DAmato_Three Natures_Three Stages.pdf

M. D’AMATO

THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES: AN INTERPRETATIONOF THE YOG ACARA TRISVABH AVA-THEORY

The trisvabhava-theory has been considered to be one of the char-acteristic theories of Yogacara Buddhist discourse. This paper will

examine that theory as it is presented in the Mahayanasutralam:

k ara

(Ornament to the Mah ayana S utras; abbr. MSA) and its commentary,the Mahayanasutralam

:

k ara-bhas:

ya (MSABh).1 The MSA/Bh refersto the trisvabhava (or trilaks

:

an:

a) in a number of contexts, but thereare three locations in which extended discussions of the three natures(or three characteristics) occur.2 While I will attempt to offer an

exhaustive treatment of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh,incorporating every reference to the trisvabhava or trilaks

:

an:

a in thetext, I will focus on the three locations in which that theory is mostprominent. This paper will be divided into three sections: in the firstsection I will offer a brief introduction to the Mah ayanasutralam

:

k ara

itself, placing the text in the wider context of Yogacara discourse; inthe second section I will present an exegesis of the three-nature theory

in the MSA/Bh, focusing on the contexts in which the theory is mostfully elucidated; and in the third section I will offer an interpretationof the text’s three-nature theory, relating the theory to the doctrinesof mind-only (citta-matra) and representation-only (vij ~napti-matra).In short, according to my reading, the three-nature theory in the

MSA/Bh should not be interpreted as an ontological model simpli-

citer, but as a soteriologico-ontological model, identifying threeprogressive stages of ontological realization, culminating in the per-fected, non-conceptually-constructing awareness of thusness.

1 When referring to both the verse-text and the prose commentary together, I willuse the abbreviation MSA/Bh. In this paper, by the term ‘‘the text’’ I mean the MSAand the MSABh taken together, by ‘‘the verse-text’’ I mean the MSA, and by ‘‘thecommentary’’ I mean the MSABh.

2 These may be found at MSA/Bh 11.15–29, 11.36–43, and 19.48–56.

Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33:185–207 Springer 2005

DOI 10.1007/s10781-005-0860-y

ON THE MAH AY ANAS UTR ALAM _

K ARA

The Mahayanasutralam:

k ara is a verse-text composed of some 804verses, of which only 794are extantin Sanskrit.3 This verse-text appearsas an independent text only in the Tibetan canon. Normally the verse-

text is accompanied by (embedded in) an extended prose commentaryknown as the Mahayanasutralam

:

k ara-bhas:

ya, which divides the textinto 21 chapters. I date both the MSA and the MSABh to the fourthcentury CE (a bit more on this below). Two Sanskrit editions of theMSA/Bh are available: Le ´ vi’sedition of 1907(French translation: 1911)and Bagchi’s edition of 1970, which is based on Le ´ vi’s edition but addscorrigenda to the text. In this paper, I will quote directly from Le ´ vi’s

edition, since this is the earliest edition based on the most completeSanskrit manuscript available. The MSA/Bh appears in the Chinesecanon (Taisho, 1604) and in the Tibetan canon (MSA: Tohoku cata-logue no. 4020; MSA/Bh: Tohoku 4026). There are also two Indian

subcommentaries to the text, both extant only in Tibetan. 4

Various hypotheses have been offered regarding the authorship of

the MSA and the MSABh. While I will not enter into that discussionhere, I will indicate that I do not accept the (Chinese canon’s) attri-bution of the MSA/Bh to Asa _nga, nor do I accept the (Tibetan ca-non’s) attribution of the MSA to Maitreya (whether or not he istaken to be a historical person).5 I believe that a careful analysis

of the structure and contents of the text indicates that the receivedverse-text is at least partially a compilation. I hypothesize that earlierstrata of the MSA were compiled, redacted, added to, and com-mented upon by one person. And I take the result of this process tobe the received text of the MSA/Bh. 6

3 Nagao (1958: xiii), following the Tibetan text, specifies that MSA, Chapter 10, iscomprised of 15 verses, rather than Le ´ vi’s count of 14. According to this reading, thethree lines of commentary to MSA 10.9 constitute an independent verse. Thus theverse-text would be comprised of 805 (rather than 804) verses.

4 The two Indian subcommentaries are the Mah ayanasutralam_

kara-vr_tti-bhas

_ ya of

Sthiramati (Tohoku 4034; DT sems tsam MI 1b1–283a7, TSI 1b1-266a7) and theMahayanasutralam

_kara-t

_ika of Asvabhava (Tohoku 4029; DT sems tsam BI 38b6-

174a7). These works may be considered subcommentaries in that they comment onboth the MSA (verse-text) and at least parts of the MSABh (prose commentary).Sthiramati and Asvabhava may be placed in the sixth century CE.

5 It should be noted that all of the colophons of the MSA/Bh (includingthose of the Tibetan and Chinese translations) identify the mahabodhisattvaVyavadatasamaya as the composer of the text.

6 These points are discussed more fully in Chapter 2 of my dissertation; seeD’Amato (2000).

M. D’AMATO186

Regarding the MSA/Bh’s place in Yogacara literature, the fol-lowing points are worth noting. (1) In terms of structure, the MSAprecisely follows that of the Bodhisattvabhumi (BBh; ed. Dutt, 1966).But while the MSA and the BBh are nearly identical in structure, they

are not as similar in their contents: although both discuss the sametopics, the ways in which those topics are discussed often differ. Forexample, the BBh’s chapter on awakening (bodhi ) makes no mentionof many of the terms and concepts found in the MSA’s chapter onthat topic, such as the embodiments of a buddha (buddha-kaya) orthe awarenesses of a buddha (buddha-j ~nana). While some havethought that both the MSA and the BBh are by Asa _nga, I disagree.

Although the colophon of the BBh identifies Asa _nga as the com-poser of the text, both Hirakawa et al. (1973: vii–ix) and Davidson(1985: 23 and 25) point out that the two earlier Chinese translationsof the BBh (Taisho, 1581 and 1582) do not name any author. Fur-

thermore, Schmithausen (1969: 812) presents strong arguments forthe hypothesis that the Yogacarabhumi as a whole represents thework of a number of authors over a period of time. Thus there is noconclusive evidence that Asa _nga was the author of the BBh; rather,he may have been the final redactor of the text, or perhaps the textlater came to be associated with the Maitreya-Asa _nga complex.Given these considerations, and the fact that the BBh presents a less

highly developed conception of buddhahood than the MSA, I think itis plausible that the BBh predates the MSA, and that the MSAderives its structure from the BBh. (2) The MSA is the text most oftenquoted by the Mahayanasam

:

graha (ed. Lamotte, 1973), and it is

quoted once by name. From the list of texts explicitly quoted by theMahayanasam

:

graha, it may be inferred that the author of theMahayanasam

:

graha considers the MSA to be an authoritative text.Since all of the traditional sources, including the colophon of the textitself, attest to Asa _nga’s authorship of the Mahayanasam

_ graha, I

think it is reasonable to identify Asa _nga as the composer of thattext. And since Asa _nga quotes the MSA in the company of an

authoritative group of texts, I would place the MSA before Asa _nga.To summarize, I would place the MSA after (an early recension of)

the Bodhisattvabhumi , but before the date of Asa _nga. Asa _nga’s datecannot be fixed with certainty, but it may reasonably be hypothesizedthat he was active sometime during the second half of the fourthcentury CE or the first half of the fifth. Thus the MSA should beplaced before that time, i.e., in the mid-fourth century CE. And since

I take the MSA and the MSABh together as the work of one

THREE NATURES, THREE STAGES 187

final redactor/author, I would also place the commentary in themid-fourth century.

Considering the broader history of Yogacara discourse, theSam

:

dhinirmocana-sutra has certainly been the most important and

influential sutra for the Yogacara, and the Yogacarabhumi is thelargest Yogacara sastra, containing (in parts at least) some of theoldest extant Yogacara material. If these two works are taken asrepresentative of the first phase of distinctly Yogacara thought, thenthe second phase might be characterized by treatises that more sys-tematically (i.e., in their entirety) present a Yogacara point of view.Among the extant Yogacara treatises of this second phase, the

MSA/Bh is certainly one of the earliest (along with the Mad-

hyantavibhaga). I understand texts of this second phase to precedetexts of the third, classical, phase of Yogacara thought, representedby the works of Asa _nga and Vasubandhu.7 Thus I would identify the

MSA/Bh as an important text in the history of Yogacara discourse.In terms of its contents, the MSA/Bh may be described as a text

primarily concerned with theoretical reflections on issues central tothe practice of the Mahayana. Put simply, the MSA/Bh is more atheory text than a practice text: it is more a reflection on issues centralto (its conception of) Mahayana Buddhism than an instructionmanual for the attainment of specific Buddhist soteriological goals.

The MSA/Bh does not, however, exhibit a particular concern withshowing how the concepts and categories it employs are logicallyinterrelated or with systematically working out their implications.Nevertheless, I think a careful analysis shows that the MSA/Bh does

present a consistent discourse. We may get a better feel for the MSA/Bh as a text concerned with theoretical reflections on the Mahayanathrough examining its presentation of the three-nature theory.

EXEGESIS OF THETRISVABH AVA IN THEMAH AY ANAS UTR ALAM _

K ARA/-BH AS _YA

Thefirst extended discussion of the three-nature theory in the MSA/Bh

occurs in the context of a group of verses dealing with the distinctionbetween reality (tattva) and illusion (maya) (MSA/Bh 11.15–29). Theseverses are preceded by two verses on the investigation of reality(dharmatatva-paryes

_t_i ); the first of these two verses (11.13) and its

commentary state:

7 To complete this picture of Yogacara thought, other phases would certainlyhave to be added, including for example that of the Indian commentators (e.g.,Dharmapala and Sthiramati) and the distinctly Chinese phases.

M. D’AMATO188

tattvam:

yat satatam:

dvayena rahitam:

bhrantes ca sam:

nisrayah:

sakyam:

naiva ca sarvathabhilapitum:

yac caprapan ˜ catmakam:

/ jn ˜ eyam

:

heyam atho visodhyam amalam:

yac ca prakr:

tya matam:

yasyakasa-suvarn:

a-vari-sadr:

s klesad visuddhir mata//

Reality – which is always without duality, is the basis of error, and is entirelyinexpressible – does not have the nature of discursivity. It is to be known, aban-doned, and purified. It should properly be thought of as naturally immaculate, sinceit is purified from defilements, as are space, gold, and water.

Here reality is said to be similar to space, gold, and water: it isnaturally pure and defiled only adventitiously. The next verse goes on

to state that there is nothing else in the world besides this funda-mentally pure reality. Thus at an ontological level the MSA/Bh positsthat, even though it serves as the basis of error, reality is funda-mentally pure. Thus we see a distinction between reality as it is initself, and reality as it appears through error – when it is

adventitiously defiled. The commentary to 11.13 aligns each of thethree descriptions of reality offered in the verse with one of the threenatures. Reality ‘‘which is always without duality’’ is the imaginednature ( parikalpita-svabhava): the imagined nature is without dualitybecause of its absolute non-existence (atyantam asatvat). Realitywhich ‘‘is the basis of error’’ is the dependent nature ( paratantra-

svabhava): the dependent nature is the basis of error because imagi-nation occurs through it. And reality which ‘‘is entirely inexpressible’’is the perfected nature ( parinis

:

panna-svabhava): the perfected naturesimply does not have the nature of discursivity; it is inexpressible.MSABh ad 11.13 further states that the first – the imagined nature – is to be known, the second – the dependent nature – is to be aban-doned, and the third – the perfected nature – is to be purified.

From this verse and its commentary we can see that the threenatures are presented as a complete model of reality.8 The three-nature theory presents reality in three aspects: as an erroneousappearance, as a basis of error, and as it is in itself. Keeping these

points in mind, we may now turn to the verses on the distinction

8 It should be noted that this ontological model is appropriately placed in astandard Mahayana context at MSA/Bh 14.34, which states that emptiness ( sunyata)fully understood is threefold: the emptiness of the imagined nature, the emptiness of the dependent nature, and the emptiness of the perfected nature. MSA/Bh 11.50 alsodiscusses three types of absence of nature ( nih

:

svabhavatva), although there only the parikalpita-laks

:

an:

a is specifically mentioned. Furthermore, at MSABh ad 12.17the three natures are described as without an inherent nature ( nih

:

svabhava). Thus theMSA/Bh understands all three natures to be empty.


between reality (tattva) and illusion (maya). In the first verse of thisgroup (11.15), the text characterizes unreal imagination and the errorof duality:

yatha maya tathabhuta-parikalpo nirucyate/yatha maya-kr

:

tam:

tadvat dvaya-bhrantir nirucyate//

yatha maya yantra-parigr:

htam:

bhranti-nimittam:

kas:

t:

ha-los:

t:

adikam:

tathabhuta-parikalpah

:

paratantrah:

svabhavo veditavyah:

/ yatha maya-kr:

tam:

tasyam:

mayayam:

hasty-asva-suvarn:

ady-akr:

tis9 tad-bhavena pratibhasita tatha tasminn abhuta-parikalpedvaya-bhrantir grahya-grahakatvena pratibhasita parikalpita-svabhavakara veditavya/

Unreal imagination is explained to be just like an illusion. Likewise, the error of duality is explained to be just like the effect of an illusion.

Unreal imagination – the dependent nature – should be known to be just like anillusion – something formed from a piece of wood or a lump of clay, for example,that has the mark of error, and is apprehended through magic. The error of duality – the mode of appearance of the imagined nature, which manifests as subject andobject in unreal imagination – should be known to be just like the effect of an illusion – the appearance of an elephant, a horse, or gold, for example, in an illusion, whichmanifests through the production of the [illusion].

In this verse and commentary unreal imagination (abhuta-parikalpa) issaid to be like an illusion, while the appearance of duality is said to belike the effect of an illusion. The trope of a magical illusion plays an

important role in this group of verses.10 This trope is used because itallows for an important ontological distinction to be made, the dis-tinction between the dependent nature ( paratantra-svabhava) and theimagined nature ( parikalpita-svabhava). According to the commen-tary, two aspects of the illusion need to be understood: the illusionitself, and the appearance of unreal objects that are the effect of theillusion. The illusion itself is identified with unreal imagination, which

is then equated with the dependent nature. The effect of the illusion(i.e., the appearance of unreal objects) is identified as the error of duality; this is the mistaken construction of the play of appearancesinto subject (the self or ego) and objects (which are taken to beexternal to the self or ego). This construction of appearances into

9 Note that the term akr:

ti is only used by the text in this group of verses (11.15– 29), and has been translated as ‘‘appearance,’’ in the sense of ‘‘mere appearance.’’The term akara, however, is used in a number of places throughout the text, and maybe translated as ‘‘mode of appearance.’’ Furthermore, while the term akr

:

ti has anegative connotation in the text, akara has a positive connotation – e.g., MSA 9.2identifies buddhahood as the attainment of sarvakara-j ~nata: an awareness of allmodes of appearance.

10 This trope also plays an important role in the Trisvabhavanirdesa vv. 27–34.

M. D’AMATO190

subject and object is equated with the mode of appearance of theimagined nature.

Continuing with the trope of the magical illusion, the next verse(11.16) states:

yatha tasmin na tad-bhavah:

paramarthas tathes:

yate/yatha tasyopalabdhis tu tatha sam

:

vr:

ti-satyata//

The non-existence of the [unreal object] in the [illusion] should be known as theultimate [truth]. But the perception of the [unreal object] should be known as theconventional truth.

Here the text brings the categories of ultimate truth and conventionaltruth into play. It states that in ultimate truth, no unreal objectsactually exist in the illusion; there is only the appearance of unreal

objects. And the perception of those objects of unreal imagination isto be understood as conventional truth. The commentary also statesthat the duality of the imagined nature does not exist in the depen-dent nature: although conventionally the dependent nature doesappear to have the characteristic of duality, in ultimate truth, the

dependent nature is devoid of the duality of the imagined nature.A later verse (11.19) clarifies the relationship between existence and

non-existence:

tad-akr:

tis ca tatrasti tad bhavas ca na vidyate/tasmad astitva-nastitvam

:

mayadis:

u vidhyate//

The appearance of the [illusion] exists, but the object does not; therefore bothexistence and non-existence are attributed to illusions, etc.

Here the appearance of the illusion itself (earlier equated with thedependent nature) is said to be existent, but the objects that appear(earlier equated with the imagined nature) – the dualistic constructionsthat are the effect of the illusion – are said to be non-existent. So illusionsand other such appearances have the characteristics of both existenceand non-existence. The following brief chart summarizes the text’s

claims regarding unreal imagination and the appearance of duality:

unreal imagination appearance of duality

metaphorically: the illusion itself

ontologically: the dependent nature

it exists conventionally

metaphorically: the effect of the illusion

ontologically: the imagined nature

it does not exist conventionally

(although it appears conventionally)

Again, two aspects are to be distinguished here. There is the occur-rence of unreal imagination; unreal imagination does exist, just as an


illusion itself may be said to exist; and unreal imagination is identifiedwith the dependent nature in the MSA/Bh’s tripartite ontologicalscheme. But there is also the appearance of duality, which is the falseconstruction of unreal imagination into a distinct subject and distinct

objects; this duality of subject and object does not actually exist, justas the objects which appear in an illusion do not actually exist; andthe appearance of duality is identified with the function of the ima-gined nature.

The final verse of interest to us in this section is 11.17:

tad-abhave yatha vyaktis tan-nimittasya labhyate/tathasraya-paravr

:

ttav asat kalpasya labhyate//

Just as in the absence of the [effect of an illusion] the manifestation of its cause isperceived, so too in the transformation of the basis the unreality of imagination isperceived.

Here the transformation of the basis ( asraya-paravr:

tti ) is introducedinto the discussion. According to the text, when the transformation of the basis occurs, the non-existence of imagination will be perceived.That is to say, when the transformation of the basis occurs, it will beunderstood that neither the conventional self or ego, nor the con-

ventional objects which appear to the self or ego actually exist assuch. They will both be understood to be constructions built upfrom the manifold play of appearances. This verse is interesting inthat it links the three-nature theory to the process (or, better, set of related processes) known as the transformation of the basis. Wewill see this link clarified further in the next relevant section of the

MSA/Bh.The next extended presentation of the three-nature theory (here

described in terms of the three characteristics) occurs in the context of a discussion of the indicator (laks

:

an:

a), the indicated (laks:

ya), and theprocess of indication (laks

:

an:

a) (MSA/Bh 11.36–43). In these verses

the indicator is described in terms of the dependent, the imagined,and the perfected ( paratantra, parikalpita, and parinis

:

panna, respec-tively); the indicated is described in terms of the five abhidharmacategories (vij ~nana, rupa, caitasika, citta-viprayukta, and asam

:

skr:

ta);and the process of indication – the process which allows for theassociation of the indicator with the indicated – is described in termsof the five stages of yoga ( pa~ncavidha yogabhumi ).

The imagined characteristic ( parikalpita-laks:

an:

a) is explained at11.38–39. Here the imagined characteristic is said to be threefold: it is

M. D’AMATO192

comprised of the sign of the conceptualization of objects in terms of discourse ( yatha-jalpartha-sam

:

j ~na-nimitta), the tendencies (vasana)that arise due to that discourse, and the perception of objects (artha)that arises due to those tendencies. Thus the imagined characteristic is

described as arising out of discourse: through discourse, objects areconceptualized, tendencies arise which are directed towards thoseconceptualized objects, and distinct objects are perceived.

The perfected characteristic ( parinis:

panna-laks:

an:

a) is discussed at11.41. In this verse and its commentary the perfected characteristic isdescribed in three ways: in terms of non-existence and existence – it isnon-existent due to the imagined nature of all phenomena, but

existent in the absence of that imagination; in terms of non-pacificationand pacification – non-pacification refers to the adventitious natureof the defilements ( agantukopaklesa), and pacification refers to theoriginal purity of reality; and in terms of the absence of imagination –

the perfected characteristic does not have the nature of discursivity(nis

:

prapa~ncata). From these three descriptions we can see that theperfected characteristic is described in terms of the text’s conception of reality itself: it is existent, originally pure, and without the nature of discursivity. This point is made even clearer in the first line of thecommentary to 11.41, which states that the perfected characteristic isthusness (tathata).

The dependent characteristic ( paratantra-laks:

an:

a) is the object of perhaps the most interesting analysis in this group of verses. 11.40and its commentary state:

trividha-trividhabhaso grahya-grahaka-laks:

an:

ah:

/abhuta-parikalpo hi paratantrasya laks

:

an:

am:

//

tatra trividhabhasah:

padabhaso ’rthabhaso dehabhasas ca/ punas trividhabhasomana-udgraha-vikalpabhasah

:

/ mano yat klis:

t:

am:

sarvada/ udgrahah:

pan ˜ ca vijn ãna-kayah

:

/vikalpo mano-vijn ãnam:

tatra prathama-trividhabhaso grahya-laks:

an:

ah:

/dvityo grahaka-laks

:

an:

ah:

/ ity ayam abhuta-parikalpah:

paratantrasya laks:

an:

am:

/

The threefold–threefold appearance has the characteristic of object and subject; it isunreal imagination, which is the characteristic of the dependent.

The threefold appearance is the appearance of words, the appearance of meanings,and the appearance of forms. Also, the threefold appearance is the appearance of mind, apprehension, and conceptual discrimination. Mind is that which is alwaysdefiled. Apprehension is the five sensory consciousnesses. Conceptual discrimina-tion is the mental consciousness. The first threefold appearance has the char-acteristic of the object; the second has the characteristic of the subject. This[threefold–threefold appearance] is unreal imagination, [which is] the characteristicof the dependent.


In this verse and commentary we see that the appearance of words,meanings, and forms (or referential objects) is understood as one aspectof the dependent characteristic ( paratantra-laks

:

an:

a): it is the dependentcharacteristic considered under the aspect of an object. Considered

under the aspect of a subject, the dependent characteristic is equatedwith the five sensory consciousnesses, mental consciousness, and thedefiled mind. According to one standard Yogacara model there areeight forms of consciousness in all: the six basic forms of consciousness(mental consciousness and thefive sensory consciousnesses); the defiledmind (klis

:

t:

a-manas) which serves as the basis of ego; and the storeconsciousness (alaya-vij ~nana) which serves as the basis of all other

forms of consciousness. The subject-aspect of the dependent char-acteristic corresponds to thefirst seven forms of consciousness. So from11.40 and its commentary we may infer the following structure:

dependent characteristic ( paratantra-laks:

an:

a)

object-aspect subject-aspect

appearance of words mind (defiled mind)

appearance of meanings apprehension (five sensory consciousnesses)

appearance of forms conceptual discrimination (mental consciousness)

[Note: these seven consciousnesses are based on

the store consciousness]

In order to understand the full import of these verses, it is necessary

to turn to a following section of the text, MSA/Bh 11.44–49, whichdeals with the topic of liberation (vimukti ). In this group of verses wesee that liberation is equated with the transformation of the depen-dent characteristic. Verse 11.44 and its commentary state:

padartha-deha-nirbhasa-paravr:

ttir anasravah:

/dhatur b ja-paravr

:

tteh:

sa ca sarvatragasrayah:

//

b ja -paravr:

t te r i ty alaya-vijn ˜ ana-paravr:

ttitah:

/padartha-deha-nirbhasanam:

vijn ãnanam:

paravr:

ttir anasravo dhatur vimuktih:

/sa ca sarvatragasrayah:

sravaka-pratyekabuddha-gatah

:

/

The transformation of the appearance of words, meanings, and forms is the undefiledrealm; it is due to the transformation of seeds; and it is a universal basis.

‘‘Due to the transformation of seeds,’’ means due to the transformation of thestore consciousness. The transformation of consciousnesses – which have theappearance of words, meanings, and forms – is the undefiled realm, which is liberation.And it is a universal basis because this occurs for sravakas and pratyekabuddhas[as well].

M. D’AMATO194

This verse and its commentary state that liberation is the transfor-mation of forms of consciousness which have the appearance of words, meanings, and forms; i.e., conscious modes of appearancewhich participate in dualistic conceptual constructions. The verse

states that this transformation comes about through the transfor-mation of seeds, which the commentary specifies as the transformationof the store consciousness (alaya-vij ~nana). The term alaya-vij ~nana,which has come to be closely associated with the Yogacara, appearsonly a limited number of times in the commentary, and it does notappear in the verse-text at all. Here in the commentary to 11.44, as inthe commentary to 19.49, the store consciousness is equated with

seeds, as in the seeds that contribute to, and are contributed by,moments of defiled consciousness. So when there is the transformationof these seeds – of the store consciousness – the result is a transfor-mation of the object-aspect of the dependent characteristic. It may also

be noted that this process – viz., the transformation of the object-aspect of the dependent characteristic – is said to occur for sravakasand pratyekabuddhas, as well as for bodhisattvas.

The next verse in this section discusses the transformation of thesubject-aspect of the dependent characteristic. 11.45 states:

caturdha vasitavr:

tter manasas codgrahasya ca/vikalpasyavikalpe hi ks

:

etre jn ãne ’tha karman:

i//

Due to the reversion of mind, apprehension, and conceptual discrimination, there arefour supremacies: in not conceptually discriminating, in a field, in awareness, and inaction.

According to the commentary the reversion (avr:

tti ) of mind, etc.means the transformation ( paravr

:

tti ) of them. Recall that the com-mentary to 11.40 had identified mind, apprehension, and conceptual

discrimination as the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic,so here the transformation of this aspect of the dependent char-acteristic is described. 11.46 and its commentary discuss the foursupremacies in further detail: the supremacies are said to begin on theeighth bodhisattva-stage, and the supremacy in a field is said to bedue to the complete purification of a buddha-field. Thus it is clear

that the transformation discussed here – viz., the transformation of the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic – is understood tooccur only for bodhisattvas.

Considering MSA/Bh 11.44–46 together with 11.40 we may seethat the dependent characteristic is clearly linked to the transfor-mation of the basis (asraya-paravr

:

tti ). Indeed, one important


interpretation of the transformation of the basis in the MSA/Bh is thetransformation of the dependent characteristic. As we saw above, thetransformation of the appearance of words, meanings, and forms – i.e., the object-aspect of the dependent characteristic – is due to the

transformation of seeds – i.e., the store consciousness, which is theground of the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic. Andthe transformation of the mind, apprehension, and conceptual dis-crimination – i.e., the subject-aspect of the dependent characteristic – is itself understood as a transformation of forms of consciousnessbased on the store consciousness. Thus it may be seen that thetransformation of the dependent characteristic – both as object and

as subject – entails the transformation of the store consciousness. Afurther important point to note from this discussion is that the MSA/Bh directly links the three-nature theory with an important conceptfor soteriological attainments – viz., asraya-paravr

:

tti . Thus while the

first group of verses we examined above (11.15–29) presents the three-nature theory as an ontological model, this group of verses presentsthat theory as a soteriological model: the three natures here do notrepresent a model of reality as much as a model of stages of onto-logical gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddhahood.

The final extended discussion of the three-nature theory in theMSA/Bh occurs in the context of a group of verses on thorough

knowledge of the way things really are ( yatha-bhuta-parij ~nana)(MSA/Bh 19.48–56). The first verse of interest to us is 19.49, whichstates:

pratis:

t:

ha-bhoga-b jam:

hi nimittam:

bandhanasya hi/sasrayas citta-caittas tu badhyante ’tra sab jakah

:

//

The sign of bondage is the dwelling, experience, and the seed. Mind and mentalfactors, along with their bases and their seeds, are bound.

In the commentary to this verse, the dwelling is identified as theinanimate world (bhajana-loka); experience is identified as the fivesense-objects of forms, sounds, etc.; and the seed – explained as theseed of the dwelling and of experience – is identified as the store

consciousness (alaya-vij ~nana). Mind and mental factors, along withtheir bases and seeds, are understood to be bound. And the seed of mind and mental factors is identified as the store consciousness. Wemay represent this verse and its commentary through the followingchart:

M. D’AMATO196

mind and mental factors

whose seed is the store consciousness

are bound to:

the threefold sign

dwelling = the inanimate world, whose seed is the

store consciousness;

experience = the five sense-objects, whose seed is the

store consciousness;

seed = the store consciousness itself.

Viewing the verse and commentary in this way allows us to see theimportance of the store consciousness to this interpretation. While it

is the mind and mental factors which are bound to the threefold sign,when viewed in terms of their basis or source of origin, it is actuallythe store consciousness that is bound to itself. It is the store con-sciousness that is at the root of both the subjective aspect of experience (mind and mental factors) and the experience of objects

(the threefold sign).The state of affairs described above is understood to obtain before

the attainment of awakening. A following verse (19.51) – whichintroduces the three-nature theory into the discussion – describes howthat state of affairs is brought to an end.

tathatalambanam:

jn ãnam:

dvaya-graha-vivarjitam:

/daus

:

t:

hulya-kaya-pratyaks:

am:

tat-ks:

aye dhmatam:

matam:

//

etena yatha-svabhava-traya-parijn ãnat paratantra-svabhava-ks:

ayaya sam:

vartate/tat-paridpitam

:

/ tathatalambanatvena parinis:

pannam:

svabhavam:

parijn ãya/ dvaya-graha-vivarjitatvena kalpitam

:

/ daus:

t:

hulya-kaya-pratyaks:

atvena paratantram:

/ tasyaivaks:

ayaya sam:

vartate daus:

t:

hulya-kayasyalaya-vijn ãnasya tat-ks:

ayartham:

tat-ks:

aye/

Awareness whose object is thusness is free of grasping after duality and perceives themultitude of hindrances. In the destruction of that, there is the knowledge of the wise.

What is pointed out by this [verse] comes about through thorough knowledge of thethree natures as they are, in order to bring about the destruction of the dependentnature. The perfected nature is known through its object of thusness; the imagined[nature], through freedom from grasping after duality; and the dependent [nature],through the perception of the multitude of hindrances. So [knowledge of the threenatures] is conducive to the destruction of [the multitude of hindrances]; [in the verse,the phrase] ‘‘in the destruction of that’’ means the destruction of the multitude of hindrances, which is the store consciousness.

Here it is explained that when the three natures are properly under-stood, the dependent nature will be brought to its termination. Thenotion of bringing the dependent nature to its end should be


considered in the context of the verses discussed earlier (11.40 and11.44–46), where we saw that liberation was interpreted in terms of the transformation of the dependent characteristic. At 11.40 thedependent characteristic was understood to be composed of two

aspects: the subject-aspect and the object-aspect. And the transfor-mation of each of those aspects of the dependent characteristic wasclosely related to the transformation of the store consciousness. Hereat 19.51 we also see that a close link is established between thedependent nature and the store consciousness (which is described in theverse as the multitude of hindrances). The dependent nature is said tobe understood through perceiving of the multitude of hindrances.11

And when the three natures are thoroughly understood, the result willbe the destruction of the dependent nature – which is also explained asthe destruction of the multitude of hindrances, or the store con-sciousness. This interpretation may be linked to 11.13 (discussed

above) which states that the dependent nature is the basis of error – and that it is something to be abandoned.

An important point to be noted from this group of verses is thatagain we see that the three-nature theory is presented as a soter-iological model: when the three natures are properly understood, thedestruction of the store consciousness will be brought about. So herethe three natures are not only presented as a model of reality, but also

as a model of forms of gnosis directed towards the termination of thestate of spiritual bondage. This interpretation of the three natures asforms of gnosis directed towards liberation may also be seen at 13.1,which links the three natures to the three standard entrances to

liberation: the concentration of the emptiness of the imaginednature (sunyata-samadhi parikalpitasya svabh avasya), the wishlessness(apran

:

ihita) of the dependent nature, and the signlessness (animitta)

of the perfected nature.12

11 A link between the dependent nature and the multitude of hindrances may alsobe seen at MSABh ad 6.9, which states that the multitude of faults ( dosa-sam

:

caya),which has the characteristic of hindrance ( daus

:

t:

hulya-laks:

an:

a), has its basis in thedependent nature. It should be noted, however, that the dependent nature is notmentioned in the Tibetan and Chinese versions of MSABh ad 6.9; see Levi (1911:54), note 1.

12 The interpretation of the three natures as a model of forms of gnosis may alsobe seen at MSABh ad 19.77 and ad 19.78, which identify the understanding ( bodha)of the three natures as a special understanding of bodhisattvas. And the link betweenthe three natures and soteriological attainment may also be seen at MSABh ad11.52, where the certainty that phenomena do not arise ( anutpattika-dharma-ks

:

anti ) – an important Mahayana realization – is partially explained in terms of the threenatures.

M. D’AMATO198

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TRISVABH AVA

One standard interpretation of the three natures may be given in thefollowing terms. The dependent nature is the basis or substratum of reality; it is comprised of a dependently arisen, interconnected web

of ever-changing representations, which are themselves empty of inherent nature. The imagined nature is the dependent nature whenviewed through a matrix of conceptual construction; the imaginednature sees the dependent nature as comprised of distinct entities withenduring, inherent natures. The perfected nature, however, is thedependent nature viewed without the conceptual matrix of the ima-gined nature.13

The MSA/Bh’s interpretation of the three natures, however, differsin a not insignificant way from what I have offered as the standardinterpretation. Before turning to the specifics of the MSA/Bh’salternate interpretation, I wish to emphasize that in the corpus of

Yogacara literature there is indeed strong support for the standardinterpretation. In fact, it seems to me to be a solid interpretation of the three-nature theory as presented in the classical texts of Asa ngaand Vasubandhu. But that a particular interpretation of a theory hasbecome dominant should not prevent us from noting and consideringalternate interpretations found in our sources. As Sponberg haspointed out (1983: 98):

Any attempt to come to terms with the three natures is further complicated, however,by additional historical problems. Our confusion regarding the doctrine has arisen,

13 For one presentation of what I am calling the standard interpretation, seeWilliams (1989: 82–85) ‘‘The conceptualized [imagined] aspect is the world as it isexperienced by everyday unenlightened folk, the world of really existing subjectsconfronting really existing and separate objects. It is… the realm of subject–objectduality… . The flow of perceptions which forms the basis for our mistaken con-structions is the dependent aspect… . The Mahayanasam

:

graha describes it as thesupport for the manifestation of non-existent and fictive things (2:2)… . Over-negation is to deny the substratum [viz., the dependent] which really, ultimately( paramartha) exists… . The final aspect is called the perfected aspect… . It is said tobe the complete absence, in the dependent aspect, of objects – that is, the objects of the conceptualized [imagined] aspect ( Mahayanasam

:

graha 2:4).’’ Further textualsupport for the standard interpretation of the three-nature theory may be found inthe Trim

:

sika, especially v. 21cd (ed. Levi 1925: 39): nis:

pannas tasya purven:

a sad arahitata tu y a/‘‘The perfected is the perpetual absence of the former in that.’’ As thecommentary explains, ‘‘the former’’ means ‘‘the imagined nature,’’ and ‘‘in that’’means ‘‘in the dependent nature.’’ According to one possible interpretation, theimplication here is that the dependent nature exists as the substratum or basis of reality, which may be viewed improperly (in terms of the imagined) or realized forwhat it is (in terms of the perfected).


in part, from the often unacknowledged fact that the various sources we employpresent the doctrine in different stages of its historical development. It is under-standably difficult to settle on one interpretation of the three natures when differenttextual accounts seem inconsistent.

I would agree with Sponberg that it is important to remain

exegetically sensitive to our sources, and not to assume that everypresentation of the three-nature theory found in Yogacara literatureshould be read through the lens of one standard interpretation.14

Briefly stated, the difference between the MSA/Bh’s interpreta-tion of the three-nature theory and the standard interpretation isthat the MSA/Bh does not emphasize the ultimate existence of the dependent nature. In the standard account offered above,

the dependent nature is understood to be ultimately real since it isthe basis or substratum of reality itself: although the dependentnature is empty of inherent nature, it does ultimately exist. In theMSA/Bh, however, the existence of the dependent nature is not ulti-

mately affirmed (although it is, of course, conventionally affirmed).In discussing the non-duality of the ultimate, the commentary to6.1 states that the ultimate is not existent because of the imaginedand dependent characteristics, but it is not non-existent because of the perfected characteristic. This implies that the dependent char-acteristic does not ultimately exist. And in the commentary to18.81, the dependent characteristic is said to be impermanent

(anitya), as the imagined characteristic is declared to be. So herethe dependent characteristic is not presented as the existent basisor substratum of reality, but rather is categorized with the (non-existent) imagined characteristic. Also at 11.13, the commentarystates that the dependent nature is to be abandoned ( praheyam).Such a statement would be unreasonable if the dependent nature

were understood to be the basis or substratum of reality, giventhat the ultimate goal posited by the text is assimilation to realityitself. Furthermore, the commentary to 19.51 states that thoroughknowledge of the three natures brings about the termination of thedependent nature. Again, this would not be reasonable if the

14 Of course I intend this statement to apply to one operating in an exegeticalmode; in a philosophical mode, one may construct arguments intending to demon-strate that some particular interpretation of the three-nature theory ought to beaccepted, or ought to function as the lens through which other interpretations areassessed.

M. D’AMATO200

dependent nature were understood to be the ultimate substratumof reality.15

So in the MSA/Bh, the dependent nature is categorized with theimagined nature, and is discussed in terms of the phenomenal or

conventional aspect of reality. The difference between the imaginednature and the dependent nature, according to the MSA/Bh, is thatthe imagined nature is conventional reality viewed through a matrixof conceptual construction, where the representations that appear aretaken to be distinct objects with inherent natures; in the dependentnature, on the other hand, the representations that appear areunderstood to be themselves illusory. According to 11.16, in ultimate

truth, there is not the existence of the imagined nature in thedependent nature.16

In the MSA/Bh, the perfected nature is the only one of the threenatures that is posited as ultimately existent. In the commentary to

11.41, the perfected characteristic is equated with thusness ( tathata),an important term for ultimate reality in the text. And in the com-mentary to 11.13, the perfected nature is said to be naturally purified( prakr

:

tya vi suddha) from defilements, which is itself a characteristicof ultimate reality, as described by the MSA/Bh. And at 9.78, the

15 Further support for these claims may be found in the Sam:

dhinirmocana-sutra’strope of the three natures in terms of having diseased vision, where the imagined is‘‘like the defects of clouded vision,’’ the dependent is ‘‘like the appearance of themanifestations of clouded vision . . . which appear as a net of hairs,’’ and the perfectedis ‘‘like the unerring objective reference, the natural objective reference of the eyeswhen that person’s eyes have become pure and free from the defects of cloudedvision’’ (trans. Powers 1995: 83; Tib., ibid.: 82, 84; cf. French trans. Lamotte 1935:189; Tib., ibid.: 61). One possible implication here is that viewing things in termsof the dependent – in terms of the manifestations of clouded vision – must beabandoned. I do not claim that every statement about the three natures in theSam

:

dhinirmocana may be interpreted in terms of denying the ultimate existence of the dependent; after all, as Lamotte (1935: 25), May (1971: 276), Boquist (1993:Chapter 2), and others have pointed out, the s utra is probably a compilation, andseems to comprise different approaches to the three-nature theory. But Powers alsotranslates the following relevant passage from a canonical commentary to the s utra – the Arya-sam

:

dhinirmocana-sutra-vyakhyana (Peking 5845):

The other-dependent character is produced by the power of other conditions but isnot [produced] through its nature. Therefore – since it exists merely [like] amagician’s illusions in terms of conventional truths – it is a lack of own-being dueto being a lack of own-being in terms of production… it is not an ultimate lack of own-being because it is not an ultimate truth.… the thoroughly established{perfected} character is the ultimate. (trans. Powers 1995: 334, note 3)

16 Note that the claim, ‘‘According to ultimate truth, x is not in y,’’ does not entailthat x or y must ultimately exist.


perfected nature is described as ultimately existent ( parama-

vidyamanata), while the imagined nature is described as non-existent.Also, the commentary to 19.79 equates the comprehension of theperfected with buddhahood; in that buddhahood may be understood

as the awareness of thusness, here the perfected is again related tothusness. Furthermore, the commentary to 20–21.60–61 states thatpurified thusness (vi suddha tathata) is the perfected (nis

:

panna), whichis the ultimate ( paramartha). So here it can be seen that the perfectednature is brought together with terms for ultimate reality. Therefore,according to the MSA/Bh’s interpretation of the three natures, it isnot the dependent nature that is ultimately real or that functions as

the substratum of reality; rather, it is the perfected nature that isultimately real.

The following diagram may further help to clarify the MSA/Bh’sinterpretation of the three natures through showing how the three

natures relate to the distinction between the conventional and theultimate:

CONVENTIONAL REALITY

(phenomena)

reality improperly viewed

in terms of conceptual

construction and the

subject–object distinction: imagined nature

reality properly viewed as

unreal imagination, as an

illusion where apparent

objects are not taken as real: dependent nature

ULTIMATE REALITY

(thusness)

non-conceptually-constructing

awareness of thusness: perfected nature

Again, it should be emphasized that conventional reality and ultimatereality are not taken to be distinct; conventional reality is reality asviewed from the perspective of sentient minds, while ultimate realityis reality as viewed from the perspective of buddha-mind.17

17 While I cannot, of course, enter here into the intricacies of Tibetan inter-pretations of the three natures, it is worth pointing out that the ontological status of

M. D’AMATO202

Given that the three-nature doctrine pertains to differences inperspectives on reality, it would be inappropriate to characterize thisdoctrine as a purely ontological model employed by the MSA/Bh.Rather, the text’s three-nature doctrine is better understood as a so-

teriologico-ontological model: it is a model that identifies stages of ontological gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain buddha-hood. These stages of ontological gnosis may be specified in the fol-lowing terms. Ordinary sentient beings confront reality in terms of asubject–object distinction and thereby construct the flow of appearances into distinct entities with enduring natures; this is thelevel of the imagined nature. Then, when a sentient being comes to the

realization that conceptually constructed entities do not themselvesexist at all, but that the illusion which is the basis of these constructions(unreal imagination) does conventionally exist as an interdependentweb of causes and conditions, that is the level of the dependent nature.

Finally, when the termination of the illusion is brought about – whenthe basis of the matrix of conceptual construction is abandoned –

(Footnote 17 continued).the dependent – i.e., whether it is to be understood as conventionally or ultimatelyexistent – is indeed a point of controversy addressed by Tsong kha pa in his treatment of the Sam

:

dhinirmocana-sutra (see Hopkins, 1999: 153ff.; also see Hopkins, 2002: 233ff.).Forexample, Tsong kha pa cites the following passage as one whichhe intends to refute:

Imputational {imagined} factors do not exist as either of the two truths [ultimateor conventional]. The dependent-arisings of other-powered {dependent} natures of apprehended-objects and apprehending-subjects [which are different substantialentities] exist conventionally [and do not exist ultimately], like magical creations.The thoroughly established {perfected} nature is the ultimate, and its existence inthe manner of naturelessness also ultimately exists. (trans. Hopkins, 1999: 156)

Also, from reading Hopkins’ work, it is my impression that the Jo nang pa inter-pretation of the three-nature theory seems to be closer to my interpretation of theMSA/Bh’s three-nature theory than Tsong kha pa is. In this connection, Stearnsstates that according to Dol po pa:

The fully established [perfected] nature ( parinis:

panna) is the state of ultimatereality which can withstand rigorous and reasoned examination from the absolutepoint of view, and is empty of both the imagined and the dependent natures. Inthis way all the imagined and dependent phenomena are non-existent in reality,whereas the fully established [perfected] nature is fully established in reality, isnever non-existent as the true nature of phenomena, and always exists in truth.(Stearns, 1999: 95)

Stearns also points out that Dol po pa considers the Mahayanasutralam:

k ara to beGreat Madhyamaka, i.e., a text presenting the highest teachings (ibid.: 218, note 26).


buddhahood, an unmediated awareness of thusness, is attained; this isthe level of the perfected nature. The key, then, to understanding thedoctrine of the three natures in the MSA/Bh is to interpret the doctrinein soteriologico-ontological terms: the three-nature doctrine is not a

model of reality simpliciter; rather, it is a model of how reality is to berealized for the attainment of buddhahood.

This interpretation of the three natures may be considered along-side the MSA/Bh’s presentation of the doctrines of mind-only (citta-

matra) and representation-only (vij ~napti-matra). The doctrines of mind-only and representation-only have sometimes been understoodas hallmark doctrines of the Yogacara: it has sometimes been stated

that the Yogacara is metaphysically idealist because of the claimthat reality is ‘‘nothing but mind’’ (citta-matra) or ‘‘nothing butrepresentation’’ (vij ~napti-matra). According to the MSA/Bh, however,the doctrines of representation-only and mind-only are not to be

understood as ultimately valid, since in the end the goal is to realizethat even mind does not exist.18 Thus in the context of our text, mind-only and representation-only (like the three natures) are betterunderstood as soteriologico-ontological doctrines: they do not representreality as it really is; rather, they identify stages of ontological gnosisthat must be traversed in order to attain buddhahood.

As with the doctrine of the three natures, we may chart out the

stages of ontological gnosis according to the doctrine of mind-only orrepresentation-only in terms of the distinction between the conven-tional and ultimate aspects of reality:

CONVENTIONAL REALITY

(phenomena)

reality improperly viewed in

terms of the subject–object

distinction; mind as distinct

from the objects that confront it: duality

reality properly viewed as

nothing-but-mind; all

phenomena reduced to mind: mind-only

ULTIMATE REALITY

(thusness)

not even mind taken to exist: buddhahood

18 MSABh ad 6.6–9 states that a bodhisattva first arrives at mind-only ( citta-matra), but later realizes that even mind-only does not exist; and MSABh ad 11.47states that a bodhisattva first attains the realization of representation-only ( vij ~napti-matra), but later does not even perceive the reality of that.

M. D’AMATO204

As presented, we can see that the doctrine of mind-only is quitesimilar in form to the doctrine of the three natures in the MSA/Bh.

But it may be interesting to note that the two doctrines are alsosimilar in content. We may specify this similarity as follows.Regarding the first element in each diagram, the imagined nature andduality, both are described in terms of the characteristic of subject-

object duality. Regarding the second element in each, the dependentnature and mind-only, we have already seen (at 11.40) that thedependent nature is interpreted as having two aspects, a subject-aspect and an object-aspect. We also saw that each of those aspects isunderstood to be caused by or grounded in the store consciousness(alaya-vij ~nana). Thus the dependent nature is interpreted in terms of the store consciousness – which is the basis of mind.19 The doctrine of

mind-only may be described as the view that reality is nothing-but-mind, that all phenomena should be reduced to mind. If we under-stand the concept of mind to be linked to the store consciousness (asat MSABh ad 19.76), then we can see a link between mind-only and

the dependent nature.20 At a more theoretical level, we may see thatboth the dependent nature (explained in terms of the store con-

sciousness) and mind-only (according to which all phenomena arereduced to mind) are offered as psychological models for the inter-pretation of phenomenal reality. That is to say, both offer a mentalexplanation for what are understood to be the underlying processesof phenomenal reality: phenomenal reality is unreal imagination

generated through the store consciousness, or phenomenal reality isnothing but mind. Finally, regarding the final element in each dia-gram, we can see that the perfected nature may be related to the stageof buddhahood, wherein not even ‘‘mind-only’’ is taken to exist. Theperfected nature is understood to entail a pure, unmediated awarenessof thusness, which is equated with the attainment of buddhahood.21

While the MSA/Bh’s presentation of the three-nature theory cer-

tainly brings together various terminologies and conceptual cate-gories, I think a case may be made that the text does offer a consistentinterpretation of the three natures. Again, the point I have attempted

19 The link between the dependent nature and the store consciousness is also madeat MSA/Bh 19.51.

20 An indirect link between these two is also made at MSABh ad 13.19.21 See MSA/Bh 9.4, 9.22, 9.56, 9.57, 9.81, 11.31, 11.41, 19.79, 20–21.60–61, and

the discussion in D’Amato ((2000), Chapter 7: Buddhatva).


to emphasize here is that in the context of the MSA/Bh, the three-nature theory is properly understood not as an ontological modelsimpliciter, but rather as a soteriologico-ontological model, a modelpresenting stages of gnosis that must be traversed in order to attain

buddhahood – an attainment which may be interpreted in terms of anon-conceptually-constructing awareness (nirvikalpa-j ~nana) of thus-ness (tathata).

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