Critical Analysis of the Good Friday Agreement 2

Critical Analysis of the Good Friday Agreement

Seamus Duffy 25 April 2008

Assignment Submitted in fulfilment of the Societies in Transition course to Module Coordinator during the 2nd semester of Masters in Humanitarian Action Programme 2007/2008, UCD School of Biological Science

Introduction

The Northern Ireland conflict spanned 30 years and ended with the Good Friday Agreement

(hereafter referred to as Agreement) in 1998. The Agreement laid the framework for Northern

Ireland to move forward from hatred and violence to reconciliation, peace and development.

Yet, the Agreement proved to be controversial, as there were conflicting views regarding its

long term effectiveness.

There were some that applauded the Agreement as opportunity for Northern Ireland to build a

closer relationship between Ireland and U.K. Others saw it confirming the status of Northern

Ireland as part of Union. Why are there so many different interpretations of the Agreement?

How does the Agreement address and resolve the underling roots of conflicts? How is the

Agreement formed between all actors? How does the Agreement influence Northern Ireland

society to transform from conflicts to peace and reconciliation? How does the implementation

of the Agreement affect the different levels of the population in politics, economy and

culture? Ten years after the deployment of the Good Friday Agreement, these questions still

remain unanswered. In order to critically analyze the Agreement, one must first fully

understand the context in which the Agreement was formed as well as what influence the

Agreement had on the transitional society (Cain, 1968 to present).

In this study a brief geographical overview of the conflicted area will be provided, along with

a historical outline of the events leading up to the Good Friday Agreement. A summary of the

Agreement and its tenets will be addressed, as well as the reaction of the Irish Republican

Army (IRA) to the deployment of the Agreement. Finally, a critical analysis of the

Agreement will be given through a descriptive conceptual framework based on the triangle

theory and the model of influence. The perspectives of the international, regional, national,

local and community levels will be included in the analysis. The paper will conclude with a

summary of the findings. The research methods used for this study include: documentary

analysis, participatory observation and meetings with key informants during the 2008 UCD

academic trip to Northern Ireland (R.o.S.A South Armagh).

Ireland Divided

Northern Ireland is situated in the northeast of Ireland Island comprising a sixth of the

island’s total area (see Fig 1). Northern Island covers 13,466 km2 and has a population of

approximately 1,660,516 people (Table 1). It consists of six counties: Antrim, Armagh,

Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone.

Northern Ireland

County Area Population

Antrim 2,844 km2 566,000

Armagh 1,254 km2 141,000

Down 2,448 km2 516,000

Fermanagh 1,691 km2 58,000

Londonderry 2,074 km2 213,000

Tyrone 3,155 km2 166,516

13,466 km2 1,660,516

Table 1 Geographical and population comparison of the six counties in Northern Ireland

Figure 1 Map of Ireland Island

History of the Conflict

Irish and British histories have been linked for over 800 years. Colonial aspirations and

security risks of Great Britain and the cultural resilience and strength of Ireland clashed at

many times throughout the past eight centuries, reaching a crescendo 300 years soon after the

defeat of the Spanish Armanda and subsequent British colonial rule of the island of Ireland.

The British practice of plantations lead to a cultural mixing in what would become Northern

Ireland. Through the transfer of land ownership to loyal subjects immigrating into Ulster,

Queen Elizabeth I’s government laid the foundations of overcoming the strongly independent

and often difficult Northern Ireland Celtic population through the control of resources and

high numbers of their army. The strategic positioning of different cultural groups in direct

conflict would lead to years of strife where tension was constant and the potential for

violence lay right beneath the surface of everyday life.

When Irish nationalism took rise in the eighteenth century, inspired by the American War of

Independence and the French Revolution, the indigenous population of Ireland hoped for

national freedom and an end to colonization much like many other parts of the world did at

that time in history. Through the work of leaders including Daniel O’Connell, John Stuart

Parnell, Podrick Pearse, Michael Collins and finally Eamond De Valera, the Republic of

Ireland gained its freedom after the war of independence in 1922 and so broke away from the

United Kingdom.

However the Irish republican movement would be frustrated due to the strength and numbers

of the citizens of Northern Ireland, who were loyal to the crown of Britain. The Anglo-Irish

treaty after the war of Independence was signed on December 6, 1921 and was then ratified

in 1922, giving 26 counties of Ireland independence; yet separating six predominantly

Protestant Ulster counties which would decide to remain part of the United Kingdom.

The Boundary Commission that was set up by the British to decide the division of Ireland has

been the source of great controversy at the time and remains so today. The Ulster Unionists

were a highly organized majority living inside a predominately Roman Catholic colonial

Ireland. They feared living in a country loyal to a foreign Pope as they saw it and through

political organization and social engineering, put in place the mechanisms required to remain

part of the British Kingdom. Gerry-manning, the act of dividing county or district lines along

social and cultural lines for political gain and control, led to the creation of local Protestant

majorities inside the dominantly Catholic isle. From the nine counties of Ulster, six

Protestant counties were divided from the rest of Ireland so that six countries would remain

with the crown.

This created a complicated and tense society, divided not only along religious lines but also

economic lines. Discrimination was rampant and as frustrated Independent Republican

desires clashed with deep seeded Loyalist fears made for a national time bomb due to the

significant divisions in individual desires. Overlapping of these divisions created a fragile,

multifaceted situation. (Calvocoressi,1982).

Despite the tension, there was relative peace in Northern Ireland for almost a half century

following the division of North from South. But spurred on by the zeitgeist of the time, civil

rights movements in the Catholic parts of the six countries began in 1969. Quickly the

peaceful protests following the model seen at the time throughout the world attracted

backlashes from the outraged Protestant population and the British army stepped in to

mitigate the risk of violence. Unfortunately instead, they fanned the flames of Irish

nationalism as they had in the Easter Rising of 1916. The Irish Republican Army (IRA),

which had remained loosely associated since the Republic Independence movement in the

1920’s, elected to engage what they termed ‘the forces of occupation’ in combat the ‘Royal

Ulster Constabulary,’ formed in 1922 by the British. By 1970, the Official Irish Republican

Army split along ideological lines as part decided to abandon violence in favour of socialist

and Marxist propaganda. The other part, which was renamed the Provisional IRA, stuck to

the policy of achieving a United Ireland by forcible removal of the British troops (Royal

Ulster Constabulary, 1921-2001).

As the years of violence continued, some in the Nationalist community, came to realize not

only would ultimate military victory being very costly and perhaps impossible, but that

perhaps the British presence was not the problem, in that the border was only in place at the

persistence of the Ulster Unionist people. The Nationalists realized that Irish unity would

only come about if there was mutual acceptance and respect between the Protestants and the

Catholics. It became clear that the real border was not geographical, in reality it was created

in the minds of the people.

The Republic of Ireland would play an increasingly important role in the development of the

peace process. Ireland’s equal footing with Britain as a member of the EU gave the Irish

government confidence, a new self image and far greater confidence in discussions with their

former colonizers. The former Fine Gael leader and Irish Prime Minister Garrett FitzGerald

and established the ‘New Ireland Forum’; an institute consisting of representatives from the

main constitutional nationalist political parties. A policy institutive was put forth outlining

three constitutional options for Ireland to discuss with the British: a united Irish republic

comprised of all 32 counties on the island, a cooperative dual state Ireland or joint authority

by Ireland and the UK over Northern Ireland (Patterson, 2007). Options were to be achieved

in peaceful manner and by consent of the Irish and Unionist people. The British Prime

Minister, Margaret Thatcher rejected all three options as proposed. Thatcher was unwilling to

believe that British sovereignty over Northern Ireland was at risk but was gravely concerned

about the situation in Northern Ireland now which was well into its second decade (Northern

Ireland Office, 1985).

Thatcher looked to the Ulster Unionists, the political leaders in Northern Ireland, for more

cooperation in the intelligence (M.15-M I6), security and judicial systems. She realized that

Northern Ireland was the only place in the world where British soldiers were losing their

lives. Thatcher recognized that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, it could be

called into question whether the British government was responsible for murdering its own

citizens.

In November 1985, after considerable negotiation, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed by

Prime Minister Thatcher and the Taoiseach FitzGerald. The Irish Republic now for the first

time in history had a say in the running of the six counties in Northern Ireland. Thatcher’s

reward was a guarantee for improved security support for those that live in the North and for

those that visited that area. (Patterson, 2007)

The governments of Britain and Ireland were throughout the process the most important

international players in the Northern Ireland context and their involvement gave much greater

confidence to Loyalists on their side, and Republicans on the other, that some resolution

could be found. The agreement between the two states and their subsequent cooperative

efforts were highly significant in their ability to achieve success in the long march towards

peace. During the conflict different British governments tried various ways to manage and

contain the conflict. Starting as early as 1972, both British and Irish governments had

engaged in secret talks starting with the Provisional IRA to try to move a peace process

forward. Martin Mc Guinness was one of the first to lead a delegation to London as part of

this effort. (Provisional IRA campaign 1969-1997).

Even though the Anglo-Irish Agreement was rejected by the Unionist parties, it did show

them that there would be an ongoing dialogue about peace and that a door was left open for

other views that may lead to a political settlement. Equally in the Republic of Ireland, it was

recognized that the dialogue that had taken place was helpful, in that the Anglo-Irish

Agreement of 1985 gave the Republic of Ireland government a consultative role in the

political affairs of Northern Ireland for the first time. The Agreement also brought the

problems of the conflict in Northern Ireland into a new international debate with other world

powers. The United States of America and the Canadian government started to play their part

to help deliver peace.

In February 1993 the Downing Street Declaration was published by the British and Irish

governments. In this legal document individual positions were laid out on Northern Ireland

and the issues that may arise in any political settlement. The declaration detailed the basics

principles that could create the conditions for an IRA ceasefire (Mulcahey, 2006). Intense

negotiations followed between church leaders Father Denis Fall and Gerry Adams, also

known for his role as the head of the Sinn Fein party and also with the leader of the Ulster

Unionist Party, David Trimble. The former British Prime Minister John Major, American

Senator George Mitchell, and especially President Clinton of the United States also played

significant roles (Northern Ireland Office, 1998).

The Downing Street Declaration offered incentives to the Republicans by putting an end to

the release of political prisoners, banishment from the airwaves in the Republic, and an Irish

version of a proposed Anglo-Irish Framework which would provide a ‘dynamic’ set of North-

South institutions that Republicans could visualize as ‘transitional’ to a united Ireland. Irish

Prime Minister Reynolds made it clear to Gerry Adams (see Fig 2), that there had to be a

permanent end to the conflict in the Northern Ireland.

Figure 2 Photograph of Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein party

Due to discussion within the Irish Republican Army, on 31 August, 1994, the IRA announced

‘a complete cessation of military operations’. As Volunteer Pat Thompson, Second Battalion,

South Armagh, PIRA, stated, “It was a hard pill to swallow”. Six weeks later, on 13 October

1994, the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC), a body representing the main

loyalist paramilitary organizations, also called for a ceasefire which was implemented by

their command structure.

The persuasion and support of both the British and Irish government was to be an important

factor in the final founding of the Belfast Agreement in 1998. Leading up to this point, the

election of Bertie Ahern in Ireland and Tony Blair in the UK had a profound effect on the

peace process. The new leadership in Ireland and in the UK shared a focus on pragmatic

action and were not afraid of taking a stand on this important regional issue. The mutual

respect shown by both leaders for one another gave a strong example for their Northern Irish

counterparts, struggling to find grounds for cooperation. Ahern’s involvement was even

more critical as the Agreement could only be agreed upon with a yes vote in Ireland to

change articles 2 and 3 in the Republic of Ireland’s constitution, one of the keystones to the

Unionists acceptance of the deal and a piece of legal masterwork by Byrne (Byrne, 2008).

However, the fact that it was not until the summer of 1994, nine years after the signing of the

Anglo-Irish Agreement that the IRA announced the cessation of violence, speaks to the

difficulty involved in moving the two sides towards one another. Finally, Gerry Adams, the

leader of Sinn Fein, the political branch of the IRA, announced a retraction of violence on

behalf of the Provisional IRA. Events that followed led to the IRA’s disengagement from the

armed struggle and its entrance into a peaceful political process (Sinn Fein 2003).

Figure 3 Photograph entitled: The IRA terrorist: a thing of the past?

-

An Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) body was set up in

August 1997 to monitor the disarmament process and verify the disposal of arms (see Fig 3).

The committee was chaired by former United States Senator George Mitchell, and also

included former Finnish brigadier, Tauno Nieminen and Canadian General, John de

Chastelain. The IICD later confirmed that the Provisional Irish Army had fully

decommissioned its armaments and submitted them to the British and Irish governments.

In September 1997, Sinn Fein confirmed its pledge to the Mitchell principles of democracy

and for non-violence; however, the Unionists remained unimpressed. The Mitchell principles

were named after American Senator George Mitchell (see Figure 4) who chaired the political

talks in the negotiating process that led to the Downing Street Declaration. Mitchell stated

that the asset he brought to the table was more than any other, and that his patience, would be

tested repeatedly throughout the peace process. They included the total disarmament of all

paramilitary organizations and also called for an end of punishment in relation to killings and

beating, with-in the republican areas.

Finally, the deadlock was broken as the parties’ concerned finalized a deal opening the way

to peace talks. In October 1997, for the first time in history, Ulster Unionists, Nationalists and

Republicans came together to openly discuss a viable solution for the Northern Ireland

conflict this led to the signature of the historic Good Friday Agreement in April 1998, which

was the plan for the all-inclusive political settlement. The discussions took place all through

the evening of Holy Thursday and were coordinated by Mitchell along with Irish Attorney

General David Byrne. Sensing a chance to end the conflict and underlining the importance

that the situation had achieve in the international community, US President Bill Clinton

would call the negotiating delegation six times that evening, supporting them to find ways to

resolve their differences on key issues. After 30 years, it appeared as though the conflict was

finally over. Ratification in Northern Ireland and the modification of articles two and three of

the Republic of Ireland’s constitution to remove its claim to the whole of the Island of Ireland

were the final steps in creating a political and legal skeleton on which local leaders could

painstakingly build true peace in Northern Ireland over the last ten years.

Figure 4 Picture of Senator George Mitchell

The Good Friday Agreement

In the 1990’s, both Unionists and Nationalist, ‘conflict fatigue’ set in and the economic

prosperity of the Republic of Ireland to the south, which had been poorer for centuries,

reminded people of the benefits that peace could bring. Despite the grounds for hopefulness

after the summer of 1994 a cessation of violence was delivered by the IRA it still took a

further four years to reach agreement. Subsequent political negotiations on a permanent

ceasefire and the decommissioning of the weapon arsenal of the paramilitary groups stalled.

In April 1998, the negotiators produced the Belfast Agreement, also known as the Good

Friday Agreement (Mulcahy, 2006).

The Good Friday Agreement provided a blueprint for a lasting political settlement. The pillar

supporting this was from the nationalists’ point of view in that the unification of the north and

south of Ireland would come about, if the majority of the Northern Irish population gave their

consent for renunciation of the Island of Ireland. This was to be by exclusively peaceful and

democratic means only.

The agreement proposed an elected assembly in Northern Ireland; to encourage devolution

which is the statutory for granting of powers from the assembly of a the state to the Northern

Ireland government at national, regional, or local level. On 10 May 1998, the agreement was

ratified in a separate referendum in the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland.

The tenets of the Good Friday Agreement

The Good Friday Agreement is comprised of three strands. In Strand one, the agreement

provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its

membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to

safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community. The agreement

also defines the conflict in terms of a divide between unionist and nationalist identities,

people viewed themselves as Irish and the Unionists who see themselves as British. This is

most clearly obvious in the elections where this singular issue seems to define outcomes more

than any other.

In Strand two, all Assembly decisions are to be made by agreement between Sinn Fein and

the Democratic Unionist Party. Northern Ireland was to be represented by Dr. Ian Paisley,

Martin Mc Guinness and other elected Ministers, the Irish Government by the Taoiseach

Bertie Ahern and members of the parliament. They work in accordance with the rules for

democratic authority and accountability for the benefit of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Strand three is considered to be the most promising component of the agreement, as it was

not solely based on the inter-regional British-Irish Council, but the intergovernmental

relations that built the peace process. The framework of the agreement associates the British

and Irish states ideologically, constitutionally and politically with unionism in Northern

Ireland. The British therefore are linked with the loyalists, including paramilitaries groups

that claimed to act in defence of British occupation of the six counties. On the other hand,

Ireland is connected with the republicans motivated by Irish people who support the return of

the six countries to the Irish people. (British Irish Council,1998).

The way forward from the Good Friday agreement, therefore, depended on the partnership of

the Unionist and Nationalist communities, rather than the establishment of a middle ground

between them. The British and Irish governments, now with joint responsibility for Northern

Island, agreed on a ‘speedy withdrawal of British military forces’ following paramilitary

ceasefires, reduction of police forces, and the reintroduction of normal judicial procedures in

the court system in Ireland (Northern Ireland office, 1998).

Why the IRA gave up its arms

The Provisional IRA’s primary political objective was to attain freedom and unite Ireland by

forcing the British to withdrawal. However, the IRA ended its long campaign without

achieving this end and ultimately proved its political ineffectiveness. Many believe that the

IRA ‘defeated itself’ in that the people of Northern Ireland, especially those in republican

communities, such as Derry, Belfast and South Armagh, grew weary of the disorder and

bloodshed. Additionally, the IRA’s supply was severed from the Libyan government which

left the army vulnerable. (Office of Public Sector Information, 2004 ).

Another explanation of the IRA’s retraction was an increased international awareness to the

conflict. In 1992, United States’ (US) President Bill Clinton granted Gerry Adams a visa,

while simultaneously sending a ‘peace’ envoy to Ireland. Henry Patterson, author of ‘Ireland

since 1939: The Persistence of Conflict,’ reports that these decisions were strongly supported

by influential Irish Americans.

The 9/11 attacks on New York in 2001 also altered the context of the IRA’s struggle in that it

solidified their decision to retract. The ‘war on terrorism’ was deployed by the US in

response to 9/11 and with that came a list of terrorist groups in which would be under

surveillance. The IRA’s name was included on that list, concerning many of its members.

According to the US State Department, terrorism was defined as a political act of violence,

which was planned and carried out against the civilian population. The example used by the

US government was that of the IRA stating, ‘. . . murderous terrorist organizations such as the

provisional republican army’. Furthermore, members of the IRA found themselves on the

USA’s most wanted list. As a result, IRA’s use of violence disappeared after 9/11 and focus

shifted to the political arena and towards peaceful change (The Christian Science Monitor,

2007).

Today, there are many countries facing similar struggles, including armed conflict and

terrorism. Even though these oppositions are caused by different factors, for instance

nationalism and separatism, religious or ethnic discrimination, it is essential for the

international community to understand why the IRA fighters laid down their weapons and

were willing to participate in a peace process. There are many lessons that can be learned

from the Northern Ireland conflict and one would hope that these tactics could be applied to

conflicts elsewhere in the world.

Critical Analysis of Progress Post Good Friday Agreement

The conceptual framework for analysis

A conceptual framework is needed in order to analyze how the Agreement influenced the

transitional society in Northern Ireland. There are a number of conflict resolution theories and

approaches used to establish the context and the analytical model. Johan Galtung proposed an

influential triangle, which includes contradiction, attitude and behaviour. The contradiction

refers to the underlying “incompatibility” between the conflicting parties in social, political

and economical levels (Ramsbotham et al, 2005). Here, the tensions of interests between the

parties will be defined. Attitude refers to how the conflicting parties perceive the relationship

between each other, often influenced by emotional factors. Behaviour includes the violence

and hostility towards the opponent groups between the conflict parties. All the three

components interact with each other. In order to resolve the conflict, efforts should be made

not only in addressing these three components, but also breaking up the dynamics. Thus, a set

of dynamic changes in behaviour, attitude and resolving conflicting interests and

relationships should take place in community, local, national, regional, international levels.

Based on this theory, a conceptual framework (see Figure 5) will examine how the

Agreement influences the various levels. In addition, the problems and success that derived

from the Agreement will be analyzed throughout this model.

The General Analysis of the Agreement

According to experts, the contradiction between the Protestant, Unionist, and British section

of society and the Catholic, Nationalist, and Irish communities underpins the root of the

conflict in Northern Ireland.

There are two main aspects of the contradiction. First, there are political, economic and social

inequalities between these two communities. Secondly, it is the aspect of legitimate status of

Northern Ireland? These aspects have led the communities to feel a certain amount of

Figure 5 Conceptual Framework

mistrust, hatred and bitterness towards one another. Consequently this has led to escalating

violence and hostilities during the 30 year conflict across the six countries.

The Agreement addresses these underlying contradictions as well as the changing attitudes

and de-escalating hostile behaviours. Conflicting interests between the Protestant and

Catholic communities are focused on the economic, political and cultural inequalities. The

Protestant community was inclined to stay with the Union between the UK and Northern

Ireland in order to maintain superiority and also protect its long term safety and self

determination. On the other hand, the Catholic community sought equality, receiving the

same rights and opportunities as did the Protestants (Hayes et al, 1999). The lack of trust

between the two sides was the major stumbling block for the peace process.

To mediate these contrasting interests, the Agreement confirms the current status of Northern

Ireland as part of the Union, in order to give security to the Protestants. However, the

Agreement also introduces political power-sharing mechanisms, advocating human rights,

promoting equal social and economic opportunities and normalizing security postures, so as

to meet the needs of the Catholic community who were oppressed by the protestant

community.

The equality issue underpins the conflict; however, the legitimacy aspect takes precedence in

the political arena. The conflict over legitimacy of Northern Ireland includes the issue of

national identity and the associated perception on equality and security (Ruane et al, 1996).

The Agreement sets up a new institutionalization of legitimacy in order to get acceptance

from both communities.

The Irish government relinquished its formal territorial claim to Northern Ireland and the

status of Northern Ireland’s constitution was to be determined by the majority of its citizens

through democratic referendum. To that extent, the Agreement supports the Protestants' view

to stay in the Union. However, the Agreement prohibits political discrimination and endorses

equal rights for all society members. North-South Ministerial Councils were established to

promote Irish integration and identity (Todd, 1999).

These efforts largely influenced a change in attitude and behaviour in Northern Ireland. The

Agreement emphasized decommissioning and normalization of the security force.

Reformation among the policing force re-established confidence in the communities

(Cain.2001).

The establishment of the Human Rights Commission and Equality Commission

institutionalize the commitment to promote reconciliation and a “shared future” for peace and

development in Northern Ireland. The political, social and economic changes brought on by

the Agreement take place at every level to ensure equality takes place at all levels of society.

The success of the Agreement on different levels

On the international level, the British-Irish Council promoted cooperation in the

reconciliation, and development of Northern Ireland. Both the Irish and British government

allocated funds and resources to different organizations in Northern Ireland in order to

improve community integration, economic and social development. The European Union and

the United States also took an active part in the peace process and the reconstruction of social

peace and reconciliation. These efforts helped to resolve the basic contradiction in inequality

between two conflicting communities.

The international business community, mainly the United States, also played an important

role during the transition period. In 1996, the Clinton Administration encouraged all political

parties to get involved in negotiations with the intention of creating new business. The

Chamber of Commerce and various trade unions were in discussions with Sinn Fein and the

Loyalist parties, often regarding economic issues. This type of influence was beneficial,

particularly as it pressured the political parties to enter into significant dialogue. The Clinton

Administration was committed to the peace process in Northern Ireland through diplomatic

and commercial efforts. The U.S. Department of Commerce has been at the forefront of

supporting those efforts through specific initiatives which encouraged the U.S. business

community to access trade and investment in Northern Ireland.

The United States business development delegation was sent to Belfast and Derry City to

focus on the growth sectors of environmental, information and health technologies to create

additional employment after 1998. More recently the economy has benefited from major

investment made by large multi-national corporations into the high-tech industry. These large

organizations are attracted by government subsidies and a highly skilled workforce in the

Northern Ireland (Hillary Clinton News, 2008).

At regional level, the North-South Ministerial Council involves both North and South in

mutual interested areas. The Council influences the social, educational and economic life on

the base of equality and justice. This was seen with the release of prisoners, which was

carried out in a quick and stable manner under the Agreement. On both international and

regional levels, the Agreement focuses on addressing the contradiction between conflicting

communities.

On the national level, there was a reduction in violence from both Sinn Fein and Loyalist

paramilitaries post Agreement. The British government significantly reduced the security

force in Northern Ireland. The Agreement stresses the importance to decrease sectarianism

among the forces through the programs of the Community Relations Council and the

Understanding Conflict Trusts. The policing force in Northern Ireland, previously known as

the Royal Ulster Constabulary, is now referred as the Police Service of Northern Ireland or

PSNI. The percentage of Catholics in the policing force has risen from 7% to 27%, there is

still much to be done to reach the goal of a 50%-50% composition.

PSNI’s main objective is to establish a level of confidence and trust with the Catholic and

Protestant communities. Divided societies, where state authority is disputed, question police

legitimacy, which dominates the social and political landscape. However, police involvement

in state and public security ensures that any action taken is directed only at those deemed

illegitimate by the state (Mulcahy, 2006). In 1999, the Patten Report, entitled “A New

Beginning” was published which recognized the crucial role of the police in the peace

process and advised a genuine partnership between the communities (Northern Ireland

Policing Board, 2002).

In order to guide the transformation of policing, the Agreement provides a human rights

framework. This framework implies that the appropriate way to rebuild community

confidence in through equality and respect the rights of all society members. The Human

Rights Act of 1998 and sections 6 and 24 of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 provide the

human rights safeguards that apply to the devolution of policing and justice. In order for

legislation to be passed it the Northern Assembly it must align with the convention between

the police and the community. This is to ensure that there is human rights-based model of

policing for the police service of Northern Ireland (Human Rights, 2000).

Accountability and judicial independence are also areas of concern with policing in Northern

Island. The Agreement addresses issues of accountability, effectiveness and efficiency and

this same message can be seen in the Independent Commission on Policing. The vision in

both is clear, a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland. It begins with solid policing

structures and that those who serve in the policy force carry out duties in a professional,

efficient, fair and impartial manner. The force is to be free from partisan political control and

accountable for upholding the law and to the community in which it serves. The policing

force represents the society and operates within the criminal justice system, which conforms

with human rights norms (Northern Ireland Act 1998).

The Patten Report offered itself as a model that met universal needs regarding policing and

community safety and so could be implemented in any jurisdiction. The recommendations of

the Patten Commission and the success of the police service in Northern Ireland are now seen

as models for many police forces around the world. This can be seen in the measures taken by

the US security after the 9/11 event, which incorporated methods developed in Northern

Ireland. (Mulcahey, 2006).

Major reforms in policing and judicial have been undertaken. The Assembly and government

were established according to Strand one of the Agreement. The power-sharing mechanism

provides a platform for all the parities to communicate and work together in the process of

reconciliation. The Irish language received official recognition in Northern Ireland for the

first time in 1998 under the Agreement. On this level, efforts were made to reduce violent

behaviour and resolve inequality and legitimacy issues.

Northern Ireland is characterized as a deeply segregated society. The Protestants and

Catholics communities live in different areas, work in different places and most importantly

and have separated education systems. The majority of Protestant children in Northern

Ireland attend state controlled schools, whilst the majority of Catholic children attend

Catholic maintained schools. Previously Protestant schools have had a better and more

selective education system than that of the Catholic schools. The Agreement addresses the

importance of equality in education and advocates integration, stressing the importance of

creating opportunities and incentives for both communities.

In local and community level, the civil societies take an active role in community

development, psychological counselling and relationship rebuilding. Attitudinal change and

trust building are considered top priority. Community Restorative Justice (CRJ),

Regeneration of South Armagh (R.o.S.A) and South/North Armagh Victims Encouraging

Recognition (SAVER/NAVER) are programmes/organisations dedicated to reconciliation at

the community level. Each organisation works with a different group promoting respect and

understanding for the other community, all the while addressing community development

(R.o.S.A South Armagh).

CRJ, through empowerment, builds a fair community that is open-minded, receptive and

inclusive. The programme is community led and is designed to tackle issues in a holistic

manner. CRJ’s goal is to reduce the incidence of socially harmful activity by ways of

encouraging reconciliation between the victim and offender and to by building safer

communities. Today, CRJ is one of the fastest growing community based initiatives in

Ireland and to date, 14 groups have been established in Northern Ireland (Restorative Justice

Consortium, undated).

R.o.S.A, a rural support network for South Armagh, focuses on community development and

rural generation. Funded by the European Union, R.o.S.A provides service to both Catholics

and Protestants communities through cross-border IT education, volunteer work and heritage

protection and promotion. The membership-based community organization is dedicated to

eradication of social isolation and exclusion, inequality and deprivation through a partnership

approach. R.o.S.A focuses its work on youth, believing that the future is in the hands of the

youth their ability to move forward from the grievance and mistrust.

SAVER/NAVER, established in 2000, is a non-political organisation which promotes peace

and reconciliation in South and North Armagh. The goal of SAVER/NAVER is to help

victims of the Troubles deal with the past and to move forward in building a cohesive

community. Assistance is provided to men, women and youth through counselling,

alternative therapies and education. In its short existence, SAVER/NAVER has witnessed a

transformation in its members from a feeling of resentment to one of acceptance and

optimism (Gee-Silverman). The organisation just recently published a book entitled, ‘A

Legacy of Tears’, which is a collection of short stories told by the families of those lost

during the conflict. Proceeds of this book sale will go towards a Memorial Wall listing those

names that were lost.

The Problems of the Agreement

The Agreement has enabled progress in Northern Ireland; however, it has also been seen as

an impediment. Many feel as though the Agreement only mediates the interests of the two

communities, but fail to resolve the conflict. Efforts towards equality in economy and culture

will ultimately improve the status of the Catholic community, while reducing Protestant’s

dominance in society and politics. In contrast, the Catholics will expect more actions beyond

the rhetoric efforts, since the equality referred to in the Agreement is more of a goal rather

than a promise. On the community level, the different expectations will influence the process

of formal and informal interactions between the two communities. On the national level, the

Agreement highlights the Irish culture and language, which should be supported; however,

efforts should be made to embody the British culture as well.

Since 1999, the political crisis has revealed two structural flaws in the Agreement design: the

Assembly designation and the voting system. Based on consociational theory, the Assembly

in Northern Ireland adopts a power-sharing mechanism. This mechanism deepens the division

within society, making it difficult to move to a “shared future”. Strictly designed the

mechanism represents the current political parties, but leaves little space for adjustment in the

future changing the demographic and political situations.

Another debatable issue is the notion of “constructive ambiguity” of the Agreement, which

offers diverse interpretations of different communities. The Protestants party feels secure,

believing the Agreement safeguards their position by staying in the union. The Catholics

believe it could lead to a united Ireland, as stated by Gerry Adams after the signing of the

Agreement. It helps both sides to accept the Agreement; however, both parties keep

predetermined radical positions. Those extreme positions have gained more support from

followers when the power-sharing mechanism has lead to compromise, negotiation and delay

in decision making. The moderate parties were not represented and therefore had no voice. In

addition, the power-sharing system leads to political polarization, meaning that both extreme

groups outweigh the moderate parties in both in representation and political rivalry.

The political dispute between the two communities was so serious that in 2002 the Assembly

was suspended and direct rule from the British government was resumed. In 2004, the

institution was reviewed and structural changes were initiated. By the end of 2006, both the

Irish and British governments declared that the reestablishment of the political institutions

were either going to work or complete fail. It is believed that these political crises are related

to the flaw in the Agreement, which embeds separate identities and lacks efforts towards

community reconciliation.

Conclusion

When one speaks of Northern Ireland at the end of the last century, images of violence,

bloodshed and suffering spring to mind. In August 1994 Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn

Fein, the political branch of the IRA, announced a cessation of violence on behalf of the IRA.

Events that followed led to the IRA’s disengagement from the armed struggle and its entrance

into a peaceful political process.

On 10 April 1998, the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ was concluded. It provided a blueprint for a

comprehensive political settlement, based on the acceptance of the fact that the unification of

the north and south of Ireland would come about only if the majority of the Northern Irish

population gave their assent. This principle had been rejected for decades by the IRA. The

Good Friday Agreement proposed an elected assembly in Northern Ireland, all-Ireland bodies

with executive powers, a council of the Isles to discuss matters relevant both to Ireland and

the UK, and other matters such as the release of paramilitary prisoners. At last a political

settlement was in place.

The IRA ended its long campaign without achieving its primary political objective: to

achieve freedom and unity of Ireland by forcing a British withdrawal. The question arises

why the IRA laid down their arms to participate in peace process. The explanation most

likely is that IRA ‘defeated itself'. Eventually, the people of Northern Ireland's grew tired of

the mayhem and bloodshed. This weakened the IRA’s political influence in Northern Ireland

and also led them to the realisation that victory through military means was unlikely.

After the Good Friday Agreement was concluded, important issues like decommissioning, the

border issue, and the role of the police had to be solved. An Independent International

Decommissioning body was set up to monitor the disarmament process and actually verifying

the disposal of stocks of arms. It consisted of three persons and was headed by former

Canadian general John de Chastelain (see Figure 6).

Figure 6 Picture of John de Chastelain

The Agreement is a complicated mechanism based on political compromise and

understanding of the root causes of the conflict. It tries to address the contradiction between

Unionist and Nationalist communities through the advocacy of human rights and equality in

social and economic life. Furthermore, it aspires to the creation of a country where the rights

and interest of all are respected and protected. The referendum about the constitutional

legitimacy of Northern Ireland allows its citizens to decide their future through peaceful and

democratic process. These efforts have positively influence all the levels of society in

Northern Ireland, helping the society move from conflict, violence and hatred to

reconciliation, peace and development. The challenge for Northern Ireland derives from the

ambiguity and the shortcomings in the power-sharing system design. In order to push the

peace progress forward, adjustments should be made to the power-sharing system. Secondly,

in order to sustain peace the go the government should establish a more inclusive framework

to allow for better communication between all stakeholders. Finally, the government should

work more closely with the civil society to build a "shared future", creating a new identity for

all people living in Northern Ireland.

Renunciation of the island of Ireland is still a possibility but the idea has not been advanced

considerably in the last ten years. Dublin seems much closer in many ways to Northern

Ireland than London does. The likelihood of a better future with a unified Irish nation than a

backwater part of a changing United Kingdom is starting to sound more plausible to many in

the six countries than previously one would have been hoped for. The Good Friday

Agreement, while not creating a perfect solution for the future of Northern Ireland, has

brought a peace to the region and in some places the healing process has begun. This peace

matters far beyond the borders that contain it, as it is can be used as an example of what can

be achieved in troubled regions through the peoples determination and involvement by local

and international leaders.

References

British-Irish Council(undated), www1.british-irishcouncil.org accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Byrne, D. (2008). 'Northern Ireland Peace Accord' David Bryne Address to the Bar Association of

Lexington, April 2008

Cain (undated), http:// www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/ accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Cain (undated), http:// cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Cain(undated), http:// cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Calvocoressi Peter (1982) “World politics since 1945” (4th ed),New York: Longman.

Hillary Clinton(undated), www.hillaryclinton.com/news/ accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Hayes B. and Mc Allister, I., (1999). “Ethnonationalism, public opinion and the Good Friday

Agreement” in Jospeph Ruane and Jennifer Todd ed. After the Good Friday Agreement.

Dublin: UCD Press.

Mulcahy, Aogán (2006), “Policing Northern Ireland. Conflict, legitimacy and reform”, Devon UK/

Portland USA.

Northern Ireland Office(undated), www.nio.gov.uk/the- agreement accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister (undated),

www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/index/equality/ human - rights accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Office of Public Sector Information(undated), www.opsi.gov.uk/ accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Patterson,H., (2007), Ireland Since 1939: The Persistence of Conflict, Penguin Ireland: Dublin.

Restorative Justice Consortium (undated), www. restorativejustice .org.uk/ accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Ruane, J. and Todd, J., 1999. “The Belfast Agreement: Context, contents, consequences” in In

Jospeph Ruane and Jennifer Todd eds. After the Good Friday Agreement. UCD Press:Dublin.

Royal Ulster Constabulary (undated), www.royalulsterconstabulary.org accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

Sinn Fein (undated), www.sinnfein.ie/peace/ good _ friday accessed on 12 Apr 2008.

The Christian Science Monitor(undated), ww w.csmonitor.com accessed on 13 Apr 2008.

Todd, J (1999) “ Nationalism, republicanism and the Good Friday Agreement”. In Jospeph Ruane and

Jennifer Todd ed. After the Good Friday Agreement. UCD Press, Dublin.