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CSE 461: Computer networks Spring 2021 Ratul Mahajan
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CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Dec 10, 2021

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Page 1: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

CSE 461: Computer networksSpring 2021

Ratul Mahajan

Page 2: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Other threats

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 3: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Threat model (beyond TLS)

• TLS = confidentiality, integrity, authenticity

• Metadata leaks

• Resource starvation

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 4: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Topic

•Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)• Run as closed networks on Internet• Use IPSEC to secure messages

Introduction to Computer Networks

Internet

Page 5: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Motivation

•The best part of IP connectivity• You can send to any other host

•The worst part of IP connectivity• Any host can send packets to you!• There’s nasty stuff out there …

Introduction to Computer Networks

Internet

Page 6: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Motivation (2)

•Often desirable to separate network from the Internet, e.g., a company• Private network with leased lines• Physically separated from Internet

Introduction to Computer Networks

Site A

Site B

Site C

No way in!

Leased line

Page 7: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Motivation (3)

• Idea: Use the public Internet instead of leased lines – cheaper!• Logically separated from Internet …• This is a Site-to-site Virtual Private Network (VPN)

Introduction to Computer Networks

InternetSite A

Site B

Site C

Maybe …

Virtual link

Page 8: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Goal and Threat Model

•Goal is to keep a logical network (VPN) separate from the Internet while using it for connectivity• Threat is Trudy may access VPN and intercept or tamper

with messages

Introduction to Computer Networks

Idea

l

Page 9: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Tunneling

•How can we build a virtual link? With tunneling!• Hosts in private network send to each other normally• To cross virtual link (tunnel), endpoints encapsulate

packet

Introduction to Computer Networks

Public Internet

Virtual linkor tunnel

Private Network BPrivate Network A

Tunnel endpoint Tunnel endpoint

Page 10: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Tunneling (2)

•Tunnel endpoints encapsulate IP packets (“IP in IP”)• Add/modify outer IP header for delivery to endpoint

TCP

IP

802.11

App

IP

802.11

TCP

IP

802.11

App

IP

Public Internet

802.11IP

Ethernet

IPIP

Ethernet

IP

TunnelEndpoint

TunnelEndpoint

Private Network BPrivate Network A

ManyRouters!

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 11: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Tunneling (3)

•Simplest encapsulation wraps packet with another IP header• Outer (tunnel) IP header has tunnel endpoints as

source/destination• Inner packet has private network IP addresses as

source/destination

Introduction to Computer Networks

TCP HTTPIPIP

Outer (Tunnel) IP Inner packet

Page 12: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Tunneling (4)

•Tunneling alone is not secure …• No confidentiality, integrity/ authenticity• Trudy can read, inject her own messages• We require cryptographic protections!

• IPSEC (IP Security) is often used to secure VPN tunnels

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 13: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

IPSEC (IP Security)

• Longstanding effort to secure the IP layer• Adds confidentiality, integrity/authenticity

• IPSEC operation:• Keys are set up for communicating host pairs• Communication becomes more connection-oriented• Header and trailer added to protect IP packets

Introduction to Computer Networks

Tunnel Mode

Page 14: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Client-server VPNs

Use cases• Secure access to remote resources

Company network

Want these resources to be accessible by only

authorized users

Hosts/applications not necessarily aware of

user identity

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 15: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Client-server VPNs

Use cases• Secure access to remote resources• “Teleportation” to another region

Asia

Servers limit access to clients in the USA

USA

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 16: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Client-server VPN operation

1. Client and VPN server establish an encrypted connection 2. VPN software creates a logical network interface on the client3. Applications send traffic to this interface4. The VPN software tunnels the traffic to the VPN server5. The VPN server unwraps the traffic, NATs the packet, and sends it to the destination

a) The destination only see the VPN server IP6. The destination sends reverse traffic to the VPN server 7. ……

Asia

Servers limit access to clients in the USA

USA

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 17: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Takeaways

VPNs help build private networks atop the Internet• Virtual links encapsulate packets• Alters IP connectivity for hosts

VPNs need crypto to secure messages • Encrypted tunnels are used for confidentiality,

integrity/authenticity across the two endpoints

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 18: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Tor: “The Onion Router”

Basic idea: 1. Many volunteers act as routers in the overlay2. Generate circuit of routers will send packet

3. Encrypt the packet in layers for each router4. Send the packet

5. Each router receives, decrypts their layer, and forwards based on new info

6. Routers maintain state about circuit to route stuff back to sender• But again, only know the next hop

Performance?Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 19: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Resource Attacks

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 20: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Topic

•Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS)• An attack on network availability

Introduction to Computer Networks

Internet

Yum!

Page 21: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Topic

•Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)• An attack on network availability

Introduction to Computer Networks

Internet

Uh oh!

Page 22: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Motivation

•The best part of IP connectivity• You can send to any other host

•The worst part of IP connectivity• Any host can send packets to you!

Introduction to Computer Networks

Internet

Uh oh!

Page 23: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Motivation (2)

•Flooding a host with many packets can interfere with its IP connectivity• Host may become unresponsive• This is a form of denial-of-service (DoS)

Introduction to Computer Networks

Internet

Uh oh

Hello?

Page 24: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Goal and Threat Model

•Goal is for host to keep network connectivity for desired services• Threat is Trudy may overwhelm host with undesired traffic

Introduction to Computer Networks

Trudy

Internet Idea

l

Hello! Hi!

Page 25: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 26: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Internet Reality

•DDoS is a huge problem today!• GitHub attack of 1tbps

•There are no great solutions• CDNs, network traffic filtering, and best practices all help

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 27: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Denial-of-Service

• Denial-of-service means a system is made unavailable to intended users• Typically because its resources are consumed by attackers instead

• In the network context:• “System” means server• “Resources” mean bandwidth (network) or CPU/memory (host)

Introduction to Computer Networks

Page 28: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Host Denial-of-Service

• Strange packets can sap host resources!• “Ping of Death” malformed packet • “SYN flood” sends many TCP connect requests and never follows up• Few bad packets can overwhelm host

• Patches exist for these vulnerabilities• Read about “SYN cookies” for interest

Introduction to Computer Networks

XXX

Page 29: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Network Denial-of-Service

• Network DOS needs many packets• To saturate network links• Causes high congestion/loss

• Helpful to have many attackers … or Distributed Denial-of-Service

Introduction to Computer Networks

Uh oh Access Link

Page 30: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS)

•Botnet provides many attackers in the form of compromised hosts• Hosts send traffic flood to victim• Network saturates near victim

Introduction to Computer Networks

Ouch L

Victim Botnet

Page 31: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Complication: Spoofing

•Attackers can falsify their IP address• Put fake source address on packets• Historically network doesn’t check• Hides location of the attackers• Called IP address spoofing

Introduction to Computer Networks

From: “Bob”Trudy

I hate that Bob!Ha ha!

Alice

Page 32: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Spoofing (2)

•Actually, it’s worse than that• Trudy can trick Bob into really sending packets to Alice• To do so, Trudy spoofs Alice to Bob

Introduction to Computer Networks

1: To BobFrom: “Alice”

Trudy

Huh?

Alice Bob

2: To AliceFrom Bob

(reply)

Page 33: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Best Practice: Ingress Filtering

• Idea: Validate the IP source address of packets at ISP boundary (Duh!) • Ingress filtering is a best practice, but deployment has

been slow

Introduction to Computer Networks

From: Bob

Trudy

Nope, from TrudyDrat

ISP boundary

Internet

Page 34: CSE 461: Computer networks - courses.cs.washington.edu

Introduction to Computer Networks

Flooding Defenses

1. Increase network capacity around the server; harder to cause loss• Use a CDN for high peak capacity

2. Filter out attack traffic within the network (at routers)• The earlier the filtering, the better• Ultimately what is needed, but ad hoc measures by ISPs today