DA - Nuclear Modernization - NDT - 2016

8/18/2019 DA - Nuclear Modernization - NDT - 2016

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Topshelf


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1NC – Nuke ModNext of, Nuclear Modernization

The plan causes it

Kalman et. al. 16 (Brian, Edwin Watson, and South Front, The U.S. NuclearDeterrent Triad. Can the U.S. Aford to Modernie it!,

htt"#$$www.%lo&alresearch.ca$the'u's'nuclear'deterrent'triad'can'the'u's'aford'to'

odernie'it$))*+)-, MAC/ 0th 1*+2 NA

Although the costs o modernizing and re3italiin% the U.. nuclear deterrent

triad are signi!cant , the" are not outside the realm o easi#ilit", i a

nu&er o4 waste4ul ilitar5 "ro%ras and harmul o$erseas endea$ors are halted in

short order . The %& and '( programs )ere doomed to ailure rom

the start, and ha$e pro$en to #e #ottomless pits o militar"

industrial complex )aste at a grand scale. The U.S. ta6 "a5ers deser3e &etter. The U.S.

war7%hter tas8ed with de4endin% his$her hoeland deser3es &etter. * national deense is trul" theaim o4 the De"artent o4 De4ense, as it should &e, then a ma+or efort must #e made to

modernize and re3a" the U.S. nuclear de4ense ca"a&ilit5. This )ill reuire the a#andonment

o the current waste4ul and har4ul international de4ense posture that has U.S. soldiers , sailors and airen

stationed all over the globe, en%a%ed in a contri3ed and unwinna&le war a%ainst 9international terroris: , the endin% o4

waste4ul de4ense industr5 wea"ons "rocureent "ro%ras, and the adoption o a rational and lo%ical

national deense strateg" . ;ro7t, "olitics and i"erial a&ition ust once a%ain 5ield to classical li&eralideals o4 a re"u&lican nation'state li3in% in an o"en and 5et 3i%ilant haron5 with the rest o4 the world. These United States o4

Aerica can and ust re%ain their ri%ht4ul "lace aon%st the nations o4 the world, ins"irin% the world with its ideals o4 li&ert5,

cons"irin% a%ainst no one and 5et aintainin% a 3i%orous and ro&ust de4ense a%ainst an5 trans%ressors that ai to har her.

The impact is proli, terror, economic collapse and miscalc.

Kinzer 16 ' Senior 4ellow at the Watson 1s and ?1s directed the de3elo"ent o4 air'launched nuclear cruise issiles

and later &ecae secretar5 o4 de4ense. Now ;err5 is ca"ai%nin% a%ainst 0#amas plan to

de$elop and &u5 1,222 ne) missiles )ith ad+usta#le nuclear capacit",

122 ne) long3range #om#ers, and a ne) 4eet o nuclear 3armed

su# marine s . /e warns that i the plan #ecomes real, disputes among

nations )ill #e 9more li5el" to erupt in nuclear con4ict than during

the (old ar .: When ;err5 was directin% Aericas last nuclear &uildu", he and others ar%ued that it wasnecessar5 to co"ensate 4or NATGs relati3el5 wea8 con3entional "ower in countries around the So3iet Union. That


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rationale e3a"orated when the Cold War ended, &ut it still sha"es our de4ense "olic5. 0#amas

proposed 7modernization8 increases our $ulnera#ilit", not our securit5. The7rst and ost o&3ious reason is that it will certainl5 lead other countries to see8 eui3alent arsenals o4 their own.

*t is especiall" upsetting to 9ussia, )hich alread" eels under

increasing American threat as a result o our militar" maneu$ers on

its #orders and the act that man" o our missiles are positioned in:erman", Tur5e", and other countries near its territor". The 9ussian

deense minister recentl" announced that in response to 0#amas

plan, 9ussia )ill 7#ring !$e ne) strategic nuclear missile regiments

into ser$ice.8 (hina )ould surel" match that escalation.


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U0


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ont Modernize 2NCink controls the direction of Uni3ueness – None of their evidence sasModernization is a done deal$ /ust that there !ill #e fi"hts – the plan is a pre&re3uisite in a.4 freein" funds$ and #.4 shiftin" the tone of the a!a to!ard the

perceived necessit of modernization. This means the plan is a )%5&%50UISIT5 toModernization even happenin"$ that*s 6inzer and 6alman.

Con"ress !on*t allo! modernization

a.4 7ears of 8esta#ilizationMehta 1&22 (htt&'www)2efensenews)co%story2efense&olicy-bu2getbu2get++stratco%-hea2-nuclear-bu2get-csisA+A, $aron, 1"R$"=O< >ea2 owever, calls for cuttin" so%e &art of the nuclear modernization effort remain loud$ with those8uestioning the nuclear strategy 6eroing in on the Bong-Range 1tan2 Off (BR1O/ wea&on, which woul2 re&lace the $B=ve #een slippin". e>re the onl countr in the !orld that isn>t advanced in %aintaining its nuclearsyste%s) "heyEre ol2) 5e coul2 create a safer, %ore-reliable syste% an2 we absolutely have to 2o that)H


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+2@ #ama ants#ama !ill amend his stance – prefer our predicative evidence.e#er 1( –


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inks


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ink 5Dt.ithdra!al allo!s the U.S. to pursue modernization

1.4 7rees %esources – the are scarce$ overseas presence saps them$ that*s 6ahlman.

The aff allo!s a priorit shift.8ole 2&2E & In2e&en2ent nuclear security s&ecialist) 3ro% AA to +K, he was on thetechnical staff of the #on&roliferation Division at the Bos $la%os #ational Baboratory) (.a%es :), "he full &rice of nuclear 2eterrence

, .anuary Ath +, htt&'thebulletin)orgfull-&rice-nuclear-2eterrenceAA/ #$R

3irst, defense #ud"ets are limited and unlikel to increase above current levels) Tradeoffs therefore need to#e made #et!een spendin" on nuclear !eapons and all of the other militar priorities like

ships$ planes$ tanks$ radars$ satellites$ missile defenses $ forei"n #ases $ counterterrorism$trainin"$ and special operations) 3or e7a%&le, if we have J++ billion to s&en2 annually on wea&ons (as o&&ose2 to %ilitarysalaries, health care, an2 &ensions/ an2 s&en2 JN+ billion on nuclear forces when J+ billion can buy effective 2eterrence, we will waste J+

billion annually that coul2 go to other vital 2efense %issions such as fighting I1I1, strengthening our conventional 2efenses an2 those of our

allies, i%&rove2 training, cyber-security, an2 research) If those non-nuclear 2efense invest%ents are nee2e2 to &rotect us fro% non-nuclear threats

that we are far %ore li!ely to face than nuclear attac!, short-changing the% results in &oor national strategy an2 less security for $%erica) Russia

is the only country in the worl2 that can even re%otely threaten our nuclear 2eterrent) #ew 1tart, an agree%ent reache2 in ++ that Russia

continues to abi2e by, !ee&s our two nuclear arsenals in rough balance, so neither si2e gains the ability stri!e first while avoi2ing a 2evastating

res&onse) "his is the essence of nuclear 2eterrence, an2 it %a!es such an attac! e7tre%ely unli!ely) $ %o2erni6e2 force of ,CC+ 2e&loye2 nuclear

warhea2s, as &er%itte2 by #ew 1tart, can be &urchase2 for far less than the J trillion N+-year &lan envisione2 by Presi2ent Oba%as new fiscal

+ bu2get) 5e certainly can s&en2 that huge a%ount on nuclear forces at the e7&ense of other %ilitary ca&abilities, but we %ay also gravely

regret it) 1econ2, &lanning a full li!e-for-li!e re&lace%ent of our tria2 of nuclear forces entails several ty&es of e7istential an2 &olitical ris!) "he

%ost obvious of these is that reliance on nuclear 2eterrence carries the unavoi2able ris! of global nuclear catastro&he) #uclear 2eterrence can fail,

through &oor 2ecisions, escalation 2uring a crisis, a series of %echanical an2 hu%an errors, or %alicious acts that lea2 to ina2vertent use) #uclear

wea&ons are %achines that can %alfunction with 2evastating conse8uences) $nother ris! flows fro% one si%&le fact' #uclear wea&ons an2

nuclear %aterials that can be %a2e into wea&ons can never be &erfectly secure2 fro% theft or %isuse) "errorists such as I1I1 an2 their il! are

trying to get their han2s on a nu!e, to blow one u&, or to s&ar! a nuclear war between states that woul2 create the atavistic outco%e they 2esire)

"he %ore nuclear wea&ons there are, the greater the ris! that terrorists %ight succee2) $ 2esire to re2uce the ris!s of nuclear terroris% was one of

the reasons that the latest official state%ent of U1 nuclear &olicy, a +N re&ort fro% the Pentagon on U1 #uclear :%&loy%ent Gui2ance,

conclu2e2 that $%ericas nuclear 2eterrence re8uire%ents coul2 be %et with a force of ,++ 2e&loye2 warhea2s, nearly one-thir2 less than the,CC+ &er%itte2 un2er #ew 1tart) "he current &lan to %o2erni6e an2 u&gra2e the entire arsenal of ,CC+ 2e&loye2 warhea2s, 2elivery vehicles,

an2 %any hun2re2s of reserve nuclear wea&ons &reserves a greater than necessary ris! that terrorists will ac8uire one) $%ericas 2eclare2

intention to continue u&gra2ing nuclear wea&ons for N+ years an2 !ee& the% in service until ++ or beyon2 has a &olitical cost, as well) It

un2er%ines another ob9ective of U1 national security strategy, which is to &revent the &roliferation of nuclear wea&ons to other states) "he Unite2

1tates an2 other &arties to the A+ #uclear #on-Proliferation "reaty have acce&te2 the obligation to acco%&lish the eventual eli%ination of their

nuclear arsenals) "o create the con2itions for this to be &ossible, the Unite2 1tates 2e&en2s on the coo&eration of over ++ nations that have

agree2 not to ac8uire nuclear wea&ons)


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IN6 – +S)I;ithdra!al saves mone for nuclear modernization6alman et. al. 1( (rian, :2win 5atson, an2 1outh 3ront, "he U)1) #uclear Deterrent "ria2) =an theU)1) $ffor2 to


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ink – +fricaithdra!al saves mone for nuclear modernization6alman et. al. 1( (rian, :2win 5atson, an2 1outh 3ront, "he U)1) #uclear Deterrent "ria2) =an theU)1) $ffor2 to


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ink – +siaithdra!al saves mone for nuclear modernization6alman et. al. 1( (rian, :2win 5atson, an2 1outh 3ront, "he U)1) #uclear Deterrent "ria2) =an theU)1) $ffor2 to


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ink – HM8)lan causes a US strate" shift to modernization.7utter 11 – Senior ecturer in International )olitics U of eicester ($n2rew,0Oba%as #uclear 5ea&ons Policy in a =hanging 5orl2,4 Dece%ber,

htt&'www)lse)ac)u!ID:$1&ublicationsre&orts&2f1R++Afutter)&2f , =


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&2N% CardsFes tradeoff – reductions in Nuclear modernization onl possi#le #ecause of U.S.HM8$ prefer our 7utter evidence !hich hi"hli"hts #ama*s "lo#al strate".

Hud"et opportunit cost.)ifer 1


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strategy) If ashin"ton can*t learn to live !ith risk$ the cost of closin" small andhpothetical "aps in the nuclear arsenal !ill #e paid in harsh currenc @ # sacrificin"conventional militar priorities$ the !elfare of citizens$ and the countr*s lon"&term a#ilitto compete in a chan"in" !orld.


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&&Fes #amaFes #ama.7utter 11 – Senior ecturer in International )olitics U of eicester ($n2rew,0Oba%as #uclear 5ea&ons Policy in a =hanging 5orl2,4 Dece%ber,

htt&'www)lse)ac)u!ID:$1&ublicationsre&orts&2f1R++Afutter)&2f , =


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&&HM8 k2 ModNo turns – HM8 ke to makin" s3uo nuclear deterrence successful.%o#erts 1B ra2, for%er visiting fellow at the #ational Institute for Defense 1tu2ies of the


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&& +2@ HM8 Scares +llies KGan 1L4This evidence is from an Under"raduate$ !hich means Solice in 1( is more 3ualifiedsince im applin" to "raduate school.

This evidence /ust sas HM8 mi"ht create eDpectations and ma#e resentment inashin"ton – doesn*t sa the U.S. should !ithdra! HM8$ /ust that !e shouldchan"e our attitudes.

HM8 is ke$ that*s the link de#ate

It creates pretense for other confidence #uildin" measures !hich solves.7%=IN; 1( $ssociate Professor in the 1trategic an2 Defence 1tu2ies =entre, PhD($#U/,


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threat of nuclear wea&ons) It also stresse2 the countrys &re&are2ness to 0wor! closely4 with the U nite2 S tates in or2er to enhance the

cre2ibility of its e7ten2e2 2eterrence, includin" apan*s own efforts for ballistic %issile 2efense (HM8/iV) "he #ational 1ecurity 1trategy wasthe first &olicy state%ent of it s !in2 for .a&an, which re&lace2 the asic Polic y for #ational Defense to which .a&an ha2 been hol2ing since AC) "he new an2 fifth #ational Defense Progra%

Gui2elines (#DPG/ a2o&te2 at the sa%e ti%e e7&resse2 the sa%e recognition with regar2 to the U)1) e7ten2e2 2eterrence an2 state2 that .a&an woul2 0coo&erate4 with the Unite2 1tates in or2er

to enhance its cre2ibilityiiV) It %ust be note2, however, that these two 2ocu%ents were not the first &olicy announce%ent affir%ing .a&ans 2e&arture fro% a%bivalence towar2 the U)1) e7ten2e2

2eterrence) "he &revious (fourth/ #DPG a2o&te2 in Dece%ber ++ by the De%ocratic Party of .a&an (DP./-le2 coalition govern%ent of Pri%e


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that of conventional forces in 2eterrence strategy have hel&e2 %a!e it &olitically easier for .a&an, &articularly the 1elf Defense 3orces (1D3/, to ta!e &art in the alliances 2eterrence efforts

without worrying about &ossible conflicts with the countrys non-nuclear &olicy) $s note2 later, a newly institutionali6e2 2ialogue on e7ten2e2 2eterrence, which &resu%ably inclu2es 2iscussion

on nuclear 2eterrence, has incurre2 little negative reaction either fro% 2o%estic &un2i ts or &ublic o&inion) "he &ros&ect for 2i%inishing U)1) 2efense bu2gets has also a22e2 to causes for .a&an to

e7&an2 2efense coo&eration with the Unite2 1tates) $lthough 2i fferent in scale fro% U)1) 2efense s&en2ing, the .a&anese govern%ent began to increase 2efense bu2gets in 3; +N after

re2uctions for ten consecutive years) .a&an has %any resources with which to &artici&ate in the co%%on 2eterrence strategy) "hey inclu2e, a%ong %any others, efforts to facilitate U)1) force

&resence in the country with financial su&&ort %ost generous a%ong U)1) allies, increase2 2efense coo&eration between the two countries forces, an2 foreign &olicy coo&eration to &ro%ote the

share2 strategic interests, inclu2ing use of official 2evelo&%ent assistance (OD$/ for co%%on strategic &ur&oses, as s&ecifically %entione2 in "he #ational 1ecurity 1trategy) Of these resources,

an increase2 role of the 1D3 in 9oint efforts with U)1) forces woul2 be &articularly i%&ortant, because of the

centralit of 2efense coo&eration in the co%%on 2eterrence strategy an2 also given the &ros&ect for U)1) 2efense bu2get cuts) 5ith this

recognition, the N ational S ecurity S trategy stresse2 the &re&are2ness to coo&erate with the U nite2 S tates in broa2 &olicy areas,inclu2ing 9oint training, 9oint intelligence, surveillance, an2 reconnaissance (I1R/ activities, an2 9ointshare2 use of facilities by the two countries forcesM o&erational an2 &olicy coor2ination

inclu2ing contingencies &lanning as well as %i2 an2 long-ter% strategyM an2 security coo&eration in broa2 areas such as HM8 , sea, outer s&ace an2 cybers&ace as well as large-scale2isaster res&onse)


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Impacts


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Impact – 8isarm P %ussiaModernization #reaks the nuclear ta#oo$ upsets plans for "lo#al disarmament$ andcollapses U.S. %ussia relations.ittner 1( - Professor of >istory e%eritus, 1U#; $lbany (Bawrence,

htt&'www)huffington&ost)co%lawrence-wittner%o2erni6ing-the-o&&ortuniXbXA++C++)ht%l,E


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in his recei&t of the No#el )eace )rize that ear, in succee2ing years the a2%inistrationEsaction on this front 2ecline2 &reci&itously) It did mana"e to secure a strategic ar%s re2uctiontreaty (Ne! ST+%T/ with Russia in 2-1- and issue a pled"e that same ear that the U.S.

"overnment !ould ?not develop ne! nuclear !arheads .? ut, 2es&ite &ro%ises to bring theAA =o%&rehensive "est an "reaty to the 1enate for ratification an2 to secure further nuclear

ar%s agree%ents with Russia, nuclear 2isar%a%ent efforts groun2 to a halt) Instea2, &lans forHnuclear %o2erni6ationH began) "he &resi2entEs + 1tate of the Union a22ress containe2 not a

wor2 about nuclear 2isar%a%ent, %uch less a nuclear wea&ons-free worl2) 5hat ha&&ene2F "wo

for%i2able obstacles 2eraile2 the a2%inistrationEs nuclear 2isar%a%ent &olicy) $t ho%e,

po!erful forces moved decisivel to perpetuate the U.S. nuclear !eapons pro"ram ' %ilitarycontractors, the wea&ons labs, to& %ilitary officers, an2, es&ecially, the Re&ublican Party)

%epu#lican support for disarmament treaties !as crucial, for a two-thir2s vote of the U)1)1enate was re8uire2 to ratify the%) "hus, !hen the %epu#licans a#andoned the nuclear armscontrol and disarmament approach of past ;) presidents and ferociousl attacked the#ama administration for ?!eaknessH or worse, the a2%inistration beat an igno%inious

retreat) "o attract the bac!ing of Re&ublicans for the #ew 1"$R" "reaty, it &ro%ise2 anu&gra2e2 U)1) nuclear wea&ons &rogra%) RussiaEs lac! of interest in further nuclear 2isar%a%ent

agree%ents with the Unite2 1tates &rovi2e2 another !ey obstacle) 5ith AN &ercent of the worl2Es

nuclear wea&ons in the arsenals of these two nations, a si"nificant reduction in nuclear!eapons hin"ed on %ussia>s support for it) ut, angere2 by the shar& 2ecline of its &ower inworl2 affairs, inclu2ing #$"OEs a2vance to its bor2ers, the Russian govern%ent engage2 in its

own nuclear buil2u& an2 s&urne2 U)1) 2isar%a%ent &ro&osals) 8espite these road#locks$ the#ama administration could rene! the nuclear disarmament process. 8evelopin" #etter

relations !ith %ussia , for e7a%&le by scra&&ing #$"OEs &rovocative e7&ansion &lan, coul2s%ooth the &ath towar2 a Russian-$%erican nuclear 2isar%a%ent agree%ent) $n2 this, in turn,

woul2 soften the ob9ections of the lesser nuclear &owers to re2ucing their own nuclear arsenals)If %epu#lican opposition threatened ratification of a disarmament treat$ it could #e#passed throu"h an informal U.S.&%ussian a"reement for parallel !eapons reductions.t it time to "et #ack on the disarmament track J


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+2@ Nuke mod k2 8etterence+ consensus of hi"hl 3ualified scholars a"ree !ith us & Fou should prioritize thisevidence #ecause it is #oth peer revie!ed and is the conclusion of eDtensive research.Murdock et. al. 1< – Incre2ibly 8ualifie2 grou& of scholars fro% 2iverse bac!groun2s

stu2ying IR an2 #uclear Proliferation, =lar! is a 1enior a2viser for the Defense an2 #ational 1ecurity Grou& at =1I1 an2 2irector of the Pro9ect on #uclear Issues (PO#I/)(=lar!, Samuel . Hrannen is senior %anager in $)") earneys Global usiness Policy =ouncil, astrategic a2visory service, Thomas 6arako is a senior fellow with the International 1ecurity Progra% an2the Pro9ect on #uclear Issues at the =enter for 1trategic an2 International 1tu2ies (=1I1/), +n"elaeaver is &rogra% coor2inator an2 research assistant for the Defense an2 #ational 1ecurity Grou& at=1I1), 5l#rid"e Col# is the Robert


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The United States can move second – even if modernization is inevita#le$ the lon"er!e dela it the #etter.Mount 1


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+2@ Nuke 62 apan +ssurancesClose consultation has allaed apan*s fears even in the face of declinin" ra!nuclear num#ers.%o#erts 1B ra2, for%er visiting fellow at the #ational Institute for Defense 1tu2ies of the


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disarmament !ith the commitments to strate"ic sta#ilit and eDtended deterrence. ne ofthe most important results of these consultations !as the personal en"a"ement of the U.S.)resident and his clear commitment to preserve the nuclear um#rella even !hile reducin"

the role and num#er of U.S. nuclear !eapons ) 3ro% his re%ar!s in "o!yo in #ove%ber ++A' 0so lon" asthese (nuclear/ !eapons remain$ the U nited S tates !ill maintain a stron" and effective nucleardeterrent that "uarantees the defense of our allies ? includin" 1outh orea an2 apan )4K >e followe2this with written gui2ance to the %ilitary 0reaffirmin" the role of nuclear !eapons in eDtendin" deterrenceto U.S. +llies and partners and the U.S. commitment to stren"then re"ional deterrencearchitectures: and directin" the militar to ensure 9a !ide ran"e of effective responseoptions: dra!in" on #oth a stron" strate"ic deterrent and the capa#ilit to for!ard&deplonuclear !eapons)K


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+2@ Tactical&Nuke Cruise&MisslesThe are inherentl desta#ilizin" and risks nuclear !ar !ith %ussia.ise 1ans 6ristensen$ director of the nuclear information pro/ect at the7ederation of +merican Scientists, a national security grou& 2e2icate2 to &reventing nuclearwar) 9If the*re seein" us increasin" the accurac of our "ravit #om#s$ !ill the concludethat !e*re contemplatin" usin" nuclear !eapons more readil in a conflict thanother!iseJ: ristensen sai2) 9It can have real si"nificant implications for ho! nuclear!eapon states perceive each other.: ristensen an2 other critics believe the H(1&12 could violate the 2-1-Nuclear )osture %evie!, a &le2ge by the Oba%a a2%inistration that 0life-e7tension &rogra%s4 to %o2erni6e ol2 nuclear wea&onswont result in new %ilitary ca&abilities) 9hat the*re doin" is takin" an unrefined a 2u%b #om# andturnin" it into a refined s%art #om# and claimin" that it*s not a ne! militar capa#ilit$:said .ay Co"hlan$ eDecutive director at Nuclear atch Ne! MeDico, a non&roliferationgrou&) 9It /ust doesn*t s3uare !ith realit.: Co"hlan added that the H(1&12*s improved

accurac and lo!er ield could make it easier to /ustif its use in the future , since s%aller,%ore &recise blasts %ean less ra2ioactive fallout) %ussia has its o!n modernization pro"rams,=oghlan &oints out) 9The end result is an arms race .: "he controversy has attracte2 attention not only fro% U)1) rivals, but also fro%observers in countries allie2 with the Unite2 1tates) In ritain, The ;uardian ne!spaper*s diplomatic editor .ulianHor"er$ raised concerns si%ilar to =oghlans in a recent article) 9In non&proliferation terms$: orger wrote, 9. . . the onl thin" !orse than a useless #om# is a Ousa#le* #om#.: 9The "reatthin" a#out nuclear !eapons !as that their use !as supposed to #e unthinka#le and the!ere therefore a deterrent to contemplation of a ne! !orld !ar$: he a22e2) 9nce the#ecome Othinka#le* !e are in a different$ and much more dan"erous$ universe.: On Oct) +, the thir2 an2last 2evelo&%ent flight test of the - too! &lace in #eva2a) In announcing the test, the U)1) #ational #uclear 1ecurity $2%inistration stresse2 that 2es&ite the new tail-!it asse%bly, the -

is not GP1 gui2e2 an2 0will have no a22itional ca&abilities)4 "he Pentagon also has state2 that the -s ca&abilities are not new, an2 that its 2evelo&%ent si%&ly will e7ten2 t he life of an

out2ate2 wea&on an2 %a!e it safer) Plus, its &ro2uction will allow for the retire%ent of about half of the countrys re%aining nuclear gravity bo%bs, inclu2ing the N, the only %egaton class

wea&on re%aining in the U)1) nuclear stoc!&ile) "he ne7t ther%onuclear warhea2 slate2 for %o2erni6ation is the 5-+, which woul2 be converte2 for use in about ,+++ nuclear-ca&able air-

launche2 cruise %issiles) "he &resi2ents + bu2get re8uests JAC %illion for the &ro9ect, u& fro% JA)K %illion the year before a ,A+ &ercent i ncrease) In an o&inion

colu%n &ublishe2 Oct) C in "he 5ashington Post, former Secretar of 8efense 5illia% .))err and $n2y e#er$ a former assistant secretar of defense for nuclear, che%ical an2 biological 2efense &rogra%s, ur"ed #ama to halt the development of the cruise missile . "heyalso suggeste2 a global ban on such wea&ons to &revent uninten2e2 escalation) The pro#lem is that other states !ouldn*t have an!a of kno!in" if a cruise missile that had /ust #een launched had a conventional !arhead


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or a nuclear !arhead until it detonated$ Perry an2 5eber wrote) 01o%e have argue2 that a new nuclear-ca&able air-launche2cruise %issile is nee2e2 to allow future &resi2ents the Lfle7ibility to engage Russia or =hina in li%ite2 nuclear war,4 they a22e2) 9That is Cold ar thinkin"$and it is dan"erous. Such Otactical* use of nuclear !eapons !ould #e a "rave mistake.:

DA - Nuclear Modernization - NDT - 2016

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