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Citation: 11 Legal Stud. 1 1991 Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)Wed Oct9 01:24:46 2013-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do? &operation=go&searchType=0 &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0261-3875Vol11No1March1991LegalStudiesThevariablestandardof care,contributory negligenceandvolentiRichard KidnerReaderin Law,UniversityCollege of Wales,AberystwythOne of theproblemswhicharisesin thetort of negligenceiswheretheplaintiffisawareofcertaincharacteristicsofthedefendantwhichindicatethat thedefendantisincapableof achievingtheusualstand-ard of care,andyettheplaintiff entersinto orcontinuesa relationshipwiththatperson.Enteringacardrivenbyadrunkdriverisasimpleexample.Thereseemstobeacommonfeelingthatsuchaplaintiff is'lessdeserving'andthatitisanecessaryconsequenceofthefaultsystemthatheshouldbearatleastpartof theresponsibilityforhisloss.Recentdevelopments,particularlyinAustralia,havesuggesteddifferentapproachestothisproblemwhichraiseissuesaboutthenatureandroleof thestandardof care,aswellasabouttherelation-ship betweenthe standardof care andvariousdefencestonegligence.Theremaybeothersituationswheresimilardifficultiesarise,butwhicharenotbasedontheplaintiff knowingof thedefendant'sdisa-bility.Theliabilityof childrenor of theinsaneareexampleswhereitmight befeltthattheblameworthinessof theactual defendantdoesnotjustifyimposingliability,eventhoughhehasfailedtoliveuptothestandardof thereasonableman.Hereagainattemptshave beenmadetoresolvethisissueeitherbysayingthattherewasnodutyorbyvaryingthestandardofcarebyattributingcharacteristicsoftheactualdefendanttothereasonablemanand judgingthedefendantonthatbasis.Theaimof thisarticleistodiscussthe variouswaysin whichtheseproblemshavebeenapproached.Theseincluderegardingit asadutyissue,or asa matter of varyingthestandardof care,or of applyingthevariousdefencestonegligencesuchasvolentinonfitinjuria,contri-butorynegligenceor exturpi causa non oritur actio.2LegalStudiesThe duty of careThe issue isnot one of duty of care, although it is often presented as such.Whethera dutyexistsdependsonproximity,that iswhetherthere isasufficientlycloserelationshipbetweentheparties,andinthecaseofphysicaldamagetherequireddegreeof proximityisthat of foresightofdamage tothe plaintiff. This dependson categoriesof circumstances,sothat we can say that all drivers owe a duty totheir passengers(althoughthis could be negatived by consent or ex turpicausa). It follows that a learnerdriver owesa dutyto hispassenger, andthe questionthen relatestothecontentof thedutyratherthanwhetheradutyexistsornot,ieisthestandardthat of the reasonabledriver or thereasonablelearner driver?In thecase of MLC v Evatt' this relationshipbetweenduty of careandstandard of care was confused. That case involvedthe question whether aperson was liable for giving advice even though he was not in the businessof giving advice. Lord Diplock argued against liability on the ground thatthe only possible standardof care which could be owed wouldhave to bebasedon thereasonableprofessionaladviserandthereforeit wouldbewrongtoimposeadutyofcareonapersonwhowasnotsuchaprofessional:in other wordstherewas noduty becausethe only possiblestandard of care wastoohigh. An alternativeapproach wouldbe tosaythat a duty arises wherethe relationship is sufficiently close(in the view ofthe minorityin MLC v Evatt that wouldbeif the advicewas givenon abusinessoccasion)andthat thequestion isthen oneof thelevelof careowed.Thiswould dependonthecircumstances,andinthisparticularcasecouldhavebeenbasedonthe levelof skill whichthe plaintiff wasentitledtoexpect.Another area wherethe duty approachmight be thought applicable isinrelationtotheliabilityof theinsane.Forexamplein Buckleyv SmithTransport' thedefendantwassufferingfromsyphilisandwas undertheimpressionthathislorrywasbeingdrivenbyremotecontrol.Itwasdecidedthat he wasnot liableforinjuringtheplaintiff becausehewasunabletounderstandthenatureof thedutywhichheowedandwasincapable ofdischargingit. This is not a duty issue, but rather the questionwaswhether,asalllorrydriversoweadutytootherroadusers,thestandard required ofthis particular defendant should be varied because ofhis disability. The central question both in cases where the plaintiffknowsof thedisabilityandwherehedoesnot iswhetherthestandardof careshouldbevaried,orwhethersuchdefendantsshouldbeheldtothestandardof the reasonableman.Thefunctionof the standard ofcareIt is universallyacceptedthat the standardof care in negligence must beobjectively determined and that 'it eliminates the personal equation and isindependent of the idiosyncracies of the particular person whose conduct1.[1971]AC793.2.[1946]4 DLR721.The variable standardof care3isinquestion'.'Thishoweverdoesnotbyitselfenableacourttodeterminewhatlevelof care isowed in aparticularcase,for evenif weusethedeviceof themythicalreasonablemanwemuststill givehimsome characteristicsbasedon thecircumstancesof the case,for examplewecantalkofthereasonablesurgeon,thereasonabledriverorthereasonablehandyman.Suchaformulawillsolve mostcases,but theremaybesomeinstanceswherewemaybepromptedtosaythatthereasonablemanshouldbegivenmorecharacteristics,suchasthereasonablenewlyqualifiedsurgeon, the reasonablelearner driver or thereasonableinexperiencedhandyman.Sucha temptationwill onlyexistwhentherelationshipbetweentheplaintiff andthedefendantiscloserthan that of mere foresight, usuallywhen the plaintiff is fully aware of theparticularcharacteristicsof thedefendanttowhomhethenentrustshimself. The questionthereforeiswhetherthe law would be justifiedinsuch circumstancesin varyingthe standardof care or rather makingthestandardmore specificto the class of individuals of whom the defendantis one.Whetherthis issodependsto some extenton the functionof thestandardof care.Thestandardof careperformstworoles:ontheonehandit offersprotectiontoadefendantsothatheisnotliableunlesshehasbeencareless,andontheotherhanditprotectsapotentialplaintiffbyenabling him to recover compensationif he hasnot been giventhe degreeof safety he isentitled to expect.Generally thesetwo functions will pointtothesameconclusion,buttheremaybecaseswheretheydonot, forexamplein injuriesoccasionedby children.In that exampleit could bearguedthat it would beunfairto condemna child if he was incapableofunderstandingthe risk created by his actions,but equally it could be saidthat intheir dailylives peopleare entitledto expect that theywill not beinjuredbybehaviourwhichisout of theordinary,whoevertheactormight be.4The function of the standardof care as protecting defendantsdoes notmeanthat liability shouldbelimitedtomorallyblameworthyactsbuttheissueiswhetherinthecircumstancesof thedefendant'sactsheshouldhavebehaveddifferently.Inconsideringwhetherhecould havebehaveddifferentlyhis abilityas an individual isirrelevant'but there isaquestionastohowfarthecharacteristicsof theclassof whichthedefendantisamemberwillberelevant.Asinmanyotherareasof3.Glasgow Corpn v Muir[1943] AC 448 at 457per LordMacMillan. However,there may becases where the circumstancesofthe defendant are relevant:an example is HerringtonvBRB[1972]AC 877 where in relation to the liability ofan occupier to a trespasser it was said thatthe knowledge, ability and resources ofthe defendant wouldbe relevant. See also Goldman vHargrave [1969]1 AC645.4.Anotherexampleis BuckleyvSmithTransport [1946]4 DLR715(the case of the insanelorry driver) wherethe moral blameworthinessof the actualdefendant was nail(unlessheknew the nature of his disability),but on theother hand a member of the public is entitledtoexpectthathewillnotbehit byerraticallydrivenlorries.Orisbeingstruckbyasyphiliticlorry driverone of theriskswe mustexpectto putup with?5.Glasgow Corpn vMuir [1943]AC448.4Legal Studiesnegligencethe question comes downto one ofcategorisationof 'relevant'circumstances. B-ing a child is relevant,6 but being inexperiencedis not.'When we look at the standardof care from the plaintiff'spoint of viewwe ask whether he hasreceivedthe levelof safety whichhe isentitledtoexpect. This means that a person isentitledto engageinthe activitiesofdaily lifein the expectationthat he will not suffer harmfrom unusual orunexpectedrisks.In other wordswhat riskscana person beexpectedtoput up with?In mostcases the two functionsof the standard of carebring about thesame result, but will not do so wherethe defendant isa member of a classwhich is incapableof achieving therequired level ofsafety.The questionis how toresolvethat problem.The legaltheoryof the standard of care(i) GlasgowCorpnvMuirThevariousdictaonthestandardof careshowthattheappropriatemeasureispurelyobjective.Thus, inVaughan v MenloveTindalCJsaidthat'instead,therefore,of sayingthat theliabilityfornegligenceshouldbeco-extensivewiththe judgmentof eachindividual,whichwouldbeasvariableas thelength of thefootof eachindividual,we oughtrather toadhereto the rules whichrequires in allcases a regardto caution such asamanof ordinaryprudencewould observe'YHoweverthisdoesnotresolvetheproblem,forasLordMacMillanobserved inGlasgow Corpn v Muir''...there is a sensein whichthestandard of careof the reasonablemaninvolves in itsapplicationa subjectiveelement.It isstill leftto thejudgetodecide what,in thecircumstancesof theparticularcase,thereason-able man wouldhavehad incontemplationandwhat, accordingly,thepartysoughttobemade liableoughttohave foreseen'.Thus we posit an objectivelyconstructedreasonableman and ask him asubjectivequestion. But the problem isto definethe attributes which thisreasonablemaninthiscaseissupposedtopossess.Doeshehaveawoodenlegliketheactualdefendant,orisheasmyopicastheactual6.McHale v Watson[1966]ALR 513;Ryanv Hickson (1975)55DLR3d1967.7.Nettleship vWeston[1971]2QB691;The LadyGwendolen [1965]p 294.8.(1837)3BingNC 468,132ER 490.9.See also Blyth vBinningham Waterworks (1856)11Ex 780, 156ER 1947:'Negligenceis theomissiontodosomethingwhichareasonableman,guideduponthoseconsiderationswhichordinarilyregulatetheconductof humanaffairswoulddo,ordoingsomethingwhich aprudent andreasonable manwouldnot do'.10.[1943]AC448at 457.The variablestandard of care5defendantor ishe as over-confidentas the actual defendant?"Even ifweweretoapply alower standardby making thejudgment on thebasis ofthestandardof thereasonablemanwhohasthesame disabilityasthedefendant,thatwouldnotnecessarilyrelievehimof liabilitysinceinmanycaseshewouldbenegligentinengagingin theactivity,suchasdriving, when he knowsthat his disability disqualifies him from doing so.But theremaybe cases wherehe isunawareof the defect,'2 or wheretheplaintiffknowsof the defect(eg drunkeness on the part of the driver) andknowingly putshimself into a positionwhereheis at riskbecauseof thedefendant'sdisability.Bothexamplesraiseissuesastothedegreeofsubjectivity(or specificcategorisation)in thestandardof care.The traditionalviewof thestandardof care asestablishedinGlasgowCorpnvMuir affirmstheobjectivenatureof thestandardof carebutleavesunclear just how specific'thecircumstancesof thecase'maybe(eg the reasonabledriver or thereasonable jaguar driver?).Also uncleariswhichattributesof theactualdefendantmaybeattributedtothereasonableman(egthereasonable driver or thereasonable75year olddriver?).Ingeneraltherelevantcircumstanceswillbethephysicalconditionsin whichthe acttakesplace, suchasdriving at nightor on anarrowroadand shouldexcludethose factorswhichdescribetheactorratherthantheact.Thusintheexampleof theelderlydriverthequestionwouldbe whetherthereasonabledriver would haverefrainedfromtheactinthe circumstances,thelatter includingthestateof theroadand the weather, but not including the defendant'sage. In relatingthestandardof care tothecircumstancesof thecase thecourtcan takeaccountof therelativelackof skill .of the defendantby referringtothelevel of safety which a person is entitled to expect. Thus in Wells v Cooper3thequestionwas whetherthedefendanthouseholder hadactedreason-ablyin using 3/4inchscrewsto fix a door handle.The court rejectedthesuggestionthattheappropriatestandardwasthatof theprofessionalcarpenterworkingforreward,andsaidthatthetestwasthatof thereasonablecarpenter,notingthat'thedefendant'sexperienceof dom-esticcarpentryissufficienttojustifyhisinclusioninthecategoryofreasonablycompetentcarpenters'.Thusthecourtacknowledgedthatminordomesticcarpentryisusuallydonebyhouseholders,thatinrelationtosuchmattersonecannotexpectany higherdegreeof safety,andthereforethatthe applicablestandardwasthatof thereasonablehandyman.Thusthespecificattributesof thereasonablemanweredeterminedby what riskswe can be expectedto put up with, in this case11.SeegenerallySeavey,'Negligence- subjectiveorobjective'(1927)41HarvLR1where itis arguedthatthereasonablemanintheinstantcase doespossessthe physicalcharacteristicsof theactual defendant andwill bejudgedaccordingly.This mayinvolve adifferent (and evenhigher standard),eg the manwith poor eyesight shouldrealise that heshould notdrive.12.Eg, automatismwhich is a possible defence in tort: Roberts v Ramsbottom[1980]1 All ER7:however the defendantwas heldliable becausehe shouldhave realisedthat hisdrivingwouldbe impaired.13.[1958]2QB265.6LegalStudiestheriskthatthereasonablehandymanwillbetoo optimisticabouttheholdingpower of 3/4inchscrews.The legaltheoryofstandard ofcare: (2)proximity derivedAn alternative wayof looking at the standardof care is to relateit tothesource of the obligation, that is the duty ofcare.In other words looking atwhytheobligationarisesmaytellussomethingof thecontentof theobligation.In most casesthis approach will make no difference,except inthose cases where the plaintiffknowsthat the defendant suffers from somedisability whichpreventshim fromexercisingthe usuallevelof care.The modern view ofduty of care is that it is based on proximity, that ison the relationshipbetweenthe plaintiff and thedefendant.4 In casesofphysicaldamagethenecessarydegreeof proximityisestablishedbyforesightof damage,butinothercasesacloserrelationshipmayberequired.'5 Theargument inrelationtothestandardof careisthat thecontent of the duty flows from the relationshipbetween the parties. Wherethat relationshipisoneof foresightof damagethereisnodifficultyinapplying thestandardbased on the foresight of the reasonableman; butwhere that relationship is different, that differencemay be reflected in thecontent of the standardof care. Thusin Cook v Cook,6 where the plaintiffwasa passengerinjuredby alearnerdriver,themajoritysaidthat'ifa person were deliberately to agree to allow a blacksmith to seek to mendhis watch, the blacksmith would be required to act as a reasonable personshould in the circumstances,thoughhe wouldnot be subject to the highstandard of care whichwould be required of a professionalwatchmaker.The reason for that isnot that the objective general standard requiredbythe law of negligence is abandoned.It is that the more detailed definitionof thecontentof that objectivestandardwill dependupontherelevantrelationshipof proximityfrom which it flowsand into whichthe reason-ablepersonof the lawof negligencemust be projected... 'Is thereanynecessarylinkbetweenproximityandthecontent of theduty to take care?It sounds logicalthat if the obligation existsbecauseoftherelationshipbetweentheparties,thenthenature of that obligationshouldequallybedeterminedbythatrelationship.However,suchaconclusion is not a necessaryone for it couldequally well be arguedthatproximitymerelyraisestheobligationtotakecare,thenatureoftheobligationbeingdeterminedby othercriteria.Indeed,aswillbeseen,the proximity derivedview of the standard of care could lead to consider-able problems if universally appliedand theremay be very good reasonsbothof principleandlogictodeterminedutyandstandardof careseparately.Inaddition,many,but notall,of the difficultieswhichthe14.SeegenerallyKidner,'ResilingfromtheAnnsprinciple:thevariablenatureofproximity in negligence'(1987)7 LS319.15.See for example MuirheadvIndustrialTank SpecialitiesLtd [ 186]QB 507; SutherlandShireCouncil vHeyman(1985)60ALR1;Caparo vDickman [1990]1 AllER 705.16.(1985)162CLR376;notedbyS. Todd(1989)105LQR24.The variable standardof care7proximityviewattemptstosolvecanbedealtwithbythevariousdefencestonegligence- theissueof drunkendriversisanexampleofthis. Aparticulardifficultyof policy withtheproximityviewisthat itintroducesthe unpopulardoctrineof volenti bytheback door,andmayevengosofar astoprecludea personwhomerely knowsof the defectfrom suing,thus extendingthedefencefrom volentito scienti. On theonehand it issaid that it isonly right to deny recovery in a case where both thedefendantisunabletoreachtherequiredstandardand theplaintiff isfully aware of that fact andneverthelesscontinueshisrelationshipwiththe defendant.In otherwordsa plaintiff cannotexpect more by wayofsafety thanheknowsthe defendantcan provide.Whatfollowswillexaminethewayinwhichthecourtshaveapproachedthisproblem,andit isconvenienttodividethecasesintothreegroups:(1)applicationof thepurelyobjectiveprinciple;(2)theholding outprinciple;and(3)theproximityprinciple.It willthenbenecessarytoexaminethe relationshipbetweenthe standardof care andthe defencesof volenti, contributorynegligenceandexturpi causa.The purely objective principleThestarting point forexaminationof thisprinciplemustbe Nettleship vWeston7 wheretheplaintiff was'injuredwhileteachinga learner driver.Twopointswereacceptedwithoutargument:first,thatsofarasthecriminal lawisconcernedalearner driverisexpectedtoadheretothesame standardas other drivers, and it isno defence that he was doing hisbest."Thereasonmustbethat thefunctionof thecriminallawistoprotectthepublicandthecriminallawlookssolelyat thestandardofsafetythatotherhighwayusersareentitledtoexpect.Secondly,there is no doubt that in relationto other highway users thestandardof care in thecivillaw ispurely objective.Again,the reasonisthe levelof safetywhichtheyareentitledtoexpectand thefactthat inrelationto them the inexperience of the driver is not a material or knownfactor.In engagingin theact of driving all driversmust conformto thereasonablestandardof careappropriateforthecircumstances,thosecircumstancesbeingonlyfactorsexternaltothe individualactor.'9 The17.[1971]2 QB 691.The result ofthe case was that the defendant was heldliable, but theplaintiff washeld50%contributorilynegligent,MegawLJdissentingonthis point.18.See McCranev Riding [1938]1 AllER 157and Rv PrestonJustices,exp Lyons [1982]RTR173 wherethe learner driverwas convictedofdrivingwithout duecare andattention eventhoughhe was followingtheordersof his professionalinstructor.19.Thereis one case implicitlyagainst this view:inWaugh vAllan [196412 Lloyd'sRep1theplaintiffwasinjuredbythedefendantlorrydriverwhohadsufferedacoronarythrombosis.He hadbeen illbeforecommencingdriving but hadrecoveredandthe Houseof Lords heldhe was not negligentin undertakingdriving. LordReid saidthat he wasnotnegligent in driving offso soon after his illness and'noother fault could be imputed to him'.Negligencewhiledrivingwasnot alleged,butthecommentsuggeststhathe wouldnothavebeen liable.The case could be arguedas one of automatism, ie after the heartattackhecouldnotbesaidtohavebeendrivingatall,butthisexplanationisnotreallysatisfactory and one wonders why users of thehighway shouldbear the risk of unexpectedillness onthepart of drivers.8Legal Studiesproximityviewof thestandardof carereachesthesameconclusionbecausethe relationshipbetweenthepartiesis notspecial but dependsonlyon foresightof damageobjectivelydetermined.As to the special factorsin Nettleship, that isthe passenger's knowledgeof thedriver'sinexperience,LordDenningtooka robustattitude.Hesaidthat'seeingthat the law lays down, for all driversofmotor cars,a standard ofcare to which all must conform,I think that even a learner driver, so longasheisthesoledriver,mustattainthesamestandardtowardsallpassengersin thecar,includingthe"instructor" ,20He madeplainthat hisreasonswere overtlyduetopolicysayingthat'... the injured person isonly able to recover if the driver is liable in law.Sothe judgessee toit that heis liable,unless he can prove care and skillof a highstandard...Thusweare,inthisbranchof thelaw,movingaway from the concept:"No liability without fault".We are beginning toapplythetest:"onwhomshouldtheriskfall".Morally,thelearnerdriver is not at fault:but legallyshe isliable tobe becauseshe is insuredandthe risk shouldfallon her.20This view was criticisedin Cook v Cook2'on the grounds that socialpolicyisamatterforthelegislatureandnotforthecourts,butalthoughinNettleship the point wasmade ratherbluntly, it isquite properto adopt apolicyargument when principleand authoritypresents the court with achoice.However,it is interesting that neither Lord Denningnor MegawLJadvancedanargumentbasedonprinciple,butratherboth judgesreliedontheuncertaintieswhichwouldarisefromadoptingtheprox-imity view,principallythat therecouldbe noone standardfor learnerdrivers but rather that the standardwould need to vary depending on thedegreeof experienceahdskillof thelearner.Othercasesalsoillustratethegeneralprinciplethat vis-a-vis'unre-lated'plaintiffstheincompetentorinexperienceddefendantowestheusual standardof care.Thus inThe Lady Gwendoline22 a brewing company(Guinness)whoalsooperatedshipswererequiredtoconformtothestandardofthereasonableshipownerincontrollingtheirshippingactivities,andcouldnotpleadtheirinexperienceinsuchmatters:thestandardwasnotthatof thereasonablebrewerwhooperatedships.Again in Wilsher v Essex HealthAuthority23 Mustill LJ made it clear that the'notionof adutytailoredtotheactor,ratherthantotheact whichheelectsto perform,has no placein the law of tort'.The onlyexceptiontothisprinciple seemsto bechildren whereit isthought that thetest isthe20.[1971]2QB691at 699-701.21.(1986)162CLR 376at 386.22.[1965]P 294.23.[1987]QB730 at 750,CA.Reversedonappealon a differentissue [1988]AC1074.The variable standard of care9standard of the reasonable child of that age.24 However,that view did notgo unchallengedsincein the leadingcase,McHale v Watson,24 Menzies Jvigorouslydissented,arguing that the adult standard should apply since'thelawof negligenceisprimarilyconcernedwiththecircumstancesunderwhicha personwhosuffersdamagemayrecovercompensation,andthereisnonecessaryconnectionbetweenlegalliabilitytomakecompensationand- moralculpability'.Thatistrue,butequallytheexceptionfor childrenprobablyhasa great deaLtodo with thefact thatchildrenwillnotalwaysbecoveredbyinsurance.Ifthecontestisbetweentwo'innocent'anduninsuredparties,thetraditionalideasoffaultaremorelikelytoberesuscitated.However,inexperienceorincompetencemaynotbe theonlyfactorswhichlimit the defendant'sabilityto reachthe usual standard.He maybeinhibitedbylackof resourcesor by anobligationwhichheowestoanotherortothestate.Lackof resourceswouldnotnormallyberel-evant25 butanexampleof thelatterproblemisKnight vHomeOffice26wherethedeceasedcommittedsuicidein prison andit wasarguedthathadhebeen detainedin a secure mentalhospital(as wasintended)hewouldnot havehad the opportunitytokillhimself. Pill Jsaidthat 'itisforthecourttoconsiderwhatstandardof careisappropriatetotheparticularrelationshipandin the particular situation',and he heldthatthestandard of care owedina prison was not as high as in a psychiatrichospital.Thiscanbe justified,notonthegroundsof lackof resources(although the judge saidthatthat wasrelevantto a limitedextent),butrather on the ground that the function of a prison is different from that ofa psychiatric hospitalandthat the otherobligations owedby the prison(for example in relationtosecurity) maybe one of the'circumstancesofthe case'which limit or vary the duty to the inmates.'The duty is tailoredtotheact andfunctiontobeperformed'.Concerning caseswherethere is a particular relationshipbetweenthepartiesthereareothercaseswhichtakethesamelineasNettleshipvWeston.Thecasesondrunkendriving allaffirmthatthedriverowesaduty to thepassenger, althoughthe latter maybe heldto be contributo-rilynegligent.AsimilarkindofcaseisGrego~yvKelywheretheplaintiff accepteda lift in a car knowingthat the footbrakedid not work:herethedefendantcouldnotarguethatheonlyowedthedutyof areasonabledriver of a carwithnobrakes.Theplaintiff washeldtobe24.McHale vWatson(1966)115CLR199; seealso Ryan vHickson (1975)55DLR3d196where it is argued that achild who engagesin an adult activity (here driving a snowmobile)may beheldto theadultstandard.25.HerringtonvBRB[1972] AC877is an exception butit may be argued that in occupiersliabilitythe status ofthe parties is relevant:however this is not a convincing argumentas itisnotobviousthataplaintiff shouldbeentitledtoexpectahigherlevelof carefromaperson with greaterresources.26.[1990]3AllER 237.27.Dann vHamilton [1939]1 KB509(contributorynegligencenotpleaded);OwensvBrimmelt[1977]QB859.28.[1978]RTR 426.10Legal Studiescontributorilynegligent,butif theproximityviewhadbeentakenhewouldhavereceivednothingatall.Theargumentinthesecasesisexemplifiedby the rejection of the defence of volenti in Dann v Hamilton29 onthegroundsthatthedefendantshouldnotbeexculpatedaltogethermerelybecausehiswrongdoingis obvious.Theideathat thestandardof care cannot bevariedbythenatureofthe relationshipbetweenthepartiesisalsoillustratedbyMLC v Evattwhereit wasarguedthattheonlyobjectivelydeterminatestandardofcare inanegligentmisstatementcaseisthat of theprofessionaladviser.Lord Diplocksaidthat 'thereisno halfway housebetweenthat and thecommonlaw duty whicheach man owes his neighbour irrespectiveof hisskill- thedutyof honesty'.However,ratherthanhavetheeffectofraisingthe standardrequiredof the non-professionaladviser, thePrivyCouncil felt that asthis standard wastooonerous,no duty wasowedatall.3'As seenabove thiscase confusestheissues of duty and standardofcare,but is a good illustrationof the problemof 'fairness'that canarisewheretheplaintiff knowsof theinexperienceof thedefendant.The holdingout principleAviewwhichcanbeseenasahalfwayhousebetweenthepurelyobjective principleandthe proximityview, istheidea that the standardof caremaybe varied wherethe defendanthasheldhimself outasonlypossessinga limiteddegreeof skill.Thisissomewhatakintothevolentidefence,thatisthat theplaintiffagreesthat heshouldonlybe owedalimitedlevelof care,andforthat reasonthe ideaislikelytobetreatedwith the same strictnessas that defence. Indeed it is most likelyto arise incases wherethereisa contractualrelationshipbetweenthe parties.Anexample is Philipsv Whiteleywhere the plaintiff had her ears pierced by ajewellerandlater complainedof an earinfection.33 GoddardJsaid thatthedefendanthadtakenreasonablestepsasajewellerandwasnotrequiredtoconformtothestandardsof thereasonablesurgeon.Thereasonwasthatthe jewellerdoesnotholdhimself outashavinganygreater skill than that of a reasonablejewellerand theplaintiff, knowingwhothedefendantwas,couldnotexpectanyhigherstandardof care.Thus the duty to take care exists because of the relationshipbetween the29.[1939]1 KB509.30.[1971]AC793.31.Doesthis meanthat if I havemy watch repairedby a blacksmithhe doesnot even owethe standardof thereasonableblacksmith?The answer mustbe nobecause MLC vEvattwasdealingwith thecriteria fortheexistence of a duty inrelationto statements,andtheproblemoverthe appropriatestandardof care wasa policy reason for denying aduty. Inthecaseof theblacksmiththereisnodoubtthathe owesadutynottocausephysicaldamagecarelessly,andtheonlyquestioniswhetherthisimportsthestandardofthereasonableblacksmith,thereasonable watchmaker,orthedutyto refusetodothe job.32.[1938]1 AllER 566.SeealsoMiller vMillward [1935]NZLR s12.33.In theevent the judge wasnot satisfiedthat theearpiercingcausedtheinfection.The variablestandardof care11parties,but thecontentof thatduty islimitedbecausetheplaintiff wasaware3 4 that the defendantheldhimself out ashaving limited skills.Thisargumentfitsin withtheviewthat wherethepartiesareinacontractualrelationshipthelawof tortshouldnotimposeanyhigherstandardof carethanexistsunderthecontract.35 Thusit couldbesaidthat in Philips vWhiteley therelationship wasessentiallycontractualandthe law of contract wouldonly requirethedefendantto act as areason-.able jeweller.Whileit is agreedthat theholdingout principle(or thatof voluntaryassumptionofresponsibility)36 mayincreasethestandardofcarerequired,theproblemiswhetherit oughttobeallowedtoreducethelevelof care.Wherea specificdeclarationof lackof skillismadeby apersonacting in thecourseof abusinessthat mightrun into difficultieswith the Unfair Contract Terms Act1977 as being a term or notice whichrestricts liability which would otherwisearise,3 7 but that would not be sowherethelimitationarisessolely fromtheobligationsderivedfrom theobjective relationshipof theparties. Thusthejewellercannot reduce hisduty by saying that he is incompetentat piercing ears for he must at leastbeheldtothestandardofthereasonablejeweller.Actuallytheearpiercing exampleisnot a very goodone for it caneasily bearguedthatthe standardofcare is that which people in general are entitled to expect,and as ear piercing byjewellersis universal, that must be the appropriatestandard,evenapartfromtheholdingoutissue.Themattercanbetested by asking whether a woman who has her ears pierced by ajewellercould be held to becontributorily negligent,and the answer must be no.Shehasnotdisregardedherownsafetyasearpiercingby jewellersiscommonpractice.Theproblemdoesariseifwetaketheexampleof ablacksmithrepairingawatch.Herethereareanumberof possibilities:(i)theappropriatestandardisthatofthereasonableblacksmith(eitherbyreasonof holding out or by the proximitytest of the standard of care)(nodamages);(ii)the standard isthat of the reasonablewatch repairer(fulldamages);(iii)the standard isas in (ii),but the plaintiffis contributorilynegligent(reduceddamages)orhasconsented(nodamages).Philips vWhiteleycan beexplainedeither becausetheear piercing didnot in factcause the damageor becausetheordinary standardof care wasappliedin that the standardof the jeweller represents the level of safety a personisentitledtoexpectwhoeverisdoingthepiercing.Accordinglythereseemsnogoodreasonforsayingthattheholdingoutprinciplecan34.Thesameprincipleshouldapplyif theplaintiffisnotactuallyaware,butthedefendanthastakenreasonablestepstobringhislimitedskillstotheattentionofareasonablepersonin theposition of the plaintiff.35.Reidv Rush and Tompkins [1989]3 All ER 228;TaiHingLtdvLiu ChongHing Bank [1986]AC80.However,inmanycases,especiallywhereimpliedtermsareconcerned,thecontractualdutywillbe thesame asthetort duty.36.In Nettleship v Weston[197112QB691SalmonLJarguedthat thelearnerdriver hadvoluntarily assumedthe ordinarystandard of care by sayingthat shewasinsured.37.Smithv Eric Bush[1990]AC831.12LegalStudiesreducethestandardof carebelowthatwhichapersonisentitledtoexpectforthatrelevantact,andthatproblemssuchasthatoftheblacksmithandthewatchrepairercanberesolvedbycontributorynegligenceorconsent.Theproximity principleThereareanumberof cases,mainly fromAustralia, whichsay thatasthedutytotakecareisgovernedbythenatureof therelationshipbetween the parties, it follows that the content of that duty should also begovernedbythat relationship.The storybeginswiththe judgmentofDixonJinTheInsurance Commissionerv Joyce,5 acaseof apassengerinjuredbythenegligenceof adrunkdriver.He outlinedthreewaysofdealingwith theproblem,but discardedtheidea of adoptingtheordi-nary levelof careandthen applyingthedefencesof contributorynegli-genceor volenti. Hesaid'It appearstome that the circumstances inwhich the defendantacceptsthe plaintiff as a passengerand in whichthe plaintiff acceptsthe accom-modationin theconveyanceshould determinethe measureof duty andthatitisamoresatisfactorymannerof ascertainingtheirrespectiverightsthanbyopposingtoafixedmeasureof dutyexculpatorycon-siderations,suchasvoluntaryassumptionofriskorcontributorynegligence'.Thusthelevelof careowedisdeterminedbytherelationshipbetweenthe parties,of which an important factor iswhether the plaintiffknowsofthedefendant'sdefect.Dixon Jthoughtthat inpracticethisapproachwouldnotproduceanydifferentresultfromadoptingthealternativeapproach,but it should be rememberedthat if the proximity test isusedthe plaintiffgets no damages. This is the same result as the application ofvolenti, but that doctrinehas beenlookedon with disfavour"9 and isonlyrarelyapplied.Ifcontributorynegligenceisusedtheresultwillbedifferent fortheretheplaintiff willreceivea portionof hisdamages.TheproximityviewwasrecentlyapprovedbytheHighCourtofAustralia in Cook v Cook'wherethe plaintiffpassenger was injured by thenegligenceof an unlicenseddriver.The court adoptedthe viewthat thestandard should be that of an inexperienceddriver4 becausethe 'specialandexceptionalfactsmaysofartransformtherelationshipbetweendriverandpassengerthatitwouldbeunrealtoregardtherelevantrelationship as being simplythe ordinary one ofdriver and passenger...'The ideais thatastheduty arises outof the relationship,thereforethe38.(1948)77CLR 39.39.Thevolenti doctrinecannot be appliedinroadaccidentcases:s 149(3),RoadTrafficAct 1988;Pitts v Hunt[1990]3 WLR 542.40.(1986)162CLR 376;seealsoChang v Chang [1973]1 NSWLR708(alearnerdrivercase)andRoggenkampv Bennett (1950)80CLR 292(a drunkdriver case),41.It was decidedon thefactsthat thedriver wasinbreachof eventhat lower standardandthattheplaintiff wascontributorilynegligent.CookwasfollowedinRicketts v Laws(1988)14NSWLR311with thesameresult.The variable standard of care13content of the duty must be related tothat relationship, but that doesnotexplainwhy,eitheratthedutyoratthestandardofcarestage,therelationshipshouldbe regardedas any more specificthanthat of driverandpassenger.Whyadopt therelationshipof passenger/learnerdriverrather than just passenger/driver?Cook v Cook did not need to adopt this view as the defendant was held tobenegligentevenonthestandardoftheinexperienceddriver,andanywaythedriver wasnot merelyalearnerdriver but ratherapersonwhoheldno licenceof any kindat all. Furthermoretheplaintiff incitedthedefendanttodrive evenknowingthatshehadnolicence.Thusthedefencesof volenti,contributorynegligenceand exturpi causa would havebeenavailable.The problemmight havearisenif thedriverhadheld aprovisionallicence,for in suchacaseit wouldbe difficulttosaythat apassenger/teacherwas contributorilynegligent42 (unless her instructionwasnegligent)whensuchcircumstancesaresanctioned,andevenrequired,bythelaw.43 Inthissituationit mightbeasked whetherit isrightfortheproximityviewtoplacetheburdenofinjuryonthepassenger/instructorwhenit isclearthat someone hastotakethe riskaslearnerdriversmustbetaught.Ininsurancetermstheproblemisnotlarge,sincelearnersalreadypay a higher premiummainlytocovertheriskof damagetothird partiesand theelementof thepremium attribu-tableto injurytoinstructors mustbe small.This approachwas rejectedinCookvCookonthegroundthatsocialpolicywasamatterforthelegislatureandnot for thecourts,but theconsequencesof non-liabilityare more seriousfor a plaintiff in sucha situation thanthe consequencesfor adefendantwho isheldliable.However,therewillbecases,suchasCookvCookitself,wherethedefendantisuninsured,wheretheAustraliancourtswouldarguethatthemattermust beresolvedbylegaltheoryunencumberedbysocialpolicy.The majorityrefertotheexampleof the blacksmithmendingawatchand saythat the degreeof definitionincorporatedintothe stand-ard(iethenumberof attributesgiventothereasonableman)willdependontherelevantrelationshipof proximity.'Themoredetaileddefinitionof theobjectivestandardof careforthepurposesof aparti-cular category of case must necessarily depend upon the identificationoftherelationshipof proximitywhichisthetouchstoneandcontrolof therelevantcategory'.'Therearea numberof problemswiththis view.The firstisthat it isnot necessarilylogicalto use the relationshipwhich gives rise to the duty42.In Nettleship v Weston[1971]2 QB691Lord Denningreducedthe plaintiff's damagesonthe groundsofjoint responsibilityfor the accident:'theirjointdriving must comeuptothe highstandardrequiredof a singleindividual'andintheabsenceof evidence tothecontrarythey must be held equallyresponsible.This seems rather onerous on the supervi-sor.SalmonLJadoptedcontributorynegligencetoreducethedamages,butthiswasrejectedby MegawLJ.43.Wouldit be possible to saythat a non-instructor/passengeris contributorynegligent,but aninstructor/passengeris not?The answer maywellbe yes.44.Cook v Cook(1986)162CLR 376at 382.14LegalStudiesof careto determinethe contentof that care. Oncethe obligationto takecarearisesthestandardcanequallylogicallybedeterminedbyotherfactors,andif oneelementin thestandardof care istobenot onlythecarelessnessof thedefendantbut alsothe standardof safetywhichtheplaintiff isentitledto expect,it issensiblethat thisshouldbeso.Secondly,the formuladoesnot explainwhich attributesof theactualdefendantthereasonablemanshouldberegardedaspossessing.Thiswas an argument usedby MegawLJ in Nettleship v Weston45 when he said'if this doctrine weretoapply, wouldnot logicirresistibly demandthatthereshouldbesomethingmorethanasingle,conventionalstandardapplicabletoanyonewhofallsintothecategoryof learnerdriver...?Thatstandarditselfwouldnecessarilyvaryoverawiderange,notmerelywith the actualprogressof the learner,but also with the passen-ger'sknowledgeof that progress...'Hencethe standardowedat the first lessonwould differ from that owedjust beforethe driver takes a driving test, and indeed may vary thereafter.Equallywouldit berelevantthatthepassengerknowsthatthe driver,albeitqualified,isnervous,temperamentalorover-confident?Thesecriticismswere rejectedby thecourt inCook v Cook,but only by arguingthatthe standardwould onlybevariedin exceptionaland rarecircum-stances,whichwerereferredtoas'specialandexceptionalinthe sensethat they so alter the ordinary relationshipof driver and passengerthat itwouldbe plainly unreasonable'for the ordinarystandard to apply.Thisisnot reallyananswertothe criticismsof MegawLJespeciallyastheproximity basedview eschewspolicyand social expediency and isbasedonlegaltheory.Thetheoryrequiresustotakeaccountof thedutyrelationshipbetween the parties, but onlyto specifyadditional attributesinexceptionalcircumstances.Finally theconsequencesof thisview mayalsobe objectedtoonthegroundsthat the resultof applyingit will oftenbe thesame as applyingthe defence of volenti andthat has been regardedwith disfavour.What ismoretheresultof completenon-compensationcouldalsoapply wherethe plaintiffmerely knowsof therisk(scienti) ratherthan consentstoit,andthat wouldbeaconsiderableandobjectionablelimitationontherangeof compensation.However,theproximity basedview is an attempt toexpressa generalnotionofjusticeand fairnessin suchcasesandhasnotbeenlimitedtoAustralia.Thusin NettleshipvWeston46 SalmonLJadoptedtheviewofDixonJinTheInsurance Commissioner v Joyce,47 sayingthat'thespecialrelationshipwhichthepassengerhascreatedby acceptingaliftinthecircumstancespostulated4 surely cannot entitle him to expect the driverto dischargea duty of care or skillwhich ex hypothesi the passengerknowsthedriverisincapableof discharging',andheonlyheldthelearner45.[1971]2 QB691at708-9.46.Ibid at 703.47.(1948)77CLR 39.48.SalmonLJwas referringto adrunk drivercase.The variablestandard of care15driverliablein Nettleshiponthegroundsthat bysayingthatshewasinsuredshe hadvoluntarilyacceptedresponsibility.SimilarsentimentscanbefoundinWooldridgevSumner"9 whereahorseman engagedin a competitiontook acorner too fastand thehorseranintotheplaintiff whowasstandingontheedgeof theshowarea.SellersLJsaidthat'therelationshipofspectator and competitor or player is a special one, asIseeit, asthestandardof conductof theparticipant,asacceptedandexpectedbythespectator,isthat whichthesport permitsor involves.The differentrelationshipinvolvesitsown standardof care'.EquallyDiplockLJmadethe pointthat thespectatorknowsthat thecompetitorwillconcentrateonwinningandthat inthe'agonyof themoment'he maymakea mistake,whichbecauseof the expectationsofthe spectator,could not be regardedas negligence."0 The case cannot beexplainedasoneof volenti,5"butperhapsitseffectcanbetestedbyamendingthe facts.If weassume that the competitionwas taking placein fieldboundedbya fenceandthatthehorseinjuredA,whowasaspectatorinside the fence,andalsoB,who wasa passer byontheroadbeyondthefence,couldBsuebutnotA?Iftheproximityrelatedstandard of care appliesthen Bcouldsue,but if theexplanationis thatwhat limitedthestandardof care wasnottherelationshipbetweentheplaintiff and the defendant,but ratherthe circumstancesof the accident(ratherthanthe attributesof the defendant),thenBcouldnot sue.Thelatter isa feasible answer, althoughin these particularcircumstancesitmayberatherfinetodistinguishbetweenthestandardof careof ahorseman in the circumstancesof a competitionand the standardof careof a horseman/competitor.Anothercasewhichcanbeexplainedaseitherbeingbasedontherelationshipof the parties or the circumstancesof thecase isMarshallvOsmond52 wherea policecarpursuedsuspectedcriminalsand, instop-ping, skiddedinto the criminal's car, injuring one of them. In holding thedriver of the police car not liable it was said that volenti was not applicablebutthatthedutywasbasedonthecircumstancesof thecase,iethechase.This wouldmeanthat if any otherroaduser hadbeeninjured inthechasehewouldnothavebeenabletosue.Thisviewlooksattheblameworthinessof thedefendantand assumesthat beinginjuredby apolicecarpursuing criminalsis ariskof lifewhichwemust allaccept.The relationship view would assume that the pursuit isjustified, but thatit isnota risk whichshouldbeplacedonthird parties.49.[1963]2QB43.50.See also McComiskgy v McDermott [1974]IR 75where the plaintiff wasthe navigator inthedefendant'scarin arally:it washeldthat thestandardwasthat of thereasonablecompetitiverallydriver.51.Thevolenti doctrinewasexcludedbyDiplockLJ.CompareMurray v HarringayArena[1951]2KB 529 where aspectator was struck by a puck at an ice hockey match:it was heldthatit wasanimpliedtermof thecontractthatthespectatortakestheriskof damageincidental tothe game.See alsoHall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club[1933]1 KB205.52.[1983]1 QB1034.16LegalStudiesIt is interestingto note that in none of the proximitytype cases did theapplicationof that principlemake any difference,5 3 whichmaysuggestthattheorymaybeheadinginadifferentdirectionfromoursenseofjustice.Thusit maybecommonlyagreed that wherea person knowsofthedisabilityofthedefendantandneverthelessputshimselfintoarelationshipwith him,heshouldbear part of the blame,but should notbe uncompensatedaltogether. Thus in both Cook v Cook4 and in Ricketts vLaws"5 theinexperienceddriverswereheldtobeinbreachof eventhelower standardof care andboth passengers wereheld tobe contributo-rilynegligent.The dangerof adoptingthevolentidoctrinebythebackdoor,orevenslidingintoascienti doctrineisaseriousriskunderthisprinciple.However,therearecaseswherethestandardof care is reduced,butthesecanbe regardedas beingbasedon 'thecircumstancesof thecase'rather thanthe attributes of the individual defendant.A clear example isWatt v Hertfordshire CC16 wherethesavingof life justifiedtaking a risk,57but theremaybe cases, such asWooldridge v Sumner8 wherethereis littledistinctionbetweenthe circumstancesof thecase andtheattributesofthe defendantasknowntotheplaintiff. However,thegeneralproposi-tionin thiscountryat least isthat expressedbyMustill LJinWilsher vEssexArea Health Authoriy59 when he said that 'thisnotion ofduty tailoredtotheactor,ratherthantotheactwhichheelectstoperform,hasnoplacein thelawof tort'.The standard of careand defencesto negligenceThe problemsinherent in adopting a variable standardof carebased ontheattributesof the defendantortherelationshipbetweentheparties,andthecommonfeelingthat whereapersonknowsof thedefendant'sdisabilityhe is tosome extentresponsiblefor his owndamage,have ledtothe applicationof variousdefencesto thissituation.The effectsof thedefencesof violenti andexturpi causa arethesameasadoptingalowerstandardof care and sayingthat thedefendanthas not beenin breachof.it,whereascontributorynegligenceattributesresponsibilitytoboth53.DixonJ was theonly judge inInsurance Commissioner vJoyce(1948)77 CLR39fullytoespousethisprincipleandinhisdissenthe thoughtthattheplaintiff shouldbecompen-satedbecausetherewasnoevidencethathefullyappreciatedthedriver'sdrunkencondition.54.(1986)162CLR 376.55.(1988)14 NSWLR311.56.[1954]2 AllER 368.57.But compare Latimer v AEC [ 1952] 2 QB701where the difficulty of remedialmeasuresafter a flood ina factory justifiedexposingthe workers to arisk.In boththese casesit maybe arguedthat the risk isjustified, but that does notanswer the question ofwho should bearthe burden of the risk.In Latimer theemployer mayhave been justifiedin resuming work,butwashejustifiedinimposingtheriskof injuryarisingfromthatdecisionontheemployees,or shouldhe haveassumedit himself?58.[1963]2 QB43.59.[1987]1 QB730 at 750,CA. The issue ofstandardof care did not arise in the House ofLords:[1988]AC1074.The variable standardof care17parties. In most casesit makes no difference whetherthe lower standardviewisadoptedor .volenti isapplied,buttherewillbecaseswheretheresultwillbedifferent,"suchasthestraightforwardlearnerdrivercase.6' However,the lower standardview isprobablynot acceptableintheory,andthequestioniswhetherthedefencecanfulfilltherequire-ments ofjustice62 and whether they amount in effect, to adopting varyingstandards of care.Volenti non fit injuriaThisdoctrinehasmetwithdisfavourforsometimealthoughitisoccasionallyappliedwheretheriskisglaringlyobvious.6"Therehasbeenalong debate,beginningwithDann v Hamilton, 64astowhetheritshouldbeappliedwheretheplaintiff isawareof thedefendant'sdisa-bility.Most casesof this kind involve drunkendrivers,but that debate israthersterileasit isnowclearthattheRoadTraffic Actpreventstheapplicationof the volenti doctrine in road accidentcases.65 It is often saidthatthe doctrineappliesbut forthe statutoryexclusion,66 and indeedithasbeenappliedin similar circumstanceswherethestatutorybar doesnotapply.67However,it is arguablethat the doctrine shouldnot apply in any casewherethedefendantisrequiredtobeinsuredorwheretheplaintiffknowsthat the defendant is in fact insured.68 The reason isthat as volentimustbebasedonexpressorimpliedagreement,itshouldnotbeassumedthattheplaintiff would,if asked,haveagreedtoabsolvetheinsurancecompanyinrelationtorisksforwhichthedefendanthasalreadypaidhispremiums,evenif hewouldhavebeenpreparedtoabsolvethedefendantpersonally.Itisnotenoughtosaythattheinsurancecompanystandsin the shoesof the defendant,for what wouldonemake of the reply that theplaintiff would notbe willingtotake theriskif thedefendantisinsured?Neverthelessin Morris v Murray6 9 the doctrine wasappliedtothe caseof a passengerin aplaneoperatedby a drunk pilot,andit waspointedout that a clearer case ofgreat danger could hardly be imagined, and thatthesortof errorsof judgmentwhichanintoxicatedpilotmightmake60.Thiswas recognisedbyDixon J in Insurance Commissioner vJoyce(1948)77CLR 39.61.Thisiswhere theinstructor isnot slowtocorrectthe errorof the learner.62.Justicein this context relates tothe existing structure of the tort of negligenceand nottothe ratherdifferentdemands of socialpolicy.63.See for exampleTitchener v British Railways Board [1983]3 AllER 770; Morris v Murray[1990]3All ER 801.64.[1939]1 KB509.65.Section149(3),Road Traffic Act1988replacing s148(3),Road Traffic Act 1972;PittsvHunt [1990)3 WLR542;WinnikvDick1981SLT101;contraAshton v Turner[1981] QB137.66.Nettleship vWeston [1971]2QB 691per Salmon LJ;Winnik v Dick 1981SLT101; Ashton vTurner [1981]1 QB137;contra Dann v Hamilton [1939]1 KB 509.67.Morris v Murray [1990]3AllER 801.68.SeeJaffey,'Volentinonfit injuria'[1985]CLJ 87at p102. The fact thatin Nettleship vWeston theplaintiffs knowledgethat the defendant wasinsuredaltered the situationin hisfavouris alsorelevant,as isthepolicybehind theRoadTrafficAct1988.69.[1990]3All ER801.18LegalStudieswerelikelyto havea disastrousresult. Neverthelessit isperhapsunfor-tunatethatthiscasewasnotresolvedbycontributorynegligence,'especiallyinthelightof thebarontheuseof volentiintheanalogouscircumstancesofdrunk drivers ofmotor vehicles. The problem is whetherthe plaintiff shouldbe regardedaswholly responsiblefor hisinjuriesinenteringthe planeknowing of the pilotsconditionand whetherthe pilotshould be exculpated merely becausethe risk he created was obvious. Thedifficulty isthat the pilot was wholly responsible for the accident happen-ing and the passenger was responsible for being injured by that negligencebybeing in the wrong place at the wrong time. No doubt the plaintiff wascarelessfor hisown safety,but it maybe doubted whetherhe should beregardedaswhollyresponsibleforhisinjuries.However,volentiwasnotappliedin Nettleship vWeston"(whichwasdecided before the Road Traffic Act 1972), where Lord Denning said that'nothingwillsufficeshortofanagreementtowaiveanyclaimfornegligence',andin Letang v Ottawa Electric Railway2 it wassaid thattheplaintiff must have 'freelyand voluntarily, with the full knowledge of therisk he ran, impliedly agreed to incur it'. The fiction of implied consent inthe circumstances ofan obvious risk is dangerous for it allows the courts todenya remedyto theplaintiff whenhe has been verycareless for his ownsafety,even wherethedefendanthasalsobeenverycareless.Hence theneedto deal strictly with this defence,and the natural desire injustice toseeboth partiesaspartlyresponsibleforthedamage.Allthissuggeststhatexceptinextremecasesthereisageneralunwillingnessto adopt a solution whereby a plaintiffloses all his damagesbecauseof his knowledgeof thedefendant's disability,and hencethat toadoptaproximityorrelationshipbasedviewof thestandardof care(which wouldhavethesameresult)wouldbeoutof stepwith currenttrends. Indeedit would be wrong to allowthe proximityviewto subvertthestrict controlsonthe volenti'3 doctrine,for examplebyallowingit incasesshortofagreementorbysayingthatthebaronproceedingscontainedin theRoad Traffic Act1988doesnot apply where thereisnoduty in thefirst place. However, there may be one exception to this, for itseemsthattheexturpi causa doctrineisnowbeingappliedinlimitedcircumstances,whereoncevolenti mighthavebeen chosen.Ex turpi causa non oritur actioThismaximhasonlyrecentlymadean appearanceinthelaw of negli-gence,andagaintherevivalbeganinAustralia.Therearenowtwo70.FoxLJconsideredthispoint but saidthat 'thewildirresponsiblityof theventureissuch that the law shouldnot intervene to awarddamages and should leavethe loss whereitfalls'.71.[1971]2 QB 691at 701.See also DubevLabar(1986) 27 DLR4th 653 to the same effect.Howeverthedoctrinewas appliedinrelationtoanexclusionnotice inacar inBennett vTugwel[1971]2 AllER 248.72.[1926]AC725;seealso ICI v Shatwell [1965]AC656.73.SeeJaffey,'Volentinonfitinjuria'[1985]CLJ 87wherehe saysthatthe differencebetweentheproximity viewandvolenti issemantic only.The variable standardof care19distinctapproachestotheissue. The first,and more traditionalview,isbased directly on public policy, and the second holds that the illegality isonlyrelevant in sofar asit affectsthe standardof carewhichone partycanbe expectedto owe tothe other-in other words the relationship viewof the standardof care.Thepublicpolicyviewismostclearlyexpressedincasesinvolvingfraud, especiallycontractualcases. Thus is Euro-DiamLtd v Butlers74 KerrLJsaidthat'the exturpi causa defenceultimately restson aprincipleof public policythat the courts will notassist a plaintiff who hasbeen guilty of illegal(orimmoral)conductof whichthecourtsshould takenotice.It appliesif inall.the circumstancesit would beanaffronttothe publicconsciencetogranttheplaintiff therelief heseeksbecausethecourtwouldtherebyappear toassist inor encouragetheplaintiff inhis illegalconductortoencourageothers insimilar acts'.Thisviewmaybeappropriatewheretheplaintiffhasbeenguiltyoffraud,but ismore difficult to apply to casesof the kind being consideredhere. However,the public policy view was adopted by Beldam LJ in Pittsv Hunt75 wherea passengerwas denied compensationwhen he incitedanunlicensedanduninsureddrivertodriverecklessly.Hesaidthat theplaintiff wasjointlyconcernedin an act that amounted tomanslaughterand that thereforepublicpolicyprecludedhisclaim.One problem with the public policy view isthat it requires ajudgmentbased on public conscienceas to whetherthe illegalityisso serious astoprecluderecovery,andalsowhetherthereisasufficientcausallinkbetween the illegalityand the damage.Distinguishing between gradesofillegality anddegreesof causativeeffectcauses suchdifficultiesthat thealternativeapproachtoillegalityispreferable.That alternativeapproach,currentlyadoptedin Australia,andper-haps also here, is that it isthe character of the act rather than its illegalityalonewhichcausesthecourttodenyadutyof care.Thusin Jackson vHarrison76 the passengerwasinjuredwhiletravellingwith adriverwhohad been disqualifiedfrom driving. The maxim was not applied becausethe illegalitydidnot affectthe standardof care whichcould reasonablybeexpectedof thedriver.7 Mason Jsaidthat'thedenialof relief shouldberelatednottotheillegalcharacterof theactivity but ratherto the character and incidents of the enterpriseand tothehazardswhicharenecessarilyinherentinitsexecution.Amore74.[1990]1 QB1 at 35.SeealsoThackwell vBarclays Bank[1986]1 All ER 676(a caseofconversion of a cheque);andSaunders vEdwards [1987]1 WLR1116(fraudulent misrepre-sentationtoavoid stamp dutyonthe sale of alease).75.[1990]3WLR 542.76.(1978)138CLR 438(not cited in Ashton v Turner.Jackson vHarrisondistinguishestheearlier case of Smith vJenkins (1970)119CLR 397which was appliedin AshtonvTurner. SeealsoGoldbolt v Fittock (1964)NSWR 22.77.The court distinguishedSmith vJenkins (1970)119CLR397where the passengerwasinjuredbythe negligentdriving of thedefendantof acarwhichthey had jointly stolen.20LegalStudiessecurefoundationfor denying relief, though morelimitedin itsapplica-tion - and for that reason fairer in its operation,is to say that the plaintiffmustfailwhenthecharacterof theenterpriseinwhichthepartiesareengagedissuchthatitisimpossibleforthecourttodeterminethestandardof care whichisappropriatetobe observed'.Althoughthisapproachassumesthat in certain circumstancesnodutyatallisowedbythedefendant,itmightneverthelessbepossibletodevelopthetheorysoastoholdthatthecircumstancesmaylowerthelevelof carebut not abolishit altogether.Nocasehasyetdone so,andthis may be becausethe applicationof contributorynegligencemightbemoreappropriateinsuchcases.ThisapproachwasadoptedbyBalcombeLJinPitts vHunt"andseemsto have been approvedby Dillon LJ whoalso gave as a reasonthatthe damage arosedirectly fromtheillegality.Thusthe Courtof Appealseemstohave movedin thedirectionof theAustraliansolution sothatthe questionis whetherinthe circumstancesof the case an appropriatelevelof carecouldnot, forwhateverreason,beestablished.Thisviewowes somethingtothe public policybasis of the defencebut alsoregardsthe particular circumstancesof thecasetobedecisive.However,thequestioniswhether,inconsideringthecircumstancesof thecase,it isappropriate toconsidertheparticular relationshipbetweenthe parties.This seemsto be inevitablewhere one is dealing in joint participationinanillegal act,but it is not illogicalto reject the particular relationshipasan element in thestandardof care and yetto accept it as relevant tothedefenceof exturpi causa. Thereasonis that inthis area isit notthe fact ofillegalitywhichbars-theclaim,butrather the jointparticipationin theillegalityandthereforeonemustlooktothedegreeof responsibilitywhichtheoneparty canbe saidtohaveundertakentowardstheother.Alsothe adoptionof this view wouldprevent thecourtsfrom takingtheview that it should'onthefirst indicationof unlawfulnessaffectinganyaspect of a transaction,draw upits skirtsand refuse all assistancetotheplaintiff, no matter how serious his loss nor how disproportionate his losstothe unlawfulnessof hisconduct'.79Even thoughthe defenceof ex turpi causa isundoubtedlyapplicabletotort,oneshouldbewarythatitdoesnotsimplyreplacethevolentidoctrine, which hasnot onlyfoundjudicialdisfavour in the past but hasalso inmotor vehiclecasesbeenexcludedby legislation."It should notbe used merely as a waytoavoid theeffectof s149(3),Road Traffic Act1988incasesof greatfoolhardiness,but ratherthepublicpolicy justi-ficationforthedefenceshouldbekeptinmind.Theplaintifflosesbecausehe has donesomething illegalwhich in the circumstancesof the78.[1990]3 WLR542at 549.He did soon the ground that it then becomes unnecessarytoassessthedegreeof themoralturpitudeinvolved,andhespecificallyrejectedpublicconscienceasa test forthe applicabilityof the maxim.79.Per BinghamLJin Saunders v Edwards [1987]1 WLR1116at1134.80.The exturpi defenceisnotaffectedbys149(3),RoadTrafficAct1988; Pitts v Hunt[199013WLR542.The variable standardof care21caseisso seriousthat the defendantcannot be expectedtoowe him theusuallevelof care.Consentor knowledge,even in thecircumstancesofanunlawfulact,isnotby itself enough.Contributory negligenceMany of theproblems of the variable standardof care andof the volentidoctrinehavebeen solved by theapplication of contributorynegligencewheretheeffectis generallymerelyto reduceratherthan eliminatetheplaintiffsdamages.8'This representsadifferentapproachtoliability,beingbasedmore on causationthan onduty, sothat the defendantdidowea dutytotheplaintiff, was inbreachof that duty,butthedamagewasnot whollycausedby him.(It is notnecessary that the carelessnessofthe plaintiff should contributeto the accident happening,but only thatitcontributestothedamagethat resultsfromthedefendant'snegli-gence.)In this waythe responsibilityfor putting himself at risk when heknows of the defendant'sdisability can be recognised without too drastican effect.The cases on drunk driversare now resolved in this way,82 eventhoughit hassome odd effects.83 However, thisprinciplewill only applywhere the plaintiff iscareless for his own safety, knowing of the plaintiffsdisability,andtheremaybesomecaseswherethe relationshipviewofthe standardof care could apply but contributorynegligence would not.The ordinary learner driver case wouldbe an example,as would Philips vWhiteley.4 Thesearecaseswhena person is justifiedintaking a known-risk,in the latterbecause it iscommonpracticetohave earspierced byjewellers,andintheformerbecausesomebodymusttaketheriskofteachingpeopletodriveandtheparticularplaintiffshouldnotbepenalisedfordoing so.85Strictly speakingtheapplicationof contributorynegligencedoesnotvarythestandardof care,butratherlimitstheconsequencesof thebreach by reducingthe damages payable.Nevertheless it doesperform a81.In Pittsv Hunt at first instance[ 1989]3 WLR 795it wassuggested that it is possible toholdtheplaintiff tobe100%contributorilynegligent.However,intheCourt of Appeal[1990]3WLR542itwassaidthatthisislogicallyunsupportable.TheLawReform(ContributoryNegligence)Act1945requiresthat thecourt must be satisfied that there isfault onthe part of both parties, and,ifthat is so,presupposesthat the person suffering thedamage willrecoversome damagesasthe Act states that theplaintiff's damagesshallbereduced andnot eliminated.BeldamLJ said that 'tohold the claimant is100%responsibleisnot to holdthat he sharedintheresponsibility forthedamage'.82.Owens vBrimmell [1977]QB 859.83.Forexampletheslightlydrunkpassengeriscontributorilynegligentbuttheverydrunk is not (except where the lift wasplannedin advance)because at thetime ofenteringthe carhe is unable toappreciate the risk.See Owens v Brimmell [1977]QB 859 and Dixon vKing[1975]2NZLR357.84.[1938]1 All ER 566;Wooldridge vSumner [1963]2QB 43might at firstsight appear tobe such a case, but it might have beenpossible tohold the plaintiffcontributorilynegligenton the ground that he haddisobeyed an instructionfrom the steward ofthe course to retreatbehindthe running track whereas he onlywent behind the lineof tubs in front of the trackmarkingoutthe competitionarea.85.However,alearner does not have a right to be taught, andif he is knowntobe muchmore dangerousthanthe usuallearneritmight becontributorily negligentto teachhim.22LegalStudiessimilar function by taking into account the relationship of the partiesandfulfillingadesiretolimit recoverywheretherelationshipbetweenthepartiesissuchthat aplaintiff cannotbeexpectedtobe fullyprotectedagainstthe consequencesof thedefendant'snegligence.Hence thebal-ancebetweentheblameworthinesselementof thestandardof careandthe expectedlevel of safetycanbemaintained.ConclusionThe argumentthat as the duty of care is now determinedby proximity itistherefore logicalto determinethecontent of that duty byreferencetothe relationshipbetweenthe parties,is probably misguided. The conclu-siondoesnotlogically followfromthepremise,andthetheory doesnothelp usto determinein whichcases the attributesof the defendant whichare knownto the plaintiff shouldbe ascribed to the reasonableman so asto vary the standard of care. The only exception relates to children wherethestandardisthatof thereasonablechildof thatage.Theissueisimportant not only becauseapplication of the proximity principlewoulddenyaremedytoanumberof plaintiffs,butalsobecauseittendstoconcentrateon the blameworthiness of the plaintiff tothe exclusionof thedefendant.Itmightbethoughtthat inafault basedsystemthisisthecorrectapproach,but thepragmaticapproachof thecommonlawhasalwaystakenaccount of the function andconsequencesof a rule. Henceit might be right to ask who should bear the risk and what degreeofsafetyinthecircumstancesa plaintiffisentitledtoexpect,andperhapsatahigher level how the losses shouldbe allocatedbetweendifferent groups(includingthetaxpayer).Toadopttheproximityviewwouldbetorestrictthosechoicesandlimittheextent towhichnegligencecanfulfilits roleasan accidentcompensationsystem..Eventhoughthepurelyobjectiveprincipleshouldbeapplied,thisdoesnotmeanthatthesituationsurroundingtheeventshouldbeignoredcompletelybecausethestandardwillalwaysrelateto'thecircumstancesof the case', and often the relationshipbetweenthe partiescanbe incorporatedas oneof thosecircumstances:Wooldridge v Sumner6may be an example. Whilethe actual levelof skill of the defendant isnotanelementwhichisrelevanthere,skillmayberelevantasoneof thecircumstancesof thecase whereit can be arguedthat the plaintiff couldexpectnohigherdegreeof safetythanthatprovidedbytherelativelyunskilleddefendant.WellsvCooper87 isanexampleof this(wherethequestionwas whetherthe defendant wascareless inusing 3/4 inch screwswhenfixinga door handle).In adopting thestandardof thereasonablecarpenter ratherthan the reasonable professional the court was bringingtogetherboththeblameworthinessof thedefendantandthedegreeofsafetywhichtheplaintiff canexpectinthecircumstances.Afurthersuggestionisthat wherethepartiesareinarelationshipwhichiscloserthanmereforesight,thestandardshouldbethat which86.[1963]2QB43.87.[1958]2 QB265.The variable standard of care23thedefendantholdshimself outaspossessing.Thisisratherlikethevolentidoctrineandshouldbetreatedwiththe same scepticism.Whilethestandardcouldbevariedbythe consensualvariation,thereistheproblemof impliedvariation.The samestrictnesswhichisappliedtovolenti shouldapplytosuchcases.Indeedthe strictness with whichvolenti is applied probably means thatithaslittlevalueasawayof amendingtheapplicablelevelof care,althoughwherethereisbothconsentandillegalitytheexturpi causadoctrine isnow more commonly applied than before.However,there is asuspicionthatthisisso,not becausetheexturpi defenceisdifferentinnatureto the volenti defence,but in fact that it applies for similar reasonsbut avoids both thecommon law andstatutory restrictionson the volentidefence.Thiswouldmeanthat itsapplicationishaphazardinthat aplaintiff will lose wherehisfoolhardinessoccurs in the circumstancesofan illegal act but not otherwise.One cannot be sure that the current teststo distinguishbetweenthose unlawful actswhichshould and should notmakethedifferencesufficientlydifferentiatebetweenthetwodefences.The preferredsolution is contributory negligencewhich has the virtueof preservingthe theory of the wholly objectivestandard of care whileatthe same time recognising that by placing himself in a positionof risk theplaintiff hasbeenpartiallyresponsibleforhisowndamage.However,contributorynegligenceis not always an idealsolution andsuffersfromits owntheoreticalproblems.88However,this survey doesshow that thereis general agreement that itisappropriatetoreduceor excludeliability incaseswheretheplaintiffknows of the lack of skill of the defendant and entrusts himself to his care.Thisis not aconclusionof social policy,but rather thenaturaloutcomeof a fault basedsystem,albeitonein whichthelevelof safetywhichaperson is entitled to expect is a relevant factor. The best wayto achieve abalance betweenthesefactorsisnotto adoptaproximitybased view ofthe standard of care,but to retainthe traditionalwhollyobjectiveview,temperedby the applicationof contributory negligence.The standard ofcare isnot a simple concept and it hasin the past been too easyto acceptthatit isenoughmerely tosaythat itis objectivelydetermined.Whilethat is a necessary factor,it doesnot tell uswhat thoseobjective criteriaare nor how they are determined,and the function of the standard of careas a concept whichprotectsboth plaintiff and defendant shouldbe borneinmind.88.Eg,therelativelyproblem(iethat aplaintiffisbetter off if he isinjuredbyaverynegligent defendant rather than aslightly negligent defendant).There are also problems ofbalancingresponsibilityfor different sourcesof the injury,as inthe seatbelt cases.