CURRENT MILITARY AIMS AND STRATEGIES LONG RANGE BALANCE OF POWER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. TO GUARANTEE SEA BORNE ACCESS TO SUPPLY AND.

CURRENT MILITARY AIMS AND STRATEGIES

• LONG RANGE BALANCE OF POWER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

• TO GUARANTEE SEA BORNE ACCESS TO SUPPLY AND ROUTES OF TRADE

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

PLA ORGANISATION

• CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION PLA-ARMY PLA- NAVY PLA-AIRFORCE SECOND ARTILLERY

FORCE

• MILITARY REGION• GP ARMIES (CORPS

EQUIVALENT)

PLA DOCTRINE

• ACTIVE DEFENCE.• RAPID REACTION

FORCES.

•LIMITED WAR UNDER HIGH TECHNOLOGY CONDITIONS.

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY-NAVY

PLA-N ORGANISATION

• THREE FLEETS– NORTH SEA– EAST SEA– SOUTH SEA

• 700 SHIPS, 75 SUBMARINES AND 500 COMBAT AIRCRAFTS

PLA-N MODERNISATION

• PURCHASED RUSSIAN KILO CLASS SUBMARINES.

• ADDITION OF NEW INDIGENOUSLY BUILT DESTROYERS, FRIGATES, SUPPLY SHIPS & LANDING CRAFTS.

• MODERN ANTI SUBMARINE AND ANTI AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS.

NAVAL FORCE PROJECTION STRATEGY

• IMMEDIATE– TO DOMINATE SEAS ON HER

BORDERS.– TO WREST CONTROL OVER

ENTIRE SOUTH CHINA SEA, TAIWAN & EAST CHINA SEA.

• SUBSEQUENT– TO DOMINATE SLOC IN

EASTERN INDIAN OCEAN & WEST PACIFIC.

– POWER PROJECTION IN INDIAN OCEAN & WEST PACIFIC.

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE

CMC

PLAAF HQ

5000 COMBAT AIRCRAFTS1000 SAM SYSTEMS

THREE AIRBORNE DIVS 24 ANTI AIRCRAFT DIVS

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCEMODERNISATION PLAN

NEW ACQUISITIONS

J-10

SU-30

SU-27

J-7

J-8UPGRADATIONS

NUCLEAR STATUS

CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

DOCTRINE •NO FIRST USE•NON-USE AGAINST NON NUCLEAR NATIONS•DETER OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS BY MAINTAINING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

CAPABILITY •DELIVERY TRIAD OF ICBM, SLBM AND AIR LAUNCHED

•TYPES SHORT, MEDIUM, LONG RANGE AND INTERCONTINENTAL

980

53140

1.2

1600

250

420

10

470370 362

175

0

300

600

900

1,200

1,500

Th

ou

san

ds

INDIA 980,000 53000 140000 1200

CHINA 1600000 250000 420000 10000

USA 470000 370000 362000 175000

ARMY NAVY AIRFORCE MARINES

COMPARISON FORCES CHINA VIS-À-VIS INDIA AND USA

3,5002500

200

4500

225 35

9200

5000

1000

13000

250 60

8000

24000

30002000

4000

1500

0

3,000

6,000

9,000

12,000

15,000

INDIA 3,500 2500 200 4500 225 35

CHINA 9200 5000 1000 13000 250 60

USA 8000 24000 3000 2000 4000 1500

TANKS AIFV / APC ARTY SP ARTY TOWED HEPTRS UTILITY HEPTRS ARMED

COMPARISON MAJOR EQUIPMENT : ARMY

16

17

13

0

69

0

21

41

0

80

12

54

37

27

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

INDIA 16 1 7 13 0

CHINA 69 0 21 41 0

USA 80 12 54 37 27

SUBMARINES AC CARRIER DESTROYERS FRIGATES CRUISERS

COMPARISON OF NAVIES : PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS AND SUBMARINES

0

680

205

6

13350

950

520

12

170208

2600

830

547

220

0

250

500

750

1,000

1,250

1,500

INDIA 0 680 205 6 133

CHINA 50 950 520 12 170

USA 208 2600 830 547 220

LONG RANGE BOMBERSTAC / RECCE / COMD /

ELINTTRANSPORT TANKERS HEPTRS

COMPARISON OF AIR FORCES

THREAT : LAND

• PLA’S FORMIDABILITY INCREASING AT A RAPID PACE

• EMPHASIS ON INTEGRATED EMPLOYMENT OF AIR, HELICOPTER AND AIRBORNE / SPECIAL FORCES TRAINED IN NBC IN SIMULTANEOUS DEEP BATTLE

• MASSIVE IMPROVEMENT IN LOGISTICS INFRASTRUCTURE

• RADICAL UPGRADATION OF OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY DUE IMPROVEMENT IN COMD AND CONT, SURVEILLANCE AND OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY

MAJOR AND FORMIDABLE THREAT BY 2015 / 2020

THREAT : MARITIME

RAPID UPGRADATION OF CAPABILITY INCLUDING A CARRIER TASKFORCE WITHIN A DECADE

CHINESE NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERS INDIA AS PRINCIPLE ADVERSARY WHEN CHINA PROJECTS NAVAL FORCE ACROSS MALACCA STRAITS

THREAT : AIR

ACQUISITION OF MODERN AIRCRAFTS, MID AIR REFUELLING CAPABILITY AND EXTENSION OF RUNWAYS IN TIBET

CAPABILITY TO THREATEN EASTERN PART OF INDIAN HINTERLAND INCLUDING MOST OF EASTERN SEA COAST

NUCLEARTHREAT

•NUC MSLS LOC IN TIBET

ABILITY TO HITALL PARTS OF THE GLOBE

WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN TO INDIA

NO IMMEDIATE MILITARY THREAT

BY 2015 / 2020 A MODERNISED AND ECONOMICALLY STRONGER CHINA LIKELY TO

FLEX THEIR MUSCLES

INDIAN FORCE DEVELOPMENT MUST CATER FOR A CREDIBLE DETERRENCE CAPABILITY VIS-À-VIS A STRONGER CHINA