D2.3 – COMPENDIUM FOR TECHNOLOGIES FOR DESIGNING ...

PASSENGER STATION AN D TERMINAL DESIGN FOR SAFETY, SECURITY AND RESILIENCE TO TERRORIST ATTACK

Project nº: FP7-SCPO-GA-2011-266202

Funding Scheme: CP – Collaborative Project

Call (part) identifier: FP7-SST-2010-RTD-1

D2.3 – COMPENDIUM FOR TECHNOLOGIES FOR DESIGNING SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEMS

Due date of deliverable: 31/05/2012 Actual submission date: 31/05/2012

Start date of project: 01/06/2011 Duration: 36 months

Organisation name of lead for this deliverable: MT RS3 Ltd.

Contributors: ISD, InteCo, CRTM, JMP, DAPP, TECNALI A, USFD Revision: 1.0

Project co -funded by the Eu ropean Commission within the Seven th Framework Programme (2007 -2013)

Dissemination Level

PU Public X

PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)

RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)

CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)

Date: Document ID: Revision:

31/05/2012 SECEST-WP2.3-MTRS-DE-PU-v1.0 1.0

D2.3 – COMPENDIUM FOR TECHNOLOGIES FOR DESIGNING SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEMS - 1 -

This project has been carried out under a contract awarded by the European Commission No part of this report may be used, reproduced and/or disclosed in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the SECURESTATION project

partners. © 2011 – All rights reserved

Document Change Log

Revision Edition Date Author Modified Sections / Pages Comments

v0.01 15.02.2012 All All Draft version

v0.02 28.02.2012 DAPP/Emiliano Costa Chapter 2 Amending content on video surveillance

v0.03 04.05.2012 ISD/Raquel Lozano Bernal

Chapter 5 Amending content on threat detection systems

v0.04 11.05.2012 DAPP/Stefano Porziani

Chapter 2 & 6 Amending content on video surveillance & telecommunication systems

v0.05 14.05.2012 USFD/Jonathan Paragreen

Chapter 4 & 7 Amending content on building management systems and construction techniques & materials

v0.06 18.05.2012 CRTM/Javier Aldecoa Chapter 4 & 7 Amending content on building management systems and construction techniques & materials

v0.07 21.05.2012 MTRS/Gilad Rafaeli & Yael Shazar

All Final editing and proofread

v1.0 22.05.2012 ISD/M. Martin All Final review






Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 15

1.1. Background ......................................................................................................................... 15 1.2. Purpose and Scope ............................................................................................................. 15 1.3. Document Structure ............................................................................................................ 15 1.4. Applicable and Reference Documents................................................................................. 16

2. PASSENGER RELATED SAFETY & SECURITY SYSTEMS ....... .................................................... 18

2.1. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE (CCTV) & VIDEO ANALYTICS .................................................... 18 2.1.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 18 2.1.2. Video analytics..................................................................................................... 26 2.1.3. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 27

2.2. ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM (ACS) ................................................................................. 28 2.2.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 28

2.2.1.1. Access control point........................................................................... 29 2.2.1.2. Access identification & authentication (I&A) device ............................ 30 2.2.1.3. ACS management ............................................................................. 30 2.2.1.4. ACS in the public transport environment ............................................ 30

2.2.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 31 2.3. INFORMATION & HELP POINT / EMERGENCY CALL SYSTEM (ECS) ............................ 31

2.3.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 31 2.3.1.1. Functionalities and usage .................................................................. 31

2.4. BURGLAR ALARM.............................................................................................................. 32 2.4.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 32

2.4.1.1. Interior / indoor burglar alarm systems ............................................... 32 2.4.1.2. Exterior / outdoor intrusion detection systems.................................... 36

2.4.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 42 2.5. FIRE AND SMOKE DETECTION, SUPPRESSION AND EXTINGUISHING ........................ 44

2.5.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 44 2.5.1.1. Smoke, flame and fire detection ........................................................ 44 2.5.1.2. Active/passive fire protection ............................................................. 47

2.5.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 50 3. PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEMS ..................... ................................................................... 51

3.1. PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEMS (PIS) ................................................................. 51 3.1.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 51 3.1.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 52

3.2. PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS (PA) ................................................................................... 53 3.2.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 53 3.2.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 54

4. BUILDING MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ....................... ..................................................................... 55

4.1. BUILDING AUTOMATION AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT ................................................ 55 4.1.1. Overview of building automation and energy management system ...................... 55

4.1.1.1. Backup power generation .................................................................. 55 4.1.1.2. Emergency lighting ............................................................................ 55 4.1.1.3. Plumbing ........................................................................................... 57



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4.1.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 58 4.2. HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING (HVAC) ........................................... 58

4.2.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 58 4.2.1.1. HVAC in mainline stations ................................................................. 58 4.2.1.2. Metro systems and underground stations .......................................... 59 4.2.1.3. Air conditioning .................................................................................. 61 4.2.1.4. Air conditioning in operational and emergency situations. .................. 62 4.2.1.5. Smoke and fire control. ...................................................................... 62 4.2.1.6. Ventilation systems designed for security .......................................... 62

4.2.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 63 5. THREAT DETECTION SYSTEMS .................................................................................................... 64

5.1. TECHNOLOGIES FOR PASSENGER SCREENING .......................................................... 64 5.1.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 64

5.2. TECHNOLOGIES FOR PASSENGERS & BAGGAGE SCREENING .................................. 66 5.2.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 66

5.3. TECHNOLOGIES FOR PASSENGERS & BAGGAGE SCREENING .................................. 68 5.3.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 68 5.3.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 70

5.4. DETECTION OF POISONOUS BY INHALATION HAZARDS (PIH) – CHEMICALS AND TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS (TIM) .................................................................... 70

5.4.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 70 5.4.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 73

5.5. DETECTION OF BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS ......................................................................... 73 5.5.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 73 5.5.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 76

5.6. DETECTION AND CONTAMINATION OF RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS .......................... 76 5.6.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 76 5.6.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 79

6. TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ...... ............................................... 80

6.1. WIRELESS & LANDLINE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM FOR INCIDENT REPONSE ......... 80 6.1.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 80 6.1.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 83

6.2. PHYSICAL SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (PSIM)........................................ 84 6.2.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 84 6.2.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 85

6.3. CYBER SECURITY MEANS (HARDWARE & SOFTWARE) ............................................... 86 6.3.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 86 6.3.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 88

7. CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES & MATERIAL................. .............................................................. 92

7.1. REINFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES ..................................................................................... 92 7.1.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 92

7.1.1.1. Anti-shatter film ................................................................................. 92 7.1.1.2. Laminated glass ................................................................................ 93 7.1.1.3. Blast curtains ..................................................................................... 93 7.1.1.4. Glazing catch cable/bar retrofit .......................................................... 93 7.1.1.5. Polymer material for structural retrofit ................................................ 93






7.1.1.6. Geotextile fabric retrofit ...................................................................... 94 7.1.1.7. Structural retrofit ................................................................................ 94

7.1.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 94 7.2. MITIGATION MATERIALS (BLAST, GRAFFITI & VANDALISM,

DECONTAMINATION) ........................................................................................................ 95 7.2.1. Technology overview ........................................................................................... 95 7.2.2. Functionalities and usage .................................................................................... 95



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List of Figures

Figure 2-1: CCTV General block diagram architecture of an analogue video network .............................. 18

Figure 2-2: CCTV General block diagram architecture of an IP based video network (digital) .................. 19

Figure 2-3: Different types of cameras & lenses ....................................................................................... 21

Figure 2-4: Different types of camera housings ........................................................................................ 22

Figure 2-5: CCTV resolution matrix [R18] .................................................................................................... 24

Figure 2-6: Examples of the user interface of video management software (VMS) ................................... 25

Figure 2-7: Examples of video analytics (VA) application in passenger terminals ..................................... 27

Figure 2-8: Detect, monitor, recognize and identify ................................................................................... 27

Figure 2-9: Full height turnstile and tripod ................................................................................................. 29

Figure 2-10: Different types of identification and authentication means .................................................... 29

Figure 2-11: Schematic layout of access control / fare collection system in stations ................................. 30

Figure 2-12: Schematic illustration of interior / indoor burglar alarm technologies ..................................... 35

Figure 2-13: Examples of burglar alarm technologies – PIR, magnetic switch, dual technology, glass break x 2, beam sensor (from upper left, clockwise) ...................................................... 36

Figure 2-14: Examples of outdoor detection technologies – vibration, taut wire, E-field, buried geophone, radar & video analytics (from upper left, clockwise) ............................................. 41

Figure 2-15: Schematic illustration of exterior / outdoor intrusion detection technologies .......................... 42

Figure 2-16: Typical response cycle of an intrusion / burglar alarm incident ............................................. 43

Figure 2-17: Examples of smoke, flame, fire detectors, linear heat and ASD (from upper left, clockwise) ............................................................................................................................... 46

Figure 2-18: Examples of control panels ................................................................................................... 47

Figure 2-19: Examples of fire sprinklers (left), gaseous suppression tanks (middle) and fire extinguishers (right) ................................................................................................................ 49

Figure 3-1: PIS General block diagram architecture ................................................................................. 51

Figure 3-2: Examples of passenger information systems .......................................................................... 52

Figure 3-3: PA system at a station – block diagram architecture ............................................................... 53

Figure 3-4 – PA main control room block diagram architecture ................................................................. 54

Figure 4-1: Examples of emergency lighting – self-illuminating emergency exit sign (left), self-powered emergency light (middle) and self-powered emergency exit sign (right) ................... 56

Figure 4-2: Example of 2-pipe Fan Coil System ....................................................................................... 59

Figure 4-3: Heat Recovery Unit ................................................................................................................ 59

Figure 4-4: Examples of metro ventilation systems - proposed ventilation system for RER[R10] (left) and "Design of a modern subway ventilation system" [R11] (right) ............................................ 60

Figure 4-5: Protecting Outdoor Air Intakes (left) and Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) chemical detector designed for installation in HVAC Systems (right) ..................................................... 63

Figure 5-1: Walk-through metal detector & hand-held metal detector ....................................................... 64






Figure 5-2: Active MMW imaging system (left), X-ray backscatter (middle and explosive trace portal (right) ............................................................................................................................ 65

Figure 5-3: Passive MMW camera ............................................................................................................ 66

Figure 5-4: Hand-held and stationary trace detector (left and middle) & explosive and narcotics spray test kit ........................................................................................................................... 68

Figure 5-5: Dual energy X-ray, Inline & standalone CTX (upper right & bottom left) & X-ray diffraction (bottom right) .......................................................................................................... 69

Figure 5-6: Different point and standoff technologies for detection of PIH – IMS, Filter-based IR Spectrometry, SAW, FLIR & LIDAR (from top left, clockwise) ................................................. 72

Figure 6-1: Wireless and landline communication devices (from left GSM-R & TETRA portable devices and GSRM-R dispatcher) .......................................................................................... 82

Figure 6-2: IP based integration of landline & wireless communication technologies ................................ 83

Figure 6-3: Typical PSIM architecture ....................................................................................................... 84

Figure 6-4: Examples of PSIM solutions ................................................................................................... 85

Figure 6-5: Access points to securing multiple networks ........................................................................... 87

List of Tables

Table 1: VGA resolutions .......................................................................................................................... 23

Table 2: Megapixel formats ....................................................................................................................... 23

Table 3: Minimum normal lighting levels according to UNE 23033/34/35 .................................................. 56

Table 4: Air quality parameters in metro stations ...................................................................................... 60

Table 5: Functionalities of cyber security technologies ............................................................................. 91

Date: 31/05/2012

Document ID: SECEST-WP2.3-MTRS-DE-PU-v1.0

Revision: 1.0




List of Acronyms

ACS

Access Control System

BTN Backbone Transmission Network

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive

CCTV Closed Circuit Television

CONOP Concept of Operations, Operational Concept

COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf

COUNTERACT Cluster Of User Networks in Transport and Energy Relating to Antiterrorist ACTivities

DBT Design Basis Threat

DVR Digital Video Recorder

FOV Field of View

FPS Frames per Second

GIS Geographic Information System

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials

HHMD Hand Held Metal Detector

HMI / GUI Human Machine Interface / Graphical User Interface

HRU Heat Recovery Unit

IAs Immediate Actions

IDS / BAS Intrusion Detection System / Burglar Alarm System

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IID Improvised Incendiary Device

IM Infrastructure Manager

IT Information Technology

LPR License Plate Recognition

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Revision: 1.0

- 10 - D2.3 - Compendium of Technologies for Designing Safe ty and Security Systems

This project has been carried out under a contract awarded by the European Commission No part of this report may be used, reproduced and/or disclosed in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the SECURESTATION

project partners. © 2012 – All rights reserved

LPS Local Positioning System

NVR Network Video Recorder

OCC Control Facility / Operations Control Centre

PA Public Address

PA Public Address

PBIED Person Borne IED

PIDS Perimeter Intrusion Detection System

PIH Poisonous by Inhalation

PIN Personal Identifier Number

PSIM Physical Security Information Management

PTA Public Transport Authority

PTO Public Transport Operator

RH Relative Humidity

RoIP Radio Over IP

RU Railway Undertaking

SCC / SOC Security Control Centre / Security Operations Centre

SCC/SOC Security Control Centre / Security Operations Centre

SEST-RAM SECURESTATION Risk Assessment Methodology

SMS Safety Management System

SoA State of the Art

TETRA Terrestrial Trunked Radio

TIM Toxic Industrial Materials

VA / VCA / IVA Video Analytics / Video Content Analysis / Intelligent Video Analytics

VBIED Vehicle Borne IED

VRF Variable Refrigerant Flow

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VMS / VMX Video Management Software / Video Matrix

VoIP Voice Over IP

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTMD Walk Through Metal Detector

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LIST OF DEFINITIONS

Access Control (ACS) A system enabling an organisation to control access to areas and resources in a given physical facility or computer-based information system. The access control's functionality answers one or more of the following questions:

Something I have (for example: a card, entry authorisation);

Something I know (PIN code);

Something I am (individual biometric identification).

Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

An image-processing technology used to identify road vehicles by their license plates. Often referred also as LPR (Licence Plate Recognition).

Area of Interest (AOI) A general or specific area in the video frame or stream, concerning which rules have been defined via a video analytics application.

Backbone Transmission Network (BTN) A central communication network serving mission critical systems.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

A system using video cameras to capture / transmit / record a signal to a specific place, on a limited set of monitors, though a point to point (P2P), point to multipoint, or mesh wireless links.

According to ISO/DIS 22300: Television system in which signals are not publicly distributed.

Contactless Smart Card RFID based (proximity read/write) smart card used for entitlement (ticket) and/or electronic means of payment.

Digital Video Recorder (DVR)

An electronic device including application software that records video in a digital format to a disk drive, USB flash drive, SD memory cards and other local or networked mass storage device.

Dome Camera Surveillance cameras, usually with PTZ capacity, that are mounted into a dome-like enclosure either for protection or for concealment.

Field of View (FOV)

The part of the scene that is visible through the camera at a particular position and orientation in space; objects outside the FOV are not recorded. It is most often expressed as the angular size of the view cone, as an angle of view or as a ratio of lengths.

Frames per Second (FPS) The frequency (rate) at which an imaging device produces unique consecutive images expressed in frames per second (FPS).

Geographic Information System (GIS)

A system designed to capture, manage, analyse, store, manipulate and display all types of geographically referenced information.

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Human Machine Interface (HMI) / Graphical User Interface (GUI)

Graphics-based visualisation of a control and monitoring system.

Incident Management System

Software developed specifically to support incidents. The software collects, analyses, displays and investigates data through one or more control stations. Most applications are capable of managing processes, tasks and inputs; defining process escalation; classifying incidents based on risk levels, and controlling security, safety, operational, communication and information systems, via physical or logical interfaces.

Information Capture The recording, through a sensor-based device (camera, microphone etc.), on a permanent or temporary storage medium of information in a way such as it can be accessed by humans.

Integrated Security Systems

An integrated security system, application or solution, tightly coupled together as a functional unified system.

Interoperability The capability to communicate, execute programmes or transfer data among various functional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics of those units (ISO/IEC 2382-1:1993). The property of a product or a system enabling it to work with other products or systems, presently installed or to be added in the future, without any particular restrictions or additional implementation.

Intrusion Detection System (IDS) / Burglar Alarm System (BAS)

Electronic alarms alerting the user to a specific danger. Classified into home or industrial burglar alarms and perimeter intrusion detection.

License Plate Recognition (LPR)

An image-processing technology used to identify road vehicles by their license plates. Often referred also as ANPR Automatic Number Plate Recognition.

Local Positioning System (LPS)

A system using wireless communication – a transmitter and a receiver to calculate the location via triangulation and display it using a software application.

Credential / Identification & Authentication (I&A)

A physical/tangible object, a piece of knowledge, or a facet of a person's physical being, that enables an individual access to a given physical facility or computer-based information system.

Typical credentials include one or more of the following elements:

(1) Something I have (for example: a card / badge, entry authorisation);

(2) Something I know (PIN code);

(3) Something I am (individual biometric identification).

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Network Video Recorder (NVR)

A system receiving video input over a network and recording it in a digital format to a disk drive, USB flash drive, SD memory card or other mass storage device, and allowing for selective retrieval of the collected videos.

Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS)

A generic name for electronic perimeter security systems, including vibration detection, optic fibres, seismic detectors, volumetric systems, transmitter-receiver technologies, video analytics, scanning observation systems, radar systems and more.

Physical Security Information Management (PSIM)

A category of products that integrate an organisation’s disparate security devices and systems into a single unified operating picture.

Public Address (PA) An electronic amplification system with a mixer, amplifier and loudspeakers, used to reinforce a sound source.

Security Control Centre (SCC) / Security Operations Centre (SOC)

A physical location at which command & control and communication systems are installed to enable security operation management.

Systems Interoperability The ability of two or more systems or components to exchange and make use of information.

Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA)

A digital trunked mobile radio interoperability standard, used by private mobile radio users such as public safety, transportation, utilities, government, commercial & industrial, oil & gas and military etc., which allows equipment from multiple vendors to interoperate with each other.

User Requirements A set of needs and / or expectations of the user(s) from the product, system or service under development. The term ‘users’ encompasses any citizens, businesses or public authorities that may use the final product, system or service.

Video Analytics (VA) / Video Content Analysis (VCA) / Intelligent Video Analytics (IVA

The automated analysis of images or video streams, usually acquired through video surveillance systems, in order to create useful information about the content.

Video Recording System A DVR or NVR

Video Surveillance Remote observation and/or recording of one or more persons or a certain area by means of connected video cameras (CCTV or other system).

VMS (Video Management Software) / VMX (Video Matrix)

Software operating on a computer or a server, which is used to manage monitoring, analysis and recording functions of monitoring / surveillance systems.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

A broad range of technologies and means are available for enhancing the level of safety and security at passenger terminals, to protect passengers, the public, tenants, physical infrastructures, mission critical systems and information systems. These include specific systems for security, such as access control, intrusion detection and threat detection systems; dual systems serving safety and security purposes, such as fire detection and extinguishing systems and video surveillance systems; and operational systems with dual use – security and safety, such as passenger information systems. Additionally there are physical means and other technologies that are implemented to prevent or mitigate damage – whether techniques, means, materials for reinforcing structures against blasts, or materials that allow quick cleaning of graffiti, prevent or mitigate the damage from vandalism and enable quick decontamination following incidents in which chemical or toxic industrial materials are used.

This deliverable will review a wide range of technologies, means, materials and engineering techniques serving safety, security and operational needs in passenger terminals. A summary will be given for each of the above, describing the technology or technique and its use in passenger terminals – whether in existing structures, structures undergoing renovation or retrofit, or structures that are under construction. The description of technologies contains only information essential to ensuring a proper understanding and any reference to a make etc., is not an endorsement of a specific manufacturer or product. Images of various manufacturers' products will be included only for the purpose of illustrating the technology.

The compendium of technologies, means, materials and engineering techniques included in this deliverable will serve as a basis for the development of the Constructive Design Handbook in WP2.

1.2. Purpose and Scope

This document has two purposes:

To map and describe technologies, means, materials and engineering techniques for safety, security and operational uses in passenger terminals, which can be implemented to mitigate terrorism and crime risks;

To define the uses of these technologies, means, materials and engineering techniques in public and non-public areas, as safeguards that mitigate terrorism and crime risks.

1.3. Document Structure

This document contains six main parts:

Passenger related safety & security systems Passenger information systems Building management systems Threat detection systems Telecommunication and information management Construction techniques & materials

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For each part the relevant technologies, means, materials and/or techniques for managing terrorism and crime risks will be defined; and for each sub-group a brief review of the technology, means or technique and its uses in the public and non-public areas in passenger terminals will be provided.

1.4. Applicable and Reference Documents

R[1] SECUR-ED, D21.1 – Public Transport Security Terminology & Definitions

R[2] COUNTERACT / PT5: Public Transport Security Planning – Organisation, Countermeasures & Operations guidance; Available at http://www.uitp.org/knowledge/projects-details.cfm?id=433

R[3] COUNTERACT / State of the art report; COUNTERACT Deliverable 2, 2007

R[4] http://www.cnlsoftware.com/

R[5] http://www.vidsys.com/

R[6] http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/100810-physical-security-information-management-psim.html

R[7] Will Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) Systems change the Global Security World? A look at this important emerging security technology to aid decision making and deployment planning, February 2011, Jon Roadnight, Director CornerStone GRG Ltd.

R[8] United States General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO-04-321, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 2004

R[9] Design of CCTV Systems for Use in Transport Related Applications, APTA, technical standards working group (TSWG1), 2008

R[10] Association, ECA - Electrical Contractor's. Guidance for Electrical. London : s.n., 2012

R[11] Centre, Fire Safety Advice. Emergency Lighting, April 2012; available at: http://www.firesafe.org.uk/emergency-lighting

R[12] RATP. New ventilation system for metro and RER, 2012; available at: http://www.ratp.fr/en/ratp/c_7163/new-ventilation-system-for-metro-and-rer/print/

R[13] Mohammed Tabarra, Davar Abi-Zadeh, Stefan Sadokieri; Design of a modern subway ventilation system; Tunnels and Tunnelling International. 2004.

R[14] Tunnels and Metros; FlaktWoods Ireland; April 2012; available at: http://www.flaktwoods.ie/products-services/industry/applications/tunnels-and-metros

R[15] Rob Bolin, Whole Building Design Guide - Chemical/Biological/Radiation (CBR) Safety of the Building Envelope. s.l. : National Institute of Building Sciences, 2009.

R[16] www.video-insight.com

R[17] www.genetc.com

R[18] www.2mcctv.com

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R[19] Axis Communication web site, www.axis.com

R[20] Mobotix web site, www.mobotix.com

R[21] GE Homeland Protection web site, Now "Morpho Detection", www.morphodetection.com

R[22] AS&E web site, www.as-e.com

R[23] L3 Communication web site, www.sds.l-3com.com

R[24] Microsemi web site, www.microsemi.com

R[25] Thermo Fisher Scientific web site, www.thermofisher.com

R[26] Smith Detection web site, www.smithsdetection.com

R[27 Mistral Security web site, http://mistralsecurityinc.com

R[28] Analogic web site, www.analogic.com

R[29] Magal security Systems, www.magal-s3.com

R[30] Intelligent transportation systems, http://itramas.com

R[31] Chemical and Biological Terrorism - Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response, Institute Of Medicine and Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology Commission on Life Sciences, National Research Council, US, 1999

R[32] Sensor Systems, www.sensorantennas.com

R[33] Bruker Daltonics, www.bdal.com

R[34] Cisco Physical Security Operations Manager, available at: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps11265/index.html

R[35] CNL PSIM Introduction, available at: http://www.cnlsoftware.com/ipscIntroduction.php

R[36] http://www.cybergroup.in/cctv_camera/28_ad_5346_u_opst_nlax_0000.htm#

R[37] John Harrell Application Note AN2009-07Cybersecurity With the SEL-1102 Computing Platform and N-Dimension Solutions

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2. PASSENGER RELATED SAFETY & SECURITY SYSTEMS 2.1. VIDEO SURVEILLANCE (CCTV) & VIDEO ANALYTICS 2.1.1. Technology overview

Electronic security systems have become a mainstay of any comprehensive and cohesive security management program. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) technology has improved significantly over the past decade and enhanced the surveillance capabilities of security departments in both the private and public sectors, while also deterring hostile elements. In addition, CCTV systems are now becoming increasingly integrated with other security and building management systems to provide a more comprehensive facilities management function in commercial applications.

(1) CCTV system – general architecture

A standard CCTV system (Figure 2-1) consists of cameras, a data transmission medium, monitors for viewing the footage, keyboards and other equipment for controlling the system, and computer hard drives for storing recorded images. CCTV systems are either analogue or digital, or a combination of both. The main difference between analogue and digital systems is in the signal transmitted from the camera to the recorder / monitor: in analogue systems the image that has been captured and digitised by the analogue camera sensor is not converted into digital signal before transmission; on the other hand, in digital systems the image is converted and digitally transmitted. Digital CCTV cameras are also referred to as IP (internet Protocol) network cameras, because they utilise the advantage of this technology in data transmission (Figure 2-2).

Figure 2-1: CCTV General block diagram architecture of an analogue video network

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Figure 2-2: CCTV General block diagram architecture of an IP based video network (digital)

While the first CCTV cameras to be developed were analogue, and are still in use, the most recent technological advances have been in the development of Internet Protocol cameras and systems. IP network cameras can be connected directly to existing IP networks, eliminating the need for separate, expensive coaxial cable installations. IP cameras have individual IP addresses that enable CCTV images to be viewed over the Internet from anywhere in the world on any Internet ready computer or smart phone. Another of the many advantages of IP technology is that it allows the user to record the images that are captured by the camera at a secure location that is distant from the site at which the camera is installed, thus providing an added level of security against the threat of data interception and theft. IP systems also support additional analytical functions, such as video motion detection. However, like every IP network based application, IP traffic is subject to several potential drawbacks, such as bandwidth limitations, network congestion, load balancing, viruses and latency. If the network fails, even momentarily, the recording and monitoring of video will be immediately affected and will be stopped or degrade.

Where analogue CCTV systems are installed, the communication medium consists of cables, which are chosen for compatibility with the scale of the system, as well as with the distances between the cameras and the CCTV servers. The most common and least expensive among the transmission media is the coaxial cable, which is used for cable runs up to a maximum of about 400m, depending on the coaxial type. If the cable run is more than a few hundred meters, twisted pair cables are a good alternative, as they can be utilised for distances of up to about 600m, without line repeaters.

Another benefit of twisted pair cables is that they typically have four pairs per cable, which means that it is possible to connect up to four cameras at the single location using only the one cable run. Fibre optic is the most secure of the CCTV transmission media; however, its use is generally limited to very long cable runs or to sensitive installations, due to its higher cost. Fibre optics use light to transmit data, rather than electrical signals that are typically used in other copper based transmission cable types.

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Some of the advantages of fibre optic cables include:

Very high data carrying capacity; Cables can be installed over very large distances with no loss of data; The signal is difficult to intercept (making the system more secure); The light signal travels entirely within the fibre, causing no interference to the adjacent wires or

other optical fibres, and it is immune to electrical interference; Fibre optic cables are very small and light, and are becoming increasingly cost effective to install.

Conversely, terminating fibre optic cables require special tools as well as a higher degree of precision in installation than with any other types of cables. In addition, switching and routing fibre optic signals is difficult; and the cables are fragile and can, therefore, be easily damaged. All these advantages and disadvantages should be considered when deciding whether to use fibre optic cables for data transmission in CCTV installations.

(2) Edge devices: cameras, lens encoders and decode rs

The CCTV system's cameras are clearly visible in most instances and, along with appropriate signage; aim to deter people from engaging in illegal or inappropriate behaviour, although opinions relating to the effectiveness of CCTV as a crime deterrent vary.

There are numerous possibilities to choose from when selecting CCTV cameras and lenses (Figure 2-3). Regarding CCTV cameras, it is possible to choose between:

Fixed focus cameras: are suitable for areas where the required field of view generally remains unchanged, such as foyers and waiting areas, including airport lounges for example. When fixed cameras are mounted in outdoor areas they are usually encased in a dome type housing to protect the camera from bad weather.

PTZ cameras: are designed to pan (move from side to side), tilt (move up and down), and to zoom (move in and out) as directed by the control centre operator. These cameras are suitable for installation outdoors, as they cover large areas and enable the operator to zoom in on an item or an individual, and track moving vehicles or persons. Systems incorporating PTZ cameras are generally monitored and operated by security personnel, while smaller CCTV systems, which include only a few cameras, may not require constant monitoring and may simply record the images for evidentiary purposes. PTZ cameras are generally more expensive than fixed ones.

IP cameras: are digital video cameras commonly employed for surveillance and can send and receive data via a computer network or via the Internet. IP cameras can be either centralised or decentralised. When centralised, they require a central Network Video Recorder (NVR), whereas when decentralised, the cameras have built-in recording functionality, allowing recording on digital storage media. IP cameras can be fixed or PTZ, since pan, tilt, and zoom commands can be sent via IP protocol.

Megapixel IP cameras: are the most technologically advanced IP cameras. These cameras can capture images at high resolutions, allowing either monitoring a very large area or zooming in to record video without compromising on quality. They use sensors that require more light than analogue cameras to produce good quality videos.

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CCTV cameras are responsible for capturing images, and they do so when the light reflected from an object is then focused by a lens and captured by what is known as a charged coupled device (CCD) image sensor. Light plays a crucial role in video surveillance because without it an image cannot be obtained. Therefore, the area to be viewed must be illuminated either naturally (by the sun), or by artificial light sources. Both poor lighting and extremely bright conditions result in poor image quality and cause a lack of contrast between moving objects and their background. The most common type of image sensor found in CCTV cameras is the CCD, which is typically available in different sizes: 1/2", 1/3", and 1/4".

The purpose of the camera lens is to focus incoming light onto the sensor, to produce an image. The type of lens that is selected depends on the surveillance application for which it is required. There are three types of lenses:

Fixed focal lenses: these have a set of focal lengths that cannot be changed, and can be used either for overviews or for close-ups, but cannot be used for both or adjusted;

Vari-focal lenses: these are usually more expensive than fixed focal lenses; their advantage is that they allow adjusting the focal length on the fly and changing the camera view.

Zoom lenses: these are a mechanical assembly of lenses for which the focal length can be varied. Compared with the vari-focal ones, zoom lenses do not lose focus when the focal length changes.

Figure 2-3: Different types of cameras & lenses

Side Opening Policarbonate

Housing

Professional Weatherproof

Housing

Vandal Resistant Ceiling Housing for Indoor

Installation

Housing For Installation in an

Aggressive Environment

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-

Dome Enclosure with Top-Mount Opening

System Dome Enclosure Positioning Unit

Positioning Unit For Day And Night

Surveillance with Infrared

Figure 2-4: Different types of camera housings

(3) Recording

Whether monitored or not, the data captured by the camera in the form of video footage are generally recorded so they can be used to review incidents and provide evidence at a later date, if required. The formats that are commonly used include:

'Common Intermediate Format' (CIF). CIF refers to the number of horizontal and vertical lines in the video image frame and frame rate. The official CIF size is 352 x 288 lines at 25 frames per second', but video can also be transmitted and displayed at 2CIF and 4CIF.

'Motion JPEG': records a very high quality image, because it records a full frame image of the video stream. This is not practical for storage, given the large amount of hard disk space that is required. 'Motion JPEG 2000' enables better compression, requiring less storage space than 'Motion JPEG'.

'MPEG': uses what is known as a key frame, at the beginning of the video sequence, which involves recording a full frame of the image and using it as a reference. For each additional frame, only the parts of the image that have moved are recorded, reducing the storage requirements and enabling a longer sequence of video to be recorded. 'MPEG-2' uses advances in technology to produce a better video image than 'MPEG-1' without increasing bandwidth and storage space requirements. ‘MPEG-4’ standard is a further improvement that permits recording at lower bitrates while maintaining high quality images.

Real-time video surveillance applications require high performance compression standards such as ‘MPEG-4’, which offers a higher level of performance than their predecessors. An added advantage of these standards is the feasibility to adjust the compression ratio. This means that video can be recorded at different qualities by merely adjusting the compression rate and consequently, the quality and the size of the image.

The recording capabilities and hardware requirements vary depending on the number of cameras in the system as well as on the length of time that the recorded images need to be stored. It is common for recorded images to be stored for up to thirty days in commercial settings, and many sites have in excess of 100 cameras. Understandably, such large systems have extensive data storage requirements, which must be considered in the design of the CCTV system. Storage for typical systems is usually achieved by installing a digital video recorder (DVR), which typically has up to 16 camera inputs. A separate DVR is

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used for each of the multiples of 16 cameras that are connected to the system; however, where a very large number of cameras are installed, a network video recorder (NVR) device may be utilised. An NVR device is a server that has large storage capabilities, as a function of the size of its hard drive (generally measured in Terabytes), and it is often used in instances where the sheer size of the system means that the number of DVRs required is too large to be housed in the security control room, due to space restrictions.

(4) Viewing

The resolution when using analogue and digital cameras is similar, although in analogue video the image resolution is based on lines (or TV-lines, since analogue video technology is derived from the TV industry), whilst in digital video the image resolution is based on square pixels. There are two analogue video standards:

NTSC (National Television System Committee): used in North American and Japan, has a resolution of 480 lines with a refresh rate of 60 interlaced field per second (480i60);

PAL (Phase Alternating Line): used in Europe, Asia and Africa, has a resolution of 576 lines with a refresh rate of 50 interlaced fields per second (576i50).

When an analogue video is digitised, the maximum amount of pixels that can be created depends on the TV-lines to be digitised.

When IP network cameras are used, the available resolutions (see Table 1) are derived from the computer industry. VGA (Video Graphics Array) is a graphics display system developed by IBM. The VGA resolution is defined as 640x480 pixels, which is the common format for non-megapixel cameras. Computer monitors can handle resolution in VGA or multiples of VGA.

Display format Pixels Display format No. of megapixels

Pixels

QVGA (SIF) 320x240 SXGA 1.3 megapixels 1280x1024

VGA 640x480 SXGA+ (EXGA) 1.4 megapixels 1400x1050

SVGA 800x600 UXGA 1.9 megapixels 1600x1200

XVGA 1024x768 WXGA 2.3 megapixels 1920x1200

4x VGA 1280x960 QXGA 3.1 megapixels 2048x1536

Table 1: VGA resolutions Table 2: Megapixel formats

A conventional analogue camera can provide, once the signal is digitised in D1 resolution, a resolution of either 720x480 pixels (NTSC) or 720x576 pixels (PAL). D1 resolution corresponds to a maximum of 414720 pixels or 0.4 megapixels. By comparison, a 1.3 megapixel camera provides a resolution more than 3 times greater than the resolution that can be provided by an analogue CCTV camera, as shown in Figure 2-5.

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Figure 2-5: CCTV resolution matrix [R18]

In large commercial environments, CCTV cameras are usually monitored by a security guard force that is able to provide a physical response in the event of an incident. The security guards are stationed either in a control centre or in a separate building containing all the necessary equipment to monitor the CCTV system and, in some cases, to also monitor the access control system (ACS) and/or burglar alarm system.

A typical security control centre consists of a number of monitors for viewing CCTV footage and administering any other appropriate security and building management systems. The more advanced monitoring facilities have numerous monitors of varying sizes, which enable the operator/s to observe multiple cameras at any point in time, or watch the footage from one particular camera of interest if they are tracking an individual person or vehicle, or watch an incident unfold. Other monitors display additional information, including burglar alarm and duress alarm interfaces, as well as emergency management systems, for instance.

Image and videos captured by cameras are managed via dedicated computer software that is generally addressed as Video Management Software (VMS). VMS programs (Figure 2-6) can run on Windows and Linux systems, or alternatively, on a web server and used via a web browser by any client connected to the network.

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VMS can support many specific features, such as:

Simultaneous viewing of video from multiple cameras. VMS enables live and recorded video to be viewed by multiple users in split view (different cameras at the same time), full screen view, or camera sequence (views from different cameras displayed in sequence).

Recording of video and audio. Video and audio can be recorded continuously, at scheduled times, manually, or on trigger (by motion or alarm). The continuous recording requires more storage space than trigger recording. In order to save storage space, the resolution, the compression level and the video format can be set to lower values, and increased in the event of an alarm.

Event management functions. VMS can identify or create an event that is triggered by inputs received from a built-in feature in the network camera, from point-of-sale terminals or from intelligent video software. VMS can be programmed to automatically respond to the event by, for example, recording videos, sending alert notifications, activating doors and lights.

Video Motion Detection (VMD). VMD is a common feature in VMS. It defines activity in a scene by analysing image data and detecting differences in a series of images. It is possible to define zones in the camera’s view to be included or excluded in the motion detection.

Camera administration and management. In addition to the ability to configure the camera settings, the frame rate, the resolution and the compression format, VMS can include advanced functionalities, such as:

�� Locating and showing the connection status of video devices in the network;

�� Setting IP addresses;

�� Configuring single or multiple units;

�� Managing firmware upgrades;

�� Managing user account rights;

�� Providing a configuration sheet, which enables users to obtain an overview of all camera and recording configurations.

User access control and activity logging. VMS allows defining authorised users, passwords and different user access levels. Typical user access levels include Administrator (access to all functionalities), Operator (access to all functionalities except for certain configuration pages), and Viewer (access only to live video from selected cameras).

Figure 2-6: Examples of the user interface of video management software (VMS)

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2.1.2. Video analytics The video industry offers numerous applications that define suspicious behaviour, such as "Intelligent Video", "Video Analytics", "Video Content analysis" and more. Specifically, Video Analytics is software technology that is used to analyze video for specific data. It is typically applied in a physical security context. The software algorithms run on processors inside video cameras, recording devices, or specialized video processing units. Increasingly, software packages that combine multiple video analytics algorithms together into an integrated Video Intelligence Software system are being developed. The system runs on generic servers and storage devices. The technology can evaluate the contents of video to determine specified information about the content of that video. Video Analytics and similar applications operate on the basis of the following parameters:

(1) Intrusion detection, line crossing, illegal ent ry - this algorithm defines an alert on the basis of an object's entry into a predefined virtual area. When analyzing suspicious situations in the public transport and mass transit environments, this application is mainly relevant to a situation in which an object enters a restricted access zone.

(2) Crowd density detection – the detection of overcrowding situations is relevant for security reasons as well as for safety reasons. Crowds in transport systems gather, for example, during rush hours, or out of curiosity, when an incident occurs. Video analytics can estimate the level of crowd density and indicate the affected area to the operator. In succession, the tool can propose a qualitative classification of the density level, e.g.: empty, uncrowded, slightly crowed, crowed and very crowed.

(3) Loitering in a virtual area - this algorithm defines an alert on the basis of the object's loitering in a predefined virtual area. When analyzing suspicious situations in the public transport and mass transit environments, this application is relevant to a situation in which an object loiters in a particular area for the purpose of collecting intelligence about the area itself, and the activities carried out in it.

(4) Tailgating - this application has been adapted specifically for points at which access control is implemented. The application is intended to prevent a situation in which an unauthorized individual exploits the entry of an authorized individual into a restricted access zone, closely following him/her and entering this zone as well.

(5) Left object - this algorithm defined a threat when an object that is larger than a predefined size is left at the scene for a more than a predefined period of time. After alerting, the system automatically accesses the database of video images taken shortly prior to the time of the alert (for example, a 30-second period), and displays what has transpired during this time to the operator. When analyzing suspicious situations this application is relevant to a scenario in which a suspect plants a deferred or remote-controlled IED and then leaves the site; for example, a bag left under a seat on the platform (in an area found under camera coverage).

(6) Stationary Vehicle Detection - this algorithm produces alerts in scenarios involving vehicles – with the most common application being an alert provided when a vehicle stops at a certain location. The alert is received when the vehicle enters a predefined area of interest; or alternatively, when it remains there for longer than a predetermined period of time. A referenced threat may also be defined, so that the alert will be produced on the basis of the vehicle's size characteristics. This application may be implemented in order to detect vehicles suspected of being car or large vehicle bombs; to detect safety hazards (on highways, for example) – of vehicles endangering traffic; and also to deal with traffic violations – such as parking in restricted or forbidden zones, parking for longer than permitted, etc.

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Figure 2-7: Examples of video analytics (VA) application in passenger terminals

2.1.3. Functionalities and usage

The CCTV system has two main functionalities:

(1) Live images visualisation;

(2) Recording.

1. The use, or purpose, of cameras will fall into one or more of the following four general areas of application [R9]: Deter, monitor, recognise and identify (Figure 2-8).

Detect: 10% screen height Monitor: 20% screen height

Recognise: 50% screen height Identify: 120% Screen Height.

Figure 2-8: Detect, monitor, recognize and identify

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Public and private CCTV systems are deployed for a number of reasons:

Monitoring public areas to detect incidents and to coordinate police responses; Recording events for use as evidence and to inform investigations; Directed surveillance in order to recognise & identify suspected offenders; Deterring hostile elements from engaging in criminal or terrorist activity.

An example of the usage of CCTV for security reasons is the European project SUBITO (Surveillance of Unattended Baggage and Identification and Tracking of the Owner), which launched to deal with the problem of unattended baggage threats. IED concealed in baggage is a well-recognised security threat in mass transport networks and other critical national infrastructure.

Building on existing surveillance technology, the SUBITO programme aims to demonstrate novel data processing technologies which will improve the performance of security surveillance systems employing multiple CCTV systems by meeting the objectives of:

Autonomously detecting unattended baggage; Rapidly identifying, locating and tracking the baggage owner.

2.2. ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM (ACS) Access control systems (ACS) are used to manage control to specific areas within facilities, based on predefined authorisation granted to specific individuals or groups of individuals. The authorisation may include limitations based on areas, days of the week and time of day. 2.2.1. Technology overview Access control and visitor management systems are a technological tool used by organisations in order to implement their access control policy. System components include the following: (1) Access control point – an access control point can be a door, turnstile, parking gate, elevator, or

other physical barrier where granting access can be electronically controlled;

(2) Access identification & authentication (I&A) de vice – the access verification element can be a keypad where a code is entered, a card reader, or a biometric reader;

(3) Exit device – generally, only entry is controlled. However, to control exit, a second reader is used on the opposite side of the door. In cases where exit is not controlled (free exit) – a component called a request-to-exit (RTE) device is used;

(4) Access control controller – an electronic security device designed to identify users and control entry to or exit from protected areas;

(5) Management application & database – a software based management system that defines the objects (buildings, storeys), users (groups, individuals, vehicles, visitors) and authorisations, on the basis of the access control policy. The system has a database through which it defines three parameters: Identification & authentication, authorisation, and accountability:

Identification & authentication – determines who can log on to a system, and the software elements they are authorised to access after logging in;

Authorisation - determines what a person gaining access is authorised to do; Accountability - comprises of the log and events register in the access control system.

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2.2.1.1. Access control point

Access control points are points at which people are restricted from accessing predefined areas by:

Human means, where members of the security staff filter the people wishing to enter a restricted access area;

Mechanicals means, which include physical barriers where access is blocked by elements such as revolving doors, turnstiles, fences, locks, etc.;

Technological means, which include identification & authentication means.

Figure 2-9: Full height turnstile and tripod

Figure 2-10: Different types of identification and authentication means

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2.2.1.2. Access identification & authentication (I&A) device

There are various types of readers, each compatible with a particular type of credential that may be used, including, for example, those based on:

Cards – including proximity cards; Biometrics – whether fingerprint, iris, palm print or other; Numerical codes License plate readers (for parking gates)

2.2.1.3. ACS management

Electronic access control uses computers to overcome the limitations of mechanical locks and keys. The electronic access control system grants access based on the credential presented. When access is granted, the door is unlocked for a predetermined time and the transaction is recorded. When access is refused, the door remains locked and the attempted access is recorded. The system also monitors the door, and provides an indication if the door is forced open or is held open for a period of time exceeding the interval defined, after being unlocked.

2.2.1.4. ACS in the public transport environment

Each station must be equipped with an ACS intended to:

Allow access to the platform to authorised persons (passengers who have purchased tickets; employees);

Deny access to restricted areas, such as equipment rooms, control centres, etc. to unauthorised individuals.

Different architecture is implemented to achieve each of the above tasks:

A turnstile system is usually used to control the platform gates. Readers read passengers' tickets, and allow those having valid tickets to access the platform. Turnstiles can also operate as a person/passenger counter. The access gates are monitored by a dedicated CCTV camera.

Figure 2-11: Schematic layout of access control / fare collection system in stations

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Restricted areas are separated from public areas by locked doors. Access is permitted to authorised individuals presenting the appropriate credentials.


This section should be divided into the two different functionalities:

(1) Functionalities dealing with fare:

Fare collection and access management for the travelling public; and Functionalities and usage to reduce fare evasion.

(2) Access control system enforcing the access mana gement policy:

Control of restricted areas to protect physical assets, mission critical systems and confidential information;

Separate public and non-public areas; Real time alerts of 'security breaches' – violation of the access credentials.

2.3. INFORMATION & HELP POINT / EMERGENCY CALL SYST EM (ECS) 2.3.1. Technology overview

Information or help point / emergency call systems are implemented in different configurations in passenger terminals – whether as passenger information points, as help / emergency call system points, as combined points (providing both information and emergency assistance) or as units installed on the wall. These points include off the shelf technologies that are integrated together using unified hardware. These technologies include:

Call button; Duplex intercom; Camera or integration with the cameras system.

The passenger information & help points are connected to command and control centres (operation, passenger services, security) in order to allow providing assistance throughout the station's operating hours.

2.3.1.1. Functionalities and usage

The functionalities of the information or help point / emergency call systems are intended to improve the quality of service and assistance provided to passengers, as it enables them to receive information from a call centre operator, as well as to provide information to the operator about security issues and incidents taking place at the station. The system supports the following applications:

Indication of the call and the display of the location at which the call was initiated – in alphanumeric data and/or on the mapping tool;

Duplex communication; Viewing of the person initiating the call by the systems operator at the command and control

centre; Indications of damage caused to the information / help point or sabotage.

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2.4. BURGLAR ALARM

Burglar or intrusion alarms are systems designed to detect unauthorised entry into an area. The integration of sensors and systems is best accomplished as part of an overall system/installation/facility security system. Although sensors are designed primarily for either interior or exterior applications, many sensors can be used in both environments. Exterior detection sensors are used to detect unauthorised entry into clear areas or isolation zones that constitute the perimeter of a protected area. Interior detector sensors are used to detect penetration into a structure, movement within a structure or to provide knowledge of intruder contact with a critical or sensitive item.

2.4.1. Technology overview

The main elements of an intrusion detection system include:

The intrusion detection sensors; The alarm processor; The intrusion/alarm monitoring station; The communications structure that connects these elements and connects the system to the

reaction elements.

2.4.1.1. Interior / indoor burglar alarm systems

Four types of technologies are recognised – window, door, wall and volumetric sensors.

(1) Window sensors

� Mechanical switch. Used to detect the opening of a protected door or window. The sensors are contact switches that generate an alarm upon direct physical operation/disturbance of the sensor.

� Magnetic switch. Used to detect the opening of a protected door or window. The sensors are contact switches that generate an alarm upon direct physical operation/disturbance of the sensor.

� Balanced magnetic switch. Consists of a switch assembly with an internal magnet that is usually mounted on the door/window frame and a balancing magnet mounted on the moveable door/window. It provides a higher level of security for windows and doors than magnetic or mechanical switches. Balanced magnetic switches are available in casings designed to prevent the switch from electrically causing an explosion in a hazardous area (recommended for flammable or hazardous environments).

� Glass break acoustic. Glass break acoustic sensors listen for noises generated by an intruder’s entry into a protected area. They are generally, but not exclusively, used in internal applications, from an entrance foyer to critical data/resource storage areas. Audio sensors should be mounted in areas where the predicted intrusion noise is expected to exceed that of the normal environmental noise. If there is background noise, and if calibration is not accomplished to compensate for it, the microphone may be unable to detect/differentiate an intrusion noise. If excessive background noise is present, the audio sensor should not be considered. Typically, audio sensors are used in conjunction with another detection sensor to provide a greater probability of detection. Since an audio sensor is unaffected by changes in the thermal environment and fluorescent lights have no effect on the sensor’s detection

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characteristics; its use with a thermal imaging motion detection system can provide both audio and visual record/tracking of an intrusion.

(2) Door sensors

� Mechanical switch. As detailed above.

� Magnetic switch. As detailed above.

� Balanced magnetic switch. As detailed above.

(3) Wall sensors

� Vibration. Vibration sensors are designed to be mounted on walls, ceilings and floors, in order to detect mechanical vibrations caused by chopping, sawing, drilling, ramming or any type of attempted physical intrusion that would penetrate the structure on which it is mounted. These sensors should be securely and firmly placed 2.5m – 3.0m apart, on a wall or ceiling where intrusion is expected. The difference in spacing lengths should be determined by the wall’s ability to transmit the disturbance energy. A volumetric sensor should be used in conjunction with wall sensors and be directed toward the expected penetration site, to provide detection of an intrusion that may not cause sufficient vibration to trigger the vibration sensors.

� Fibre optic. A fibre optic wire sensor is in an open mesh network appliqué that can be applied directly to an existing wall or roof, or installed in a wall as it is being constructed. The fibre optic network is designed to detect the low frequency energy caused by chopping, sawing, drilling, ramming or physical attempt to penetrate the structure on which it was mounted. These sensors are very sensitive, and special consideration must be given to determine if they are suitable for a particular wall or roof. A vibration sensor may generate false alarms if mounted on walls that are exposed to external vibrations (vehicle, train or heavy foot movement) or if the walls are subject to vibrating machinery. However, an embedded fibre optic sensor, although very perceptive to slight changes in the light pattern, can be easily calibrated and tuned to detect various forms of intrusion.

(4) Volumetric sensors

� Microwave sensors: These sensors are motion detection devices that transmit/flood a designated area/zone with an electronic field. A movement in the zone disturbs the field and sets off the alarm. Microwave sensors may be used in exterior and interior applications. There are two basic types of sensors: Monostatic sensors, in which the transmitter and receiver are encased within a single housing unit; and bi-static sensors, in which the transmitter and receiver are two separate units creating a detection zone between them. Microwave sensors can be used to monitor both exterior areas and interior confined spaces. In the exterior setting they can be used to monitor an area or a definitive perimeter line, as well to serve as an early warning alert of intruders approaching a door or wall. In situations where a well-defined area of coverage is needed, monostatic microwave sensors should be used. However, monostatic sensors are limited to approximate 120m coverage, while bistatic sensors can extend up to approximate 450m. To further enhance detection video motion detection equipment can be installed along side the microwave sensors.

� Passive infrared sensor (PIR): The sensor is passive; it does not transmit a signal – the sensor head simply registers an impulse when received. An area is typically divided into several sectors, each defined with specific boundaries. Detection occurs when an emitting heat source crosses two adjacent sector boundaries or crosses the same boundary twice within a specified time.

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These sensors should be installed on walls or ceilings with the detection pattern covering the possible intrusion zones. Each detection or surveillance zone can be pictured as a searchlight beam that gradually widens as the zone extends farther from the sensor with different segments being illuminated, while others are dark. This design characteristic allows the user to focus the beam on areas where the protection is needed while ignoring other areas, such as known sources of false alarm.

� Dual-technology passive infrared/microwave sensor ( PIR/MW): This sensor uses a combination of both microwave and passive infrared technology with AND logic to provide a lower false alarm rate sensor than either of the sensors independently. This category of sensors is typically referred to as dual-tech. The sensors can be installed along a perimeter line, a fence or a delineated buffer zone, or as a defence against intruders approaching a door or wall. To further enhance the probability of detection, image motion detection equipment can also be installed to survey the intrusion/approach zone. In addition to increasing the detection potential, this capability permits security personnel to assess the nature of the intrusion/alarm immediately and remotely. Although a dual-technology sensor reduces the false alarm rate, it also reduces the probability of detection, since both sensors must have a positive detection before initiating an alarm.

� Passive ultrasonic sensor: A motion detection device that listens for ultrasonic sound energy in a protected area, and reacts to high frequencies associated with intrusion attempts. Ultrasonic sensors are typically mounted on a wall or ceiling and are frequently used in tandem with another sensor, such as a passive device to provide a greater probability of detection. However, this may also increase the overall false alarm rate slightly, depending on the variability and uncontrollability of the environmental characteristic of the monitored area. Passive ultrasonic sensors have the advantage of being unaffected by heat, thus thermal changes in the environment do not hinder their detection ability. It is also easy to contain their energy within a selected area, since ultrasonic energy does not normally pass through walls, roofs or partitions. The disadvantage is that it does not pass through furniture or other obstructions; therefore it creates "dead" non surveillance zones. This disadvantage can be overcome by placing additional sensors at second and third locations to cover the "dead" zones of sensor 1.

� Active ultrasonic sensor: A motion detecting device that emits ultrasonic sound energy into a monitored area and reacts to a change in the reflected energy pattern. Typically, ultrasonic sensors are mounted on the wall or ceiling. They can be used in conjunction with a passive device to provide a greater probability of detection. However, this may also increase the false alarm rate, depending on environmental characteristics of the monitored area. Ultrasonic sensors are not affected by heat, thus changes in the thermal environment do not hinder its detection ability. Ultrasonic energy is easily contained within a selected area avoiding the problem of the energy passing through walls and detecting activity outside the protected zone.

� Photo electric beam sensors: These sensors transmit a beam of infrared light to a remote receiver creating an electronic fence. They are often used to cover openings, such as doorways or hallways, acting essentially as a trip wire. Once the beam is broken/interrupted, an alarm signal is generated. A photo electric beam sensor is unaffected by changes in thermal radiation, fluorescent lights or electronic frequency interference/radio frequency interference. It has a high probability of detection and low false alarm rate.

� Interior active infrared sensor: This sensor generates a curtain pattern of modulated infrared energy and reacts to a change in the modulation of the frequency or an interruption in the received energy. Both occur when an intruder passes through the protection zone. Depending

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upon the type of tape used as the reflective medium, coverage patterns can be between 3-5m wide by 5 – 9 meters long. In addition, the laser plane angle can be adjusted from 37º to 180º. This system provides a high probability of detecting intruders. The speed or direction of the intruder, and the temperature of the environment, have no effect on detection characteristics.

� Video motion detection sensor: See 2.4.1.2.

Figure 2-12: Schematic illustration of interior / indoor burglar alarm technologies

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Figure 2-13: Examples of burglar alarm technologies – PIR, magnetic switch, dual technology,

glass break x 2, beam sensor (from upper left, clockwise)

2.4.1.2. Exterior / outdoor intrusion detection systems

Two types of technologies are recognised – fence line (fence line & in ground) and open area surveillance (volumetric & video).

(1) Fence line sensors

� Fence vibration sensor: This sensor, when mounted on a fence fabric, detects frequency disturbances associated with sawing, cutting, climbing or lifting of the fence fabric. There are two basic types of fence vibrations sensors: Electro mechanical sensors, whose signal processor has a pulse accumulation circuit that recognises momentary contact openings of electromechanical switches; and piezoelectric, whose signal processor responds to the amplitude, duration, and frequency of the transmitted signal.

Fence vibration sensors perform best when mounted directly onto the fence fabric. Each sensor is connected in series along the fence with a common cable to form a single zone of protection. The sensor zone lengths have a recommended range of 90m.

Vibration sensors are the most economical fence sensor and the easiest to install. The sensors have a high probability of detecting intrusion and work well protecting properly installed and maintained fence lines.

In ground vibration sensors installed adjacent to the perimeter fence (in a controlled zone within the overall protected area) can provide additional detection capability in case the vibration sensors mounted on the fence are by passed by tunneling or careful climbing.

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Another type of enhancement focuses on adding information about prevailing weather conditions to increase or decrease the sensitivity of the processor. A weather sensor station can be mounted on the fence line to feed information to a field processor. The field processor then adjusts the vibration alarm sensitivity based on inputs from the weather station, to ensure an effective sensitivity range is maintained.

Mounting volumetric motion detection devices along the perimeter of the fence will also enhance detection reliability. Determining which volumetric device to use will depend greatly on the environment, terrain and length of the fence line.

Because vibration sensors are prone to activation from all types of vibrations, additional sensing equipment is frequently added to the processor capability to reduce false activations. One type of enhancement is the pulse count accumulator circuit. With this device, sensitivity is determined by a number of pulses required to create an alarm. A pulse is specific amplitude of activity occurring due to fence stress of vibration associated with cutting chain links or climbing the fence fabric. A minimum number of pulses are required during a preset period of time before an alarm is generated.

� Taut wire sensor: Taut wire sensors combine barbed wire fencing with micro switches to detect changes on the fence fabric, rather than the vibration or stress associated with fence disturbance sensors. They can be mounted in two different configurations: on top of an existing fence in conjunction with barbed wire outriggers to provide protection from climbing, or as the fence fabric itself.

Taut wire sensors are used to protect perimeter fence lines. They are one of the most expensive fence sensor systems, because of the laborious installation and maintenance time required. They are very reliable, and provide a high probability of detection and an extremely low false alarm rate. Because of these features, taut wire sensors are usually installed at high risk facilities. However, tedious, regular tensioning of the system is required to ensure the system performs as intended.

Exertion needed on the wire for activation is substantial; therefore, weather is not a factor to be considered in the case of this sensor. Typically, small animals do not pose a threat for false alarms either, because of the magnitude of a 35 pound force needed for activation of the sensor.

To enhance the system, in ground sensors can be installed inside the protected fence area, providing protection in the event the taut wire sensors are by passed by tunnelling or bridging. Furthermore, mounting volumetric motion detection devices along the perimeter of the fence will also increase the probability of detection. However, determining which volumetric device to use will depend greatly on the environment, terrain and length of the fence line. In addition, video motion detection cameras mounted outside or inside the protected fence area can provide a second level of security while also allowing personnel to assess the alarm quickly.

� Fibre optic fence: Fibre optic sensors use light, rather than electricity, for transmission and detection. Fibre optic cable is ideal for incorporation into existing fences, or can be used as standalone fencing. Depending on the processor used, two basic types of fibre optic sensors can be employed: fibre optic continuity, which requires the fibre optic strand to be broken to initiate an intrusion alarm, and fibre optic microbending, which detects alterations in the light pattern caused by movement of the fibre optical cable.

Fibre optic fence sensors should be mounted directly on, or woven into, the fence fabric. A quality and stable installation of the fence is necessary for reliable detection. Freedom from rattles, clanks, knocking sounds, and vibrations/stress activity maximises line sensor quality.

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The more activity that exists around the fence, the lower the sensitivity setting for the system and the less likely the system will be to detect an intruder.

To enhance the potential for intrusion detection, in ground sensors can be installed within the protected fence area to provide an additional level of detection. Video motion detection cameras mounted outside or inside the protected fence area can increase the intrusion detection potential, and allow security personnel to assess the intrusion zone visually. An additional way to enhance the security of a fibre optic fence is to mount a volumetric motion detection device along the perimeter of the fence.

� Strain sensitive cable: A line sensor that uses electric energy as a transmission and detection medium. Line sensors maintain uniform sensitivity over the entire length of the protection zone. The cable runs from the signal processor to an end of line resistor, which guards against cutting, shorting or removal of the cable from the processor. The cable is shielded with an ultraviolet resistant coating, and is designed to be mounted directly onto the fence fabric. Strain sensitive cables should be installed using ties halfway between the bottom and the top of the fence. Furthermore, stainless steel wire ties should be used to prevent silent removal by burning. Sensor zone lengths can extend up to 300m; however, a quality fence and stable installation are necessary for reliable detection. Intrusion detection probabilities can be enhanced by mounting volumetric motion detection devices along the perimeter of the fence line. Other fence sensors can be employed in tandem to provide increased detection possibilities. In addition, video motion detection cameras mounted to view the protected area will provide another layer of detection potential, while also allowing security personnel to assess the alarm visually.

� Electric field sensor: Electric field sensors generate an electrostatic field between/around an array of wire conductors and an electrical ground. Sensors in the system detect changes or distortion in the field. This can be caused by anyone approaching or touching the fence. Electric field wire configurations are mounted on free standing posts or on chain link fences. All the wires are mounted parallel to each other and to the ground, thereby achieving uniform sensitivity along the fence length. Springs are used at the connectors to ensure tension reducing vibrations caused by wind.

An advantage that an E-field sensor has over other fence sensors is the self-adjusting circuit, located in the processor, which rejects wind and ambient noise. This circuit not only requires the amplitude of an intrusion attempt to exceed a present level, but also for a preset period of time. Sensor zone length can extend up to 450m.

� Capacitance sensor: Detects changes in an electrostatic field created by an array of wires. A signal is generated when an intruder changes the capacitance of the field by approaching or contacting the wires. Three strands of closely spaced 16 gauge wire form the sensor array. The wires are secured to a fence top or wall by using high dielectric brackets. The brackets can be adapted to any barrier but are most commonly used on outriggers atop chain link fences. The sensor segment can extend 300m. Capacitance sensors are usually mounted on the top of existing fence fabric, and normally require physical touch to activate the alarm. However, by increasing the sensitivity level, a presence in close proximity can be detected without direct physical contact with the array. Because of the high mounting location, it is recommended that other sensors be used in conjunction with this configuration to detect lower level intrusion actions. Due to the system’s operating principle, weather and EMI/RFI have no effect on the sensor’s detection ability. Much maintenance is required to ensure the capacitance characteristics of the fence are continuously adjusted.

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(2) In-ground fence line sensors

� Balanced buried pressure line sensor: An in ground system that detects vibrations and seismic energy. These energy waves are typically caused by personnel, animal or vehicular movement across the surface of the ground in which the sensors are installed. The detection zone is created by burying the tubes approximately 1.25m part, with the pressure sensing unit linked and places between the sensor tubes. Depending on the nature of the soil, this type of system can create a detection zone with up to a 100m radius. The depth at which the tubes are positioned depends on the composition of the medium in which the tubes are placed. Normally, 25 cm depth is sufficient for earth and sand. Soil with asphalt covering requires tubes to be placed at a more shallow depth of 10-20cm. When working with a concrete surface/area, the sensor tubes should be buried just beneath the surface of the concrete.

� Ported coax buried line sensor: Coaxial cables that have small, closely spaced holes in the outer shield. These openings allow electromagnetic energy to escape and radiate a short distance. Emissions from these cables create an electric field that is disturbed when an intruder enters the field. There are two basic types of buried ported coax sensors: Continuous wave sensors, and pulse sensors. The cables are buried approximately 20-25 cm below the surface of the ground, depending on the soil density, creating an electric field of approximately 0.9 -12m above the ground that extends 3-4 meters wide. The variation in zone size depends on cable separation and on the characteristics of the burial medium. With this sensor cable, zone length can extend up to 150m. Routing the cables underneath chain link fences should be avoided. If metallic pipes or cables must be routed through the sensor cable field, they should be buried at least approximately 1 meter below the ported coaxial cable. When installing the cables along or near fence lines, the cables must be installed between 2 – 3m feet from the fence to avoid distortions and to reduce potential false alarms caused by the motion of the fence fabric disrupting the detection field. A video motion detection system can be used to complement the cable sensor and provide security personnel with the capability to assess alarm location quickly and safely.

� In ground fibre optic sensor: Fibre optic sensors are also used as an in ground, pressure sensitive detection system. In operation, light is pulsed through the optic fibre in a manner similar to an electric signal through a wire. Light, when introduced into the core of the optic fibre, is retained by a process of total internal reflection until it exits into a receiving device; however, external pressures on the cable create changes in the signal flow. In ground fibre optic fence sensors should be installed away from poles or trees. If installed near poles, the detection zone should be at a distance equal to the height of the pole. The sensors should not be installed in or under concrete or asphalt. The installation area should have proper drainage to prevent water from collecting over the detection zone.

� Buried geophone transducer: Detect the low frequency seismic energy created in the ground by someone or something crossing through the detection screen above the sensors. Geophone sensors are typically fielded with 20 to 50 geophones per line. The geophone should be buried, depending on manufacturer directions 1.75–3.5m apart, with recommended burial depth between 15-35cm in soft to compact soil and 15cm asphalt. It is recommended that burial field soil be stable and relatively compact, and the geophones should be installed between layers of sand, as compact sand is very conductive of seismic vibrations. Geophone sensor zones lengths can extend up to 100m. An audio listen in feature can be incorporated into the sensor filed to aid in differentiating between nuisance alarms and valid intrusion attempts. The listen in feature allows the operator at a monitoring station to listen to the audible seismic signals from the geophones. A trained operator can usually differentiate between normal stimuli and stimuli associated with intrusion attempts.

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� Acoustic detection: Acoustic air turbulence sensors detect low frequency created by helicopters that are in their final landing phase or at close range (1.5-3.25km). This sensor can be very useful in detecting helicopter borne intrusion attempts, which would otherwise bypass normal perimeter sensors.

Under test conditions some helicopters, including some of the quietest, have been detected at distances up to 150m. However, for increased probability and reliability of detection, detector sensitivity is typically set for a range of 100m. Detection zones should overlap to ensure all approaches to the protected area are covered by at least one sensor. The sensors should be located away from any vehicular traffic and railroad right of ways to minimise potential interference from any pressure/wind turbulence generated by high speed truck or train movement. There is no restriction on the distance of sensors from the main control unit, as long as system communication is properly designed. Therefore, the protected area can literally extend for kilometres.

(3) Open area surveillance – volumetric sensors

� Exterior active infrared sensor: This sensor generates a multiple beam pattern of modulated infrared energy and reacts to a change in the modulation of the frequency, or an interruption in the received energy. Both occur when an intruder passes through the area covered by the beams. Exterior active infrared sensors are line of sight devices that require the area between the two units to be uniformly level and clear of all obstacles/obstructions that could interfere with the IR signal. Low spots in the terrain will create holes in the surveillance pattern, while obstacles will disrupt the coverage pattern. Typically, active infrared sensors are used in conjunction with a single or double fence barrier which defines the perimeter to be covered. A sensor zone length can extend up to 300m. Precise alignment of the transmitter to the receiver is critical for reliable detection. The detection beam is relatively narrow and requires regular calibration.

� Microwave sensor. As in 2.4.1.1.

� Passive infrared. As in 2.4.1.1.

� Passive infrared / microwave. As in 2.4.1.1.

� Radar: Radar is an active sensor that has undergone substantial refinement and enhancement since its first operational use as a detection sensor in the early 1940s. Radar uses ultrahigh frequency radio waves to detect intrusion of a monitored area.

There are two basic types of radar sensors: Monostatic sensors, in which the transmitter and receiver are encased within a single unit; and bistatic sensors, in which the transmitter and receiver are separated units created a detection zone between them.

Radar sensors are used primarily to monitor exterior areas, although in some situations they can be used to monitor large interior open areas. In both situations, the ground should be reasonably level and the perimeter boundaries straight. If portions of the perimeter are highly or have crooked boundaries, the radar unit may be elevated to provide a better line of sight, or radar sensors can be used to monitor the straight and level sections of the perimeter, while other types of detectors can be used to monitor the remaining sections. The use of a companion system, such as video image motion detection, not only provides a second line of defense, but it provides security personnel with an additional tool to assess alarms and discriminate actual/potential penetrations from false alarms or nuisance events.

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� Open area surveillance – video sensors. These sensors use CCTV systems to provide both an intrusion detection capability, and a means for security personnel to immediately and safely assess alarms. CCTV systems provide the added benefit of documenting the events of an intrusion and the characteristics of the intruder. Once activated, most systems allow the security monitor to manipulate the camera’s field of view (FOV). Some systems also have a listening, as well as a voice communication capability as part of the alarm assessment and situation monitoring system. Correct positioning, lighting conditions, and stability of cameras are all factors to be considered, as should striking a balance between the deterrent value of visible cameras and the security/monitoring value of concealed cameras. Both are valid applications. The installation configuration of a CCTV system is directly related to the nature of the security requirement.

Figure 2-14: Examples of outdoor detection technologies – vibration, taut wire, E-field, buried

geophone, radar & video analytics (from upper left, clockwise)

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Figure 2-15: Schematic illustration of exterior / outdoor intrusion detection technologies


(1) Functionalities and usage for the protection in indoor environments

The intrusion detection systems are implemented to protect secured non public spaces in stations, such as equipment and communication rooms, rooms housing building systems (HVAC, water, sewage), offices, service and information centres, ticket vending centres, local control centres, various apertures (ventilation, tunneling), etc.

The intrusion detection systems are usually installed on the entrance door and in the room itself. Rooms with windows will usually be protected with physical means as well (grating / bars on the windows), as well as electronically.

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(2) Functionalities and usage for the protection of outdoor environments

Perimeter security systems in the outdoor environment will be utilized to protect the area of the station, the line of route in the station's proximity and to protect secured areas (for example, electrical sub-stations, command and control centres) that are adjacent / near the station or comprise an integral part of the station.

The technologies that will be implemented depend to a large extent on the physical elements installed, such as walls, fences or other barriers.

The intrusion detection and perimeter security systems will be connected to the station's control centre, to a central control centre or to a security services provider that operate the control centres and dispatches patrols in the event of an alert. A typical flow chart demonstrating the response process is depicted in Figure 2.15 below, and includes the following main steps:

Detection and transmission of an alert to the command and control centre;

Alert verification;

Alert classification (false alarm, genuine alarm, nuisance alarm);

Handling of the intruders by the site security personnel or a mobile unit.

Figure 2-16: Typical response cycle of an intrusion / burglar alarm incident

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2.5. FIRE AND SMOKE DETECTION, SUPPRESSION AND EXTI NGUISHING 2.5.1. Technology overview 2.5.1.1. Smoke, flame and fire detection

(1) Smoke detection

There are four main types of smoke detection devices:

Ionisation smoke detectors: Detect the presence of smoke by means of a small ionisation chamber and a source of ionising radiation. When smoke enters the ionisation chamber, it disrupts the electrical current field generated by the Alpha particles, and by measuring this change in electrical current, an alarm can be generated at the required sensitivity. The amount of radiation in an ionisation smoke detector is extremely small, and is predominantly Alpha radiation, which is very weak and is easily blocked by a sheet of paper or a few centimetres of air. Ionisation smoke detectors are generally better at detecting smaller smoke particles, such as those produced by rapidly burning fires, but are less sensitive to the larger smoke particles generated by smouldering fires, etc.

Photoelectric (optical) smoke detectors: Detect the presence of smoke by means of a small light source and a separate photoelectric light sensitive cell housed within a sensing chamber. The sensing chamber is designed so that the light source and the photoelectric cell are mounted at acute angles to each other in separate sections of the chamber. Under normal circumstances, light from the light source travels along the chamber in a straight line and does not enter the section where the photoelectric cell is found. However, when smoke enters the chamber, the smoke particles scatter the light, causing some to travel towards the photoelectric the photoelectric cell. By measuring the amount of light reaching the photoelectric cell an alarm can be generated at the required sensitivity. Photoelectric smoke detectors are generally more sensitive to larger smoke particles, such as those generated by dense smoke or smouldering fires, but are less sensitive to small particles of smoke found in rapidly burning files.

Infrared smoke beams: Consist of two parts: an infrared transmitter unit and an infrared sensitive receiver. The system operates by projecting an infrared beam of light, which is invisible to the human eye, across the protected area. When the light becomes obscured by rising smoke, an alarm is generated.

Aspirating smoke detectors (ASD): Consist of a central detection unit that draws air through a network of pipes to detect smoke. It is based on a nephelometer that is capable of detecting the presence of smoke particles suspended in the air by detecting the light scattered by them in the chamber. For example, VESDA (Very Early Smoke Detection Alarm) systems, which are based on aspirating smoke detectors, are used for early warning applications where immediate response to a fire is critical.

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(2) Flame detection

Flame detectors are optical fire detection devices that are able to detect infrared and or ultraviolet radiation emitted from a flaming fire.

Ultraviolet (UV). The detectors operate at wavelengths shorter than 300 nm and can detect fires and explosion within 3-4 milliseconds;

Near Infra Red (IR) array. These detectors are also known as visual flame detectors. They employ flame recognition technology, analysing near IR radiation via the pixel array of a charged-couple device (CCD);

IR. These detectors operate in the IR spectral band. Hot gases emit a specific spectral pattern which can be sensed with a thermal imaging camera (TIC);

UV/IR. These detectors compare signals in the UV range with signals in the IR range to minimise false alarms;

IR/IR. These detectors compare signals in two IR ranges;

−−−− IR3. The compared signals originate in three different IR spectral regions, allowing the detector to distinguish non flame IR sources and flames that emit CO2:

−−−− Visible sensors. In some detectors a visible light spectrum sensor is added to improve the detection range and minimise false alarms.

(3) Fire detection

The purpose of fire detection is to identify a developing fire emergency in a timely manner, to alert facility occupants / potential casualties and the fire brigade. Depending on the anticipated fire scenario, facility and use, number and type of occupants, and criticality of contents and mission, these systems fill several main functions: Firstly, they provide a means to identify a developing fire through either manual or automatic methods; and secondly, they alert building occupants to the fire and to the need to evacuate. Another common function is the transmission of an alarm notification signal to the fire brigade or other emergency responders. They may also shut down electrical, HVAC systems or special process operations, and may be used to initiate automatic suppression systems.

A linear heat detector is a cable that detects heat conditions anywhere along its length. It is available in a range of alarm temperatures and jacket models to suit a vast array of fire detection applications. Linear heat detectors are widely used for detection in tunnels.

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Figure 2-17: Examples of smoke, flame, fire detectors, linear heat and ASD (from upper left,

clockwise)

Control panels

The control panel is the brain of the fire detection and alarm system. It is responsible for monitoring the various alarm input devices, such as manual and automatic detection components, and then activating alarm output devices and building controls. Control panels may range from simple units with a single input and output zone, to complex computer driven systems that monitor several buildings over an entire area. There are two main control panel arrangements: conventional and addressable.

−−−− Conventional, or point wired fire detection and alarm systems, were for many years the standard method for providing emergency signalling. In a conventional system, one or more circuits are routed through the protected space or building. Along each circuit, one or more detection devices are placed. Selection and placement of these detectors is dependent upon a variety of factors, including the need for automatic or manual initiation, ambient temperature and environmental conditions, the anticipated type of fire, and the desired speed of response. One or more device types are commonly located along a circuit to address a variety of needs and concerns.

When a fire breaks out, one or more detectors will operate. This action closes the circuit, which the fire control panel recognizes as an emergency condition. The panel will then activate one or more signaling circuits to sound building alarms and summon emergency help. The panel may also send the signal to another alarm panel so that it can be monitored from a remote point.

In a conventional alarm system, all alarm initiating and signaling is accomplished by the system’s hardware, which includes multiple sets of wire, various closing and opening relays and assorted diodes. Because of this arrangement, these systems are actually monitoring and controlling circuits, and not individual devices.

−−−− Addressable or intelligent systems represent the current state of the art in fire detection and alarm technology. Unlike conventional alarm methods, these systems monitor and control the capabilities of each alarm initiating and signalling device through microprocessors and systems software. Similarly to conventional systems, the address system consists of one or more circuits that radiate throughout the space or building. Also similarly to standard systems, one or more alarm initiating devices may be located along these circuits. The major difference between system types involves the way in which each device is monitored. In an addressable system, each initiating device is given a specific identification or address. This address is correspondingly programmed into the control panel’s memory with information such as the type of device, its location, and specific response details, such as which alarm devices are to be activated.

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The control panel’s microprocessor sends a constant interrogation signal over each circuit, in which each initiating device is contacted to inquire its status (normal or emergency). This active monitoring process occurs in rapid succession, providing system updates every 5 to 10 seconds.

The addressable system also monitors the condition of each circuit, identifying any faults that may occur. One of the advancements offered by these systems is their ability to specifically identify where a fault has developed. Therefore, instead of merely showing a fault along a wire, they will indicate the location of the problem. This permits faster diagnosis of the problem, allowing quicker repair and return to normal.

The main disadvantage of addressable systems is that each system has its own unique operating characteristics. Therefore, technicians must be trained to service the specific system.

Figure 2-18: Examples of control panels

2.5.1.2. Active/passive fire protection

(1) Active fire suppression

Fire suppression systems shall be used in conjunction with smoke detectors and fire alarm systems to enhance passenger safety. Fire sprinklers and gaseous agents are principal types of fire suppression means. Such systems are required to meet the following standards - UNE EN 12845 and UNE 23500.

Fire sprinklers. Fire sprinklers are fire suppression devices that release water upon the detection of the effect of fire, such as increased temperature. Sprinklers are essentially nozzles connected to a pipe network that contains pressurised water. The sprinkler is held closed either by a heat sensitive glass bulb or a two part metal link. These prevent the water from flowing out until the ambient temperature reaches the defined activation value. Each sprinkler is individually activated when the temperature in the surrounding area increases, so that the number of sprinklers activated is limited to those near the fire, thus maintaining maximal water pressure over the fire source. The quick response sprinkler is a special kind of fire sprinkler that operates at higher pressure and has a higher discharge capacity.

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Gaseous suppression. Gaseous fire suppression indicates the use of inert gases and chemical agents to extinguish a fire. The system typically consists of the agent, agent storage containers, the agent release valve, agent delivery piping and agent dispersion nozzles. This system is connected to both the fire alarm and fire detection systems. The agent uses extinguishes the fire through: −−−− Reduction or isolation of fuel;

−−−− Reduction of heat;

−−−− Reduction or isolation of oxygen;

−−−− Inhibition of the chain reaction.

There are two methods through which the extinguishing agent can be applied:

−−−− Total flooding: The agent is applied to a three dimensional enclosed space in order to achieve adequate concentration. This can be done automatically.

−−−− Local application: The agent is applied directly either onto a fire (usually a two dimensional area) or in the volume surrounding the fire.

Some suppression agents and CO2 in particular, present a risk of suffocation. To avoid this risk, an audible and visible alarm is activated and the agent is released only after a preset period of time. The release of gas can also cause an increase in pressure that is sufficient to shatter glass and break walls. Therefore, when employing such systems, measures must be taken to adequately protect people and structures.

In order to avoid suffocation, the risk level is classified depending on the agent and the concentration. When using a gaseous suppression system, it is mandatory to use either a NOAEL (No Observed Adverse Effect Level) agent or LOAEL (Lowest Observed Adverse Effect Level) agent.

Such systems are specified by the regulations NFPA 2001 – Standard for clean agent fire extinguishing systems, UL 2166 – Standard for Halocarbon Clean Agent Extinguishing Systems Units and ISO 14520 – Gaseous Fire Extinguishing Systems.

Some examples of these fire suppression systems include HFC125//FE-13 TM, HFC-227ea//FM 200 and HFC 236FA//FE 36 gaseous suppression systems.

Fire extinguishers. Fire extinguishers are active fire protection devices used to extinguish or control small fires. They principally consist of a hand held cylindrical pressure vessel containing a fire suppression agent. Typical suppression agents are:

−−−− Dry chemicals: Powder-based agents that prevent chemical reactions and halt the production of fire sustaining substances;

−−−− Foams: Foam forms a frothy blanket and seals the fire, preventing the oxygen from reaching it;

−−−− Water: To cool the burning substances;

−−−− Cleaning agents and carbon dioxide: Agents that displace oxygen remove heat from the combustion zone or inhibit chemical reactions.

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−−−− Water mist systems: These systems release fine water sprays in which 99% of the spray volume comprises drops with diameters of less than 1000 microns. Compared to the gaseous agent systems and sprinklers, this fire suppression system has demonstrated advantages, such as no toxicity and asphyxiation problems, no environmental problems, low system cost, limited or no water damage and high efficiency in suppressing certain fires. This system operates similarly to a sprinkler system, and its effectiveness depends on the spray characteristic and its suitability to the fire scenario. Water mist systems are specified in Standard FM5560.

(2) Passive fire protection (PFP)

PFP aims to contain the fire or decrease its spread through use of fire-resistant walls, floors and doors by maintaining the temperature of the protected side at 550°C (the critical temperature for structural st eel), and either at 140°C or below in case of walls, floo rs, and electrical circuits required to have a fire-resistance rating. Two types of PFP are relevant for structural steel fire protection:

Intumescent fire protection. A layer of paint is applied as part of the coating. The layer thickness depends on the structural steel used. Due to their relatively thin layer, attractive finish and anti-corrosive nature, intumescent coatings are preferred from both aesthetics and performance perspectives.

Vermiculite. Structural steel is covered with a very thick layer of vermiculite materials. It is an economic solution; however, an aesthetically unattractive one. Moreover, it is inadequate for protecting corrosive environments.

During a fire, if the steel reaches the critical temperature, the PFP will not be able to prevent the steel structure from collapsing, only delay it.

Figure 2-19: Examples of fire sprinklers (left), gaseous suppression tanks (middle) and fire

extinguishers (right)

(3) Smoke control systems

Transport interchange stations can be equipped with smoke extraction facilities, smoke suppression systems and pressurisation systems for fire escapes. It is also possible to control the fire's development and the spread of smoke by installing water curtains.

Fans and ducts must be fire resistant (F400120, 400ºC for two hours for the fans, and E120, for two hours for the ducts);

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Tunnels must have a longitudinal ventilation system;

Pressurisation of stairs - the fire escape stairs can include a pressurisation system to stop smoke from entering in the event of a fire. Air supply fans are activated from the fire control centre in the event of a fire alarm.

The pressurisation of staircases is specified is specified in standard EN 12101-6 –Station or terminal: Class D and NFPA-92 Standard for Smoke Control Systems. When designing a pressurisation system, it is necessary to take into account the air leakage of the system, which can be calculated according to the regulations mentioned above.

Smoke extraction – It is very useful to also install a smoke extraction system that includes extractor fans capable of withstanding smoke at 400ºC for a period of two hours. These extractor fans are activated from the fire control centre in the event of an alarm. The smoke extraction system should be installed in combination with water curtains to retain the smoke.


The functionalities and usage of the fire and smoke detection and fire extinguishing systems include:

Detection and protection from fire and smoke in public areas;

Detection and protection from fire and smoke in non public areas – electrical sub-systems, technical equipment rooms, offices and building systems rooms.

The fire detection systems are connected to the station control room, the command and control centre and the fire brigade control centre – as usually required by law.

Fire protection can be further enhanced through the architectural design of the building, by creating areas that can be (easily / quickly) isolated. Architectural design can also aid the easy evacuation of people, as well as prevent fires and smoke from spreading.

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3. PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEMS 3.1. PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEMS (PIS) 3.1.1. Technology overview

The PIS system comprises part of the signalling architecture, whose purpose is to provide passengers and staff personnel with up-to-date information. The system is connected to the railway network in order to make information on the location of vehicles available in real time from the signalling system, and to inform users when a train is approaching or entering the station. The information can be exchanged through displays or wall screens installed in stations.

From the perspective of the security and safety operation, the PIS is used to increase awareness to potential threats (for example, to unattended baggage) and to display instructions to the public in the event of a security or safety incident.

A possible architecture of a PIS system is depicted in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1: PIS General block diagram architecture

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In each station, the operator workstation will allow the monitoring of the train status from the control room and enable, when required, special messages to be displayed (e.g., information or alerts) in a centralised or isolated mode.

Figure 3-2: Examples of passenger information systems


The system will make data from the network available for display via the following steps:

Train information received from the signalling system is stored and processed in the PIS database server, in order to be translated into commands for the information panel/displays;

The displays receive information from the network and show the data. The displays always send back an acknowledgement signal to confirm the receipt of the command; in case of a malfunction, the displays send an alarm signal to the network, with a failure expansion code;

The operators can also switch to manual mode and write special messages onto displays.

The status of the train system can be accessible from a web terminal as well, which allows access to data regarding each station, each train or even track the train's position on the railway map. Access can be achieved from a PC connected to the railway network, or via the Internet, using protection algorithms and access control systems.

Since users may belong to different "groups", different levels of access will be foreseen. As an example it is possible to define three categories:

Admin: Full control and full access to data exchanged on the PIS system in read/write mode;

Operator: Full access to data transferred to the PIS system in "read" mode, with specific authorisation to control a set of functionalities in "write" mode;

User: Read access only, to specific data (e.g., train position, delays…).

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3.2. PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS (PA) 3.2.1. Technology overview

The PA system provides stations with an intelligible and reliable audio distribution system suitable for security paging, routine paging and background music distribution. The system is split into several distributed sub-systems, one for each station, all along the line.

Figure 3-3: PA system at a station – block diagram architecture

Each sub-system is independent, but remains linked with the main control room and with the other sub-systems. This architecture increases the reliability of the entire system; in fact, the interactions among the station systems are limited to the activities involving the operation control centre (OCC), which is able to page the underground stations and collect error-logs.

Through the network system, the OCC point has access to any or all underground stations. At the OCC, operators are able to broadcast microphone announcements by using a personal paging console linked to a PC that works as a control board. The same system records the paging announcements sent from the OCC operators to one or more underground station systems. Furthermore, the PCs at the OCC display and store the error and alarm logs received from all the underground station local systems. This allows the service to be centralised and makes it easier and more convenient.

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Figure 3-4 – PA main control room block diagram architecture


The PA system provides several functionalities both at the station and the operations control centre level. At the station level, the main functionalities that are provided include:

Transmitting emergency and routine announcements to the concourse and the platforms; selectively or generally;

Delivering emergency pre-recorded messages to a specific area;

Delivering several routine pre-recorded messages throughout the station itself;

Displaying the status of the local system, reporting any fault and emergency situation;

Transmitting security and routine announcements to the relevant platform and/or the station management room through the wall mounted microphones.

With regard to the OCC, the PA system is able to collect logs from each station and transmit messages, data and commands to them. The main functionalities at the OCC level are:

Transmitting emergency and routine announcements to the concourse and the platforms; selectively or generally;

Delivering EMERGENCY pre-recorded messages to any area and sub-area;

Locally recording, selecting and transmitting messages to any of the stations;

Displaying the status of the local systems, reporting faults and emergency situations;

Supporting the control and supervision activities.

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4. BUILDING MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 4.1. BUILDING AUTOMATION AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT 4.1.1. Overview of building automation and energy management system 4.1.1.1. Backup power generation

Major mainline stations typically use double-power or medium-tension power systems, powered from different circuits’ rings, each with a minimum simultaneous supply capacity of 100% the power. Stations will also maintain an uninterrupted backup power supply (UPS), and in some cases, backup generators to maintain essential services during a power cut or the loss of a substation. A backup system will maintain services such as:

At least one-third of normal lighting;

All the information, management and safety systems;

Train control systems;

Communications and public announcement systems;

Ventilation;

Fire prevention equipment;

Plumbing pumping tanks.

Most UPS backup systems are battery powered, with the batteries continuously trickle charged whilst the mains supply is operational, and then, upon loss or interruption of the mains supply, the battery system takes over. Battery systems have the capacity to maintain power for only a few hours. Battery degradation also necessitates the costly replacement of batteries every couple of years. However, the battery powered UPS systems maintain power long enough to bridge any momentary power interruptions, or allow time for backup generators to be started, if the power interruption is expected to last a longer period of time.

Fuel cell UPS systems are now regularly being installed to provide backup to offices and Internet server farms. They provide the dual benefits of rapid start-up and the ability to run for longer periods of time, potentially replacing the battery systems and diesel generators with one system.

UPS systems, communications equipment and control rooms should be physically secured to prevent unauthorised access.

4.1.1.2. Emergency lighting

Emergency lighting is provided for use when the normal supply fails in order to allow for safe evacuation or to allow for the shutdown any potentially dangerous processes. Emergency lighting should continue to supply lighting for a minimum of 3 hours in the event of loss of mains power and can be powered either by an internal battery in the light unit itself or from a centralised battery backup system. Each system has advantages and disadvantages and generally cost analysis and risk assessment can be used to specify which is to be installed. A self-contained emergency light has the advantage that installation is faster and installation costs will be lower, maintenance costs are reduced and it is easy to expand the system. Also in an emergency a self-contained system is not dependant on external cabling which may fail is fire scenario.

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However, self-contained units do require regular testing of each individual unit and replacement of the individual batteries every 2-4 years, testing frequencies are specified in EU draft standard prEN 50172[R10]. Central battery systems have the benefit of only having to test one battery location and easier replacement of the battery which can also have longer lives of 5-25 years depending upon the type, a centralised battery solution can also be cheaper in terms of battery costs, however, all cabling must be fire resistant and a single failure of the cabling can disable the whole system [R11].

Self-illuminating signs are a cheap and effective method for providing emergency exit signage to be used in conjunction with emergency lighting. Self-illuminating strips are also an effective method for demarking doorways and obstacles that may hinder an effective evacuation. Floor strips are also effective to provide a guide in thick smoke scenarios.

British Standard BS 5266: Part 1: 2011 sets out the guidelines for design of emergency lighting for public spaces, exit signage is also specified is specified in the EU Signs Directive or BS 5499 Pt.1, self luminated signs are specified by the regulations S 5499 Pt.1: 1990 (1995).

Figure 4-1: Examples of emergency lighting – self-illuminating emergency exit sign (left),

self-powered emergency light (middle) and self-powered emergency exit sign (right)

Area Lighting level (lux)

Waiting and transit for passengers 600

Entrances to ramps 500

Offices 500

Technical facilities 300

Vehicle areas 100

Table 3: Minimum normal lighting levels according to UNE 23033/34/35

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Emergency lighting should as a minimum provide one-third of the normal lighting levels, with a uniformity of 20%. Emergency lighting is grouped by area into independent circuits with common circuit breakers. As a result, should one circuit breaker fall, the zone’s emergency lighting will be activated.

The minimum values for emergency lighting depend on the area illuminated, as follows:

Emergency escapes: 5 lux.

Fire protection equipment: 10 lux.

General background lighting: 3 lux.

The types of illumination used, depending on the type of area illuminated, will be:

Passenger areas: lighting built into a false ceiling with minimum IP 44/class I protection, with fluorescent lamps with electronic reactance. The temperature colour of the lamp will be between 3,300 and 5,300 ºK (white light).

Technical facilities: surface lighting with minimum IP 65/class I protection, equipped with fluorescent lamps and electronic reactance. The diffuser will be injection-moulded from transparent polycarbonate.

Evacuation routes: surface lighting with minimum IP 65/class I protection, equipped with fluorescent lamps and electronic reactance. The crossing points of evacuation routes in the bus areas will be reinforced with brighter levels of help and emergency lighting. The diffuser will be injection moulded from transparent polycarbonate.

Tunnels and access ramps: wall mounted lighting with IP 65/class I protection, equipped with sodium vapour lamps. Furthermore, signal lighting with IP 65 protection and a fluorescent lamp and electronic resistance will be installed.

In all areas there will be emergency lighting, using a minimum surface IP of 65, and 300, 150 or 85 lumens according to the surface.

The type of screen chosen should be one that is easy to clean.

4.1.1.3. Plumbing

Plumbing systems should have pressure-reduction valves and self-cleaning filters, all of which will have a by-pass facility for maintenance purposes.

The plumbing pressure system should be installed in a separate, isolated room, to which only the maintenance team will have authorised access, with access authorisations to the members of the maintenance team only, managed by an entrance control system. A frequency regulator should be installed in the electric circuit board in order to reduce electricity consumption. The frequency regulator will consist of pumps, each of which will be able to simultaneously provide some of the maximum forecast flow, with one serving as a reserve pump. The pumps will be alternated in order to extend the life cycle of all their components.

The main water supply should include a bypass mechanism to maintain the pressure required for the system's proper functioning. This mechanism / device will be closed at least twice a day for two hours, to refresh the water in the tanks.

The water reserve tanks must be sufficient to guarantee a minimum consumption of two days.

A system that analyses the chemical composition of the water that is stored in the tanks can be incorporated into the water supply system, as well as a treatment system that maintains quality parameters within the values established in current regulations.

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It is recommended that the entire internal installation will use triple-layer polypropylene pipes, S 3.2 (SDR 7.4), soldered through implementation of polyfusion methods, or an electrical sleeve, meeting UNE 53-380 and to DIN 8077/1997 specifications. Hydro-pneumatic pressure flush valves should be installed in each toilet unit.

All the areas must have water supplies for fire fighting (sprinklers, water curtains, fire hose cabinets and water atomisers).

Pipes that pass through fire zones must use intumescent fire-stop jackets in accordance with standard UNE 23802-79.

The rainwater, cleaning and drainage networks will have a sediment settling box and a hydrocarbon separator prior to external discharge.

4.1.2. Functionalities and usage Emergency illumination and power backup systems must be used in all enclosed station environments to allow safe operation and possibly evacuation during a power failure or an emergency. Emergency illumination systems are legally required in public spaces. Plumbing systems can be used to provide continuous water supply, which is critical for some applications, for example, in fire systems, or as a cooling fluid for machinery. These systems are to be separate from the regular water supply. In most cases, a loss of the domestic water supply will create operational problems, but it is rarely critical.

4.2. HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING (HVA C) 4.2.1. Technology overview 4.2.1.1. HVAC in mainline stations

Most European mainline railway stations provide only natural ventilation in the main public areas. Heating and sometimes air-conditioning is limited to waiting rooms, café areas and retail outlets and ticket offices. Heating and air-conditioning is also provided to staff areas.

Typically, a fan coil hydronic system is used for this purpose. Fan Coil systems are either 2-pipe or 4-pipe. The 2 or 4-pipe designation refers to the water distribution system serving the climate control equipment.

2-pipe Fan Coil System , fan coil units served by a 2-pipe system contain only one coil, which serves as the heating and cooling coil, and thus 1 supply pipe and 1 return pipe. The facility is either entirely in the cooling mode or entirely in the heating mode. During certain times of the year, it is not uncommon to have alternating hot and cold spells, the 2-pipe systems cannot handle simultaneous heating and cooling and an entire building must be converted, the change from heating mode to cooling mode can take several hours before there is a noticeable difference, which might cause some occupant discomfort.

4-pipe Fan Coil System , it has two separate water loops: one for heated water and one for chilled water. This allows both systems to operate simultaneously for hot water and chilled water pipes in each fan coil unit, thus allowing both systems to operate simultaneously for those times when some parts of the building need to be heated and other parts need to be cooled. Additionally, there is no seasonal switchover needed. It is easier to switch between heating and cooling when the outdoor temperature is unstable.

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Figure 4-2: Example of 2-pipe Fan Coil System

Direct expansion systems , especially those which operate with variable refrigerant flow (VRF). In these VRF systems, the refrigerant flow in the compressor and the expansion valve is regulated in order to adjust the capacity system to the demand. Among the direct expansion systems, the heat recovery units (HRU) are considered to operate at a higher energy efficiency level.

In a HVAC system, it is necessary to extract air from the building and to introduce fresh air in order to renovate it. The extracted air is at the desired comfort level, humidity and temperature; but the outside air is quite likely to be at a different condition from the required comfort zone condition and it has to be treated for turning its initial condition into the desired comfort level. So, the heat recovery units’ operation principle is to take the energy that is necessary for this change from the extracted air. These systems reduce operating costs by transferring energy, which would typically be wasted, through different areas of the building.

Figure 4-3: Heat Recovery Unit

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4.2.1.2. Metro systems and underground stations

Metro systems typically require ventilation systems for two main purposes; safety, to remove smoke during a fire and control the fire, and also for the purpose of passenger comfort.

Passenger comfort. Older metro systems rely on the piston mechanism of the trains travelling through the tunnels to drive air down ventilation shafts and circulate air through the tunnels and platform areas, in order to counter the heat generated by the traction motors, braking, lighting and people. However, as metro systems have become more congested and if trains stop running the temperature can become extremely uncomfortable.

Modern metro systems are often fitted with a forced air ventilation system to aid passenger comfort, usually consisting of using an air supply duct and extract duct and a jet fan system to force the ventilation flows.

Figure 4-4: Examples of metro ventilation systems - proposed ventilation system for RER[R10] (left) and "Design of a modern subway ventilation system" [R11] (right)

Air quality in metro stations should meet the following requirements (Table 4).

Parameter Limits

Temperature 15ºC – 25ºC

Relative humidity 30% – 65%

Air circulation Standard UNE EN 13779.2005 stipulates that air flow will be a maximum of 12 renewals per hour, or 12.5 litres per person for the forecasted number of occupants in fires

Carbon dioxide (CO2) Standard UNE EN 13779.2005 stipulates that this cannot exceed 600 ppm under any circumstances

Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) Standard UNE EN 13779.2005 stipulates that this will be the lower between 1 ppm and 50% more than the concentration in the exterior

Carbon monoxide (CO) Standard UNE EN 13779.2005 stipulates that this cannot exceed 25 ppm under any circumstances

Table 4: Air quality parameters in metro stations

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For example, in a new underground transport area, the external air should be treated before being released onto the platform. This treatment can be performed using an adiabatic treatment unit with air filter and humidifier panels. This system combats thermal loads and reduces pollutant ingress. The air flow provided by the system has to be variable, to ensure maximum energy efficiency. A system properly installed can achieve 12 renovations per hour.

The monitoring and control of these parameters ensure that the internal environmental qualities are maintained. This is not only important for maintaining comfort conditions, but greatly influences the safety of the station.

There is a combined detection system for carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxides. The sensors have an inlet equipped with a filter, and are evenly distributed throughout the space of the underground station. Another option consists of opacity measurement equipment based on sample aspiration and progressive dispersion of light

The technical facilities area must be ventilated by extraction and air supply to ensure the dissipation of heat from areas where it tends to build up, and to guarantee that all equipment works properly. It is also necessary to remove the polluting particles from the transport area.

4.2.1.3. Air conditioning

The thermal hygrometric conditions in air conditioned areas should be within the following limits:

Summer: 25ºC 50% RH

Winter: 20ºC 50% RH

In addition to maintaining these conditions, air in the climate controlled areas must be constantly renewed, with six renewals per hour and an energy saving heat and humidity recovery system.

A frequently used system is a production plant that consists of air-water heat pumps, with an inertial tank to limit the number of times the main equipment comes into operation. Water distribution from the production centre to the areas of use is executed through black steel tubes that originate in the hydraulics room, in which all the circulation pumps, valves, inertial tanks, etc., are located.

The design of the secondary circuits, those distributing water for their end-use (air conditioning plant, fan coils), is to be based on a range of timetables to enable production and distribution to be matched to energy demand.

A management system is very useful to minimise the energy consumed by the installations during operations, and thus increase the system’s efficiency. A further measure that minimises energy consumption is the provision of fans with frequency regulators that constantly adjust their performance according to actual demand, thus reducing the energy used by the motor to the level necessary for achieving the established comfort standard. This kind of system facilitates the management of heating and cooling production in order to maximise performance, and balances the workload of the equipment.

The design should ensure air treatment unit, which is responsible for:

Collecting external air;

Filtering external air;

Returning air from the treated area;

Recovering heat from the extracted air;

Heating and cooling in the water plant;

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Final filtering;

Channelling the air to the area treated.

The external air intakes should be located as far as possible from traffic and equipped with G4 pre-filters and humidity, temperature and NO2 probes.

Each air treatment unit should distribute air to the treated area through galvanised steel pipes driven by rotary diffusers. In order to monitor air quality, probes will be evenly distributed throughout the area (every 300 metres) to measure NO2, CO2, and temperature and humidity readings.

An alternative design involves a system to maintain a higher pressure in the passenger area than on the platforms, in order to avoid polluting particles from entering the passenger areas.

A system for supplying external air and extracting used air should be installed in the area intended for complementary use by passengers, such as shops and cafes.

4.2.1.4. Air conditioning in operational and emergency situations.

In emergency situations involving a fire, the forced air extraction system can be used to remove the smoke and the heat generated by the fire. In order to stop smoke from spreading, curtains should be used to compartmentalise the floors and sections within them. In addition, passages to the tunnels must be also closed.

4.2.1.5. Smoke and fire control.

Ventilation and pressurisation systems should be used to ensure safe exit routes from a metro tunnel or station, by drawing smoke out of the station and allowing people to see their way during evacuation. Such systems can be triggered to start automatically through the metro’s fire alarm system. European Standard EN 12101 for Emergency Smoke and Heat Control Equipment specifies the requirements for tunnel ventilation equipment for smoke and heat control [R14]. Such ventilation systems should be designed to be heat resistant (F400120, 400ºC for two hours for the fans, and E120, two hours for the ducts) to allow operation during fire events.

Water curtains can also be implemented to control the fire's development and the spreading of the smoke.

4.2.1.6. Ventilation systems designed for security

The impact of fire has already been discussed above; however, it is important that ventilation systems are also designed to protect against other malicious attacks. Ventilation systems present a potential point of vulnerability to chemical, biological and radiation attacks, air intakes can be used as a method for introducing particulates or gases which will then be dispersed throughout the building. The air intakes should be positioned above ground level and preferably at roof level wherever possible, the inlet should be designed to prevent contamination materials being dropped into the air inlet and if inlets are positioned on a roof the roof access should be secured [R15].

Ventilation systems can be further improved with chemical and biological filters and scrubber systems which can remove harmful substances before they enter the building space. Analyser systems can be installed to detect chemical releases as they direct all of the air into a common system it means that one analyser can monitor for a release and the ventilation system can respond as necessary, increasing extraction to dilute concentration and raise an alert.

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Figure 4-5: Protecting Outdoor Air Intakes (left) and Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) chemical

detector designed for installation in HVAC Systems (right)


Heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems are generally not used in mainline stations in the main passenger areas, these spaces are usually very large and airy in the ticket hall areas and often open to the environment around the station platforms, this makes temperature control expensive and largely unnecessary, also most passengers arrive at a station dressed in outdoor clothing reducing the need for heating systems.

Areas which do tend to be heated or air conditioned are retail outlets and waiting rooms, and staff areas where the spaces are enclosed and people may be located for longer periods of time, these areas will use standard HVAC systems as used in office or shopping spaces.

The spaces in underground metro systems are a much more confined therefore the requirements for ventilation systems are higher and they are generally included in new underground metro stations to provide cooling, to mitigate against the heat and humidity generated by people and the metro trains, as well as providing a circulation of fresh air to the passengers. Also smoke extraction units in air pressurization facilities can be used to provide clear pathways of escape during a fire event, removing smoke from metro station and tunnels or preventing smoke ingression into protected areas.

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5. THREAT DETECTION SYSTEMS 5.1. TECHNOLOGIES FOR PASSENGER SCREENING 5.1.1. Technology overview

(1) Point detection of weapons and illegal items de tection

Walkthrough and hand-held metal detectors. These devices detect metal objects. A coil, through which pulses of electrical current are sent, generates a magnetic field that expands and collapses hundreds to 1,000 times per second. This collapse generates an eddy current that changes when a metal object is hit by the pulse and produces an electrical field of its own, setting off an alarm. Walk-through and hand-held detectors are based on the same principle; though the former is used to detect metal objects carried on the entire body, while the latter – in a limited area (pocket, etc.).

Figure 5-1: Walk-through metal detector & hand-held metal detector

(2) Imaging portals (Active MMW and X-Ray backscatt er)

Active MMW Portal. The sensing mechanism in these systems is based on the use of active millimetre waves, which are transmitted towards the person being checked; these are common radio-frequency signals that reflect off objects at extremely low power levels. These signals pass through the various layers of clothing the person is wearing, however do not penetrate the body. The reflected signals are received by the system's sensors, and are processed to produce an image. Since the advanced systems scan the body, covering between 270° and its full circumference, a 3D image is produced.

X-Ray Backscatter . This technology is highly effective in detecting organic (explosives, ceramic weapons and narcotics, etc.), as well as inorganic materials (metal, etc.), while protecting the screened individuals' privacy. It is based on the scattering of photons from charged particles (Compton scattering). When beams hit these materials, a backscatter image is produced, and is then analyzed by advanced image processing software, enabling the operator to identify the nature of the concealed threat.

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Figure 5-2: Active MMW imaging system (left), X-ray backscatter (middle and explosive trace

portal (right)

(3) Explosives detection

Explosives Trace Portal (ETP). ETP detects particles of explosives that are freed by air flowing downward along the screened individual's body. These are sucked into slots at the bottom of the portal, pass through an SSP (Sandia screen preconcentrator) and are subsequently sent to an IMS (Ion Mobility Spectrometer) detector for identification. ETP detects sub-fingerprint amounts of key high explosives with a field tested result of less than 1% false alarm rate, when screening 5 persons/min.

Quadruple Resonance (QR). QR technology is used to detect explosives and metals concealed in the shoes of persons standing on the scanner pad within 2-3 seconds. Radio frequency excites the atoms found in the above materials, and a detector indicates their presence with a red light, or their absence – with a green light. The high detection speed renders QR ideal for processing large numbers of people quickly, thus eliminating queues.

(4) Standoff detection

Passive Millimetre Wave (MMW). Each substance has its own distinct level of energy emissivity and reflectivity. MMW have relatively large wavelengths, which can penetrate clothing. MMW cameras detect the emitted and reflected MMW energy. Due to the difference in the emissivity of the human body and that of denser substances (metals, plastics, composites, etc.), MMW cameras distinguish between the above potentially threatening substances (even when concealed under clothing), displaying them as a black image against the background of the human body.

THZ imaging. THz imaging technology is used to identify various substances based on their characteristic transmission or reflectivity spectra in the THz range. THz energy can penetrate clothing, but is safely dissipated in the first 100 µm of skin tissue. Therefore, substances that can be classified as potentially threatening (such as metal and ceramics, which are used to manufacture weapons), can be identified, even when concealed under clothing, and displayed on the background of the human body.

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THz Spectroscopy. One proposed solution for locating, detecting and characterizing concealed threats is to use THz electromagnetic waves to spectroscopically detect and identify concealed materials through their characteristic transmission or reflectivity spectra in the range of 0.5–10 THz. For example, many explosives (for example, C-4, HMX, RDX and TNT) and illegal drugs (for example, methamphetamine) have characteristic transmission/reflection spectra in the THz range that could be distinguishable from other materials such as clothing, coins and human skin. Using THz spectroscopy it should be possible to detect explosives or drugs even if they are concealed, since the THz radiation is readily transmitted through plastics, clothing, luggage, paper products and other non-conductive (non-metallic) materials.

Figure 5-3: Passive MMW camera

5.2. TECHNOLOGIES FOR PASSENGERS & BAGGAGE SCREENIN G 5.2.1. Technology overview

Explosive detection may be classified into two major categories: bulk, and trace. Bulk detection relates to macroscopic quantities of explosives that appear on X-ray scanner images and can therefore be directly detected.

Trace detection is far more complicated, as it entails a chemical-based identification of residual traces of explosives. These traces may appear in the form of vapour and/or as particulate. Although such traces will activate an alarm, they do not necessarily indicate the presence of a threat (the object screened may have been contaminated with explosive material, even under totally legal circumstances). Moreover, even the use of nitroglycerine tablets by people suffering from heart disease will trigger an alarm.

Vapour Pressures of Explosives. All solid and liquid substances release vapour, at varying amounts, at all temperatures above -273 °C (absolut e zero). The amount of vapour released at a particular temperature is characteristic of the particular substance, and can therefore be used to identify it.

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Particulate Contamination. Particulate contamination refers to microscopic solid particles, often amounting to several micrograms. Persons handling explosive material will easily become contaminated, due to the oily, rather sticky nature of these materials, and will most likely transfer these particles to other objects they touch, such as their clothing, items they are carrying, etc. When checking for particulate contamination, objects and surfaces are wiped with a special pad, which is then analyzed by the device, quickly revealing whether traces of explosives are present. As only minute quantities are required to provide a clear indication, this technique is extremely effective for various applications. It should be noted, however, that the direct contact involved may be regarded as an invasion of privacy when used to screen people.

Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS). IMS, the most extensively utilized trace detection technology, a spectrometer detects explosive material vapour or airborne particulate matter. Ambient air is drawn into the spectrometer's ionization region, where ions are generated. These ions then enter the instrument's drift region, where they are drawn toward a collection plate at its far end.

The ions' travel time from one end of this region to the other, referred to as the drift time, is characteristic of the ion's size, mass and charge. The IMS spectrum produced is a plot of ion current vs. time, with peaks corresponding to the specific ions, which are thus identified.

Chemiluminescence. The majority of explosive compounds contain either nitro (NO2) or nitrate (NO3) groups. The presence of NO2 is shared with compounds often used in plastic explosives as taggants. Chemiluminescence-based detectors detect the IR light of a characteristic frequency that is emitted from electronically excited NO2 molecules when they decay to form unexcited NO2 molecules. The signal output measured is directly proportionate to the quantity of NO, enabling the detection of explosives, although not to distinguish between various types of explosive materials.

Electron Capture Detectors (ECD). The ECD detects explosives with high electron affinities. In an ECD, a vapour sample drawn into the instrument is mixed with an inert carrier gas. Together, they pass through the instrument's ionization region to an exhaust line, flowing through a chamber containing a radioactive material that emits electrons. The standing current produced is characteristic of the gas mixture that had entered the instrument, enabling the presence of explosives to detect. However, to enable differentiation of one explosive material from another, it is necessary to use a gas chromatograph as a supplementary device.

Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) Sensors and Gas Chromat ography (GC). SAW sensors are commonly used in conjunction with a front end GC. The SAW sensor's main component is a piezoelectric crystal resonating at a specific, measurable frequency.

This frequency changes when molecules condense on its surface of this crystal; this change is affected by various factors, including the condensed substance's characteristics and the surface temperature, among others. In most systems, the GC exit gas is directed at the SAW crystal by way of a nozzle, whose temperature can be controlled, thus enabling the sensor to detect and distinguish between high and low vapour pressure explosives.

Thermo-Redox Detectors. Explosives molecules undergo thermal decomposition, which results in a reduction of NO2 groups. In a thermo-redox detector, the sampled air enters the instrument and flows through a concentrator tube, where the explosives vapour is adsorbed in a selective manner. The air sample subsequently undergoes pyrolyzation, the purpose of which is to free NO2 molecules, which are identified by the detector.

Field Ion Spectrometry (FIS). The basic principle of FIS involves the separation and quantification of ions as they flow in a gas at atmospheric pressure. Ions enter an analytical volume, where they drift to the length of the instrument and also oscillate in a generated asymmetric electric field. The DC and AC fields in the FIS detector can be set in order to enable

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only predetermined ions to travel through the analytical volume and arrive at the collection area, where they are detected. At the end of the process, FIS produces an ionogram, i.e., a spectrum of current vs. field intensity.

Mass Spectrometry (MS) . Mass spectrometry (MS) is basically a magnetic filtering technique, in which molecules are ionized and then travel through a magnetic filter, after which they can then be identified by their charge-to-mass ratio. Although MS is capable of providing an accurate, specific identification and is widely used in laboratories, it is much less suitable for field use. The technique is presented here for the sake of providing a comprehensive picture of explosive detection means.

Field Spray for Test Kit. This kit is attractive due to its ability to detect a wide range of explosives, coupled with its ease of use in the field (detection through a change of colour on test paper) and low cost. Each kit includes:

Figure 5-4: Hand-held and stationary trace detector (left and middle) & explosive and narcotics

spray test kit

5.3. TECHNOLOGIES FOR PASSENGERS & BAGGAGE SCREENIN G 5.3.1. Technology overview

Standard Transmission X-ray Systems. These systems are commonly used at airports, for screening hand luggage. Objects being screened are conveyed past the X-ray scanner on a conveyor belt; as a result, a black and white image is produced and displayed on the operator's screen. It should be noted that this technology is rather limited; it allows the operator to view and identify bomb making components, such as wires, detonators, etc., but does not identify explosive materials per se.

Dual Energy X-ray Systems. These more advanced systems are based on the comparison of the attenuation of X-ray beams at two energies, enabling to distinguish between different types of substances according to their Z values. Colour-coding of specific Z values associated with

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explosive materials, metals, etc. further enhances the quick and easy identification of the substance in question.

Computed Tomography (CT). CT is a more advanced technology, in which three-dimensional X-ray images are formed by combining numerous images of two-dimensional "slices" of the object being scanned – enhancing detection. Furthermore, the Z number – and the explosive material associated with it – is identified.

X-Ray Diffraction (XRD) – X-Ray Scattering Technolo gy. X-ray diffraction is a versatile, non-destructive technique that reveals detailed information about the chemical composition and crystallographic structure of natural and manufactured materials. The principle of the technology is X-ray diffraction EDS (Explosives Detection System) based on a detector segments that collect the scatter signal of vertically adjacent volume cells (voxels) of the screened bag. Hence, this X-ray analysis technique is tomographic, or three-dimensionally resolving, its central segments of the detectors are used to measure the transmission spectra. Automatic evaluation of measured spectra is comprised of dedicated pre-processing, followed by a comparison with stored reference spectra of explosives or other illicit targeted material.

Figure 5-5: Dual energy X-ray, Inline & standalone CTX (upper right & bottom left) & X-ray

diffraction (bottom right)

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Explosive detection technologies are most often used for either general search purposes; or for screening individuals and individual items.

General search refers to searching a general area (such as a stadium, a building, etc.) in which there is reason to suspect explosives may be found. The method of choice in this case will most often be canine detection, due to the combination of high levels of effectiveness and mobility.

Screening individuals and individual items can be sub-classified into screening persons (for concealed explosives or other contraband); items they are carrying; items that are mailed or shipped; and vehicles. Screening persons may be further sub-classified into individuals or crowds; screening items is usually carried out in conjunction with the above, as it involves baggage, hand bags, etc. carried by them. Mailed or shipped items may include small parcels to containers, which are increasingly used to transport explosives and other illegal items. Similarly to screening persons, screening vehicles may involve either single vehicles (from private cars to large vehicles) or a large number of vehicles, at checkpoints.

5.4. DETECTION OF POISONOUS BY INHALATION HAZARDS ( PIH) – CHEMICALS AND TOXIC INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS (TIM)


(1) Point detection technologies

Given sufficient time, point detection technologies can be used to map contaminated areas and identify the type of chemical agent involved. Point detectors are placed up-wind of area in which the first responders operate; thus, a chemical agent will first reach the detector, alerting the responders to its presence. However, if the concentration of these agents is at a life-threatening level, these technologies may not provide ample time to implement the necessary protective measures.

Point detectors can also be used for contamination triage purposes, enabling to provide decontamination and medical services and invest resources in the most effective manner.

Ionisation/Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS). An IMS-based detector usually operates as a stand-alone system, using an air pump to sample the environment; liquid samples must therefore be transformed into vapour. Portable IMS detectors ionize the sampled air (most often using radioactive Beta emitters for this purpose); the sample then travels through a weak electric field to a detector.

The travel time is a function of the chemical's mass, and is therefore used to identify it; an indication of the concentration is also given. The IMS-based detector provides results within several seconds up to several minutes.

Flame Photometry . Flame photometry is a sensitive technology that allows direct air sampling, and is particularly effective for the detection of nerve agents (which contain phosphorus and sulphur) and mustard (which contains sulphur). The technology involves the burning of ambient air with hydrogen gas, to decompose chemical agents and detect the presence of hydrogen phosphorus oxygen (HPO) and sulphur (S), which are produced by compounds containing phosphorus and sulphur, respectively. The characteristic light emitted by phosphorus and sulphur indicates their presence and concentration. The incidence of false alarms resulting from

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interferants can be reduced by implementing algorithms or using a gas chromatograph in conjunction with the flame photometry detector.

Infrared (IR) Spectroscopy . This technology is mainly used to identify organic and organometallic molecules. Every molecule has a distinct IR spectrum signature. IR spectroscopy measures a sample's mid-IR light absorption wavelength and intensity and thus identifies it. The 2 IR spectroscopy technologies utilised in point detectors are:

−−−− Photoacoustic Infrared Spectroscopy (PIRS). PIRS detectors are based on the principle that gas heats and expands as it absorbs IR radiation. Modulating the IR radiation will cause the gas sample to expand and contract; if the modulation frequency is in the audible range, the sound produced can be picked up by a microphone. To reduce the detection of interferants, a larger number of wavelengths may be used in succession.

−−−− Filter Based IR Spectrometry. In filter-based spectrometry, a narrow IR beam passes through the sample in a predetermined path, directed by mirrors and lenses; this process is repeated at up to 4 additional wavelengths. The measured results are stored, and the accumulated data is then analyzed to produce the detection results.

Electrochemistry. The available types of electrochemical detectors monitor either a change in electric potential resulting from the absorption of a chemical agent, or the increasing resistance of a thin film as it absorbs chemical agents from the air. These detectors are not as sensitive as some of the previously reviewed technologies; some are also less sensitive and selective in extreme temperatures.

Colorimetric or Colour Change Chemistry. This method is based on the fact that a specific agent's chemical reaction results in a change in colour, which therefore indicates its presence (or absence). As the test conducted involves a specific agent, this technique is usually used to verify the presence of an agent already detected by a different instrument. Detection means based on this method include detection paper, which is used to test liquids; and colorimetric tubes, which are used to test vapour and gas.

Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW). SAW detectors absorb chemical agents from the air into their piezoelectric crystals, which detect the vapour mass. The crystals are coated with chemically selective polymeric films, each absorbing a specific class of volatile compound. The change in mass of the coatings results in changes in the crystals' resonant frequency; these changes are monitored to produce response patterns, each specific to a chemical agent, which are then stored. Response patterns detected during the instrument's operation are compared with the stored pattern, and when a match is found an alarm is set off.

Photo Ionisation Detection (PID). In PID, a gas stream is exposed to a UV light with energy that is sufficient to ionize a chemical agent's molecules, if these are found in it. If ions are produced, a detector registers a voltage that is proportional to their number, which serves as an indication of the agent's concentration. The narrowness of the spectral range of the exciting UV light, and the degree to which the energy uniquely ionizes only the molecules sought, determine the detectors' specificity.

Sensor Array Technology (SAT). Sensor array technology (SAT) combines a number of different chemical sensors, implementing them concurrently to provide real-time detection capabilities. SAT is most commonly used in devices referred to as chemical noses.

Thermal and Electrical Conductivity. In these types of detectors, metal oxide thermal conductivity semiconductors measure the change in heat conductivity resulting from gas absorption. Additionally, the system measures the change in resistance and electrical conductivity when a gas adsorbs onto the surface of a metal film. As different agents have different thermal conductivities, the electrical responses they produce from thermal and electrical conductivity detectors are also different.

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Flame Ionisation Detector (FID). FIDs establish whether volatile carbon-based compounds that are incinerated in a hydrogen-oxygen flame are found in the sample. These detectors require supplementary instruments, such as a gas chromatograph, to identify specific agents.

(2) Standoff detectors (IR spectroscopy)

Standoff detectors, most often based on optimal spectroscopy, are designed to detect chemical agent clouds from a distance of up to 5 kilometres. This is done by comparing baseline, agent-free spectra with sample spectra. The results are interpreted by an operator, who requires some knowledge of spectroscopy. Two types of spectroscopy detectors – passive and active – are detailed below.

Passive (Forward Looking Infrared [FLIR], Fourier T ransform Infrared [FTIR]). Passive standoff detectors detect chemical agent vapour clouds by collecting emitted IR radiation and/or measuring IR radiation absorbed from the background. These detectors collect the IR radiation by implementing either Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) technology – in which optical filters are used; or Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR), which uses an interferometer.

Active (Differential Absorption LIDAR). Laser-based light detection and ranging (LIDAR) can be used to track a chemical agent cloud that had already been detected, however, not to identify one. It operates in a manner similar to that of radar. A pulsed laser beam is transmitted to a target object; some of the light is reflected back. The time lapsing between the transmission of the beam and reception of the reflected light serves as data for computing the distance to the target object. To measure both the cloud's distance and its concentration profile, differential absorption LIDAR may be used.

Figure 5-6: Different point and standoff technologies for detection of PIH – IMS, Filter-based

IR Spectrometry, SAW, FLIR & LIDAR (from top left, clockwise)

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The functionalities and usage of the PIH detection systems, whether as chemical agents or TIM, serve two purposes:

Protection of public areas;

Protection of ventilation system vents.

In order to exploit the threat detection functionalities of these systems, it is essential to connect them to the command and control centre, and thus enable realising them in the station environment, through the following integrations:

� Integration with the fare collection access points and the emergency exits, to ensure efficient evacuation from contaminated sites;

� Integration with the ventilation system, to ensure that the air flow will not exacerbate the threat and cause a larger number of casualties;

� Integration with the OCC and the traffic management systems, to ensure that train traffic will not expand the scope of the threat by changing the air flow – on the one hand; and will prevent passengers from entering the PIH contaminated area – on the other hand;

� Integration with the PA & PIS systems, to assist and to promote effective crowd evacuation;

� Integration with the CCTV system, to enable verifying alerts.

5.5. DETECTION OF BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS

According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC):

A bioterrorism attack is the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, toxins or other harmful agents used to cause illness or death in people, animals or plants. These agents are typically found in nature, but it is possible that they could be mutated or altered to increase their ability to cause disease, make them resistant to current medicines, or to increase their ability to be spread into the environment. Biological agents can be spread through the air, water, or in food. Terrorists tend to use biological agents because they are extremely difficult to detect and do not cause illness for several hours to several days. Some bioterrorism agents, like the smallpox virus, can be spread from person to person and some, like anthrax, cannot.


(1) Point detection technologies

Point detectors are sensors that must be in the aerosol plume or have the suspect biological agent introduced into/onto them for sensing. Point detection systems have traditionally encompassed the following components: Trigger/cue (nonspecific biological agent detectors), sample/collector, and identifier (specific identification technologies).

Trigger/cue (nonspecific biological agent detectors ). The function of the trigger is to provide early warning that a change in the background air has occurred. Therefore, the operation of a trigger requires establishing background aerosol levels in a specific location and then sensing that there has been an increase in the aerosol particle count in the background. A trigger is non-selective and does not identify the organism; it only indicates a change in the background aerosol level. Consequently, a detector is required if there is no cue. A cueing device is first able to determine when an increase in particulates occurs, and then is able to distinguish between concentrations of biological aerosols and

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non-biological aerosols (non-specific biological agent detection). Some trigger/cue technologies are showed below:

−−−− Particle measurement: Counting the relative number of particles in specific size ranges, such as: o Aerodynamic particle sizing (APS)

o High volume aerodynamic particle sizer (HVAPS)

o Met-One.

−−−− Fluorescence methods: Involve the excitation of molecular components of a material with light, usually in the ultra violet region of the spectrum. The excited components spontaneously revert to an unexcited state, followed by emission of light at different wavelengths. Biofluorescence based techniques generate data from only some specific molecular components of biological material, allowing them to be a tool for nonspecific agent detection by providing the emission spectrum of a common material when an unknown sample is irradiated. Some devices using this technology include:

o Fluorescent aerodynamic particle sizer (FLAPS)

o Ultra violet aerodynamic particle sizer (UVAOS)

o Biological aerosol warning system (BAWS)

Samplers/collectors. A collector/concentrator samples the atmosphere and concentrates the airborne particles into a liquid medium for analysis.

A collector is most useful when it is part of a detection system. When the collector receives a signal from a trigger indicating a change in the background level, an air sample is collected, and airborne particles are concentrated into a liquid medium. Some examples of samplers/collectors include:

−−−− Viable particle size samplers (impactors) −−−− Virtual impactors −−−− Cyclone samplers

Detectors. Detectors are components/instruments used to determine if the particulates are biological

or inorganic in origin, and if further analysis of the sample is needed. They can be classified into two groups:

−−−− Wet detection (flow cytometry) −−−− Dry detectors (mass spectrometry)

Identifiers (specific identification technologies). Identifiers are components that are able to identify the suspect biological agent to the species level and toxin type. Specific identification technologies determine the presence of a specific biological agent by relying on the detection of a specific biomarker that is unique to that agent. Antibody based identifiers are used in systems where speed and automation are required. Examples of identifiers include:

−−−− Immunoassay technologies detect and measure the highly specific binding of antigens with their corresponding antibodies by forming an antigen-antibody complex. They are grouped into three categories: Disposable matrix devices, biosensors that use tag reagents to indirectly measure binding, and biosensors that do not require a tag.

−−−− Nucleic acid amplification may be used to help detect the presence of DNA or RNA of bacterial and viral biological agents.

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(2) Standoff technologies

Standoff systems are designed to detect and identify biological agents at a distance from the aerosol/plume or from the detection system, before the agents actually reach the location at which the system is found.

Standoff systems do not utilise a trigger/cue, collector or detector; they detect and measure atmospheric properties by implementing laser remote sensing: A short laser pulse is transmitted through the atmosphere; a portion of that radiation is reflected back from a distant target or from atmospheric particles such as molecules, aerosols, clouds, or dust. (3) Passive standoff technologies

These systems rely on the background electromagnetic energy present in the environment to detect biological agents.

(4) Next generation immunoassays

Next generation immunoassays have made great strides since the days of traditional enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays. While such technologies, including microbead, fibre optic, piezoelectric, amperometric, and nanowire immunosensors are being developed, they show great promise as applications for rapid, sensitive, high-throughput and multiplexed pathogen detection.

Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): Real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-based technologies, such as immuno-PCR techniques that combine the specificity of immunoassays with the amplification and quantification of real-time PCR, have emerged as a leading technology for rapid pathogen identification, due to their speed and high degree of sensitivity and specificity. However, the drawbacks of PCR have limited its potential as a first responder technology. Such drawbacks include the high cost of equipment, training, and reagents; the high degree of false positives or negatives, which is a direct result of its ultra-sensitivity, and the requirement of having some knowledge of the pathogen subgroup or subtype.

Similarly, PCR based assays for detecting agents such as dianthin and ricin have been limited to quasi-pure samples, and are unlikely to detect such agents in their purest and most dangerous forms because of the lack of nucleic acids available for detection.

Advances in nucleic acid detection chemistries, technologies and hardware have significantly shortened the analysis time from hours to about 30 minutes. These technologies include handheld devices such as the Razor by Idaho Technologies (Salt Lake City, UT), the Bio-Seeq Plus by Smiths Detection (Edgewood, MD), and the GeneXpert real time PCR system by Cepheid (Sunnyvale, CA). These PCR systems have been praised for their sensitivity and preformatted all in one cartridge or pouch based systems that can assay a multitude of samples simultaneously.

Nanotechnology: Researchers at Oregon State University have found a way to use magnetic nanobeads to help detect chemical and biological agents, with possible applications in everything from bioterrorism to medical diagnostics, environmental monitoring, or even water and food safety. When a chemical of interest is detected, ferromagnetic resonance is used to relay the information electronically to a tiny computer, and the information is immediately displayed to the user. No special thin films or complex processing is required; however, the detection capability is still extremely sensitive and accurate. Essentially, the system might be used to detect almost anything of interest in air or water. The use of what is ordinary, rusty iron should help address issues of safety in the resulting nanotechnology product.

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Rapid detection of chemical toxins used in bioterrorism would be possible, including such concerns as anthrax, ricin or smallpox, where immediate, accurate and highly sensitive tests would be needed. Partly for that reason the work has been supported by a four-year grant from the US Army Research Laboratory, in collaboration with the Oregon Nanoscience and Microtechnologies Institute. This work focuses on:

−−−− Microarrays. Microarrays are a high-tech version of a reverse dot blot, typically containing hundreds, thousands, or hundreds of thousands of individual nucleic acid probes addressed at specific locations within a 1x1 cm chip. Each defined location contains a different immobilised oligonucleotide, PCR product, cDNA or full-length gene. Purified nucleic acid is labelled, denatured and hybridised to the immobilised probes. After removing nonspecific DNA, the hybridisation pattern is visualised with an appropriate detector.

−−−− Electrochemistry. Electrochemiluminescence is a hybrid technique that uses an electronic stimulus to generate a fluorescent signal in response, to analyse binding at a surface.

(5) Integration of detection and identification

The critical step for biothreat monitoring technologies is integrating the detection and identification processes into a reliable, easy-to-use, and portable system. Such a system should operate as a constant sample collector or detector, and utilise a real-time trigger to prompt the identification system.


From the perspective of the passenger terminals, the biological threat detection systems will comprise a component of the unconventional threats detection system, including risks of biological hazards in the urban environment. The rationale is that the consequences of these threats, i.e., the symptoms of the virus of the bacteria, are not immediate; therefore, the mass transit system, including the passenger terminals, will also serve as a means for spreading the biological threat, if such agents are dispersed.

5.6. DETECTION AND CONTAMINATION OF RADIOLOGICAL MA TERIALS

Detection involves screening for nuclear and radiological materials at the exits of nuclear facilities, borders, ports and airports, as well as in the public transport system. Currently available detection means include: Detectors of various types, such as radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at ports and borders, in-situ detectors within transport containers, distributed networks and wide area searches; passive radiation monitoring and/or active interrogation of SNM; and unpacking and inspection of cargo.


A brief description of the radiological materials detection process is provided below:

Ionisation

Ionising radiation produces ions along its direction of travel, which can then be collected and measured by:

−−−− Geiger-Muller counters: Each photon or ionising particle registers as a single count or click. These counters provide a rough estimate of the intensity of radiation, but no information about the type or energy or its source.

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−−−− Proportional counters: A chamber – usually a gas-filled tube – measures the amount of ionisation formed by an incident particle or photon, which is proportional to the incident radiation’s energy. Collecting many such measurements produces a source spectrum.

−−−− Solid-state crystals (e.g., germanium): Measure the energy spectrum at a much higher resolution. The highest resolution detectors need to be cryogenically cooled.

Scintillation

Ionising radiation passing through certain substances produces flashes of light whose brightness is proportional to the energy of the radiation. These flashes of light are amplified by photomultipliers. There are different types of scintillators:

−−−− Sodium-iodide or other scintillating crystal

−−−− Liquid scintillator

−−−− Plastic scintillator

Dosimetry

Dosimeters measure the total dose over a certain period of time. They do not provide real term measurements. Different types include:

−−−− Photographic film

−−−− Thermoluminescent dosimeters

Active neutron interrogation

Neutrons can induce reactions in materials that produce secondary neutrons and gamma rays, which can be detected. This approach can be used to search for explosives or other distinctive materials.

Nuclear weapon materials are particularly sensitive to this approach, since they react strongly with neutrons, although this technique is not effective for other radiological materials.

Muon deflection

Cosmic ray muons (charged particles produced in the atmosphere by incoming protons) constantly bathe the earth and are highly penetrating. They are deflected when they pass through matter – more by high-Z (atomic number) materials such as uranium, plutonium, or lead used for shielding, than by low-Z materials. Measuring incoming and outgoing muon directions can locate high-Z materials.

The difference between radiation detection survey meters, Geiger counters and dosimeters is explained below:

o Survey meters, field survey meters, rate meters, radiac meters, radiation detection meters, low range meters, high range meters, airborne meters, fallout meters, remote monitors, Geiger counters and even dose rate meters are all instruments, equipment and devices that detect and measure the exposure rate of the intensity of radiation at a location, at some point in time.

o Dosimeters, which are also available in high or low ranges, are available in the form of a badge, pen/tube type, or even a digital readout, and all measure exposure of the total accumulated amount of radiation to which one was exposed.

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There are several ways to detect radioactive materials: One is to sense gamma rays, or high-energy photons emitted by nuclear compounds. When gamma rays collide with certain materials, such as plastic, they emit lower-energy photons of visible light. The photons can be converted into electrons to generate a measurable electrical pulse.

Nuclear reactive materials can also be detected by detecting the emission of neutrons, or the non-charged particles found in atoms. Uranium and plutonium – the two radioactive compounds used in modern nuclear weapons – emit neutrons through their natural decay process.

Conventional neutron detectors consist of metal tubes containing helium-3 gas. When a high voltage is applied to a fine wire running along the length of the tube, any passing neutrons create a nuclear reaction with the helium-3 atoms. The atoms split into two particles, a proton and a triton. A triton consists of a single proton and two neutrons. These particles zoom through the rest of the gas and collide with other helium-3 atoms. The collisions knock loose electrons, which are attracted to the tube or to the wire, depending on the polarity, and cause a sudden jump in the electrical current.

Detection of special nuclear materials

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium are commonly referred to as special nuclear materials (SNM). Field based methods to detect SNM exploit the properties of neutrons, high energy gamma rays and X-rays.

Gamma rays and X-rays are potentially very useful, since they combine good detection specificity with high detection efficiency. Identifying the gamma ray signature of SNM is problematic, since it can be heavily masked by the significant levels of gamma rays in the background of naturally occurring radioactive material. For this reason, spectrally resolving detectors with the highest energy resolution can be particularly useful in identifying SNM against a strong background signal. In contrast, the natural neutron background is significantly lower and more constant, making neutron detection a potentially more sensitive technique.

Passive measurement systems are ideal for use in public areas, but are typically more limited in sensitivity in comparison with active interrogation systems, which may not be suitable for measurements in public areas. Their production of radiation requires shielding, and the dose per analysis must be considered if people, such as front line officers, are routinely present or being scanned. The exposure of the samples will also be affected by regulatory controls on the level to which the items being inspected, such as food, can be irradiated.

Neutron detection

Helium-3 gas tube proportional detectors are the industry standard thermal neutron detector. They consist of a sealed tube containing pressurised H-3e gas and are available in a variety of lengths, diameters and pressures. They require moderate operating voltage and their power consumption is significant. Their major disadvantages include rigid geometry, slow response and sensitivity to vibration.

Solid state thermal neutron detectors, such as lithium-6 doped scintillating glass fibres, are commercially available. They are less sensitive to vibration and can be used for mobile and aerial applications, or even as in-situ detectors built into containers and other cargo transporters. Their key advantages over gas tubes are their flexible geometry and sensitivity.

Muon detection

Muon detection is an attractive possible technique to detect SNM because it exploits a safe, free and ubiquitous source of radiation. As muons move through materials, they lose energy and are scattered, accumulating a net deflection around their incident direction.

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Imaging systems

At energies around several MeV, gamma rays can be used in a radiographic mode to take an image of the contents of a container. The degree to which they are absorbed or penetrate will depend on the atomic number and on the density of the material.


These systems are in the same range as the biological detection ones. The symptoms following radiological exposure are not immediate, so these kinds of systems are especially important for mitigating the effects of the contamination and its spread. Normally, with the exception of cases of direct contamination, controlling the radiological spread resulting from a contaminated person is not the main factor that needs to be taken in account.

Early detection is the key factor when implementing a radiological detection system. Nowadays, these systems are normally used not only to avoid terrorist attacks, but also to prevent the illegal transport of radiological materials.

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6. TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 6.1. WIRELESS & LANDLINE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM FOR I NCIDENT REPONSE

A crisis situation such as a terrorist attack requires deploying emergency teams on a local, regional or national level, depending on the nature and scope of the attack. Coordination among the responding forces is vital. For this purpose, using dedicated emergency call systems (ECS) is preferable, as it offers the services required (group and broadcast call, short call setup time, specific terminal options, etc.) while also eliminating the risk of public communication system overload that would impede an effective response.

6.1.1. Technology overview (1) Wireless Systems

All wireless systems operate using the electromagnetic spectrum – radio waves, TV waves, and radar – to send signals between devices. These waves are distinguished from one another only by frequency and wavelength. Systems used by public transport operators include mobile radio communications, low-powered localised transponders, rail vehicle communications and control, and OTS (Orbital Test Satellite) commercial systems and equipment.

Mobile radio communications systems. Most public transport operators use mobile communications systems in everyday fleet operations. In normal operations these system are used for communicating with the transit vehicle operators, dispatch, monitoring vehicle location and status, vehicle rerouting, and for notification about on-vehicle emergencies. It consists of a base station antenna and transceiver, additional towers (“repeaters”) for providing required coverage, and both vehicle-mounted and handheld transceivers. The repeaters consist of a tower based antenna and often a housing for the transmit/receive equipment; a landline tie to the OCC is typical.

Low-powered, localized transponders. Some public transport operators use low-powered systems for very short-range operational applications. Uses include downloading bus-stored data on passenger counts when the bus returns to the garage, providing bus access to special travel lanes and to facilities like parking lots, and granting traffic signal priority to transit vehicles.

Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) systems and equipme nt. These systems include: cellular/mobile phone service, handheld devices and pagers, walkie-talkies, microwave links, satellite phone systems, and wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) networks.

GSM-R (Global System for Mobile communications - Ra ilway). GSM-R is a sub-system of ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System). It is a wireless communications platform developed specifically for railway communication and applications. It is mainly used to permit communication between train and railway regulation control centres. GSM-R is built on GSM technology, and benefits from the economies of scale of its GSM technology heritage, aiming at being a cost efficient digital replacement for existing incompatible in-track cable and analogue railway radio networks.

GSM-R is typically implemented using dedicated base station towers close to the railway. The distance between the base stations is 3-4 km. This creates a high degree of redundancy and higher availability and reliability. The train maintains a circuit switched digital modem connection to

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the train control centre at all times. This modem operates with higher priority than normal users (eMLPP). If the modem connection is lost, the train will automatically stop.

GSM-R permits new services and applications for mobile communications in several domains:

−−−− Control and protection (Automatic Train Control/ETCS) and ERTMS);

−−−− Communication between train driver and regulation centre;

−−−− Communication of on-board working peoples;

−−−− Information sending for ETCS (European Train Control System);

−−−− Communication between train stations, classification yard and rail tracks.

TETRA (TErrestrial Trunked Radio). TErrestrial Trunked RAdio (TETRA) (formerly known as Trans European Trunked RAdio) is a specialist Professional Mobile Radio and two-way transceiver (colloquially known as a walkie talkie), designed for use by government agencies, and specifically emergency services, such as the police forces, fire departments, ambulance, transport services and the military.

TETRA terminals can act as mobile phones (cell phones), with a direct connection to the PSTN. It is common also for them to operate in a group calling mode in which a single button push will connect the user to a dispatcher and all the other users in a group. It is also possible for the terminal to act as a one to one walkie talkie but without the normal range limitation since the call still uses the network. Emergency buttons, provided on the terminals, enable the users to transmit emergency signals, to the dispatcher, overriding any other activity taking place at the same time.

TETRA uses Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) with four user channels on one radio carrier and 25 kHz spacing between carriers. Both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint transfer can be used. Digital data transmission is also included in the standard though at a low data rate.

In addition to voice and dispatch services, the TETRA system supports several types of data communication. Status messages and short data services (SDS) are provided over the system's main control channel, while Packet Data or Circuit switched data communication uses specifically assigned traffic channels.

(2) Wire Line Systems

Wire line systems (also known as landlines) normally connect two fixed points by transmitting voice and data over wires or cables, either buried or strung along telephone poles. Systems used by public transport operators include conventional telephone systems, dedicated landlines, and high-capacity landlines.

Conventional telephone systems. Conventional telephone systems can be either digital or analogue, and are typically routed through commercial operators’ landline systems connected to the international network. Public transport operators use conventional telephone systems on a daily basis for many purposes: voice communications between facilities and with external agencies, fax transmissions, and low-bandwidth Internet connections.

Dedicated landlines. Some operators, especially those operating metro and/or light rail services, use dedicated landline services to directly communicate between facilities, without involving a commercial routing facility. The operators typically use landlines to link remote repeaters with the OCC, to link wayside transponders along rail lines with the OCC, or to establish internal analogue phone systems for additional backup. Dedicated landlines can also be part of a rail vehicle control system, enabling the OCC to control the rail system’s trackside signals.

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High-capacity landlines. As operators adopt new technologies for communications, parts of their communications networks rely on high-capacity landlines, which may be privately owned or leased from private commercial vendors. These include fibre optic cables and other landlines used for high-bandwidth data transmission, computer network connections, data feeds from remote devices such as CCTVs, and Internet connections.

Figure 6-1: Wireless and landline communication devices (from left GSM-R & TETRA portable devices

and GSRM-R dispatcher)

(3) IP bridging technology

IP bridging technology (Figure 6.2) uses a unique network bridging technology to create seamless integration between different voice and radio communication devices, using VoIP/RoIP technology adapted for Land Mobile Radio (RoIP) with one flip of a switch. The technology is used to create an instant wireless conference-call network for radios, cell phones, phone lines or other devices per site, and places them under the command of a single radio gateway. The technology supports LMR, 2-way Radios, TETRA, iDEN, GSM, GSM-R and landline phone technology.

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Figure 6-2: IP based integration of landline & wireless communication technologies


Public safety mobile communications are voice-based, with widespread use of group calls (network-centric), also called talk groups; these calls are called push to talk calls. Point to point voice calls are also used, especially by emergency managers. There is a trend towards using a range of data applications alongside traditional voice applications to enhance communications. Data services have widely differing requirements in terms of capacity, timeless and robustness of the data service.

There are wireless broadband systems that are intended for first responders; however, they are proprietary solutions provided by traditional vendors to the public safety and security networks market.

On the other hand, current state of the art is represented by the coexistence of various networks and protocols, where a user decides which particular network should be active at a particular instant. The problem of exploring all available communication systems in a cooperative manner, aiming to improve availability and quality of service, remains unsolved. Recent wireless broadband standards (e.g., IEEE802.16e/WiMAX) incorporate a cross layer optimizer, which allows enhancing in system performance via interaction between the physical and media access control layers of the system. However, this interaction is constrained within the neighbouring layers of the same system and cannot be applicable to different layers of different networks.

In addition, different networks have different NMS protocols; thus, current state of the art in network management in multi network environment still assume independent management of each network, providing no opportunities for cross-network collaboration.

The communication equipment of first responders (FR) is typically incompatible with the equipment of other FR units. Even when all are using the same type of equipment, they typically use different frequencies. The problem of incompatibility of voice communication between FR units is recognised as a major obstacle for efficient operation.

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Several vendors currently propose a solution to this problem in the form of gateway switches. A gateway switch connects multiple frequency bands and/or coverage areas and thereby provides interoperability between them. Gateway switches connect several dissimilar radio systems. The use of gateway switches is viewed as a cost effective alternative to the procurement of a new radio system, while still providing individual public safety agencies the flexibility of maintaining existing radio infrastructures.

6.2. PHYSICAL SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (PSIM ) 6.2.1. Technology overview

Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) is a new security technology class that combines physical security devices and completely manages them from a single platform.

Physical security information management (PSIM) is a category of software that provides a platform and applications created by middleware developers, designed to integrate multiple unconnected security applications and devices and control them through one comprehensive user interface. It collects and correlates events from existing disparate security devices and information systems (video, access control, sensors, analytics, networks, building systems, etc.) to enable personnel to identify and proactively resolve situations.

PSIM is the integration of various security systems into a single command and control interface. PSIM software applications are designed and optimised to integrate and analyse information from various physical security devices and systems, and present the necessary data to automatically or manually resolve situations in real time. By viewing a single screen, security operators can assess and correlate information across their video, access control, alarm, detectors and other systems. These solutions also integrate workflow management to simplify operator response and ensure execution of the correct procedures.

Figure 6-3: Typical PSIM architecture

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Figure 6-4: Examples of PSIM solutions


A PSIM system combines several technologies, to provide the following functionalities:

� Aggregate, correlate and analyse data from various sources, including alarms, environmental sensors (which monitor parameters like temperature), intrusion-detection systems and video surveillance;

� Present a situational view of data;

� Guide standard operating procedures by documenting efficient best practices for every situation;

� Identify trends by searching through data from current and past events to create reports;

� Audit operator behaviour by recording all responses to all alerts for later analysis.

� PSIM technology allows users to experience the advantages of convergence that brings rapid solutions to security operations even for decentralised equipment. It provides:

� Centralised security processes;

� A fully integrated system;

� Incident and event management;

� Advanced notification methods;

� An automated reporting system.

In traditional security management operations physical and logical operations work separately, and in some cases, results indicate / pinpoint unnoticed security threats.

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6.3. CYBER SECURITY MEANS (HARDWARE & SOFTWARE) 6.3.1. Technology overview

Many cyber-security technologies are currently available for use to protect critical infrastructures from cyber-attacks. Other technologies are still being researched and developed.

These technologies can help to protect information that is being processed, stored, and transmitted in the networked computer systems that are prevalent in critical infrastructures and are structured in the following categories:

Access control technologies : Restrict the access of unknown or unauthorised users to view or use information, hosts, or networks and can help protect sensitive data and systems;

System integrity technologies : Are used to ensure that a system and its data are not illicitly modified or corrupted by malicious code;

Cryptography tools : Include encryption of data during transmission and when it is stored on a system. Encryption is the process of transforming ordinary data into code form so that the information is accessible in its encoded form only to those who are authorised to view it;

Audit and monitoring tools : Help administrators to perform investigations during and after an attack. There are four types of audit and monitoring technologies: Intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, security event correlation tools and computer forensics;

Configuration management assurance controls technol ogies : Help administrators to view and change the security settings on their hosts and networks, verify the correctness of security settings, and maintain operations in a secure fashion when under duress.

A cyber-security framework can assist in the selection of technologies for critical infrastructure protection, and can include:

−−−− Determining the business requirements for security; −−−− Performing risk assessments; −−−− Establishing a security policy; −−−− Implementing a cyber-security solution that includes people, processes and technologies to

mitigate identified security risks; −−−− Monitoring and managing security.

Cyber-security technologies cannot operate independently; they must operate within the framework of an overall security scheme and be implemented by trained personnel.

Long-term efforts, the development of standards, research into cyber-security vulnerabilities and technological solutions, and the transition of research results into commercially available products are needed.

Cyber security solutions are an essential element for protecting systems that operate critical infrastructure. These solutions provide an effective means to reduce electronic vulnerabilities in critical communications systems. National and international research firms have identified threats and documented specific cases of real cyber-attacks. In some cases, it cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to repair the damage

To secure devices used in environmentally challenging stations from potential cyber security attacks, a hardware platform needs to be hardened to the same standards as the protective relays that are being secured. The hardware platform needs to comply with the standards: IEEE 1613, IEEE 37.90, and IEC 60255.

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Figure 6-5: Access points to securing multiple networks

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The functionalities of some cyber-security technologies are presented in Table 5 below.

Category Technology Functionality

Access control

Boundary protection Boundary protection technologies protect a network or a node by controlling the network traffic at a network boundary; typically the point where an internal network or a node connects to an external network, such as the Internet.

Firewalls Firewalls control the network packets that pass between two networks or a network and a node, and can keep unwanted external data out and sensitive internal data in. A firewall acts as a protective barrier because it is the single point through which both incoming and outgoing communications pass. There are many types of commercially available firewalls, including packet filters, state inspection firewalls, application proxy gateways, and dedicated proxy servers.

Content management

Content management or filtering technologies can monitor web, e-mail and other messaging applications for inappropriate content, such as spam, proprietary information and banned files types. The technologies can also check for noncompliance with an organisation’s security policies.

Authentication Authentication technologies help to establish the validity of a user’s claimed identity, typically during access to a system or application.

Biometrics Biometrics cover a wide range of technologies that are used to verify identity by measuring and analysing human characteristics.

Smart tokens Smart tokens are easily portable devices that contain an embedded integrated circuit chip capable of storing and processing data.

Authorisation User rights and privileges

Once a user is authenticated, authorisation technologies are used to allow or prevent actions by that user based on predefined rules.

Authorisation technologies support the principles of legitimate use, least privilege, and separation of duties. These technologies help to define and maintain what actions an authenticated user can perform once granted access to a system.

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System integrity

Antivirus software

Antivirus software can help to detect known viruses and worms and stop them before they cause damage to a system’s software or data, and provides protection against viruses and malicious code, such as worms and Trojan horses.

Integrity checkers

Integrity checking tools can detect whether any critical system files have been changed, thus enabling the system administrator to look for unauthorised alteration of the system. Integrity checkers examine stored files or network packets to determine if they have been altered or changed. These checkers are based on a simple mathematical operation that turns an entire file or a message into a number.

Cryptography

Digital signatures and certificates

Digital signatures use public key cryptography to provide authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation for a message or transaction. Just as a physical signature helps to provide assurance that a letter has been written by a specific person, a digital signature helps provide assurance that a message was sent by a particular individual or machine. A digital certificate is an electronic credential that can help verify the association between a public key and a specific entity.

Virtual private networks

Virtual private networks allow organisations or individuals in two or more physical locations to establish network connections over a shared or public network, such as the Internet, with functionality similar to that of a private network.

VPNs establish security procedures and protocols that encrypt communications between the two end points. VPNs encrypt not only the data but also the originating and receiving network addresses.

Audit and monitoring

Intrusion detection systems

Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) monitor and analyse events occurring on a system or network and either alert appropriate personnel or prevent the attack in progress from continuing. Both technologies can use a pattern matching algorithm or an anomaly-based algorithm that identifies deviations from normal network or system behaviour in order to detect attacks.

An IDS can only provide alerts to an administrator that an attack is occurring.

Intrusion prevention systems

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An IPS can take steps to defend against the attack or mitigate its effects.

Security event correlation tools

Security event correlation tools produce audit logs, or lists of actions that have occurred from operating systems, firewalls, applications, and other devices. Depending on the configuration of the logging functions, critical activities, such as access to administrator functions, are logged and can be monitored for anomalous activity.

Computer forensics tools

Computer forensics tools identify, preserve, extract and document computer-based evidence, and can be used to recover files that have been deleted, encrypted or damaged.

Computer forensics tools are used during the investigation of a computer crime to identify the perpetrator and the methods that were used to conduct the attack.

There are two categories of computer forensics tools:

(1) Preservation and collection tools, which prevent the accidental or deliberate modification of computer-related evidence; and

(2) Recovery and analysis tools.

Configuration management and assurance

Policy enforcement applications

Policy enforcement applications help administrators to define and perform centralised monitoring and enforcement of an organisation’s security policies, examine desktop and server configurations that define authorised access to specified devices, and compare these settings against a baseline policy.

These applications provide a centralised way for administrators to use other security technologies, such as access control and security event and correlation technologies.

Network management

Network management provides system administrators with the ability to control and monitor a computer network from a central location. Network management systems obtain status data from network components, enable network managers to make configuration changes, and alert them to problems. Network management includes management of faults, configurations, performance, security, and accounting.

Continuity of operations tools

To provide continuity of operations, secure backup tools are available that can restore system data and functionality in the event of a disruption. These tools are being applied to help recover from system problems resulting from malicious cyber-

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attacks. Technologies are also available to help systems and networks continue to operate in spite of an on-going cyber-attack.

Scanners Scanners are common testing and audit tools, used to identify vulnerabilities in networks and systems as a part of proactive security testing. A wide variety of scanners is available that can be used to probe modems, Internet ports, databases, wireless access points, web pages and applications. These tools often incorporate the capability to monitor the security posture of the networks and systems by testing and auditing the security configurations of hosts and networks.

Patch management

Patch management tools automate the process of acquiring, testing, and applying patches to a computer system and can be used to identify missing patches on systems, deploy patches, and generate reports to track the status of a patch across various computers.

Table 5: Functionalities of cyber security technologies

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7. CONSTRUCTION TECHNIQUES & MATERIAL 7.1. REINFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES 7.1.1. Technology overview

Developing strategies for protection from air blast caused by a bomb explosion can be applied either in the early design phase or after building construction is completed. The location of the building may have great impact on its level of vulnerability. A first directive to follow is to situate the building as far away as possible from all critical assets. Major threats may originate in streets; therefore, a large plaza that is inaccessible to vehicles should be considered. Furthermore, vehicle parking areas can also be a source of potential attacks, so they must be situated accordingly. A reasonable distance should also be kept from adjoining structures, since one cannot anticipate how access to the protected site from these properties may change during the building's lifetime.

The shape of the building can significantly influence the effect of a blast: Re-entrant corners and overhangs will produce multiple blast reflections, which can amplify the effect of the air blast. In general, convex shapes are preferred for the exterior of the building, as the shock front incidence angle on a convex surface increases more rapidly with the lateral distance from the detonation point than on a planar surface, causing the rapid decay of reflected overpressure. Similarly, the blast overpressure decays with height, since the incidence angle becomes more oblique.

Generally, simple geometries with a minimum of ornamental objects (potential flying debris) are recommended. If ornamentation is used, a lightweight material should be preferred: Timber or plastic are less likely to shatter into lethal projectiles.

An existing building may need some enhancements to resist explosive threats when changes in its mission, occupancy or threat level take place. A threat, vulnerability and risk assessment is the first step in determining the need to upgrade a building's structure in order to protect occupants and assets. Upgrades also depend on their aesthetic and functional impact on particular buildings, for example historic preservation may limit retrofit actions.

7.1.1.1. Anti-shatter film

Anti-shatter film is a laminate that is applied to the internal surface of glass panes, to hold the fragments of glass shattered by a blast together and prevent or mitigate casualties and damage from the flying fragments. Generally, the film is made of polyester-based materials and is coated with adhesives. Films can be tinted or have minimal optical effects, and can be installed in the following three different ways:

Daylight installation: The application of security film must cover the the glass, but not the frame.

Wet glazed installation: The film is attached to the frame using a high strength liquid sealant, like silicone. It offers more protection than the daylight installation, because the frame is allowed to deform and the number of glass fragments entering the building is reduced.

Mechanically anchored/attached installation: The film is secured to the window frame by means of a mechanically connected anchorage system. This method offers the maximal protection, although not absolute.

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The film thickness and the positioning the film must be taken into account: A thinner and lighter film facilitates installation; water used in the film positioning process must be completely extruded, because residual moisture prevents optimal fastening of film and glass, decreasing the level of performance. Also, the window frame must be sufficiently strong to bear the loads transmitted by the glazing system – corner welded frames are preferred over frames constituting individual components.

7.1.1.2. Laminated glass

Laminated glass consists of two of more glass panes permanently bonded by means of a plastic interlayer made of polyvinyl butyral (PVB) resin. Once bonded, the sandwich behaves as a single body. Different glass types can be bonded to meet light and design requirements. When fractured, fragments from laminated glasses adhere to the PVB interlayer. During installation, a proper sealant must be used to prevent water from coming into contact with the interlayer. Laminated glass requires the same maintenance as ordinary glass.

7.1.1.3. Blast curtains

Blast curtains are attached to the interior frame of a window opening to catch the glass fragments produced by the blast wave. Debris is deposited on the floor at the base of the curtain, limiting its travel distance – a person sitting near the window may still be injured in the event of an explosion. Blast curtains are made of a variety of materials, including warp knit fabric or polyethylene fibre. The main components are the curtain itself, the attachment mechanism by which the curtain is affixed to the window frame, and another retain mechanism at the base of the curtain. Blast curtains differ from standard curtains in that they do not open and close, but remain in closed position all times.

7.1.1.4. Glazing catch cable/bar retrofit

Even with the above retrofit techniques, there is a high possibility that entire glass panels will be projected from the window frame in a blast wave event. Rigid catch bar systems have been designed to intercept laminated glass and to interrupt their flight. They can collect a great deal of force, so they have to be anchored to the structure very effectively to prevent failure; otherwise they may become flying debris as well.

Flexible catch bars can be designed to absorb a significant amount of the energy upon impact, keeping debris intact and impeding its flight into inner spaces. The restrain mechanism must be strong enough to withstand transferred energy, and the connections must be capable of transferring the force to the supporting slabs. The system should never add significant mass to the structure, as in the case of failure it could create greater risks to the occupants.

The most effective systems to stop massive objects from moving at high velocities are catch cable systems. Their flexibility can absorb energy and make them easily adaptable to many situations. The energy-absorbing characteristics allow the catch systems to be attached to relatively weakly constructed walls without the need for additional structural reinforcement. To reduce the possibility of slicing the laminated glass, the cable may either be sheathed in a tube, or an aluminium strip may be affixed to the glass directly behind the cable.

7.1.1.5. Polymer material for structural retrofit

Unreinforced masonry walls provide limited protection against air blasts – subjected to overloads, the wall will fail and the debris will be projected into the interior of the structure. This type of wall has been prohibited for new construction if blast protection is required. Existing unreinforced masonry walls can be retrofitted with a sprayed-on polymer coating to improve air blast resistance. The toughness and resiliency of polymer material permit deformation and blast energy dissipation while containing the wall fragments. The masonry wall can shatter due to a blast event, but the polymer coating will remain intact and contain the debris.

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7.1.1.6. Geotextile fabric retrofit

An aramidic (Geotextile) debris-catching system may be attached to the structure by means of plates bolted to the floor and ceiling slabs. The aramid layer doesn’t strengthen the wall, but restrains the debris that would otherwise be projected into the occupied space.

7.1.1.7. Structural retrofit

In some cases it may be not possible to retrofit an existing building to prevent the collapse of the floor near a failed column. If columns and beams are retrofitted to develop catenary behaviour, the adjoining bays must be upgraded to resist lateral forces due to this mode of response (catenary deformation). The upgrade can be very extensive and expensive, so it may be preferable to isolate the collapsed region.

The retrofit of an existing building against progressive collapse due to the detonation of explosives can be achieved through localised hardening of vulnerable columns. These columns need to be upgraded to a resistance level that balances the capacity of adjacent ones.

Conventionally designed columns are vulnerable to explosive effects, particularly when the charge is placed in contact with their surface. Partitions and enclosures can be used to guarantee a minimum standoff distance. Steel jackets or carbon fibre wrap can be used to confine the concrete core, to increase the strength and shear resistance, holding rubble together to permit continuing carrying axial loads.

Floor slabs are typically designed to resist downward gravity loading; due to an air blast load, upward forces on slabs can overcome downward ones, causing a reverse curvature deformation, which requires tension reinforcements at the top fibre (layer) of middle span location. These reinforcements can be added with lightweight carbon fibre panels bonded at critical locations.


The appropriate types of materials and reinforcement techniques should be determined on a case by case basis, and should be appropriate for the specific structure and its use.

In most public areas of railway station environments glass panels should be reinforced, so that it will not shatter and create sharp projectiles. Therefore, as a minimum measure, anti-shatter film should be applied, and reinforced laminated glass should be installed at lower levels, where there is a risk of persons crashing into the glass pane, to prevent its accidental shattering. Catch bars are recommended for roof glazing and where there is risk of the entire pane falling and causing injury. Blast curtains may be beneficial in some office spaces.

Reinforcement / hardening will be very specific to a particular building design, and should be used where the current redundancy in building design is insufficient to sustain the loss of a load bearing column, or where floor sections have not been designed for upward blast loadings. Textile or polymer coatings are particularly recommended for non-supporting masonry walls, to prevent bricks or stones from becoming harmful projectiles.

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7.2. MITIGATION MATERIALS (BLAST, GRAFFITI & VANDAL ISM, DECONTAMINATION) 7.2.1. Technology overview

Numerous commercial blast effect mitigating products are presently available on the market.

For retrofitting purposes, Fabric Reinforced Polymers (FRP), Polyurea, Policarbonate (PC) and Polyethylne Terpthalate (PET) can be used.

Polyurea can be utilised not only in the retrofitting of masonry walls, but also in composite systems with other materials; resulting composite panels can undergo large deflections, absorbing energy and dissipating blast wave effects.

Porous resin aggregates are used to absorb and attenuate explosive blast wave effects, realised with a specific graded aggregate and a coating of resin typically only one molecule thick. This connects particles but leaves the material porous, allowing the blast energy to be absorbed.

Other porous materials are employed in blast effects mitigation: Cellular solids (metallic foams, ceramic foams, polymer foams and micro-truss structures) constitute a frothy web of air-filled vesicles. This kind of solids, when subjected to blast loading, collapse at a cellular level, absorbing much of the blast energy and effectively containing the damage. Pumice is an example of a lightweight, abundant, easily processed and economic material. It can be combined with an epoxy binder and sandwiched between rigid or flexible sheets. Pumice application is used for military purposes – some rocket containers consist of an aluminium shell filled with 4 inches of pumice. This material has proven effective in preventing sympathetic detonations, inhibiting fragment impact action and increasing the capacity of the container.

Special panels realised with carbon foams can be used to protect vehicles, aircraft, ships, infrastructure and buildings against blast wave effects.


Blast effect mitigating materials reinforce structures; prevent collapse and the fragments of material being projected from the structure. These materials should be used to retrofit existing structures that have not been designed to withstand blast loadings.

Blast absorbing and attenuating materials can be used to reduce the peak blast overpressure. This is particularly important to mitigate the impact of blasts in confined spaces such as tunnels, where blast reflections from the structure walls can amplify the overpressure. However, the decision making process of whether to use such materials must balance the cost with the risk levels.