JournalofBuddhistEthicsISSN1076-9005http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/The
Criteria of Goodness in the PaliNikayas and the Nature of Buddhist
EthicsDr. AbrahamVelezdeCeaTheology DepartmentGeorgetown
UniversityEmail: [email protected] Notice: Digital
copies of this work may be made anddistributed provided no change
is made and no alteration is madetothecontent.
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All enquiries to:
d.keown@gold.ac.ukTheCriteriaofGoodnessinthePaliNikayasandtheNatureofBuddhistEthicsDr.
AbrahamVelezdeCeaAbstract: I start by discussing Damien Keowns
important con-tributiontotheeldofBuddhistethics,
andIpointoutsomedicultiesderivedfromhiscriterionofgoodnessbasedontheidenticationof
nirvanawiththegoodandtheright. Inthesecondpart,
IexpandKeownsconceptionofvirtueethicsandovercomethedicultiesaectinghiscriterionof
goodnessbyproposing a heuristic distinction between instrumental
and tele-ological actions. In the third part, I explore the early
Buddhistcriteria of goodness and argue that they do not correspond
to aform of virtue ethics as Keown denes it, but rather to a
partic-ularsystemofvirtueethicswithfeaturesofutilitarianismandmoral
realism. That is, a system where the goodness of actionsis
determined not only by the mental states underlying actionsas Keown
claims, but also by the content and the consequencesof actions for
the happiness of oneself and others.DamienKeowns Buddhist Virtue
Ethics andItsDicultiesKeownswork,
TheNatureofBuddhistEthics(1992)isperhapsthemostcomprehensivediscussionofBuddhistethicaltheorythatcanbefoundinthe
market today. Keown rejects utilitarian readings of Buddhist ethics
andadvocatesvirtueethicsasabetterinterpretativeframework.
TheclosestwesternanaloguetoBuddhistethicsisnotutilitarianismbutAristotelianvirtue
ethics. Aristotles ethical theory is an illuminating guide to an
un-derstanding of the Buddhist moral system. (1992: 21). As in
Aristotelianethics, in Buddhism there is a teleological summum
bonum(eudaimoniainAristotle,nirvanain Buddhism)tobeachieved
throughthecultivationofvirtues.AccordingtoKeown, actions
inBuddhismarenot, as utilitarianismclaims, good or evil because
they lead to good or evil consequences.
Rather,actionsgenerategoodorevil
consequencesbecausetheyareintrinsicallygoodorevil.
Theintrinsicgoodorevil of
actionsderivesfromthemen-talstatesmotivatingandaccompanyingactions.
Specically, theintrinsic123124
JournalofBuddhistEthicsevilofactionsderivesfromthethreerootsoftheunwholesome(akusala).The
three roots of the unwholesome are greed (lobha) or passion (raga),
ha-tred (dosa), and delusion (moha). Conversely, the intrinsic good
of actionsderivesfromtheoppositementalstates,
thethreerootsofthewholesome(kusala), a term that Keown translates
as the good. The three wholesomeroots are the source of all the
wholesome mental factors
(kusaladhamma),whichhetranslatesasgoodqualities.Similarly,
thethreerootsof theunwholesomearethesourceof all unwholesomemental
factors(akusala-dhamma), which he translates as bad qualities, also
known as delementsoraictions(kilesa,Skt. klesa).
Goodandbadqualities,wholesomeandunwholesomemental
factorsareperhapsbestunderstoodascorrespond-ing to the Western
notion of virtues and vices (1992: 63). In fact, Keowncalls the
three wholesome roots the three Buddhist cardinal virtues,
namely,nongreed (alobha) or nonpassion (araga), nonhatred (adosa),
and nondelu-sion (amoha),which he translates as liberality,
benevolence, and un-derstanding. The summum bonumof nirvana is
achieved by purifying themental
stream(santana)fromvicesandbadqualities, andbycultivatingthe three
cardinal virtues and good qualities.However, unlike Aristotle,
Keown identies the summum bonum with thegood and the right: Nirvana
is the good, and rightness is predicated of
actsandintentionstotheextentwhichtheyparticipateinnirvanicgoodness.TherightandthegoodinBuddhismareinseparablyintertwined.
If
anactiondoesnotdisplaynirvanicqualitiesthenitcannotberightintermsof
Buddhist ethics whatever other characteristics (such as
consequences) itmight have (1992:
177).Keownsidenticationofnirvanicvirtueswiththegoodandtherighthasfarreachingandcontroversial
implications. Therstoneisthatthegoodnessof
actionsdependsexclusivelyonthemotivationorthementalstates
underlying actions. Moral actions are clear cut: When they display
orparticipate of nirvanic good, they are right and virtuous, and
when they donot display or participate of nirvanic good, they are
wrong and nonvirtuous.This is so from the inception of action in
the mind, and nothing can change itlater. As Keown puts it, An
action is right or wrong from the moment of itsinception its nature
is xed by reference to nirvanic values, and it
cannotsubsequentlychangeitsstatus.. . .
InBuddhistethicsitisthemotivationwhichprecedesanactthatdeterminesitsrightness.
Anactisrightif itisvirtuous,i.e.
performedonthebasisofLiberality(araga),Benevolence(adosa) and
Understanding (amoha) (1992:
177-178).ThesecondimplicationisthattheBuddhistcriterionof
goodnessex-cludesfromthemoral
domainactionsnotparticipatingornotdisplayingVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics
125nirvanic virtues. The problem is that many Buddhists,at least at
the be-ginningof theirspiritual practice,
actmorallynotsomuchmotivatedbynirvanicvirtues,
butratherbynonnirvanicvirtuessuchascravingforaproximate goal such
as a good rebirth. Even practitioners who act
ethicallyaimingattheultimategoal ofnirvanadoso,
atleastonsomeoccasions,motivated by subtle forms of spiritual
greed. Aiming at nirvana out of spir-itual greed and observing the
ve precepts out of craving for some worldlyreward or fear of
punishment after death cannot be said either to participateor
display nirvanic virtues. However,it is problematic to suggest,like
Ke-owns criterion does, that such actions are morally wrong, evil,
and outsidethe moral domain.Keowns identication and subsequent
criterion of goodness lead him
tomarginalizetheproximategoalsofBuddhistethics.
Proximategoalssuchasalargefortune, goodreputation,
enteringcondentintoanyassembly,unconfused death, and rebirth in
heaven are no longer part of the moral do-main unless actions
leading to them participate or display nirvanic virtues.In Keowns
words, the proximate goals are just non-moral consequences
ofethical action. . . secondary, contingent, consequences of moral
actions, andapartfromthenal one[heavenlyrebirth]
thereisnothingparticularlyBuddhist about them (1992: 125). This
marginalization of the proximategoalsofBuddhistethics, however,
isalsoproblematic. Itistruethatac-cording to the Pali Nikayas, it
is considered wrong to state that whateverapersonexperiences,
whetheritbepleasantorpainfulorneither-painful-nor-pleasant, all
that is caused by what was done in the past (SN IV.230).Because not
everything is due to past moral actions or karma, it is also
truethat the proximate goals one experiences are not necessarily
the fruit of pastmoral actions. However, this does not justify
Keowns marginalization of theproximate goals for several
reasons.First,
BuddhisttextsandBuddhistpractitionersdonotseetheproxi-mate goals as
nonmoral. On the contrary, in all cases it is understood
thattheyaremoralconsequencesofmoralactions,
andinsomeoccasionsitisexplicitly said that they are so. For
instance, in (SN I.92) it is said that as aresult of a moral action
(providing a Buddha with almsfood), a person wasreborn seven times
in a good destination, in the heavenly world. Similarly,it is also
said that as a result of that moral action, he obtained the
positionof nancier seven times. That is, after being reborn seven
times in
heaven,hewasbornanotherseventimesasahumanbeingwhoobtainedineachlife
a good job and the material prosperity that goes with it.Second,
not all Buddhist traditions followwhat thePali Canonsaysabout
karma, and accept that Canon as the authority to dene what is or126
JournalofBuddhistEthicswhat is not moral in Buddhist ethics. In
fact, there are Buddhist traditions,for instance Tibetan
traditions, that believe that everything, including
theproximategoals,arealwaystheconsequenceofpastactionsorkarma. Soat
least from the point of view of these Buddhist traditions, the
experienceof proximate goals is necessarily a moral consequence of
past moral
actions.IntheseBuddhisttraditions,whereeverythingisseenasbeingtheconse-quenceof
pastkarma, Keownsmarginalizationof
theproximategoalsisunjustiable.Third, even if one were to ignore
other Buddhist understandings of
karmaandconcedetoKeownandtheTheravadaorthodoxythattheproximategoalsarenotalwaysandnecessarilyconsequencesof
moral actions, itistrue,as we have already said,that according to
the Pali Nikayas they aresoonsomeoccasions. Consequently, evenif
itisadmittedthattheyarecontingentconsequencesofmoralactions,therearenogroundstocharac-terizethemasnonmoral.
Whentheyareconsequencesof moral actions,theyarenecessarilymoral,
asmoral
astheactionsthatproducedthem.Onlywhentheproximategoalsarenotcausedbymoral
actionscanoneproperly say that they are not moral consequences.
However, according tothe Pali Nikayas, the workings of karma, and
therefore whether or not theproximate goals are moral consequences
of ethical actions, is something thatonly Buddhas can know (MN
I.74), not scholars of Buddhist ethics.Furthermore,
Keownsmarginalizationof theproximategoalsisques-tionable from a
descriptive point of view. Buddhist ethics in practice seemsto
unanimously consider the proximate goals as part of the Buddhist
moraldomain. It has been extensively documented that the proximate
goals playan important ethical role in actual Buddhist practices.
The proximate goalsare the most common pattern of validation in
traditional Buddhist commu-nities. In Theravada communities, the
proximate goals of prosperity, fame,accumulation of merit,
wholesome karma, and a happy rebirth usually val-idate moral and
religious actions independently of the validation based onthe
ultimate goal of nirvana (Swearer, 1995; Gombrich, 1971; Bunnag,
1973;Keyes, 1983). Similarly, in Tibetan Buddhist ethics, even
though the bod-hisattvaideal isprevalentamongmonks, nuns,
andlaypeople, themostcommonpatternof validationof ethical
conductisnottheultimategoalof Buddhahood, or nonabiding nirvana
(apratis.t.hita nirvan.a), but the moreproximate goals of merit,
wholesome karma, and a good rebirth (Tucci, 1980;Ekvall, 1964;
Samuel, 1993; Tatz and Kent, 1977; Lichter and Epstein 1983).Keowns
marginalization of the proximate goals is also questionable
ontextual grounds. Already in the Pali Nikayas, it is possible to
detect textswherethejusticationof ethical
conductbasedonproximategoalsfunc-VelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics
127tions independently of the justication of ethics based on the
ultimate goalof nirvana. (DNII.85; MNIII.165; MNIII.203f; MNI.400f;
ANIV.247-248; ANV.306-308). Similarly,
greatBuddhistthinkersusethedoctrinesof karma and rebirth to justify
moral behavior without mentioning
nirvanaorthedisplayofnirvanicvirtuesasanecessaryrequirementformoralac-tions.
See for instance Nagarjunas Precious Garland(I. 12-23; IV.310)
andSantidevas Bodhicaryavatara(I. 17; IV 5, 9, 12, 14; V. 20; VI
72-74). Eventhe Dalai Lama discusses the doctrines of karma and
rebirth and uses themas a justication of ethical conduct, without
speaking about nirvana or theneed to display nirvanic virtues
(1994: 68-69).Becausethemarginalizationof
theproximategoalsandtheexclusionofnonnirvanicactionsfromthedomainofthegoodarenotwarrantedbyearlyBuddhistsources,
classical Buddhistthinkers,
orBuddhistethicsinpractice,IdonotseeenoughempiricalgroundsforKeownsidenticationand
subsequent criterion of
goodness.OnemightdefendKeownbysayingthatheisengagedinnormativeethics.
That is, he is not trying to describe Buddhist ethics as it is or
as ithas been commonly practiced,but rather as it ought to be
practiced. Ke-owns criterion of goodness would be intended to apply
only to certain
idealtypesofBuddhistethicsbutnottoalltypesofBuddhistethicalpractice.Therefore,
it would be unfair to reject his ideal view of Buddhist ethics
froman empirical point of view.It is true that Keown wants to go
beyond simple descriptive ethics, butit is also true that following
a methodology inspired by Little and Twiss, heclaims to be doing
both description and analysis (1992:5-6). To state
thattheproximategoalsarenonmoral
consequencesthatarenotparticularlyBuddhist, as Keowndoes, is
animprovement fromsayingthat
theyareaconcessiontospirituallyretardedindividuals(LittleandTwiss1978:244).
Nevertheless, I believe there is still room to improve our
descriptionsandanalysisof Buddhistethics. Forinstance,
thereisnothingwronginsaying from a descriptive point of view that
there is a gap between the idealpractice of virtue ethics and the
actions of Buddhists aiming at proximategoals without
displayingnirvanicvirtues. However, I donot thinkit
isaccuratetoidentifyideal types of practicewiththenatureof
Buddhistethics, especially when that natureentails the
marginalization of importantaspects of Buddhist ethics and the
exclusion from the moral domain of lessideal types of ethical
practice.128
JournalofBuddhistEthicsExpandingKeownsConceptionofVirtueEthicsKeownsrejectionofutilitarianreadingsofBuddhistethicsisintendedtoovercomewhathecallsthetranscendencythesis,thatis,
theviewac-cording to which morality is a preliminary stage of the
Buddhist path to betranscended once the goal of nirvana is
attained. Keowns major contribu-tion to the eld of Buddhist ethics
is perhaps his conclusive refutation of thetranscendencythesis.
Aparticularexampleofthetranscendencythesisiswhat Keown calls the
King-Spiro hypothesis, that is, the understanding ofBuddhist ethics
as composed of two originally independent and
ultimatelyincompatible ethical systems, karmatic and nirvanic
Buddhism (King 1964;Spiro1970). AccordingtotheKing-Spirohypothesis,
karmaticBuddhismis primarily practiced by lay people and nirvanic
Buddhism by monks andnuns. Whereas the aims of karmatic Buddhism
are the accumulation of goodkarma and happy rebirths, the aims of
nirvanic Buddhism are the cessationof karmaandrebirth.
KarmaticBuddhismisrelatedtoethical
practice,andbecausekarmaticBuddhismisameanstonirvanicBuddhism,
itfol-lows that ethics is also a means to nirvana and not a
constitutive part of theultimate goal. In other words, ethics is
merely instrumental and transcendedin nirvanic
Buddhism.Buildingupontheworkof HarveyAronson(1979;
1980)andNathanKatz (1982) Keown challenges the anthropological
studies of King and
SpiroandshowshowkarmicBuddhismandnirvanicBuddhismareintegrated;they
are neither separable nor incompatible. Comparing Buddhist ethics
toAristotelian ethics, Keown argues that moral virtues are
constitutive partsof the ultimate goal of nirvana. According to
Aristotle,human ourishingincludesnotonlythecultivationof
intellectual virtuesbutalsoof moralvirtues. Similarly, the Buddhist
ideal involves both cognitive and aectivevirtues, wisdom as well as
love and compassion. I agree with Keown on this,andhiscomparisonof
BuddhistethicsandAristotleisveryilluminating.However, the price to
pay for Keowns excellent refutation of the transcen-dencythesisand
theKing-Spirohypothesisisacriterion ofgoodnessthatgenerates several
diculties from a descriptive point of view, specically,
theexclusionofnonnirvanicactionsandthemarginalizationoftheproximategoals.I
believe there is a way to avoid the trancendency thesis and the
King-Spirohypothesis without generatingthesedescriptivediculties. I
alsobelievethat that wayis moreconsistent withtheAristotelianmodel
ofvirtue ethics than Keowns criterion of goodness.The diculties
that Keowns criterionof goodness generates
canbeVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 129solved by introducing a
heuristic distinction between instrumental and teleo-logical
actions. By instrumental actions I mean actions leading to
favorableconditions for cultivating nirvanic virtues and by
teleological I mean actionsactually displaying nirvanic virtues or
virtues characteristic of the Buddhistideal of
sainthood.Actionsnotdisplayingnirvanicvirtues,suchasobservingthepreceptsoutofcravingforaproximategoal,
participateinthegoodbecausetheyare instrumental for attaining the
highest good of nirvana. The nonnirvanicmoral actions are also good
because they accord with the Dharma. Whenthe proximate goals are
the consequence of good actions leading to favorableconditions to
cultivate nirvanic virtues or good actions actually
displayingnirvanic virtues, they are part of the moral domain of
the good. Even whenthe proximate goals are not the consequence of
moral actions, they are partof
thegoodbecausetheyarefavorableconditionsforthecultivationandactual
display of nirvanic
virtues.Keownsidenticationofthegoodwithnirvanicvirtuesisinconsistentwith
the Aristotelian model of virtue ethics on which he explicitly
bases hisviewof Buddhistethics(1992: 21).
Aristotleidentieseudaimoniawiththehighestgoodofhumanourishing,
butnotwiththemoraldomainofthe good. Aristotle speaks about a
variety of intrinsic goods, some of themconstitutiveof
thehighestgoodof humanourishing, suchasmoral andintellectual
virtues, andothersexternal orinstrumental, suchashonors,fortune,
sensual pleasures, andfriendship(Kraut 1999: 82-83; Sherman1989:
125-127). Similarly, inBuddhismthegoodisneveridentiedwiththe summum
bonum of nirvana. As Keown himself acknowledges, the termskusala
and pu n na, which denote the good in a wide sense, are predicated
notonly of good moral actions and dispositions, but also of the
consequences ofmoral activity (1992: 123), which include the
proximate goals.Keownscriterionimpliesthatinstrumental
goods(nonnirvanicmoralactionsandtheproximategoals)arenotpartofthemoraldomainofthegoodandnotcharacteristicofvirtueethics.
ForKeown, onlyteleologicalgoods (actions participating or
displaying nirvanic virtues) seem to qualifyas good and
characteristic of virtue ethics. However, it is important to
noticethatwithKeownscriterionofgoodnessnoteventheAristoteliansystemwould
qualify as virtue ethics because Aristotle speaks of both
instrumen-tal andteleological goods. If
Aristotleistheparadigmaticrepresentativeof virtueethicsandhehimself
admitstheexistenceof bothinstrumentaland teleological goods, I do
not see why Buddhist virtue ethics cannot haveinstrumental goods.
How does the acceptance of instrumental goods com-promise virtue
ethics?If the acceptance of instrumental goods does not so130
JournalofBuddhistEthicscompromise the virtue ethics of Aristotle,
why would such acceptance com-promise Buddhist virtue ethics?The
acceptance of instrumental goods doesnot make Aristotle a
utilitarian or an advocator of the transcendency thesis.Similarly,
the acceptance of instrumental goods within Buddhism does notentail
a commitment to utilitarianism or the transcendency thesis.In
dierent ways, the two kinds of actions that I am distinguishing
hereare related to the highest good of nirvana. While actions
leading to
favorableconditionstocultivatenirvanicvirtuesareinstrumental,
actionscurrentlydisplaying nirvanic virtues are teleological. In
other words, whereas actionsleading to favorable conditions to
cultivate nirvanic virtues are good becauseof their consequences,
actions actually displaying nirvanic virtues are goodbecause of
their participation in mental states characteristic of the
Buddhistideal of sainthood.The distinction between actions leading
to favorable conditions to culti-vate virtues and actions actually
displaying virtues is inspired not only byAristotelian ethics, but
also and primarily by the early Buddhists conceptsof kusalaand pu n
na.According to Premasiri, the terms kusalaand pu n nain early
Buddhismrefer to dierent types of actions with dierent
soteriological consequences:the term that is invariably used in
specifying the good actions which leadto the spiritual bliss of
nibbanais kusala, whereas the term more frequentlyused for
specifying the good actions which lead to sensuous enjoyment
andhappinessinsam. saraispu n na(Premasiri, 1976: 69,
quotedbyKeown1992:122). Keown rejects Premasiris distinction
between kusala and pu n
naactionsbecausebothtermsoverlapinearlyBuddhismandbecausethereisnotscriptural
evidenceforthedistinction. Inhiswords, If theywereopposed in some
way and had such dierent soteriological implications thereis little
doubt that the Buddha would have taken care to point it out.
Inopposition to Premasiris view, Keown contends that pu n na and
kusala donot describe two kinds of actions but emphasize dierent
aspects of one andthesameaction(1992: 123).
However,eventhoughtheBuddhadidnotliterally distinguish between
kusala and pu n na actions, Lance Cousins studyof kusalainthePali
traditionshowstheexistenceof textual
groundsforPremasirisdistinction. Cousins states explicitly that he
essentially agreeswith Premasiri in this point and although there
is some overlapping, pu n nais most often used in regard to actions
intended to bring about results of apleasant kind in the future. It
is almost exclusively kusalawhich is used inrelation to the Buddhas
path (1996: 154). Using Keowns own argument,if it were true that pu
n naand kusalareferred to one and the same
actionthereislittledoubtthattheBuddhawouldhavetakencaretopointitVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics
131out.Becausetheearlytexts donot sayexplicitlythat pu n na
andkusalarefer either to two actions or one and the same action,
one has to analyze thedierent usages of the terms to reach a
conclusion. The most comprehensivestudy of these usages seems to
indicate that the terms refer to two dierentkindsof actions.
AtleastthisiswhatCousinsconcludes, agreeingwithPremasiri.
IprefertofollowtheirviewanddisagreewithKeownonthispoint.TheravadaBuddhistethics,
inpractice, seemstomaintainacleardis-tinction between actions
leading to the accumulation of pu n na and the expe-rience of
pleasant consequences within sam. sara, and kusalaactions leadingto
nirvana. This fact could be interpreted as an indication of the
canonicalorigins of these two kinds of actions. One might dispute
whether or not thecontemporary Theravada emphasis on pu n naover
kusalais consistent withthe Pali Canon, but one cannot deny that
there are early textual grounds forspeaking about two kinds of
actions, at least when the meanings of kusalaand pu n nado not
overlap. What can be denied, in agreement with Keown,is that the
soteriological outcome of the two actions is unrelated.
Keownsrejection of the distinction between pu n naand kusalaactions
presupposesthat the two kinds of actions are opposed to each other
and that they leadto two qualitative dierent soteriological goals.
This, however, is not neces-sarily the case because kusalaand pu n
nacan also be interpreted as leadingin dierent ways (teleological
and instrumental) to one and the same sote-riological goal, namely,
nirvanicvirtues. Thatis, onecanconsiderpu n naand the proximate
goals as stepping stones towards kusala and the ultimategoal of
nirvana.However, in order to avoid the exegetical issues around the
terminologyofkusalaandpu n
na,Iprefertheheuristicdistinctionbetweeninstrumen-tal actions
(leading to favorable conditions to cultivate nirvanic virtues)
andteleological actions (actually displaying nirvanic virtues). In
fact my distinc-tion is not exactly equivalent to the distinction
between pu n naand
kusala.Actionsactuallydisplayingnirvanicvirtuesaresimilartokusalaifkusalasigniesactionsparticipatinginwholesomementalstatescharacteristicofthe
Buddhist ideal of sainthood. However, they are dissimilar if
kusalaac-tionsinearlyBuddhismdenotesprimarily, asCousinshasshown,
actionsassociated with special states produced by wisdom and
related to a medita-tional context (Cousins 1996: 145). Actions
leading to favorable conditionsto cultivate nirvanic virtues are
similar to pu n naactions in that they bothlead to pleasant or
happy results in the future. However they are dissimilarin that pu
n naactions arenotexplicitly subordinated to thecultivation of132
JournalofBuddhistEthicsnirvanic virtues in the
future.Mydistinctionhighlightstheunityandcontinuitybetweenthesetwokinds
of actions,and between instrumental and teleological goods in
Bud-dhist ethics. Instrumental and teleological actions have the
same soteriologi-cal goal, both lead to nirvanic virtues and the
cessation of suering.
Strictlyspeaking,itcouldbemaintainedthatthesoteriologicalgoalsaredierentbecause
favorable conditions for cultivating nirvanic virtues is not the
sameas the actual display of these virtues. However, I prefer to
emphasize thatboth kinds of actions ultimately converge in one and
the same goal.Like Keown, I do not support the King-Spiro
hypothesis. The distinctionbetween instrumental and teleological
actions should not be confused
withthedistinctionbetweenkarmaticandnirvanicBuddhism.
ThedistinctionI am proposing between these two kinds of actions is
precisely intended torender the categories of karmatic and nirvanic
Buddhism unnecessary. Ac-cording to my distinction, both kinds of
actions are karmatic and nirvanic atthe same time. Both kinds of
actions generate karma either
instrumentallyorteleologicallyrelatedtonirvanicvirtues.
Liberatedbeingscouldbein-terpreted as performing actions that are
only nirvanic in nature, but this ismisleading because liberated
beings are not beyond the moral domain of thegood or beyond the
karma of other living beings. The actions of liberatedbeings
display nirvanic virtues, and in this sense they are part of the
moraldomainofthegood.
Similarly,actionsofliberatedbeingscanleadothersto favorable
conditions by teaching or inspiring them to cultivate or
displaynirvanic virtues.Like Keown, I do not support the
transcendency thesis, and my
distinc-tiondoesnotimplythatethicsinBuddhismisapreliminarypracticetobe
transcended in advanced stages of the spiritual path. Keown is
perfectlyrightonthispoint, andI sharehisviewof moral
virtuesasaconstitu-tive part of nirvana, together with cognitive
virtues. In order to avoid thetranscendency thesis, Keown proposes
a version of virtue ethics where onlyteleological actionsarepartof
themoral domainof thegood. However,the acceptance of instrumental
actions does not necessarily entail the tran-scendenceof
ethicsoncenirvanaisattained. Ethicsisnevertranscendedin Buddhism.
Although actions leading to favorable conditions to
cultivatenirvanic virtues are instrumental, they are never
transcended. In fact, lib-erated beings and perhaps all
practitioners are supposed, at least ideally, toact to generate
favorable conditions for the cultivation or display of
nirvanicvirtuesinothers.
WhatistranscendedinBuddhistethicsistheneedtoaccumulatemorekarmatoattainawakening,
butnottheperformanceofactionsdisplayingnirvanicvirtues,
noractionsleadingotherstofavorableVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics
133conditions to cultivate nirvanic
virtues.TheEarlyBuddhistCriteriaofGoodnessAt rst sight, Keowns
analysis of morality in the Digha Nikaya seems to begrounding his
account of Buddhist ethics in the Pali Nikayas. However, thethird
chapter (Ethics and Psychology) and the refutation of utilitarian
read-ings of Buddhist ethics in chapter nine, make clear that
Keowns criterion ofgoodness is inspired by Abhidharma thought. In
his words, For utilitariansthere are not intrinsically good
motives, while for Buddhism action inspiredbythethreeCardinal
Virtuesisintrinsicallygood. IntermsofBuddhistpsychology,
aswesawwhendiscussingtheAbhidharmainChapter3, thelocusof
goodandevil istobefoundinthehumanpsychenotintheconsequences of
actions in the world at large. (1992: 179).However,
isAbhidharmapsychological ethicstheyardsticktomeasurethe nature of
Buddhist ethics? Can Abhidharmaethics be generalized
andextrapolatedtoallmanifestationsofBuddhistethics?
HereIlimitmyselftodiscusswhetherornotKeownsAbhidharmiccriterionofgoodnesscor-respondstothecriteriaofgoodnessfoundinearlyBuddhism,
bywhichImean the Buddhism of the Pali
Nikayas.PerhapsthemorestraightforwardearlyBuddhistcriterionofgoodnesscanbefoundin(M.I.415-419)
withintheAmbalat.t.hikarahulovadaSutta.There the Buddha advises his
recently ordained son Rahula to reect before,during, and after
performing a bodily, verbal, or mental action: whether ornot an
action may lead to my own aiction, or to the aiction of
others,ortotheaictionof both; itisanunwholesomebodilyaction. . .
verbalaction. . . mental action with painful consequences, with
painful results. . . itis a wholesome bodily action. . . verbal
action. . . mental action with pleasantconsequences, with pleasant
results (Bhikkhu Nan.amoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi1995: 524-526).The
criterion has two parts. The rst one is clearly utilitarian because
itexplicitly states that one should consider whether or not the
consequences ofan action might lead (sam. vatteyya) to ones one
aiction (attavyabadhaya),to the aiction of others (paravyabadhaya),
or to the aiction of both (ub-hayavyabadhaya). Inotherwords,
therstpartof thecriteriontriestominimize suering for the greatest
number, which here is referred to as theaictionofoneself, others,
andbothoneselfandothers. Thesecondpartof the criterion, which Peter
Harvey does not mention in his own discussionof this text (1995),
can be interpreted as characteristic of either moral real-134
JournalofBuddhistEthicsism or virtue ethics, depending on how the
terms unwholesome (akusala) orwholesome(kusala) are understood.The
standard denition of the unwholesome and the wholesome
appearsin(MNI.47), withintheSammadit.t.hi Sutta. There,
theunwholesomeisdenedasthetenunwholesomeactions:
killing,takingwhatisnotgiven,misconduct in sensual pleasures,
false, divisive, harsh, and frivolous speech,covetousness, ill
will, and wrong view. The roots of the unwholesome are saidto be
greed, hate, and delusion. The wholesome is dened as the opposite
ofthe ten unwholesome actions, and the roots of the wholesome as
the oppositeof the three roots of the
unwholesome.Becausetheunwholesomeandthewholesomerefertobothcertainex-ternal
bodily and verbal actions and certain internal mental actions or
men-tal states, itisnotclearwhichistheprimarymeaning. If
unwholesomerefers primarily to the intrinsic proprieties of certain
external actions suchas killing, stealing, lying, and so on, then
the second part of the criterion ischaracteristic of moral realism.
If unwholesome refers primarily to internalmental actionsormental
statessuchascovetousness, ill will, andwrongview, then the second
part of the criterion is characteristic of virtue ethics.The fact
that the three roots of the unwholesome and the three roots ofthe
wholesome are mental states does not preclude the existence of
certainexternal actions that are intrinsically unwholesome or
wholesome. Certainlymental states addunwholesomeness or
wholesomeness toactions, but
itisimportanttohighlightthat(MNI.47)doesnotstatethattherstsixexternal
bodily and verbal actions are unwholesome or wholesome
dependingonjustthemental rootfromwhichtheyoriginate.
ThisideaappearsinAbhidharmaliterature but not in the Pali
Nikayas.Because the referent of unwholesome is external bodily and
verbal actionsas well as internal mental actions, I interpret the
second part of the criterionas a combination of moral realism and
virtue ethics; moral realism
becausecertainexternalactionsareunwholesomeorwholesome,
andvirtueethicsbecause certain internal actions are unwholesome or
wholesome.The second part of the criterion also states that
unwholesome and whole-some actions have respectively painful or
pleasant consequences, painful orpleasantresults.
However,thismentionofconsequencesinrelationtothewholesomeness or
unwholesomeness of actions is not a sign of
utilitarianism.Thepointhereisnottoconsidertheconsequencesinordertominimizesuering,
but rather realizethat certainactions
producecertainkindofconsequences.The second part of the criterion
does not refute my characterization
oftherstpartasutilitarianbecauseitisnowherestatedthatthewhole-VelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics
135someness or unwholesomeness of actions is what leads to pleasant
or painfulconsequences. The second part of the criterion is not to
be universalized butsupplemented by a consideration of the
consequences of actions. If what thecriterion conveys as a whole
were that the good or evil of actions
dependsexclusivelyontheirwholesomenessorunwholesomeness,
thenitwouldbeunnecessarytoconsidertheconsequencesof actions;
atbestitwouldberedundant. Because the criterion as a whole does
require a consideration ofthe consequences of actions and not just
of their wholesomeness or unwhole-someness, I think it is better to
interpret it as implying that the goodnessof actions depends not
only on their wholesomeness but also on their
con-sequences.Itistruethatthewholesomenessorunwholesomenessof
actionsisavery important factor to determine the goodness of
actions. However, thisdoes not mean that all the good or evil of
actions derives from their whole-someness or unwholesomeness. In
the Pali Nikayas, the consideration of
thewholesomenessorunwholesomenessof external bodilyandverbal
actions(moral realism) and internal mental actions (virtue ethics)
is to be supple-mented by the consideration of the consequences of
actions for the happinessof oneself and others (utilitarianism).If
something can be inferred from the criterion found in the
Ambalat.t.hi-karahulovada Sutta, it is not that the good or evil of
actions depends exclu-sively on their wholesomeness or
unwholesomeness. What the Ambalat.t.hi-karahulovada Sutta indicates
is that before, during, and after performing anaction one has to
take into account two basic things: the wholesomeness
orunwholesomeness of actions,and the consequences of these actions
for thehappiness or suering of oneself, others, or both self and
others. The moralrealism and the virtue ethics of the second part
of the criterion is combinedwith the utilitarianism of the rst
part. The second part of the criterion em-phasizes the pleasant or
painful consequences of wholesome or unwholesomeactions, and in
that way restates from a dierent angle (moral realism andvirtue
ethics) the rst utilitarian part of the criterion. While the
utilitarianparttriestominimizesueringforthegreatestnumber,
themoralrealistand virtue ethics part remind the practitioner the
intrinsic good or evil ofcertain actions.I believe that the
complexity and richness of this early Buddhist criterionof goodness
is seriously compromised when one tries to reduce it to a
formofvirtueethicswhereonlytheintentionsorthemental
statesunderlyingactions count. Similarly, I believe that reducing
this early Buddhist criterionof goodness to utilitarianism is
equally reductionistic because
consequencesarenottheonlythingthatmatters. FollowingRoyPerret,
Ibelievethat136 JournalofBuddhistEthicsthe opposition between
intentionalism and consequentialism in Western
eth-icaltheorydoesnotgureinBuddhistethics(1987). Inotherwords,
thegoodnessofactionsdoesnotdependexclusivelyoneitherthegoodnessofintentions
or the goodness of consequences. Virtue ethics is certainly
presentinearlyBuddhism, andevidentlytheinternal mental
stateormotivationunderlying actions is very important to determine
the overall goodness of ac-tions, perhaps the most important from a
Buddhist point of view. However,the intrinsic wholesomeness of
certain external bodily and verbal actions, aswell
astheconsequencesoftheseactionsforthehappinessorsueringofoneself
and others, are also extremely important and necessary to assess
thegoodness of actions.Another text indispensable to understand the
early Buddhist criteria
ofgoodnessappearsin(ANI.186-187)withintheKalamaSutta. There,
theBuddhanotonlyproposesacriteriontoacceptthetruthofadoctrineasitiscommonlyinterpreted,
butalsoacriteriontoascertainthegoodorevil ofapractice.
TheBuddhaadvicestheKalamapeoplenottoacceptsomething because it is
tradition, hearsay, a sacred scripture, a logical rea-soning,
somethingsaidbyacompetentspeaker, orevenbecauseitissaidby one of
their teachers. Then the Buddha says, But when you know
foryourselves, These things are unwholesome, these things are
blamable; thesethings are censured by the wise; these things, if
undertaken and practiced,leadtoharmandsuering.
Thenyoushouldabandonthem.ThentheBuddha asks whether greed, hatred,
and delusion lead to welfare or harm,and he says that a greedy,
hating, and deluded person will kill, steal, sexu-ally misbehave,
and lie. The opposite is said about what is wholesome andthe three
roots of the wholesome.Like the criterion of the
Ambalat.t.hikarahulovadaSutta,the criterion ofthe Kalama Sutta does
not advise one to consider only the unwholesomenessof actions,
literally of things (dhamma), which can refer to doctrines
and/orpractices. Besidestheunwholesomeness(akusala)of things,
theBuddhaadvisestoconsiderthreemorethings:
whetherornottheyareblamable(savajja),censuredbythewise(vi n n
ugarahita),andifpracticed andun-dertaken lead to harm and suering
(samatta samadina ahitaya dukkhayasam. vattanti ). The opposite is
also to be considered, that is, the wholesome-ness of actions,
whether or not they are blameless, praised by the wise, andlead to
harmless and happy results.Thersttwoitemstobeconsidered, namely,
whetherornotactionsare wholesome or unwholesome,blamable or
blameless,are similar in thatthey all refer to the intrinsic
goodness of certain bodily, verbal, and mentalactions. The Kalama
Sutta, like the criterion of the
Ambalat.t.hikarahulovadaVelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 137Sutta,
mentions internal and external actions, that is, mental actions
such asgreed, hatred, and delusion; and external bodily and verbal
actions such askilling, stealing, sexual misconduct, and lying.
Again, it is nowhere statedin the Kalama Suttathat the four
external actions are unwholesome due tothe three mental roots of
the unwholesome. Strictly speaking, the text onlysaysthatagreedy,
hating, anddeludedpersonwillperformfourkindsofexternal actions, and
that a nongreedy, nonhating, nondeluded person willabstain from
these actions. The unwholesome or the wholesome can refer toeither
the three roots or the four external actions. That is, it can be
arguedthat the criterion combines features of moral realism
(intrinsic good or evilexternal actions) with features of virtue
ethics (intrinsic good or evil
mentalstates).Thethirditemtobeconsidered,namelywhetheractionsarecensuredor
praised by the wise,can be interpreted either as virtue ethics
(virtuouspersonsdeterminewhatisgoodorevil)orasasocialconvention(societyoraparticulargroupofsocietydecideswhatisgoodorevil).
Thefourthitem to be considered clearly refers to the consequences
of actions. Again,theharmful andpainful
consequencesareneithersaidtobederivedfromthe unwholesomeness of
actions, nor from greed, hatred, and delusion. So,it can be argued
that the fourth item of the criterion is utilitarian becauseit
takes into account the resulting happiness or suering of
actions.Another Pali text relevant for our discussion of the early
Buddhist cri-terion of goodness can be found in (MN II.114), within
the Bahitika Sutta.There the king Pasenadi of Kosala asks the
monkAnanda whether or notthe Buddha performs actions censured by
wise recluses and brahmins. Theking asks what action is censured by
the wise,Ananda replies that unwhole-someaction,
whichisfurtherexplainedinsubsequentquestionsasactionthatisblamable,
actionthatbringsaiction, actionwithpainful results,and action that
leads to ones own aiction, or to the aiction of
others,ortotheaictionof both, andonaccountof
whichunwholesomestatesincreaseandwholesomestatesdiminishes.
Suchbodily. . . verbal. . .
mentalbehavioriscensuredbywisereclusesandbrahmins(BhikkhuNan.amoliand
Bhikkhu Bodhi 1995: 724-726).It seems possible to interpret the
text as suggesting a criterion of good-ness characteristic of
virtue ethics. The goodness of actions derives from thewholesome
virtue or root mental motivation associated with them; it is
duetothisintrinsicunwholesomenessofactionsthattheyareblamable,bringaictionandpainful
resultstooneself andothers, andthatiswhytheyarecensuredbythewise.
Idisagreewiththisinterpretationbecausethetextdoesnotsaythattheconsequencesderivefromtheunwholesomeness138
JournalofBuddhistEthicsof actions. The three roots of the
unwholesome are not mentioned, and, as Ihave already said, the term
unwholesomerefers not only to internal mentalactions (the last
three of the ten unwholesome actions), but also to externalbodily
and verbal actions (the rst six of the ten unwholesome actions,
andthe four
precepts).Itseemsalsopossibletointerpretthetextassuggestingacriterionofgoodnesscharacteristicof
consequentialism. Infact, thisispreciselytheinterpretation of
Premasiri (1987). I also disagree with his
consequentialistinterpretation because the text does not explicitly
state that the unwhole-someness of actions derives from their
consequences.In my view, neither a consequentialist nor a virtue
ethics reading of thetext do justice to this early Buddhist
criterion of goodness. If it were
truethatonlytheconsequencescount,Idonotseewhythetextmentionstheunwholesomenessandblamefulnessofactions.
Conversely, ifonlytheun-wholesomeness and blamefulness counts, why
are the consequences so muchemphasized?I do not think that the
point of the text is to justify any exclu-sive interpretation of
Buddhist ethics,be it virtue ethics or consequential-ism. I prefer
to interpret this criterion as the other criteria I have
discussed,that is, as advising the consideration of actions from
dierent angles. Theseangles generate diverse but complementary
perspectives of the goodness ofactions.
Fromonepointofview,onecalculatesthehappinessorsueringresulting from
actions. From another point of view, one assesses the moti-vation
or mental states underlying actions. From still another point of
view,one ponders the kind or content of actions. The overall
goodness of actionsdepends on several factors, not just on one of
them, be it the consequences,the mental states, or the nature of
actions.In conclusion, the criteria of goodness in the Pali Nikayas
does not cor-respondtoaformof virtueethics as Keowndenes it, but
rather toaparticular system of virtue ethics with features of
utilitarianism and moralrealism. This does not mean that early
Buddhist ethics is a form of moralparticularism with a plurality of
moral theories, namely, virtue ethics, util-itarianism, and moral
realism (Hallisey, 1996). Early Buddhist ethics is suigeneris, that
is, one of a kind, dierent from other traditions of virtue
ethicsknown in the West. As Peter Harvey rightly says the rich eld
of Buddhistethics would be narrowed by wholly collapsing it into
any single one of theKantian, Aristotelian or Utilitarian models.
(2000: 51).Early Buddhist ethics considers mental action as more
important thanbodilyandverbal action(MNI.373): Idescribemental
actionasmorereprehensiblefor theperformanceof evil action, for
theperpetrationofevil action, andnotsomuchbodilyactionandverbal
action.Similarly,VelezdeCea,NatureofBuddhistEthics 139early
Buddhism equates intention (cetana) and karma (AN III.415),
whichdoes not mean that only intention or motivation constitutes
moral actions,but rather that without intention actions do not
generate karma. That is,intention is the basic requirement for
speaking about moral actions withinBuddhism.
ThisprimacyofthemindandintentioninearlyandclassicalBuddhism seems
to indicate that the mental states behind actions are themost
important factor to determine the goodness of actions. I do not
denythisclassical tenetof Buddhistethics. However, thisprimacyof
mentalactionandintentiondoesnotmeanthatwithinearlyBuddhistethicstheconsequencesorthecontentof
actionsareirrelevantfordeterminingthegoodness of actions. Generally
speaking, it might be said that Abhidharmaethics tend to emphasize
the mental states behind actions, Mahayana ethicsthe consequences
of actions for the suering of all living beings, and Vinayaethics
the rules and the content of actions. Early Buddhist ethics,
however,tend to integrate in its criteria of goodness the three
factors: motivation andcontentof actions(wholesomeness,
blamelessness)andtheirconsequences(harmless and happy results for
oneself and others).EarlyBuddhist ethics canbeconsideredasystemof
virtueethics ifvirtue ethics is understood more in keeping with the
Aristotelian model andChristian traditions of virtue ethics. That
is, as a system where the
summumbonumisnotidentiedwiththemoraldomainofthegoodandtheright,where
there are both instrumental and teleological goods, where
observingcertainsetsofpreceptsorlawsismorallygoodevenwhenthemotivationisnotvirtuous,andwheretheconsequencesofactionsarealsotakenintoaccount
to assess the overall goodness of actions. However, if virtue
ethicsis understood as Keown does, that is, as an ethical theory
where the goodandtherightisidentiedwithnirvana,
whereonlyactionsdisplayingorparticipating in nirvanic virtues are
good, and where motivation or
intentionistheonlyfactortodeterminethegoodnessofactions,
thenIthinkthatcalling early Buddhist ethics a system of virtue
ethics is problematic.I believe that the interpretation of the
early Buddhist criteria of goodnessI have developed in this article
has important consequences for our under-standingof
Buddhistethicsasawhole. First, if whatIhavesaidaboutthe early
Buddhist criteria of goodness is plausible, then Keowns view,
ac-cordingtowhichactionsinBuddhismaregoodorevil dependingonjustthe
agents motivation, has to be modied. Besides motivation,
Buddhists,atleastthosewhoconsiderauthoritativethePali Nikayas,
havetotakeintoaccounttheconsequencesof actionsforthehappinessof
oneself andothers,as well as the intrinsic good or evil of certain
actions. Second,thewidespread belief according to which Mahayana
ethics constitute a radical140
JournalofBuddhistEthicsdeparturefromearlyBuddhistethicshastobequalied.
ItistruethatMahayana ethics is more consequentialist than earlier
Buddhism,but it isalso true that Mahayana ethics builds upon the
utilitarian features of earlyBuddhism. Like the utilitarian
features of early Buddhism, the consequen-tialist features of
Mahayana ethics do not imply that the goodness of
actionsdependsexclusivelyontheconsequences.
Thecontentofactionsmatters,andthebadkarmaassociatedtocertainactionsisacknowledgedeveninMahayana
texts where someone is killed in order to preserve the happinessof
the greatest number (Harvey 2000: 135-136).Similarly,
IbelievethattheheuristicdistinctionIhaveintroducedinthisarticlehasalsoimportantrepercussionsforourdescriptionsof
Bud-dhist ethics. First,the distinction privileges ideal types of
ethical practicewithout excluding or marginalizing less ideal but
equally important types ofBuddhist practice. Second,the distinction
expands Keowns conception ofvirtueethics,
makingitevenmoreconsistentwithAristotelianethicsandother Western
traditions of virtue ethics.0.1 AbbreviationsAll
referencestothePali textsaretotheeditionof thePali
TextSoci-ety,Oxford. ReferencestotheA
nguttara,Digha,MajjhimaandSam. yuttaNikayasare to the volume and
page number.AN A nguttara NikayaDN Digha NikayaMN Majjhima NikayaSN
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