Cultural Realism Johnston

8/13/2019 Cultural Realism Johnston

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L/O/G/O

By Alistar I Johnston

Presented by Yavor Kostadinov 802330315

Cultural Realism
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Chapter 5 - A Return to Theory

Strategy of Symbols and Symbolic Strategy

Contents

Ming Security Problems in the North

Chapter 6The Ming Security Problematique

Bingshu in the Ming Dynasty


The Parabellum Paradigm and Alternatives

Effects of Symbolic Strategy on Choice

Hypotheses about Ming Strategic DM


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L/O/G/O

A Return to TheoryChapter 5


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Symbols for decision makers

Symbols as a source of authority

Symbols as a distance creators

Internal usedirected at the self, at the elite. Symbols for the

purpose of autocommunication. This is what you should look like

Outwards usedirected at the group, non-elites. Symbols for official

language that excludes alternative strategies, undermines challenges

to the authority and legitimacy, and reinforces hegemony in the DM

Strategy of Symbols and Symbolic Strategy

Outwards usedirected at the relationship between groups.

Symbols for the creation of us vs. the others to rationalise

group behaviours otherwise inconsistent with the self-professed

preferences of the group. Done by renaming objectionable

behaviours with culturally accceptable symbolic terms


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Restriction on Strategic choice

No apriori reasons for restrictions

Disjuncture between SCs in China

1. org. or political interest of strategic elitesmilitary own agenda

2. acceptance of limited debate -echo ex. if one country falls to

communism others will follow, recent ex. Koreas FP towards

Japan

3. unintended result of the deliberate manipulation of strategic

symbols by decision elitesex. constraints by public opinion

-Johnston argues that in contrast autocommunication implies that

1. inertia, SOPs, rational choices lift a priori reasons

2. strategic discourse accentures us-them differences lifting

restrictions

Effects of Symbolic Strategy on Choice

- autocommunication hypothesisapplied to decision makers

seeking to affirm their own competence over DM process. Hard to

defend this hypothesis for writers of the Seven Military classics

-official language hypothesis the Confucian-Mencian discourse

would have been used to validate the authority of the strategist

- cognitivedissonance hypothesis - from ideal to real or the support

for war clothed as righteous punishment


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Hypotheses about Ming Strategic DM

No expectation of

relationship between the

idealized grand strategic

preference ranking and

Ming strategic choice

Given the parabellum

axioms in the operational

strategic culture, expected

is a positive relationshipbetween changes in the

relative capacity of the

Ming to act offensively

against the Mongols and

offensive strategic choice

Independent

variable

attitude

Dependent

variable

behaviour

Relationshipof Ming

Chinas

strategic

culture and

strategic

choice


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The Ming Security ProblematiqueChapter 6


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Bingshu in the Ming Dynasty

1References to Sun

Zi, Wu Zi, Wei Liao Zi

2 No Confucian-Mencian variable-

sum view

3Similar to

parabellum axioms

of 7 Mil. Classics

4

Preemptive

application of force

5 Emphasis oncaution

6 Principle ofabsolute flexibility

1Reference to Wu Zi

and 7 Mil. Classics

2 Some of theConfucian-Mencian

strategic discourse

3In general force is

necessary to deal with

external threat

4

The use of deterrent

capabilities

5 Emphazis onharmony, flexibility

6 Si Ma Fas axiom ofreckless pursuit

1Builds on Sun Zis

Art of War

2

defeat the enemy without

the use of actual violence

3

4

5 Active defence

6 Content of quanbien

Zhen JI Cao Lu Jing Lue Tou Bi Fu Tan

Bingshutexts on strategy and statecraft

In general,stratagem

to create opportunities

for attack

Absence ofConfucian-Mencian

language
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Hong Wu

Push of the Mongols

out of North China

Yong Le

Extended offensive

campaigns

1368 -

1423

1449 1470-

1540

1580

Decline in wars

due to Mongol

weakness from

internal problems

United Mongols under

Esen

Counteroffensive by

Ming forces and defeat

at Tu Mu - captured

emperor by the Mongols

flaring of debates on

offensive strategy

Decline of Mings

capacity to mobilize

facing other external

threats

Ming Security Problems in the North


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The Parabellum Paradigm and Alternatives

Alternatives Parabellum Paradigm

Common among memorials werethe clear causal paths from military

preparations to the defeat or

submission of the enemy and then

to the security of the state

Primary strategic goal of the Mongolswas to get access to Chinas materialwealth, if not through plundering thenthrough trade. Economic goals

Variable-sum

Analysis of both absolute and relativegains

Conflict and war constant characteristics

of human affairs

Zero-sum view

Military preparations and application of

violence for resolve

Quan bian as a key decision-making

axiom

vs.
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Critique and Conclusion

Although Johnston has flaws, his contribution to the field of

strategic studies from cognitive meta-theoretical orientation is

significant

Case Bias Culture/behaviour

Johnston provides no

convincing explanation

for choosing to study

Ming China

Claims that behaviour is

culturally determined areunrealistic, given that leaders

are open to many different

cultural influences, and that

behavior might be culturally

informed but not determined

by culture alone

Chinesenes

sIf other countries havesimilarly offensive strategiesduring times of external

threat, then the unique

Chineseness of the

parabellum culture is gone

Predeter-

mines

outcome Overarchingproblem

Overarching

problem


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L/O/G/O

ThankYou!

Cultural Realism Johnston

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