Dalla Rosa - Dominating the Auspices

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DOMINATING THE AUSPICES:AUGUSTUS, AUGURY AND THE PROCONSULS

Alberto Dalla Rosa

It is well known that augury played a very important part in the construction ofAugustus’ own image as founder of a new era for the city of Rome. Augustus washimself an augur and made frequent use of augural symbols on coins and onmonuments. Through the performance of the ancient rite of the augurium salutis in the year 29 BC, Octavian was celebrated as the bringer of peace to the State,

and the ceremony was repeated several times before Augustus’ death in AD 14.1 Moreover, the name Augustus itself had a clear and acknowledged connectionwith augurium.2 This title had an obvious religious meaning, but it had some po-litical implications as well. Octavian and the leading intellectuals of his era (suchas Varro, Livy and Ovid), were well aware of the significant role of augury in thecity’s foundation and beyond. The augural law concerned a number of aspects ofRoman private, religious and political life.3 The validity of numerous acts carriedout by magistrates depended on the goodness of their auspicationes and this againdepended on their conformity with the augural rules.4 This is why Cicero con-sidered the augurate the most important priesthood for the correct and virtuous lifeof the State, and the auspices one of the two pillars of the Republic, together withthe Senate.5 The written nature of the libri augurales meant that any change tothem had to be approved by the college of the augurs, although in our evidencethere is only one case in which this procedure is attested, and that was when Cae-sar was created dictator by a praetor and not by a consul as was customary. Sincethe augural law did not allow the dictio by anyone other than a consul, an officialdecretum augurum was needed to change the rule and to give the dictatorship toCaesar in the consuls’ absence from Rome.6

1 Suet. Aug . 31.4; Cass. Dio 51.20.4. On the rite cf. Linderski 1986, 2255-2256; on the politicalsignificance for Octavian cf. Linderski 1986, 2226 and 2291; more recently Kearsley 2009,who exaggerates the role played by the augurium salutis in the process that eventually gavesole rule to Augustus.

2 Ov. Fast. 1.593-616.3 An interesting discussion of the intellectual debate about augury in Augustus’ time is found

in Green 2009.4 This fact led Giovannini 1998, 106 to compare the augural college with a modern constitu-

tional court.5 Cic. Rep. 2.17: duo firmamenta rei publicae. The most notable statement about the role of the

augurs in the State can be found in Cic. Leg. 2.20-21 and particularly in 2.31-33. Other Cice-ronian passages concerning this priesthood are usefully collected by Tucker 1976.

6 Cic. Att. 9.9.3.





Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls 245

1. THE CARRINAS EPISODE AND ITS INTERPRETATION

After the expiration of the triumvirate, Octavian had to reinvent his position in theRepublic.8 He could count on being designated consul for 31, and on the supportof the vast army that he was readying for the war against Cleopatra and Antony. Nonetheless, Octavian needed something more to demonstrate that he was notfighting in his own interests, but on behalf of the Republic. He wanted to identifyhimself with the entire State, binding every citizen, Roman or peregrine, of thewestern part of the empire to himself through a solemn oath. Augustus himselfrecalls that circumstance in his Res gestae (§ 25) saying that more than 700 sena-tors fought under his standards ( sub signis meis). The best men, the boni, the oneswho were to receive the highest honores of the Republic, were all with Octavian,who was joined by a considerable number of equites too.

The oath did not give Octavian any real new power, but instead provided him

with an auctoritas greater than that of any other aristocrat.9 He conducted thecampaign against Antony and Cleopatra on the basis of his consular imperium.The new role that Octavian gave to the consulship was in itself relevant and wasclearly used in opposition to Antony, who continued to style himself as triumvir.

Obviously the new position sought by Caesar’s heir inevitably entailed conse-quences for the holders of imperium, whether they were magistrates or pro-magistrates. In this context, it is important to recall the events of C. Carrinas’ tri-umph, which was held either on the 12th of June or on the 14th of July 28 BC, andwhich was shared with Octavian for reasons that have not yet been fully clarified.C. Carrinas, whose father was a victim of the Sullan proscriptions, was one of theleading Caesarian generals. He campaigned against Sextus Pompeius in Spain in45, was suffect consul in 43, stood in for Octavian and fought for him againstSextus Pompeius again in Sicily in 36. Finally, as proconsul of Gallia Comata, hewas victorious against the Morini and other German peoples who had crossed theRhine and invaded Roman territory. For these achievements he was granted a tri-umph, which he held on the Ides of June or July in 28. It is generally agreed thathis proconsulship should be placed in 30-29, because such a date would fit wellwith the date of his triumph. This is however not the only possible solution. The

8 A reconstruction of the last years of the triumvirate from a constitutional perspective is given by Girardet 1990a. His view on the date of the expiration of the triumvirate and on Octa-vian’s position until 27 BC has been challenged by Roddaz 2003, 405-406, and by Vervaet2008, 40-44. The problem is far from being resolved, but it is undeniable that Octavian con-

tinued to hold some triumviral prerogatives after dropping the title.9 A connection between this oath and the consensus uniuersorum of RG 34 is proposed by

Kunkel 1969, 320. Some scholars conjectured that an actual plebiscite gave Octavian ex-traordinary command (Kienast 1999, 59 n. 240); another interpretation sees the oath as a le-gitimisation of Octavian’s usurped triumviral authority (Kromayer 1888, 17-19; Herrmann1968, 78-80; Petzold 1969, 343-351; Fadinger 1969, 145 n.1; De Martino 1972-75, 107-109;Bleicken 1998, 93; Reinhold 2002, 97-98). But, as Girardet 1990a, 345-346 suggested, Octa-vian’s position in 32 could have been that of a prorogued triumuir with a designation for theconsulship for the next year (cf. von Premerstein 1937, 42-43).



246 Alberto Dalla Rosa

only narrative of Carrinas’ triumph is provided by Cassius Dio:10

For Gaius Carrinas had subdued the Morini and others who had revolted with them, and hadrepulsed the Suebi, who had crossed the Rhine to wage war. Not only did Carrinas, therefore,celebrate the triumph – and that notwithstanding that his father had been put to death by Sullaand that he himself along with the others in like condition had once been debarred from hold-ing office – but Caesar also celebrated it, since the credit of the victory properly belonged tohis position as supreme commander (transl. E. Cary).

This passage comes just after Dio’s account of the first day of the triple triumphof Octavian and the narrative gives the clear impression that it was on this firstday that the future princeps claimed for himself the achievements of the proconsulof Gaul.11 The explanation given by Dio is simple: Carrinas did not possess theautokrator arche. This, and similar expressions like strategos autokrator , are of-ten used by Dio to identify a generic supreme commander or, more precisely in

relation to Roman warfare, an independent imperium-holder, namely a magistrateor promagistrate fighting under his own auspicia.12 Such status was the basic pre-requisite for a triumph, and therefore Dio’s discussion might suggest that Carrinaswas not an independent commander, but one subordinate to Octavian. However,we know from the fasti triumphales Capitolini,13 that, at the time of his achieve-ments, Carrinas was proconsul and therefore should have been fighting under hisown auspicia, for it had always been the rule to give this title only to consuls whohad had their imperium prorogued or to private men who had been provided withconsular imperium and who were campaigning independently.

The problem posed by Carrinas’ case has prompted modern scholars to recon-sider the relationship between the proconsuls and the triumvirs, and that between

the proconsul and Octavian/Augustus.

14

Our sources always take for granted asuperiority of Octavian, and this fact has been interpreted in many ways. One so-lution is to take a stance similar to that of Cassius Dio who imagined that therewas some continuity between the triumviral period and the years 32-28, and whotherefore justified the subordination of the proconsuls by the fact that the trium-virs and later Octavian had the right to appoint them. For this reason the procon-suls could not be regarded as supreme commanders, and consequently every tri-

10 Cass. Dio 51.21.6. Cf. Freyburger-Roddaz 1991, 158 n. 204-205.11 There is no mention of the Gallic and German tribes defeated by Carrinas in the accounts of

the first day of the triumph given by Suet. Aug. 22 and Livy Per. 133.12 The relevant passages are Cass. Dio 51.21.6 (about C. Carrinas); 51.24.4 (about M. Licinius

Crassus and the spolia opima); 18.57.81 (consul’s superiority over a praetor in a dispute overthe right to triumph); 36.23.4 (Pompey as supreme commander in the war against the pirates);36.36.2-3 (Roman independent commanders, opposed to lieutenants); 39.14.2 (chief of anembassy); 40.18.3 (Roman expedition commander); 40.28.2 (Crassus commander-in-chief atCarrhae); 42.57.5 (Metellus Scipio commander of the Pompeian army at Thapsus); 43.30.2(Scapula commander of the Pompeian army in Spain); 48.41.5 (Ventidius, Antony’s legate,not awarded with any honour because he did not fight independently).

13 InscrIt 13.1.86-87, 344-345, 570; for Carrinas’ career cf. PIR2 C 447.14 Rich 1996, 97 denies that the episode is reliable; contra Östenberg 1999, 160.




umph they celebrated was a kind concession granted by the rulers, rather than alegitimate right.15 Another solution is based upon two passages from Cicero’s De

diuinatione and De natura deorum that seem to affirm that promagistrates, andtherefore priuati cum imperio too, did not possess auspicia at all. If this were thecase, it would have been easy for Octavian to cast doubt on the legitimacy of theauspices of every proconsul and it could have been on this basis that he sharedCarrinas’ triumph, gradually assuming for himself and his family a control of themilitary auspicia and of the religiously correct conduct of warfare.16 Evidence forthis permanent constitutional shift may be provided by an inscription fromTripolitania, dated to AD 7-8, in which the proconsul Cossus Cornelius Lentulusis praised for his victory over the Gaetulians in a war conducted under the auspices of Augustus.17

The circumstances surrounding the Carrinas episode are far from clear, butany explanation for Octavian’s supremacy that is based upon the idea of a perma-

nent constitutional reform risks falling short of providing a reason for the numer-ous triumphs accorded to the proconsuls in the period from 31 to 19 BC. Had theauspical prerogatives of Octavian been so strong, or those of the proconsuls soweak, cases such as that of Carrinas would have been the rule, but because thereare so many cases in which the bestowing of military honours worked as usual, I believe it is easier to assume that the case of Carrinas was the result of an ad hoc

15 Cass. Dio 48.41.4 wondered how Cn. Domitius Calvinus could have been saluted as imper-ator for his victories in Spain, for, he says, the region had been assigned to Octavian, whohad to be the legitimate imperator . Even if not stated openly, Dio probably continued to thinkin this way for the subsequent period between Actium and 27 BC. Mommsen 1887, 1.130-

132 assumed the total superiority of the triumvirs, justifying the granting of a triumph withthe concession of a fictive imperium to the provincial governors; Schumacher 1985, 191-209considers the existence of a maior potestas, that would prevent the proconsuls from getting atriumph if they fought in the same region as one of the triumvirs. A clearer perspective on thesubject is given by Roddaz 1996, 82-87.

16 This position is set out in the excellent series of articles dedicated to imperium and the magis-tracies of the late Republic by K. M. Girardet, particularly in Girardet 1990a, 118-126 andGirardet 1992, 218-220. His ideas have been followed by Hurlet 2001 and then further devel-oped in Hurlet 2006b, 164-173, with some important differences: Girardet dates to 19 BC thereform that introduced the five year interval between the tenure of the praetorship or the con-sulship and the provincial government, thus preventing the proconsuls from taking regularauspicia. This settlement had then paved the way for another act, this time giving to Augus-tus the monopoly of the auspices. Hurlet, in his most recent contribution on the problem, doesnot think that the proconsuls’ auspicia were considered void, but instead gives them an infe-

rior status (auspicia minora) in relation to those of the princeps (auspicia maiora), in thesame way as the auspices of the consuls and the praetors were superior to those of the lessermagistrates. A more general assumption of a concentration of the military auspices in thehands of Augustus is expressed, with some differences, by Mommsen 1887-1888, 1.101;Gagé 1930a, Gagé 1930b, Gagé 1933; Grant 1950, 59-72 and 167-169; Rüpke 1990, 241;Cecconi 1991, 16-17; Pani 1997, 243-244; Scheid 1998, 100-101; Itgenshorst 2004, 452. Thetheory of a de facto monopolisation is defended by Kneissl 1969; Eck 1984, 139; Eck 2006,59; Beard 2007, 295-305.

17 IRT 301.




solution, and therefore constituted an exception. In order to verify this, the first point that has to be considered is whether or not the proconsuls possessed auspi-

cia, and subsequently, whether or not these auspicia could be considered vitiated.The history of the auspices is a long one. According to tradition, it predatesthe birth of Rome, as Romulus founded the city auspicato.18 Auspicationes weretaken before a great number of activities, both private and public, such as thecrossing of a river, the convening of an assembly of the Senate or the people, orthe commencing of battle. Magistrates, after their nomination, had to take an auspication prior to entering office in order to validate their authority over the citi-zens.19 They had to take the auspices before crossing the pomerium at the head ofthe Roman army. In a solemn ceremony on the Capitol, the magistrate asked thegods to let him lead the army of the Roman people against the enemy under hisown command and his own auspices. After this act, he had his imperium grantedoutside the pomerium, in the military sphere (imperium militiae), until he returned

to the city, crossing the pomerium again and thus relinquishing his military power.20 This particular aspect of the duration of military powers allowed Q. Pub-lilius Philo to conclude the siege of Naples in 326 BC having set aside his urbanmagistracy, but still holding a regular imperium militiae until he victoriously re-turned to Rome. This was the first case of ‘prorogation’, not of the magistracy, butof the imperium based on the auspication taken during the magistracy and prior todeparture for war. War had always been considered to be an activity that was con-centrated in the period between March and October 21 and therefore no magistratewas ever meant to stay outside the city at the end of his office. But if the urbanmagistracy and the connected imperium auspiciumque strictly ended after oneyear, this was not the case with the military power. Therefore, in 326 BC the Ro-

18 Cic. Nat. D. 3.5, Diu. 2.33.70, Vat. 6.14.19 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.5-6: diamanteusasthai peri tes arches; cf. Suet. Aug. 95, App. B Ciu.

3.94. Other sources and discussion in Magdelain 1968, 36-40 and Linderski 1986, 2168-2172.

20 Had this auspication not been held, then the magistrate would have had no imperium outsidethe city and would have been regarded as a priuatus, as is shown by the episode of the consulC. Flaminius in 217 BC. He did not take the ritual auspication before departing for the warand therefore the Senate refused to consider him more than a simple private man according toLivy 22.1.5-7. Another case involves the consul C. Claudius Pulcher in 177 BC, whose im-

perium was not regarded as valid by his own soldiers because he did not take the customaryuota on the Capitol, but preferred to head quickly for his designed province. Pulcher had toreturn to Rome to perform the ceremony (Livy 41.10.2-13; cf. Linderski 1993, 69 n. 31 =Linderski 1995, 624 n. 31). Rüpke 1990, 45-46 has cast some doubts on the real existence of

the auspices of departure as a specific category of auspices, whose validity could extend overthe customary single day period and cover the entire military campaign. His arguments are probably right, but since this auspication was the basis of the military power of the magis-trate, it is natural that it was linked with the campaign until its conclusion, namely until thereturn to the city. Similarly, the auspices of investiture referred only to the magistrate’s en-trance into office, but an unfavourable sign was regarded as a bad omen for the whole yearand therefore the magistrate was expected to abdicate (Linderski 1996, 180 = Linderski 2005,169).

21 Cf. Rüpke 1990, 22-28.




mans decided that the end of the urban auspices did not affect the validity of themilitary ones, because of their different duration: fixed for the former ones, but

connected with the crossing of the pomerium for the latter. We do not know if theaugurs were involved in this decision and how much it was debated,22 but in anycase Philo was regarded as fighting under his own auspicia and so was eligible tocelebrate a triumph on his return. The same situation applied to the numerousother prorogued consuls and praetors in subsequent centuries.

A relevant innovation was introduced during the Second Punic War, when P.Cornelius Scipio, then a private citizen, was given imperium consulare militiae.23 Scipio could not take the auspication inside the city, because only magistrateswere entitled to do that. Nevertheless he had to validate the power entrusted tohim by means of an auspication, because the Republican tradition could not con-ceive of any public authority that was not sustained by favourable auspices. Wedo not know where and when Scipio took this auspication, but we know from

Livy that he conducted the campaign in Spain under his own auspices and there-fore his position was considered perfectly legitimate.24 A similar case is presented by a much later source, the lex arae Augustae Narbonensis, which gives us impor-tant information about the granting of imperium pro praetore to another privatecitizen: Octavian. Propraetorian imperium was given to him by the Senate onJanuary 2nd, but it was auspicatum five days later, when Caesar’s heir was inSpoletium.25 This episode is very important for two aspects: firstly, the need foran auspication to validate a grant of imperium militiae to a private individual; sec-ondly, the attestation that such an auspication had to be taken outside the pomer-ium. This evidence leads us to the conclusion that both priuati cum imperio andmagistrates validated their military power and the inherent extra-pomerial author-ity by means of an auspication, with the important difference that a private mancould do that only outside the pomerium, while a magistrate usually did it in thecity.26

22 For the political context cf. Dalla Rosa 2003, 193-194.23 Livy 26.2.5-6. Further discussion ibid ., 207-212.24 Livy 26.41.18, 28.16.14.25 CIL 12.4333 (p. 845) = ILS 112 = AE 1964, 187 = 1980, 609 ll. 21-23: VII quoq(ue) / Idus

Ianuar (ias) qua die primum imperium / orbis terrarum auspicatus est . Speaking of imperiumorbis terrarum, the text uses a hyperbole and refers to that first grant of power that eventuallygave Octavian supreme power. On the powers granted to Octavian cf. RG 1; Livy Per . 118;Cic. Phil . 6.3, 11.20; App. B. Ciu. 3.51; Cass. Dio 46.29, 46.41. The information about thelocation of the ceremony (Spoletium) is given by Plin. HN 11.190. On this inscription see

Magdelain 1968, 53.26 Rüpke 1990, 46 denies that the auspices of departure were auspicia urbana and allows them

to be taken in the ager Romanus, that is even outside the pomerium (cf. Rüpke 1990, 30-35).The issue is complex and the same definition of auspicium urbanum as limited by the pomer-ium-line is given only by the antiquarians Varr. Ling. 5.143 and Gell. NA 13.14.1. But Livy’sevidence cited above (n. 20, particularly Flaminius’ case) directly links the nuncupatio uoto-rum on the Capitol and the possession of a iustum imperium auspiciumque. From the same passages it is clear that there was no other place to celebrate this ceremony except the Capi-tol, which was inside the pomerium. Pulcher himself makes his repetitio auspiciorum on the






sure its safety, are conducted without taking the auspices. We no longer take them whencrossing rivers, or witnessing flashing spear-points, or when men are summoned for call-up,and that is why soldiers no longer make their wills when geared for battle; our commanders

begin their military operations only after dispensing with the auspices (cum auspicia posu-erunt ) (transl. P. G. Walsh).31

Diu. 2.76-77: Our ancestors would not undertake any military enterprise without consultingthe auspices; but now, for many years, our wars have been conducted by pro-consuls and pro- praetors, who do not have the right to take auspices (qui auspicia non habent ). (77) Thereforethey have no tripudium and they cross rivers without first taking the auspices. What, then, has become of divining by means of birds? It is not used by those who conduct our wars, for theyhave not the right of auspices. Since it has been withdrawn from use in the field I suppose it isreserved for city use only! As to divination ex acuminibus, which is altogether military, it waswholly ignored by that famous man, Marcus Marcellus, who was consul five times and, be-sides, was a commander-in-chief, as well as a very fine augur (transl. W. A. Falconer).32

Modern scholars have interpreted these texts very differently. The context of both passages is related to the religious negligence of the Roman ruling class ofCicero’s time, something that has resulted in the neglecting of the auspices, bothin the public and the private sphere. The passages seem to convey the view thatthe Republic had tolerated the idea that military campaigns could be conducted by people who not only did not consult the auspices but, worse still, did not evenhave the right to do so. Much of the interpretation depends on what meaning wegive to Cicero’s phrases auspicia habere and auspicia ponere. Recently, M. Tar- pin has proposed that both phrases refer to the customary auspications that had to be taken day by day in the course of the military operations.33 In this case auspiciahabere would mean ‘consult the auspices’, much like senatum habere or con-tionem habere, i.e. to gather the Senate or the people for consultation. This interpretation could well apply to Diu. 2.77-78, but could not explain the expressionauspicia ponere of Nat. D. 2.9.

Many other scholars, A. Giovannini and F. Hurlet among them, have seen inCicero’s words evidence for a more rigorous interpretation of the augural law, 34

31 sed neglegentia nobilitatis augurii disciplina omissa ueritas auspiciorum spreta est, speciestantum retenta; itaque maximae rei publicae partes, in iis bella quibus rei publicae saluscontinetur, nullis auspiciis administrantur, nulla peremnia seruantur, nulla ex acuminibus,nulli uiri uocantur, ex quo in procinctu testamenta perierunt; tum enim bella gerere nostriduces incipiunt, cum auspicia posuerunt .

32 bellicam rem administrari maiores nostri nisi auspicato noluerunt; quam multi anni sunt,

cum bella a proconsulibus et a propraetoribus administrantur, qui auspicia non habent. ita-que nec amnis transeunt auspicato, nec tripudio auspicantur. ubi ergo auium diuinatio?quae, quoniam ab iis qui auspicia nulla habent bella administrantur, ab urbanis retenta uide-tur, a bellicis esse sublata. nam ex acuminibus quidem, quod totum auspicium militare est,iam M. Marcellus ille quinquiens consul totum omisit, idem imperatori idem augur optumus.

33 Tarpin 2003, 287-289.34 Giovannini 1983, 60; Hurlet 2006b, 161-164; cf. Magdelain 1968, 55. It is unlikely that

Cicero could refer here to the lex Pompeia of 52, for its provisions had been in place for tooshort a time; the passage instead seems to allude to a more general and ancient custom, that




an interpretation similar to that of another important augur, M. Valerius Messalla.A statement made by Messalla is reported by Varro, according to which no one

but a magistrate could take the auspices. This would mean that, in Messalla’sview, priuati cum imperio and presumably all consuls and praetors whose imperium had been prorogued could not take the auspices.35 But, if a proroguedmagistrate had no right to auspicate, then his power had to be considered void. Asimilar position was defended by the consuls of 187 BC, M. Aemilius Lepidusand C. Flaminius. Livy reports that they complained in the Senate over the proro-gation of their predecessors in Macedonia and Asia, saying that, if Rome wantedto maintain an army in those regions, it had to be led by the consuls and not by private men.36

Prorogued magistrates could not act inside the city, because their magistracyhad expired and therefore they had ‘deposed’ their auspicia urbana. For a stricttraditionalist, a magistracy was marked by a series of actions that were to be car-

ried out inside the pomerium, or at least in the ager Romanus. Cicero himself didnot want to go to a province during his consulship, giving a central significance tothe political and urban role of the supreme magistracy. However there was, as wehave seen, a vigorous series of interpretations and precedents that allowed pro-rogued magistrates to exist and to fight under their own auspicia, and this was thecase for the priuati cum imperio as well.

The opinions of Cicero and Messalla were and remained largely academic,and it is very unlikely that they could be adopted tout court by Octavian to justifyhis supremacy over the proconsuls.37 In fact, saying simply that proconsuls likeCarrinas had no auspices, was like saying that they had no power at all, becausethere was no imperium without the right to take the auspices. Imperium that hadnot been validated by auspication did not exist, as a lex rogata against the auspices did not need to be abrogated, simply because it never existed.38

of the magistrates remaining most of the year in the city and leaving for their province onlyin the last weeks of office.

35 Varr. Ant. Hum. fr. 84 (ap. Non. 92.8): de coelo auspicari ius nemini sit praeter magistratum.36 Livy 38.42.9-10, with the final sentence: si exercitus in his terris esse placeat, consules iis

potius quam priuatos praeesse oportere. For the political context of the passage see Briscoe2008, 150-153.

37 Cicero did not regret asking for a triumph for his achievements in Cilicia ( Fam. 11.1.1) andfor this reason remained outside the city until he was sent to recruit news forces to face theinvasion of Caesar in 49 ( Fam. 16.11.3, 12.5; Att . 7.11.15, 14.2, 15.2, 8.3.4, 11B.1 and 3,

11D.5.9, 11A.2).38 There were many ways in which a law could be declared to have been passed against the

auspices. In general, the claim had to do with the validity of the auspications taken before theconvening of the popular assembly, and involved the interpretation of sudden signs from thesky, like thunder. These signs were considered an expression of disapprobation intentionallygiven by the gods and were therefore called auspicia oblatiua. Cic. Phil. 5.7-8, 16 uses thisargument to claim that a law by Antony was passed against the auspices. Apparently, the au-gur in charge of reporting such auspices was intimidated and did not report what had to beconsidered a clear sign given by Jupiter through a thunder clap (7: silet augur uerecundus




Our evidence suggests that during the first decades of the Principate thingswent on according to the normal Republican praxis, and therefore the cases in

which the auspical superiority of Octavian/Augustus seems to be in place weremost probably the result of ad hoc measures. These could not be based on a sup- posed nullity or imperfection of the auspices of the proconsuls, but could onlytake advantage of Octavian’s constitutional and moral position. For this reason, itis fundamental to try to find some analogous cases, in which we can see two gen-erals with the same imperium fighting one under the auspices of the other. Thiswill be the subject of the next section.

2. THE CONSULS AND THE PROCONSULS:CASES OF SUBORDINATION OF THE AUSPICES

F. Hurlet has recently proposed that we should see subordination to the auspicesof Augustus only when proconsuls were nominated directly by the emperor andwithout recourse to the lot, i.e. extra sortem. This happened unquestionably in thecase of Cossus Cornelius Lentulus in AD 6-8, who had been nominated by theemperor after a special decree of the Senate had authorised the emperor to chooseevery provincial governor and to appoint them for two years to face the calami-tous series of insurrections that were taking place throughout the Empire.39 Ac-cording to Hurlet, Augustus was given this prerogative in 19 BC, as a corollary ofa reform that set his auspicia as greater (maiora) than those of the proconsuls,considered somewhat invalid for the reasons expressed by Cicero.40

This solution has many merits, but poses two difficulties: the use of the Cice-ronian passages quoted above, and its inapplicability to the case of Carrinas forchronological reasons. Nevertheless the connection between the auspical promi-nence of the emperor and the nomination of the proconsuls in AD 6-8 finds a sig-nificant parallel in the status of Octavian in 31 BC. As we saw at the beginning,Caesar’s heir had an unprecedented position in the Republic, as he himself recog-nises in his Res gestae, and yet it is not his constitutional position that takes centrestage, but his moral one. As Octavian wrote, his intention was not to gain a greater

potestas over his colleagues in the magistracies, but to define his prominence byexploiting his extraordinary auctoritas.41 This grew enormously after the con-iuratio of Italy and the western provinces, but probably much more when almostthe whole Senate (except those who deserted to join Antony) and a good numberof equites fought with him in the campaign. In other words, the whole of the Re-

public was fighting under his guidance, that is under his own auspicia. A hint to

sine collegis de auspiciis. quamquam illa auspicia non egent interpretatione; Ioue enimtonante cum populo agi non esse fas quis ignorat ?).

39 Cass. Dio 55.28.2; IRT 301.40 Hurlet 2006b, 166-173. It remains unclear how the passages of Cicero ( Nat. D. 2.9; Diu.

2.77) could be used to justify an inferior status of these auspices, because, as we have seen,they seem to say that proconsuls did not have auspicia at all.

41 RG 34.




this effect may be found in the text of the Res gestae itself, when Augustus speaksof the number of senators and equites that fought under his standards ( sub signis

meis tum militauerint ).42

To serve under the standards of a general, and in particular of a consul, meantclearly to be under his auspices, as shown by several passages of Livy.43 A furtherdetail given by the Res gestae is that such a position of prominence was intendedto be limited to the war that was won at Actium, and therefore could not be ex-tended beyond this point in time.44

Given these elements, Octavian had many arguments to affirm that, from the beginning of his third consulship to September 2nd, the date of the victory of Ac-tium, every military action conducted by generals of the Republic had to be placedunder his auspices, and therefore any achievement by them had to be referred onlyto his person. Such a claim would have been unprecedented, but later evidencetells us that in AD 6-8 something similar happened. The year 31 could thus be

seen in hindsight, and could furnish a reasonable explanation for Carrinas’ case.In fact, nothing prevents us from placing the achievements of the proconsul of

Gaul in the year 31. The provincial fasti are fragmentary for that period, but atwo-year tenure of the proconsulship does not seem unreasonable and surely Oc-tavian needed to entrust the Western provinces to his most loyal collaborators before departing for the East.45

The most important question is related to the legal arguments that Octaviancould employ to give some strength to his claim. We have already seen the coni-uratio Italiae and the fact that the best men of the Republic served under his stan-dards. But further claims could be based on the magistracy that he held at thattime, the consulship. Regarding this point, there were some precedents for thesubordination of proconsuls to consuls and Octavian probably knew them.

According to the regular practice of provincial administration under the Re- public, when a magistrate was sent to replace another magistrate of the same rank,the latter had to hand over command and return to Rome.46 A proconsul had thesame imperium consulare of the consul that would succeed him, but it was principally a matter of auctoritas that gave strength to the position of the consul.47 Fur-thermore, it would not have been a good move for a proconsul to go against the

42 RG 25.43 Livy 28.27.12 (auspicia sub quibus militatis); 36.17.3 (qui in hac eadem prouincia T. Quincti

ductu auspicioque militaueritis); in 22.30.5 ( sub imperium auspiciumque tuum redeo et signahaec legionesque restituo) Minucius Rufus handed over his standards to the dictator Q.Fabius Maximus as a sign of submission to his auspices, thus providing us with a good ex-

ample of the equivalence of having one’s own standards and fighting under one’s own auspices.

44 RG 25 refers only to the war that was won in Actium ( Italia … belli quo uici ad Actiumducem depoposcit ).

45 In the same years we find C. Calvisius Sabinus in Spain (who could have been there from 31to 28 as postulated by Broughton 1986, 2.421, cf. PIR2 C 352), L. Autronius Paetus in Africaand M. Valerius Messalla as Carrinas’ successor in Gaul.

46 For example Livy 36.37.6, 39.54.3.47 For this point cf. Staveley 1963, 475-477.




Senate’s decision to replace him with a regular magistrate. This lack of a clearhierarchy between magistrates and promagistrates is probably the principal reason

why the instances of consuls and proconsuls operating simultaneously on thesame battlefield are very rare. It is not surprising that the examples are predomi-nantly found only in periods of intense military action, such as the Second PunicWar.

To my knowledge, the first circumstance was the ominous campaign that ledto the defeat of Cannae. At the beginning of 216 BC Cn. Servilius Geminus andM. Atilius Regulus, the consuls of the previous year, were left in Apulia to controlHannibal’s movements, while the new consuls recruited new men for the army.Both arrived in Cannae probably at the beginning of the summer, joining the two proconsuls. At this point Livy notes that Geminus and Regulus had already hadtheir imperium prorogued, while Polybius states that they were made antistrategoi by the consul L. Aemilius Paullus.48 The word used by the Greek historian is not

immediately understandable, but in any case cannot be taken as a formal degrada-tion of the two former consuls, first of all for procedural reasons. A degradation ofimperium could have hardly been possible without the participation of the people,and the delegation of praetorian imperium would seem very strange, if not absurd,to a person that already held consular power.49 Furthermore, Livy refers to Servil-ius simply as prioris anni consul , giving the impression of a normal prorogation.50 Nevertheless, both Livy and Polybius make it clear that Servilius was a subordi-nate of the two consuls that led the operations. The battle ended up being theworst defeat in Roman history and Servilius himself, commanding the centre ofthe army, fell during the course of it.

A second case occurred in 204 and again in relation to Hannibal’s dangerous presence in Italy. The consul P. Licinius Crassus Dives was sent against Hannibalin Bruttium in 205. At the beginning of the next year, the Senate decided to leavehim in place to control the enemy until it seemed appropriate to his successor, theconsul P. Sempronius.51 After he arrived in the ager Crotoniensis, Sempronius didnot seek the proconsul’s help and clashed alone with Hannibal’s forces. Beingdefeated, he contacted Crassus and ordered him to join his forces for the next bat-tle. With two armies, Sempronius did not hesitate and attacked again, leading the

48 Livy 22.34.1; Polyb. 3.106.2.49 Contra Brennan 2000, 640-41. Concerning the role of the people, we have the example of an

increase of imperium in 217, when the authority of the magister equitum Minucius Rufus was

made equal to that of the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus (Livy 22.25.10), and perhaps in 215,when the people may have given an imperium pro consule to the praetor M. Claudius Marcel-lus (cf. Brennan 2000, 192; Dalla Rosa 2003, 207); other interventions concerned the com- plete abrogation of the powers of a certain magistrate (cf. Mommsen 1887-1888, 1.629). Asall these cases present exceptional circumstances, we cannot speak of strict rules, but it seemsclear that the modification of someone’s imperium could not be simply arranged by anothermagistrate.

50 The same opinion is expressed by Jashemski 1950, 102 n. 102 and Walbank 1957, 1.435.51 Livy 29.13.3: quoad eum in prouincia cum imperio morari consuli e re publica uisum esset .




assault, while Crassus remained behind, ready to bring help if necessary.52 In thisway, the consul alone could be said to have reported the victory, and probably he

was well aware that an active participation of the proconsul could have resulted inan unwanted claim to share the honour deriving from the success. In fact, such adispute would not have been unpredictable, given the precedent of 242, when the praetor Q. Valerius Falto won a naval battle against the Carthaginians while theconsul C. Lutatius Catulus remained inactive. Falto argued that he deserved thetriumph, but after much debate the Senate decide that it was the consul that had to be credited with the victory because of his superior imperium and auspicium.53 Onthe basis of this precedent and given that the assignment of a triumph was often amatter of dispute, Sempronius did not rely much on the superiority given to him by the Senate and, considering the consular status of his collaborator, preferred toavoid every risk and so acted alone.54

The third and final case is another Roman defeat, this time at Arausio in 105

BC. Q. Servilius Caepio had received Gaul as his consular province the year be-fore, but refused to hand over his command to the new consul Cn. Manlius Maxi-mus. The Senate had sent him with the intention of replacing the proconsul (as isclearly indicated by the use of metepempsato by Cassius Dio) and therefore nocollaboration had been planned. However Manlius had no formal power to dis-miss Servilius, for the two generals had the same imperium consulare. Serviliusclearly did not consider the prominence of the magistrate to be enough to concedethe supreme command to him. Therefore the two Roman armies were prepared tofight separately against the Cimbri, and Servilius tried in every way to take a posi-tion between the consul and the enemy, because, as Cassius Dio reports, he had‘the evident intention of being the first to join battle and so of winning all theglory of the war’.55

These examples seem to offer little help in solving the problem of Octavian’sauspical prominence in the Republic at the time of Actium. Anyway, if we have tothink about Roman religion and warfare, precedents can be very important andthese examples can give us some precious evidence.

The first thing that has to be noted is that it was the consul, the regular magis-trate, that was always meant to be the commander-in-chief ( strategos autokrator )in case of any collaboration with a proconsul. This seems quite logical in a periodwhen the consuls still had a central role in the fabric of the State and especially inthe conduct of military campaigns. But, apart from the case of Cannae in which itseems that the Senate was in favour of maintaining the former consuls in the field,any joint action resulted from the decision of one of the generals: the consul in the

52 Livy 29.36.6-9.53 Val. Max. 2.8.2. The fasti attribute the triumph to both magistrates ( InscrIt 13.1.76-77;

Stewart 1998, 120-122). This is a clear sign that, despite the differences in levels of imperium, consuls and praetors were independent generals by their nature, as was pointed out by Last 1947, 159; Staveley 1963, 471.

54 Cf. recently Beard 2007, 206-214.55 Cass. Dio 27.91.1-3. More concise accounts of the event are provided by Livy Per. 67; Flor.

1.38.4; Gran. Lic. 17B; Eutr. 5.1.1; Oros. 5.16.17.




case of the year 204, the proconsul in the case of 105. The case of Arausio is par-ticularly interesting, because it shows all the problems of the archaic system of the

Roman magistracies when it had to face the administration of a large empire,which needed to be carried out by many officials.Servilius Caepio could argue that his imperium was equal to that of Manlius,

but his deliberate aim was to obtain the glory of a triumph. Had his troops foughtunder the consul’s standard, then he would have definitively lost the right to fightunder his own auspicia. Given the absence of strict regulations for the awardingof triumphs, his only chance to keep his hopes alive was to attack first and to keepManlius away from the enemy, in order to prevent him from having any claim tothe possible victory. Nevertheless, the main question remained the determinationof whether he was fighting under his own auspices or not.

A hierarchy was actually put in place at the battle of Cannae. The consuls hadthe leadership and the proconsul Servilius was clearly subordinate to them. The

subordination meant in the first place that Servilius had to fight under the auspicesof the consuls (actually under those of the consul that had his turn in the dailyrotation of the auspices).56 That, and not any change of the level of imperium, wasthe only formal way to set the leadership among the three generals pari imperio.Unfortunately the tremendous defeat meant that no triumph could be celebratedand so we cannot see which general would have been credited with victory hadthere been one, but unquestionably it could not have been Servilius.

In 204 the Senate did not envisage any collaboration between the consulSempronius Tuditanus and the proconsul Licinius Crassus, but left it to the magis-trate’s discretion. The consul did not dismiss Crassus, but nevertheless preferredto exclude him from the actual fighting against Hannibal. On this occasion as wellthe two generals had joined their armies and there should not have been any doubtthat the battle had to be fought under Sempronius’ auspices. Anyway the consulavoided any kind of participation in the victory and made all contact betweenCrassus and the enemy impossible, just to make sure that the proconsul could not be a contender for any honour deriving from the victory.

A second aspect that has to be pointed out is that the consuls seem not to havehad a theoretical auspical superiority. It was always a concrete situation of dangerthat made the Senate decide for a joint action of two or more generals, thus creat-ing the conditions for a hierarchy of the auspicia. Furthermore, the auspical supe-riority was strictly connected to the province assigned: according to the cases dis-cussed above, it seems that it was only when a consul was given the same prouin-cia as a proconsul that the auspices of the former were intended to be maiora than

those of the latter.The importance of these precedents for Octavian’s likely claim to be strategosautokrator of the whole of the Republic in 31 is related to the central role thatthey give to the consulship as the only magistracy capable of having greater aus-

56 According to Polyb. 3.110.4, 113.1; Livy 22.45.5; Plut. Fab. Max. 15, Varro was the com-

mander in chief on that day; App. Hann. 19 agrees with this view, but reports that Varroeventually left the command to Aemilius Paullus.




pices than those of other generals pari imperio. It is well known that between 31and 23 BC Octavian/Augustus made use of the consulship as the principal instru-

ment to administer the Republic.57

In 27 he received an extraordinary number of provinces, which he governed by virtue of his consular imperium, like his fatherCaesar in 59. As consul he could summon the Senate and he passed many acts oflegislation by virtue of his ius agendi cum populo and cum patribus, somethingthat he later did on the basis of his tribunicia potestas.58

The consular powers were just one aspect of the plan that Octavian put in place to redefine his position in the Republic after the expiration of the triumvi-rate. Despite the unprecedented set of powers that he had, Octavian still wanted toappear more as the princeps or rector rei publicae outlined in Cicero’s works.59 This figure, according to Cicero, should exercise his good influence on the State principally by virtue of his moral qualities and of his auctoritas. His political ac-tion should follow regular Republican practice and therefore the Senate and the

civic magistracies were to remain valuable instruments. In particular, the consul-ship played a key role in the description of the ideal constitution, as is outlined inthe third book of the De legibus. The consuls possess a regium imperium (limitedonly by the tribunician intercession), the militiae summum ius, and their supremegoal is the safety of the people.60 In another passage Cicero restates that the con-suls have supreme power and all other magistrates must obey them, with the ex-ception of the plebeian tribunes.61 The special position of the consuls, this time inrelation to the assigning of the provinces, occurs again in a letter to Atticus62 andin the Philippics,63 where Cicero clearly states that every province should be at theconsuls’ disposal. The words he uses in the two passages are different: in the for-mer he speaks of the consul’s right to be assigned to whatever province he desires;in the latter he seems to imply that the consuls could dispose of, and have powerover, every province, even if not assigned to them. This last passage could be seen

57 Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.2.58 Further evidence is provided by the case of the denial of the spolia opima to M. Licinius

Crassus. A solution to the controversy about the legitimacy of Crassus’ claim is far from be-ing reached, and I do not intend to risk any new interpretation here. Nevertheless, it is impor-tant to note that Livy (4.20.6) reported that Augustus had said that the last person to havededicated the spolia opima was a consul and not a military tribune. That implied that only asupreme magistrate could receive this honour, because the only two precedents were Romu-lus, the first king, and M. Claudius Marcellus, cos. 222 BC (this is the position held by Syme1959, 44 [= Syme 1979a, 418], cf. Kienast 1999, 220; for sources cf. Rich 1996, 81 n. 81).This interpretation conveniently excluded any proconsul like Licinius Crassus.

59 See the famous passage of RG 34: post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti, potestatisautem nihilo amplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt (‘After that time, I exceeded all in influence, but I had no greater power than the others whowere colleagues with me in each magistracy’). On the importance of Cicero’s politicalthought for Augustus’ consular principate see Grenade 1951 and De Francisci 1968.

60 Cic. Leg. 3.8.61 Cic. Leg. 3.16.62 Cic. Att. 8.15.3.63 Cic. Phil. 4.4.9.




as evidence for a formal superiority of the imperium of the consuls over that of the provincial governors, but the context of the passage is largely polemical and, de-

spite the general tone of the sentence, there is clear reference to the province ofGaul, to which Antony wanted to be assigned in place of the proconsul D. Brutus.Cicero’s assessments did not reflect actual practice but were the result of his

own thinking about magistracies. In fact we know that the provisions of the lexSempronia did not give the consuls the chance to get any province but only thosealready defined as consular by the Senate before the election. The reforms of 52 by Pompey and of 49 by Caesar do not seem to have introduced any kind of free-dom of choice for the consuls.64 Cicero’s view seems then to be heavily influ-enced by his own political reflections on the consulship.65

Another aspect has to be stressed and it concerns the role given to the pro-magistrates by Cicero. To put it simply, there is no place at all for prorogued mag-istrates in Cicero’s ideal Roman State. This may be better understood if we look

again at the two passages from the De natura deorum and from the De diuinatione cited above. Cicero expressed there his doubts about the validity of the auspices ofthe promagistrates. Following the augural tradition very strictly, he thought thatthere were no auspices other than those of the civic magistrates and thereforemeasures like prorogation or the bestowing of imperium on private men were seenas aberrations and simply could not exist. It has to be said that this extreme con-servatism was limited to political theory, because in practice Cicero was keen toaccept and promote compromises. He certainly knew very well that the empirecould not be effectively governed without the continuous prorogation of the im-

perium of consuls and praetors and with the occasional creation of extraordinarycommands, such as those of Pompey. Nevertheless he dreamed of a Republic inwhich the consuls guided the city with the Senate in every aspect: military, politi-cal and moral. The emphasis that he put on his own consulship of 63 confirms thisview of the magistracy. In that fateful moment for the State, Cicero took responsi- bility for breaking one of the principles of the Republic, the prohibition of capital punishment without the people’s permission, because he was convinced that hisduty as consul was to preserve at any cost the safety of the Roman people. Thesafety of the people was the supreme law ( suprema lex) for a consul, and only thisfact could justify an extraordinary measure.66

It is time to try to sum up the results of these first two sections. According toOctavian’s propaganda, in 31 BC Caesar’s heir was not only leading a Roman

64 After the lex Pompeia the provinces continued to be designated by the Senate, as confirmed

by Caes. B Gall. 1.6.5. On the lex Iulia see Girardet 1987.65 On this argument see Dyck 2004, 456-457. As shown by the excellent analysis of Powell

2001, 32-37, in the exposition of the laws of the ideal State Cicero gradually assumed a uni-versal perspective, using more general language in the definition of the magistracies. Refer-ring to virtually any State with a mixed constitution, the role of the supreme magistrates(sometimes called consuls, sometimes praetors or iudices) was that of representing monar-chy, with all that that entailed in terms of the extent of their powers.

66 The connection of this passage with the practice of the senatusconsultum ultimum is dis-cussed in Dyck 2004, 458-459.




army, but the Roman State itself in a great battle for survival against an Easternmonarchy. The Senate and many equites were under his direct command. Italy

and the Western provinces had sworn to support him in this crucial battle. Hecame and won, and won again in Alexandria. Upon his return he celebrated a triple triumph, something that put him on the same level as Romulus, the founder ofthe city.

How does Carrinas’ case fit in to this chain of events? The solution proposedabove assumes that the achievements of the proconsul of Gaul date to 31 and thatOctavian exploited his extraordinary position to place all military action in every province under his own auspicia. Any reconstruction of how this could have happened must remain hypothetical, but it is nonetheless worth offering a possibleoutline of events. Octavian, after his return to Rome, took an unexpected moveand celebrated Carrinas’ victory among his other achievements in the first tri-umph. The extraordinary political, moral and military status that he held at Ac-

tium could justify this, as could the appropriate interpretation of those precedentswhich suggested that the consuls had greater auspicia than any other generals. Hemay have found further support in Cicero’s political theory about the supremacyof the consuls over the other magistrates. With this act Octavian intended to forcethe Senate to accept a new kind of prominence for the consulship and, indirectly,for him. The second case, of Carrinas’ triumph of 28, which took place three yearsafter his achievements in Gaul, could be seen as the result of a compromise. TheSenate may have conceded to Octavian that he had the right to celebrate that par-ticular victory because of his extraordinary position as leader of the entire Repub-lic, but did not make Carrinas a subordinate, considering his auspicia still independent and thus giving him the honour he deserved.

Whether this solution is likely or not, it remains unclear how and why Octa-vian decided to add Carrinas’ achievements to his own. Normally, it was the Sen-ate that gave the authorisation for a triumph, and therefore it should have had thelast word on the achievements that deserved to be celebrated. Rather than beingdefined by strict rules, the right to hold a triumph was based on a customary set ofrequirements, whose interpretation could always be subject to the actual politicalcircumstances, as we have seen with the priuati cum imperio. In some cases, mag-istrates took the initiative themselves and celebrated a triumph without having previously been allowed to do so by the assembly.67 If the Senate acted in favour

67 This is a point well stressed in the recent monograph by Beard 2007, 187-218. Nevertheless,the author goes too far and argues that there were no real rules for the assigning of triumphs

in the Republic; this statement is unnecessarily derived from the critique of later attempts toreconstruct a clear ius triumphandi. Even if customary, some of the requirements were clearenough and concerned chiefly the status of the general (independent or subordinate) and theimportance of the victory itself. Both aspects could be interpreted in a more or less strictsense, but we are nonetheless able to say that the possession of independent auspices was afundamental requisite and that generals with delegated imperium (i.e. legates) were neverable to triumph; Beard 2007, 298, 390 n. 23, following Cass. Dio 48.42.4 and 49.21.2-3wrongly thinks that Cn. Domitius Calvinus and P. Ventidius Bassus triumphed as legates ofone of the triumvirs, but they were certainly proconsuls as is shown by the triumphal fasti




of Octavian already in 29 – thus acknowledging the extension of Octavian’s auspicia to the entire Republic – then a second triumph for the same victory, this time

celebrated by Carrinas, would have seemed very odd. Probably then, the Senatewas not consulted at all and had to face the difficult situation created by Octa-vian’s unexpected move. Caesar’s heir still had a great share of power, but heneeded to avoid the possibility that, with the end of the emergency status for theRepublic, his opponents could demand the revocation of any extraordinary powerand a return to normal political practice. Nevertheless, Octavian’s attempt did notcompletely achieve his goal: the Senate recognised the validity of his triumph andtherefore of the extension of his auspicia to the entire Republic for the period upto the battle of Actium, but did not downgrade Carrinas’ auspices to a lower level.After this episode, triumphs continued to be awarded regularly to every proconsulwho deserved them, and Carrinas’ case remained isolated until a new serious mili-tary crisis occurred.

3. AUGUSTUS’ CONSULAR PREROGATIVES OF 19 BCAND THE COSSUS INSCRIPTION

In AD 6-8 a tremendous series of riots rocked a very large number of provinces inthe empire. The pirates renewed their activity, the Isaurians ravaged some of theirneighbouring regions, disorder broke out in Africa and Germany, riots began in anindeterminate number of cities, and among the Dalmatians and the Pannonians.This dangerous series of upheavals forced Tiberius to come back from his campaign in the heart of German territory and forced the Senate to decide to hand overto Augustus the nomination of every proconsul, and to extend their service to twoyears instead of one.68 As we have seen above, an inscription from Lepcis Magnareveals that Cossus Cornelius Lentulus, one of the proconsuls appointed for twoyears by Augustus in AD 6, celebrated a victory over the Gaetulians, but foughtunder Augustus’ auspices.69 The text of the inscription tell us that the war had been won under the command of the proconsul (ductu … Cossi Cornelii Lentuli … procos.), but under the auspices of Augustus (auspiciis imp. Caesaris Aug.).70

( InscrIt 13.1.632-633, 636); for Calvinus cf. also RRC 532/1 and CIL 2.6186; for Bassus cf.Schumacher 1985, 194-197. On the relationship between the triumvirs and the proconsuls cf.Roddaz 1996, 82-87.

68 Cass. Dio 55.28.1-2.

69 Cossus’ campaign is briefly described by Cass. Dio 55.28.3-4.70 IRT 301: Marti Augusto sacrum | auspiciis Imp(eratoris) Caesaris Aug (usti) | pontificis

maxumi patris | patriae ductu Cossi Lentuli | co(n) s(ulis) XVuiri sacris faciundis | proco(n) s(ulis) prouincia Africa | bello Gaetulico liberata | ciuitas Lepcitana. We cannotdoubt the official character of this text (cf. Hurlet 2000, 1515-1516). The inscription men-tions the traditional formula ‘under the command and the auspices’ (ductu auspicioque) fre-quently used for Roman generals (for example Livy 28.16.14; other sources in Hurlet 2000,1518 n. 23), but in this case the two elements are distinguished and referred to two different persons, reflecting a precise legal difference that was officially defined. The same distinction




Many scholars have already pointed out the importance of this text for thestudy of the relationship between the proconsuls and the emperor, and some inter-

pretations also call into play the passages of Cicero quoted above.71

However, wehave seen already that Cicero’s words do not reflect the real position of the pro-consuls in the Republic. A comparison with Carrinas’ case could, in contrast, shedsome useful light on the matter. As in 31 BC, so in AD 6-8 the State was undergreat military pressure that could potentially affect Italy. To face the danger, theSenate decided to give Augustus some of the powers that he had enjoyed in thetriumviral period, such as the right to nominate every provincial governor, thustemporarily suspending the traditional allotment of the proconsular provinces.Furthermore, Cossus’ inscription from Lepcis Magna tells us that his campaignagainst the Gaetulians and probably every other military action, both in the pro-consular and in the imperial provinces, were placed under Augustus’ auspices.This fact did not make the proconsuls the immediate subordinates of the emperor:

their imperium remained consular and continued to derive from the people, andtheir auspices were always of the same status as before. Augustus would not have been in direct command of every province, but nevertheless every victory wouldhave been credited to him and to no one else.

By AD 6, Augustus’ position in the State was much more secure and clearerthan thirty-five years previously. Furthermore, the last triumph assigned to a gen-eral who was not a member of the imperial family was twenty-five years in the past. By AD 6, victory was something that belonged exclusively to the emperorand his family and this fact required that the Senate find a new solution that couldsave the existence of the proconsular provinces while giving to Augustus the rightto claim every military achievement for himself.72 At this point, Carrinas’ casecould have constituted a useful precedent, because of the many similarities be-tween the two emergency situations of 31 BC and AD 6.

One important difference was the position of Augustus himself. After his ab-dication from the consulship in 23, the princeps had decided to found his poweron a different basis from the monopoly of the supreme magistracy. Between 23

is made by Flor. 2.31 when he says that ‘[Augustus] suppressed the Musulami andGaetulians, who dwell near the Syrtes, under the command of Cossus’ (Cosso duce).

71 Syme 1946, 156 (= Syme 1979a, 192); De Martino 1972-75, 4.185-186; Syme 1979b, 308 (=Syme 1984, 1198); Vogel-Weidemann 1982, 9 and 44-45; Raaflaub 1987, 261 n. 30;Bleicken 1990, 89-90; for the use of Cicero’s evidence, cf. Mommsen 1887-1888, 1.101;Magdelain 1968, 55-56; Hurlet 2001, 173-74; Hurlet 2006b, 167-173. I prefer not to refer tothe spolia opima of Licinius Crassus in 29 BC: as said before, the case is complex and proba-

bly over-interpreted by Cassius Dio.72 The last triumph awarded to a proconsul was in 19 BC (L. Cornelius Balbus, from Africa).

There is still some controversy among those who find a political or a religious reason for theend of the concession of triumphs to generals other than Augustus and his family. For varioustheories on the monopolisation of the auspices by the emperor, see the bibliography citedabove n. 16, and also Gagé 1930a, 1-35, Gagé 1930b, 166-167, Gagé 1933, 2-11 (who con-nects it with the conferring of Augustus’ name); Giovannini 1983, 43-44 and 77-79; Konrad1994, 155-159; Rich 1996, 102-103. A purely political motivation is argued for by Eck 1984,139 and Eck 2006, 59; see also Beard 2007, 295-305.




and 19 a series of powers and prerogatives was granted to Augustus, who couldstill act in as many areas as he could have done before, when he was consul.73

However, he did not hold the consulship after 23, apart from on a few occasions,and therefore could not exploit any more the argument of the pre-eminence of thismagistracy and all the precedents that gave to the consuls greater auspices thanthose of the proconsuls. Despite that, it is likely that Augustus found this particu-lar consular privilege again among the others that were conferred on him in 19BC, when Cassius Dio tells us that he received a generic consular authority(exousia ton hupaton).74 The interpretation of this grant is controversial and I donot intend to go into the details of every possible consequence of this crucial deci-sion. My intention is to focus on a particular aspect, one related to some tasks thatwere the duties of the consuls and that nevertheless Augustus could perform afterreceiving the exousia.

Cassius Dio reports that after this grant Augustus was permanently assigned

twelve lictors, like a consul, and could take a seat in the Senate between the twoconsuls in office. As J.-L. Ferrary pointed out in his fundamental essay on Augus-tus’ powers, the assumption of the symbols of consular coercitio could not be pos-sible without the corresponding authority.75 Similarly, although it was a purelysymbolic measure, the fact that he could sit between the consular pair was of greatimportance, as it almost made Augustus into a third consul. Still, the princeps wasnot a consul: he could not preside over consular elections and could summon theSenate or the people by means of his tribunicia potestas only, and not by means ofthe ius agendi cum patribus or cum populo that was proper to the magistrates. Asmany scholars have already shown, the grant of 19 BC did not give Augustus anynew powers, but probably extended to the city and Italy some of the powers thathe already possessed, that is the imperium consulare and the iurisdictio uoluntaria proper of the provincial governor residing outside his province.76 Moreover, onecan say that the imperium consulare that Augustus continued to possess as a pro-magistrate was elevated to a higher dignity, namely that of the consuls. Theexousia ton hupaton would be then the grant to use his powers to perform tasksthat were exclusively conferred upon the consuls for reasons of dignity or becausethey concerned the Republic in general, such as the census.77

73 Among these powers and prerogatives were the annually renewed tribunicia potestas and animperium greater than that of any proconsul whose province he visited: see Ferrary 2001,130-141.

74 Cass. Dio 54.10.5.75 Ferrary 2001, 124; the statement is based on Dig . 1.16.1 (on the possession of the proconsu-

lar insigna); 1.16.16 (on the deposition of the imperium when trespassing the pomerium);1.16.2 pr. (on jurisdictional prerogatives outside the assigned province); see also Cass. Dio53.13.4.

76 Cf. Jones 1951, 13-15; Cotton-Yakobson 2002, 196-203; Eck 2006, 58. The levelling of Au-gustus’ imperium with that of the consuls is suggested by Girardet 1990b, 120-121.

77 One of these tasks could have been the conducting of the general censuses of 8 BC and AD14, that Augustus held consulari cum imperio ( RG 8). He did hold a census in 28, during hissixth consulship. There is no doubt that, as consul, Octavian could receive censorial powers,as did the consuls of 75 when they were made responsible for the locatio of Sicily’s uectiga-




What is important for us is that the reform of 19 gave the consular dignity back to Augustus even without the corresponding magistracy and therefore made

it possible for him to exploit once again all the precedents concerning the auspicalsuperiority of the consuls over the proconsuls. This privilege could have had avery broad impact on many different areas and was not primarily concerned withthe auspices of the emperor. But the unexpected emergency of AD 6 required adrastic measure and it was then that the prerogative that had been granted to Au-gustus twenty-five years earlier provided a fundamental basis for finding a solu-tion to the crisis. From that moment on Augustus had another way of securing his prominence over the other imperium-holders without making them imperial leg-ates, thus preserving the traditional façade of the Republic.

Following this case, the subordination of a proconsul to the emperor’s auspices recurred on at least two more occasions, both involving the province of Af-rica, and the proconsuls M. Junius Blaesus in 21-23 and Ser. Sulpicius Galba in

44-46 respectively. Both proconsuls were appointed extra ordinem for a two-year period and were sent to face difficult military situations: Blaesus had to deal withthe dangerous raids of Tacfarinas, while Galba had to bring security again to a province troubled by internal unrest and by the incursions of nomadic populations.For these cases we have good evidence from a passage of Velleius and a probableimperial acclamation for Claudius.78 There may be other cases, but I would notargue that the auspical submission was used so frequently: by 11-10 BC, if notearlier, only the proconsul of Africa was left in command of legionary troops,while the other senatorial provinces had only a few auxiliary units;79 this meantthat a proconsul was rarely engaged by the enemy and therefore it was de facto very difficult for him to achieve a victory that could entitle him to a triumph. As aresult, the emperor did not need to fear the competition of these governors andcould leave them independent, apart from on a very few occasions, such as those

lia (Cic. Verr . 2.1.130 and 2.3.18-19). Similarly, the lex portorii indicates that the consulshad the same task, this time in relation to the province of Asia, in 73 as well, and other pas-sages of the same text show that many subsequent revisions of the locationes were made byconsuls (cf. Kunkel-Wittmann 1995, 329-330; see now Cottier 2008, 4-8). That means that,in a period in which no censors were elected, some of the competencies of these magistrateswere passed on to the consuls and that was what happened also in 28. For the next two cen-suses, Augustus was not consul, but nevertheless could perform the operations. As he himselfsays, he was still in possession of his consulare imperium, which was nothing other than thesame power that he enjoyed as promagistrate from 24 and that was freed by the traditionallimit of the pomerium in 23. He was technically a proconsul and no proconsul was ever given

a task of general concern for the State like conducting a census. However, the exousia tonhupaton of 19 gave Augustus the dignity to perform such assignments. He did not need anynew power, because his imperium was still valid and adequate for the task. What he neededwas the permission to use that power, as if he was a consul.

78 On the military action against Tacfarinas, see Vell. Pat. 2.129.4; on Blaesus’ appointment,see Tac. Ann. 3.32-35. On the subordination see Eck 1999, 225; contra Hurlet 2006b, 94 and169 n. 178. For Claudius’ acclamation see Kienast 1996, 91; cf. Mattingly 1968, 1.125 no.116-121.

79 Cass. Dio 54.34.4; Syme 1934 (= Syme 1971, 40-72); Hurlet 2006b, 135-147.




involving Blaesus and Galba. The auspical subordination was then the best compromise and it was only on those few occasions that this ad hoc measure was

adopted. A permanent auspical superiority would have been unnecessary andcould have given rise to some resentment among the senatorial class.

4. CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, the reconstruction proposed here for explaining how the auspical superiority of the princeps was put in place relies upon a certain degree of conjec-ture, as the paucity of ancient evidence inevitably creates great uncertainty. Cos-sus’ inscription from Lepcis Magna tells us that such a subordination was a fact atthe end of Augustus’ reign. Some scholars have deduced from two passages inCicero’s writings about religion that the auspices of the promagistrates were

somewhat vitiated and have used these statements as a key argument to justify theimperial superiority. As I have tried to show, Cicero’s passages were largely po-lemical and very conservative in the interpretation of augural law and thereforecannot provide evidence for Republican practice. Had Cicero’s principles beenused, the whole category of proconsuls would have disappeared, but much evi-dence confirms that the proconsuls continued to enjoy full auspical autonomy.The vindication of the superiority of Augustus must therefore be founded else-where and, as far as we can see, the only available precedents all concern cases inwhich, for different reasons, consuls were given auspical prominence over pro-consuls, without diminishing in any way the imperium of the promagistrates. Inthe face of this new political interpretation of some of the religious foundations ofthe Republic, the augurs as a college of priests did not and could not express anykind of opposition and this is the reason why they do not appear in our sources;nevertheless such an arrangement could not have been reached without any debateabout different antiquarian views of the augural discipline concerning magistra-cies and triumphs.

The cryptic reference of Cassius Dio to a victory in Gaul celebrated by bothOctavian and Carrinas could hint at the first attempt to achieve what we know became a reality in AD 6. The arguments that the future prince could have used to justify the celebration of Carrinas’ victory were his position as consul, the largenumber of senators and knights fighting under his standards, the precedents aboutthe auspical superiority of the consulship and Cicero’s political thought about the prominence of the supreme magistracy. The extreme danger that threatened the

Republic gave the best pretext for Octavian’s claim. The actual events cannot bereconstructed, but everything probably ended in a compromise. The definitiverecognition came thirty-five years later. At the time Augustus was no longer con-sul, but the grant of exousia ton hupaton in 19 BC gave him the same dignity as aconsul. Roman religion, always strictly bound to Roman political life, and thesacral conduction of warfare gave Augustus a powerful instrument to eliminateevery possible threat to his position from the military achievements of the procon-suls.




One last word has to be said about the actual procedure that was followed tosecure auspical superiority for the emperor. Obviously there had to be a decision

of the Senate, like that of AD 6, but this could not be enough. In fact, we knowfrom the episode of Arausio that a proconsul could refuse to join the consul’sforces and could then remain independent; a personal submission seems thereforeto be required, as shown in 217 BC by the case of Minucius Rufus, the magisterequitum of the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus. The former’s imperium had been ele-vated to the same level as the dictator’s by a popular vote and so Minucius couldtherefore act independently.80 But following a serious defeat, Minicius returnedunder the auspices of Fabius Maximus, offering his personal submission to thedictator’s standards.81 Similarly, we can think that all the proconsuls of AD 6made such a personal submission before departing for their province and usedAugustus’ standards for their armies, becoming simply duces of an empire se-curely led by Augustus’ divine protection.

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Dalla Rosa - Dominating the Auspices

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