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Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the WarsAuthor(s):
Elizabeth KierSource: International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4
(Spring, 1995), pp. 65-93Published by: The MIT PressStable URL:
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Culture and Elizabeth Kier Military Doctrine
France between the Wars
Offensive military doc- trines threaten international stability'
World War I vividly illustrates how a crisis can spark a major war
that might have been avoided if the major players had had defensive
rather than offensive doctrines. Similarly, throughout the Cold
War, the Soviet Army's offensive doctrine in Europe fueled the arms
race and heightened threat perception. The choice between offensive
and defensive military doctrines is at least as important now as
during the Cold War. Al- though restructuring military doctrines
along defensive orientations will not erase ethnic hostilities or
suspend territorial appetites, it could remove one of the
structural impediments to cooperation in the post-Cold War world.
Yet an adequate explanation for why states choose offensive or
defensive military doctrines remains elusive.
Many scholars credit civilian policymakers with formulating
doctrine well- suited to the state's strategic environment, and
blame the armed services' parochial interests for the sometimes
disastrous choice of offensive doctrines.2 However, using
illustrations from doctrinal developments in the French army during
the 1920s and 1930s, this article challenges this portrait of the
role of civilians and military in choices between offensive and
defensive military doctrines. Even during times of increased
international threat, I argue, the international system is
indeterminate of choices between offensive and defen- sive military
doctrines; civilians intervene infrequently in doctrinal
develop-
Elizabeth Kier is Assistant Professor of Political Science at
the University of California at Berkeley.
I would like to thank Martha Finnemore, lain Johnston, Susan
Peterson, Alan Rousso, Jack Snyder, Steve Weber, and especially,
Jonathan Mercer for their thoughtful comments and criticism. Thanks
also to Cate Knapp for research assistance. An earlier version of
this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September
1993.
1. For discussions and debate about the destabilizing effects of
offensive military doctrines, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under
the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January
1978), pp. 167-214; Stephen Van Evera, "The Causes of War" (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984); and
numerous articles in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and
Stephen Van Evera, eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the
First World War, rev. and exp. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1991). 2. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military
Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars
(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Jack Snyder, The
Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the
Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press,
1984);
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 65-93
? 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
65
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International Security 19:4 | 66
ments; and most important, civilian concerns about the
military's power within the state often have the greatest effect on
doctrinal developments.
In addition, the French case highlights the analytical
limitations of assuming that military organizations prefer
offensive doctrines; concerns about increas- ing their size,
autonomy, and prestige do not, I argue, drive doctrinal develop-
ments within the military. Not only do these goals have little to
do with type of military doctrine, but military organizations often
forfeit the attainment of these goals. This is true even in the
case of the preference for greater resources. Furthermore, without
civilian prompting, military organizations often ostracize those
officers advocating a more offensive orientation, and willingly and
dog- matically endorse defensive doctrines.
In this article, I argue that choices between offensive and
defensive military doctrines are best understood from a cultural
perspective.3 There are two parts to my argument. First, military
doctrine is rarely a carefully calculated response to the external
environment. Instead, civilian policymakers have beliefs about the
military's role in society, and these beliefs guide civilian
decisions about the organizational form of the military Civilian
decision-makers must first address their concerns about the
domestic distribution of power before they consider international
incentives. These civilian decisions affect later doctrinal
developments.
Second, military organizations do not inherently prefer
offensive doctrines: their preferences cannot be deduced from
functional characteristics and gener- alized across all military
organizations. Military organizations differ in how they view their
world and the proper conduct of their mission, and these
organizational cultures constrain choices between offensive and
defensive mili- tary doctrines. In particular, the military's
organizational culture guides how it responds to constraints set by
civilian policymakers. Understanding vari- ations in organizational
behavior requires an analysis of cultural characteristics and of
how these characteristics shape militaries' choices between
offensive and defensive doctrines.
In adopting a culturalist approach to the question of the
determinants of offensive and defensive doctrines, this article is
part of a larger debate in the social sciences between the
intersubjective, cultural, and constructivist ap-
3. For a full discussion of the ideas presented in this paper,
see Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military
Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, forthcoming).
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 67
proaches and the more conventional structural, functional, and
"rationalistic" methods. While the former approach never
disappeared, we have recently seen a resurgence of interest in the
influence of ideational factors on political phe- nomena,
especially in international relations scholarship.4
Those using a culturalist approach argue that actors'
preferences cannot be deduced from structural conditions or
functional needs. In many instances, we must understand an actor's
culture in order to make sense of its choices. Independent
exigencies such as the distribution of power, geographic factors,
or technological discoveries are important, but culture is not
simply derivative of functional demands or structural imperatives.
Culture has independent explanatory power. This is especially the
case in choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines:
the preferences the civilians and the military bring to doctrinal
decisions respond to cultural more than to structural or functional
characteristics. Preferences are endogenous; they must be
understood within their cultural context.
The first section of this article outlines the roles both of
domestic politics and of the military's organizational culture in
the origins of military doctrine. The next section uses this
argument to explain doctrinal developments in the French army
during the 1920s and 1930s.5 This is followed by an elaboration of
how culture affects choices between offensive and defensive
military doc- trines, and a discussion of methodological strategies
for gauging culture's explanatory power. I then assess the most
powerful alternative explanations of choices between offensive and
defensive military doctrines, and close with a brief discussion of
policy implications.
Culture and Doctrine
I argue that military doctrine is primarily the product of
domestic political and organizational factors. Civilian elites hold
beliefs about the nature of military force and the military's role
in society These beliefs-such as the value of
4. For example, see Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order:
A Pluralistic Security Com- munity," in Beverly Crawford, ed., The
Future of European Security (Berkeley: International and Area
Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1992); Friedrich V.
Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and
Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989);
Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," International
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-426. 5. The
arguments presented in this article are based on a study of the
French and British army and air force during the interwar period.
For a discussion of case selection see Kier, Imagining War.
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International Security 19:4 | 68
conscription or of a particular type of army-establish
constraints. But these constraints do not determine choices between
offensive and defensive military doctrines. Instead, it is how a
military's organizational culture responds to these constraints
that determines doctrine. Other militaries would not respond
similarly; constrained within an organization that has powerful
assimilating mechanisms, the officer corps "sees" only certain
doctrinal options. Domestic politics set constraints; the
military's culture interprets these constraints; the organizational
culture is the intervening variable between civilian decisions and
military doctrine.6
THE DOMESTIC BALANCE OF POWER
Military doctrine is about state survival, but military policy
also affects the allocation of power within the state. Thus,
designing military policy requires that policymakers consider,
first and foremost, how the distribution of power at the domestic
level affects their own interests.
Civilian choices in military policy often reflect fears about
the distribution of power within the state. In Britain, for
example, civilians have sought for centuries to avoid the creation
of an efficient and centralized army that could threaten
parliamentary sovereignty Any potential increase in military
efficiency would have to yield to civilian insistence on stifling
the growth of a strong military caste whose interests might be at
odds with the state. Similarly, the relatively poor condition of
the Austrian army in the 1890s corresponded to the Magyars' fears
of the domestic repercussions of a strong army, and not to the
requirements of Austria's position in the international system.7 It
is hardly surprising that Madison and Hamilton devoted substantial
portions of The Federalist Papers to explaining that the proposed
military institutions would not threaten domestic interests.8
Such concerns about the distribution of power within the state
become institutionalized and shape decision-makers' views of
military policy In many instances, they persist past their initial
formulation, so that when civilians make decisions about military
policy, their choices reflect their country's past expe- rience
with the armed services and the role that the military played in
securing a particular distribution of power within the state.
6. I have used Barry Posen's definitions of offensive and
defensive military doctrines. See Posen, Sources of Military
Doctrine, pp. 13-15. 7. FR. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: the
Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914 (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 255. 8. For example, see Nos. 8, 24, and 26
by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers, Clinton Rossiter,
ed. (New York: New American Library, 1961).
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 69
To capture the role of domestic politics in choices between
offensive and defensive military doctrines, I focus on
political-military subcultures; that is, civilian policymakers'
beliefs about the role of armed force in the domestic arena. The
composition of the subculture varies from state to state and among
political actors in a state; at its heart are a number of important
questions about the military's power within the state. For example,
what is the perception of the role of the military in society? Do
domestic political actors fear the latent force inherent in
military organizations? Many of the answers originate in each
state's experience with the military in the state-building
process.
In some countries, all important political actors share the same
view of the military In the 1920s and 1930s, this was the case for
Great Britain, where there was general agreement across the
political spectrum about the role of the armed forces in society In
other countries, as in France during the same period, there are
several competing conceptions. As discussed later, whether there is
one or more than one subculture affects the causal role of cultural
factors. However, in either case, civilian decisions rarely
determine doctrine; the mili- tary's organizational culture works
within the constraints set by civilians.
THE MILITARY S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
Borrowing from the work on organizational culture, I argue that
making sense of military choices between offensive and defensive
doctrines requires an understanding of the military's culture.9
Organizations' perceptions of their world frame their decisions;
this is particularly true of "total" institutions like the
military. Few organizations devote as many resources to the
assimilation of their members. The emphasis on ceremony and
tradition, and the develop- ment of a common language and esprit de
corps, testify to the strength of the military's organizational
culture.10
The culture of an organization shapes its members' perceptions
and affects what they notice and how they interpret it: it screens
out some parts of reality while magnifying others. I define
organizational culture as the set of basic assumptions and values
that shape shared understandings, and the forms or practices
whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed, and
communicated
9. For useful introductions into the work on organizational
culture, see Andrew Pettigrew, "On Studying Organizational
Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4
(December 1979), pp. 570-581; and the following special issues:
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (September 1983);
and Organization Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1986). 10. For an
application of this concept to security studies, see Jeffrey W.
Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World
War H (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, forthcoming
1995).
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International Security 19:4 | 70
to the members of an organization. I have divided the components
of the military's culture into the values and attitudes relevant to
the military's rela- tionship with its external environment, and
those that affect the internal work- ings of the organization. For
example, what is the military's relationship with the state? Does
it feel accepted and valued by dominant political actors?
Similarly, what skills do the officer corps value: do they model
their behavior on the modern-day business manager or the warrior
and heroic leader?
Determining the culture of a military organization requires an
extensive reading of archival, historical, and other public
documents, including curricula at military academies, training
manuals, personal histories of officers, internal communications in
the armed services, and leading military journals. It is important
to look for who or what is considered deviant or taboo in the
culture and what it is about such people or beliefs that conflicts
with the organization's culture.
Militaries' beliefs shape how the organization responds to
changes in its external environment, but not all militaries share
the same collection of ideas about armed force.11 Not all military
organizations would react similarly to the same constraints set by
civilian policymakers. For example, although a civilian decision
about the length of conscription severely constrained what the
French army thought was possible, differing lengths of conscription
has had little effect on German or British army choices.
"Military culture" does not mean military mind; it does not
refer to a general set of values and attitudes that all militaries
share. All military organizations can be classified according to a
basic set of components, but not all military organizations share
the same mixture of values and attitudes. Nor is this an argument
about strategic culture.12 Organizational culture refers to the
collec- tively held beliefs within a particular military
organization, not to the beliefs held by civilian policymakers.
Finally, organizational culture is not the primor- dial notion
sometimes found in analyses of strategic culture: the military's
organizational culture is not equivalent to the national
character.13 The mili- tary's culture may reflect some aspects of
the civilian society's culture, but this
11. The military's organizational culture influences how it
interprets all incoming information, whether from the domestic or
the international environment. 12. For example, see Alastair I.
Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in
Ming China (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
forthcoming 1995). 13. Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military
Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Vol.
19, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31.
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 71
is not necessarily the case. The military's powerful
assimilation processes can displace the influence of the civilian
society.14
Focusing exclusively on either domestic politics or the
military's organiza- tional culture provides neither a necessary
nor a sufficient explanation of choices between offensive and
defensive doctrines. Choices by civilian policy- makers set
constraints-the length of conscription or type of army-but these
constraints do not determine doctrine. Instead, a military's
organizational cul- ture must work within these constraints. But
the organizational culture alone also does not explain doctrine.
There must be some change in the external environment of the
organization-primarily as a result of domestic politics-to which
the organizational culture reacts.
French Military Doctrine, 1919-39
The Maginot Line has come to symbolize the highly defensive
doctrine that the French army took to war in 1939. The events that
led to the construction of the Maginot Line and its accompanying
operational doctrine resulted from domestic conflict over military
policy and the limits imposed by the French army's culture. Since
the mid-nineteenth century, the left and right had fought over the
organizational form of the army While the right demanded a profes-
sional army that, in its view, could insure domestic order and
stability, the left feared that a professional army would do the
bidding of the reactionary segments of society, and believed that
only militia or reserve forces could guarantee the survival of the
French Republic.15 Driven by this preoccupation, a coalition of
center and left-wing parties reduced the length of conscription to
one year in 1928.
This civilian decision did not force the French army to adopt a
defensive doctrine. The politicians established the organizational
form of the army, but it was the French army's organizational
culture that sealed France's fate. An- other military organization
could have responded differently to a constraint that, in the
French army's eyes, left them only one option. Despite evidence
14. Although this article does not address the origins of
military culture, it highlights two impor- tant issues: that
culture is not merely a reflection of structural conditions, nor is
it simply being used instrumentally. For an extended discussion of
the origins of military cultures see Kier, Imagining War. 15.
Standing or professional armies are composed of volunteer (regular)
soldiers serving during peacetime and war; conscript and militia
armies are composed of citizen-soldiers who are normally employed
in the civilian sector but are liable for military service during a
national emergency.
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International Security 19:4 | 72
from the German army, French officers could not see that
conscript armies were good for anything but defensive doctrines. In
their view, only years of service could endow a soldier with the
necessary skills for offensive warfare.
Despite the compelling strategic environment, French
policymakers re- sponded to domestic, not international factors
when deciding on the organiza- tional structure of the army The
reduction in the term of conscription to one year responded to the
left's fear of domestic threats, not to German capabilities or
alliance diplomacy The army reacted to this decision within the
constraints of its organizational culture. Instead of choosing an
offensive doctrine as posited by functional arguments, the French
army adopted a defensive doc- trine.
COMPETING POLITICAL-MILITARY SUBCULTURES
Within months of the signing of the 1918 Armistice, the old
political struggle reemerged between the French left and right over
the organizational form of the French army The left called for an
army based on short-term conscripts.16 In the left's view, it was
imperative that the army not be a separate caste, isolated from
society and imbued with military values. If the army were able to
retain the conscript for several years, it would be able to elicit
passive obedience and to use this force for domestic repression. A
writer in L'Humanite explained that, "the fear of a popular army
tied to the masses haunts the chief of staff. As class warfare
worsens, the army leaders increasingly attempt to recruit soldiers
whom they hope to make into docile instruments." 17 In the left's
view, it was only by eliminating the professional army that the
threat to French democracy would diminish.
Fear of the latent domestic force of a professional army had
dominated leftist rhetoric and legislative agendas since the
Franco-Prussian war. The left's mili- tary projects ranged from the
establishment of a purely militia force to an army composed
primarily of reserves with a small professional core. Integral to
each position was a short length of conscription and the abolition
or subordination of the professional component of the army During
parliamentary debates over the length of conscription in the early
1920s, a radical socialist declared that "it is necessary that
France have the army of its policies; but I do not want France
16. For illustrations of the left's subculture see Jean Jaures,
L'armee nouvelle (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1977); and Joseph
Monteilhet, Les Institutions militaires de la France (Paris: Felix
Alcan, 1932). 17. Paul Vaillant-Couturier, "Obeissance passive et
l'armee de metier," L'Humanite, July 5, 1934, p. 1.
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 73
to carry out the policies of her army."18 The left feared the
repressive power of a professional army
In contrast, the French right preferred the retention of a
professional army The right, too, believed that the number of years
that the soldier served in the ranks determined whether or not the
army could be relied upon to maintain the status quo. In a domestic
crisis, only soldiers toughened by many years of strict discipline
could be depended upon to guarantee social stability and the
preservation of law and order. Creating citizen-soldiers would, in
their view, strengthen the revolutionary forces in society In the
nineteenth century, Louis Adolphe Thiers declared that he did not
want "obligatory military service which will enflame passions and
put a rifle on the shoulder of all the socialists; I want a
professional army, solid, disciplined, and capable of eliciting
respect at home and abroad."19
Whereas the left sought to avoid a deep divide between the army
and society by minimizing the length of conscription, the right
wanted to keep the con- script under arms for at least two years.
While the right agreed that a shorter military service was
sufficient to train soldiers in the technical aspects of the trade,
it argued for more time to create the necessary obedience.20 Before
the parliament, Horace de Choiseul explained this process: "A
soldier that has served for one year has learned without doubt to
use his weapons, but he has not learned to obey; his character has
not been subjugated, his will has not been broken; he has not yet
become what makes an army strong: obeissance passive."21 Developed
in the eighteenth century to fight against insubordination and
insure obedience whoever the adversary, this autocratic conception
of command insured, in Gouvion-Saint Cyr's words, that orders
should be fol- lowed "literally, without a murmur or
hesitation."22
Remembering the worker's revolt of 1848 and hardened by their
experience during the Commune, the right felt that one of the
army's chief tasks was to preserve peace at home. As the Germans
were approaching Paris in 1940,
18. Quoted in Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire politique de la
Troisieme Republique, Vol. 3, L'apres-guerre (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1968), p. 311. 19. Quotation from Joseph
Monteilhet, "L'avenement de la nation armee," Revue des e'tudes
Napoleoniennes (September-October 1918), p. 51. 20. General Jules
Louis Lewal, Contre le service de deux ans (Paris: Librairie
Militaire de Baudoin, 1895), pp. 46-52 and 77; and Richard D.
Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 85-87. 21. Quoted in
Monteilhet, Institutions militaires, p. 166. 22. Quoted in Serge
William Sherman, Le corps de officiers franqais sous la deuxieme
republique et le second empire (These presentee devant l'universite
de Paris IV, 18 December 1976), p. 718.
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International Security 19:4 | 74
General Maxime Weygand, the commander in chief of the French
army, reveal- ingly declared that "Ah! If only I could be sure the
Germans would leave me the necessary forces to maintain
order!"23
Although French civilians of both right and left were acutely
aware of their weakness relative to Germany, it was their
perception of domestic rather than international threats that
shaped the pivotal decision about the French army's organizational
structure. A collection of center and left-wing parties captured
the parliament in 1924, and within three years adopted a series of
bills that established the organizational structure of the army The
left's agenda had triumphed; the length of conscription was reduced
to one year. The reason for the left's rejection of the longer
service had nothing to do with Germany, Britain, or the Eastern
allies. As the head of the Socialist Party, Leon Blum, warned, a
longer term of service would "be a danger for republican liberties,
that is to say for domestic peace."24
THE FRENCH ARMY S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
The French army objected to the shorter term of service, but
once it was adopted, the army had no choice but to design a
doctrine around this decision. However, nothing about a shorter
length of service objectively required the switch in 1928 to a
defensive doctrine. The French army had an offensive orientation in
the 1920s, and this could have continued; an offensive doctrine was
objectively possible. The French army did not suffer from a lack of
financial support; the requisite material for armored warfare could
have been acquired. Nor were they unaware of offensive
alternatives. The French army was well versed on doctrinal
developments in Germany, and had its own advocates of offensive
mechanized warfare. French civilians neither demanded a defensive
doctrine nor actively participated in the formation of army
doctrine. Even construction of the Maginot Line left open offensive
possibilities; indeed, the fortifications were initially conceived
to support offensive operations. The French army had the money,
ideas, and freedom to adopt an offensive doctrine, but it instead
chose a defensive doctrine. Its organizational culture would not
allow otherwise.
The French army could not imagine an offensive doctrine with
short-term conscripts. For the French officer, one-year conscripts
were good for only one thing: a defensive doctrine. In the army's
view, "young troops" could only be
23. Quoted in Brian Crozier, DeGaulle: The Warrior (London: Eyre
Methuen, 1973), p. 97. 24. Leon Blum, "A bas l'arm6e de m6tier!" Le
Populaire, December 1, 1934 (emphasis added).
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 75
engaged "methodically"; they could not handle sophisticated
technology or new methods of warfare, nor could they demonstrate
the type of elan necessary for offensive actions. To most French
officers, a one-year term of conscription reduced the army to
marginal value. As an officer explained, "short term conscripts
[are].... in the end, a myriad of men, ready for everything, good
at nothing, whose average output is very low; morose, fussy, and
passive."25 In 1930 General Antoine Targe noted that "only a
professional army could go beyond our frontiers. . . . A militia
army is appropriate for the defense of prepared positions, not
maneuver."26
With only short-term conscripts, General Henri Mordacq
explained, "it was absolutely impossible to give our troops an
instruction responding to the demands of modern warfare."27 The
vice president of the Superior Council of War and inspector general
of the army, General Weygand, agreed about the marginal value of
the French conscript army, saying in 1932, "The character and the
possibilities of the French army were profoundly modified the day
that France adopted military service of less than two years....
Today's army is much weaker and less prepared to fight than the
army in 1914."28 Representing only quantity, short-term conscripts
could not be entrusted with offensive operations.
It is important to note that not all military organizations
shared the French officer corps' evaluation of conscript or reserve
forces. For example, the Ger- man army did not agree. While Joseph
Joffre was declaring that "under no circumstances will we absorb
the reserve formations in the active units," the German army was
stating that "reserve troops will be employed in the same way as
the active troops."29 In other words, an officer assimilated into
the German army would have reacted differently to the reduction in
the term of conscription. It was not the "objective" value of a
conscript army that deter- mined French doctrine.
Charles DeGaulle's advocacy of an offensive doctrine in the
1930s raises questions about this argument. DeGaulle was a French
officer, assimilated into the culture of the French army, calling
for the adoption of an offensive doctrine
25. Capitaine G. (pseud.), "L'arm6e nouvelle et le service d'un
an," Revue militaire geine'rale (August 1921), p. 594. 26. General
Antoine Targe, La garde des frontieres (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle,
1930), pp. 87 and 95-96. 27. General Henri Mordacq, La defense
nationale en danger (Paris: Les editions de France, 1938), p. 2.
28. Service historique de l'arm6e de terre (SHAT), 1 N 42, file 2,
Etat-major Maxime Weygand, Conseil Sup6rieur de la Guerre (CSG),
"Rapport sur l'6tat de l'arm&e," May 1932. 29. Jean Feller, Le
dossier de l'arme'e franqaise (Paris: Librairie Academique Perrin,
1966), p. 65.
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International Security 19:4 | 76
after the reduction in the length of conscription. This seems to
suggest that the reduction in the length of conscription was not
decisive. Yet a closer look at DeGaulle's campaign illustrates both
the strength of the French army's culture and the importance of
domestic politics.
DeGaulle was convinced that France's defense depended on the
adoption of a new offensive doctrine, yet he endorsed these
offensive operations only if they were coupled with a special force
of 100,000 professionals serving six years of military service. As
a product of the organizational culture of the French army,
DeGaulle could not imagine entrusting young, unseasoned troops with
the tasks involved in offensive mechanized warfare. Only
professional soldiers, he believed, possessed the skill and
training to implement lightning armored attacks. DeGaulle persisted
in holding this belief even though he was well aware of the
political hurdles to the creation of a professional force of long-
serving soldiers.
The reception that DeGaulle's ideas received in the French army
further reveals the link between a professional army and an
offensive doctrine in the organizational culture of the French army
The high command was not per- suaded. A primary reason for their
rejection of DeGaulle's ideas was that the creation of the
specialized corps would, in their view, cut the army in two.30
Because the officer corps could not imagine a way for the conscript
army to implement DeGaulle's proposal, adopting this new doctrine
would require taking the army's professionals out of the conscript
army, leaving it stripped of its professional officers, with little
if any combat value. The French officer corps could only accept the
package of DeGaulle's ideas; separating the offen- sive doctrine
from a professional army was inconceivable. Either these concepts
were to be implemented by professional soldiers, or not at all.
DeGaulle's campaign also reveals the impact of domestic
politics. The left was not pleased with DeGaulle's proposal. A
commentator in a leftist magazine captured this sentiment when he
referred to DeGaulle's proposed force as "hand-hired killers of
which each possess all the aptitudes of murder and all the
extraordinary instruments to kill." He asks, "when will this army
then march on Paris?",31 This fear of the domestic
ramifications-and not whether these ideas were most suited to repel
a German attack-emerges time and
30. General Eugene Debeney, "Encore l'arm6e de m6tier," Revue
des deux mondes (July 15, 1935), pp. 285-290; and General Maxime
Weygand, La France est-elle defendue? (Paris: Flammarion, 1937), p.
23. 31. Jacques Lefrancq and Leo Moulin, "Dialogue sur l'arm6e de
la classe 15 a la classe 25," Esprit, Vol. 32 (May 1935).
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 77
again in the leftist press and parliamentary debate. In
discussing DeGaulle's project, Leon Blum exclaimed that "in order
to save the national independence of France, you are risking the
loss of her domestic liberty."32 Similarly, Edouard Daladier, the
leader of the Radical Socialist Party, worried that a professional
army might be "more dangerous than one might believe for the
security of our nation."33 Not surprisingly, however, the extreme
right welcomed DeGaulle's proposal for a professional army.34
Even though the international environment had become
dramatically more threatening, the domestic political divide
persisted. Domestic considerations determined the army's reliance
on a mass conscript army Once this constraint was set, the French
army could see only one possibility DeGaulle and the French army
were incapable of decoupling offensive concepts from a profes-
sional army, yet insisting on a professional force doomed
DeGaulle's efforts, because such a force was politically
impossible. The French were trapped; the left would not accept a
professional army and the army could not imagine an offensive
doctrine without one.
Culture as an Explanation
This section explores two important issues raised by my argument
about the role of culture in doctrinal developments: first, how
does culture-both the political-military subcultures and the
military's organizational culture-affect outcomes? Second, how can
one have confidence in these cultural explana- tions?
I argue that the number of subcultures affects the causal role
of the political- military subculture. Some states have only one
subculture-during the inter- war period, the British civilians
concurred on fundamental questions about the domestic position of
the armed forces-while others have two or more com- peting
subcultures, e.g., during the same period in France. Both show the
importance of ideational factors, but they work in different
ways.35
32. Quoted in Feller, Dossier de l'armee francaise, p. 218. 33.
Quoted in Pierre Hoff, Les programmes d'armement de 1919 2 1938
(Vincennes: Service historique de l'armee de terre, 1982), p. 157.
34. General Alfred Conquet, L'Enigme des blindes (Paris: Nouvelles
Editions Latines, 1956), pp. 62 and 71; Hoff, Programmes
d'armement, p. 141; and Ladislas Mysyrowicz, Anatomie d'une defaite
(Laussane: Editions de l'age d'homme, 1983), pp. 237-238 and 248.
35. This discussion draws heavily on Ann Swidler, "Culture in
Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review, Vol.
51, No. 2 (April 1986), pp. 273-286.
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International Security 19:4 | 78
If there are competing subcultures, the subculture works more
like an ideol- ogy, "as a highly articulate, self-conscious belief
system, aspiring to offer a unified answer to social action."36 It
is coherent and consistent. In France, both of the opposing
subcultures contained explicit policy prescriptions about the
organizational form of the army; the left wanted short-term
conscripts, the right a professional army The ideologies play a
direct and visible role in determining military policy
In contrast, where there is only one political-military
subculture, this consen- sus resembles "common sense." Free from
having to justify or defend itself against a competing set of
beliefs, consensual subcultures contain fewer explicit directives
for action. In Britain, for example, it is taken for granted that
the country does not want a strong standing army independent of
legislative control, but the specifics of military policy are not
articulated. The independent role of culture is more difficult to
determine and has a weaker, less direct control over action. But
culture is important: it constrains action by establishing what is
"natural." It gives us our common sense, but it also screens out
parts of reality by limiting what we see and even what we can
imagine.
The presence of one or more than one subculture also affects how
civilian intervention in doctrinal developments corresponds to
systemic imperatives. Where there is only one subculture, the
civilians will not be consumed with domestic battles over military
policy and, as a result, their decisions are more likely to reflect
the external environment. Where subcultures compete, civilian
decisions are more likely to respond to domestic
considerations.37
But why call the civilians' choices "cultural" rather than
"interests"? Because "interests" do not tell the whole story; we
must understand the meaning-or cultural connotations-that actors
attach to certain policies. Similar social- economic positions do
not necessarily mean similar policy positions across national
boundaries. We cannot assume that all left-wing parties, like the
French in the 1920s, fear a professional army, nor that all
right-wing parties do not want a conscript army There is nothing
inherent in a conscript or militia army that makes it a force for
the left. The types of armies that the British left and the French
left imagined to be in their interests are opposite. For the French
left, conscription expressed community spirit, equality, and most
important, it insured against the growth of a praetorian guard. For
the British left, conscrip-
36. Ibid., p. 279. 37. For a discussion of potential hypotheses
about the origins of offensive and defensive doctrines, see Kier,
Imagining War.
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 79
tion attacked individual liberty and was a tool of continental
imperialism. Whereas the French left liked militia forces; the
American left feared them, and with good reason. Although militias
in the United States had been in decline since the 1820s, they
underwent a dramatic revival in the late 1870s, especially after
the great railroad strike of 1877. Strikebreaking became the
militia's main function, and states with large working-class
populations took the lead in the militia's revival.38 In 1892,
Samuel Gompers declared that "membership in a labor organization
and a militia at one and the same time is inconsistent and
incompatible."39
The very social forces that opposed reliance on a conscript army
in France -the Right-mobilized in support of this system in both
England and the United States.40 In the early part of this century,
the American left bitterly attacked proposals for national service
and instead advocated the creation of a well-equipped and volunteer
professional force. What the U.S. left supported, the French left
opposed (and the French right supported). To make sense of these
choices, we must understand the meanings attached to policies; that
is, we must examine the relevant cultures.
How does the military's organizational culture affect doctrinal
develop- ments? Traditional cultural approaches assume that culture
shapes action by supplying the ultimate ends or values; actors
change their behavior to achieve these ends.41 This is end-guided
action: the means vary, but the goal (provided by the culture)
remains constant. Instead, I adopt the approach developed by the
sociologist Ann Swidler, who argues that culture provides means,
not ends; culture provides a particular (and limited) "way of
organizing action."
There is no a priori preference for an offensive or a defensive
doctrine within a military culture. Instead, the culture contains
certain approaches to a variety of issues that provide each
military with a finite number of ways to order behavior. In
Swidler's words, every culture contains "tool kits" or a "reper-
toire" of ways to organize behavior. For example, the British and
German armies have different assumptions about how to structure
command patterns. The command patterns in the British army closely
resembled the hierarchical
38. Barton C. Hacker, "The United States Army as a National
Police Force: The Federal Policing of Labor Disputes, 1877-1898,"
Military Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 1969), p. 259. 39. Stephen
Skrowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of
National Administrative Capacities 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), p. 105. 40. John Whiteclay Chambers,
"Conscripting for Colossus: The Progressive Era and the Origins of
the Modern Military Draft in the United States in World War I," in
Peter Karsten, ed., The Military in America: From the Colonial Era
to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1980). 41. Swidler,
"Culture in Action," pp. 274-278.
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International Security 19:4 | 80
arrangement of the English gentry; the idea of a subordinate
exercising initia- tive was practically unthinkable.42 In contrast,
the Prussian army's concept of auftragstaktik endorsed a degree of
decentralization, initiative, trust, and mutual respect that was
unheard-of in the British army.43
During the 1930s the French army did not value a defensive
doctrine and thus adopt one. That would be end-driven behavior.
Instead, the organizational culture contained a set of elements
that limited the possible types of action. The army choose the
doctrine that corresponded with the possibilities con- tained
within its culture. If the French army's culture had contained
different assumptions about the value of short-term conscripts, it
might have adopted an offensive doctrine.
This view of culture's explanatory role allows for change in the
dependent variable-doctrine-despite continuity in the intervening
variable, culture. The culture remains relatively static, but
constraints set by the independent vari- ables-technology or
domestic politics-vary The organization continues to think along
the lines set by its culture and integrates exogenous changes into
its established way of doing things. The outcomes (doctrine) may
change but the means (its culture) of getting there stay the same.
In France and Britain, each army's culture remained relatively
static, yet doctrines shifted radically, from offensive prior to
World War I to defensive prior to World War II. To explain this, we
must look at how the British and French armies' (static)
organizational cultures incorporated (changing) variables in their
external en- vironment.
The change in French doctrine is straightforward. In 1913 the
parliament increased the length of conscription to three years; in
1928 it reduced the conscription period to one year. After 1913 the
French army had the type of conscript that its culture assumed
capable of executing offensive operations. After 1928 and the
reduction in the length of conscription, it could imagine only
defensive operations.
We see a similar pattern in the British army, except that this
time the exogenous change came from technology, not from domestic
political con-
42. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortune: The
Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 240;
and Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-first
Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defense, 1985), pp. 228-234. 43.
Eugene Carrias, La Pense'e militaire allemande (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1948), pp. 268-272; and General Robert
Vial, "Les doctrines militaires francaises et allemandes au lende-
main de la premiere guerre mondiale," in L'influence de l'ecole
superieure de guerre sur la pensee militaire fran,aise de 1976 2
nos jours (Paris: Ecole militaire, May 13-14, 1976), pp.
124-125.
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 81
straints. When going on the offensive was a matter of bravery
and morale, the British army could imagine charging forward and
overcoming the opposing forces, and so the British army entered
World War I with an offensive doctrine. However, the defensive
stalemate in Northern France showed that this was no longer
possible. The British army could have responded by incorporating
new technology or tactical changes into an offensive doctrine. If
it had, this would have been value-driven or end-driven behavior: a
change in means in order to continue achieving the same valued end
(an offensive doctrine). This is not what they did; in the decades
after World War I, the British army endorsed a defensive doctrine.
The British army incorporated the enhanced firepower and mobility
into their organizational culture, that is, their existing ways of
organ- izing action. As in the French case, the means (or culture)
stayed constant; the end (or doctrine) changed as the culture
responded to exogenous factors. This explains how something
relatively static (organizational culture) can help ex- plain
change: there must be some change in the external environment of
the organization to which the organizational culture reacts.
CULTURE S CAUSAL AUTONOMY
But how can we have confidence that culture really explains
change? This is important because culture is often used
instrumentally, or is all consequence rather than cause. Political
entrepreneurs can use culture as much as they may be unknowingly
constrained by it. For example, one might mistakenly assume that
London's unwillingness to adopt a continental commitment was part
of its strategic culture. The "British Way of Warfare" called for a
maritime strategy and gained considerable currency during the
interwar period. However, this "tradition" was not a sincere
assumption about British national interests, but instead a myth
manipulated by British civilians to lobby for a policy that they
desired for other reasons. The "British Way of Warfare" was a
politically inspired, not a culturally determined myth.44
There are several strategies to help assess culture's causal
power. First, culture must do more than simply reflect structural
or functional conditions or other "objective" criteria; we must
find individuals or groups who share the same situational
constraints but reach different conclusions. We already saw the
various ways in which the left evaluates conscription. We also saw
that the
44. Britain's reluctance to make a continental commitment in the
1930s was the result of a conscious decision not to tax the
peacetime economy, not of cultural blindness. For a development of
this argument, see Kier, Imagining War.
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International Security 19:4 | 82
German and French armies have very different evaluations of the
value of reserve or conscript forces.
The contrasting positions of the French and British delegations
at the Ver- sailles negotiations is another example. Both countries
shared the same objec- tive interest in the same context: reducing
the military threat posed by Germany. France proposed that Germany
rely solely on a conscript army. A French officer wrote that it
"would be better to let Germany have a relatively numerous army
without seriously trained officers, than a smaller army of
well-tried, proven officers that Germany will have and which I fear
she will know how to make use of."45 Britain reached the opposite
conclusion. Lloyd George worried that with a conscript army
"Germany will train 200,000 men each year, or two million in ten
years. Why make a gift to them of a system which in fifteen to
twenty years will give Germany millions of trained sol- diers?"46
Lloyd George insisted that only the imposition of a professional
army could harness German military power.47 Both countries sought
to contain Germany's offensive potential, but they proposed
opposite prescriptions.
A second way to demonstrate culture's causal role is to show
that the culturally derived preferences were not used
instrumentally to achieve other goals. Otherwise, we can have
little confidence that the "culture" was not invoked as a
justification for a policy chosen for other reasons. For example,
how can we know that the French army really believed that
short-term con- scripts and a defensive doctrine were inseparable
could this belief have been instrumental? Some of the best evidence
comes from the French army's esti- mate of the German army prior to
World War I. The French army's belief that conscript forces could
not undertake offensive actions prevented them from
believing-despite intelligence reports-that the Germans would
attack with the forces that they did. Because they could not
imagine short-term conscripts leading offensive operations, they
dismissed intelligence reports showing that the Germans would use
"young troops" in the front lines. This caused the French army to
underestimate the strength of the German offensive by 20 corps.
Whatever the outcome of the future battle, the French army's belief
in
45. Quoted in Pierre Miquel, La paix de Versailles et l'opinion
publique fran,aise (Paris: Flammarion, 1972), p. 258. Also see
Ministere des affaires etrangeres, Documents diplomatiques
fran,aise 1932- 1939, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale,
1969), p. 569. 46. Quoted in Miquel, Paix de Versailles, p. 256.
47. Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Le service militaire obligatoire....
est-il une institution de gauche?" La Voix (February 9, 1930), p.
8; and Pertinax (pseud. Andr6 G6raud), "Le d6sarmement radical de
l'Allemagne est d6cid6," Echo de Paris (March 11, 1919).
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 83
the relative incompetence of short-term conscripts was not in
its interest; it is not in the military's interest to underestimate
the strength of opposing forces.48 Thus we can see that the French
army's evaluation of short-term conscripts was sincere.
One can make a similar argument about DeGaulle. DeGaulle was
convinced that defending France depended on the adoption of an
offensive doctrine. DeGaulle also knew that the creation of a
professional force was politically impossible. Yet he continued to
advocate the coupling of an offensive doctrine with a professional
army If DeGaulle's estimation of the value of short-term conscripts
had not been sincere, he would have dropped it in order to pursue
the offensive doctrine that he felt was in France's national
interest.
The British army during the interwar period is another example
of a military organization making decisions that were not in its
interest as commonly un- derstood. Although continually suffering
from a lack of financial support, the British army rejected the
ideas of the advocates of armored warfare, even though adoption of
this offensive doctrine would have given them a much stronger
rationale for increased expenditures. In other words, where its
bureau- cratic interests for greater resources diverged from its
cultural predisposition, culture won. If the British army's culture
had led it to adopt a doctrine that required greater resources
(that is, if cultural and bureaucratic interests con- verged) we
would have less confidence that it was the culture that led to its
doctrinal choice. But instead, the British army adopted a doctrine
that went against its bureaucratic interest.
Stressing the importance of contrasting culturally and
functionally derived interests should not let us lose sight of the
central argument in this article, or fall into the trap of treating
interests and culture as separate factors. To argue that culture
matters is not to argue that interests do not. Culture and
interests are not distinct, discrete, competing factors. Actors'
definitions of their interests are often a function of their
culture. Artificially dividing interests and culture into separate
categories obscures culture's explanatory role; it leads theorists
wedded to interest-driven or power political approaches to discount
cultural analyses as naive. But discounting culture is itself
naive. The French army is not putting some lofty cultural
aspiration above its organizational needs or the
48. Although militaries may exaggerate the strength of an
adversary's forces to make their sub- sequent victory more laudable
or their defeat more understandable, it is not in the military's
interest to underestimate the opposing forces when designing
strategic plans.
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International Security 19:4 | 84
defense of France. How the French military defined its interest
was a function of its culture.
Contending Approaches
Barry Posen and Jack Snyder conducted what have become classic
studies of the origins of offensive and defensive military
doctrines. Although these two scholars disagree on the role of
domestic politics and the explanatory weight of organizational
factors, both see the international system as providing accu- rate
cues for civilian intervention in doctrinal developments. Snyder
argues that it is the civilian policymakers' absence from the
decision-making process that allows the self-serving doctrines of
the military to take root. Posen accords an active role to
civilians, arguing that as the international system becomes more
threatening, civilians increasingly intervene in doctrinal
developments in accordance with systemic imperatives. The civilians
are painted as the cham- pions of the national interest and the
principal architects of well-integrated military plans, while the
military is portrayed as pursuing its organizational interests and
adopting offensive doctrines that may be poorly integrated with the
state's grand strategy The following section briefly examines these
two propositions, as well as the most popular explanation for
France's defensive doctrine, the lessons of World War I.
CIVILIAN DECISIONS AND THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
The argument that civilian intervention corresponds with the
dictates of the international system has weak theoretical and
empirical foundations; it exag- gerates the power of systemic
imperatives and the wisdom of civilian partici- pation. This is
true even in an easy case such as France during the interwar
period. If there is any case where the international system should
determine a state's doctrinal orientation, this is it. Paris
understood the nature of the German threat and devoted extensive
resources to insuring France's security France spent twenty years
preparing for the German assault. Yet it was domes- tic politics,
not international incentives, that drove the civilian decision that
severely constrained doctrinal developments.
As compelling as the international system may have been, it
cannot account for doctrinal developments in France. And in
general, the international system does not provide determinate
explanations for choices between offensive and defensive doctrines.
Although revisionist states require offensive doctrines, both
offensive and defensive doctrines can defend a status quo state.
Even the
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 85
prospect of fighting a two-front war provides several
alternatives. The Schlief- fen Plan's double offensive is one
possibility, but as Jack Snyder pointed out, Germany could have
chosen "a positional defense of the short frontier in the west,
combined with either a counteroffensive or a positional defense in
the east."49
Scott Sagan argues that the international system makes offensive
doctrines necessary to honor alliance commitments.50 During the
interwar period, how- ever, France's inability to launch an
offensive into Germany in order to provide relief to her Eastern
allies demonstrates how easily systemic "imperatives"- and in
particular the one that Sagan cites-may be overruled. Similarly,
Snyder argues that the offensives adopted by both France and
Germany prior to World War I were counterproductive to the
strategic interests of their allies.5'
More important, a state's position in the international system
is indetermi- nate of doctrine: France's relative weakness could be
used to explain both its offensive orientation during the 1920s and
its defensive orientation in the 1930s. In the decade immediately
following World War I, the French sought to strike offensively to
end the war quickly before Germany could mobilize its superior
economic strength. A long war of attrition would only have resulted
in the eventual triumph of Germany's superior economic strength and
industrial mobilization. An official report in the early 1920s
explained that "an offensive conception was the only one that would
permit us to compensate for the inescapable causes of our weakness
which result from the inferiority of our population and industrial
strength."52
In the following decade, this argument was turned on its head.
Now, it was said, France must stay on the defensive in the opening
battles of a conflict with Germany, and throw all its resources
into defeating the initial German assault. France's only hope, it
was argued, was that the initial resistance to a German offensive
would provide the necessary time for the injection of allied
assistance. France could only win a long war. In other words,
France's relative weakness justified an offensive orientation in
the 1920s and a defensive doctrine in the 1930s. French
policymakers were not misguided, nor did they misunderstand
France's strategic position: both an offensive and a defensive
posture were
49. Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, p. 191. 50. Scott D.
Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability,"
International Security Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-177. 51.
Jack Snyder, "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the
Consequences of Counter- force," International Security, Vol. 11,
No. 3 (Winter 1986/87), pp. 190-191. 52. Quoted in General
Paul-Emile Tournoux, Haut Commandement, gouvernement et defense des
frontiWres du Nord et de l'Est, 1919-1939 (Paris: Nouvelles
Editions Latines, 1960), p. 334.
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International Security 19:4 | 86
sensible responses to the systemic demands on a relatively weak
state. The choice between them requires us to look beyond the
international system.
At first glance, there may appear to be a strong correlation
between German power and French doctrine. Germany is relatively
weak in the 1920s and the French army has an offensive orientation;
Germany is strong in the 1930s and the French army has a defensive
doctrine. However, the correlation is illusory. It did not take
German rearmament to make the French respond to German power. The
French sought to use the Versailles negotiations to harness German
power, and the series of alliances that Paris concluded with
Eastern Europe belies any notion that it took Hitler's rise to
power to wake the French to the potential threat on their doorstep.
More important, France switched to a de- fensive doctrine in 1929,
five years prior to Hitler's seizure of power, seven years prior to
the reinstatement of conscription, and eight years prior to the
remilitarization of the Rhineland. There is no correlation between
French doc- trine and German power: the French army switched to a
defensive doctrine long before Germany had begun to rearm.
Given the indeterminacy of the international system, it is easy
to understand why dramatic doctrinal shifts may occur in the
absence of systemic variation, or why changes in the international
system may not lead to shifts in states' doctrinal orientations.
Although the systemic constraints facing France and Britain before
World War I and World War II were similar, both countries changed
their doctrines from offensive to defensive. Similarly, the U.S.
Army's adoption of Air Land Battle in 1982 shifted American
doctrine from a defensive to an offensive orientation, despite the
lack of any significant transformation in the international
system.
Even if the international system prescribed certain doctrinal
responses, civil- ians rarely intervene directly in the military's
choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines, even
during periods of international threat. In Britain and France
during the interwar period, civilians did not directly choose the
army's doctrinal orientation. The French parliament's decision to
reduce the length of conscription led to the adoption of a
defensive doctrine, but this was not the legislators' intent.
French civilians were preoccupied with the organizational structure
of the army, but they felt that doctrinal decisions were beyond
their purview.53 British civilians took a similar approach.54
53. Robert Allan Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development
of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books,
1985), p. 164. 54. Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the
Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 41.
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 87
Barry Posen provides a sophisticated defense of balance-of-power
theory's ability to explain French army doctrine during the
interwar period. Posen argues that due to France's relative
weakness, French policymakers focused on external balancing, and in
particular on gaining British support to allow France to "pass the
buck." This required, according to Posen, the adoption of a
defensive doctrine in order to avoid appearing bellicose in British
eyes. How- ever, this logically compelling argument has empirical
problems. First, al- though France did seek Britain as an alliance
partner, Posen provides no evidence that the political
repercussions of an offensive doctrine concerned French or British
statesmen, or that a desire to avoid antagonizing Britain motivated
French action. In fact, France was more than willing to risk
British displeasure across a whole spectrum of issues. On an
economic front, for example, the French attempted to exploit their
ability to undermine the inter- national monetary regime and to
weaken its leader, Great Britain.55 In foreign policy, the British
were far from pleased with French behavior during the Chanak Crisis
and the occupation of the Ruhr. In military policy, French war
plans were explicitly designed to draw Germany into Belgium, in
order to threaten the security of the British isles. If French
policymakers desired a defensive doctrine in order to present a
reassuring image to their British allies, why did French war plans
continue to be offensive until 1929?
Second, if external balancing took precedence, British
reluctance to make a continental commitment should have encouraged
France to seek alternative sources of assistance. Paris could have
insured that France would have the military capabilities necessary
to honor existing alliance commitments in East- ern Europe, or
could have allied France with the Soviet Union; it did neither.
Finally, there is little support for the claim that French
policymakers sought to "pass the buck" through external balancing.
To the contrary, there is evidence that French civilians strongly
objected to such an idea. During a meeting of the Superior Council
of War in December 1927, one of the military officers re- marked
that France could only aid itself with the help of allies. The
civilian Minister of Defense quickly responded that such a remark
was extremely serious, useless, and dangerous.56 France did of
course seek allied support, but to accuse Paris of buck-passing
ignores the substantial financial resources devoted to French
defense spending throughout the interwar period, even
55. Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political
Economy of International Monetary Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, forthcoming 1995). 56. SHAT, 1 N 20, R&eum
succinct des seances du Conseil Superieur de la Guerre, December
14, 1947.
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International Security 19:4 | 88
during economic crises and left-wing governments. Similarly, for
a country intent on buck-passing, we have the curious situation of
a British general hinting to the French in 1937 that they should
request additional support from the British government.57
Contrary to what one would expect from balance-of-power theory,
much of civilian behavior in France during the 1930s seemed immune
to the quickening pace of international events. Many of Hitler's
policies severely compromised France's security system, but French
civilians did very little to realign French doctrine with the new
strategic realities. This does not mean that civilian decisions are
not important to doctrinal developments. They frequently are. But
we should remember that military policy is not exclusively about
external threats; power politics at the domestic level can play an
important role.
THE MILITARY S BUREAUCRATIC INTERESTS
According to a functional logic, offensive doctrines are
powerful tools in the organization's pursuit of greater certainty,
resources, autonomy, and prestige; this leads military
organizations to prefer offensive doctrines. However, both
offensive and defensive doctrines can satisfy many of the posited
desires of military organizations. For example, while Posen and
Snyder argue that the preference for the reduction of uncertainty
encourages the adoption of offen- sive doctrines, defensive
doctrines can also be very effective means of struc- turing the
battlefield and reducing the need to improvise. For example, an
integral aspect of the French army's defensive doctrine prior to
World War II was the concept that the French termed the "methodical
battle." Instead of allowing for initiative and flexibility, la
bataille conduite insured tightly control- led operations in which
all units adhered to strictly scheduled time tables. As a German
officer explained, "French tactics are essentially characterized by
a systematization which seeks to anticipate and account for any
eventuality in the smallest detail."58 The French army's defensive
doctrine maximized the centralization of command and reduced
spontaneity to a minimum.
57. John Dunbabin, "British Rearmament in the 1930s: A
Chronology and Review," Historical Journal, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1975),
pp. 587-609. For a critique of the argument that British desires
determined French foreign policy, see Anthony Adamthwaite, "France
and the Coming of War," in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar
Kettenacker, eds., The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of
Appeasement (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983). 58. Quoted in
Alvin D. Coox, "French Military Doctrine 1919-1939: Concepts of
Ground and Aerial Warfare" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,
1951), p. 108. Posen argues, although for different reasons, that
the French army adopted a defensive doctrine because it would
reduce uncertainty. Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, p.
118.
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 89
Similarly, military organizations can also use defensive
doctrines to maxi- mize their autonomy from civilian interference.
The French army's endorse- ment of a defensive doctrine after 1929
is partly attributable to it being part of larger package that
allowed the army to retain what it most treasured, a small (and
relatively autonomous) professional force. In fact, with the
exception of the air force, the connection between autonomy and
offensive doctrines is not strong. Civilians, especially those in
the foreign office, could be more likely to interfere in military
planning if these operations included offensive strikes into a
foreign country Civilians are unlikely to take a hands-off approach
if their armed forces are invading a neighboring country.59
Air forces have exploited plans for strategic bombing, an
offensive doctrine, to insure their independence. During the 1920s
and 1930s, both the French and British air forces used offensive
doctrines in their efforts to obtain institutional autonomy.
However, the extent to which each service manipulated its doctrinal
preferences to defeat the army's and navy's attack on its
independence does not correspond to the expectations of a
functional perspective. While the French air force fought bitterly,
and unsuccessfully, for its independence, French air- men only
half-heartedly endorsed the offensive doctrine that, according to a
functional argument, could have furthered their quest for autonomy
60 In con- trast, the Royal Air Force gained institutional autonomy
relatively easily, but remained enamored of strategic bombing long
after it had cemented its inde- pendent status as the third
service.61
Even when military organizations could gain greater resources,
autonomy, or prestige through the adoption of an offensive
doctrine, they often fail to do so. This is true even in such easy
cases for a functional analysis as that of the French army
Throughout the 1930s, the French army was exposed to the ideas of
mechanized warfare and was free from civilian interference. The
French army's desire for autonomy from the civilian sphere could
hardly be more extreme. With the recurrent instability of the Third
Republic, the rise of the left, and the outbreak of the Spanish
Civil War, the army became increasingly fearful of the republic. If
military organizations seek autonomy by adopting offensive
59. I thank Scott Sagan for suggesting this point. 60. Pierre Le
Goyet, "Evolution de la doctrine d'emploi de l'aviation francaise
entre 1919 et 1939," Revue d'histoire de la deuxieme guerre
mondiale, Vol. 19, No. 73 (January 1969); and General Charles
Christienne and General Pierre Lissarrague, Histoire de l'aviation
militaire franqaise (Paris: Ecole Militaire, 1984). 61. Barry D.
Powers, Strategy Without a Slide Rule: British Air Strategy
1914-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
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International Security 19:4 | 90
doctrines, we should see it here. The French army had the
(functional) need for autonomy, and the money, ideas, and freedom
from civilian intervention necessary for the adoption of an
offensive doctrine. Nevertheless, the French army became
increasingly committed to a defensive doctrine.
Still more surprising from a functional perspective is the
budgetary behavior of the British military during the interwar
period; all three services show a budgetary modesty that baffles a
conventional evaluation of organizational interests. Not only did
the British army ignore the financial benefits who adoption of an
offensive doctrine could have brought, but all three British
services also submitted modest budget requests. In fact, it was the
civilians who consistently prodded the military chiefs to submit
larger budget requests, leading one participant in the rearmament
debate in the mid-1930s to comment that he found it "curious how,
all throughout, the Chiefs of Staff have been the moderating
influence.'62 Similarly, in 1936 the Popular Front government in
France increased the army's budget request by fifty percent,
augmenting the application by the Chief of the French General
Staff, General Maurice Gamelin, with an additional 5 billion
francs.63
Finally, generalizing that military organizations prefer
offensive doctrines makes it difficult to explain, without
reference to cultural factors, why military organizations
adopt-sometimes dogmatically-defensive doctrines. They do this on
their own initiative, without civilian prodding, and despite
adequate knowledge of and resources for the development of an
offensive doctrine. In the French case, the civilians did not
intervene in doctrinal developments to force a defensive doctrine
upon a reluctant high command. From the mid- 1930s, it was the
civilians who were voicing support for a more offensive
orientation. Nevertheless, the French army ignored these calls and
instead became increasingly committed to a defensive doctrine and
ostracized those officers calling for a more offensive orientation.
The British army also margi- nalized those officers advocating the
offensive use of massed tanks.64
62. Quoted in Wesley Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British
Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986), p. 29. Also see Uri Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber:
The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics, 1932-1939 (London:
Royal Historical Society, 1980), pp. 58-68; and Brian Bond, Liddell
Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1977), p. 67. 63. Robert Frankenstein, "A Propos
des aspects financiers du rearmement francais," Revue d'histoire de
la deuxieme guerre mondiale, No. 102 (April 1976), p. 7. 64. Bond,
British Military Policy, pp. 53 and 183-185; Major Kenneth Macksey,
Armoured Crusader: A Biography of Major General Sir Percy Hobart
(London: Hutchinson, 1967), pp. 135, 141-147, 152, and 178.
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Culture and Military Doctrine I 91
THE LEGACY OF VERDUN
The lessons of World War I seem to explain why the functional
explanation cannot account for the French army's adoption of a
defensive doctrine. Accord- ing to this argument, the 1920s and
1930s are an exceptional period: emerging from the carnage of the
Great War, perceptions of the offense-defense balance were so
skewed that an otherwise accurate generalization-that military or-
ganizations prefer offensive doctrines-does not apply. Given the
French army's doctrine in 1939, it seems plausible that the
leadership of the French army, marked by the bloody experiences of
World War I, had prepared for a rematch of the last war. This is a
myth. The French army did not simply reapply the defensive lessons
of the Great War. There was an extensive debate over doctrinal
developments in the 1920s. The French army eventually adopted a
doctrine reminiscent of the defensive stalemate in northern France,
but the "lesson" of the trench warfare was far from universally
endorsed.
In the decade immediately following the armistice, the French
military elite debated the potential use of prepared positions and
in particular, whether the fortifications would serve offensive or
defensive functions.65 While Marshal Petain and General Buat argued
that fortifications were primarily defensive, Generals Berthelot,
Debeney, Fillomeau, Foch, Guillaumat, Joffre, and Mangin rejected
the notion of a continuous frontier and instead argued that
fortified regions should serve as centers of resistance to
facilitate offensive actions. The proposal creating a commission to
study the use of fortifications in 1925 specified that the prepared
positions would be used in offensive operations, and the
commission's report two years later stated that the fortified
regions would serve as a base for French operations into Germany.66
The debate continued for almost a decade. A leading historian of
the Maginot Line states that this extended debate shows the
"markedly offensive spirit of the French high command."67
The discussions about the potential of mechanized warfare
further reveal the extent to which the French army was open to
offensive warfare. In the early 1920s, the military journals and
academies were alive with debate on the
65. For example, see SHAT, 1 N 20, R&eum succinct des
seances du CSG, May 17, 1920. Also see Judith Hughes, To the
Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the
1920s (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp.
200-204; and especially Tournoux, Defense des frontieres. 66. SHAT,
1 N 20, Resume succinct des seances du CSG, December 15, 1925;
Tournoux, Defense des frontieres, pp. 53-54. 67. Tournoux, Defense
des frontieres, p. 36.
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International Security 19:4 | 92
potential for massed armor, the army training grounds were
actively engaged in experimentation,68 and many influential
officers saw mechanization as a way to break out of the defensive
stalemate that dominated the last war.69
The call for offensive striking power was no mere wish list. Far
from plan- ning to wait behind reinforced concrete, French war
plans in the 1920s were unequivocally offensive. If a conflict with
Germany occurred, the French in- tended to bring the battle to
Germany and divide the country in two. These offensive plans were
later superseded by increasingly defensive plans, but the initial
reaction to the threat of a resurgent Germany was to plan once
again for offensive strikes beyond the French frontier.70 Such
plans contradict the notion of an army overwhelmed by the defensive
lessons of World War 1.71
The lessons of history are multiple, and are frequently invoked
after a particular policy has been taken. They are not the source
of the policy itself. The French army did not adopt a defensive
doctrine in the interwar years because of the trench warfare of
World War I. However, once this defensive orientation had been
chosen, history was invoked to justify or bolster the chosen policy
As Jack Snyder aptly stated in his study of the myths of empires,
"it is more accurate to say that statesmen and societies actively
shape the lessons of the past in ways they find convenient than it
is to say they are shaped by them."72
Conclusion
This is not a call for the wholesale adoption of cultural
analyses. Structural and functional analyses are valuable tools for
understanding international politics. Indeed, the normative and
political rationale for understanding the determi- nants of
offensive and defensive military doctrines stems from a
structural
68. For example, see Colonel Charles-Armand Romain, "La
reorganisation de l'armee: les chars de combat," Revue de Paris,
Vol. 29, No. 5 (October 15, 1922), pp. 868-871; and Major Joseph
Doumenc, "Puissance et mobilite," Revue militaire franqaise, Vol. 9
(January-March 1923). 69. For discussions of mechanization in the
French army, see Jean Delaunay, "Chars de combat et cavalerie,"
Revue historique des armies, Vol. 155 (June 1984); Hoff, Programmes
d'armement; and Henry Dutailly, "Motorisation et mecanisation dans
l'armee de terre francaise," Revue internationale d'his- toire
militaire, Vol. 55 (1983). 70. Jean Doise and Maurice Vaisse,
Diplomatie et outil militaire (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1987),
pp. 269 and 276; and Tournoux, Defense des frontires, pp. 332-335.
71. For further discussion of France's shift from an offensive to a
defensive orientation during the interwar period see Doise and
Vaisse, Diplomatie et outil, pp. 275-256; Doughty, Seeds of
Disaster, p. 67; Hoff, Programmes d'armement, pp. 153 and 268; and
Hughes, Maginot Line, p. 198. 72. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire:
Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1991), p. 30.
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Culture and Military Doctrine | 93
constraint: offensive military postures are structural
impediments to coopera- tive relations among states. Nevertheless,
functional and structural analyses cannot adequately explain
choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. If we
want to control doctrinal developments, we must understand the
civilians' political-military subculture and the military's
organizational culture.
This study offers three lessons to policymakers interested in
restructuring their armed forces along more defensive lines. First,
decision-makers can take solace in the knowledge that the structure
of the international system does not dictate either an offensive or
a defensive orientation. Status quo states can do what they want.
Second, policymakers must recognize the highly political nature of
any enterprise to restructure the armed services. For domestic
politi- cal reasons, certain types of military policies appeal to
certain sectors of society. These preferences may reflect
contemporary stakes or they may seem outdated, but in either case,
they constrain policy options and must be taken into con-
sideration.
Finally, policymakers should resist blaming the military for the
adoption of offensive doctrines. They should not assume that all
military organizations prefer offensive doctrines, or that military
resistance to doctrinal change stems from attempts to protect the
offensive doctrine itself. It may not be the offensive aspect of
their doctrine that the military seeks to safeguard, but instead
some part of its traditional way of doing things whose preservation
is, for these officers, integral to the successful execution of
their mission.
Changing military doctrine from offensive to defensive is as
important as it is difficult. Status quo states can choose
defensive doctrines regardless of their position in the
international system, but the absence of structural requirements
does not mean that doctrinal change is easy. Two powerful barriers
remain. First, civilians worry about domestic security before
external security-without the former there is no need to worry
about the latter. They will worry about the disposition of the
military and how it bears on the domestic distribution of power.
Second, the military's culture limits what they imagine is
possible. Changing military doctrine is hard, but it is harder
still if we neglect culture's role.
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Article Contentsp. 65p. 66p. 67p. 68p. 69p. 70p. 71p. 72p. 73p.
74p. 75p. 76p. 77p. 78p. 79p. 80p. 81p. 82p. 83p. 84p. 85p. 86p.
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Issue Table of ContentsInternational Security, Vol. 19, No. 4
(Spring, 1995), pp. 1-192Volume Information [pp. 190-192]Front
Matter [pp. 1-2]Editors' Note [pp. 3-4]Does Strategic Culture
Matter?Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters [pp.
5-31]Thinking about Strategic Culture [pp. 32-64]Culture and
Military Doctrine: France between the Wars [pp. 65-93]
"Bismarck" or "Britain"? Toward an American Grand Strategy after
Bipolarity [pp. 94-117]The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings
[pp. 118-144]Review: Overextension, Vulnerability, and Conflict:
The "Goldilocks Problem" in International Strategy (A Review Essay)
[pp. 145-163]CorrespondenceThe Democratic Peace [pp. 164-184]
Books Received [pp. 185-189]Back Matter