1 Current welfare measures and participation income: involvement in socially valuable activities and motivational issues. Abstract: This paper found that participation income can be considered a better policy than the current welfare system due to its ability to incentivize people to participate in socially valuable activities. First, this research argues participation income (PI) is the best alternative welfare measure available. Then, previous arguments made against the feasibility of PI are addressed through new technologies such as blockchain and new market development as the sharing economy. The new challenge identified for participation income is the definition of the right level of monetary compensation. To provide a quantitative answer to what the right level of compensation could be, a vignette survey was put in place. Results gave a significant negative effect of low monetary compensation level on individual’s willingness to participate. In the case of a high compensation, results are not significant. This can probably be explained by setting the level of the high compensation too low. Overall, this study pointed out that PI is a more sensible public policy than current welfare systems. It also contributed to stimulate and start a new discussion around a possible PI scheme. Rebecca Belochi - 11084499 Bsc Economics and Business Finance and Organizations University of Amsterdam Dhr. Dr. D.F. Damsma
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Current welfare measures and participation income: involvement in socially valuable activities and motivational issues.
Abstract: This paper found that participation income can be considered a better policy than the current welfare system due to its ability to incentivize people to participate in socially valuable activities. First, this research argues participation income (PI) is the best alternative welfare measure available. Then, previous arguments made against the feasibility of PI are addressed through new technologies such as blockchain and new market development as the sharing economy. The new challenge identified for participation income is the definition of the right level of monetary compensation. To provide a quantitative answer to what the right level of compensation could be, a vignette survey was put in place. Results gave a significant negative effect of low monetary compensation level on individual’s willingness to participate. In the case of a high compensation, results are not significant. This can probably be explained by setting the level of the high compensation too low. Overall, this study pointed out that PI is a more sensible public policy than current welfare systems. It also contributed to stimulate and start a new discussion around a possible PI scheme.
Rebecca Belochi - 11084499 Bsc Economics and Business Finance and Organizations University of Amsterdam
Dhr. Dr. D.F. Damsma
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Statement of originality
This document is written by student Rebecca Belochi, who declares to take
full responsibility for the contents of this document.
I declare that the text and work presented in this document are original and that
no sources other than those mentioned in the text and its references have been
used in creating it.
The faculty of economics and business is responsible solely for the supervision
2. Ethical and political aspects on the idea of Participation Income .............................. 7 2.1. The dilemma of Participation Income, an ethically and politically superior idea considered unfeasible. ..................................................................................................................................... 7
2.2. Emergence of new trends offering viable solution to PI’s dilemma ..................................... 9
3. Economic aspect on the idea of Participation Income: incentives and motivational issues…. ............................................................................................................................. 10
3.1. The debate in academic literature surrounding motivation ................................................. 11 3.2. Understanding of the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and monetary incentives .................................................................................................................................... 12
4. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 14 4.1 Research design ................................................................................................................ 14
5.1.1. Correlations .......................................................................................................................... 20 5.2. Testing of hypothesis ........................................................................................................ 21
5.2.1. Predictors. ............................................................................................................................ 21 5.2.2. Direct effect of low monetary compensation on willingness to participate............................... 22 5.2.3. Direct effect of high monetary compensation on willingness to participate ............................. 22 5.2.4. Effect sizes of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in low monetary compensation setting. ......... 22 5.2.5. Effect sizes of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in high monetary compensation setting ......... 23 5.2.6. Mediation effects in a low monetary compensation setting...................................................... 23 5.2.7. Mediation effects in a high monetary compensation setting .................................................... 23
6.2. Discussion of the results and perspective on previous literature findings ........................... 27 6.2.1. Crowding out of intrinsic motivation. ..................................................................................... 27 6.2.2. Higher incentives, higher performance .................................................................................. 27
6.3. Contributions to theory and suggestions for future research .............................................. 28
6.4. Contribution to policy makers ........................................................................................... 29
All hypothesis are tested through Hayes’ serial multiple mediator model number six. The steps
taken follow his recommendations as given in his book (Hayes, 2013, pp. 143-163). How results are
reported and what paths are tested can be seen in figure 1. The model was run with the consistent
heteroscedasticity consistent standard error option of Hubert and White, as recommended by Hayes and
Cai (2007), to allow for a stronger validity and power of the tests performed. Moreover, the tests were
run whilst also controlling for age, gender, nationality, and level of income. The results can be found in
tables 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Figure 1: model 6, double mediation.
Note: taken from Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process
analysis: A regression-based approach. Guilford Publications.
5.2.1. Predictors.
When running the analysis, certain control variables were found as predictors of the two
mediators and the dependent variables in both monetary settings. They will be presented here before
addressing hypothesis testing.
Two control variables significantly associate to the dependent variable willingness to participate.
First, it is found that age is positively associated to intention to participate (B = .013, SE = .004, p =
.002). This implies that the older an individual is, the more likely he is to participate in the proposed
participation income scheme. Additionally, high income appears to be negatively related to an
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individual’s willingness to participate (B = -.358, SE = .151, p = .019). This can be interpreted as the
idea that individual’s with higher incomes will be less willing to engage in a participation scheme.
Moreover, categories of incomes also seem to have effects on both mediators. First, high income
is perceived as positively paired with intrinsic motivation (B = .497, SE = .209, p = .019). This can be
understood as individuals earning higher incomes to be more sensitive to intrinsic motivation. Also,
medium income negatively affects extrinsic motivation (B = -.860, SE = .337, p = .012). This implies
that individuals earning between 1,550 and 3,500 euros a month are adversely affected by extrinsic
motivation.
5.2.2. Direct effect of low monetary compensation on willingness to participate.
Hypothesis one predicted that a low monetary compensation setting will result in less intention
to participate than a setting with no monetary compensation. The total effect c is negative and significant
(c = -.413, SE = .200, p = .042) which means that a low monetary compensation setting versus no
monetary compensation is negatively associated with individuals’ willingness to participate (see table
3). Therefore, hypothesis one is supported.
5.2.3. Direct effect of high monetary compensation on willingness to participate.
Hypothesis two speculated that a high monetary incentive scheme will result in more willingness
to participate than no monetary incentives at all. This can be tested through the total effect of the
compensation scheme on intention to participate. The total effect (c = -.099, SE = -.210, p = .639) is not
significant (see table 5), thus hypothesis two rejected. There is no strong statistical support for the idea
that a higher level of compensation results in more willingness to participate. However, the latest
discussions on mediation methods (Hayes, 2009) argue that scholars should continue to test for
mediation in the absence of direct effect.1 Thus, this paper will proceed with the mediation analysis.
5.2.4. Effect sizes of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in low monetary compensation setting.
Hypothesis three assumed intrinsic motivation is a stronger driver of intention to participate than
extrinsic motivation in a low monetary incentive setting. By comparing partially standardised indirect
effects, one can see that indeed intrinsic motivation has a bigger effect (Ind2= -.502, SE = 175, CI: -.840
to -.157) on intention to participate than extrinsic motivation does (Ind1 = .251, SE = .112, CI: .075 to
.499) as it can be seen in table three. Hence, hypothesis three is supported.
1 “ If a mediator is a variable, M, that is causally between X and Y and that accounts at least in part for the association between X and Y, then by definition X and Y must be associated in order for M to be a mediator of that effect” (p.8).
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5.2.5. Effect sizes of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in high monetary compensation setting.
Hypothesis four tested that in the case of a high monetary compensation setting, extrinsic
motivation would be a stronger driver of intention to participate than intrinsic motivation. Partially
standardized indirect effects allow to provide an answer. However, extrinsic motivation appears to have
less of an effect (Ind1 = .277, SE = .117, CI: .082 to .534) on willingness to participate than intrinsic
motivation (Ind2 = -.460, SE = .180, CI: -.837 to -.117). Therefore, even though the magnitude of the
negative effect of intrinsic motivate does decrease (from -.502 to -.460), as it can be seen by comparing
tables three and five, it also remains larger than the effect of extrinsic motivation and accordingly,
hypothesis four is rejected.
5.2.6. Mediation effects in a low monetary compensation setting.
Hypothesis five predicted that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation would sequentially mediate the
relationship between a low monetary compensation and individual’s willingness to participate.
After running the analysis, the direct effect of low monetary compensation on willingness to
participate remained significant (c’ = -.531, SE = -.145, p = .001) but the value of the total effect is
smaller (c = -.444, SE = .200, p = .042). From this, we can infer there is an associated effect with at
least one of the mediators.
The mediational path running from low monetary compensation, to intrinsic motivation until
intention to participate is significant and negative (Ind2= -.502, SE = 175, CI: -.840 to -.157). Also, the
mediational path from low monetary setting to extrinsic motivation on behavioural intentions is
significant and positive (Ind1 = .251, SE = .112, CI: .075 to .499).
Finally, this study finds evidence of sequential mediation. In this case, extrinsic motivation
positively mediates the path from intrinsic motivation to intention to participate (Ind3 = .338, SE = .108,
CI: .153 to .570). However, against expectation this effect is positive and thus does not support
hypothesis five which is rejected.
5.2.7. Mediation effects in a high monetary compensation setting.
Finally, hypothesis six predicted whether the relationship between a high monetary compensation
and intention to participate is sequentially mediated by intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
First, there is a clear mediating effect of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on intention to
participate. The direct effect when testing for all the path simultaneously is not significant (c’ = -.298,
SE = .159, CI: -.594 to .039), this evidence supports the claim that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
fully mediate the relationship between X and Y.
Moreover, the mediational path from a high monetary compensation setting to intrinsic
motivation until individual’s willingness to participate is significant and negative (Ind2 = -.460, SE =
.180, CI: -.837 to -.117). Similarly, the path running from high monetary compensation to extrinsic
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motivation until intention to participate is positive and significant (Ind1 = .277, SE = .117, CI: .082 to
.534).
Finally, this study proves sequential mediation. Whilst the mediational path testing for both
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is significant (Ind3 = .374, SE = .110, CI: .167 to .602) it is positive.
Therefore, evidence goes against the hypothesis of this research that extrinsic motivation negatively
relates to intrinsic motivation and hypothesis six is rejected.
Table 2: output summary of mediation analysis in a low monetary compensation setting. Consequent
M1 (extrinsic) M2 (intrinsic) Y (intention to participate)
Antecedent Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p
X (low vs no) 𝑎1 1.292 .243 p < .001 a2 -.668 .234 p = .005 c' -.494 .145 p = .001
M1 (extrinsic) - - - d21 .348 .072 p < .001 b1 .180 .053 p = .001
M2 (intrinsic) - - - - - - b2 .699 .068 p < .001
constant iM1 3.138 .361 p < .001 iM2 4.675 .338 p < .001 iY .506 .155 p = .205
Control variables
Age - - - - - - .013 .004 p = .002
High Income - - - .497 .209 .019 -.358 .151 p = .019
Medium Income -.860 .337 p = .012 - - - - - -
R2 = .295 R2 = .240 R2 = .684
F(8,96) = 7.936, p < .001. F(9,95) = 4.275, p < .001. F(10,94) =31.737, p < .001.
Table 3: summary of direct and indirect effects of mediation analysis for a low monetary compensation setting.
Effect Effect_ps* SE p LLCI ULCI
Direct effect c' -.494 -.531 -.145 p = .001 -.781 -.206
Total effect c -.413 -.444 .200 p = .042 -.811 -.015
BOOT
SE
BOOT
LLCI
BOOT
ULCI
Indirect effect 1_ps* a1,b1 .251
.112
.075 .499
Indirect effect 2_ps* a2,b2 -.502
.175
-.840 -.157
Indirect effect 3_ps* a1,d21,b2 .338
.108
.153 .570
Total indirect effect_ps* .087 .219 -.327 .534
* partially standardized results
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Table 4: output summary of mediation analysis in a high monetary compensation setting.
Consequent
M1 (extrinsic) M2 (intrinsic) Y (intention to participate)
Antecedent Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p Coeff. SE p
X (high vs no) 𝑎1 1.429 .269 p < .001 a2 -.612 .228 p < .001 c' -.277 .159 p = .085
M1 (extrinsic) - - - d21 .348 .085 p < .001 b1 .180 .059 p = .003
M2 (intrinsic) - - - - - - b2 .699 .062 p < .001
constant iM1 3.138 .361 p < .001 iM2 4.675 .339 p < .001 iY .506 .397 p = .205
Control variables
Age - - - - - - .013 .004 p = .002
High Income - - - .497 .209 p = .019 -.358 .151 p = .019
Medium Income -.860 .337 p = .012 - - - - - -
R2 = .295 R2 = .240 R2 = .684
F(8,96) = 5.023, p < .001. F(9,95) = 3.337, p = .001 F(10,94) = 20.335, p < .001.
Table 5: summary of direct and indirect effects of mediation analysis for a high monetary compensation setting
Effect Effect_ps* SE p LLCI ULCI
Direct effect c' -.277 -.298 .159 p = .085 -.594 .039
Total effect c -.099 -.107 -.210 p = .639 -.517 .318
BOOT SE BOOT LLCI BOOT ULCI
Indirect effect 1_ps* a1,b1 .277
.117
.082 .534
Indirect effect 2_ps* a2,b2 -.460
.180
-.837 -.117
Indirect effect 3_ps* a1,d21,b2 .374
.110
.167 .602
Total indirect effect_ps* .192 .226 -.243 .640
* partially standardized results
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6. Discussion.
This section addresses the outcomes of hypothesis testing. First, a summary of the results will be
provided. Thereafter, results will be comprehended in perspective of the academic literature reviewed
in section three. Finally, the limitations of this research layout will be discussed.
6.1. Results summary.
6.1.1. Low monetary setting.
In the case of a low monetary compensation setting, results show that it has, as expected, a direct
negative effect on intention to participate. Additionally, extrinsic and intrinsic motivation are related,
which leads to partial mediation of the relationship between low monetary compensation and intention
to participate. All three indirect effects were significant. The path testing for both extrinsic and intrinsic
motivation lead to positive effect on intention to participate. Extrinsic motivation based on a low
monetary compensation positively affected willingness to participate. However, intrinsic motivation in
a low monetary setting lead to less willingness to participate. This supported the conjecture that intrinsic
motivation has a stronger negative effect on intention to participate than the positive effect of extrinsic
motivation on intention to participate. Therefore, from the results above, it can be concluded that
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation both partially mediate the relationship between low monetary rewards
and intention to participate even though there is no negative sequential mediation. This implies that they
both are mediators of the relationship but independently of one another.
6.1.2. High monetary setting.
In contrast to expectations, no direct relationship was found between a high monetary incentive
scheme and individual’s willingness to participate. Consequently, the main hypothesis that higher
compensation leads to more willingness to participate was rejected. However, significant indirect
effects stand out and are still relevant for interpretation following Hayes’ argument (2009). The indirect
effect of extrinsic motivation based on high compensation had a positive influence on intention to
participate, whilst the path testing for intrinsic motivation based on high compensation remained
negative for intention to participate contrary to expectations. However, the difference in size between
the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on intention to participate decreased in the high
compensation setting in comparison to the low compensation setting. This implies that a higher
monetary incentive did have an influence on the both mediators and individual’s intention to participate.
Additionally, there was evidence of sequential mediation for intrinsic and extrinsic motivation even
though the negative effect was not proven. Therefore, it can be concluded that they both mediate the
relationship independently of one another. In conclusion, there is thus no statistically supported
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argument that a higher compensation level leads to more willingness to participate whilst intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation do mediate that relationship.
6.2. Discussion of the results and perspective on previous literature findings.
6.2.1. Crowding out of intrinsic motivation.
One could say that Titmuss’ intuition was right (1970). As Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), and
many others, have proven low monetary incentives have a negative effect on intrinsic motivation. This
study is another addition to the literature supporting the theory that low monetary incentives crowd out
individual’s intrinsic motivation. In low monetary setting, individuals were more sensitive to intrinsic
factors than extrinsic and the introduction of a low monetary reward negatively affected their intrinsic
motives which resulted in less willingness to participate. It is however important to note that the effect
on extrinsic motivation was positive. Thus, the resulting decrease in intention to participate has to be
interpreted as a simple sum, intrinsic motivation’s effect was larger than the one of extrinsic motivation
and lead to less willingness to participate.
The implications for a participation income scheme are the following. Intrinsic motivation
seems to clearly dominate individuals’ motives of participation. Therefore, it appears as important to
frame participation accordingly and ensure individuals understand their participation is meaningful to
society and not only a mean to receive monetary compensation. This is a point that Bowles and Polonia-
Reyes (2012) underlined as crucial to enhance the effectiveness of monetary incentives. Additionally,
it is clear that a PI scheme should not be elaborated on the basis of low monetary rewards or the intended
effect will not be reached and participation will be lower than if no compensation at all would have
been offered.
6.2.2. Higher incentives, higher performance.
The testing of the effectiveness of higher incentives on intention to participate is more
mitigated. There is no evidence that higher monetary incentives lead to more willingness to participate.
However, one can argue that there is an underlying effect of increasing the level of compensation. As
it was mentioned in section 6.1.2., the difference in effect size between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
on intention to participate decreased in the high compensation level compared to the low. This can be
interpreted as a first sign that the effect of a higher compensation is relevant but smaller than expected.
Thus, a higher increase in monetary reward would be necessary to lead to significant results. Heyman
and Ariely (2004) hypothesized that a higher monetary reward would lead to higher performance, an
assumption that is not significantly supported through this study even though there is strong evidence
for it. The main contribution of this study would then be the to illustrate the dilemma described by
Reeson and Tisdell (2008). They argue that policy makers are faced with a dilemma when trying to
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incentivize contribution to public good. On one hand not to decrease intrinsic motivation with monetary
rewards while still attracting extrinsically motivated individuals through them. They give a high
monetary reward as a solution to avoid adversely affecting intrinsic motives, however in the case of this
study, the compensation still negatively affected intention to participate for intrinsic motivation.
6.3. Contributions to theory and suggestions for future research.
This research contributed to discussions addressed in the academic field. First, it sheds a new
light on participation income and its potential. By addressing PI’s previous limitations and identifying
the new ones, this paper contributed to restart the debate surrounding PI and make it a relevant welfare
measure. The proposed use of blockchain technology and recent trend of the sharing economy provide
new insights in how the public sector can be restructured. Indeed, changes ahead induced by
technological progress will represent a challenge for every country and this proposal represents the first
step towards actively addressing the issue. There are many more aspects open to investigation such as
the overall effectiveness of a complete PI scheme also including “traditional” activities such as full time
work or studying. It is hoped this first study will induce many more discussion amongst scholars on the
new future for participation income and its elaboration.
Moreover, this paper offers additional evidence of the negative effect of low monetary
compensation on intrinsic motivation, and thus supports crowding out theory. Whilst the direct positive
effect of higher monetary rewards could not be proven, a clear link between the monetary compensation
setting and intention to participate was established as well as the mediating role of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation in that relationship. In line with these results, as the effect of higher monetary rewards could
not significantly be proven, several choices can be made. Future researchers can attempt to tackle this
limitation by investigating the effect of a higher incentive on motivation, or research whether the same
incentive on a specific target group has a different effect. This point will also be discussed in the next
section.
To conclude, with the argued new relevance of a participation scheme, many questions remain
unanswered and offer material for future research. Another possibility is to tackle this research’s
limitation, mentioned in the next paragraph, in order to achieve more significant results.
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6.4. Contribution to policy makers.
Another way to interpret this paper’s results is from the viewpoint of policy makers. From the
beginning, the position this research defended is that current welfare measures are outdated. If one
considered the academic literature on alternative welfare measures, universal basic income and
participation income stood out. Given the results of this study, as monetary compensation harms
intrinsic motivation, one could argue that they support the defense of a UBI scheme. However, as it was
previously established, it must not be forgotten that UBI is a measure that does not convince a majority
of individuals and fails to secure political support as opposed to participation income. Moreover, results
certainly do not reject the overall relevance of PI, simply that there is more research needed to set the
right level of compensation which mostly depends on the expectations of policy makers.
Accordingly, the weaker effect of extrinsic motivation given by the results in a high monetary
compensation setting has to be analysed with the intentions of policy makers in mind . If policy makers
envision a future PI scheme intended for the whole population, the level of compensation needs to be
reconsidered. As a final PI scheme should also incorporate “traditional” activities such as studying or
full time employment, a compensation set a the level of minimum income can appear insufficient for a
majority of individuals. Thus, it is still necessary to determine how much higher the compensation level
should be set to allow for higher intrinsic motivation whilst also not harming individual’s intrinsic
motives. On the other hand, if policy makers seek to develop a PI scheme intended for individuals
currently without occupation, a scheme closer to workfare, while further investigation is required, the
compensation level set in this study might be sufficient to extrinsically motivate individuals.
6.5. Limitations.
Understandably, several limitations were faced during the elaboration of this research. Even
though the validity and significance of all results are supported and defended in this paper, the reader
should also keep the following limitations in mind.
First, the hypothetical nature of all vignette experiments represents a limitation to the
interpretation of individual’s willingness to participate. There always is a difference between a real and
a hypothetical situation, no matter how strong internal and external validity are. In the case of this
experiment, it is possible individuals were more willing to participate because they knew they would
not have to actually commit to this project. It is also possible that the level of monetary reward was not
as relevant as expected compared to intrinsic motives because individuals knew they would never
receive that monetary reward. Neil et al. (1994) investigated this effect on hypothetical payments
showing they were consistently higher than real payments, thus proving that individuals commitments
in theoretical settings is sometimes overestimated compared to their actual willingness. Such
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discrepancies are inherent to a study construct like a vignette experiment and thus inevitable, it is
however still important to underline them.
Another possible point of critique for this research would be the composition as well as the size
of the sample. Even though it was attempted to create an as diverse as possible sample population, most
of the respondents were students and two major subgroups of a representative population sample were
missing: retired individuals and individuals looking for employment. Thus, it cannot be argued that this
sample is representative of a country’s population. Moreover, the data set gathered in total 120
respondents, whilst it is a sufficient amount of participants to have a statistically significant result, a
larger group would have been preferred.
This point leads to another limitation of this study, namely time and financial resources. If more
time was available for this research, it probably would have been possible to gather a larger data set or
even consider to elaborate a more complex and demanding real-life experiment.
Finally, a last point that could be considered for future research would be the determination of
a high level of compensation. From the results, a high compensation equal to the minimum wage is not
enough to extrinsically motivate individuals and lead to more willingness to participate. With more
time, it would have been possible to pre-test for such considerations, asking individuals what a high
compensation would represent for them and thus better investigate its effects. Therefore, it is suggested
that for further research, one considers to test for different levels of high and low compensation and
investigate how intention to participate varies accordingly.
7. Conclusion.
In today’s fast changing world, individuals have to face new challenges and the role of the State
has to be redefined, especially when thinking of welfare measures. Previous debates in academic
literature discussed which proposals represented a better alternative to the current welfare system. This
paper argued that participation income is the best alternative to current welfare system. Afterwards, it
answered the following research question: Are individuals more willing to engage in socially desirable
activities not recognized by the State today in a Participation Income setting or in the current welfare
system? Is this willingness dependent on the level of compensation?
First, this paper argued that participation income represents and ethically and politically
superior idea to other welfare proposals and would induce more participation in socially valuable
activities than the current welfare system. Moreover, the outdated arguments made against PI such as
its administrative overload and risk of government steered definition of participation were addressed
and solved with the new revolutionizing blockchain technology and the recent trend of the sharing
economy.
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After addressing PI’s outdated unfeasibility, this paper identified the new relevant challenge
that PI is facing, finding the right level of compensation. As literature in behavioral economics and
psychology suggests, individual’s intention to participate or performance is not defined by a clear and
straight forward relationship with the level of compensation. On the contrary, it was found that low
levels of compensation carry a risk of crowding out intrinsic motivation whilst higher level of
compensation do not always lead to a higher level of performance. Therefore, this research identified
a need to investigate the relationship of individual’s willingness to participate in a PI setting depending
on the level of compensation.
To provide an answer as to whether intention to participate is contingent on the level of
compensation, a vignette study was developed. Three vignette scenarios were created, all three
representing the same PI project with the only difference being the level of compensation offered to
individuals in return for their participation. One scenario offered no compensation at all, while the others
respectively offered a low (5 euros) and a high (10 euros) per hour compensation for engaging in
socially valuable activities. Through adapted scales developed from previous peer-reviewed studies, the
survey questionnaire measured how monetary compensation affected participant’s willingness to
participate in a possible PI scheme through intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
Results were found by running a double mediation model through the PROCESS method of
Andrew F. Hayes (2013). They allow to formulate an answer to the second part of the research question.
Individual’s intention to participate is dependent on the level of compensation offered. Results indicated
a low monetary compensation leads to less intention to participate, supporting crowding out theory. The
experiment for higher compensation gives somewhat more mitigated results. No significant relationship
is found on how a high compensation affects willingness to participate, even though it still appears that
the higher the compensation the less intrinsic motivation is negatively affected by it.
32
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