofhisship:heislimiting

hisagencyatfuturemomentsintimethroughanactoffreedomatanearlier

momentintime.Themodalityofenhancementdoesn’tmatterthen:allthat

mattersisthatheisn’tforcedintoundergoingtheenhancementatT1.Hauskeller

acknowledgesthispossibilityinbothofhispapers,butgoesontosuggestthat

theymayinvolveadubiousformofself-enslavement.Atthispoint,the

metaphysicalaccountofmoralfreedombecomeslessimportant.Wemustturn,

instead,toamorepoliticalunderstandingoffreedom.

5.Freedom,DominationandSelf-Enslavement

20Maslen,H.,Pugh,J.andSavulescu,J.‘TheEthicsofDeepBrainStimulationforAnorexiaNervosa’8(2015):215-230.

Wheremetaphysicalfreedomisaboutourmoralagencyand

responsibility,politicalfreedomisabouthowothersrelatetoandexpresstheir

willsoverus.Itisaboutprotectingusfrominterferenceanddominationby

otherssoastomeettheconditionsforajustandmutuallyprosperouspolitical

community—onethatrespectsthefundamentalmoralequalityofitscitizens

(Gaus2010;Pettit2014).21Consequently,accountsofpoliticalfreedomarenot

somuchaboutensuringfreewillastheyareaboutensuringthatpeoplecan

developandexercisetheiragencywithoutbeingmanipulatedanddominatedby

others.So,forexample,ImightarguethatIampoliticallyunfreeinexercisingmy

vote,ifthelawrequiresmetovoteforaparticularparty.Inthatcase,others

havechosenforme.Theirwilldominatesmyown.Iamsubordinatetothem.

Althoughunderexploredintheenhancementdebate,22thispoliticized

accountoffreedommightprovideamorepromisingbasisforadefenceof

premise(2).Afterall,onecriticalproblemwithdebatesaboutmoral

enhancement–particularlythosethatappealto‘highstakes’riskssuchasthose

thatfigureinPerssonandSavulescu’saccount–isthattheyimplicitlyor

explicitlyendorsecasesinwhichothersdecideforuswhetherweshould

undergomoralenhancementtherapy.Thus,ourparentscouldgenetically

manipulateustobekinder;ourgovernmentsmayinsistonustakingacourseof

moralenhancementdrugstobecomesafercitizens;itmaybecomeaconditional

requirementforaccessingkeylegalrightsandentitlementsthatwebemorally

enhanced,andsoon.Themorallyenhancedpersonwould,consequently,beina

politicallydifferentpositionfromthenaturallygoodperson.That,atleast,ishow

Hauskellerseesit:

Themostconspicuousdifferencebetweenthenaturallygoodandthemorally

enhancedisthatthelatterhavebeenengineeredtofeel,think,andbehavein

acertainway.Someoneelsehasdecidedforthemwhatisevilandwhatisnot,

21Gaus,G.TheOrderofPublicReason.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010);andPettit,P.JustFreedom.(NewYork:WWNorton&Co,2014)22ThoughseeSparrow,‘Betterlivingthroughchemistry?’.

andhasprogrammedthemaccordingly,whichundermines,asJurgen

Habermashasargued,theirabilitytoseethemselvesasmoralagents,equal

tothosewhodecidedhowtheyweregoingtobe.Thepointisnotsomuch

thattheyhavelostcontroloverhowtheyfeelandthink(perhapswenever

hadsuchcontrolinthefirstplace),butratherthatothershavegainedcontrol

overthem.Theyhavechanged…fromsomethingthathasgrownandcometo

bebynature,unpredictably,uncontrolled,andbehind,asitwereaveilof

ignorance,intosomethingthathasbeendeliberatelymade,even

manufactured,thatis,aproduct.23

Thereisalotgoingoninthisquote.Butthegistofitisclear.Theproblem

withmoralenhancementisthatitcreatesanasymmetryofpower.Weare

supposedtolivetogetherasmoralequals:nooneindividualissupposedtobe

morallysuperiortoanother.Butmoralenhancementallowsoneindividualor

grouptoshapethemoralwillofanother.Butthiscomplaintdoesn’tquitegetat

thepre-commitmentsituation.Whatifthereisnootherindividualorgroup

makingthesedecisionsforyou?Whatifyouvoluntarilyundergomoral

enhancement?Hauskellerarguesthatthesameinequalityofpowerargument

appliestothiscase:

…wecaneasilyextend[this]argumenttocaseswherewevoluntarilychooseto

submittoamoralenhancementprocedurewhoseultimatepurposeisto

depriveusoftheverypossibilitytodowrong.Theasymmetrywouldthen

persistbetweenourpresent(andfuture)selfandourpreviousself,whichto

ourpresentselfisanother.Theeventwouldbesimilartothecasewhere

someonevoluntarilysignedacontractthatmadethemaslavefortherestof

theirlives.24

Whatshouldwemakeofthisargument?Itprivilegesthebeliefthatfreedom

fromtheyokeofothersiswhatmatterstomoralagency—thatweshouldbeleft

togrowanddevelopintomoralagentsthroughnaturalprocesses—notbe

23Hauskeller,‘The“LittleAlex”Problem’,78-7924Hauskeller,‘The“LittleAlex”Problem’,79

manipulatedandmanufacturedintomoralsaints(evenifthemanipulationand

manufacturingisdonebyourselves).ButI’mnotsureweshouldbeswayedby

theseclaims.Threecriticalpointsseemappositetome.

First,Ithinkweshouldbegenerallyskepticaloftheclaimthatitisbetter

tobefreefromthemanipulationofothersthanitistobefreefromothersortsof

manipulationorinterference.Therealityisthatourmoralbehaviouristhe

productofmanythings:ourgeneticendowment,oursocialcontext,our

education,ourenvironment,andvariouscontingentaccidentsofpersonal

history.Itisnotobvioustomewhyweshouldsingleoutcausalinfluencesthat

originateinotheragentsforparticularire.Inotherwords,thepresumptionthat

itisbetterthatwenaturallygrowanddevelopintomoralagentsseems

problematictome.Ournaturaldevelopmentandgrowth—assumingthereisa

coherentconceptofthe‘natural’atplayhere—isnotintrinsicallygood.Itisnot

somethingthatisnecessarilyworthsavingornecessarilybetterthanthe

alternatives.Attheveryleast,thebenefitsofmoralconformitywouldweigh

(perhapsheavily)againstthedesirabilityofnaturalgrowthanddevelopment.

Second,Idonotthinkthattheclaimthatinducedmoralenhancement

involvesproblematicasymmetriesofpowerholdsupunderscrutiny.Atthevery

least,itisnotaclaimthatisgenerallyorunquestionablytrue.Ifanything,Ithink

moralenhancementcouldbeusedtocorrectforasymmetriesofpower.Tosome

extentthiswilldependonthemodalityofenhancementandthebenefitsitreaps,

butthepointcanbemadeatanabstractlevel.Thinkaboutitthisway:Theentire

educationalsystemrestsuponasymmetriesofpower,particularlytheeducation

ofyoungchildren.Thiseducationofteninvolvesamoralcomponent.Dowerail

againstitbecauseoftheasymmetriesofpower?Notreally.Indeed,weoften

deemeducationnecessarybecauseitultimatelyhelpstocorrectforasymmetries

ofpower.Itallowschildrentodevelopthecapacitiestheyneedtobecomethe

truemoralequalsofothers.Ifmoralenhancementworksbyenhancingour

capacitiestoappreciateandrespondtomoralreasons,orbyalteringourdesires

todogood,thenitmighthelptobuildthecapacitiesthatcorrectforasymmetries

ofpower.Itmightactuallyenableeffectiveself-controlandautonomy.Being

morallyenhancedthendoesnotmeanthatyouareproblematicallyenslavedor

beholdentothewillofothers.

Third,andperhapsmostcontroversially,Iamnotconvincedthatself-

enslavementisabadthing.Everydecisionwemakeinthepresentenslavesour

futureselvesinatleastsomeminimalsense.Choosingtogotoschoolinone

place,ratherthananother,enslavesthechoicesyourfutureselfcanmakeabout

whatcoursestotakeandcareerpathstopursue.Isthatabadthing?Ifthe

choicesultimatelyshapeourdesires—iftheyresultinusreallywantingto

pursueaparticularfuturecourseofaction—thenI’mnotsurethatIseethe

problem.StevePetersenhasmadethispointinrelationtothecreationofrobot

slaves.25Hearguesthatifarobotisdesignedinsuchawaythatitreallyreally

wantstodotheironing,thenmaybegettingittodotheironingisnotsobadfrom

theperspectiveoftherobot(thislastbitisimportant—itmightbebadfroma

societalperspectivebecauseofhowitaffectsorexpressesourattitudestowards

others,butthat’snotrelevantheresincewearetalkingaboutself-enslavement).

Likewise,ifbychoosingtoundergomoralenhancementatonepointintime,I

turnmyselfintosomeonewhoreallyreallywantstodomorallygoodthingsata

latermomentintime,I’mnotconvincedthatI’mlivingsomeinferiorlifeasa

result.

6.Conclusion

Tosumup,the‘freedomtofall’objectionisoneofthemorepopular

objectionstothemoralenhancementproject.Hauskellerdefendsaninteresting

versionofthisobjection,onethatdrawsourattentiontocertainkeyaxiological

intuitions:thatitisbettertohavemoralfreedomanddobadthanitistobe

forcedintomoralconformity;thatitisbettertonaturallydevelopandgrowinto

amoralpersonthanitistobemanipulatedandmoldedbyothers(including

yourself).Inthischapter,Ihavecalledtheseaxiologicalintuitionsintoquestion.I

arguethattheyrestontheimplausiblebeliefthatmoralfreedomisanintrinsic25Petersen,S.‘DesigningPeopletoServe’inLin,AbneyandBekey(eds)RobotEthics:TheEthicalandSocialImplicationsofRobotics.(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2012)

goodandthatmanipulation/self-enslavementisanintrinsicbad.Neitherof

theseviewsiscorrectorsufficienttojustifytheargumentagainstmoral

enhancement.Moralfreedomisanaxiologicalcatalyst,notanintrinsicgood;

self-enslavementandmanipulationarenotobviouslyinferiortootherformsof

causaldeterminationorexternalmolding.Ontopofthis,itisnotevenobvious

thatmoralenhancementunderminesmoralfreedom.Italldependsonwhatyou

meanbymoralfreedomandthemodalityofthemoralenhancement.Allthe

leadingtheoriesallowforthepossibilitythatmoralenhancementincreases,

ratherthanundermines,moralfreedom.