I CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN: ROLE OF LEADERSHIP AND SYSTEMIC FACTORS (1988-1999) By MUHAMMAD ILYAS KHAN Reg# 68-FSS/PHD-PS&IR/F12 Supervisor: Co-Supervisor: Dr. Husnul Amin Dr. Sadaf Farooq Department of Politics & IR Department of Politics & IR DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD 2019
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I
CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN: ROLE OF LEADERSHIP
AND SYSTEMIC FACTORS
(1988-1999)
By
MUHAMMAD ILYAS KHAN
Reg# 68-FSS/PHD-PS&IR/F12
Supervisor: Co-Supervisor:
Dr. Husnul Amin Dr. Sadaf Farooq
Department of Politics & IR Department of Politics & IR
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD
2019
II
CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN: ROLE OF LEADERSHIP
AND SYSTEMIC FACTORS
(1988-1999)
By
MUHAMMAD ILYAS KHAN
Reg# 68-FSS/PHD-PS&IR/F12
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Politics and International Relations
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, ISLAMABAD
2019
III
In the loving memories,
Of
my mother
Shareen Zada Khattak
Who, despite great difficulties, streamlined our lives
of
my wife
Asstt: Prof.Shazia Khattak
for
Encouragement, Lawangeen Khan, Inaya Laleen, and for much more…
IV
Certificate Page
V
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my individual research and that it
has not been submitted concurrently to any other university for any other
degree.
Muhammad Ilyas Khan (PhD)
VI
CONTENTS Sr. No Page No.
I. Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………. IX
II. Abstract …………………………………………………………………................ X
III. List of Abbreviations & Acronyms……………………………………... XII
Introduction
1.1 Rationale of the Study …………………………………………………………………. .01
1.2 Statement of the Problem …………………………………………………………….... 04
1.3 Objectives of the Study…...…………………………………………………………..... 05
1.4 Research Questions/Hypothesis ……………………………………………………….. 05
1.5 Significance of the Study …………………………………………………………….... 05
1.6 Delimitations of the Study ………………………………………………………….…. 07
1.7 Operationalization of the Key Terms …………………………………………….… 07
2 Literature Review …………………….…………………………...………………….…. 09
3 Methodology …………………………………………………………………….…......... 13
4 Organization of the Study………………………………………………………………… 15
CHAPTER 1
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
1.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………. 19
1.2: Conceptualization and Operationalization of Key Concepts …………………….......... 19
1.2.1. Crisis of Democracy.………………………………………….…………………...... 19
1.2.2: Leadership: …………………………………………………………………………...47
1.2.3: Systemic factors: ……………………………………………………………………..52
1.3: Theoretical Framework ……………………………………………………………….. 69
1.3.1: Powers Theories …………………………………………..……………….……....... 69
1.3.2: Elite Theory of C. Wright Mills: Framework for Understanding the Case of Pakistan80
1.4: Conclusion ………………………………………………………..………………….....92
VII
Chapter: 2
Leadership, Systemic Factors, and Crisis: An Analysis of Benazir’s and
Nawaz Sharif’s First Term in Elite Theoretical Perspective
2.1. Introduction ………………………………………………………………………..… 94
2.2. Public Face of the Crisis of Democracy ……………………………………………… 95
2.3. Pragmatics of the Crisis of Democracy: Rivalry, Benazir, and Ishaq ………………... 96
2.4. Benazir, the Opposition and the Crisis of Democracy ……………………………….. 99
2.5. Benazir, Provincial Governments and the Crisis …………………………………… 107
2.6. Benazir, the Army and the Crisis ………………………...……………………...…… 112
2.7. Pragmatics of the Crisis: Nawaz Sharif, Ishaq Khan and Rivalry..………………….. 117
2.8. Nawaz Sharif, the Opposition and the Crisis …………………..…………………….. 125
2.9. Nawaz Sharif, the Army and the Crisis ……………………...………………………. 129
2.10 Role of Judiciary, Dismissal of Benazir, and Nawaz Sharif ……………………...…. 132
2.11. Elections, Leadership, Systemic Factors, and the Crisis: An Analysis ……...……. 132
2.12. Analysis of Discussion: Elite Theory in Focus ……………………………..………. 135
2.13. Conclusion ……...………………………………………………………..…………. 147
Chapter: 3
Linking Elite Theory to the Role of Leadership and Systemic Factors and
the Crisis: Benazir’s and Nawaz Sharif’s Second Term in Perspective
3.1. Introduction …………………………………………………………..………………. 148
3.2. Public Face of the Crisis of Democracy …...…………………….......………………. 148
3.3. Pragmatics of the Crisis: Benazir versus Farooq Leghari ………..…………………... 150
3.4. Benazir, the Opposition and the Crisis of Democracy ……...………………………... 153
3.5. Benazir, the Army and the Crisis ………………………..………………………….... 159
3.6. Nawaz Sharif‟s Second Term: An Analysis of Pragmatics of the Crisis..…………… 161
VIII
3.7. The Crisis of Democracy: Nawaz Sharif versus the Opposition …..………………… 166
3.8. Causes of Rivalry: Nawaz Sharif versus Musharraf …………..…………………...… 169
3.9. Dismissal of Benazir versus Nawaz Sharif: The Role of Judiciary ……...……………176
3.10. Elections, Leadership, Systemic Factors, and the Crisis: An Analysis………………177
3.11. Analysis of Discussion: Elite Theory in Perspective …………..…………………… 179
3.12. Conclusion ……...…………………………………………...……………………….183
Chapter: 4
Crisis of Democracy, Role of Leadership and Systemic Factors: An
Analysis
4.1. Introduction ………………………………………………...………………………….185
4.2. Analyzing the Role of Leadership and of Systemic Factors in the Crisis ……………..185
4.3. Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………..228
Conclusion…………………………………..………………………………….………..230
References …………………………………………………………..……….……..........247
Appendices ……………………………………………………………………………....266
IX
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
When the topic for my PhD dissertation was embryonic, one person knew I had an
important idea. None but Dr. Husnul Amin was and has been a source of much
inspiration. I thought he could not be wronged, so I proceeded to prove him right. And
today the result is before me. So, thank you Doctor for all that and for much more. I
am equally indebted to my co-supervisor Dr. Sadaf Farooq who, despite her busy
schedule, gave me a lot of time and sorted out the problems I had during research. I
feel special gratitude to Professor Dr. Amna Mahmood for her guidance and support
whenever I approached her. I am also thankful to Dr. Manzoor Khan, Head of the
Department, for providing us congenial environment at the Department of Politics and
IR, IIUI. I also feel obliged to Dr. Noor Fatima, Professor Brig Dr. Muhammad Khan,
Professor Dr. Mansoor Akber Kundi ( Vice Chancellor Gomal University), Dr. Qandil
Abbas (Quaid-e-Azam University),and Dr.Manzoor Nazar for their support and
encouragement during my stay at the Department of Politics and IR. I convey my
special thanks to supervisory staff of the Department of Politics and IR, of the Central
Library of IIUI, and of Dr Hamid Ullah Library IIUI for their ready service. I am
equally indebted to Senior Advocate Haji Zafar Iqbal (Supreme Court of Pakistan),
Haji Habib-ur-Rahman Advocate (High Court), Haji Saghir Nawaz Khan Advocate
(High Court), Waheedullah Khan Advocate (High Court), Fazal-ur-Rahman Advocate
(High Court), and Waris Khan Advocate (High Court). They all facilitated and guided
me during my studies. I am highly thankful to Air Commodore Akhtar Nawaz Khan
who encouraged me during my studies and also provided me with good suggestions. I
am equally appreciative of those who provided me with insights I could not gain in
any other way. So many thanks to Musa Khan Sherani, Abdul Malik Sherani( OGRA)
Dr. Annajam-us-Saqib, Nisar Khan (Senior Librarian), Naeem Khan (Junior
Liberian), Ghafoor Khan (Junior Liberian), Imranullah (Labour Department),
Matiullah Khan (Labour Department), Dr.Shafique Qurban and Safdar Ali Khan (
Superintendent). I say an extra thank-you to Atif Iqbal for providing practical help,
and big thinking regarding how to synchronize concepts and many things more. I say
special thanks to my family for their encouragement each day each time I took a step
closer to making this project a reality. Everyone is happy for me. So thank you
everyone! I am happy.
Muhammad Ilyas Khan (PhD)
April 2017, Islamabad
X
Abstract
Pakistan suffered from the crisis of democracy many times. Its history stands witness to the
frequent dissolution of assemblies before the completion of their respective constitutional
terms, the intermittent breakdown of the constitutions, take-over of military, disintegration
and perpetual bad governance. The study attempts to unfold the rivalries behind the crisis of
democracy that did not allow democracy to take roots in the period 1988 to 1999. It seeks to
analyze that how the role of leadership both in government and in opposition through their
mutual rivalries for political and economic gains generated a wave of political crisis that in
turn gave birth to the crisis of democracy in the period and to what extent systemic factors
played their role in deepening the crisis of democracy during 1990s. The state of affairs, in
the period 1990s, was the result of the leadership and their personal gains and losses as well
as of systemic factors out of their rivalries that made democracy suffered. The study
attempted to analyze the role of leadership in the persons of Benazir and of Nawaz Sharif in
their respective terms in office as the head of the government and the head of the opposition
that how they played their role in the crisis of democracy in the period under study as well as
the role of the President in the persons of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, of Farooq Ahmed Khan, and
of General Pervaiz Musharruf. There were existed certain kinds of rivalries among them that
was repeated and escalated and created crisis that gave way to an integrated group of elites to
play their role in deepening the crises. Consequently, democracy was suffered in the period
1988-99. Systemic factors were an integrated group of elites that influenced the political
system of Pakistan and played their role in deepening the crisis of democracy in the period.
The group consisted of elites both political and non-political and played a decisive role in the
crisis. Besides, it was a perpetual and manipulating factor in the crisis and worked as a group.
The group collaborated with the man at the helm based on similar interests against the
common rival. It was heterogeneous in the making consisting of political-religious-civil-
XI
military-judicial elites. It remained united throughout the decade of democracy and played
their role in deepening the crises. Consequently, democracy suffered from crisis in the period
1988-99. The popular and semi-academic discussion regarding civil- military tension and
crisis of democracy generally lead to a conclusion that the institution of military is the main
cause and politicians are the main victims in the derailment of democracy. Whereas the
researcher finds himself in partial agreement with the above stated conclusion, his research
has concluded the complex process of power struggle and internal rivalries among the power
elites. Based on rigors study of these processes, his thesis conclusion is that mutual rivalries
among the power elites both systemic factor and leadership against each other result into the
derailment of democracy
Besides, the research is qualitative and descriptive-analytical method is used to analyze the
data collected. Moreover, power elite theory is applied to substantiate the study as Pakistan is
in the grip of power elites that incorporate all kind of elites related with power in the state.
Moreover, the researcher has used primary and secondary methods for the collection of data.
XII
Acronyms and Abbreviation
ANP Awami National Party
BNM Balochistan National Movement
CDNS Council of Defense and National Security
CDO Civil Disobedience
CJCSC Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff
CM Chief Minister
CML Conventional Muslim League
COAS Chief of Army Staff
COP Combine Opposition Party
COP Combined Opposition Parties
DAC Democratic Action Committee
DG Director General
EBDO Elective Bodies Disqualification Order
EU European Union
FSF Federal Security Force
GDA Grand Democratic Alliance
GHQ General Head Quarters
IJI Islami Jamhoori Itehad
INC Indian National Congress
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
JCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
JI Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI Jamiat Ullama Islam
JUP Jamiat Ullama Pakistan
JWP Jamhori Watan Party
ML Muslim League
MNA Member of National Assembly
XIII
MPA Member of Provisional Assembly
MQM Mohajir Qaumi Movement
MRD Movement for Restoration of Democracy
NA National Assembly
NAP National Awami Party
NICFC National Industrial Credit and Finance Co
NPP National Peoples Party
PAT Pakistan Awami Tahreek
PDA Pakistan Democratic Alliance
PML Pakistan Muslim League
PML (J) Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo)
PML (N) Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
PNA Pakistan National Alliance
PODO Public Disqualification Order
PONAM Pakistan Oppressed Nation Movement
PPD People‟s Programme for Development
SCCC Services Cooperative Credit Corporation
TI Tahreek-I-Istiqlal
UP United Province
US United State
USA United State of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1
Introduction
1.1. Rationale of the Study:
The founders of the state wanted Pakistan to be a democratic polity. However, the
political evolution adopted a different path. In the course of its political evolution, Pakistan
suffered from military coups, political instability and wars with India. The attempts since
Pakistan independence proved to be short-lived. As a result, the political structure of the
polity of Pakistan oscillated like a pendulum between two Ds (Democracy and Dictatorship).
A number of reasons did not allow democracy to take its roots in the polity. As a result, the
legacy of institutional imbalance and authoritarianism remained a tradition in the course of
political history of the state.
The crisis of leadership that occurred as a result of the early death of the Quaid-e-
Azam, the failure of the PML to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a political
party and suffered from fragmentation and re-fragmentation, and the rise of the bureaucrat-
military elites into politics were among the other reasons that affected the growth of
democracy in the state. Such a trajectory of democracy in the polity of Pakistan has been
described and labeled as the “Eye of a Storm” ( Owen Bennet Jones), politically “ a Failure
State” (Louis D.Hayes), a “Country in Crisis” with a “Fruitless Search for Democracy”(
Christopher Jafferlot), “Poor Track Record of Democracy”( Safdar Mahmood), “ Three As:
Allah. Army and America” and “Waiting for Allah” (Christina Lamb), and “a State at a
Critical Juncture” (Stephen Cohen), (Parray, 2014).
2
Since the independence, Pakistan has failed to build viable democratic system that
could sustain for long. The scenario since 1947 presents a grim picture and is in sharp
contrast to the dream that the founder of the state, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, popularly known
as the Quaid-e-Azam, visualized that it would be a polity based upon democracy. However,
the state of the Quaid paid, times and again, the price in the form of democratic crises.
This democratic crisis gave birth to confrontation and polarization that made the
political system of the state dysfunctional. As a result, the political system suffered from
institutionalized corruption, low economic performance, inter-leadership conflicts whose
opportunism, and rhetoric partially played any role in the problems of the state. Moreover,
Pakistan experienced a number of governments that is parliamentary, presidential, and
controlled democracy. All of them failed to effect any solid change as the political culture of
the state was more or less of the violation of law, the abuse of powers, and the abrogation of
constitutions.
Such sort of situation in the state was the anti-thesis of the Quaid‟s dream of the state
of Pakistan. Conflicts and dissention, authoritarianism, and intolerance have remained the
main features of the politics in the state. „If you are not with me, you are against me, you are
my enemy‟ was the long practiced and standing principle in the political culture of Pakistan
(Qureshi M. S., 2002). Hamid Youaf (1980) is of the opinion that in the history of Pakistan,
not a single government had been removed on the basis of general elections rather „historical
circumstances, human folly, personal ambition, and political aspiration‟ have played their
respective role in the political crisis in the state.
Besides, the founding-fathers had broader view of the western model of democracy
and fought for Independence accordingly. The making of the political party in the name of
AIML and seeking the right of self-determination for the Muslims were some of the instances
3
of that democratic vision. However, that vision of the founders was diminished by the
successive leadership of the state as that vision of the founding-fathers was in sharp contrast
to their interests. So squabbling for powers and the abrogation of the Constitution were the
norms set just in the beginning of the state.
As a result, the state suffered from crisis after crisis and ultimately lost its one wing in
1971. A new Constitution was framed in 1973 but it was not followed as had been pledged to.
There were frequent conflicts between the government and the opposition. As a result of the
protest of the alliance of the political parties, the then-civilian leader was dethroned by the
COAS and martial law was proclaimed in the state. For the purpose of power, the martial law
administrator played terribly with democracy, and with Constitution (Ahmed M. , 1980).
In short, since the independence, the state of Pakistan suffered from the want of true
democratic culture. It has been ruled with authoritarianism of the civilians and of the military
dictatorship. Besides, the role of judiciary was not too up-to-the mark in the establishment of
democracy in the state. Rather, it had validated the rule of military under the doctrine, the
Law of Necessity, many times in the past. Historically speaking, it had remained divided on
political basis favoring one party against the other while putting aside the rule of the law.
After the Quaid-e-Azam, his successors used powers for their own interests.
Assemblies were dissolved frequently on the basis of so-called charges that include
corruption, mismanagement, misuse of power, had failed to stay as the representative bodies
of the masses, and what not. However, this practice of the dissolution of assemblies had
certainly some other reasons beyond the so-called charges that were leveled against.
Therefore, the topic attempts to analyze the reason beyond the so-called charges responsible
for the crisis of democracy in Pakistan. It is different from the journalistic approach that
provides superficial analysis of the crisis.
4
The topic attempts to point out that there are certain conflicts existed among the
leadership in which forces both political and non-democratic forces play their respective role
to take advantage of the situation and this is how democracy suffers from crisis. Upon such a
foundation, the study is built around. And the scholarship, in this area, is justified with
special reference to the period from 1988 to 1999. The period was a democratic period
between the two military governments. Unfortunately, political and non-democratic forces
derailed democracy on account of their political and economic gains. The leaders were
engaged in the struggle for power. In this struggle of power, political and non-democratic
forces played as a group and joined hands with the leadership of the day against the common
rival on the basis of similar interests. The present study is, therefore, justified on the
aforementioned grounds. It is beyond any doubt that this study contributes to the knowledge
regarding the role of power elites in the crisis of democracy with special reference to the case
of Pakistan.
1.2. Statement of the Problem:
The period (1988-1999) was the longest period of democracy in Pakistan sandwiched
between the two military governments. The main conflict between the leadership and
systemic factors was inter-rivalries for political and economic gains. The political leadership
was divided out of rivalries that in turn created a crisis. This crisis was repeated and
escalated. This provided an opportunity to systemic factors to play their role in the deepening
of the crisis. They had rivalries against the common rival in the person of prime minister and
collaborated with the president/COAS. The president/COAS had already a bone of contention
with the prime minister. This collaboration between the president/COAS and systemic factors
paved the way for the dismissal of the prime minister. Out of these inter-rivalries democracy
was derailed in the period under investigation. The period was the period of conspiracy and
5
counter-conspiracy and of how to dismiss the rival no matter what means needed to be
adopted. The chief aim was to get power. This state of affairs did not allow democracy to
take its roots in the state. These rivalries for powers continued till October 1999. As a result,
they put a seal on democracy in a military coup.
1.3. Objectives of the Study:
To find out the factors responsible for increasing rivalry between the leadership and their
subsequent impacts on democracy in Pakistan.
To explore the systemic factors and their rivalries that played their role in the crisis of
democracy
To theorize the crisis of democracy in the light of power elite theory with reference to
Pakistan.
1.4. Research Questions/ Hypothesis:
How did the role of leadership both in government and opposition through their mutual
rivalries for political and economic gains generate a wave of political crisis that in turn
gave birth to the crisis of democracy during 1988 to1999?
To what extent systemic factors played their role in deepening the crisis of democracy
prevailed during 1988 to 1999?
1.5. Significance of the Study:
Since independence from the British, Pakistan has struggled hard to achieve a
sustainable political order. However, the polity of Pakistan has experienced frequent changes
in government. The political history of the country has been characterized by long, successive
periods of dictatorship interspersed with short-lived intervals of democratic rule, often
6
preceded or followed by elections turmoil. Pakistan‟s experience with government change is
of a pendulum that swung between democracy and dictatorship. Those shifts in regimes in the
polity are associated with the role of the elites at the topmost level in their respective regimes.
This study defines the role of elite groups who have ascended to occupy positions at
the executive levels during various regime shifts in the chequered history of the polity. The
period (1988-1999) stands witness to the longest period of democracy in the state. However,
it suffered from discontinuity on account of the political crises generated out of the elites‟
struggle for power and role succession. The main problem, the research is related with, does
not revolve around the instability of governments as was observed in the aforementioned
period but rather to discuss the inter-rivalries of the elites who in collaboration with one
another created crisis and derailed democracy in the end.
Besides this, the study attempts to find out the social background as well as the
character of the elites who have occupied important positions in the politics and played their
respective roles in making intrigues against one another without any regard for democracy.
The worrisome crises of the regime change since 1947 and especially in the period (1988-
1999) have continued to raise questions on the role of elites in the politics of Pakistan.
The study is academic and different from the journalistic type of literature available
on the issue of the crisis of democracy in Pakistan. In addition to this, the crisis of democracy
in the polity is being studied from elite perspective. This aspect of the study of the crisis
makes this research unique and researchable. For this purpose, Power Elite Theory is being
used to substantiate the study theoretically and is explained how democracy in Pakistan
suffered from crisis on account of elites‟ rivalries. Besides, how did they influence the growth
of democracy in Pakistan and pave the way for political crisis to have power in their hands?
Moreover, the study gives policy guidelines with regard to the problems of democracy in
Pakistan.
7
1.6. Delimitations of the Study:
The study is confined to the crisis of democracy in Pakistan, the role of leadership and
systemic factors. Besides, the period of the study is from 1988 to1999.
1.7. Operationalization of Key Terms:
1.7.1. Crisis of Democracy:
In this study, the phrase “crisis of democracy” denotes that there were existed certain
rivalries among the leadership who had rivaled for powers. This rivalry produced political
crisis which gave way to the political and non-political forces of the system to play their role
in deepening the crises. Consequently, democracy was suffered and governments as well as
assemblies were dissolved before their stipulated time in the Constitution.
1.7.2. Leadership:
In this study, by leadership is meant those who were in the government or in the
opposition or non-political. To be more precise, the role of leadership in the persons of
Benazir and of Nawaz Sharif in their respective terms in office as the head of the government
and the head of the opposition is being analyzed that how they played their role in the crisis
of democracy in the period under study. In the same way, the role of the Presidents/COAS in
the persons of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, of Farooq Ahmed Khan, and of General Pervez
Musharruf in the politics of the period is also important and is analyzed.
1.7.3. Systemic Factors:
8
Here in this study, systemic factors were the factors that had influenced the political
system of Pakistan and played their role in deepening the crisis of democracy in the period.
The factors were in fact an integrated group of elites both political and non-political and
played a decisive role. The group joined hands with the leader on the basis of similar interests
against the common rival. This group had remained a constant factor in the period. It was
heterogeneous in the making consisting of political-religious-civil-military-judicial elites.
Operationalization of key terms and their measurement are explained below.
Operationalization of Key Terms and their Measurement
Concepts Operationalization Measurement
Crisis of
Democracy
There were existed certain kinds of rivalries among
the leadership that was repeated and escalated and
created crisis that gave way to an integrated group
of elites to play their role in deepening the crises.
Consequently, democracy was suffered in the
period 1988-99.
Rivalries with relevant
instances
Leadership
The role of leadership in the person of Benazir and
of Nawaz Sharif in their respective terms in office
as the head of the government and the head of the
opposition as well as the role of the President in the
person of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, of Farooq Ahmed
Khan, and of the COAS General Pervaiz
Musharruf has been analyzed
Role in the crises.
9
Systemic
Factors
Systemic factors were an integrated group of elites
that influenced the political system of Pakistan and
played their role in deepening the crisis of
democracy in the period. The group was consisted
of elites both political and non-political and played
a decisive role in the crisis. Besides, it was a
perpetual and manipulating factor in the crisis and
worked as a group. The group collaborated with
the man at the helm based on similar interests
against the common rival. It was heterogeneous in
the making consisting of political-religious-civil-
military-judicial elites. It remained united
throughout the decade of democracy and played
their role in deepening the crises. Consequently,
democracy suffered from crisis in the period 1988-
99
Role in the crises
Source: Author‟s Own Construct
2. Literature Review:
The literature on the study is abundantly available, however, the authors have written
on the political developments in Pakistan with their own particular approaches and insights
both on the developments before and after nineties. Some of them are discussed here.
Hassan Abbas (2005) gives an excellent analysis of political developments in pre-
independence and to the period of General Pervez Musharruf. The author is of the view why
political leaders of Pakistan fail to face political crisis and come to end their respective
regimes amid charges of corruptions and incapability in deliverance. In the preface, he
endorses that the book is the story of Pakistan wherein three characters namely Army, Jihadi
actors and America are at interplay amid the affairs in the checkered history of Pakistan. He
further points out that governance and state-building seem a difficult task amid such myriad
factors. Moreover, the author recapitulates the political developments since 1947 and presents
10
candid analysis of the affairs therein. He explains how Pakistan was drawn into Cold War
tussle. He also throws light on General Ayub Khan‟s era and gives an account of 1965 war
with India with emphasis that how Pakistani leadership took the war with hope that it would
help settle the issue of Kashmir as it would catch the attention of the comity of nations and
would involve them in arbitration. However, the author emphasizes to tell that political
agitation and protest at this critical juncture put the state into another problem that is another
military coup which threw water on the developments once and for all. This coup the author
brands it a complete disaster for the integrity of Pakistan wherein the state divided into two
wings. The writer further tells that how Z.A. Bhutto attempted to curtail the influence of the
Army and sought the support of the religious groups. However, he was dethroned after
rigorous protest by the alliance in the name of PNA and that was how another military
dictator General Zia was set on the throne. The writer is also of the opinion that USA‟s
involvement in the overthrow of Z.A.Bhutto could not be underestimated. He discusses the
period of General Zia as well as the developments and the policy options in that decisive
period when the State of Pakistan was sandwiched between two giants who were trying their
muscles in Afghanistan of 1980s. The author gives a detailed description of the democratic
governments in 1990s and of the challenges with which they were faced with. He ends the
books with the detailed descriptions of the period of the government of General Pervez
Musharruf and of the challenges with which the State of Pakistan was faced with in the
aftermath of 9/11 incident.
Hassan Askari Rizvi (1974) gives an analysis of the military‟s role in politics and
assesses the role and influence of military in various regimes including the elected ones. He
holds responsible the colonial legacy of authoritarianism for this role that characterizes the
political culture in the state. He gives an account that how military justifies its role in the
body politic by aligning itself with the state apparatus.
11
Riaz Mohammad Khan (2012) analyses in the chapter of his book the failure of the
institutions of governance in reference to whatever is going on in today‟s Pakistan. He calls
to this failure as the leadership and institutional crises. The writer gives the details how
bureaucracy and the so-called politicians in the State of Pakistan after the deaths of the
Quaid-e-Azam and of Liaqat Ali Khan managed the affairs and paved the way for military
coups. That was how they played havoc with the constitutionalism in the years to come. The
period of democracy that started in 1990s stands witness to the decay of institutions,
corruption, and behind the curtain role of the army in civilian affairs. The elected
governments therein failed to address the challenges faced to the State in the domains of
governance and rising religious extremism. They had no vision, and there was trust deficit
prevailed among them. All this, at last, ended this period of democracy with military coup in
1999.
Aqil Shah (2014) highlights and thoroughly discusses the role of the army in the
politics of Pakistan to show how it plays with democracy. The author calls Pakistan a
garrison state. It was, for most of the time, ruled by army directly and sometimes from behind
the curtain. He also discusses how the military have influenced the foreign policies of the
state throughout the checkered history of Pakistan. The writer holds that civilian rule vis-a-vis
military is popularly held thought in the world. However, he argues that democracy was
never allowed to take roots in Pakistan, no matter, how much strong it was. One the pretext of
bad governance, and corruption, the military attempted to derail the democratic process and
took the affairs in its hands. In the end, the author maintains that the military can proclaim
coups in the state whenever it wants.
Dr. Sohail Mahmood (2007) gives a scholarly analysis of the problems of governance
since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. He pinpoints international, political, and economic
developments that had influenced the governance in Pakistan. The writer, in the book, has
12
discussed in detail the political economy, political system, decentralization in the state,
judicial system, and civil service. He tells the reader how to reform these entities. In another
book, Dr. Sohail Mahmood (2009) discusses the worst governance problems in the state with
reference to poor administrative management, worse planning, and poor work ethics. He
holds that bureaucratic structure in Pakistan is excessively in bad shape. There is no clear-cut
division of authority. The authorities frequently suffer from overlapping. As a result, the
performance of the government is affected. There is a wide gap between policy-formation
and policy-execution in the state. The writer maintains further that over-centralization of
power in the Centre coupled with corruption and weak governmental organization are the
points that have made governance worst in Pakistan
John Bray (1997) points out that since 1988, the president of Pakistan have dismissed
the prime ministers of Pakistan four times in their respective terms in office. He also
maintains that low turn-out in 1997 elections exhibits the public loss of faith in governmental
machinery of Pakistan. The author discusses the political development in1980s and 1990s as
well as the problems the state was faced with therein. He holds that accusations and counter-
accusations were the culture of the politics of Pakistan. The writer enumerates the prominent
reasons that put the state on the way of confrontation. The role of the president, of the army,
of mismanaged economy, of law and order situation in Karachi, and of high level of
corruption, in the writer‟s opinion, was among the reasons.
Ahmad Saleem (1998) presents how assemblies during their respective periods were
dissolved in the history of Pakistan. Besides this, he tells how military and civil bureaucracy
played their part in the dissolution of assemblies in Pakistan. The writer holds that the
military has become the permanent and strong factor in the politics of Pakistan since the
imposition of first martial law in the state in 1958. He has discussed in detail the political
developments with regard to the development of legislatures in the Sub-Continent as well as
13
of Pakistan after partition. The author, in short, has discussed the imposition of martial laws
as well as the dissolution of the civilian governments and sought to present the circumstances
responsible for candidly.
The following authors have good thoughts on the role of elites in Urdu and could be a
basis for understanding their influence on the political affairs of Pakistan. They
comprehensively have delineated their views and reviews that could be the very basis to
make opinion on role. Aqeel Abbas Jafri (1994) has beautifully presented his views on the
elites of Pakistan in his book “Pakistan key Siyasi Waderay”. Wakil Anjum (1994) has given
a judicious analysis in his book “Siyasat key Firun”. These books although lack theoretical
foundation yet a good source to develop further studies on the elites of Pakistan in academic
circles.
The writers have written on the subject with their own specific angles. Moreover,
most of them have not approached it in an academic way and their writings appear to be an
account of the historical developments. Besides, none of the authors has written specifically
under the title which the researcher is working on. Moreover, they have not pointed out the
reason that obstructs democracy and opens the way for other factors. As a result, democracy
suffers from crisis. Moreover, literature on the political development of Pakistan is
abundantly written. However, literature concerning the role of leadership and of the systemic
factors in the crisis of democracy the polity of Pakistan suffered from in different phases in
the history is scanty. Therefore, the present study attempts to fill those gaps and to analyze
the crisis of democracy in power elite perspective.
3. Methodology:
3.1. Research Design:
14
This research is qualitative in nature. This kind of research is concerned with research
revolved around person‟s lives, experiences, organizational functions, social movements,
cultural phenomena, and interactions between nations. This study attempts to find out the role
of leadership and of systemic factors in the crisis of democracy in the period (1988-99).
Actually, there are certain kinds of rivalries existed among leaders that are dramatized i.e.
ignited and reproduced in media etc. This provides an opportunity to the systemic factors to
capitalize on those rivalries and the way for the crisis is furnished and consequently
democracy suffers. The researcher uses descriptive-analytical approach. In this approach, a
particular state of affairs is described and duly analyzed. Questions like why, how, and when
are answered in detail. Moreover, the descriptive-analytical method is used to analyze the
data. Besides, the crisis of democracy, leadership, and systemic factors are the variables
being studied in this research. It is held that crisis is an independent variable whereas
democracy is a dependent one. Leadership and systemic factors are intervening variable.
Moreover, this study is carried out in the light of C.Wright Mills‟ power elite model.
3.2 Data Collection:
This research uses qualitative data obtained through both primary and secondary
sources. The primary data is the firsthand information that the researchers obtain through
various methods. These consist of media, official documents, dissertations etc. The secondary
data is collected from books, magazines, articles from journals, reports, survey etc. The
researcher uses newspapers published at national level both in English and Urdu languages.
The following newspapers are used e.g. the Daily News, the Dawn, Jung. In the same way,
materials from internet are used. Similarly, reports and survey of the famous organizations
are used.
3.3. Data Analysis:
15
The primary data is analyzed, and conclusion is drawn in the light of descriptive-
analytical method. The books in the secondary source are organized and analyzed in the
following way. The popular literature also known as anecdotal literature consists of books
like “Kun Kaisay Gia (2009)”, “Siyasat key Firun(1994)”etc. The information in such books
although sometimes lack references to support the authenticity of statements therein in the
book but such information does provide ground to build arguments. In the same way, works
of the scholars present cogent analysis of the politics of Pakistan. Similarly, the editorials
and news contents in the News, the Dawn and the Daily Jung published about the state of
affair of that time are analyzed to extract information for the study. In the same way,
materials from internet are used with their URL. Similarly, reports and surveys of the famous
organizations are categorized as of PILDAT, CRISIS Group. FAFEN etc. to maintain the
authenticity of the data collected for the study. It is mentioned that data obtained are analyzed
in the light of descriptive-analytical method.
4. Organization of the Study:
This study consists of introduction, four chapters and conclusion. The introduction attempts
to delineate all the discussion. It consists of the statement of the problem, the main research
questions, the objectives of the study, the significance of the study, the delimitation of the
study, the key concepts, literature review, and methodology. The first chapter attempts to
conceptualize, theorize, and operationalize the concepts used in the research. It attempts to
present the concept of democracy to show how it suffered from crisis worldwide and in the
state of Pakistan. Moreover, the crisis of democracy in Pakistan is viewed in the light of
power elite theory to pinpoint how this crisis was evolved. It also makes a detailed discussion
on the concept of elite (leadership) and argues how historically the concept evolved in
Pakistan. The chapter also conceptualizes and operationalises systemic factors in the crisis of
democracy. Similarly, the second chapter seeks to find out the pragmatics of the dismissals of
16
Benazir‟s and of Nawaz Sharif‟s first term in office in 1990 and 1993 respectively and
explores the political crisis the political elites suffered from in the struggle for personal gains.
It also attempts to point out how systemic factors as an integrated group of elites played their
role in deepening the crisis among the political elites. The period of Benazir‟s and of Nawaz
Sharif‟s first government provides a sorrowful picture of the politics in the polity. Benazir
Bhutto had majority in the elections of 1988 and became able to form government in the
center. However, her relations with the President, the military, and with the provinces
especially with the province of the Punjab deteriorated with the passage of time. This gave
birth to the politics of confrontation. As a result, the government of the PPP was dismissed
apparently amid charges of corruption, mismanagement, worst law and order situation in the
state.
Assemblies were dissolved. As a result, new elections were held under the
supervision of the interim government. Mian Nawaz Sharif got majority in the elections and
formed government in the center. However, differences soon cropped up between him and
the President. Consequently, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed his government on
19th April 1993 amid charges of corruption and mismanagement apparently. Although, his
government was reinstated but the rivalry between the two halted the working relations. As a
result, both had to resign. On the whole, the chapter analyses that how political elites were
engaged in the struggle for power in collaboration with systemic factors. They even
engineered elections and the dismissals of the government of the day to achieve their
purpose. The third chapter deals with the pragmatics of the crisis that resulted in the dismissal
of Benazir‟s and Nawaz Sharif‟s second term in office and details how the dismissal of
Nawaz Sharif‟s government paved a way for military coup in the state. It also explores the
reasons of the rivalry among the elites and investigates how political elites created crisis in
order to counter and outweigh each other. Besides this, it also attempts to find out how
17
systemic factors played their role prompting the stakeholders to take stock of the situation.
Both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif started their second terms in office amid favourable settings
as both had their trusted confidants as the head of the state in their respective terms in office.
However, differences paved the way for history to repeat and their respective governments
were dissolved before the completion of their terms. The fourth chapter attempts to analyze
critically the role of leadership in the person of Benazir and of Nawaz Sharif in their
respective terms in office as the head of the government and the head of the opposition as
well as of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, of Farooq Ahmed Khan, and of General Pervez Musharruf
who had rivaled for powers. This rivalry produced political crisis which gave way to the
political and non-political forces of the system to play their role in deepening the crises.
Consequently, democracy was suffered and governments as well as assemblies were
dissolved before their stipulated time allocated in the Constitution. The chapter also analyzes
the role of the systemic factors that influenced the political system of Pakistan and played
their role in deepening the crisis of democracy in the period. The factors were in fact an
integrated group of elites both political and non-political and played a decisive role in the
crisis of democracy. Besides, it was a perpetual and manipulating factor in the crisis and
worked as a group comprised of political and non-political elites. The group collaborated
with the man at the helm on the basis of similar interests against the common rival. The
researcher concludes and details his findings in conclusion. He claims that his main
contribution is the role of integrated group of elites which is called in this research as
systemic factors. This group of elites was a constant factor in the decade and helped the chief
rival (President/COAS) to dismiss Prime Minister from the office in the period (1988-1999).
This group was the complex of the power elites. He also have explored the rivalries among
the power elites both leadership and systemic factor. The crisis of democracy in the decade
was mainly driven by conspiracy and counter-conspiracy among the power elites. The
18
struggle for power maximized political opportunism to the extent that further escalated the
rivalries and the tension within the power elites. The time period under his investigation can
be described as the era of elite rule and may not be fully described as democratic or
otherwise. The researcher called it the era of elitocracy.
The popular and semi-academic discussion regarding civil- military tension and crisis
of democracy generally lead to a conclusion that the institution of military is the main cause
and politicians are the main victims in the derailment of democracy. Whereas the researcher
finds himself in partial agreement with the above stated conclusion, his research has
concluded the complex process of power struggle and internal rivalries among the power
elites. Based on rigors study of these processes, his thesis conclusion is that mutual rivalries
among the power elites both systemic factor and leadership against each other result into the
derailment of democracy
19
Chapter: 1
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
1.1: Introduction:
This chapter attempts to conceptualize, theorize, and operationalize the concepts used
in the research. It attempts to present the concept of democracy to show how it suffered from
crisis worldwide and in the state of Pakistan. Moreover, the crisis of democracy in Pakistan is
viewed in the light of power elite theory to pinpoint how this crisis was evolved. It also
makes a detailed discussion on the concept of elite (leadership) and also argues how
historically the concept evolved in Pakistan. It also conceptualizes and operationalises
systemic factors in the crisis of democracy.
1.2: Conceptualization and Operationalization of Key Concepts:
20
1.2.1: Crisis of Democracy:
Historically, democracy seems to have achieved success over the other forms of the
government in the world. Among the states of the world, majority are democratic having one
type or the other type of democracy. In the light of Freedom House, 121 out of 193 world
states have democratic setup. It is a progressive trend since the third wave of democratization
thirty years ago. It has become a compulsory form of government as there are economic and
political compulsions that favour democracy in the world today. The public or the general
mass favour democratic setup and believe in open and transparent system of democracy.
Leaders in states which are new democracies have faced the challenge from the mass to form
sustainable democratic institutions that could deliver what the masses expect from the
system.
In the opinion of Samuel P. Huntington, the democratic process consists of two
phases. One is the transition phase and the other is the consolidating phase .The second phase
is too much difficult to achieve. The following three indicators could be referred to if to
ascertain the consolidation of democracy. These indicators consist of well-functioning
democratic institutions, improved social and economic condition, and flourishing civil
society.
Besides, the following are also the indicators of consolidated democracy: political
choice, loyal opposition, free media, reliable bureaucracy, impartial judiciary, and civil
society. In words of Juan J.Linz and Alfred C.Stephen, such a democracy is constraint-
embedded and is people-centric in nature (Baqai, 2005, p. 43). Robert A. Dahl (1998) also
enumerated the following points for a real democratic system. The inclusion of all adult
citizens of the state in democratic process, political equality, and all citizens should be made
part of any decision are the points in his opinion.
21
The close group of elites consisting of landlords, bureaucrats, industrialists, factories
owners, and military men dominates the political power and tends to concentrate power in
their own group. This group of elites rules the state and controls its resource and policy in the
presence of weak institutions in the state (Baqai, 2005, pp. 44-51).
Many scholars accepted without any objections Samuel P. Huntington‟s classification
of democratization across the world in the wave-format followed by reverse-waves of de-
democratization. In the opinion of Samuel P. Huntington, there are three waves of
democratization across the world state. He is of the opinion that a wave is actually a
transition of non-democratic state to a democratic one in a given time. According to him, the
first wave of democratization starts from 1826 to 1926.The second wave starts from the end
of the World War II. This wave is followed by the reverse-wave in 1960s and in early 1970s.
The third wave starts with the end of Portuguese dictatorship in 1974. This is followed by a
reverse-wave in 1990s as Haiti, Sudan, and Surinam reverted to authoritarianism.
There are certain flaws in Samuel P. Huntington‟s classification. He imitates Robert
A. Dahl while specifying the prerequisite for democratization. These are competition,
inclusiveness, and civil liberties. Although he practically believes in Robert A. Dahl‟s
suggestion of the competition aspect of democratization but he overlooks the right to vote
dimension. He also does not consider the US until 1965 and Swiss until 1971 as democratic.
However, the fact is that both are democratic a century ago. He is of the opinion that the
system in 19th
century became democratic when 50 % got eligibility to cast vote. However,
he considers the 20th
century Portugal as democratic. The reality is that only male citizen had
the right to vote. The second criticism from which Samuel P. Huntington‟s classification
suffered is related with the examples he quotes with respect to the number of states that made
transition from non-democracy to democracy. Besides, he gives those examples in the form
of percentage. According to him, the denominator stands for the state. This is not appropriate
22
as the state is not a constant factor. The number of the states crossed the digit 30 in the world
in the period (1957-1972). It presents a small as well as a thinkable wave of democratization.
This is followed by a reverse-wave and the number falls from 32% to 27%. As a matter of
fact, the number of states of the world increased from 93 to 137 as a result of the
democratization of Africa. However, it is a fact although the number of democratic regimes
has increased but their proportion actually falls.
Robert A. Dahl presents the difference between democratic and non-democratic
regimes. He also presents his own wave of democratization and reverse-wave of
classification. Doorenspleet like Robert A. Dahl and Samuel P. Huntington further elaborates
and considers inclusiveness, competition, and civil liberties to be the three main prerequisites
for a political system to be democratic. Moreover, his definition is all-pervasive and is helpful
to make one‟s own opinion in its light. Universal suffrage and competition are being
practiced in the states of the world. However, civil liberties are not met in such democratic
states. Moreover, civil liberties are independent of variables like inclusiveness, and
competition. Such states wherein the aforementioned aspects are claimed to be present are
known in the current literature as minimal democracy (Doorenspleet, 2000, pp. 384-406) .
The following authors have in detail analyzed the concept of democracy and civil
liberties in their seminal works. They include Larry Diamond, Juan and Seymour Martin
Lapset (1995), Larry Diamond (July 1996), Mark J Gasiorowski (August 1996), Andreas
Schedler (April 1998), Smith George (1998), and Fareed Zakaria (1997). Moreover, the
illiberal democracy is further concretized in such terms by numerous authors in their writings.
Axel Hedanius calls such democracy as formal electoral democracy. David Beetham (1994)
also has the same opinion in his writings. In the same way, O. Donnell, and Schmittar (1986)
call this democracy democraducra in their writings. Fareed Zakaria also calls such democracy
as illiberal democracy. Samuel P. Huntington‟s classification is true although for liberal
23
democracy apparently, however, it is not applicable to the regime classification entirely
(Rostow, 1992 , p. 121).
In addition, the aspect inclusiveness or universal suffrage is important and to be
included in the concept of democracy. However, this aspect is ignored in the measurement of
democracy. Authors like Bollen (1980), Jastil (1993), Jaggers and Gurr, Alvarez Etal ignore
this dimension. They are of the opinion that it is marginally related to the concept of
democracy. Moreover, voter participation is just a tradition and even is followed in non-
democracies. Bollen (1980, p373) opines that voter participation is observed in the elections
in Albania, North Korea, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Bulgaria. However, very few
writers had declared those states as democratic. He further explains that electoral
participation is not the valid indicator to be cited in favour of democracy. The indicator is not
free from the flaw like fairness of elections. In addition, the inclusiveness dimension of
democracy might be biased, racist or even sexist. Democracy is seen as highly liberal and
allows electoral participation only to the white people. This could not be democracy at all as
it is biased and racist. Robert A. Dahl called these democracies as inclusive hegemonies.
Rather it is must have known as non-democratic regime.
In the view of Renske Dorenspleet, there are the following types of regime
classification that incorporate the inclusiveness, competition, and civil liberties variables.
First and foremost are the liberal democracies where the three variables are highly
entertained. The second type of regime is minimal democracies in which although the two
variables, that are inclusiveness and competition, are met but the concept of civil liberty is
not minimally entertained. The other is authoritarian regime in which none of the three
variables is met. In minimal democracies, the concept or variable “inclusive suffrage” is not
included in totality as in most of the political system right to vote has not been given to the
women during the first wave of democracy. Belgium, Costa Rica, France, Portugal, Spain,
24
and Swiss are the examples to mention. The final regime type is that of the interrupted
regimes which are either occupied by a foreign power or the central government is collapsed
completely, or the state is passing through transition and new institutions are being made.
The waves as classified by Samuel P. Huntington go nearly as such. The first wave of
democratization was from 1810 to1922. The first reverse-wave was from 1923 to 1940.The
second wave was from 1944 to1957. The second reverse-wave was from 1957 to 1973, and
the third wave of democratization is from 1973 to the present. However, these fail to make
sure Samuel P. Huntington‟s two steps forward and one step backward policy and there is no
signs of third reverse-way so far (Doorenspleet, 2000, pp. 384-406).
Literature on the democratization is available abundantly. However, the literature
concerning the de-democratization is scanty. First and foremost, de-democratization concept
is defined in the following paragraphs. The scholars draw their inspirations to work on
democratization process from Huntington‟s third wave of democracy. They studied the
causes, challenges, consequences, and adopted desired approaches to study democratization
process. However, in the near past, their interests in the democratization faltered a bit and
studying de-democratization gained currency with the passage of time. The phenomenon de-
democratization is not an approach to find faults with the democratization process but rather
it is another way to understand the process of reverse-wave of democratization. Besides, it
diagnosis the treatment required for the reverse ray of democratization. It is not merely a way
to repeat whatever others attempt to repeat with regard to the reverse-wave of
democratization. It differs in nature from the reports that the Freedom House presents each
year. This effort is an attempt to revive the approach Linz adopted in his work on democratic
downslide.
De-democratization is an umbrella concept covering many topics or concepts. These
may include declining civil and political freedom, loss of democratic quality, interruptions of
25
ongoing democratic transitions, decaying democratic legitimacy, dissatisfaction with
democratic institutions. Many writers like Plattern and Diamond (1994), Sartori (1995),
Haggard and Kaufman (1994), Schmitter (1994), O. Donnell (1996), Linz and Stepan (1996),
and Przeworski Etal (1994), discussed elaborately the third wave of democratization.
However, the wave of de-democratization was in the offing. Diamond described the military
takeover in Pakistan in 1999 as the reverse wave of de-democratization. The Journal of
Democracy also declared the decline of democracy. De-democratization is actually the
process or anything that effects democratization in negative way. It is a syndrome that affects
democracy. It occurs in the following ways. First and foremost, the breakdown of democratic
regime occurs. Secondly, the loss of democratic quality occurs, and lastly the interruption of
democratic transitions occurs. The three indicators show de-democratization in different
space and time to map de-democratization. The world presents evidences scattered across the
continents (Andrea Cassani and Alessandro Pellegata, 2015).
Samuel P. Huntington investigates the third wave of democratization with empirical
analysis. He gives the strategy that the wave pattern of democracy took over the years. In his
views, the first wave of democracy starts in the 1820s and lasts till 1926. This wave was
marked by the event when right to vote was granted to the male lot of the USA. As a result of
this wave, 29 democratic states came into being. The wave, however, suffered from the
reverse-wave when Mussolini in Italy took power in 1922. As a result, by 1942 the number of
democratic states reached to 12. The second wave of democratization starts when the allies in
the World War-2 had the victory in 1945 and touches the high-water mark in 1962 when the
number of democratic states reached to 36. However, this second wave of democratization
suffered from the second reverse-wave from 1960 to 1965 and brought the number of the
democratic states down to 30. The third wave of democratization starts in 1970s, and 1980s.
26
It is followed by the third reverse-wave during 1990s. He is of the opinion that it is
impossible to predict that the third wave of democratization would maintain itself or not.
No one can provide us the answer with satisfaction. However, certain factors could be
identified that could affect democratization and de-democratization. These factor are “(1) the
deepening legitimacy problem of authoritarian regimes in a world where democratic values
were widely accepted, the consequent dependence of these regimes on successful
performance, and their inability to maintain performance legitimacy due to economic and
sometimes military failure. (2) The unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s
which raised living standard, increased education, and greatly expanded the urban middle
class in many countries.(3) A striking shift in the doctrine and activities of the catholic
church manifested in the second Vatican Council (1963-65) and the transformation of
national catholic churches from the defender of the status quo to oppose authoritarianism .(4)
Changes in the policies of external actors most notably the EC, the US, and the SU (5)
Snowballing or the demonstrative effect of transition earlier in the third wave stimulates and
providing models for subsequent efforts at democratization”. Samuel P. Huntington is of the
view that democracy has closed relation with Christianity by 1970. Most of the protestant
states had accepted democracy by 1970s, and 1980 is the period when catholic states
democratized. He gives the examples of Portugal, Spain, Philippines, Mexico, Chile, Poland,
three states from Central America, six states from South America, and Hungary from Eastern
Europe. The states, made transition to democracy between 1974 and 1989, were of Catholic.
Europe also played an important role in the democratization process during the third wave in
Southern Europe and provided consolidation to the idea. Greece, Spain, and Portugal became
democratic in order to harvest the economic benefits of the EU. They became the members of
the community in order to consolidate democracy. Greece, Spain, and Portugal became
European members in 1981, 1986 respectively. The other states also followed the same path
27
joining the EU. The change in the policies of SU toward the Eastern Europe could also open
the way for democratization. If it withdraws its support to Castro Regime in Cuba,
democratization movement could be occurred. However, democratization movement was
impossible to be extended into Russia as the heterogeneous ethnicity did not allow
transforming Russia as democratic.
In the same way, the role of the USA in democratization also diminished with the end
of the Cold War and ideological confrontation with USSR. Besides, the influence of the USA
declined in the different parts of the world. The democratization in the states like Bulgaria,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Nepal, and Albania in 1990 also affected the movement towards
liberalization in states of Arab and Africa to open up political discontent and expression.
However, only snowballing affects is worth of attention. The internal conditions of the states
are also important for democratization. The third wave suffered from anti-wave when by
1990 Sudan and Nigeria reverted to authoritarianism. The first and second waves of
democratization also suffered from anti-waves due to following factors. “The weakness of
democratic values among key elites group and the general public ; 2) Severe economic set-
back which intensified social conflict and enhanced the popularity of remedies that could be
imposed only by authoritarian government ;3) social and political polarization often produced
the leftist government seeking the rapid introduction of major social and economic reforms ;
4) the determination of conservative middle class and upper-class groups to exclude populist
and leftist movements and lower class groups from political power ;5) the breakdown of law
and order resulting from terrorism or insurgency ;6) intervention or conquest by a non-
democratic power ; 7) reverse snowballing triggered by the collapse or overthrow of
democratic system in other countries”.
The transition from democracy occurs either into military coup or into executive
coups. Concentrating powers into their own hands, in the first anti-wave, military coup occurs
28
in the states of Eastern Europe and in Greece, Portugal, Argentina, and Japan. Similarly, in
the second anti-wave, military coup ended democracy in Indonesia, Pakistan, Greece,
Nigeria, Turkey, and in many Latin American states. In the same way, executive coup ended
democracy in the second anti-wave in the states like Korea, India, and the Philippines.
However, in Uruguay, the civil and military leadership combined to bring an end to
democracy via executive-military coup. Some causes suggest that the third anti-wave, first
and foremost, brought the loss of legitimization of the government which fails to provide the
basics to the general masses. As a result of which, they see towards change if any possible.
The second is the snowballing affect of the state which goes to authoritarianism on the
state adjacent to it. The example of Russian authoritarianism is significant as it affected
democratization in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Poland, Hungary, and Czech
Slovakia. Similarly, if a state which is non-democratic becomes economically strong, it
definitely affects surrounding states and could infuse its way of government therein. The
example of China and Iran could be referred to. In the same way, technocratic dictatorship is
also possible manipulating the masses the way the regime wants to.
The leaders in Asia, Africa, and Middle Eastern States possess less or more tendency
towards democracy. They often appear to believe in democracy hesitantly as compared to the
leaders in European States, North America, and Latin America who appear to be more
democratic and want to have democracy in their respective states. Although economy makes
democracy possible but it is the leadership which makes it real. The leadership coming from
elites need to believe that the democracy is the least bad form of government. The successive
waves of democracy have ousted dictatorship with brief respective reverse-waves. However,
if leadership is vigilant and democratic then democracy could move in straight line
transforming the proverb that history does not move in straight line, however, skilled and
determined leaders can make it move forward (Huntington, 1991).
29
Scott Gates, Havard Hegre Mark P Jones, Havard Strand (2007), in their paper, come
with their own explanation analyzing Samuel P. Huntington‟s thesis of the waves of
democratization and the thesis of the crisis. They are of the view that there was any such
wave existed at all. They underscore that there is a substantial support that underlines Samuel
P. Huntington‟s thesis whereas there is a very little support to the critics‟ theses. There are
clear proofs of waves and reverse-waves of democratization in the world but there is no clear
evidence for the explanation which Samuel P. Huntington has furnished for his hypothesis. In
addition, the waves‟ pattern is linked to the international developments like wars, domestic,
political, and economic issues. They are not due to the aspects of democratization. The
difference between Samuel P. Huntington and the critics is mainly revolved around the
concept of democracy as defined by Samuel P. Huntington and the instances of
democratization in the world states. The difference lies in their methodologies each adopted
to approach the democratization and its issue. There are clear evidences of the waves of
democratization and de-democratization in the world states.
Samuel P. Huntington takes help from Robert A. Dahl‟s definition (1971) of
democracy in his seminal work “Polyarchy”. His concept is based on contestation and
participation. Samuel P. Huntington‟s definition includes free and fair elections, limitation on
political power, institutionalization and stability, electoral competition and wide spread
voting participation. He thinks democracy and non-democracy dichotomously. Doorenspleet
(2000) is of the view that Samuel P. Huntington fails to include inclusiveness aspect in
defining democratization. She presents a concept of minimal democracy. Przeworski Et Al
(2000) views democracy is exited if the executive and legislatures have obtained their office
via at least semi-electoral multiparty competitive elections process. The definition is more
minimalist. His definition comes to the surface in 1950, when the second wave of democracy
was about to start.
30
Both Doorenspleet (2000) and Przeworski Et Al (2000) show difference of opinions
over the notion that there is no visible wave structure. Between 1950 and 1990, there was
dramatic increase in the number of democracies mostly in Latin America and in the rest of
the world. There was stability at large. Doorenspleet also says that there is no reverse-wave.
He suggests that there is need to research in order to explain the different waves of
democratization. The researcher found the reasons why there are waves at all across the
political system. There are certain international shocks. These shocks consist of WW-I, WW-
II and the end of the Cold War (1945-1990). However, the anti-waves are the result of the
collapse of the newly established democracies and their systems. In the same way, change in
the neighborhood is also a reason to effect change (Scott Gates, Havard Hergre, Mark P.
Jones, Havard Strand, 2007).
The democratization in the Muslim World in the post-Cold War era and in post-9/11
may one place somewhere between the democratization and outright dictatorship. The type of
democracy found in the Muslim World is better termed as pseudo-democracies. This type of
democracy may be best suitable for that society. It may be good and bad. It is a common
practice in the Muslim states. But there may be, in some states, a real transition from
authoritarian regime to real democracy. Indonesia is the best example. Why do pseudo-
democracies become entrenched in the Muslim societies? The doctrines that are based on
liberalism, republicanism, and Islamism are responsible for this entrenchment of pseudo-
democracies in the Muslim World. It is the result of the efforts of the Islamism,
fundamentalist movements that have attempted to create democratic ethics different from the
democratic ethics in the west. In the same way, the secular republicanist political elites also
attempted to create pseudo-democracies in their respective societies best suitable to their
interests. This is how one can call democracy as pseudo-democracies in the Muslim World.
Other names for these types of democracies used in the political literature are semi-
31
democracy, virtual democracy, electoral democracy, and liberalized autocracy. Moreover,
Schumpeter calls this type of democracy as minimalist model of democracy. Robert A. Dahl
calls Polyarchy to such type of democracy.
Similarly, Brumberg‟s liberal autocracies and Kamrava‟s and Case‟s pseudo-
democracies are terms used for democracy in the Muslim Society. In the view of Larry
Diamond, it has become a fashion with the states these days to call themselves as democratic.
This may be due to the external pressure or due to democratization trends worldwide. Such
type of democracy is best suitable as the ruling elites achieve their objectives easily while
masking authoritarianism. The ruling elites are secular and promote republicanism to help the
members of their groups. It is the modern version of Ibn-Khaldun‟s Asabiyya (group spirit).
Olivier Roy also has similar opinion that allegiance to one‟s group is the basis of ruling
classes and their group solidarity. This blend of republicanism and Asabiyya is different from
the type of democracy found in the west. In Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, and
Pakistan, republicanism has a happy blend with the group spirit. Such groups either share the
clan‟s spirit or the military background.
The other is the role of Islamism responsible for pseudo-democracies in the Muslim
World as these so-called democrats have attempted to couch democracies in the light of
Islam. Once, they become successful in achieving a stage suitable for getting their vested
interests, they all at once become oblivious to further democratization. This stage is lexicon
as pseudo-democracy with respect to their respective political systems which they claim
democratic in the light of Islam. One may come across many flaws contravene to Islamism.
These factors keep democracy away from real democracy in the Muslim World. This overall
discussion is explained in the figure in the Appendix on page 267. Pseudo-democracy is not a
low form of democracy but it is a way or stepping stone towards republicanist-islamists
democracy which suits best the ruling elites‟ interests in the Muslim World only to couch the
32
true face of democracy with respect to their religion and culture (Volpi F. , 2004, pp. 1061-
1078).
Aurel Croissant, in his paper, analyzes the status of democracy in Asian States. He
has categorized the status of democracy therein in different groups based on the performance
as defective democracies. The waves of demarcation across the world also brought
democratization across Asia. However, the results therein are not decent as compared to other
states of the world. The Continent Asia is ranked as the last according to the report of the
Freedom House. However, the status of democracies varies state to state in Asia. In
consequent of the third wave, started in 1974, only four states completed the criterion of free
elections and could be categorized as electoral democracies. Since mid-1980, nine states in
Asia made transition to democracy. The last of them was Indonesia in 1999. However,
democracy in Pakistan was rolled back in military coup in 1999. Besides, there is increase in
the bad rule of law, unstable institutions, corruption, and absence of the peaceful means for
settling conflicts. Moreover, none of the states in Asia fulfills the criteria for being placed as
liberal democracies. As a result, some are semi-liberal democracies, and some are illiberal
democracies.
Aurel Croissant is of the opinion that this semi and illiberal categorization although
follows electoral procedures, but the categorization groups the states with autocracies. He
terms democracies as defective democracies existed in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. The
National Congress got powers in holding elections of 1991 in Nepal but failed to resolve the
issues between the autocratic forces and NC groups. As a result, the Moist fought guerrilla
war in most parts of the state. Consequently, King Gyanendra dismissed parliament in 2002
and made a cabinet solely out of his own will. In the same way, democracy in Bangladesh has
also suffered from discrepancies which put the state virtually at the instability. The political
33
elites only care for their family interests. There is no rule of law. He analyses the status of
democracy region wise in Asia to find out the defects.
Aurel Croissant takes the South Asian democracies between 1988 and 1999 where
transition to democracy occurred. The democracy in Pakistan has suffered from the military-
cum-political elites‟ rivalry. Although the multi-party system is in place since 1980, there is
no real opposition present or known at all. The elected Prime Ministers rule with decree and
have no respect for parliament. The political stakeholders are in conflict. As a result, the
public has lost confidence in democracy. The public has lost confidence in the state
institutions and political elites. He places the type of democracy existed in each state of Asia
in various groups. There is an electoral democracy in Sri Lanka, India (second wave),
Bangladesh (third wave), and Japan (second wave). There are failed democracies in Nepal,
Pakistan, and Cambodia. Last but not least, there are autocratic regimes in Bhutan, Maldives,
Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam, China, and North Korea. To these
types of democracy, he holds responsible a plethora of reasons from socio-economic
development to political institutions as well as political system along with ethnic
heterogeneity and colonial background (Croissant, 2004).
Peter, Subas, Yogendra, and Muhammed Waseem had the opinion while analyzing
the state of democracy in South Asia that democracy has not succeeded in South Asia on the
whole as like the other states in the world. It has neither consolidated nor has economic
foundation that provides firm consolidation. Among the five surveyed states, 88% citizens
think democracy fit for their respective states. However, the rate of likeness for democracy in
Nepal and Pakistan was low with 79% and 84% respectively. In Pakistan, 50% had the
opinion that democracy or no democracy, it does not make any difference for them. Religion
dominates the thoughts of the masses in South Asia. Majority are supportive of the Sharia
(Islamic System), and do not want democracy at all. Among the states surveyed, some are in
34
favor of strong democracy and some are not. Pakistan dominates with 40% where the
respondents rejected the notion of democracy.
The variation across the South Asia is the result of the factors like formal education,
media exposures, and informal political education. The definition and meaning of democracy
in South Asia are different from that of democracy in the West. The western democracy puts
more stress on the popular control of the rulers, equal rights, and liberties for the citizens, the
rule of law, and protection against tyranny. However, democracy in South Asia is not more of
the people‟s rule, of political freedom, of equality, and of community rights. The elections in
Pakistan are not free and fair. There is no or if there is any viable mechanism, which could
check the elections process, is present at all. Besides, wide spread corruption practices by the
politicians are observed in each election. The masses in south Asia has less trust in
institutions. Pakistan, where trust in institutions, is minimum, comes first among the surveyed
population across the five South Asian states. The masses do not show much of trust in
parliament, political parties, and judiciary. They think parliament and political parties are not
their representatives. They serve the elites and their interests.
Democracy also focuses on ethnic diversity in South Asia. The masses are of the
opinion that the minority should adopt the ways of the majority. However, the protection of
minorities‟ rights varies state to state in South Asia. Political parties are the vehicles around
which the masses gather and articulate their view and reviews. Every party starts as a
movement working for the interests of the masses. In South Asia, the political parties also
originated as movements and took the shape of political parties with the passage of time. The
INC and the ML are instances to quote. But however, the ML failed to keep itself integrated
and suffered from fragmentation and provided space to other political parties. One important
point to refer to is that the multitude of political parties means the absence of institutions.
Moreover, they are formed out of personal interests and out of clash among the leadership.
35
Besides, the political parties are identified with one man or family in most of the South Asian
states. The case of Pakistan is a glaring example as majority of the parties are associated with
the names of certain families like the Bhutto, the Nawaz etc. This political ethnicization of
political parties is not conducive to democracy and has succeeded to promote the dynastic
politics in the states of South Asia like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India (Peter R. de Souza,
Subas Palshikar, Yogendra Yadav and Mohammad Waseem, 2008).
The case of Indian democracy is being analyzed in order to understand the case of the
crisis of democracy in Pakistan as both the states have same political history. The case of
Indian democracy has remained a miasma for the theorists of democracy. Despite multi-
ethnic and absence of industrial society, politically India has excelled and is counted among
the modern world. Democracy has continued its journey except a brief interruption in
1974.There is always a smooth transfer of powers and the elections turnout rises in each
election well beyond 60%. The phenomenal turnout amazed theorists like Robert A. Dahl,
Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. They are of the opinion that India is
a leading democracy in the third world despite agricultural and traditional society. A question
often looms over the mind why democracy has survived in India. The question could be
examined in the following paragraphs.
First and foremost is the historical aspect. The participation in the government affairs
and the emergence of the INC provided a space to the Indian leaders to learn in the last
phases of the British rule in India. In the beginning, the INC was a cultural unit. It
transformed itself into the cultural political party under the concept of Indian civilization with
the passage of time. If there is a party, there can be a democracy. It was the British legacy.
But most importantly, it was the interaction between the British authorities and the Indian
leadership that laid the foundation of Indian democracy. The British government started
providing opportunities to the locals in 1880 and transferred powers to the local population at
36
the provincial level in 1935.The INC took the advantage of that opportunity and had got
enough training before 1947. However, the other decolonized nations failed to take advantage
of such opportunity in real terms.
The INC was founded as an urban-middle class group in 1885. Ghandi transformed it
into a mass party opening village and district level offices in 1920. It was the institutional
ground work that provided a base to the party. He held intra-party elections in order to elect
party leaders that saved the national movement from intra-conflicts. It also succeeded in
nation-building. Civilization is a cultural unit and nation-building caps what is cultural and
what is political. It is the political roof over one‟s cultural head. The CDOM of Ghandi, over
the Amritsar killings, was an instance in which everybody participated. The Indian
nationalism was conceived and contrived in opposition to the British. Ghandi and Nehru not
only resisted the British but also transformed Indians into an Indian nation.
The notion, that parliamentary democracy in India is the legacy of the British, is a
mistake. Although the British provided the opportunity, but the Indian leaders actively
participated and gave democratic thoughts to the people. Seymour Martin Lipset was the first
to show the connection between wealth and democracy. This is not true for India. Moore is of
the view that no bourgeois, no democracy and yes peasants, no democracy. The
commercialization of agriculture liquefied peasantry. Although peasantry was present in
Europe and America, however, it was called commercial peasants. Although, in India, there
was no industrialization across the state, but she made democracy viable through the project
of the Green Revolution. India, although ethnically diverse, survived democracy. The history
is full of ethnic conflicts. Insurgency in Kashmir, Hindu-Muslim riots, and the Sikh-Hindu
riots are some of the instances. The experts of ethnic configuration point out two types of
ethnic configuration. Dispersed configuration and centrally focused configuration. In the first
type, the conflict is of local nature and the state can easily put an end to it. In the later, the
37
conflict is of not local nature and the state suffers from problems to put an end to it. Sri
Lanka-Tamilis problem and East-West Pakistan issue are cases in points.
Democracy works properly if leaders accept constraints on their authority or on their
decision-making. Moreover, it also flourishes if they accept the authority or the supremacy of
the parliament while putting aside personal ambitions. Besides, it does if they uphold the
constitutions of their respective parties as well as extend respect to the opponent‟s views
within the constitutional limits and respect the government of the federating units. The
leaders, in post-colonial-societies, failed to show such features. However, India is an
exception. Although there were temporary disagreements found between the members of the
Congress and Nehru but they were referred to intra-party forum to be resolved
democratically. Many other instances could be referred to that prove that Nehru or anyone
else had not attempted to enforce his decision upon the others (Varshney, 1998, pp. 36-50).
The crisis of democracy has been conceptualized in the aforementioned paragraphs.
However, in this study, the phrase “crisis of democracy” denotes that there were existed
certain crises among the leadership who had rivaled for powers. This rivalry produced
political crisis which gave way to the political and non-political factors of the system to play
their role in deepening the crises. Consequently, democracy was suffered and governments as
well as assemblies were dissolved before their stipulated time given in the Constitution. The
patterns of rivalries that created crisis of democracy in the period (1988-99) are explained in
flowcharts below. Democracy stands for many things not mere holding of elections. It was
not understood in the real sense in the polity of Pakistan.
38
The Crisis of Democracy: Pattern of Rivalries and Elites (1988-1999)
Competing/Principal Rivals
The Prime Minister
The President /the
Military in the 2nd
Term
of Nawaz Sharif
Causes of Rivalry:
Causes of Rivalries:
Integrated-group-of Elites (political-religious-civil-military-judicial elites)
A Constant Factor in the Crisis
Common Interest:
Removal of the PM
39
a
Source: Author‟s own construct
Note: The Integrated group of Elites remained united throughout the decade of democracy
and played their role in deepening the crises. Consequently, democracy suffered from crisis
in the period 1988-99. They were systemic factors that influenced the political system of
Pakistan and played their role in deepening the crisis of democracy in the period. The group
consisted of elites both political and non-political and played a decisive role in the crisis.
Besides, it was a perpetual and manipulating factor in the crisis and worked as a group. The
group collaborated with the man at the helm based on similar interests against the common
rival. It was heterogeneous in the making consisting of political-religious-civil-military-
judicial elites.
The Crisis and Benazir’s 1st Term in Office: Pattern of Rivalries and Elites
(1988-1990)
Competing/Principal
Rivals
Benazir Bhutto:
(PM.1988-1990)
Ghulam Ishaq Khan:
(President.1988-1993)
Causes of Rivalry:
Confrontation over military and judicial appointments
Benazir‟s attempt, Removal of Nawaz Sharif from CMship of Punjab
Benazir‟s involvement in the affairs of army, and Ghulam Ishaq‟s Resentment
End of Presidential Powers, Ghulam Ishaq, and Benazir
Causes of Rivalries:
Benazir, Army and
confrontation over
Sindh Operation.
Benazir, MQM, Rift
over Sindh
Operation. Benazir,
Religious Parties‟
Enmity, and Shariat
Bill. Benazir, no
invitation, and CMs
Integrated-group-of Elites (political-religious-civil-military-judicial
elites)
Nawaz Sharif (CM Punjab)
40
a
Source: Author‟s own construct
The Crisis and Nawaz’s 1st Term in Office: Pattern of Rivalries and Elites
(1990-1993)
Competing/Principal Rivals
Nawaz Sharif:
(PM.1990-1993)
Ghulam Ishaq Khan:
(President.1988-1993)
Common Interest:
Removal of the Benazir
Bhutto
Causes of Rivalry:
Nawaz Sharif, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and Differences over COAS appointment
Attempt to Repeal 8th Amendment, Nawaz Sharif, and Ghulam Ishaq Khan‟s Resentment
Veena Hayat Case, Nawaz Sharif, and Ghulam Ishaq Khan‟s Resentment
Ghulam Ishaq Khan‟s Humiliation, Nawaz Sharif, and the Opposition
Ghulam Ishaq Khan‟s Resentment, Nawaz Sharif, and 12th Amendment
Nawaz Sharif, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and Appointment of the Governor of the Punjab
41
Source: Author‟s own construct
The Crisis and Benazir’s 2nd
Term in Office: Pattern of Rivalries and Elites
(1993-1996)
Competing/Principal Rivals
Benazir Bhutto:
(PM.1993-1996)
Farooq Ahmed Khan:
(President.)
Causes of Rivalries:
Nawaz Sharif, Gulf
Policy and IJI.
Nawaz Sharif,
MQM, and Alliance
Break. Nawaz
Sharif, Gulf War,
and Army. Benazir-
Ghulam Ishaq
Rapprochement and
Nawaz Sharif‟s
Dismissal
Common Interest:
Removal of Nawaz
Sharif
Integrated-group-of Elites (political-religious-civil-military elites)
the COAS, Benazir Bhutto,
Bureaucracy, IJI, JI, MQM, Army
Causes of Rivalry:
Benazir, Farooq Ahmed Khan‟s Resentment, and Sindh Situation
Benazir, Farooq Ahmed Khan‟s Resentment, and Murtaza‟s Murder
Benazir, Farooq Ahmed Khan, and Sajjad Ali Shah
Benazir, Mr.Sadurdin Hashwani, Pakistan Petroleum Limited, and Farooq Ahmed Khan
Benazir, Farooq Ahmed Khan, and Inclusion of Nawaz Khokar in Cabinet
42
Source: Author‟s own construct
The Crisis and Nawaz’s 2nd
Term in Office: Pattern of Rivalries and Elites
(1996-1999)
Competing/Principal Rivals
Nawaz Sharif :
(PM.1996-1999)
Gen.Musharraf:
(President.1999-2008)
Causes of Rivalries:
Benazir,
Replacement of
PML (N) in Punjab,
and of ANP in
KPK. Benazir,
MQM, and Tussle
in Sindh. Benazir,
Qazi Hussain
Ahmed, and
Dharna. Benazir,
and Judges
Appointment,
Benazir, IJI, and
Common Interest:
Removal of
Benazir
Integrated-group-of Elites (political-religious-civil-military-
judicial elites)
Nawaz Sharif (CM Punjab)
the COAS, JI, Bureaucracy, the
MQM,ANP
Causes of Rivalry:
Nawaz Sharif, Pervez Musharruf, and Kargil Issue
Nawaz Sharif, Pervez Musharruf, and Removal
Nawaz Sharif, Pervez Musharruf, and Power Struggle
Causes of Rivalries:
Nawaz Sharif,
Parliamentarians,
and Legislation.
Nawaz Sharif,
Sajjad Ali Shah, and
Contempt of Court
Case. Nawaz
Sharif, MQM, and
Resignation. Nawaz
43
Source: Author‟s own construct
Lawrence Ziring presented a good commentary on democracy in Pakistan. He said,
“Democracy is more than rhetoric, more than good intensions and certainly more than the
natural order of things. Pakistanis have waxed eloquent on the subject of democracy but the
record reveals, it was seldom within their grasp. A divided nation at birth democratic
experience was made impossible by the inability to reconcile competing claims or relieve
deep-seated fears (Ziring, 1997, p. 505).” Similarly, on democracy, the Algerian Prime
Minister Redah Malek came with the following historical remarks. He said “democracy is not
a matter of going to voting booths…. (Volpi F. , 2002).
The case of Pakistan is different from that of India. The implicit and explicit roles of
the military and of the others have been involved in Pakistan. Democracy in Pakistan suffered
from problems throughout its checkered history. Its history stands witness to the frequent
dismissal of governments before their stipulated constitutional terms. What are the reasons
for that crisis of democracy is a question that looms over the minds of a curious reader. One
answer that could be found in the annals of history is of the usual charges of corruption,
Integrated-group-of Elites (political-religious-civil-military-
judicial elites)
Benazir, MQM, ANP, JI, Army,
Judiciary
Common Interest:
Removal of
Nawaz Sharif
44
mismanagement of economy and bad governance leveled against whenever any elected
government was dismissed in the polity. However, if one looks into the matter deeply, there
are certain rivalries present among the elites of the polity which are the factor behind the so-
called charges to validate the dismissal of the government of the day.
In Pakistan, the political elites, who had been engaged in mutual conflicts and
confrontation, weakened the struggle for democracy and made it suffered from crisis and
provided the way to praetorianism (Malik, 1997, p. 1). Historically, the polity of Pakistan had
suffered from the crisis of democracy at different time of the years. With the demise of the
Quaid-e-Azam, the state faced with the crisis of leadership. The present lot of the leaders did
not possess the acumen to meet the challenges faced to the polity in the fields of constitution-
making, settlement of immigrants etc. Their mutual conflicts and feuds provided an
opportunity to the civil and military elites to take advantage of the situation and put the state
virtually on the brink of collapse. As a result of their mutual squabbling, the state bore the
brunt of martial law in 1958 and set a trend in the years to come. That was how democracy
was not allowed to take roots in the state.
The disintegration of East Pakistan had been a flagrant show of floundering
democracy. In 1970s, democracy was given chance once again but the authoritarianism and
confrontation among the politicians provided the military with an opportunity to derail it. In
1985, it was permitted with restriction but was derailed the moment it started asserting itself.
In the days before 1988, the elections were not free from rigging too. In each election, the so-
called democratic forces in league with undemocratic forces floundered the norms and
principles associated with the elections. Similarly, the role of political parties also had not
remained worth mentioning. They conspired with and supported the undemocratic forces to
derail the elected governments.
45
Since independence, the polity of Pakistan suffered from the problem of nation-
building inevitable for consensus on the establishment of parliamentary system with the
federal structure. However, deep ethnic divide, the role of ambitious political and non-
political forces, and the influence of the external powers deepened this problem of nation-
building (Kukreja, 2007, p. xii).Weak political party system also caused the crisis of
democracy in the political history of Pakistan. There was no well-organized political party
which could have played its role in the development of democracy at the time of
independence. It was held that due to the absence of national political parties, Pakistan failed
to create political culture necessary to democracy (Afzal, 1976, p. 79).
The APML, which achieved Pakistan, had never been able to transform itself from the
movement into a political party. It failed to lead the state towards democracy,
constitutionalism, and institution-building. It failed to promote the culture of intra-party
democracy and was in the grip of few people who never worked together as a team.
Consequently, the politics of the Leaguers was characterized by intrigues, bickering, and
mutual rivalries (K.J.Newman, 1959, p. 20). It was, therefore, the politicians had to seek
support from the civil bureaucrats who were well-trained. That was how they had been
provided with an opportunity to establish their hold on the politics of the polity (Sayeed,
1967, pp. 62-63). The support proved fatal, later on, to the establishment and development of
political institutions and political processes (Kukreja, 2007, pp. 3-4).
After the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan, the bureaucrats became the sole leaders of
the state. As a result, a strong alliance of civil-military bureaucracy emerged that virtually
reigned the state in the days to come. Thus, in the early two decades, the cynosure of power
rested with the civil servants rather than with the politicians ( Hassan Gardezi and Jamil
Rashid , 1983, p. 72). Consequently, the bureaucrats ruled in succession. Ghulam
Muhammad, who was a bureaucrat, became Governor General in Oct. 1951. He was
46
succeeded by Iskander Mirza, who was also a bureaucrat, in Aug. 1955. They set a tradition
for bureaucracy to perform its role on permanent basis in the politics in league with the army
(Rizvi H. A., 2000. , p. 71).
Moreover, the bureaucrat-turned-politicians in alliance with the military conspired
with the landlords, industrialists, and feudals to exploit the differences among the politicians
and the process of division deepened in their lines (Jalal, 1990 , p. 296). Although the state of
Pakistan struggled to establish democracy but it was harmed during the period (1947-1958)
due to internal intrigues and personal biasness and powers were virtually in the hands of
bureaucratic-military elites (Kukreja, 2007, pp. 1-2).
The state suffered from extreme controversy over framing constitution and took nine
years to frame its first constitution in 1956 after hectic efforts. However, the domination of
the western wing paved the way for bifurcation (Dr.Noorul-Haq, 2010, pp. 5-7). The
President could take a decisive political action but he did not want to dishearten the
leadership of the mandated political party of the West Pakistan. There is an opinion that the
incident of 1971 was the failure of civilian leadership who upheld their own interests at the
cost of democratic norms and principles (Ali G. R., 2000, pp. 15-19).
In the words of Lawrence Ziring (1997.p.513), Benazir had opinion that democracy
was dysfunctional in the polity of Pakistan and she set her thoughts on destroying her rivals
before they could damage her. General Pervez Musharraf had the following views on
democracy when he imposed martial law in 1999. He said, “This is no martial law only
another path to democracy and the armed forces had no intention to stay in charge any longer
than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan”
(Http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitering/477829.stm). The irony of the situation was
that the state regained democracy in 2008.
47
The general mass, in the state of Pakistan, brands the concept of democracy in such
words as sardari and darbari democracy. This reflects the lack of real democratic setup in the
polity. It is, therefore, words like sardari and darbari democracy are becoming the part of
political discourse. In addition to, this type of perception among the mass regarding the
concept of democracy also reflects that democracy serves only the interests of the elites in
Pakistan (Ahmed S. , 2016, p. 7). Brigadier Farooq Ahmed (retired), in talk show, branded
the concept of democracy in Pakistan in such words as government of the elites, for the elites
and by the elites (Frooq, 2016).
1.2.2: Leadership:
The concept of the leadership has been conceptualized in the following paragraphs.
The role of the leaders both political and apolitical has not been remained adorable in the
development of democracy in the state of Pakistan. They furnished the way for political crisis
via their ill rather undemocratically management of the crisis. As a result, the state suffered
from either political instability or disintegration. They failed to show their political acumen in
the circumstances when the state was suffering from worst problems. They, instead of finding
solutions to those problems, were engaged in petty parliamentary squabbles, and thine and
mine business. It was the lack of political acumen that the polity suffered from military coup
d‟états, disintegration, economic crisis, and the dismissal of governments. This all occurred
out of their sheer rivalry for powers. The political history of Pakistan stands witness to such
rivalries.
The practice of dismissing governments in Pakistan has been remained a tradition in
the political history of the state. In 1950s, politicians especially of the West Pakistan, and
military elites dominated the political scene. They both used their powers against the rivals
48
dismissing their governments and formed new political parties and groups against them. They
used one group against the other for their own advantages. The politicians, therefore, could
be identified with inefficiency, nepotism, and corrupt practices (Akhtar, 2009, pp. 46-47).
From 1958-1969, General Ayub Khan ruled the state. He had no mass support and
depended heavily upon rewards in order to cater support for his rule. He shaped a political
group which encouraged the politics of inheritance in the state. However, he badly failed to
prolong his rule. In the end, he had to resign.
The leadership of the AL, and the PPP preferred their party interests and put aside
national interests. Therefore, both the parties failed to reconcile. With the passage of time, the
trust deficit upon each other kept on increase. As a result, both the parties failed to show
flexibility in their demands. They substantiated their demands with inflexible stances which
made the situation worse even more in the days to come (Sisson and Rose, 1990). ZA Bhutto
proclaimed that there were three forces in Pakistan. they consisted of the armed forces, the
AL and the PPP. It is high time that there should be two Prime Ministers one for East
Pakistan and the other for West Pakistan (Khan M. A., 2005, p. 33). His demand was equal to
virtually to separation like that of Sheikh Mujeeb‟s Six Points. He was not ready to accept the
majority of the AL. He was of the opinion that majority alone has no importance. Moreover,
he emphasized that neither any constitution could be made nor any government at the center
without his party‟s cooperation. Besides, he made this clear that he would not sit on the
opposition benches (Islam, 1989) . In such state of affairs, none of the leaders played his role
for national interests. Consequently, Pakistan suffered from disintegration. It is safe to say
that the circumstances that led to the separation of East Pakistan were not a conspiracy
against the body politic of Pakistan but a conspiracy against democracy in the state.
49
Analyzing the leadership of ZA Bhutto, one may see authoritarianism in his nature.
He never possessed any soft corner for the opposition. The dismissal of the governments of
the NAP in Balochistan and in N.W.F.P simultaneously stands witness to his
authoritarianism. He accused the government of the NAP due to the anti-state activities and
its collaboration with Kabul (Afghanistan) and New Delhi (India). Besides, the 1973
constitution was frequently amended in order to have unlimited powers (Kukreja, 2007, p.
38).
On account of consolidating his position, ZA Bhutto did not bear the politics of
opposition. As a result, he banned the NAP and obtained its approval from the Supreme
Court. His regime was unbearable to any democratic opposition for which did not matter
what method to be used (Kumar, 1978, p. 324). To substantiate his authoritarianism even
further, he accused Khan Abdul Wali Khan of anti-state activities and decided to trial him.
Many had of the opinions that the trial was the exact repetition of Agartala Conspiracy Case
instituted by General Ayub Khan against Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rahman (Jalal, 1995, p. 123).
His too much dependence on the military made ZA Bhutto vulnerable as a leader. The
operation against the Baloch in 1973-1977 proved decisive towards his dismissal. The army
carried out the operation on the directions of his Defense Minister General Tika Khan and of
him. The operation provided an opportunity to the army to return to the political arena. It
virtually became aware of the weaknesses of the civilian government (Ali T. , 1998, p. 123).
Air Martial Muhammad Azghar Khan (retired) opines on ZA Bhutto‟s authoritarian
tendencies. He said that he met ZA Bhutto in the beginning of 1970. He extended an
invitation to join his party in that meeting. ZA Bhutto told him if we joined hands, we both
could perform wonders touring the state in different directions. The moment we reach
Rawalpindi, General Yahya Khan would receive us at the station and we would then rule
50
together. He asked him what the programme was. At this enquiry, he smiled and remarked
„the programme is to rule. The people are stupid, and I know how to befool them. I will have
the danta (stick) in my hand and no one will be able to remove us for twenty years‟ (Khan M.
A., 2005, p. 60). This may be bias opinion but at least stands witness to ZA Bhutto‟s
philosophy of politics in order to motivate one to research further and to analyze his
leadership.
ZA Bhutto used to make undue interference in bureaucracy. He dismissed four
hundred civil servants without any inquiry and reason. By 1977, he had thoughts that his
position was strong and consolidated. He decided to have fresh mandate from the public and
announced general elections. In the elections, his party, the PPP, gained the mandate. The
opposition refused to accept the results of the elections and proclaimed the elections to be
rigged. As a result, they made protest against the government in every nook and corner of the
state. The religious elites also joined the ranks of the opposition. In order to appease the
Ulema (religious elites), he proclaimed ban on alcohol and gambling across the state.
Following the policy of appeasement, he even declared Ahmadis as non-muslim. But all these
measures did not work. He tried his best to contain the situation but failed miserably in his
efforts (Khan R. , 1997, pp. 65-66).
Last but not least, his rule was significant on two bases. First and foremost, it was the
first civilian government after the longest spell of the military. Secondly, it was the longest
civilian government in the political history of the polity. Unfortunately, the political elites
failed to consolidate democracy out of their personal interests. Instead of solving the political
problems in the parliament, they sought to solve them in the street. This authoritarianism on
the part of political elites paved the way for the military to come into the power. As a result,
democracy was derailed in a military coup on 5th
July 1977. Once again, the state bore the
brunt of dictatorship (Kukreja, 2007, p. 2).
51
General Zia ul-Haq gained powers as a result of the military coup in 1977. He was an
apolitical leader. He proclaimed to hold elections within ninety days and pledged to transfer
powers to the civilian leadership so that democracy might take roots in the state. However,
that pledge was never realized and ruled the state till his death in 1988. He glorified himself
as an Amirul-Momineen (the leader of the faithful) and the Savior of Islam. He had no public
support which was the basic element for the genuine leadership. His rule had no legitimacy in
political context. It was due to this lack of legitimacy that he used religion as an instrument in
order to prolong his rule. Knowing the strong devotion of the common Pakistani with Islam,
he always presented himself to be an embodiment of Islam. He played a role in the Afghan
War (1979-1988) in order to present himself as the savior of Islam and of the Muslim
Ummah. The chief aim behind all such tactics was to sustain his rule without any regard for
civilian supremacy (Hussain, 1989, pp. 136-137).
Benazir Bhutto had the political acumen and possessed charisma. However, she failed
miserably in her both terms in office. She depended heavily on her cronies who had no
qualification except flattery (Hussain, 1989, pp. 136-137). Her both tenures ended without
results as she did not deliver what she had promised during her endeavours for democracy. In
the same way, Nawaz Sharif too failed badly in his both terms in office. Their governments
could be identified with corruption, judicial assault, authoritarianism, and confrontation for
powers. Both the civilian leadership failed due to lack of political acumen and pushed the
state into the throes of crisis after crisis (Khundi, 2011). In simple words, their rivalry for
powers made democracy suffered from crisis as far as they all are concerned in the light of
their roles.
Leadership hereby means those who were in the government or in the opposition or
non-political. To be more precise, the role of leadership in the persons of Benazir Bhutto and
of Nawaz Sharif in their respective terms in office as the head of the government and the
52
head of the opposition is meant and is being analyzed that how they played their role in the
crisis of democracy in the period under study. In the same way, the role of the Presidents in
the persons of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, of Farooq Ahmed Khan, and of General Pervez
Musharruf in the politics of the period is also important and is analyzed in the light of the
crisis of democracy the state suffered from between 1988-99.
General Zia ul-Haq was the first President who used his powers under 58-2(b) in 1988
and dismissed Muhammad Khan Junejo‟s government. Later, the President Ghulam Ishaq
Khan dismissed Benazir Bhutto‟s and Nawaz Sharif‟s government in 1990 and 1993
respectively in the light of 58-2(b) article of the Constitution. Following the history, the
President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari too dissolved Benazir Bhutto‟s government under the
aforementioned article. However, Nawaz Sharif‟s government was dissolved in 1999 despite
having eliminated the killing 58-2(b) article of the Constitution using his parliamentary
majority and had the President of his own choice. He made the President Farooq Ahmed
Khan Leghari resign and became near-absolute Prime Minister. However, he locked in
conflict with the COAS General Pervez Musharraf over the Kargil Issue and was removed in
coup in 1999. Moreover, he did not enjoy good relations with the coalition political party of
his government in the province of Sindh. As a result, he dismissed the government in Sindh
in August 1999 when the MQM broke its alliance with the PML (N) in the province (Akhtar,
2009, pp. 46-47).
1.2.3. Systemic factors:
1.2.3.1. Crisis and Systemic Factors: Judicial Perspective
The judicial elites have played a role in the crisis of democracy and validated the
dismissal of the elected governments without any delay calling into practice the doctrine the
Law of Necessity. The doctrine has remained a decisive in the nullification of the rule of
53
Constitution in the political development of Pakistan. This instrument helped the judiciary,
the guardian of the constitution, validate many times in past the unconstitutional acts of the
military and of civilian leaders in the so called name of national interest.
The doctrine became incorporated in the legal and constitutional vocabulary during
1950s. The Chief Justice Muhammad Munir validated Ghulam Muhammad's unconstitutional
act in his verdict and set aside the verdict of Sind High Court. The matter as a matter of fact
revolved around Ghulam Muhammad's act when he had dissolved the National Assembly.
The Speaker of the Assembly Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan challenged the dissolution in Sind
High Court and the Court decided the case in favor of the Speaker. As a result, the Governor
General took the matter into the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court of Pakistan
nullified the decision of the High Court and validated the Governor General's act as legal and
constitutional on the basis of the circumstances prevailed in the state that had made necessary
the very act (Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan V the Federation of Pakistan, 1955).
This helped make the Governor General able to flounder democratic norms and
principles. This is how the doctrine of necessity had been remained a decisive instrument in
the crisis of democracy. This was a ready assistance of the judicial elites to provide legal
cover to the political and non-political elites. Iskander Mirza, General Ayub Khan, General
Yahya Khan, and General Zia ul-Haq were the beneficiaries of the doctrine and validated
their undemocratic steps in their respective regimes (Iqbal.S.Hussain, 2007, pp. 132-133).
The doctrine provided legal cover to General Ayub Khan‟s coup on 7th
October 1958. Justice
Muhammad Munir validated the undemocratic act of the General. And when Mrs. Nusrat
Bhutto challenged General Zia‟s coup, the court nullified her petition in favour of General
Zia. The court was of the view that General Zia ul-Haq's act on 5th
July 1977 was the need of
the time. It was, therefore, his very act was constitutional and legal in the larger interest of the
nation (Saleem, 2010).
54
The validation of the article 58-2(b) was another help that judicial elites provided to
the political and non-political elites.. The very article was even worse than martial law to
democracy (Siddique, 2006, p. 713). In the political history, the Supreme Court of Pakistan
made unpopular decisions in connection with the dissolution of Assemblies by the Presidents
of Pakistan under article 58-2(b) in their respective terms in office in 1990,1993,and1996
(Waseem, 2012, p. 22).
The judiciary commands its own justification in connection with the article 58-2 (b)
of the Constitution. Muhammad Khan Achakzia's petition is worth mentioning in this
connection. He registered a case against the article 58-2 (b) of the Constitution that had
empowered the President of Pakistan to dissolve Assemblies. The office of the president had
abused its powers at least four times in less than a decade in 1990s. However, the Supreme
Court of Pakistan validated the amendment as a legal portion of the Constitution and put its
responsibility on the parliament which failed to repel it. The Supreme Court of Pakistan had
of the view that the dormant behavior of the parliament in this connection was equal to the
ratification of the amendment (PLD1997SC, p. 426).
1.2.3.2. Crisis and Systemic Factors: Analyzing Military Elites
Roy Macridis and Steven Burg have given the following factors with respect to the
occurrence of a military coup. First and foremost, if there is a crisis situation in the state, or
there may be conflicts over resources, or there may be a civil war, civil disobedience, or the
have-not class thinks the have-class to be at advantage. In such possible situations, the
military intervenes in the political affairs. Second, winning a war or putting down an uprising
brings laurels to the triumphant army from the public. As a result, it is offered to assume the
political powers of the state. Last but not least, the army intervenes when there is revolution
being appeared in the state (Roy Macridisand ,Steven Burg, 1991, pp. 133-34).
55
Nordlinger has categorized the intervention of the military in the civilian affairs as
moderators,guardians, and rulers. In the first and foremost type, the miliatry behaves as a
balancer to maintain cordial relations among the civilians representing their respective public
domains. In such status, it possesses a veto-type role to defuse the conflict in the civilian
domains. However, in the second type,it holds powers and dismisses the civilian government.
It stays in power for more or two years. In the third type,it intervenes in the civilian sphere
and controls the state (Nordlinger, , pp. 21-27).
Roy Macridis and Steven Burg also add another type to the already known types of
military interventions. It is known as bureaucratic authoritarianism. In such type of
intervention, the army holds powers and dominates the ruling coalition. But however, it
shares powers with civilian bureaucrats and technocrats (Roy Macridisand ,Steven Burg,
1991, p. 139).
Pakistan was the logical end of the endeavor of the Muslims stretched over years
against the British Raj. Since its emergence, the Quaid-e-Azam, the founder of Pakistan,
wanted Pakistan a polity based on democracy. The political elites after his death ignored his
aspiration and got involved in trivial matters and conflicts. In addition to this, they even
involved military in the active politics out of personal interests. This involvement was the
harbinger of the military coups in the state. As a result, the state had to bear the brunt of the
military coups. In sequels, General Ayub Khan imposed the first military coup in 1958,
General Yahya Khan in 1969 and General Zia ul-Haq in 1977. Similarly, General Pervez
Musharraf imposed military coup in 1999. In the light of the past, it is questioned why
military intervention is so often repeated in Pakistan. Two thoughts are held in this regard.
One is concerned with the failure of the political leaders/ elite who fail to let democracy to
take roots in the polity. The other is concerned with the dominant role of the USA in the
politics of the state. The USA makes alliance with the military in order to have her strategic
56
objectives fulfilled. The military regimes have been in alliance with her during General Ayub
Khan‟s regime, during General Zia ul-Haq‟s regime, and during General Pervez Musharraf‟s
regime. The Cold War politics, the Soviet‟s invasion of Afghanistan (1979), and the War on
Terror are the factors that support the alliance (Pineapple, 2010)
Historically, the degeneration of the political process precedes the military influence
in the body politic of the state. This provided the military with an opportunity to become part
and parcel of the politics. General Ayub enforced martial law in 1958. It was legitimatized
when he promulgated 1962 Constitution and took some politicians in his cabinet. In the same
way, General Zia‟s rule was accepted and allowed to rule infinitely after the introduction of
the rubber-stamp parliament in 1985. The politicians, who had been the beneficiaries,
extended their full support. As a result, he amended the 1973 Constitution and obtained
powers under 58-2(b) in order to dismiss the Assemblies (Rizvi H. A., 1998, p. 97). This
collaboration of the political elites with the army stands witness to how military elites had
been supported by the political elites and legitimatized their rule for personal interests at the
cost of the democracy.
The political elites appoint the COAS on the basis of personal likes and dislikes in
Pakistan. They do so out of thinking that this would provide strength to their respective rule.
The appointment of the COAS was carried out on the basis of personal likes and dislikes after
General Gracy‟s retirement. He was likely to be replaced by Major General Iftikhar Khan.
However, Major General Iftikhar Khan died along with Brigadier Sher Khan in helicopter
crash. With their deaths, the appointment of the COAS had been made on the basis of
personal likes and dislikes in the days to come. It is important to note that the COAS is an
officer of 21 grades and he needs to be appointed like all other civil servants in line with civil
service rules. However, the appointment of the COAS is the discretion of the Prime Minister
57
of Pakistan. Therefore, Prime Minister‟s likes and dislikes in the appointment hold a lot of
importance.
General Ayub Khan was made COAS on the recommendation of Iskander Mirza
superseding Major General Akbar Khan and Major General N.A.M Raza. General Ayub
Khan, later on, imposed martial law and relinquished Iskander Mirza of powers. That was
how political process in the state came to standstill on account of underestimating the
principles of the law. General Ayub Khan made General Yakhya Khan the COAS
superseding General Altaf Qadir and General Bakhtiyar Rana. Following the tradition, ZA
Bhutto made General Zia COAS superseding seven senior Generals. It was the same Zia who
relinquished him of powers and imposed martial law. In the same way, Nawaz Sharif made
General Pervez Musharraf COAS superseding General Ali Quli Khan and Khalid Nawaz.
However, his own nominated COAS relinquished him of powers and imposed martial law
(Ahmed S. S., 2016). This all is tantamount to that how political elites favour their friends on
account of personal gains. This opportunity provides them a way to create crisis of
democracy.
Democracy is the rule of the people by the representatives. The people put their trust
in their representatives through general elections. Pakistan and India obtained their respective
independence from the British in 1947and adopted the Government of India Act (1935) as a
system of government and also obtained the same civil, military, and legal legacies. Despite
such a similar configuration, democracy never remained stable in Pakistan. The power
alternated between civil and military in the state. In such circumstances, the military stood
noticeable. It ruled the state for almost 32 years (Dr.Noorul-Haq, 2010, pp. 1-2).
The Majlas Amal started a country-wide movement against Ahmadis in March 1953.
The Majlas Amal consisted of religious political parties. The JI, the MA, the JUI, the JUP,
58
and many other religious parties were in the alliance. It started its protest in Karachi and in
Lahore and demanded of the authority to declare Ahmadis as non-muslims. Demonstrations
and run-and-strike became the order of the day. The Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin
sent the minister of defense Iskander Mirza to see the situation prevailed in Lahore. He
consulted the Commander of the 10th
Division General Azam Khan and proposed to the
government martial law to be imposed immediately in the city. The martial law was imposed
out of help to the civilian government in the crisis. However, this short-lived intervention
provided the military with an opportunity to interfere in the political affairs of the state in the
future (Khan J. , 2002, p. 46).
General Zia ul-Haq enforced martial law on 5th
July 1977. He employed religion as an
instrument to lengthen his rule. He lifted martial law in 1985 and held elections on non-party
base in the state. As a result, a rubber- stamp parliament came into existence. The parliament
was not free to state clearly and firmly its sovereignty. Consequently, the period of controlled
democracy started in the state. Muhammad Khan Junejo took the oath of the Prime Minister
as well as of the President of the Official Muslim League. General Zia ul-Haq was contented
with such sort of developments. He thought that his rule was now invincible both in civil and
military spheres. However, the differences emerged between the two as soon as the Prime
Minister started to assert his own authority.
General Zia ul-Haq made Major General Agha Naik Muhammad as the Director of
IB. This was the first time that the Head of a civilian intelligence institution was a serving
military officer. Muhammad Khan Junejo considered this move of the President as a military
watch on the Prime Minister. As a result, he removed Agha Naik Muhammad after returning
from the USA in 1986. Similarly, he also removed the Secretary of the Information Ministry
Lt. General Mujeeb-ur-Rahman. Lt. General Mujeeb-ur-Rahman was the crony and blue eyed
of General Zia ul-Haq. These moves of the Prime Minister disgusted General Zia ul-Haq.
59
Besides, differences also emerged between the two over the matter of relations with India.
General Zia ul-Haq wanted the revival of relations with India. He had proclaimed this revival
during his visit to India in December 1985. However, Muhammad Khan Junejo was against
such revival. He passed a resolution on the Kashmir issue by the parliament. This destroyed
all wishes and aspirations of the revival of relations.
Towards the end of 1986, General Zia ul-Haq had been disgusted with Muhammad
Khan Junejo and his secret alliance with Benazir Bhutto. Besides, General Zia ul-Haq had of
the view that Mr. Junejo had damaged his credibility as the COAS through interruption in his
decision-making. Junejo also wanted to end General Zia ul-Haq‟s influence on Foreign
Ministry. Consequently, he instructed the foreign affairs ministry and ordered that any file
should not be sent to the President. However, the President did not want to lose his control
over the ministry as the Afghan War was about to enter into the decisive phase (Saleem A. ,
1998, pp. 324-327).
The Prime Minister Junejo rejected the application of the extensions in the tenures of
the COAS General Arif and the COJSC General Rahimuddin despite the aspirations of the
President. Besides, Junejo and the parliament had adopted the behaviour of criticism with
regard to the military. In addition to, the misunderstanding between the Prime Minister and
the President increased when the former made a call to convene All Parties Conference. This
move of the Prime Minister was thought as an exhibition of strength (Mehmood, 1999, p.
305). However, the differences between General Zia ul-Haq and the Prime Minister chiefly
cropped up over the latter‟s emphasis upon investigation into the Ojhri Camp incident.
Besides, the Prime Minister‟s assent to Geneva Accord also disgusted General Zia ul-Haq
(Kamran, 2008, p. 37).
60
Muhammad Khan Junejo made a mistake as he started considering himself as the
Prime Minister in the true sense. However, he must have realized that he was only a figure
and the real powers were enjoyed by the President. He protested on the defense budget, and
made a statement that he would put the Generals again into the Suzuki Cars (Haqani, 1988).
In addition to, the USA had ill-feelings against Muhammad Khan Junejo. The
American policy-makers had the belief that Junejo‟s government failed to control the drug-
trafficking. Besides, the USA and the World Bank criticized the worsening financial crisis of
Pakistan. Moreover, the President and the Prime Minister also had difference on Afghanistan
Crisis. The USA and the military of Pakistan had complete harmony over the situation. In
sequel, Muhammad Khan Junejo‟s government was dismissed in the light of Article 58-2(b)
of the Constitution on his arrival from Philippine and South Korea where he presented his
opinions in the Conference on „Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy‟. General Zia ul-
Haq made against him a charge sheet of widespread corruption, worsening law and order
situation, and failure in the implementation of Sharia (Saleem A. , 1998, p. 330).
This all stand witness to the rivalries for powers between political and apolitical
leadership. Whosoever either the President or the Prime Minister could held responsible for
the mistakes, but it is safe to say that it was despising the trust of the mass who had obtained
so-called democracy at the cost of 8th
amendment in December 1985. This amendment
legalized everything that had been committed during 1977-1985. This legalization deals with
the referendum and martial law courts. The amendment granted General Zia ul-Haq powers
that he had not possessed under martial law. This was a sorrow aspect that the representatives
of the masses had passed the amendment in unison in the National Assembly. This was a
worse example of undemocratic legislation in the garb of democracy (Qureshi, 1998, p. 103).
After the death of General Zia due to air crash, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif governed
61
alternatively but neither of them fulfilled their respective term in office. In the sequel,
democracy was ended again in military coup on 12th
Oct, 1999 (http://www.bbc.co.uk).
The military had an important role in the post-1988 politics in Pakistan. It had
dominant influence on foreign policy as well as in security concerns. The political stability
was depended upon the relations among the stakeholders in the polity and vice versa. The
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif obtained an important position in 1997. He dispensed the
president of the powers of dismissing the prime minister and the assemblies. However, he put
his position at stake on account of political infighting with the army. The civilian leadership
often resented the dominance of the army. However, the army did not allow the political
elites to interfere as it considered such interference tantamount to indiscipline that could harm
the organization. In addition to that, it actively performed its role in resolving the deadlocks
between the President and the Prime Minister in 1990s. It extended its support to the
President against the Prime Minister in August 1990 and April 1993 respectively. However, it
extended its support to the Prime Minister in his conflict with the President and the Judiciary
in October 1997. (Rizvi H. A., 1998, pp. 98-99). This is an apropos to the idea that elites join
hands with one against the other to rival in the struggle for power.
1.2.3.3. Crisis and Systemic Factors: Analyzing Bureaucracy
Since creation, the state had been ruled by civil-military bureaucracy for almost 45
years. This prolong series of the civil-military rule starts with Ghulam Muhammad (1951-
1955), Iskander Mirza (1955-1958), General Ayub Khan (1958-1969), General Agha
Muhammad Yahya Khan (1969-1971), General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988),
Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988-1993), and ends with General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008).
They had of the opinion that the politicians are incapable to rule the state and thought
themselves suitable to govern the country with their own intentions and whims. Besides, the
62
civil-military bureaucracy was of the view that politicians were responsible for the movement
against the Ahmadis in the Punjab in 1953 as they failed to control the situation. As a result,
the Ahmadis and their properties were attacked in Lahore. The Provincial Secretary ordered
the Station Commander of 10th
Division General Azam Khan to enforce martial law in order
to save Lahore from this religious madness (Dr.Noorul-Haq, 2010, pp. 10-11).
This enforcement of martial law foreshadowed martial laws that had been enforced in
the state. In short, since creation, Pakistan had been under civil-military bureaucracy and used
political elites as a means to ensure its own way to power. The inefficiencies of the
politicians were significant keeping in view the fact that the state had to replace seven Prime
Ministers in just short span of seven years (1951-1958). In the same way, the period (1988-
1999) had been an unpleasant mark on the political history of the state. The political
leadership/elites failed miserably on account of corruption, incapability, and worst law and
order situation in the period etc. As a result, the state was ruled covertly by civil-military
bureaucracy in the presence of weak political parties and inefficient political leadership/elites.
The civil-military bureaucracy succeeded in removing the elected governments in their
respective tenures in the presence of such a situation (Dr.Noorul-Haq, 2010, p. 11). In brief,
the role of bureaucracy, since creation, had been of conspiracy, of malpractices, of nepotism,
of personal gains, and of rivalry for power.
1.2.3.4. Crisis of Democracy, and Systemic Factors: Analyzing Governance
Pakistan is a multi-ethnic state. The groups consist of the Punjabi, the Bengali, the
Sindi, the Pakhtoon, the Balochi, and the Muhajir. The founders of the state did not pay any
heed to acknowledge the varied social structure of the newly created polity. They were of the
belief that Islam does not recognize any ethnic segregation. On this basis, the APML did not
pay any thought to the diverse ethnic structure of the polity. And on account of this
63
unawareness, the leaders of the APML faced immediately with the increasing ethnic divide
among the Panjabi, and the Bengali, the Sindi, and the Pakhtoon.
This ethnic segregation gave way to the civil and military bureaucracy to take mileage
of the affairs in the coming years and led the affairs of the state. However, this status of civil-
military bureaucracy as a matter of fact was the dominance of the Punjabi and commanded
majority in the bureaucracy (Kukreja, 2007, p. 12). Consequently, this position of the Punjabi
bore disappointment among the Bengalis. As a result, this disappointment gave the Bengali
Separation Movement with men and materials.
Karachi bore the brunt of ethnic violence. The Muhajir (urdu-speaking immigrants
from India) started a violent struggle against the increasing dominance of the Sindhi and of
the Punjabis in 1960s. This put the identity of the local people on danger. They had of the
belief that the government was involved in this affairs and supporting the Muhajir. As a
result, they rose in agitation against General Ayub Khan. Besides, the Muhajir had thoughts
that they had been discriminated when the capital was shifted to Islamabad. They also
resented the introduction of quota system in Sind in ZA Bhutto‟s regime. In the sequel, they
launched their own political party in the name of the MQM in 1985 and resolved to fight for
their own rights. As a result, violent conflicts started in 1992 when they struggled to take the
control of the city. In such a situation, the military was involved to deal with the mischief-
makers. As a result, 1500 people died in the operation (Brown, 2007).
The state of Pakistan suffered from difficult situation when the religious and secularist
tendencies fought each other. Historically, Pakistan was not a theocratic state. The founders
thought her a state of democracy and masses would live there free in the light of democracy
and its ideals. Besides, no one would be favored on the basis of religion, creed, and caste
(Dr.Noorul-Haq, 2010, p. 6). The Quaid-e-Azam‟s first speech to the First Legislative and
64
Constituent Assembly supports the aforesaid view. The Father of the Nation had the opinion,
„religion or caste has nothing to do with the business of the state‟ (Quaid-e-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor General of Pakistan (1947-1948)).
The unparalleled increase of sectarianism put the two communities Shia and Sunni
into violent conflict and killed one another in the name of religion in 1979-1999. The SSP
(1984), the TJP (1979), and the SM (1991) spearheaded this violence since 1979. These
organizations had connections with the Middle East and obtained big finance for their so-
called religious holy conflict. This sectarianism drew its aspiration from the Iranian
Revolution (1979). In the sequel, Saudi Arabia became apprehensive of the implications and
launched her efforts to obstruct its path. As a result, she gave air to the Sunni and Shia
violence across the Muslim world. Pakistan also received the impact of Saudi efforts. The
Iranian Revolution encouraged the Shia in Pakistan and they sought to bring the Iranian type
revolution in Pakistan. As a result, the TJP was founded and launched its resistance against
General Zia ul-Haq. The TJP had thoughts General Zia ul-Haq supported the Shah of Iran in
the period (1978-1979). Besides, he had alliance with the USA in the Afghan War (1979).
In addition to, the TJP was of the belief that General Zia ul-Haq‟s policies of
Islamization were contravene to the Shia-Islam. In the sequel, this instigation paved the way
for the rise of Khomeini-type-leader in the person of Arif Husaini. This situation put the state
on danger. In the sequel, the Sunnis and their organizations had been provided with funds by
General Zia ul-Haq‟s regime. The intelligence agencies of the state played a vital role and
funded the religious schools in the provinces of the Punjab, NWFP, and Balochistan in order
to obstruct the way of Iranian support. Besides, sectarianism also increased in the context of
the Afghan War (1979). The rise of Taliban overtly challenged the Shia community. The
Taliban belonged to Sunni sect. As a result, violent sectarian conflicts appeared took place in
1980s and put the state on the danger of instability (R.Nasr, 2000, pp. 171-179). This
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situation was the result of the mismanagement of leadership both political and apolitical who
was engaged in their rivalries for powers and paid no attention seriously to the crisis that
badly affected governance and created the crisis of democracy.
1.2.3.5. Crisis of Democracy, and Systemic Factors: Analyzing Political
Parties
A democratic system functions effectively in the presence of democratic, disciplined,
and organized political parties. However, political parties stand for ill-organization and ill-
disciplined in the state (Khan H. , 2001, p. 852). Moreover, the political parties are the means
that keep democracy away from any type of intervention (Geoffrey Brennan and Alan
Hamlin, 2000, p. 185). Pakistan possesses vulnerable and ill-organized culture of political
parties since achieving independence. The AIML, that led the freedom movement, failed to
prove itself successful after independence, and suffered from fragmentation. This could be
attributed to the ill-disciplined and ill-organization of the ML. In addition to, the leaders of
the PML belonged to feudal and wealthy businessmen families. Consequently, they were
authoritarian in their attitudes and had no belief in democracy and its ideals. In the sequel, the
state was governed without constitution for nine years. This stands for their inefficiencies and
capabilities.
The politics of confrontation was adopted by the so-called political parties in the years
to come. This type of politics proved a means to dissolve elected governments before the
expiry of their constitutional term. Besides, the first general elections were delayed till 1970
in the state. As a matter of fact, the elections should have been held in 1951 as it were held
previously in 1946. This delay was the logical end of the military-bureaucratic hegemony,
incompetent politicians/political elites, and ill-organized political parties. However, the
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opposition political parties proclaimed the second general elections that were held on 7th
March 1977 as rigged and unjust (Dr.Noorul-Haq, 2010, p. 9).
Moreover, the role of the ML had not been admirable since achieving independence.
It failed to promote true democratic culture in the state. In addition to, it made alliance with
the military and other non-democratic forces in order to have power. Ghulam Muhammad,
Iskander Mirza, General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan, General Zia ul-Haq and Ghulam
Ishaq Khan used the different factions of the ML in order to fulfill their own purposes in their
respective regimes (Malik I. H., 1997, p. 31).
The ML that spearheaded the independence movement was deficient in both
organization and ability. A large number of its leaders belonged to feudal class who were
power hungry. They made no efforts to make it a viable and dynamic organization. The other
political parties also have the same fate. They suffered from internal feuds, conflicts, ill-
discipline, and no vision. Consequently, they failed to replace the ML in order to play viable
role to match the true definition of a political party i.e. interest aggregation, and articulation.
As a result, the politicians sought help from the civil bureaucracy and the military elites in the
political affair of the state. They failed to develop a consensus on political issues in order to
deal with problems.
The absence of this political acumen gave way to rivalries among the competing
political rivals for their competing interests. Consequently, the open violation of the
constitutional norms becomes a plaything and democracy failed to develop on account of
their undemocratic attitude and whims. In addition to, the politicians also amended the
constitutions for their vested interests using their parliamentary majority and underestimated
the necessity of consensus-building. Moreover, the political parties and their alliances that
had enjoyed powers since 1950 intermittently were either made by civil-military
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establishment or had their blessings. The formation of coalition in the form of the Republican
Party in 1956 in pre-1958 period is enough proof for the role of military and bureaucracy in
the party politics. General Ayub Khan also formed and patronized a political party in the
name of the CML. It was the ruling party in 1962-63.
Gen Zia ul- Haq patronized a faction of the Muslim League when he restored so-
called civilian rule in the state in 1985. The political parties made coalitions and alliances
specifically out of their personal interests. Their alliances or coalitions also broke out of their
personal interests. Besides, there was an internal disharmony among the members of a
coalesced political party which also undermined the alliance. Moreover, political parties as
movement were more successful as they had short term goals i.e. seeking the dismissal of the
government. However, they are not successful as a political party as it needs viable
organization, and long-term goals (Rizvi H. A., pp. 7-9).
Systemic factors have been conceptualized in the aforementioned paragraphs.
However, in this study, systemic factors were the factors that had influenced the political
system of Pakistan and played their role in deepening the crisis of democracy in the period.
The factors were in fact an integrated group of elites both political and apolitical who played
a decisive role and joined hands with the leader on the basis of similar interests against the
common rival. This group had remained a constant factor in the period. It was heterogeneous
in the making consisting of political-religious-civil-military-judicial elites.
1.2.3.6. Crisis, Leadership, Systemic Factors, and Elections:
In the state, free and fair elections are virtually become impossibility. Since the
general elections of 1970, elections were described with high, moderate, and low level of
rigging. The analyses of the elections of 1970, 1977, 1985 and 1988, bring forth that these
elections were not free from rigging. Rigging in elections is the violation of elections laws as
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propounded in the constitution of the state and the engagement in such activities that are
against the principles of the elections. Such violation by activities is known as pre-poll
rigging, polling-day rigging, and post-poll rigging.
Pre-poll rigging is the employment of unlawful means and publically speak ill of the
contender during elections canvassing before poll-day in order to have favour of the mass.
The unlawful tactics may consist of partial interim setup, the inclination of the Election
Commission towards a contender, the unlawful employment of media in favour of one of the
contenders, and the employment of governmental funds in favor of blue-eyed contenders. In
the same way, polling-day rigging deals with manhandling with ballot boxes, casting votes of
the other person, and frequently casted votes by a single person, pressurizing or manhandling
the voters of the competitor, and not to allow cast their votes, and to public tempered results.
Similarly, the post-polling rigging is concerned with the absence of the constitutional role of
the interim government and attempts to deny the mandate of the majority and creating hurdles
in the formation of the government. All these help decide high, moderate and low level of
rigging during the various stages of the elections.
Rigging was practiced in the general elections of 1970. The elections conductors
wanted to have a hung parliament in order to play their heinous role. In the same way,
polling-day rigging was also practiced. However, it was not of the mark that could affect the
results of the elections. However, the post-polling rigging of the elections of 1970 was
marked high. The involvement of the state, the intelligence agencies and the armed forces had
been employed without any constraint in order to have favourable results of the elections.
In the same way, rigging was not unknown in the elections of 1977. The involvement
of the state was indiscriminate. The masses were threatened before and after the elections.
The rules of the elections were despised in favour of the contenders. As a result, the results of
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the elections were known as highly rigged. This gave birth to popular uprising against the
results of the elections. This uprising provided the military with the way to impose martial
law.
The elections of 1985 were held non-partisan basis and free and independent
environment was not provided to the contenders. The PPP was prevented of the elections
through a strategy made by the government with the help of the establishment and
intelligence agencies. Consequently, the pre-poll rigging gave to the government an
environment free from any opposition on the polling day. The polling-day rigging had no
implications for the results of the elections as there was no opposition in their way. Besides,
the post-poll rigging was also not present in the elections of 1985 as the contenders and the
independents were the men of the government. As a result, the PML with the assistance of
General Zia ul-Haq established government in the center and Muhammad Khan Junejo was
nominated as the Prime Minister. Besides, Syed Fakhar Immam was made the Speaker of the
National Assembly. He belonged to the Independent Group. However, he was the old protégé
of General Zia ul-Haq.
The alliance between the PML and the religious parties was made in the name of the
IJI in order to prevent the PPP of power in the elections of 1988 with the strong help of the
intelligence agencies. Poll-day rigging was observed low and had no implications for the
result of the elections. However, post-poll rigging was marked as high. Confrontation
between the government of the Punjab and the government of Benazir Bhutto in the centre
was given air by the establishment (Gilani, 2008, pp. 9-25). In the given paragraphs, it has
been highlighted how power elites work against one another to have powers by hook or by
crook and observe no care for democracy.
2.3. Theoretical Framework:
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1.3.1: Powers Theories
We, human beings, are social animals. As a social actor, we do make certain decisions
that affect our social life. More importantly, human beings have the power to make certain
decisions regarding their particular life problem. However, some decisions affect us on large
basis. To change or challenge such powers are beyond our capacity. This makes the
difference and divides the society into two broad categories the ruler and the ruled. It then
becomes the domain of political sociology which attempts to unfold the behaviors of social
forces. It is related with such questions: who governs the larger part of the society, who are
they, what are their characteristic and all that. Political sociologists have defined power as
relationship among human beings.
Max Weber, Robert A. Dahl, C. Wright Mills among others thought power as a way
to influence or compel other to do something. It is used in both negative and positive
connotation that is why one can see phrases like power hungry, out of power etc in political
discourse. However, whatever be the motif, power is too much necessary for social
interaction, and should serve the interest of society not of a particular group. Power is used in
various domains of life, but political sociology especially deals with power being exercised at
institutional level, or at state level. Specifically, we are concerned with how power is
exercised, where it is concentrated, what the relation between the ruler and the ruled is and all
that. It is the base of an organization of any state.
In any organization, power is structured between the leader and the led. The core, who
possesses power, wields a lot of power as compared to those who are at the periphery. To just
understand, power is simply divided into four elements. Force is the capacity to compel
someone to do. Its base is the threat of punishment. Authority is the socially approved power.
Power, when socially acceptable, has legal sanction. So, it is understood as legitimate.
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Influence and dominance are the two other aspects of power. Power can be categorized on the
basis of who wields more and who wields less (Betty Dobratz, Linda Waldner, and Timothy
Buzzell, 2011, pp. 2-5). There are three models of power.
1.3.1.1. The Pluralist Model:
The three power models if compared the pluralist model is different from the other
two that focus on the verdict that power is, as a matter of fact, concentrated in the hand of
some few of the society. In the view of pluralist model, the power is not concentrated in few
hands rather it is decentralized and no group in a society is the final and only force to handle
the every other. Rather, it is the sum total of all the segments of the society that collectively
take decision about their issues. Sociologists Joan Huber and William Form are of the view
that the political system is pluralist “when a variety of groups or factions can influence policy
in such a way that no single or no small number of groups can control it or, conversely, when
all legitimate interest groups have an appreciable share of influence (Joan Huber, William
Form, 1973, p. 132).”
Simply pluralism gives chance to every group to have share in the policy making or
in the government. It is the sum total of the various groups divided either socially or
politically. So, pluralism is social as well as political. Many think pluralism is the best
suitable model in today‟s heterogeneous society mostly in industrialized society. There are
various groups like unions, ethnic based group, religion-based groups etc. in such societies.
However, it is not applicable to all society as compared to the other two models. It is the post-
industrial concept and made progressed as a result of the rapid industrialization and
urbanization. Sociologists like Max Webar, and Durkheim became apprehensive of the
development of industrialization and feared dominance of one class.
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De Tocqueville and Emile Durkheim also took notice of such developments. They are
afraid that powers might be in few hands and sought the centre of power based on plurality. If
there is no such arrangement, the liberty of the masses could be destroyed. To coup with such
circumstance, De Tocqueville thought democracy to be more compatible with post-industrial
revolution. He produced his voluminous book “Democracy in America” during his visit to the
USA. His findings almost came true and could be the forerunner of what took place in
Europe. He has of the opinion that in the absence of intermediaries to which he calls the
social aristocrats, the society is either engulfed by the tyranny of the tyrants or the tyranny of
the majority. In America, he says that this work is done by the presence of voluntary
organizations. Such organizations stand for economic, political, and religious interests. Its
benefits are two prongs. It is helpful to prevent the use of powers arbitrarily by the ruler and
also helps to keep the ruler accountable to the masses. He also studies the separation of
powers among the organs of the government and even among the centre and the units. He
appreciated this division as each safeguards their respective interests.
The pluralist model was thought to be reconcilable even in the modern-day politics
among varied interest groups/organizations. David Truman (1951), in his book,
“Governmental Process” appreciated the US political system and opined that it revolves
around the pluralist model. He underscored the membership of an organization to be the best
means to keep accountable the ruling class to the individuals or the individual member of the
organization. He singled out the interest group theory to be the main factor to understand the
pluralist point of view. His thoughts although related to the US political system and could not
be applied squarely on the other cases on account of diversity. However, it provides us with
the model which could be imitated making innovation for studying other cases. The presence
of interest groups are inevitable in today‟s complex society. The ruling class cannot
streamline the interests of different groups without them.
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Industrial Unions, Religious Association, Workers Unions, Educational Unions, and
many more are the interest groups that compel or influence the leader to pay attention to what
these groups propagate. Due to these interest groups, the public desires are met and political
leaders are guided and warned. It is the pluralist model that encompasses such organizations.
Despite the presence of such groups, the elites take decision without any heed to the
suggestions presented by them. This is the basic principle of elite power model. However,
with the emergence of so many groups representing various section of the society a single
group of elite is unable to rule the state without engaging those groups. These varied groups
make a structure known as pluralistic structure. They play their role in American democracy
as well as in any other political system based on democracy.
However, a question a curious mind may ask or loom over his mind that democracy in
which the citizens have so-called role through their representatives who come from the elite
class. Is such democracy justified at all? But it is also a fact that in today‟s complex and large
society the citizens cannot directly participate in democratic system and the leadership is
inevitable. As a result, a theory comes into being known as strategic elites, democratic elitism
or Polyarchy. This idea was propounded by Robert A. Dahl to describe the political system
having democratic ideal.
According to Robert A. Dahl, there is no perfect system of democracy existed
anywhere in the world even including America. He also accepts the role of the elites in the
US politics. They are not an integrated whole. In his view, competition among various elites
ensues for powers. For Example, Republic versus Democratic, Labour leader versus business
leader, so on and so forth. The power is divided among many leaders. It is the plurality of the
US system where power is concentrated not in one whole but rather in various spheres. The
problems among them are solved through bargaining, negotiation, and compromises. The
citizens are not the part of such arrangements, but they can make the elites (Leadership)
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accountable through periodic elections. He attempts to rationalize elites‟ role in democracy in
the light of Polyarchy.
Elite pluralists view the citizens powerful as they can check the leadership through
elections. They believe in the divisions of power that is why, in western democracy, elites are
divided whereas in Soviet Society elites are unified. Pluralists value voluntary associations
and think them to be the real vehicles in dispensation of individual interests both at national
and local level. However, many like Kariel (1961, p 182), Mills (1956), Ellul (1972, p 175),
Indiana Polic, Indiana, Gavel Sewedn and Olsen (1982) criticize the model on the basis that
the pluralist model of voluntary association is only a deception and does not represent the
interests of the general masses. Even Ellul calls to such associations as bureaucratic
authoritarianism. The pluralist claims that such organizations safeguard the individual‟s
interest in the presence of a despotic government. However, as a matter of fact, they
themselves became an association of few that engulf the individual‟s interests.
The organizations although claim to be the representatives of the general masses and
stand for their interests. However, in practice, they do not commit their service for the
benefits of the masses rather for their own group interests. The writers like Curtis (1971)
Hymn and Wright (1971), Verba and Nie (1972) and Parenti (1970) Scha Schneineir (1975 p
34,35),Mancur Olson (1971) came with their respective criticism making the point that class
biasness cannot be ignored with respect to voluntary association in the pluralist model. The
proponents of pluralist model believe in pluralism most in line with democracy. The elites
compete and struggle for political power via democratic means. However, the critic like
Davis is of the view that popular rule, the concept of democracy, is only the choice given to
the people during elections. Once the power elites are chosen, they, after that, have no role in
policy making and its implementation. The popular participation which is the essence of
democracy is no more than that. Similarly, Joseph Schumpeter also condemns democracy and
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says that it is a means in which the people are given the opportunity of accepting or rejecting
of who is going to rule (Betty Dobratz, Linda Waldner, and Timothy Buzzell, 2011, pp. 11-
22).
1.3.1.2. The Class Model:
The class model draws its inspiration from Karl Marx. It is, therefore, many call this
model as Marxist Model. According to the model, power is, as a matter of fact, concentrated
in the hands of the few in the society. Apparently, it seems distributed democratically in the
society. Property is the determining factor in the social relations. The model is related with
the study of political power to ascertain where this power is concentrated. In the thoughts of
Karl Marx, power is not resided in the state rather it is rested with those who enjoy a
dominant economic status. This dominance grants them dominance in the political
institutions and rules the state as they control the economic resources. Transformation in
economic resources brings changes in political system too. Economy has divided the society
in two classes that is the ruling and the ruled. Those, who had the sources of income, always
had purchased the labour of the ruled. It was this economy that determines the social status of
the masses.
Economy has been remained an important element in any system prevailed in a
society. The wind mill economy was based on agriculture and gave us feudal system. The
steam mill gave us industrial capitalists. So this factor of economy is the key stone in Marx‟s
historical materialism. In Marx‟s thoughts, there are two classes in a society. Those who own
the mode of production are capitalist class or Bourgeoisie and those, who do not own
anything except their labour in exchange of material needs. This capitalist class is the
dominant class playing actively in the affairs of the state and translates their economic
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potential into political party which dominates the political affairs. Today‟s executives are
actually the group of dominant classes of a society who own the means of production.
Political parties represent the interests of the class and hold political powers. They
dominate social relations and rule the rest. It is these dominant groups that consist of elites
who rule the state as well as other realms of the society. The ruling class not only dominates
the ruled materially but also ideologically. They shaped ideas and prevailed upon the
ideologies of the society which the ruled accept without any resistance. They are the material
force as well as the intellectual force. The ruled do not bother about their problems and have
no class consciousness. They accept what the ruling class handed them down and believe in
their ideas (Betty Dobratz, Linda Waldner, and Timothy Buzzell, 2011, pp. 11-22).The class
model is not being applied in this research as it does not specifically define the role of elites
in the political system.
1.3.1.3. The Elite Model:
The other power model is the elite model which theorizes that there are a certain
group of few people who rules the state and owns its resources. The members of such a group
are not accountable to the general public. It is different from the class model which is
embedded in property factor. This model has roots in the control of the organization. Besides,
the power of elites in any society is invincible as compared to the class model which
emphasizes on the expectation of the rule of the worker in distant future. They are the people
who do binding decisions for a society. Their composition may be different in a society, but
one thing is common. It is the ruling class. They retain their presence in power by whatever
means possible. They think that they are the best to maintain power. They control every
sector of the society from media to economic organizations to ideology, religion, and what
not. They legitimize their role by hook or by crook.
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There are two approaches to study elite formation or development. First and foremost,
leaders cannot be made. Those cannot be leaders who have great economic superiority rather
they become leader because of their intelligent and skills. This approach justified the power
elites due to their inborn superiority. The second approach emphasizes that elites‟ formation
is necessary in today‟s complex society. They are needed to rule an organization. They have
specialized skills and knowledge. Having such superiority on account of skills and
knowledge, they occupy prominent position in a society. The Modernists view elite model on
this approach. However, one thing is common between both the approaches. In any society,
there are those who rule and there are those who are ruled. The ruler class is a perpetual
feature.
The idea of elite rule goes back to Plato. However, Pareto and Mosca are credited
with who established the concept in 20th
century in modern social sciences. Their conclusions
are very much similar, but their reasoning is different. Pareto‟s definition of elite is very
much clear. It could be tested. It could define elite in any organization from politics to
business to any other field. He divides elites into two parts governing elites and non-
governing elites. It is the governing elite with which Pareto is concerned. He is of the view
that this group governs the masses via fraud or force or, on the whole, through cunningness.
The members of the group use any kind of tactics to achieve their purpose from physical to
the quality of the mind. Any tactic suits to them, they use. On the basis of this, he had divided
political leader as lions and foxes.
Pareto has also discussed the circulation of elites. Those who excel among masses
join elite class. This regeneration is necessary for the concept of elite to remain vibrant and
perpetual. He divided the society into elite and masses. He depends upon the psychological
factor for explaining the concept of elite whereas Mosca depends upon the sociological
factors. Pareto gives value to organizational structure, and personal features. Mosca is of the
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belief that the characteristic of organization makes elites the ruling class as compared to the
disorganized majority. He also divided elites into sub-elites. This class consists of
technocrats, managers, and civil servant. They have contacts with the masses and provide
leadership at the top. This class is the ruling class. He calls this class political class. This is
explained in the Figure in the appendix on page 266.
Robart Michels, in his seminal work “Political Parties” published in 1911, dilates
upon the rule of elite in the emergent structure or in modern organization. His theory is
grounded in the division of labour. It is not like Mosca‟s sociological concept of an
organization and Pareto‟s psychological factors. His theory is based on impartial bases and
most close to the scientific investigation in the words of Hughes. Besides, his theory is
mainly related with German political parties, however, it could be applied to any sort of
organization. He maintains that the German Social Democratic Party is ruled by few and is
tantamount to oligarchy. Any party, having such features, is oligarchic. He acknowledges
Mosca‟s and Pareto‟s argument that human being is naturally inclined to power. Therefore,
the second most important aim of any large organization is to seek power.
Robart Michels, further, elaborates that the greed for power dominates the leaders‟
tendencies to work for the betterment of the masses. This gives birth to the democratic
oligarchy. He substantiates that it is impossible for today large populace to solve their
problem personally. It is, therefore, they delegate power to some peoples who speak on their
behalf. As a result, a group of leadership comes into being who does decision for their own
benefits. To substantiate his argument, he often quotes “who says organization says
oligarchy”.
Robart Michels is of the view that this group divides the labour and the top position
among themselves when the organization gets enlarge. The leaders, who come from the
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ruling few, are like a doctor in whom the patient bestows his trust as he knows that the doctor
knows much about diseases and has specialization in it. In the same way, the general public
or more specifically in Robart Michels‟ words the political patient bestows his confidence in
the leaders for the solution of their problems. The general mass lacks expertise. The leaders
more appropriately elites hold high positions, and even replace one another and this is how
the leadership revolves in their own respective group. This results in the distance between the
leaders and the general masses. Once the elites grounded themselves in high position, they
devote their whole potential to maintain that position putting aside the masses, who had
selected them for their benefits. The sociologist like Merton calls this “goal displacement”
(Merton, 2003, p. 57).
The masses, that do not resist, are responsible for this dominance of the elites. They
are disorganized, possess no information. This is the main factor that makes them prey to the
elites‟ exploitation. There is another big challenge to the masses who fail to rise against the
elites as elites cooperate with each other and do not let any new entrant in their circle. The
elites are conservative. The revolutionaries, who resist against the tyrant, become like them
once capture power. They do not want to share power with others. Their interests transform
once they achieve power. They plan how to prolong their stay in power. They set aside the
masses‟ interest for which they struggle against the tyrant.
Max Weber presented his theory of bureaucracy. It is also known as legal rational
theory. The world organization have become so complex that it is impossible for anyone
group or political leader to take care of the organization alone. So a group of people who
possess special skills to deal day-to-day work are needed to be recruited. It is a kind of a
social machine which performs its function precisely and accurately as result of organized
human efforts. These groups of people, however, adopt an isolated way of life from the rest
of the people. This aspect, in the view of Max Weber, is alarming.
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Bureaucracy is inevitable in any society. It is necessary in the political organization to
dispose of day-to-day functions. It wields power on account of two reasons. First and
foremost, it possesses specialized knowledge. Secondly, it is capable of carrying out the
policies of the leaders. The political leader cannot do without the help of the bureaucracy.
They are attached with any kind of policy both at federal and provincial level. Moreover,
bureaucracy is important as the political leaders cannot implement laws without them. They
depend upon bureaucracy for their enforcement. They rule with the ruling class/elites as they
are involved in the policy making in every organization. They can effect changes in the
policy as power is concentrated in their hands. This made them inaccessible easily and
became the part and parcel of the power elites. Like political elites, bureaucratic elites also
far removed from the approach of the general masses that play no role in decision making and
control of the public servants i.e. bureaucratic and political elites.
Mosca‟s, Pareto‟s and Michel‟s elite theory are criticism on the democratic system.
However, some relate that their theories are the philosophical foundation of the fascist Italy
and aristocratic Germany. If anyone analyzes today‟s politics, the leaders are the public
representatives and perpetually involved in use of power for their personal benefits putting
aside the purpose for which they had been elected. Their main aim is to make their power
consolidate and pursue their personal benefits. Such types of charges are constantly leveled
against the politicians, public servant etc (Betty Dobratz, Linda Waldner, and Timothy
Buzzell, 2011, pp. 11-22).
1.3.2: Elite Theory of C. Wright Mills: Framework for Understanding the
Case of Pakistan
The Power Elite Theory of C. Wright Mills is applied to the politics of Pakistan to
substantiate theoretically the crisis of democracy the state suffered from during the period
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from 1988 to1999. On close examination, it is revealed that the case of Pakistan is, in fact,
surprisingly close to that described by C. Wright Mills. The power elite theory was
propounded in 1956 by a sociologist C. Wright Mills in his seminal work “The power Elite”
which he first published in 1956.The theory circumvents the politics of the USA and attempts
to analyze democracy in practice as well as in theory in the USA. The theory categories
power in the USA into three pillars. This consists of the military, the corporate, and the
political elites. It tells the readers that how the organization of power in America is
maintained. It attempts to remind one that in the past, local societies, throughout in the USA,
was dominated by businessman-cum-elites who had dominant sway in the Congress.
Moreover, most of the Congressman belonged either to the dominant families or had close
financial relations with them.
With the passage of time, powers became nationalized as well as inter-connected. As
a result, three prongs of power in the USA came to be known. First and foremost, the
business class became entrenched itself as the corporate sectors and became able to exercise
its influence over national politics or at national level. Similarly, the second prong of the
power elites is the military that also went through major transformation. The war lords, in the
words of C.Wright Mills, are no more an instrument for defense. It has become political. It
has ascended and now shares political power with politicians and occupies important
positions in the government. Thus, military ascendency also shares power and interests
mutually with those of corporate sector. Another important power organ of this power
organization is that of the political directorate. In the words of C.Wright Mills, local elites
were represented in the Congress in days back but now the Congress is in the grip of the most
powerful elites belonged to the higher circles and has relations with the corporate sector as
well as with military upper echelon.
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The elites are now in-charge and take executive decisions in the name of the United
State of America. They have deep understanding with intelligence agencies and with private
sectors. The top positions in the government hierarchy i.e. the defense secretary, the secretary
of the state go to the men who possess close ties with the military, and leading national
corporations. The political leaders enjoy permanent relations with the military and with
corporate sectors. So they make such an agenda or a policy that favours the interests of the
military and the corporation sector in the name of the nation. They all belong to the same
class. C.Wright Mills‟ categorization of power in America raises a question. Is America
democratic in practice as well as in theory? The question looms over the curious minds the
way C.Wright Mills envisions democracy in the United State of America.
The chief motif of C.Wright Mills is that the military elites in the USA are well
entrenched into relations with the political elites and economic elites. The personnel move
back and forth from the military world into the political and economic spheres. Big
corporations‟ interests are now connected with the military which helps fuel their economy.
In the same way, the members of the Congress enjoy amiable relations with the military and
no President could do without staffing the departments of state with them. This bonhomie
among the three prongs of power made democracy a doubtful concept in the USA. The
military elites had strong alliance with the political and economic elites. The politicians who
possess influence and control over executive and legislative branches of government are the
third part of the power organization. The politicians who climb the ladder have usually cozy
relations with the generals and CEOs of the corporate sector. The corporate sector sponsors
their political campaign. They, in response, facilitate them with favourable policies. As a
result, the USA has become antidemocratic as most of the decisions are made behind the
scene and only the chosen few from the three prongs of power organization are part and
parcel of such decisions.
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The power elite theory is presented actually in two parts. The first part is from
chapters (1-10) and is in the diagnostic language. C.Wright Mills has attempted to describe
the structure of power in the USA and is related with the description of higher circles, local
society, metropolitan, celebrities, the very rich, the chief executives, the corporate rich, the
war lords, the military ascendancy, and the political directorate. The second part is from
chapters (11-15) and is concerned with the criticism Mill has done on the democracy of the
USA that sounds biblical while taking the theory of the balance of power. It consists of power
elite, the mass society, the conservative society, and the higher immorality.
The power elite theory, if extrapolate, describes the case of Pakistan in the best
possible manner. Pakistan was and is in the grip of power elites. The power elite is an
umbrella concept and consists of all elites that Dr.Ghulam Qasim Marwat has identified in
the politics of Pakistan. In his opinion, they comprise of politicians, landlords, industrialists,
religious, judicial, civil, and military elites. Moreover, he is of the opinion that these groups
of elites coordinate and cooperate with each other in order to have power in their own hands.
These groups make up the governing class and the rest of the groups that is the middle and
lower middle class are ruled and exploited in the name of democracy. Moreover, he was of
the view that democracy possesses two aspects theoretical and practical. Theoretically, the
Constitution of Pakistan guarantees the rule of law and pledges basic rights to everyone.
However, practically, it is the elites who enjoy the blessings of democracy and most
importantly, these blessings are not meant for the general mass (Marwat).
By the term “elite” is meant those chosen few who occupy the top positions in any
organization. It is the reality of the society. They have important position on the basis of their
wealth and family status. Elites need to work for the benefits of those from whom they derive
their power. However, practically, it is the other way around. As a matter of fact, they work
for the benefits of their own class. It is against the spirit of democracy. In the opinion of
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Maurice Duverger, the definition of democracy “government of the people and by the
people” should be replaced with the definition “government of elites derived from the
people” (http://www.preservearticles.com/2014081433553/political-elites-definition-role-and-
criticism-of-elitism.html).
The term “political elite” is a plural concept comprised of politicians, civil, and
military elites. The group is also divided into sub-groups struggling against one another for
acquiring power. In addition to, they also share power and possess organizational capacities
to have the reins of the state (Micheal Albertus and Victor Menaldo, 2013, p. 4). Etzioni-
Halevy has defined the term elite as “a group of people who possess power and influence in
society because it controls authority and resources” (E.Etzioni-Halevy, 1993, p. 9).
Realistically speaking, the term and concept “Elite” has been employed from personal
angles to interpret the group in the political discourse of Pakistan. Interestingly enough,
those, who are the part and parcel of the group, by themselves, come with criticism against
their fellows. Actually, elites speak against the fellow elites on the public forum only to seek
public acceptance and attempt to ensure their way to gain power. The irony of the situation is
that leaders, who themselves belong to the elite class, talk about the problems of the middle
and lower middle classes, actually seek to acquire more and much more power and control of
the government. The judges oppose the elites over their public dealings, however, the history
stands witness to the fact that they have been remained the part of the power elites.
Loosely, the concept “Elite” is applied to the landed class who had been the part of
the ruling class in 1947. However, this application began to widen when the civil and military
bureaucracy joined the corridors of power and became assimilated or entrenched in the elite
class. The concept kept on widening when business and industrial magnates joined the
politics and shared power with their fellow members of the group. To simplify the concept
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even more and more, it is actually a group comprised of individuals who wield abundant
capacity to use political power for their own benefits to get large personal benefits. It is worth
mentioning that there are no elite-less society in the known history of mankind. The society
in Pakistan also consists of elites.
The concept “elite” is open-ended and transforms every now and then. It has grown
with the passage of time. Feudals have been remained the part of the group in Pakistan in the
beginning. Later other groups also joined the ever-evolving concept of elite. As a result,
entrants join and the old ones either withdraw or are sidelined. Such are the features of the
elites, who exploit and manipulate the state power and resources on continuous basis for
personal advantages. Consequently, a person, who was of middle class yesterday, may have
certain chance to become elite of the day. Altaf Hussain, Qaim Ali Shah, Hamayun Akhtar
Khan, and Ijaz ul-Haq are glaring examples to testify the evolution of the concept and are
part of the power elites of the state. Fazal Rahman, Qazi Hussain are the religious elites and
enjoy the status of power elites (Siddiqa., 2012).
Pakistan came into being in tiring circumstances with limited resources at its disposal.
In such kind of circumstances, the survival of the state was the immediate concern for the
leadership. Consequently, the leadership sought the help and assistance of the rich in the
society. This well-off section of the society consisted of landlords, industrial tycoons,
military top brass, and religious icons. Together they all belonged to political elites.
Besides, the military got the prime position among the governing elites (political
elites) on account of its role in security problems faced to the nascent state. Moreover, it also
became entrench in the political affairs as the politicians frequently locked in petty
controversies and sought its help to oust their opponents from power. During General Ayub
Khan‟s regime, certain families were allowed to grow financially giving birth to economic
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disparity in the society. The Punjab and the city of Karachi were made the economic hub at
the cost of the smaller provinces. As a result, wealth was concentrated into the hands of the
few of the society. Those few took advantage of the situation and provided the poor, who
were out of food and no land to take shelter, with urgent needs in exchange of votes. Thus,
power circulated among the elites taking the place of one another. This divided the society
into haves and haves-not in the polity of Pakistan.
The religious elites got entrench into the body politic as they opposed certain political
figures over their unislamic policies. During ZA Bhutto‟s regime, they got public support as
he failed to Islamize the society. In addition to, the jihad in Afghanistan also assured them
political support of the public as they spearheaded the jihad in Afghanistan. Keeping in view
their track record, they used the two means only to join the elite club. They, never and ever,
fought for those pledges for which they claimed to stand in the politics of the state. But they
aligned with the power elites in various points of time and enjoyed the status and power.
Against such a backdrop, all those who wield power or have links with power corridors are
together termed as power elites (Khawaja, 2011).
Since independence the politics of Pakistan has been dominated by a small section of
the society. Consequently, there is no transformational leadership in the state. The leadership
comes from the high complex consisting of feudals, civil and military bureaucracy. This class
enjoys all privileges and power. The feudal system since the British times has continued to
exist in the politics and exploit the masses for power. The feudals are abundantly present in
the politics of the state. Mazaris, Jatois, Mirs, Legharis.Tiwanas, Bhuttos, Nawab, Sardars,
Khan, and the like are the constant feature of the politics of the state. They all represent the
poor masses like haris, labourers, and the other poor section of the society. However,
democracy is a plaything in the hands of these feudals and they have used it for their personal
benefits time and again.
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In the history of Pakistan, neither politicians nor military has bothered about
democracy. Words or phrases, like piece of paper have been used for the august Constitution
of the state, and have become the part of political discourse in the polity. General Zia ul-Haq
used to assert about the importance of the Constitution nothing short of a piece of paper
which he could tear anytime if he liked. This is just one example to relate regarding the
undemocratic behaviour of the elites. Moreover, he got 8th
amendment passed from the so-
called parliament and damaged the spirit of the Constitution which proclaim the
parliamentary democracy in the state. The said amendment conferred upon him huge powers
as the president of the state. As a result of those powers, he dismissed Muhammad Khan
Junejo‟s government in 1988.
The Constitution of the state was mutilated at various points in time. Governor
General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly when he became
apprehensive about that it had sought to curtail his powers. Similarly, General Ayub Khan
imposed martial law and abrogated first ever Constitution of the state in 1956. This all stand
as proofs to the fact that the power elites both politicians and Generals amended the
Constitution best suited to their interests. However, interestingly enough, the judiciary, the
guardian of the Constitution, played to the tunes set by the power elites to further their vested
interests.
The polity of Pakistan is faced with the dismal picture of democracy since the day of
independence (1947). Certain elements most credibly were not interested in the development
of democracy and this absence of real constituency for democracy in the polity has been
remained a matter of concern. These elements are in league with the military-bureaucratic
elites in one way or the other. So, they do not feel any need for democracy. Historically, the
state has been remained under the military rules, however, some rather majority of
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opportunist civilian leadership have been remained the part and parcel of the military
governments. Although certain movements for democracy were launched against the military
during Gen. Ayub Khan‟s and Gen.Zia-ul-Haq‟s rule but majority among them collaborated
with them out of personal interests and helped prolong the military rule.
The civilian leadership, historically, despised democracy and has been a stimulating
as well as main factor that provided the military with the way to intervene in the civilian
affairs. The military have used the civilian regime as a proxy to influence the politics of the
polity. Muhammad Ali Bogra‟s regime in 1954 and Nawaz Sharif‟s in 90s are significant
examples. The military elites share main power with the political elites. It shares power with
civil bureaucracy and have developed a great deal of understanding how to rule together.
In parallel to this nexus, there are landlords, who are the parts of political elites. They
are an important reality in the politics. They have vast vote bank and use this majority to
share the spoils of power. No military government could afford to ignore them. They do have
seats in the National Assembly to represent their families. Such families from Punjab and
Sindh are abundantly found among the members of National Assembly. These elite groups
have symbiotic relations with the military bureaucracy and politicians. It is due to this nexus
that no movement for the restoration of democracy has so far succeeded. There are two
reasons to explain. First and foremost, there is lack of genuine leadership who believes in
democracy in true sense and strives to implant democracy in the state. Secondly, the
landlords are the main reservoir of the party politics. They do not believe in the spirit of
democracy. The state protects their interest, so they do not take care of democracy (Naseem,
2006, p. 756).
Elitist governments have dominated the polity since long and used their power for
their own advantages. As a result, the state suffered from the crisis of governance which
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shows that they have no ability to represent the masses in true faith. They have dominated the
policy making and only are interested in their own safety setting aside the national interests.
They have largely depended on executive orders rather than on constitutional or political
solutions. Their self-centred, narrow based and exploitative approach have brought a lot of
loss to the state and to the institutions in the most divided society like that of Pakistan (Malik
I. H., 1997, p. 4).
James Wynbrandt (2009) opines that politics in Pakistan could be identified with
personal power and gamesmanship at the cost of national interest. This opinion may be
helpful to look into the political affairs of the state. Pakistan made a smooth transition from
dictatorship to democracy in 1988 after the sudden death of Genera Zia ul-Haq on 17th
August, 1988 in an air crash. However, the period (1988-1999) was a dismal picture of
political crisis ridden with confrontational politics, politics for personal advantages rather
than for democratic consolidation. Each organ of the government was locked in conflict with
every other. There was no rule of law and the state had suffered from bad governance. As a
result, there was an unprecedented growth of sectarian and ethnic violence. All the civilian
governments in their respective terms failed to uphold the democratic ideals. On top of this,
the stakeholders of power suffered from deadlocks without any regard for democracy. As a
result, the elections were often engineered (Kazimi, 2009, pp. 238-241). The polity was
divided among warring parties and the parliament became a place of squabble rather of the
constructive work (Kazimi, 2009, p. 78).
General Zia ul-Haq‟s death in1988 ushered in a civilian rule in Pakistan. The political
elites struggled hard to establish their grip on power in the decade of the civilian. In the
decade, two rivals in the persons of Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif came to overwhelm
the political scene. Both represented their elite backgrounds. Benazir belonged to the feudal
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family and was the daughter of ZA Bhutto. Nawaz Sharif was from a business family and led
the PML (N). Nawaz Sharif‟s leadership was identified with the rising importance of the
industrial elites. Both ruled the state twice in turn but their governments were dismissed
before the completion of their respective terms in office. Their terms in office were marked
by political infighting, and lack of good governance (Wynbrandt, 2009, pp. 225-235).
In the period after Zia, the political scene in the politics of Pakistan could be
identified with political infighting among political elites in the provinces as well as in the
centre. In the corridors of power, each thought the other as a rival and struggled against each
other through fair or unfair means. The persons who dominated the corridors of power were
men of significance. Ghulam Ishaq Khan was a former civil servant. He became the President
as a result of the death of Zia in crash. He was pro-Zia and pro-army. Benazir Bhutto was the
daughter of ZA Bhutto and was the head of the PPP. Nawaz Sharif was the scion of the
business family and rivaled Benazir (Kap, 1991, p. 150) in the struggle for power.
Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari was elected as the President of Pakistan in November.
He belonged to the feudal family of the renowned Leghari tribe from Dera Ghazi Khan (the
Punjab). He was a civil servant by profession. In his first presidential address, he promised to
repeal the 8th amendment which was used to dismiss the government in the past. He also
extended his support to weaken the power of the religious courts and worked for the
promotion of the rights of women. However, he soon locked in controversies with the
government and the relations between Benazir and him deteriorated. Consequently, he went
back on his words and invoked the 8th amendment, which he earlier had pledged to revoke,
to dismiss Benazir‟s government in 1996 (Wynbrandt, 2009, pp. 241-42).
Malik Miraj Khalid was nominated as the caretaker Prime Minister. He was a
seasoned politician from Lahore. He joined politics as the member of Majlas-e-Ahrar. During
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Ayub Khan‟s era, he joined the CML. Later on, he joined Z.A Bhutto and was a founding
member of the PPP. In 1970, he became the member of the National assembly and assumed
the charge as the Federal Minister for Agriculture. He also served as the CM of the Punjab for
short time. He was elected as the Speaker of the National Assembly as a result of the
elections in 1988. He was also appointed as the rector of the Islamic university Islamabad. He
was made the Prime Minister of the interim government when Benazir Bhutto‟s government
was dismissed on November 5, 1996. However, he was a Prime Minister only in the name as
most of the powers were in the hands of the president.
Among the caretaker cabinet, person, like Dr.Zubair Khan was included as the
Minister for Commerce. He was the brother-in-law of the President Farooq Ahmed Khan
Leghari. Mumtaz Bhutto who was the cousin of Z.A Bhutto made the CM of Sindh. During
Malik Miraj Khalid interim setup government, CDNS was formed. This CDNS provided a
lasting role to the high brass of the army on the policy making. Moreover, it legitimatized the
role of the president and of the army in the affairs of the society (Kamran, 2008, pp. 161-62).
Rafiq Tarar belonged to Pir Kot, Punjab (Pakistan). He was not popularly known
personality before he was made the president of Pakistan on 31 December 199. His
nomination was even surprised to the cabinet members of the PML (N). It was known in the
circle that he had enjoyed the support of Abbaji, Main Muhammad Sharif. Main Muhammad
Sharif was the father and chief of the sharif family. He earned degree in law in 1951 from the
Lahore Law College and started career as a practicing lawyer at Gujranwala. He joined the
post of the chairman of the Punjab Labour Court in 1970. He was made the Chief Justice of
the Lahore High Court in 1989. Two years later, he was appointed as the Supreme Court
Judge. He had low profile as he was mainly concerned with criminal cases in 1997. He was
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made senator on the Ticket of the PML (N) in 1997 after retirement from the Apex Court
(Kamran, 2008, pp. 165-66).
Of the political infighting of the political elites, the army took advantage to the
maximum and became the master despite sitting in the back seat of the car. It allowed
political activities according to its own whims. General Ayub did not allow elections as it did
not suit him. General Yahya allowed as he knew that he can rig elections with support of civil
and military bureaucracy. In the same way, Zia rejected because it did not suit him. General
Baig in collaboration with President Ishaq allowed elections as they thought that it would not
affect army position in the politics of Pakistan (Kap, 1991, p. 150).
As a matter of fact, power in Pakistan is shared between the military and the civilian
leadership. In such type of power sharing, the military possesses great influence in the
matters of foreign, security as well as in important matters of domestic affairs. The civilian
leadership, on one hand, denies that they do not work under the direction of the army rather
want to work independently whereas, on the other hand, they cannot separate themselves
from the influence of the army as they need it for their political survival. The fact is that they
do not want to lose the perks and privileges which they enjoyed during the military rule. The
politicians support authoritarianism and undemocratic setups merely for personal gains. In
such kind of political orientation, the political governments fail to establish real democracy.
In the foregoing paragraphs, it has been revealed that the power elites who were
consisting of politicians, army, and bureaucrats have been engaged in rivalries for political
and economic gains. As a result of their rivalries, democracy suffered from crisis in the
period 1988-1999. In simple words, the period (1988-1999) was of conspiracy and counter-
conspiracy.
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1.4: Conclusion
The crisis of democracy observed in the years before 1988 is identified with the
rivalries among the leaders who out of personal ambitions struggled for power. Leadership
failed to show political acumen necessary for democratic culture. They had been involved in
politics out of personal interest and promoted their own personal whims. This provided the
civil-military bureaucracy with an opportunity to take mileage of the situation. Consequently,
the state remained in the sway of bureaucracy in the early days of its independence. This
vulnerable political culture made the state suffered from martial law in 1958 and
foreshadowed the rest in the years to come. 1969, 1977 are the cases in points. The Judiciary
also played its unpopular role during the crisis of democracy whenever the state of Pakistan
suffered from the crisis and was on the forefront to extend validation to the undemocratic
developments in the state. It was the result of the infighting of the leadership more
appropriately power elites who had engaged in rivalries for political gains putting democracy
and its ideals on their back. The state paid the price in the form of disintegration. In the same
way, democracy during 1971-1977 failed to take roots as the political elites were engaged in
political infighting for their personal interests and even some went so far in their rivalry to
invite the military to intervene. That was how democracy was derailed in 1977. The leaders
joined hands against the common rival and sought to take power. In short, the crises of
democracy observed during the years before 1988 were the result of the rivalries among the
political leadership and that rivalries produced a situation of which the civil-military
bureaucracy took advantage to the maximum with the supra-constitutional support of the
judiciary. In short, the power elite model best explains the case of Pakistan as it was in the
grip of power elites which is the complex of political, military, civil and judicial elites. The
compositions of cabinets and of parliament reveal that power was shared among power elites
in the period.
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Chapter: 2
Leadership, Systemic Factors, and Crisis: An Analysis of Benazir’s and
Nawaz Sharif’s First Term in Elite Theoretical Perspective
2.1: Introduction:
This chapter seeks to find out the pragmatics of the dismissals of Benazir‟s and
Nawaz Sharif‟s first term in office in 1990 and 1993 respectively and explores the political
crisis the political elites suffered from in the struggle for personal gains. It also attempts to
point out how systemic factors as an integrated group of elites played their role in deepening
the crisis among the political elites. The periods of Benazir‟s and Nawaz Sharif‟s first
government provide a sorrowful picture of the politics in the polity. Benazir Bhutto was
mandated with majority in the elections of 1988 and became able to form government in the
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center. However, her relations with the President, the military, and with the provinces
especially with the province of the Punjab deteriorated with the passage of time. This gave
birth to the politics of confrontation. As a result, the government of the PPP was dismissed
apparently amid charges of corruption, mismanagement, worst law and order situation in the
state.
Assemblies were dissolved. As a result, new elections were held under the
supervision of the interim government. Mian Nawaz Sharif got majority in the elections and
formed government in the center. However, differences soon cropped up between him and
the President. Consequently, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed his government on
19th
April 1993 amid charges of corruption and mismanagement apparently. Although, his
government was reinstated but the rivalry between the two halted the working relations. As a
result, both had to resign. On the whole, the chapter analyses that how political elites were
engaged in the struggle for power in collaboration with systemic factors. They even
engineered elections and the dismissals of the government of the day to achieve their
purpose.
2.2. The Public Face of the Crisis of Democracy:
The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the National Assembly on 6th
August
1990, under the Article 58-2(b) of the Constitution on charges in the following lines. The
Federal government was not running according to the provisions of the Constitution. It
became, therefore, necessary to seek fresh trust of the public. Moreover, the culture of horse
trading was rampant in the state and corruption was widespread in every institution of the
government. The PPP broke all records of corruption. Its corruption was of such volume that
the words corruption and politics became synonymous in Pakistan. On top of all these, the
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government failed to establish peace, law and order situation in the polity (Anjum, 2009, pp.
255-262). As a result, he had to dismiss the government of the PPP in 1990.
The president Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved Nawaz Sharif‟s government on charges
of corruption, mismanagement, and nepotism in April 1993. The charges were not different
from those on which Benazir Bhutto‟s government had been dissolved in 1990 (Raza, 1997,
p. 46).
The political scene in 1990s was not different from what we had experienced or heard
in the past. The procedure adopted was well thought out even words used by the men on the
helm to legalize their actions were the repetition of what we had heard before while leveling
charges against the targeted government of the day (Wynbrandt, 2009).
2.3. Pragmatics of the Crisis of Democracy: Rivalry, Benazir, and Ishaq
In the beginning, Benazir adopted a reconciliatory position and reconciled with the
President Ishaq and the army with regard to the domain of authority. She tried hard to
maintain good relations with the President and the army. However, the main tussle between
Benazir and the President Ishaq and his collaborators emerged on power. In the opinion of
Iqbal Akhund, Benazir could win this struggle for power if she had observed her principles
without caring for the support she would receive from the hung parliament (Akhund, 2001).
The democratic transition, in 1988, instilled optimism in the masses that democracy
would take roots in the polity. However, that optimism was certain to meet pessimism as the
political elites, in collaboration with systemic factors, soon engaged in controversies and
betrayed democracy for personal gains. In the elections held in 1988, the PPP got the
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majority and secured 93 seats of the National Assembly. The IJI, the brainchild of the
President and the army, obtained 54 seats. However, it was mandated with 108 out of 240
seats in the Punjab. As a result of the elections, the PPP formed government in the center.
Subsequently, the IJI formed government in the Punjab under Mian Nawaz Sharif. In
Balochistan, the JWP and the JUI (F) had the majority to form government in the province.
With such a diverse composition of the governments, the PPP had to rule in the polity in
1988. As a result, the confrontation among them became one among the other reasons that
provided a pretext to the President to dismiss the government of the PPP in less than two
years.
As a matter of fact, the reason behind the dismissal was the existence of the rivalry
between the PPP and the President and the army and their cronies. It is opined that the army
was not happy with the results of the elections of 1988 (Aziz, 2009, p. 97). It was, therefore,
the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan renowned as “the Machiavelli of Pakistan (Kukreja, 2007,
p. 242)” took two weeks in consultation with his friends before inviting the PPP to form the
government in the centre. It was agreed that the PPP would not interfere in the appointment
of the senior brass of the military as well as in the policy of Afghanistan. Benazir Bhutto
made this reveal in her several interviews. She said that she had been allowed forming the
government in 1988. However, her hands were tied. And when she attempted to use her
authority, her government was dismissed without any delay. As a matter of fact, this
compromise among the elites was not short of adjusting one another‟s interests within power
sharing paradigm. Otherwise, the majority of the PPP was enough qualification for making
government in the centre according to the majoritarian model of democracy of the polity.
In those unfortunate years, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was active to perform
his role in collaboration with the army and the opposition on the political scene of the polity.
Benazir Bhutto wanted to limit the role of the military in politics. As a result, she substituted
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General Hamid Gul (the Head of the ISI) with General Shams-ur-Rahman Kalu (Retired).
Besides this, she also sought to replace COJCS Admiral Iftikhar Sarohi. However, Ghulam
Ishaq Khan refused to extend his approval in those matters. Hence, the establishment
especially army realized that she was going back on her words that she had pledged with
Ghulam Ishaq Khan in November 1988.
During the period of General Zia ul-Haq and of Muhammad Khan Junejo, a majority
among the members of the IJI had acquired loans from the banks and also had got those loans
waived off. However, the government of the PPP sought to retrieve from them. This move of
the government of the PPP affected the beneficiaries who were the members of the IJI.
Moreover, Benazir wanted to start an operation against the business community for the
collection of tax. That community consisted of the influentials of the IJI. As a result, the IJI
made strenuous efforts to dismiss the government of the PPP. This move of the government
of the PPP against the members of the IJI antagonized the President and his associates
because the IJI was the brainchild of the President and of the army. Hence, the President
sought to teach a lesson to the PPP.
The Presidential powers of the dissolution of the Assemblies were going to be ended
possibly in March 1990. As a result, the Prime Minister would become the center of the
power. It was this power shift that made the President and the IJI worried. The IJI, therefore,
demanded of the President to dismiss the government of the PPP before it was too late
(Anjam, 2009, p. 244).
The differences occurred between Benazir and the President Ishaq over the former
recommendations regarding changes in the internal policies. However, the President always
rejected the proposed changes and used to advise her to get them pass from the parliament.
The President knew well that she could not do so as she had no majority there. Besides this,
the President Ishaq appointed General Asif Nawaz following the likely retirement of General
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Aslam Baig in August 1991. However, Benazir was least bothered in this matter (Aziz S. ,
2016).
For the sake of staying in power, Benazir Bhutto agreed to what she might otherwise
not to agree to. She agreed to extend her support to Ghulam Ishaq Khan‟s candidature for the
slot of the president of Pakistan. Besides, she pledged that she would not interfere with the
agreements made by the caretaker setup with IMF in ill-conceived way (Shafqat, 1998, p.
243).
Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the president of Pakistan on 12 December 1988.
However, he never reconciled with Benazir Bhutto‟s government and played his role as a
neutral man as was expected of him. He embroiled himself in shady deals with the opposition
political parties in order to how to make weak Benazir Bhutto‟s government (Maluka, 1995).
When Benazir Bhutto was dismissed, a caretaker government was formed under
Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. He belonged to the province of Sind. He had left the PPP and was a
rival. He had founded his own party in the name of the NPP. This maneuver of the President
Ishaq Khan was only to break the votes of the PPP (Aziz, 2009, p. 105). Moreover, Ghulam
Mustafa Jatoi‟s nomination as the caretaker Prime Minister was the reflection of the President
Ishaq Khan‟s rivalry toward the PPP. He also headed the investigation team which was
investigating corruption and maladministration charges against the members of the
government and Benazir (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 234).
2.4. Benazir, the Opposition and the Crisis of Democracy:
It was opined if she did not engage herself in confrontations with the provincial
governments and allowed them to rule and set aside the obsession to strengthen the position
of the PPP in the rest of the provinces of the state, she could assert her authority as the head
of the government beyond any doubt. However, their infighting for power put democracy at
stake and provided others with the space to take mileage of the crisis. It is a common held
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thought that elite groups worldwide with few exceptions suffer from worries when their
respective states are beset with the political instability at random basis. The case of the polity
of Pakistan, however, is much different from the cases around the world. The elite groups in
Pakistan are less imaginative about the political instability. Once they pitch against one
another in political infighting, they take this to the finish (Waseem, 2017).
The PML fielded its electoral candidates which were 80% of the total candidates of
the IJI. As a matter of fact, the alliance consisted of nine parties. It was just the successor of
the PNA at least in the number of political parties. The PNA was an alliance made against ZA
Bhutto in 1970s. It also consisted of nine parties. Six political parties were Islamists in the
alliance of IJI. In addition to the Jamaat-e-Islami and a faction of Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI),
these were Jamiat-e-Mashaikh (Society of Spiritual Leaders), Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith (Society
of the Followers of the Prophet‟s Tradition), Nizam-e-Mustafa Group (Group for the System
of the Prophet), and Hizb-e-jihad (the Party of Jihad). The Islamist touch might be an added
characteristic of the IJI to attract more and more against Benazir Bhutto (Haqqani, 2005 , p.
133).
In the election campaign, some of the religious elites of the IJI even spoke of Benazir
Bhutto and her mother as gangsters in bangles. She was tagged as the spearhead of western
culture. She was propagated as westernized woman. Their opponents airdropped her and her
mother‟s swimming costume pictures over various cities in the state. They proclaimed that
she would corrupt the morality of the people if allowed to come in power (Lamb, 1991, pp.
36-39). Benazir Bhutto faced with criticism from religious section of the society while
assuming the office in 1988. Some of the ulemas (religious elites) even came with fatwa
(religious edict) and proclaimed that a woman could not rule an Islamic state (Akhund, 2000,
p. 58).
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Benazir Bhutto took the office as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Media was given
freedom somewhat. The PTV aired music programme. The actresses were allowed to appear
bareheaded on the screen. This was banned in General Zia‟s regime. The fact that Benazir
Bhutto herself wore scarp in public but this had no effects on Islamists. They protested
vigorously and proclaimed that the government was supporting vulgarity which could
damage the Islamic culture (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 134).
As a result of the elections in 1988, the PPP became able to form government in the
centre. However, it failed to form government in the Punjab. It sought to form its government
in the province of the Punjab. For this purpose, it tried hard to bring the members of the IJI in
its fold. As a result, Mian Nawaz Sharif used the Punjab card in order to instigate the Punjabi
nationalism. If the PPP allowed the government of the IJI in the Punjab to rule, it was beyond
any doubt that the PPP would have governed in the center. As a result of this mutual
cooperation, the crisis of democracy could have prevented from emergence and would allow
democratic transition to take roots in the state.
This is a flaw of the character of the power elites that they scarcely cooperate with
their rivals. In her first term in office, Benazir had hardly any spirit of cooperation towards
opposition. This lack of cooperation was best reflected in her move that she never extended
invitation to the Chief Ministers of the Punjab and of Balochistan to attend the cabinet
meetings. This lack of trust upon one another emerged in the politics of confrontation.
Besides this, she also ignored the government of the Punjab and of Balochistan in the Peoples
Works Programme. She tasked the party heads of the PPP at the districts level with the
implementation and the monitoring of the said programme. On top of this, the PPP tried hard
to weaken the role of the Senate of Pakistan as it had no majority there.
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This kind of situation resulted into the politics of confrontation and political elites
engaged in political infighting. Consequently, Mian Nawaz Sharif did not comply with the
orders received from the center in connection to the postings of the senior officers to and
from the province of the Punjab. Besides, he founded the Bank of the Punjab because the
branches of the National Bank of Pakistan in the province either created hurdles or denied
financial assistance not only to the Itefaq Group of Companies but also to the businesses
owned by the members of the IJI.
Moreover, He also objected at the schemes under the Peoples Works Programme and
demanded of the centre that the said schemes to be implemented via district and union
councils elected in 1985. In the province of Balochistan, the government of Mir Zafar Ullah
Jamali was weak as he was able to form government in the province by narrow margin. The
speaker‟s vote was decisive. Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali, however, succeeded to form his
government in the province with the help of the members of the PPP who were only three in
number. But his government was short lived as one member of the government joined hands
with the opposition bloc. And, his government was dismissed just after twelve days. That was
how Nawab Akbar Bugti formed government in the province with the help of the JUI (F) and
soon joined hands with Nawaz Sharif to confront the center.
Although, the PPP had majority in the province of Sind, but it entered into alliance
with the MQM. However, the alliance broke when ethnic violence over Sindhi and non-
Sindhi controversy erupted in Karachi and Hyderabad. Besides, the PPP failed to deliver
what it had pledged in its elections‟ manifesto. The MQM withdrew its support from the PPP
in 1989. In response, the government launched an operation against its activists across Sind.
In that operation, the MQM activists were either gunned down or they received fatal injuries.
The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan also cited the operation as one of the reasons of the
dismissal of the government of the PPP in 1990.
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Benazir‟s alliance with the MQM, although, helped her to make government in the
centre but this alliance suffered from failure when the MQM failed to support the PPP in
parliamentary action. Moreover, she was criticized in the party especially by the sindi
nationalists who were her arch supporters when she struck alliance with the rival (Wynbrandt,
2009, p. 242).
The trust deficit was so deficient that the political elites had no faith upon one
another. It was this lack of faith that Benazir kept the portfolio of the Finance Minister with
herself during her first term in office. Besides this, in order to strengthen her grip on the
affairs of the state, she established a new Board of Investment to grant permissions for the
establishment of new industries. She even chaired its meetings in person. Moreover, she
founded a cell in the Prime Minister Secretariat under the supervision of the leaders of the
PPP. It was tasked with the responsibility to place the trustees in the various departments of
the state.
Amid such power struggle, the COP initiated a vote of no-confidence against the
government of the PPP. The PPP had 44 seats in 217 seats of the house. If the opposition had
succeeded to bring three or four members of the FATA in its fold along with the 14 members
of the MQM, the government of the PPP could have been sent to the home. This game of
buying the loyalties of each other‟s members resulted into horse trading on high level. Each
side tried its best to keep its members away from horse trading. For this purpose, the ruling
party kept its members in its custody in Swat (KP) and produced them just before the voting
day.
Besides, the ruling PPP tactfully applied a tactic to show some of the members of the
opposition in a meeting with the leadership of the PPP on the state media in order to convey a
message to the COP. This sort of situation between the ruling and the opposition elites gave
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birth to the rumors of the military coup being talked in the polity. However, the President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan rejected those rumors of the possible army coup in a meeting with his
close associate Sartaj Aziz on 14th
June 1990.
The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was of the opinion that the army imposed Martial
Law when the breakdown of civilian government became imminent in public and in its own
perception. However, no such situation is existed at present in the polity. Moreover, I had the
power to dismiss the government under 58-2 (b) of the Constitution. However, there was no
need to invoke the 58-2 (b) at this moment (Aziz S. , 2009, pp. 97-105). These all show that
how much political elites believe in the sanctity of democracy. Besides, they openly talk to
dismiss the public government without any hesitation.
The government of the PPP was faced with the Shariat bill. The bill was passed
unanimously with amendments on May 13th
, 1990, in the Senate of Pakistan. It was pledged
that every aspect of the daily life would be lined in the light of sharia. It had vast
implications. If it had implemented, it would have been affected judiciary, economy, and
mass media. Besides, the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan would have got powers to declare
the decisions of the courts null and void if it had been unislamic. It was a severe test to
Benazir‟s government.
If Benazir had extended her support to the bill, her office would have been in danger
and if she had declined her support, she would have been accused of as an enemy to Islam.
On July 19th
, Benazir Bhutto said in response to the questions of the media persons at Lahore
airport, that she would keep intact the supremacy of the parliament and did not think proper
cutting hands and ears of the human beings. She was criticized in the religious spheres over
the statement. That was how she antagonized the religious elites who had already harbor
enmity toward her due to their rightist inclinations.
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Salman Rushdie published a book known as “Satanic Verses”. The book became a
source of problem for Benazir Bhutto and her government. The Islamists considered her
government as pro-west. They linked her person with Rushdie‟s. As a matter of fact, the
publisher, who published Rushdie‟s book, had earlier published her book “the Daughter of
the East (Akhund, 2000, p. 60)”.
The IJI consisted of wealthy persons and many of whom considered themselves to be
the heirs of Gen.Zia ul Haq and were pro-army (Newberg P. R., 1989, p. 572). In reaction to
the overwhelming support of the Sindhi, the Punjabi political elites portrayed Benazir
Bhutto„s Bhutto and her political party, the PPP, as the political party of Sindhi .Nawaz
Sharif feared the dominance of Sindi even in the IJI (Newberg P. R., 1989, p. 572).
In the words of Saeed Shafqat, Nawaz Sharif was the symbol of the alliance of socio-
economic groups that Gen.Zia ul Haq wanted to promote and encourage in the province. As a
result, Nawaz Sharif got successes to bag down the PPP in the province of the Punjab with
the help of the military and secured 108 seats of 240 in the provincial assembly. The PPP got
94 seats and independents got 32 seats of the Punjab assembly. Thus the IJI became able to
form the government in the province with the help of the independence candidates. That was
how Benazir Bhutto and the PPP scored low in the elections for the provincial assembly of
the Punjab. This gave a message that Nawaz Sharif was on the solo flight towards political
prominence in the power structure in the days to come (Kamran, 2008, p. 144).
The Chief Minister of the Punjab Nawaz Sharif was too much vocal demanding the
provincial autonomy. He established his own provincial banks in order to translate that
demand into reality. As a result, a situation was created which had been considered adverse
for the newly established democracy in the polity. As the tension between the centre and the
province rose, Benazir Bhutto image deteriorated. This weakened her government‟s ability to
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foster intimate relations between the centre and the provincial governments. This was also the
case with the MQM. The Pakka Qila incident broke the relations between the PPP and the
MQM which left adverse effects in the days to come on the politics of the province of Sindh.
Thus the relations between the political actors remained broken and provided an opportunity
to the president and the army to make the point that Benazir Bhutto Bhutto‟s government was
not capable to see the affairs of the state and provided them with an excuse to dismiss her
government (Kamran, 2008, p. 145).
Benazir Bhutto went a step further in her nepotism and favoritism. She gave her
mother Nusrat Bhutto, the portfolio of senior federal minister, and made her father-in-law the
member of the parliamentary public accounts committee. There went bitter confrontation
between the PPP and IJI. Their rivalry was only for power. Their differences were not on any
national policy. The central government sought to put pressure on the government of the
Punjab. In response, the government of the Punjab bounced back in strong terms defying the
federal government. The political culture in the polity of Pakistan had been suffered from
degeneration historically as a result of authoritarian rule that destroyed the development of
institutions. Otherwise, such situation between the central and the Punjab government could
be dealt in a democratic way. However, in the absence of such institutions, the federal
government had the responsibility to restore the house and bring the state on the track of
political stability but the worst of the matter was that actually Benazir Bhutto sought to have
power in the Punjab by hook or by crook (Musarrat, 2013, pp. 261-263).
Benazir Bhutto‟s political attitude transformed into bitterness as Nawaz Sharif
campaigned publically to malign the government of the PPP. The PPP used unconstitutional
means against the PML (N) government under Sabar Shah in NWFP (later KP). The PPP
leadership in the province while employing various tactics using money brought down the
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PML (N) government and enforced Governor Rule in the province. Later, the PPP formed its
own government in the province. Demonstrations and protest started across the province
maligning openly the PPP government. Nawaz Sharif proclaimed that this was
unconstitutional and against the norms of democracy. The opposition, in the National
Assembly, boycotted and protested publicly to malign the government and its undemocratic
moves (Musarrat, 2013, p. 266).
The PPP leadership has lost too much energy in attempt to destroy the opponents.
However, it failed to adopt new policies while engaging in administration and good
governance. But to handle the opposition in such a way could be tantamount to an adverse
response. The PPP leadership failed to resolve the pressing social and economic problems.
This could be impossible until politicians on both sides set aside differences and develop
consensus on issues in a democratic way. However, currently each was involved in intrigues
rather than in parliamentary deliberation. In such state of affairs, some of the politicians from
opposition benches even had the belief that martial law was better than Benazir‟s government
(Bray, 1990, p. 114).
The Deputy Secretary of the USA was reported to have stated that 1990 was going to
be the year of the new elections in Pakistan, and the IJI wanted to defeat the PPP in the
elections. Besides this, they also sought the elections to be held under the caretaker set-up
which had been grown in the dictatorship of General Zia ul-Haq. However, he said that the
PPP was adamant and sought to get rid of the caretaker government which consisted of the
men who had the blessings of Zia.
2.5. Benazir, the Provincial Governments, and the Crisis:
The lack of cooperation between the center and the provinces gave birth to such a
situation that had expedited the crisis of democracy in the polity. However, the responsibility
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lies with those who are at the helm and it was the foremost responsibility of the government
at the center as well as at the provinces to protect democracy and played their roles to end this
political infighting. But it was a matter of great regret that the political elites put the national
interest on their back and engaged in power struggle.
With the passage of time, the politics of confrontation between the center and the
government of the Punjab assumed bad shape. The leveling of accusations on each other
became a norm in elites‟ circle. If one group of elites takes a positive step, the other one used
to adopt negative role. As a result, they thought the rival responsible for this crisis. This
rivalry between the centre and the opposition touched the high-water mark when the PPP
moved a vote of no-confidence against the Chief Minister of the Punjab Nawaz Sharif. He
although survived the move, but it engaged both of them in eternal enmity. As a result, they
spent their energies in accusations and counter-accusations rather than worked to strengthen
democratic transition in the state.
Benazir showed her anger against the IJI in her maiden press conference and made the
occasion to direct the plethora of complaints against the Chief Minister of the Punjab Nawaz
Sharif and the IJI of having stolen the provincial elections. She termed their activities as
separatist tactics and ordered the members of the PPP in the Punjab Assembly to leave the
House as a protest against the Nawaz Sharif‟s elections as the Chief Minister of the Punjab
(Ziring, 1997, p. 512). Besides, she branded him as “the GM Syed of the Punjab (Inayatullah,
1993, p. 2).
The government of the PPP faced the criticism of the alliance of the elites in the shape
of the rightist parties which were renowned in their traditional enmity towards the PPP. That
alliance of the elites consists of those religious parties which were against the leadership of a
woman as well as of those who had grown under the shadow of Zia and were active to
provide reasons to General Zia against the restoration of democracy in the polity. And now
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those elements were bent upon to sabotage democratic transition.
During the vote of no-confidence move against the government of the PPP, horse
trading outshined every precedent in the past. The members of the Assembly were kept in
custody at Murree (Punjab) and Mingora (KP) with all necessary pleasures and produced
them on the voting day. This was an open instance of struggle for power between the political
elites. Besides, the MQM broke alliance with the PPP on this critical stage only to bring it
down. It could be held that it was the constitutional right of the opposition to move a vote of
no-confidence against the PPP but this constitutional right should have been used for the
welfare of the nation rather for the satisfaction of the personal ethos.
The PPP survived the move of the vote of no-confidence. In the meantime, the
supporters of the IJI increased and this was an eye opener for the PPP. Toward the end of the
month of April, Benazir Bhutto offered dialogues to the government of the Punjab for
reconciliation. On May 3rd
, Chaudhry Shujat Hussain and Ghulam Haider Wyne called on
Nawaz Sharif to solicit him for the dialogues between the center and the Punjab. In the
meeting, the proposal of dialogues from the center was discussed. On that very day, a special
committee of the federal cabinet made an initial contact with the government of the Punjab.
The dialogues, although, were not successful completely but it was hoped that reconciliation
between the rivals would make its headway.
Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, a member of the National Reconciliation Committee,
called on Nawaz Sharif at Model Town Lahore on May 12th
and conveyed the message of
Prime Minister Benazir. According to him, Nawaz Sharif exhibited his willingness to
establish working relationship with the government of the PPP. Consequently, a three-
member committee was constituted. That committee consisted of Mian Manzoor Ahmad, the
Speaker of the Punjab Assembly, Ghulam Haider Wyne, the leader of the opposition in the
National Assembly, and Malik Naeem. It had the responsibility of holding dialogues with the
110
center on matters of political deadlock.
It is thought provoking that how political elites played a game against each other to
have power in their hands. On one hand, efforts were being made to restore normal relations
between the center and the provincial government. On the other hand, the COP convened a
National Convention in which a charge sheet of corruption, nepotism, financial irregularities,
and mismanagement against the government of the PPP was presented. The conveners
demanded direct action of the President in the interests of the nation.
Nawaz Sharif locked himself up in political conflict with Benazir Bhutto. This kicked
off confrontational politics between political leadership. Nawaz Sharif demanded provincial
autonomy from the centre. He defied the federal government authority on many occasion
(Shafqat, 1997, p. 231).
Nawaz Sharif‟s strategy to oppose Benazir Bhutto was two pronged. On one hand, he
made alliance with Islamic political parties. They continuously questioned Benazir Bhutto‟s
ideological credentials. On the other hand, he used the ethnic card “Punjabism” against her as
she belonged to the province of Sindh. He also joined hands with ethnic political parties and
struggled for provincial autonomy. He made them believe that provincial autonomy would
now be achieved as a leader from the Punjab had joined them (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 132). In
reaction, Benazir Bhutto, with consultation of certain cabinet minister, attempted to dismiss
Nawaz Sharif‟s government in the Punjab. She moved a vote of no confidence against him in
the Punjab provincial assembly (Shafqat, 1997, p. 232).
The government of the IJI in the Punjab was dependent on the loyalty of several
Independent Members of the Assembly. Consequently, the PPP tried hard to win over their
support. They were offered amenities. However, it failed to win over even a single member.
Nawaz Sharif paid in gold to retain their loyalties. The PPP failed to de-seat him from the
office of the CM. In reaction, Benazir Bhutto attempted to harm Nawaz Sharif‟s and his
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family‟s business. As a result, her government registered cases against him. The cases were
related with the evasion of bank loans, corruption and, many others. Benazir Bhutto‟s
government even stooped so low in its rivalry that the PR refused to take raw materials to
Sharif Foundry from Karachi to Lahore (Akhund, 2000, pp. 64-65).
Nawaz Sharif faced threats and cases with smiling face. He had the support of the
army and the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He even publically asked for their help
(Haqqani, 2005 , p. 132). The president Ghulam Ishaq Khan was not loyal to his duties. His
policy was more of divide and rule in the center-province relations. Benazir Bhutto
government was engaged in confrontation with Nawaz Sharif‟s government in the province
of the Punjab. It is a naked truth that democracy could not win unless and until the political
leaders had tolerant behavior towards one another. In the democratic setup, the opposition has
an important role to play. However, contrary to such role, Nawaz Sharif denied to accept the
authority of Benazir Bhutto‟s government in the center (Lamb, 1991 ).
Nawab Akbar Bugti mitigated his grievances against Benazir Bhutto‟s government.
The president Ghulam Ishaq Khan played an important role to boost up those grievances
against the government. Besides, the CM of Baluchistan Nawab Akbar Bugti joined hands
with Nawaz Sharif, excessively driven by power to bring down the government of Benazir
Bhutto in the centre. The PPP claimed that it stood for the poor and fought for their rights.
Besides, it sought Pakistan to be a social welfare state, however, not any function, stood for
the agenda it proclaimed. Its party functions were held in five-star hotels which were by
themselves an indicator of that what it stood for. The main purpose of the PPP was to get
power and pursue policies in accord with circumstances (Khan Faqir,Fakhrul Islam and
Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015, p. 204).
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During the rule of Benazir Bhutto, the civil bureaucracy faced with a new challenge.
As a result of growing enmity and political conflict both political stakeholders, the PPP and
the IJI, used the civil servants for their own purpose and used them as instruments amid the
struggle for power. The central government called back five bureaucrats to Islamabad who
were working in the province of the Punjab. The transferred civil servants included the
Inspector General of Police, Superintendent of Police, Information Secretary, the Additional
Chief Secretary, and the Chief Secretary in the Punjab. According to the central government,
these civil servants used their powers for the interests of the provincial government. Anwar
Zahid‟s transfer was successfully resisted by the Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif. In addition to,
the PPP faced resistance from the Punjab government with regard to the implementation of
the PPD in the province. The Punjab government did not allow the work under PPD even the
D.C bulldozed the work (The Dynamics of Power: Military, pp. 8-9).
2.6. Benazir, the Army and the Crisis:
The government of the PPP sought help of the army during its operation against the
MQM in 1989. The government wanted the army to handle the situation arising out of the
operation. However, the army sought full-fledged power under Article 245 of the
Constitution of the state to be granted. But the government was adamant to grant such
powers. This state of affairs further aggravated the relations between the army and the
government of the PPP.
The gulf between the army and the government of the PPP kept widening with each
day. In such a situation, Benazir decided to have reconciliation with Nawaz Sharif when she
felt that her relations with the army were going towards a point of no return. For this purpose,
she deputed her closest confidant Mr. Happy Mannola to seek rapprochement with Nawaz
Sharif. However, his efforts could not bring any results. In the mean time, the COP demanded
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of the President Ishaq to take action against the government of the PPP in a convention in
which a charge sheet against the government of the PPP was presented. This shows that
political elites do not hesitate to take advantage of the situation in order to defeat their rival.
The observers had the opinion that some persons of high importance in the civil and
military bureaucracy wanted anarchy like situation in the polity to make the public believe
that only civil and military oligarchy could run government successfully in the state. For this
purpose, they instigated political parties in their respective offices on non-cooperation. This
was how political elites provided the military with an opportunity to take mileage of the
situation. In their struggle for power, they forgot democracy and its ideals.
On July 28th
, General Mirza Aslam Baig (the COAS) called on Benazir Bhutto in the
Prime Minister House. Col.Ghulam Sarwar Cheema, the Minister of State for Defense, was
also present on the occasion. They had detailed discussion over the constitutional role of the
army and the operation against miscreants in the province of Sind. The COAS also informed
the Prime Minister of the proceedings of the Corps Commanders Conference held the
previous day.
However, a report published in the UK newspaper “the Independent” revealed that
the confrontation between Benazir Bhutto and the army over the situation in the province of
Sind had acquired the form of conflict. Moreover, this tussle had also affected the national
and foreign policy. It was certain, the report maintained, that she would face many problems
in the days to come. Many a member of her political party had refused to obey her authority.
However, she was reluctant to grant infinite powers to the army for the eradication of law and
order situation in the province of Sind. Moreover, Benazir Bhutto was trying her best to have
better relations with India and trying to reduce the current tension between the states due to
the problem of Kashmir (Anjum, 2009, pp. 241-255).
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The military was apprehensive that Benazir Bhutto had provided information to Rajiv
Gandhi about those Sikhs in Pakistan who were helping their fellows engaged in the
Separation Movement against India. This information not only revealed the role of Pakistan
intelligence agency but also caused damage to Kashmiris and their right of self-
determination. This made the intelligence agencies of the state against her and left no stone
unturned to turn the table on her (Kazimi, 2009, p. 278).
Benazir wanted India to call back her army which was deployed near the border.
However, the army of Pakistan was confident of its capability to meet the Indian aggression.
It was, therefore, the military insisted that the government should not bow against the Indian
demand. The government of Benazir had the feelings that the expenditures over army for
keeping active for seven months had shattered all hopes of economic progress in the state.
Benazir also sought to take the foreign policy of the state from the army and wanted
to give back to the foreign office as soon as the foreign powers proceed towards the solution
of the Afghan problem. She enjoyed the support of the USA at the problem of Afghanistan
and issues with India. According to the American Ambassador Robert Oakley, the support
Benazir Bhutto had from the USA even further antagonized the army. This support of the US
to Benazir‟s government was actually in the backdrop of its reservations over the Pakistan
army growing relationship with Iran.
The senior ministers of the PPP charged the army with blames that it was trying to
destabilize the government and sought to divide the PPP. This shows that how elites in
Pakistan in the light of power elite theory struggle to tighten their grip on the power they hold
for which they do not hesitate to surrender national priorities or thwart uniformity of national
interests.
An electoral alliance in the name of IJI was made to counter the PPP in the general
elections being held in 1988 in order to keep the PPP from sweeping the elections realizing
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its popularity in the masses. The idea of this alliance was floated by the ISI chief General
Hamid Gul who told COAS Aslam Baig if the PPP swept the elections, it would pose danger
to the many causes dear to the army. The COAS Aslam Baig hailed the advice in his
interview with the Herald in 2001.
The relations between Benazir and the army were cordial. However, the relations
suffered from deterioration when Benazir replaced the ISI chief Hamid Gul with General
Kalu (retired). Aslam Baig was happy over the Benazir‟s decision as General Hamid Gul had
become political. However, he was not happy over her nomination as she had rejected his list
of nomination. Benazir, in her interview with the Voice of America Radio, revealed that
Aslam Baig was also a part of the plan according to which her government was dismissed in
1990. She said that he was made convinced by Ishaq and some members of the agencies that
she was going to replace him (F.Paracha, 2016). It was the same Aslam Baig whom Benazir
awarded with Tamgha-i-Jamhooriat (Aziz S. , 2016).
General Aslam Baig, in his interview with the Nation, revealed that the ISI was
mandated with the formation of the right-wing political alliance in order to deter the expected
sweeping majority of the PPP in the elections in 1988. As a result, the ISI helped arrange the
reunification of the two factions of the PML and also encouraged other political parties to
join the alliance. Consequently, a political alliance in the name of IJI was established. In
addition to that, the ISI supported the IJI during elections campaign and even devised anti-
PPP elections slogans (Nation, 1995). In the elections, the main contender IJI, a
counterweight to the PPP, was, in fact, the competition for power between the ideas and
programme of the progenies of the General Zia and of the ZA Bhutto (Ziring, 1997, p. 509).
In September-October 1988 two officers of the ISI were tasked to launch an operation
“Midnight Jackals” in order to win over the national assembly members of the PPP to help
succeed the vote of no confidence against Benazir. That was revealed by the officer in his
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interview with the News on July 9, 1994. He told that his mission was not to dismiss
Benazir‟s government, but he was tasked to do so (News, 1994).
Besides, the agencies played active role to force the MQM to break alliance with the
PPP and extend support to the opposition in its move of the vote of no confidence against
Benazir. (Rizvi, 1998) P.101. In addition to that, Benazir sought General Aslam Baig to avoid
legal actions against those who had been removed from the service for indiscipline over their
resentment at the capital punishment administered to the former Prime Minister of Pakistan
Z.A Bhutto. The COAS resented the advice and thought that an interference in the affairs of
the army (Pakistan, 1995). The army had strong reservation over Benazir‟s attempt to have
normal relations with India. It looked with suspicion at Rajiv Gandhi‟s visit in December
1988 and July 1989 respectively and thought Benazir to be untrustworthy (Rizvi H. A., 1998,
p. 102).
Despite the fact that Benazir Bhutto compromised with the establishment, even then,
she was not in their good books. They apparently accepted her person as prime minister but
actually they considered her as their rival for power. On many occasions, General Aslam
Baig reiterated the army role as the King maker. He further said, “We have bigger things to
hijack, if we want to (Akhund, 2000, p. 55).”
Presenting himself to be pro-democracy, General Aslam Baig publically warned
Benazir Bhutto not to interfere in the affairs of the army and advised to toe her line as she had
promised. This resentment from the top position of the army came forth when she sought to
make appointment in the top hierarchy of the military. The COAS Aslam Baig‟s supposedly
likeness for democracy could not overshadow the army historical prejudice against
democracy in Pakistan as it had ruled the state for more than 23 years (Ali, 1990, p. 2240).
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The Pakka Qila incident deteriorated the relations between the Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto and the army. The incident occurred on 27th
May 1990. This incident widened the gulf
between Benazir Bhutto and army. It was the Muhajirs settlement in Hyderabad. The PPP
government had the information that some terrorists were hidden there. The government
launched an operation against them and the police killed at least 30 terrorists. However, the
operation was not brought to an end due to the lack of resources. Moreover, the police
proclaimed that the terrorists had the support of the managers of the ISI. The incident
however, was seen as an ethnic conflict in which the Sindh police killed many Muhajirs. As a
result, the relation between the army and the PPP both from personal and institutional point
deteriorated.
The COAS, Aslam Baig belonged to the Muhajirs community. Therefore, reservation
on the incident was a natural outcome. In addition to, the relations between the Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto and the COAS also got strained as Benazir Bhutto wanted to extend
the term of Lt.Gen. Alam Jan Mehsud as Corps Commander in Lahore, however, he was
replaced with Lt. Gen. Ashraf Janjua. This interference from Benazir Bhutto, however,
proved a last straw that broke the camel‟s back. It became evident to the army high command
that her government must be dismissed (Kamran, 2008, p. 143).
The army allowed the elections in 1988 and hoped that the PPP would not be able to
win the elections. For eleven years under Gen. Zia rule, the army had developed animosity
towards the PPP and condemned it as anti-establishment. Moreover, Benazir was thought as
security risk. The army had thinking of Benazir Bhutto as an enemy who even had inspired
her party workers against the army. Consequently, distraction and enmity existed between the
army elites and Benazir Bhutto (Shafqat, 1998, p. 243).
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Gen. Aslam Baig often reiterated that democracy has its own dynamics and in-built
mechanism to correct itself. Our responsibility and duty are to provide security to that system.
However, he influenced Benazir Bhutto to replace the CM of Sindh Qaim Ali Shah with
Aftab Shaban Mirani in February 1990 (Bray, 1990, p. 111). This shows his role in the
political affairs.
2.7. Pragmatics of the Crisis: Nawaz Sharif, Ishaq Khan, and Rivalry
Elections were held in 1990. The IJI and its allied political parties the MQM
and the ANP got 155 seats. However, the PPP got 45 seats. As a result of elections, Nawaz
Sharif assumed the office and started rule with strong majority. However, once again, the
prime minister embroiled in tussle with the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Despite the fact,
Nawaz Sharif was known as the blue-eyed boy of Gen. Zia Ul Haq and also protégée in the
light of his Islamization program. Besides, he had enjoyed the support of the military
establishment. However, the struggle for power brought him in direct conflict with the
president, and the military establishment (Haqqani, 2005, p. 143).
Nawaz Sharif got majority under the banner of the IJI in the elections held in
November 1990. His government was the first in the history of Pakistan that was enjoying
two-third majority in the National Assembly. Besides, it had governments in all the provinces
of the state. It was said that Nawaz Sharif had two advantages as compared to Benazir Bhutto
when she was in the power. First and foremost, he had two-third majority in the Assembly,
and had governments in all the four provinces. This sort of constitution Benazir Bhutto did
not have during her first term in office (1988-90). This was the main hurdle to her
government. Secondly, the IJI had controlled the situation in Karachi with the support of the
MQM. On top of this, Nawaz Sharif had good relationship with the President and the Army
(Kukreja, 1991, p. 665). Despite such favourable circumstances, the government of Nawaz
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Sharif suffered from deadlocks and distrust among the organs of the government (Hussain M.
, 1990).
Nawaz Sharif pledged after assuming the office of the prime minister of Pakistan. He
said, “We will change Pakistan to a prosperous, very strong and firm Islamic country. We
will bring an industrial revolution in the country. It is my desire that I should not be
remembered as those who wanted the government chair but rather as a PRIME MINISTER
(Jang, 1990).” The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan always extended his help to Nawaz Sharif
to maintain good relations with the army. It was he who patched the relations between the
two whenever any rupture in their relations had occurred. In addition to that, the President
Ishaq also succeeded in winnowing down the PPP-led-agitation in December 1992.
However, that bonhomie between the President Ishaq and him proved short-lived
when he sought to take steps to curtail the President‟s powers. In such atmosphere, the
opposition headed by the PPP demanded of the fresh elections in the state. The President
dismissed Nawaz‟s government after securing support of the army and of the opposition
(Rizvi, 1998, p. 105). This sort of affairs reflects that the elites go against one another for the
sake of power so deep that they even do not hesitate to make undemocratic endeavours to
prove their rivals a failure.
Differences began to emerge between the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz
Sharif over the former‟s humiliation at the time of his speech to the joint secession of the
Parliament at the hands of the opposition. However, he had to complete his speech amid
slogan „Go Baba Go‟. Nawaz Sharif, although, reprimanded the behavior of the opposition as
undemocratic and immoral but there was no active response from him and his party against
the humiliation of the President.
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Roedad Khan, the confidant of the President, said that the humiliation was the prime
reason of the rapture in the relations between the President and Nawaz Sharif as the President
Ishaq Khan had the opinion that Nawaz Sharif and his party did not respond appropriately to
the behavior of the opposition. As a result, there emerged serious differences between him
and the President over the appointment of the COAS after the sudden death of General Asif
Janjua as well as the repealing of the 8th
amendment (Hasan, 2009, p. 201).
On the appointment of General Asif Janjua, Nawaz Sharif was not even consulted.
He, therefore, wanted to revoke the 8th
amendment and openly he used to talk in the meetings
of the IJI that he did not want a lengthy constitution rather he wanted a constitution consisted
of twelve pages only. However, the differences between the President and the Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif, for the first time, emerged on the appointment of the COAS in May 1991
when the President appointed General Asif Janjua.
As a matter of fact, Nawaz Sharif did not want General Asif Janjua as the COAS on
account of his role in Sind operation, in floods, and in many other matters. However, the
appointment of the COAS was the discretionary powers of the President under the Article
243 (2-C) of the Constitution which he had acquired as a result of the 8th
amendment,
whereas, according to the original Constitution of 1973, it was the right of the Prime Minister
with the consultation of his cabinet if he likes.
The differences, once again, emerged on the appointment of new COAS when
General Asif suddenly died on 8th
January 1993. Nawaz Sharif called on the President in
order to know his intention regarding the appointment of the new COAS. He got the
impression that the President was going to appoint General Farakh as the COAS. On this,
Nawaz Sharif protested that he was not going to acknowledge him as the COAS. He wanted
either General Rahim Dil Bhati or General Javed Ashraf to be appointed as the COAS. To
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remove the deadlock between the President and Nawaz Sharif, Chaudhry Nasir Ali Khan, the
political adviser of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, met with Roedad Khan, a confidant of
the President Ishaq Khan and a former bureaucrat, requesting him to help him in the matter.
As a result, Roedad Khan called on the President and requested him to change his
mind about General Farakh‟s appointment. Furthermore, Roedad Khan stated that he told the
President that General Farakh was not General Montgomery or General Rommel. If he had
not appointed as the COAS, we would lose the 2nd
World War. As a result, the President
appointed General Wahid Kakar as the COAS on 12th
January 1993 in order to defuse the
situation. The crisis, although, was defused for the time being but preparation for the final
show started.
The relations between Nawaz Sharif and the President Ishaq Khan deteriorated when
the Prime Minister Inspection Commission under Lt. General Muhammad Shafiq (Retired)
prepared a report against the son-in-law of the President Irfanullah Marwat and his
accomplice Samiullah Marwat in the infamous Veena Hayat Case in which their illicit
activities were exposed. This created such a rift in the relationship that persisted to the last
day.
Nawaz Sharif used to resent the 8th
amendment in silent words. However, he had
remained silent over it in his early days in the office because it was this amendment which
provided him with an opportunity to come to power. He called it a miracle that time. In
addition to this, he was the logical end of the plan hatched out by the President in
collaboration with the civil and military bureaucracy in the light of that amendment.
However, his potent desire to have complete grip on the business of the state became public
when he prepared the draft of the 12th
amendment in the guidance of his legal advisor
Chaudhry Ihsanul-Haq.
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The 12th
amendment was even more dangerous than the 8th
amendment. If it had been
implemented in its real shape, the state would have gone in the grip of one-man rule.
According to the amendment, the Prime Minister had the power to suspend any provision of
the Constitution for an indefinite period. When the draft was tabled to the President, he called
Nawaz Sharif and asked him if he had shown the draft to the members of the Parliament. He
nodded in negative. He said if the President allowed it, the members would have no
objection. In the meantime, the coalition parties the MQM, the JI, and the ANP of Nawaz
Sharif‟s government called on the President and registered their reservations against the
amendment. Despite the objection of the President, the amendment was passed on 2nd
July
1991, and it was resented on all forums (Saleem A. , 1998, pp. 359-366).
The confrontation between Nawaz Sharif and the President Ishaq went from bad to
worse after Nawaz Sharif‟s government was restored via the verdict of the Supreme Court of
Pakistan. The working relations between the two became extremely bad. In the meantime,
Nawaz sought to replace the pro-president Governor and Chief Minister of the Punjab
through resolution using his parliamentary majority. The resolution required the assent of the
President. The resolution seemed to be a hope against the hope in the light of the relations
between the Prime Minister and the President. As a result, Nawaz Sharif proclaimed an order
to implement the resolution. However, the army failed to second his order being unlawful
(Rizvi, 1998, p. 106).
In the initial days of his rule, Nawaz Sharif did not make any efforts to interfere in the
day-to-day work of the state which was under the civil-military oligarchy. However, he
started thinking how to increase his powers and influence. He made Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmed
the head of the civilian intelligence bureau. It was the same chap who helped engineered the
IJI while working as the head of the political wing of the ISI. He worked and made alliances
for him in order to isolate the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Sohail, 1993, pp. 73-75),
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(Hussain Haqqani‟s interview with Major.Amir. Islamabad, February16.1999). (Aamir,
1999).
The operation cleanup in the province of Sindh had adverse effects on Nawaz Sharif‟s
government. He was worried at the military operation in Sindh. This created resentment
which affected his relationship with the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the COAS.
Besides, issues like the Gulf War, differences over the controversial sharia bill, rising
economic crisis and disenchantment within the IJI coalition draw the cracks in the relations
among the troika. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif‟s efforts to extend the powers of the Prime
Minister paved the way for parting the ways. Normalization of relations with Benazir Bhutto
was also a point could be pondered upon.
However, Nawaz Sharif‟s struggle to review the 8th
amendment and his silence over
the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan reelection finally proved to be the proverbial straw that
broke the camel‟s back. Nawaz Sharif appeared on the state-run television on 17 August 1993
and charged the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan with conspiracy made against him. This
address brought his dismissal by leaps and bounds. However, it made Nawaz Sharif a bold
politician as otherwise he was not known for. The wily Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed his
government and caretaker set up was made. Balkh Sher Mazari was appointed as the Prime
Minister and politicians from the PPP were included in the cabinet. Among them Asif
Zardari, Aitzaz Ehsan, Jahangir Bader were significant (Kamran, 2008, p. 152).
The situation went from bad to worse when the widow of the diseased COAS Asif
Nawaz accused Nawaz Sharif of murdering her husband and proclaimed that her husband had
been poisoned. This left Nawaz Sharif in bad situation. Benazir Bhutto made a strategic move
and in order to take the advantage of the situation, she sought to have alliance with the
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president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. She demanded of Ghulam Ishaq Khan the dissolution of the
IJI government and mid-term elections.
In return, Benazir pledged to extend her support to him in his quest for another term
as the president if he dismissed her rival government (Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 317). Nawaz Sharif,
however, realized his mistake and sought rapprochement with the president Ghulam Ishaq
Khan. He even proclaimed to provide support for his candidature for the slot of the president.
But he was too late to woo the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Cohene, 2005, p. 149).
Nawaz Sharif miscalculated the situation when he proclaimed that he would go to
dispense with the 8th
amendment. Without realization that he was alone politically, his, first
and foremost, miscalculation was that he had of the opinion, despite history of enmity,
mistrust and confrontation, that the PPP would extend its assistance in rolling back the 8th
amendment. The second miscalculation was related with the matter that he thought the
president Ghulam Ishaq Khan had been obsessed with his re-election as the president for the
next term. So he would seek nothing except his re-election.
However, Nawaz Sharif self-created world fell like the house of cards when ministers
from his own cabinet started gathering around the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Among
them Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Tariq Chaudhry and a group of Jatoi loyalists merited as
significant. As a result, the political position of Nawaz Sharif began to split and withered
away. To save his skin, he nominated Ghulam Ishaq Khan as his presidential candidate, but
his proclamation was too late to repair the gulf.
Nawaz Sharif wanted to remove the Governor of the Punjab. However, the President
was adamant to accept his demand. However, Nawaz Sharif passed a resolution from the
Parliament on 29th
June to take the administration of the province under article 234 of the
constitution. He did not get the approval of the President regarding this resolution. As a
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result, he appointed Mian Azhar as Administrator-designate of the Punjab (Hasan, 2009, p.
204).
In disparate attempt, Nawaz Sharif addressed the nation on April 17, 1993 and
publicly criticized the president. He even went so far to announce that the President House
was involved to fragment the Pakistan founding political party PML. Moreover, he
proclaimed that the Governor of the province was also involved in making conspiracies
against the sitting government and residing in the President House for that purpose. This sort
of affairs the public hardly bears. He further disclosed that the enemy of democracy even
offered his cabinet minister prime minstership to rebel against him. He reiterated that he
would not take the pressure from the president, rather he would face the dismal affair and he
would not resign or dismiss the National Assembly on the wishes of the president Ghulam
Ishaq Khan. Besides, he accused the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan of the conspiracies against
the federation in general and against his government in particular. The prime minister
challenged the sitting head of the state. No resignation, no dissolution, no dictation
proclaimed Nawaz Sharif. In addition to, he announced that he was fully prepared to face any
opponent both inside and outside (Khan Faqir,Fakhrul Islam and Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015,
p. 204).
Gohar Ayub Khan, the Speaker of NA, challenged the dismissal of the NA in Lahore
High Court that declared the dismissal illegal and the result of personal grudges. Later on,
Nawaz Sharif also filed a case challenging the dismissal in the Apex Court of Pakistan on
May 25th
, 1993. The court gave its verdict invalidating the dismissal and declared the
presidential order illegal and restored the assemblies striking down Ghulam Ishaq Khan„s
orders ( the president of Pakistan 10:1 ratio of the verdict). As a result, national assemblies
and the prime minister and his cabinet were restored (Waseem M. , 1994).
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2.8. Nawaz Sharif, the Opposition and the Crisis:
The crisis of July 18th
1993 was not a bolt from the blue. Rather, diverse forces under
the influence of both political and military leadership played their decisive role. There was
not a single neutral agency which could solve the crisis. Rather, everybody was engaged in
his own interests. Even the opposition asked the President to use his discretionary powers
under the Article 58-2(b) of the Constitution. Besides, it threatened him with the Long
March.
When Nawaz Sharif was engaged in confrontation with the President Ishaq Khan,
Benazir Bhutto, initially, sought to have alliance with Nawaz Sharif against the President but
she failed to achieve her objectives. Consequently, she sought to have the help of Roedad
Khan, a confidant of the President and a former bureaucrat, to make rapprochement with the
President. She told him that she would support the President against Nawaz Sharif so that he
might not be able to repeal the 8th
amendment and acquire dictatorial powers. This is the
sorrowful aspect of political elites that how they compromise for their personal interests and
work against democracy (Hasan, 2009, pp. 201-202).
Benazir persuaded the Chief Minister of the Punjab Manzoor Watto to dissolve the
Assembly and he dissolved it on 28th
June. However, the Lahore High Court restored the
Assembly of the Punjab. It was again dissolved by the Governor of the Punjab on the advice
of the Chief Minister within seven minutes of the Honorable Court decision.
The tussle between the President Ishaq and Nawaz Sharif became worst with the
passage of time. In the meantime, the opposition led by the PPP gave a call for a Long March
if their demand for fresh elections had not met. The COAS Waheed Kakar assured the
opposition before he made agree the President Ishaq and Nawaz Sharif to resign (Abbas,
1993).
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In order to appease the Islamists, Nawaz Sharif announced that woman lot should
cover their heads while appearing on the screen. Moreover, he restricted the management of
the Pakistan Television Corporation not to air Women Swimming Games of 1992 Olympic
Games. This was the follow up of the appeasement policy as the Islamists had thoughts that
their costumes were bad to Muslims‟ sensitivities.
However, the relations between Nawaz Sharif and Islamists suffered from
deterioration on certain issues. For example, Nawaz Sharif extended his support to the USA
and Allies during the Gulf War (1992). On the contrary, the Islamists supported Saddam
Hussain. Similarly, the Islamists attacked the temple of the Hindus in Pakistan in reaction to
the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya (India) by Hindu religious fanatics. Consequently,
Nawaz Sharif made large arrests in the temple attack. On the case of Afghanistan, opinions
were divided. Nawaz Sharif sought to support the moderate groups of Mujahedeen. On the
contrary, the Islamists and the military wanted to support fundamentalists (Haqqani, 2005 ,
p. 145).
In 1992, Nawaz Sharif suffered from ill fate as the IJI, which was a forced marriage
solemnized by ISI, began to disintegrate. The NPP of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the JI of Qazi
Hussain Ahmed, and the MQM of Altaf Hussain left the alliance on account of differences
with Nawaz Sharif and his government. In addition to, the twelve members of the MQM also
resigned from the National Assembly. Such changes in the configuration of the IJI although
posed no major problem for the continuity of Nawaz Sharif‟s government in the centre but
Nawaz Sharif did lose two-third majority in the National Assembly required for an
amendment in the Constitution.
Furthermore, the formation of a group in the name of the Conscience Group in the
Senate of Pakistan made Nawaz Sharif‟s grip in the upper house weak. Consequently, after
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such metamorphosis, the IJI coalition comprised of the PML and ANP- two strange partners
keeping in view their rivalry and hate in the past (Khan, 1993, p. 130).
Political Parties and the government of Nawaz Sharif were locked in bitter rivalries
while each attempting to play zero-sum game. Their bitterness had no parallel. The Prime
Minister and the President did not meet the opposition leader even for a single time during
the two years of the government of the IJI under Nawaz Sharif (Khan, 1993, p. 130).
Organizations like NICFC and SCCC had taken large loans from the banks. These
organizations belonged to the members of the provincial assembly of the ruling IJI. This
created a lot of problems for Nawaz Sharif and put his government credibility at stake.
Besides, this also provided an opportunity to the opposition to take mileage of the situation
and used the opportunity for destabilization in such circumstances. Benazir Bhutto sent a
telegram to the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan demanding him of Nawaz Sharif‟s dismissal
(Dawn, 1991).
It was a matter of an immense surprise that Benazir Bhutto was engaged in bonhomie
with the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who had dismissed her government. Besides, the
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan represented the establishment. This type of behaviour reflects
the features of the politics in the state of Pakistan. In such type of politics, there is more space
to confrontation than to accommodation. This shows the political intolerance of the
opposition (Talbot I. , 2005, p. 321).
The low politics touched the pinnacle in the polity when on 27 November 1991 five
masked persons entered into Veena Hayat‟s House. She was the close-associate of Benazir
Bhutto and the daughter of Muslim League leader Sardar Shaukat Hayat. She was gang
raped. She accused Irfan Ullah Marwat of the incident and said that the men were sent by
him. It is worth mentioning that Irfan Ullah Marwat was the son-in-law of the President
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Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Advisor on Home Affairs to the CM Sindh Jam Sadiq Ali (Talbot I.
, 2005, p. 321). The incident became a rallying point for the political parties and groups.
However, the establishment including the President took no interest in the incident.
Moreover, Jam Sadiq Ali at the behest of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan launched
crackdown on the workers of the PPP (Kamran, 2008, p. 151).
Judiciary handed down decision in Nawaz Sharif‟s favour, however, his sufferings
had not yet ended. His political friends now had become staunch enemies. His trusted
Lieutenant Mian Manzoor Ahmed in understanding with Altaf Hussain, the Governor of the
Punjab, did not let Nawaz Sharif take advantage of the court decision. Both had in secret
understanding with the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. This patch up did not permit Nawaz
Sharif to take support in the Punjab which was his political base. Thus, the political crisis
took the shape of the constitutional crisis. The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed
Nawaz Sharif‟s move when he sought to bring the Punjab‟s government under the control of
the central government.
The President was of the opinion that Constitution has no such provision that support
that move of the central government. The situation demanded the intervention of the COAS.
As a result, Gen. Waheed Kakar made both resign after a deal between the two. This gave an
opportunity to Moin Qureshi, a World Bank /IMF financial wizard, to take the office as the
caretaker prime minister. Mr.Wasim Sajjad became the president who was the favorite of the
establishment and was right-winged (Kamran, 2008, p. 153). The process gave way to other
groups of elites as a change occurs in the paradigm. They favour one another if there is any
deadlock. They exchange powers to their respective elites and this is how the power ball rolls
among them.
2.9. Nawaz Sharif, the Army, and the Crisis:
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Nawaz Sharif had the blessings of General Zia in going up in the political career.
Being a progeny of General Zia, he enjoyed the support of the army even after his death in air
crash in 1988 near Bahawalpur (Pakistan). The men in the uniform were happy with him and
had good relations with him. He had earned that status on account of his enmity toward the
PPP. He did not exhibit even an iota of reservation over the COAS Aslam Baig‟s open
criticism on the government policy toward the Gulf Crisis of 1991 (Rizvi, 1998) p.104.
The differences between the army and Nawaz Sharif emerged over the operation of
Sindh. The army was called upon to start operation against the miscreants in the province.
The operation was started in the rural area-the stronghold of the PPP. The army became
apprehensive being used as an instrument by the government to target the PPP activists. On
top of that, the operation when extended to the urban area came into clash with the MQM-the
ally of the PML (N). That sort of situation put the Nawaz Sharif‟s government into trouble.
Some of the cabinet ministers condemned the army publically. However, Nawaz
Sharif refused to own the statements. But the damage had been done. In rebuttal, the military
came openly maligning the government of Nawaz Sharif and said that his government
attempted to buy some of the top commanders with material rewards. The COAS Asif Janjua
called that behavior of the government low and said an attempt to corrupt the army (Rashid,
1993).
The army was not happy with Nawaz Sharif‟s foreign policy. The US imposed
sanctions on Pakistan invoking the Pressler Amendment of 1985 on account of Pakistan
nuclear programme. As a result, the economic and military assistance was suspended. In such
a situation, the army had hopes that the government of Nawaz Sharif would devise some
diplomatic solution to the impasse between the two states and the military assistance would
be restarted.
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However, the government failed to achieve any and hopes failed to materialize. In
addition to that, the US put Pakistan on the watch list of states that sponsored terrorism. In
such state of affairs, the army was conscious about the image of the state abroad and had
thoughts that Nawaz‟s government was doing nothing important on diplomatic front (Rizvi,
1998, p. 105).
On 1st July 1993, Nawaz Sharif called on the COAS and proposed to have forced the
President of his office and hold elections under the Prime Minister. In his opinion, free and
fair elections were not possible in the presence of the President. He himself knew that how he
was made the Prime Minister in 1990. However, the COAS responded in negative and said
that he had no constitutional right to dismiss the President. However, he assured Nawaz
Sharif that the President would remain neutral in the elections. In addition to this, he
proposed that the new elections were the solution of the current crisis.
There was an agreement on the proposal of holding new elections between the COAS
and the President. However, Nawaz Sharif took time to think over the proposal and went to
Lahore. In the newspapers, it was reported that the army had been putting pressure on Nawaz
Sharif to resign. It was a ploy only as the proposal for holding new elections was given by
Nawaz Sharif himself. He was of the opinion if his government had been dismissed, a doubt
would have emerged in the mind of the public against the neutrality of the military. In this
way, he would be able to have the sympathy of the masses.
Even in certain newspapers, General Wahid Kakar had been tagged as the traitor of
the nation. As a result, the COAS called on Nawaz Sharif and complained of the statements
in newspapers. He denied flatly of having any relations with the statements, but he promised
to issue an explanatory statement against those statements via the Ministry of Defense.
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However, the statement was issued by the Ministry of Information after some delay (Saleem
A. , 1998, pp. 348-349).
On the Gulf War (1991), the stance of the government and the COAS was divided.
The COAS Aslam Baig wanted to extend support to Iraq and spoke against the hegemony of
the USA. In addition to, the Islamists also rose in protest and staged demonstrations in the
capital city Islamabad and demanded of the government to support Iraq against the USA and
allied forces. The scenario gave birth to apprehensions that the COAS might probably stage a
coup in the state. Nawaz Sharif and his close associates had such apprehensions.
Consequently, Nawaz Sharif announced Baig‟s successor prior to his retirement after
consulting Generals on the matter. This move weakened Baig‟s influence in the army and
provided Nawaz Sharif with the time of solace and non-interference from the army. However,
he failed to materialize many of the modifications he had wanted to do in the presence of
strong president like Ghulam Ishaq Khan on his side (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 143).
2.10. Role of Judiciary, Dismissal of Benazir, and Nawaz Sharif:
The dissolution of the government of the PPP was challenged in the High Court of
Peshawar, Karachi, and Lahore simultaneously. However, the High Court of Karachi and of
Lahore gave their verdicts in support of the decision of the President and declared the
President‟s act as valid and necessary.
On April 17th
, 1993, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif publically acknowledged in his
address to the nation on TV and Radio that he had been pressurized from all quarters and he
was not allowed to serve the nation. He said categorically, that he would not resign and
would not dissolve the Assembly as well as would not take any dictation. When
circumstances went to a point of no return, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved the
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National Assembly on 19th
April 1993, while using his discretionary powers under Article
58-2 (b) of the Constitution. The dissolution of the Assemblies was challenged in the
Supreme Court which declared the dissolution invalid and restored the government of Nawaz
Sharif on 26th
May 1993. However, in the absence of the working relationship between the
two, both the Prime Minister and the President had to resign on the intervention of the COAS
on 18th
July, 1993 (Hasan, 2009, pp. 201-203).
2.11. Elections, Leadership, Systemic factors, and the Crisis: An Analysis
Historically, elections in Pakistan have become a plaything in the hands of the
military. General Ayub Khan and Sikandar Mirza had delayed them on the grounds that they
were befitting to their interests. However, General Yahya Khan had allowed them to be held
as he thought that he could rig the results. In the same way, General Zia ul-Haq had not
allowed them as they were not befitting to his interests. General Aslam Baig had secret
understandings with the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and held elections in 1988 in the state.
Both had understandings that they would not damage the significant position of the army in
the political affairs of the state. More importantly, the military held elections in the polity
when it could either influence the results or rig the process (Kap, 1991, p. 150).
In the elections held in1988, the PPP under Benazir Bhutto won 92 out of 292 seats of
the National Assembly. The rival IJI succeeded in winning total 54 seats. The ISI sought to
form a coalition government under IJI. The IJI took part in the elections under a leadership
who was divided and rivaled for power. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was the president of the IJI.
He belonged to the province of Sindh. It was the home of IJI rival Benazir Bhutto. He also
served as a minister in the cabinet of ZA Bhutto‟s government in 1970s. Nawaz Sharif was
the next influential leader in the IJI coalition. He was an industrialist and General Zia ul-Haq
appointed him as the CM of the Punjab. He strived hard to have the leadership of the PML.
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The PML was the largest coalition partner in the IJI coalition. Muhammad Khan Junejo was
the concurrent president of the PML (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 131).
The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the COAS made Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who
was the president of the IJI, the interim prime minister. In the elections held in 1990, the ISI
played an active role in bringing together political parties opposed to the PPP and made a
gigantic anti-PPP alliance. As a result, in every constituency, there was at least one candidate
available against the PPP‟s. In addition to, the ISI also distributed a large sum of the money
among the politicians. The money was made available by a Karachi-based banker who, later
on, acknowledged that distribution. Similarly, the then ISI Chief Lt. General Asad Durani
also acknowledged that he distributed “a total of 60 million to 20 anti-Bhutto politicians”
(Bray, 1997, p. 324) for the 1990 elections.
General Hamid Gul supervised the campaign of the IJI in the elections held in 1990
through his associates in the ISI. Nawaz Sharif and JI propagated against Benazir Bhutto as a
security risk if came again in power. Moreover, they both alleged her that she had shared
intelligence information with India regarding the Sikh Resistance Movement which had links
with Pakistani intelligence agency (Sohail, 1993).
When the first term of Benazir Bhutto was dismissed, the PDA made public white
papers alleging rigging in the elections. The interim setup both at the center and provincial
level used state machinery to realize the rigging. It was alleged that there was a cell in the
President House to ensure the defect of the candidate of the PDA. The officials on elections
day was pressurized to facilitate and favor the IJI candidate even help to stuff the boxes with
illegal votes. The rigging was also validated by foreign agencies that were observing the
election process. It was against the principles of democracy and proclaimed that without fair
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and independent Elections Commission election were not possible (Anthony, 1989, p. 105)
(Nation, 1990) (Muslim, 1990).
The elections held in 1990 were not without discrepancies and rigging. Pre-poll
rigging was significantly high and random in the elections of 1990. The President Ishaq Khan
and the caretaker Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi along with the armed forces and
intelligence agencies were engaged in the making of the elite group in order to break the PPP
vote. It was made in the shape of the IJI. In the President‟s House, a cell under General
Rafaqat was made responsible to watch all the process of tasked pre-poll rigging. Besides,
the state controlled media was used for this aim. Similarly, polling-day rigging was also
practiced in the elections. As a result, the PPP failed to get many seats in the Punjab. These
seats were won by the PPP in the elections of 1988. Consequently, it lost 39 seats out of 53
although these seats were won by it in the elections of 1988.
The IJI ballot boxes had been filled with false votes on the polling-day. Consequently,
it got many seats. Similarly, the post-poll rigging created differences between the President of
the IJI and the troika i.e. the President, the COAS, and the caretaker Prime Minister. The
President Ishaq Khan and the COAS wanted Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi to be the Prime Minister.
However, Nawaz Sharif was adamant to accept him. Nawaz Sharif was the President of the
IJI. Therefore, he did not want to surrender. Although he was allowed to make government in
the centre but this used to remark that the post-poll rigging later on prepared a ground for his
removal in his first term in office in April 1993.
2.12. Analysis of Discussion: Elite Theory in Focus
The transition to democracy just after the death of General Zia ul-Haq implanted
hopes in the democratic loving populace that a new era would start in the polity. However,
such hopes failed to bear any fruit. Both the civilian leaders Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
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alternated with powers in the office from 1988-99. As a matter of fact, the alternation was
characterized with political infighting, corrupt practices, conspiracies, and what not.
Consequently, the so-called decade of democracy failed to take roots in the polity. This sort
of affairs casts shadows of doubts over the role of leadership and raised questions why they
failed to do away with the problems which were inherently democratic in nature.
General Pervez Musharruf, who was himself a coup-maker and had rolled back
democracy in October 1999, had the opinion with respect to the role of civilian leadership
that it was all the mistakes made by politicians and made the state suffered out of their mutual
political infighting from economic and political problems (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 93). This opinion
could be biased but it does help one to look into the role of politicians in the so-called decade
of democracy.
The decade of democracy was characterized with political infighting among political
parties, struggle for power between ethnic and regional forces. Power was organized into a
number of stakeholders. The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was an ex-civil servant, was
pro-Zia and military. Mirza Aslam Baig was the COAS. Nawaz Sharif, who was the CM of
the Punjab, was a staunch political opponent of Benazir Bhutto. Benazir Bhutto, who was the
daughter of ex-prime minister ZA Bhutto, was an entrant in politics and had remained PM
twice. And finally, there were the regional and ethnic forces in the provinces of Sindh and
Baluchistan which sought provincial autonomy (Kap, 1991, p. 150).
Benazir Bhutto appreciated the role of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the
COAS while accepting her person as the Prime Minister of the state. This brought an end to
their mutual enmity after years of opposition (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 132). This behaviour stands
witness to their belief in democratic values. Benazir Bhutto, despite possessing majority, was
not allowed with ease to form government in the centre. Her appreciation also speaks volume
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about her political acumen and belief in public verdict. Power was the main goal for which
everything even including political morality could be compromised.
The relations between Benazir Bhutto and civil-military leadership deteriorated soon
after she assumed the office. She described this sorry situation in such words. “Phone calls
were being misdirected, files going missing, her own servants blackmailed by General Hamid
Gul‟s ISI” (Lamb, 1991, p. 39).
The political scene in the polity was characterized by confrontation, political squabble
in the so-called decade of democracy. Benazir Bhutto assumed the office in 1988 and soon
locked into confrontation with her rivals. The confrontation was bitter, nasty, and for the sake
of power only. There were many problems the state was faced with. However, they remained
unattained on account of this mutual infighting and rivalry. The Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto too much dependence on the military diverted her attention from national and
international issues. She failed to tackle economic problems. She also failed to address the
issue regarding women. The back-door politics was mainly responsible for this sort of affairs
and the PPP was no exception to this (Ziringan, 1990, p. 127).
“Nawaz Sharif‟s performance reminded many Pakistanis of the authoritarian patterns
experienced during the Zia period” and also his “seemingly open call to the president and the
armed forces to intervene in domestic political affairs” show his belief in democracy. Benazir
Bhutto had risen to power because of her mandate from the people. A year after her coming
to office, Ziring pointed to her “apparent reliance on the armed forces (Ziringan, 1990, pp.
129-130).”
The elections held in 1988 set political trends for the next eleven years in the politics.
Benazir Bhutto was new in politics and had zero experience in the statecraft when she took
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the office of Prime Minister in 1988. She was the daughter of ZA Bhutto. She was a college
student when he was the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1970s. In addition to, the PPP
remained in opposition against military-cum-civilian government for eleven years or so. Its
leadership and workers were either tortured or jailed. The politicians, who had started their
political career during the days of her father, either did not like her as she was the daughter of
ZA Bhutto or adamant to extend their support as she was too young.
Besides, the veterans of the PPP joined hands with army for the sake of political
gains. Consequently, Benazir Bhutto had only an inexperienced lot in her camp. On top of
this, the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the COAS Aslam Baig, and most importantly Nawaz
Sharif considered her as their main opponent in the politics since the day one. The Islamists
also had reservations over her and opposed her faith and patriotism vigorously (Haqqani,
2005 , p. 133).
Qazi Hussain Ahmed of the JI had the opinion that Benazir Bhutto should not be
criticized on the basis of being a westernized woman and on her gender that she could not
lead an Islamic state. He substantiated his stance with as the mandate that she had of the
majority of the people who had bestowed their trust in her person. So, she was not a problem
for them as she was demonized. However, her stance on national security issues could not be
underestimated. He advised the IJI to criticize Benazir Bhutto on the basis of security issues
and considered her person a security risk to the state, to its nuclear programme, and to jihad
in Afghanistan (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 134).
From the start, Benazir Bhutto failed to create workable relations with the provincial
governments. Her government‟s relations with the province of Baluchistan remained
deteriorated throughout her first term in office. In the same way, she had no good relations
with the Punjab. Besides, Cities in her home province Sindh were engulfed in violence, chaos
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and anarchy. On top of all these, she and her family were accused of corruption and
embezzlement. She earned the enmity of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan when she
replaced the ISI Chief General Hamid Gul and announced the JOCS Admiral Sirohy‟s
retirement (Yasmeen, 1994, p. 573).
Benazir Bhutto, when came into power, put stress on having good relations with the
USA. The Islamists and the military had the contrary view and opposed relations with the
USA. In the meeting of IJI, JUI leader Maulana Sami ul-Haq opined at the person of Benazir
Bhutto and her political acumen. He said, “Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons capability simply
cannot be safe under the leadership of a westernized woman. She cares more for American
approval than for ensuring the Umma’s first nuclear bomb (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 139).”
The COAS Aslam Baig accepted the nuclear programme publically. The USA
resented this open realization. He had no political cover. However, he had the opinion that
Benazir Bhutto would take the responsibility for the statement. Contrary to his hopes, she did
nothing of the sort. This open acknowledgement made the USA apprehensive about Benazir
Bhutto‟s role too. She failed to restrain the COAS from the nuclear programme.
Once the USA acquainted that she had no control on army. It did not put any weight
against to resist her removal from power. Its protest almost disappeared when democracy
was derailed in the state. According to Haqqani, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan confided
that the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto‟s government had come from the military (Haqqani,
2005 , p. 140). However, the COAS Aslam Baig proclaimed that he “was not instrumental” in
Bhutto‟s removal and that “it was the president‟s decision (Ali, 1995, p. 13).”
The ISI worked to dismiss Benazir Bhutto‟s government when she took the office of
the Prime Minister. It even bought the loyalties of the members of the PPP who were once
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hard-times associates. Now they had the opportunities to take advantage of the situation.
Besides, her husband, Asif Zardari, was involved in kickbacks and shady deals. This also
provided the ISI with an opportunity to propagate her husband corruption stories in the
public. In such circumstances, the IJI also worked side by side in building the perception of
the public about the corruption being done by the PPP (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 140).
It is relevant to refer to those cases which were registered against Benazir Bhutto and
her husband Asif Zardari when her government was dismissed in 1990. None in those cases
proved against them. Roedad Khan was made the head of the special Accountability Cell to
look into those cases. Roedad Khan was a retired bureaucrat. However, he failed to prove any
case against them till 1993 when Nawaz Sharif‟s government was dismissed on the similar
charges of corruption. In the end, the cases were dropped without any success (Yasmeen,
1994, pp. 577-578).
There was conflict over who would take the office of the Prime Minister. The COAS
Aslam Baig sought Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi to be the Prime Minister. However, Nawaz Sharif
had the support of General Hamid Gul and several other Generals who threw their weight
behind him on the basis of ethnicity. The Punjabi Generals wanted Nawaz Sharif to be the
Prime Minister. In the elections held in 1990, the IJI had landslide victory in the Punjab. To
make this victory a basis for his claim, Nawaz Sharif proclaimed that the Punjab gave its
verdict in favour of him and wanted him to be the next Prime Minister. Besides, he
acknowledged in public that he had the support of the Punjabi Generals. The house of the IJI
was divided on who should be the Prime Minister. However, in the end Nawaz Sharif became
the Prime Minister in November 1990 (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 141). This symbolizes that how
elites struggle for power without any care for group loyalties.
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Sharp differences emerged between Nawaz Sharif and the President Ghulam Ishaq
Khan over naming the successor of the COAS Asif Nawaz. In the meantime, the President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan nominated General Waheed Kakar-a Pashtun general- as the COAS.
After setting-aside the issue of the COAS, the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan sought to settle a
score with Nawaz Sharif. The relations between them went on deteriorating with passage of
time. General Waheed Kakar like his predecessor Asif Nawaz tried his best to minimize the
role of the military in the political affairs. However, he failed to translate his wish. He played
his role to bring the two to resign from their respective positions (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 144).
The military is thought in the state of Pakistan as the king-maker and behind-the-scene
manipulator. The political scenario of the state is famous for behind-the-scene manipulation.
Such shady games are played with too much decorum and decency.
Nawaz Sharif proclaimed himself to be the flag-bearer of the Quaid-e-Azam‟s
principles on the Independence Day (14th
0f August). On Zia‟s death anniversary, he also
proclaimed himself to be the guardian of the legacy of General Zia ul-Haq. He failed to pay
any heed to this matter that the Quaid-e-Azam was a democratic and General Zia ul-Haq was
a dictator (Khan, 1993, p. 131). Nawaz Sharif was so mesmerized in his authority that he
even failed to differentiate between a democrat and a dictator. For him both were respectable
without considering their thinking about democracy. How can a democratically elected prime
minister praise a dictator who had no regard for democracy? Such thoughts exhibit his belief
in democracy. Besides, he openly promised to protect the legacy of Zia.
Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of ZA Bhutto, and her assumption of the office of Prime
Minister of Pakistan as the Premier was not less than that of the dynastic succession. She
held meeting with the COAS Aslam Baig on 23rd
November on dinner. It was the
acknowledgement of the military elites‟ importance in the politics of Pakistan. In the
meeting, she agreed to the proposal of the constitution of Defense Council. The President of
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Pakistan would head the council in her place. The service and intelligence chiefs would make
up as members of the council. Besides, she also agreed not to make any reduction in the
defense budget. She agreed to not to bring her candidate against the acting President Ghulam
Ishaq Khan who was vying for the Presidency. She too gave her assent to keep continued
Sahebzada Yaqoob Khan as the Foreign Minister and would not halt policy regarding
Afghanistan Issue. It is worth mentioning that Sahebzada Yaqoob Khan belonged to the ML-
led IJI ( 1988, p. 2611).
Despite other problems faced to Benazir Bhutto, Asif Zardari, her husband became an
additional liability for her, who sought to have prominence in the political affairs of the state
and wanted his presence to be recognized in the politics. His presence in the meetings or on
foreign tours the civil-military bureaucracy disliked. They thought his presence to be
unnecessary and uncanny. In the same way, the public was also apprehensive about Asif
Zardari‟s that type of presentation. He was a constant source of embarrassment for Benazir
Bhutto as the officials used to resent his presence particularly at the official briefings
(Kamran, 2008, p. 145). This shows that how elites use the public office.
Zardari earned the name of swindle within no time. He used the office of the Prime
Minister making shady deals, sell permits and licenses of industries and blessing his friends
with favours. This earned him the little of Mr. Ten percent. It distorted the image of Benazir
Bhutto in the public. This not only made the way for her dismissal but also tarnished the
PPP‟s image as the political party (Kamran, 2008, pp. 145-46).
In the first term, Nawaz Sharif gave a lot of attention to the private sector. Private Air
lines were setup. He also founded the Privatization Commission headed by Gen.Saeed Qadir.
Its mandate was to put on the sale the sick units in the public sphere to the private ownership.
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As a result of this privatization drive, the Muslim Commercial Bank was sold to the private
firm, the Chinioti-Punjabi Mansha, Saphire group (Talbot I. , 2005, p. 320).
In the name of Privatization, the political elites entertain the interests of their groups
and involve the other groups of elites giving them opportunities to take advantage of the
situation like power elites in the USA. The elites in Pakistan also entertain the interests of one
another. Making Gen.Saeed Qadir as the Head of the Privatization Commission and the
selling of the Muslim Commercial Bank to his own nominee of the corporate sector are the
significant instances of the power elite theory with reference to Pakistan.
The political leadership of Benazir Bhutto proved to be weak if analyzed her political
inadequacies. She ill planed the movements for democracy and played down her majority as
the PM when she first assumed the office. She followed the footsteps which Gen.Zia-ul-Haq
wanted the politician to follow. She outclassed many while bring the elected representatives
to have their support in the National Assembly as she gave free hand to her husband of what
to do in the PM secretariat (Khan A. A., 1997)”.
The Eight amendment levied effects on the powers and relations between the
president and the prime minister. The president had resolved to keep play dominating role.
Making various appointments increased the space between the two. As a result, the Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif sought to dispense it once for all. However, the PPP struck a deal with
the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan to support him as the president for next term. In return, the
president Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the provincial and national assemblies and
proclaimed elections on 14 July 1993 using his constitutional power under 8th
amendment on
charges of corruption and misgovernace. However, the Apex Court contrary to the traditions
restored the government of Nawaz Sharif on 26th
May 1993. In retaliation, Benazir Bhutto,
the leader of the opposition, proclaimed long march to Islamabad against the government and
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demanded new elections. All this was not short of the musical game being played for power.
Each stakeholder wanted to have power and did not matter which way it was possible to grip.
Each was oblivious to the democratic norms, and values. (Musarrat, 2013, pp. 264-265).
The PML had close relations with Gen. Ayub Khan, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, and Gen. Pervez
Musharraf. This shows the relations between the PML and non-political forces. Similarly, the
PPP, in the opinion of Jamaat, had direct relations with the military regimes of Gen. Ayub
Khan and Gen.Yahya Khan. It was the PPP who brought Gen.Zia-ul-Haq to the covet post of
the COAS but he struck back at it, and confrontation started between him and the PPP.
Moreover, after Gen. Zia-ul-Haq‟s death in 1988, it was Gen. Aslam Baig and Lt.Gen Asad
Durrani who played an important role in bringing her to power in 1988 elections.
Benazir Bhutto too awarded them with public appreciation for their role in the so-
called restoration of democracy and awarded Tamgha-e-Jamhooriat to Aslam Baig (the
COAS). In addition to, it was the political parties that started clan based (biradari based)
politics for their own purpose. Before independence, the PML was a group of some wealthy
family, and it even remained under their influences after independence. Thus, biradari based
politics provided not only strength to the political parties but it also provided leadership to the
political parties. Bhuttos, Paghares, Lagharis, Mangales, Khan and Sherpoas are worth
mentioning (Ahmed, 2009, pp. 111-113).
During her first term in office, two things distracted Benazir Bhutto. First and
foremost, she sought to govern all the opposition parties. Secondly, she allowed her husband
Asif Zardari to use her political powers, who used those powers for personal gains. Ghulam
Ishaq Khan dismissed her government in the light of the prevailed circumstances. Despite the
fact, he was elected for the next five years by the PPP. However, Benazir Bhutto, later on,
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realized that his election as the president by her political party was her political blunder
(Khan Faqir,Fakhrul Islam and Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015, p. 204).
Nawaz Sharif used to say that the IJI government sought to have long lasting, most
positive, and well thought out democratic tradition both within and without the parliament.
However, all such claims were only wishful thinking and never were materialized. The
government worked via ordinances from 1990 to April 1993. The worst of the matter was that
total 78 ordinances were promulgated out of which 28 were not even sent to the cabinet
violating the constitutional obligation. Such dismal sort of situation made the parliament
rubber-stamp instead a body whose sole authority was to make and remake laws. The rule of
the IJI was also of worst type and there was no rule of law.
Favoritism was the order of the day. This was used arbitrarily for personal purpose
and flounder the law. The MNAs and MPAs were hardly arrested if found guilty. The
corruption was rampant. The affluent people got monetary benefit in land scam as well as in
banks or financial scams without any check from the government to patch the rent. The
government made Commission to probe Cooperative Financial Companies scams. But
however, no fruitful results were met. Moreover, to show case the public favor, the
government representatives used to distribute cheques among the effectees on TV to show
that government constituted commission were doing enough. However, both the government
and the opposition accused each other of these scams and held responsible for them one
another. Such blame game did nothing fulfilling the loss been incurred on the masses (Khan
Faqir,Fakhrul Islam and Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015, p. 204).
Benazir Bhutto becomes involved in controversy and conformation with the president
and the military, over the retirement of admiral Sirohey. Admiral Sirohey was appointed as
Chief of staff Committee in 1986. He was appointed as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
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Staff committee in 1988. When his three years term as Chief of Staff Committee ended in
1989, the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto sought to retire him on the following grounds. First
and foremost, the president is the appointing authority under the constitution to such post
whereas the prime minister is the retiring authority. Secondly, his retirement was due after his
appointment as admiral in 1989. However, the president and the army had the view that his
retirement was due not after three years as the admiral but, as the chairman JCSC that is
1991. Moreover, the president was both appointing and the retiring authority. This becomes a
thorn in the relations between the president and the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. At last,
Benazir Bhutto let Sirohey continue in his office (The Dynamics of Power: Military, p. 11).
In October 1990, the IJI led by Nawaz Sharif claimed majority in the elections and
made government in the centre. Nawaz Sharif during his 1st term in office, failed to bridge up
the divide between the socio-economic forces and political system. He broke alliances with
the MQM as well as lost the confidence of the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Besides, law
and order situation took most of the part of the state. Corruption by bureaucracy and
politicians pervaded the state. The conflicts between Nawaz Sharif and the president Ghulam
Ishaq Khan were revolved around the 8th
amendment, and the forth coming presidential
elections. As a result, political and constitutional crisis precipitated between them and both
were made resign in 1993 (Haroon, 2004, pp. 383-86).
Benazir Bhutto‟s although campaigned against military dictator but she made pledged
with the military establishment that she would not commit anything that could minimize its
privileges (S.Venkatanarayanan, 1989). It shows that it is the politicians or political
leadership that compromise with the army for their personal advantages. Although before
power, they vehemently speak against the military and its political involvement. However,
coming into power, they compromise for personal interest.
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Despite frequent elections in the state, the political leadership, however, failed to
promote democracy in the polity and an environment that could promote democratic values
and principles. As a result of this, there was a strong inclination towards ill use of democratic
norms and principles that threatened democratic consolidation. Such demeanor, on the part of
leaders, threatened political trends in Pakistan. The government of Nawaz Sharif attempted to
enforce the decision in the light of majoritarian view of democracy without giving any heed
to the view of the minority. This is manifested in his decision in the proclamation regarding
the imposition of Governor‟s rule in the province of Sindh. His, this posture, roused
undemocratic feelings, and damaged the feelings of the smaller provinces resulting in the
formation of PONAM (Shafqat, 1999, p. 282).
Such kind of behaviors on the part of political leaders has produced distrust about
democracy. This disappointment does not mean that democracy is the bad form of
government. But it is related with the undemocratic behavior of the power elites who had
been hoped to make democracy work in the polity. Like a number of democracies, where
aspiration for democracy is strong, however, pro-democratic groups are less. The same is the
case of Pakistan (Shafqat, 1999, pp. 283-284).
2.13. Conclusion
All points considered, it is safe to conclude that mutual rivalries among the power
elites (political elites and non-political elites) put the democratic transition in the state on
stake and floundered democracy for personal gains. In this struggle for power, they even do
not hesitate to join hands with the army in order to bring down their rival. It was this rivalry
for power that none of the governments was able to complete its span of time according to the
constitution. Each government had to leave the office ungracefully. For this state of affairs,
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political elites are held responsible keeping in view their role that provided an opportunity to
the integrated group of elites to take advantage of the situation.
Benazir‟s and Nawaz Sharif‟s first term in office were characterized by the politics of
confrontation, authoritarianism, and of what not. Both the ruling party and the opposition had
been engaged in the so-called politics which was only to promote their personal interests at
the cost of democracy. In addition to this, the role of the opposition was not according to
democratic norms and principles. It made alliances against the ruling party in order to bring it
down and welcomed frequently the undemocratic decisions of the President.
The role of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif during their respective periods in
opposition speaks volume about the behavior of the opposition. Moreover, the hung
parliaments were also a factor in deepening the crisis of democracy during Benazir‟s and
Nawaz Sharif‟s first term in office. If the coalition partners failed to compromise on mutual
interests, the dissident threatened the government to go out of the coalition. As a result, the
ruling party had to suffer from crisis. There was unprecedented rigging of elections in which
the government comprised of the President, the interim set up, and the intelligence agencies
performed their active role.
Chapter: 3
Linking Elite Theory to the Role of Leadership, and Systemic Factors in
the Crisis: Benazir’s and Nawaz Sharif’s Second Term in Perspective
3.1. Introduction:
This chapter deals with the pragmatics of the crisis that resulted in the dismissal of
Benazir‟s and Nawaz Sharif‟s second term in office and how the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif‟s
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government paved the way for military coup in the state. It also explores the reasons of the
rivalry among the elites and investigates how political elites created crisis in order to counter
and outweigh each other. Besides this, it also attempts to find out how systemic factors
played their role prompting the stakeholders to take stock of the situation. Both Benazir and
Nawaz Sharif started their second terms in office amid favourable settings as both had their
trusted confidants as the head of the state in their respective terms in office. However,
differences paved the way for history to repeat itself and their respective governments were
dissolved before the completion of their terms.
3.2. The Public Face of the Crisis of Democracy:
The President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari used his powers under Article 58-2(b) of
the Constitution and dismissed Benazir Bhutto‟s government on charges of corruption,
mismanagement, and maladministration on Nov 5th
, 1996. He accused Benazir Bhutto of the
following charges while dismissing her government: “failed to put an end to extra-judicial
killings, undermining the independence of the judiciary, and corruption, nepotism, and
violation of rules in the affairs of government (Jr, 1997, p. 121).”
General Pervez Musharraf thought the politicians to be responsible for the ills of
democracy in the state. They looted the state on both hands and made it suffer from collapse
via corruption, bad governance and irresponsibility (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 93). In his opinion, the
politicians were involved in the wasting of public money during elections and later during the
sham-democracy from 1988-99. Moreover, he was of the opinion that he had dismissed this
type of democracy and pledged to reform (Talbot, 2003 , p. 202).
After assuming as the Chief Executive of the state, Gen. Pervez Musharraf put all the
blame on Nawaz Sharif‟s government as far as the governance of the state was concerned. He
said: “You are all aware of the kind of turmoil and uncertainty that our country has gone
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through in recent times. Not only have all the institutions been played around with and
systematically destroyed, the economy too in a state of collapse”
www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99oct13/head5.htm ,www.atimes.com/ind-pak/AJ14Df02.html.
Talking about the unrest and deteriorating situation he added. He said, “These
concerns were always conveyed to the Prime Minister in all sincerity, keeping the interest of
the country foremost. My singular concern has been the well being of the country.”
www.caps.af/Doc/StrategicAnalysis-3.doc
Not like the two coups in the past, there was not much hue and cry over the crisis at
the time of this coup. This silence can be related to the cause of removal which had resulted
as a result of the plane hijacking posing treat to the live on board and particularly to the life
of the COAS General Pervez Musharraf. He addressed to the nation for the first time
justifying his coup. He said, “The armed forces have moved in as a last resort, to prevent any
further destabilization. I have done so with all sincerity, loyalty, and selfless devotion to the
country. This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy.” Moreover, he said,
“The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary
to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan. To him, Pakistan was under a
sham democracy which he was not going to allow.” (Kundi, 2003, p. 31).
General Pervez Musharruf addressed the nation on the state-run television just after he
imposed martial law in the state. He said, “Sharif had played around with state institutions
and destroyed the economy and tried to destabilize, politicize, and divide the armed forces
(Rashid, 2009, p. 1).”
3.3. Pragmatics of the Crisis: Benazir versus Farooq Leghari
In the elections held in 1993, the turnout gave Pakistan two-party system as other
parties performed very poor and got almost no seats in the house of 207. The JI took part in
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elections from the platform of the PIF. It got only nine seats of the National Assembly. As a
result of this low turnout, Pakistan moved towards two-party system. The PML (N) got
39.7% of the votes and secured 72 seats of the National Assembly. The PPP got 86 seats and
received 38.1% of the popular vote. Benazir Bhutto formed government in the Centre with
the help of the coalition (Amin, 1994, p. 195).
In the struggle for power, everybody is sincere about his/her own interests. Benazir
Bhutto appointed Farooq Ahmed Leghari as the president because she thought that he would
offer or pose no problems to her rule. She did not want to be victimized by the president
Ghulam Ishaq Khan once again as he earlier had dismissed her government in 1990. She,
therefore, sought to have her own man in the President House which had virtually become a
place of conspiracies. On the other hand, Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari also wanted powers.
So, he easily agreed to take the office of the president. Besides, he had satisfaction that the 8th
amendment was still in practice and he had abundant powers in his hands.
The very amendment was not amended even none struggle to amend as both the
leaders had different views regarding the amendment. With the passage of time, differences
between the Prime Minister and the President emerged especially after the murder of Mir
Murtaza, her brother, further estranged their relations. Benazir Bhutto sought to dismiss him
before using 58-2(b) by him via impeachment. However, he dismissed her government on
charges of corruption and mismanagement (Hussain, 2010, p. 369).
Benazir Bhutto started her second term in office amid favorable conditions. On many
occasions, the President Leghari talked of his power of dissolving the assemblies. However,
Benazir Bhutto took no notice of the President‟s warnings. She considered the President as
her all-time trusted lieutenant and least bothered his role the other way round. However, the
President criticized the government when Benazir was locked in confrontation with the
152
judiciary over the appointment of judges to the High Courts and the Supreme Court. In
addition to this, the President Leghari called this act of the government as an attack at the
independence of Judiciary.
The differences between Benazir and the President Leghari occurred when the later
complained of the law and order situation in the province of Sind in particular and in the rest
of the state in general. However, Benazir least bothered the request of the President. The
situation went from bad to worse when the government of Benazir empowered the state
agencies, and the police to tackle the situation with iron hands. The law enforcing agencies
worked actively under the watch of Home Minister General Nasirullah Babar.
There were widespread indiscriminate fake encounters and the city of Karachi had
been virtually made a ground for pitch battles. The Home Minister was reported to have said
that fake encounters would continue unabated until the activists of the MQM disarm
themselves. This state of affairs took even worst shape when Mir Murtaza Bhutto, the brother
of Benazir Bhutto, was killed in the broad day light by the contingent of the police in
Karachi. In such state of affairs, the government of the day made no serious efforts to find a
political solution to the situation prevailed in Karachi.
The relations between Benazir and the President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari
deteriorated more and more when the former alleged the President in the murder of her
brother Mir Murtaza via police encounter in the broad day light in Karachi in 1996. She had
the opinion that he was killed on the orders of the President Farooq Ahmed Leghari (Rizvi H.
A., 1998, p. 104).
The relations between the President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari and the PM Benazir
Bhutto also deteriorated when the former wanted the proper implementation of Shafi
Muhammadi Case by the Supreme Court. However, Shafi Muhammadi again came with
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severe criticism against the Chief Justice which was resented by the President Farooq Ahmed
Khan Leghari too much. He was of the opinion that Shafi Muhammadi had been the PPP
loyalist and he was supported or backed by the government.
Moreover, the PPP government proposed Pakistan Petroleum limited deal. Among the
bidders, Mr. Sadrudin Hashwani was the chief beneficiary. Mr. Sadurdin Hashwani was a
business tycoon and an hotelier. The president handed down back the draft ordinance aiming
at to set up multi-billion lottery to raise fund for the Pakistan 50th
independence celebrations.
He reiterated that the deal did not look transparent and advised that it must be passed through
the parliament (Abbass, 1996).
Benazir Bhutto was not happy at the president Leghari independent move with regard
to asserting his authority. To teach him a lesson, she included Nawaz Khokhar in her cabinet
as a cabinet minister. She knew well that the president Leghari would resent Nawaz
Khokhar‟s inclusion. Nawaz Khokhar was the man who had proclaimed that the President
Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari was involved in the Mehran Bank scandal (Kamran, 2008, p.
160).
It casts doubts that how a man, who had been the party loyalist for more than two
decades, goes against the leaders of the party. Even more, a question is raised that the Chief
Justice Sajjad Ali Shah was Benazir Bhutto‟s own handpicked nominee for the coveted post
of the Chief Justice of Pakistan breaks her fold and sides with the president Farooq Ahmed
Khan Leghari. The answers might be multiple but two possible might be these. First and
foremost, Benazir Bhutto had no acumen for working relations with the persons of stature,
who sought certain degree of independence. Secondly, the feudal tradition of palace intrigues
and change of loyalties and personalized nature of politics also worth mentioning (Mahmood
S. , ,2000).
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3.4. Benazir, the Opposition, and the Crisis of Democracy:
The opposition was out to criticize the mismanagement of the government. Benazir
Bhutto agreed to the IMF‟s offer in order to save her skin. Besides this, she surrendered the
portfolio of the Finance Minister to Naveed Qamar. Such state of affairs exposed the
weaknesses of the government. The PML (N) and the JI launched a mass agitation and
highlighted the corruption and the mismanagement of the government.
In the autumn of 1994, Nawaz Sharif launched a train march and started this march
from Karachi to Peshawar against the Benazir‟s government. The march was a naked display
of the confrontational politics that had characterized the politics of Pakistan. It was more the
politics between the two rivals. In October, Nawaz Sharif gave a call for another
demonstration. As a result, Benazir arrested many of Nawaz Sharif‟s activists. This action of
the government was condemned widely in the state (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 242).
Benazir Bhutto, in her second term in office, faced with stiff opposition led by the
PML (N). The history stands witness to the matter that both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
confronted each other in their respective terms in power. The opposition of the PML (N) was,
in fact, the repetition of history. In such a situation, the survival of the political process was
depended upon the role of the army in the state. Moreover, circumstances, similar to the past
that had led to the coup, were created in the polity.
That politics of confrontation between the PPP and the PML (N) reached to the lowest
point when the PPP succeeded to replace the coalition government of the PML (N) and the
ANP in the province of the NWFP. The provincial president of the PPP Aftab Ahmed Khan
Sherpao succeeded in winnowing down the loyalties of the independents and of the two of
the PML (N) members of the provincial assembly. As a result, the opposition launched “Save
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NWFP Campaign”. It is worth mentioning that the PPP proclaimed the Governor‟s rule in the
province before forming its government in the province (Amin, 1995, p. 142).
Benazir Bhutto wanted to have normal relations with the establishment who had
dismissed her government in 1990. She even underestimated the political accommodation
with the opposition in the parliament and sought to be in the good books of the establishment.
However, the establishment played duel game. On one hand, it worked against her. And on
the other hand, it showed loyalty and cooperation with her. She refused to accommodate
opposition and even denied having good relations with Nawaz Sharif. This rapture in
relations provided the establishment with an opportunity to use the civilian leadership against
one another.
The significant factors that weakened the position of Benazir Bhutto were the worst
law and order situation in the metropolitan city Karachi as well as inimical relations with her
brother Mir Murtaza Bhutto. Mir Murtaza Bhutto had been in exile for sixteen years. He was
proclaimed as the main architect of the terrorist organization “Al- Zulfikar”. The aim of this
organization was to avenge the ZA Bhutto‟s assassination via terrorist acts from 1980-1984
(Haqqani, 2005 , p. 148). The fact that the MQM had supported the PPP in the election for
the presidency in 1993 and voted in favour of the PPP‟s candidate Farooq Ahmed Khan
Leghari, however, both the parties failed to have agreement on power sharing arrangement in
the province of Sindh.
On not reaching any agreement on power sharing arrangement in the province of
Sindh, the MQM and the PPP provided civil-military intelligence with an opportunity to take
advantage of the situation. As a result, the MQM and the PPP engaged in internecine conflict.
Sectarian violence, the role of the RAW and the conflict between the MQM and the PPP gave
156
birth to the proverbial condition of the war of all against all in Karachi (Amin, 1995, pp.
143-144).
The MQM rallied against the domination of Sindhis and of the Punjabis and counted
their sacrifice for the creation of Pakistan. However, it had no share in the political power of
the state. It is significant to note that it shifted and re-shifted its alliance with the PPP and the
PML (N) in the so-called decade of democracy (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 149).
The JI campaigned vigorously against the government in the summer of 1996. The
campaign was so violent that the JI lost three of its party activists in clash with police. In the
meanwhile, PML (N), the JI, and nine other opposition parties gave call for a strike that had
paralyzed the life in Karachi. The MQM and some other political parties joined hands with
the PML (N) and the JI. With this, the alliance of the opposition enlarged, and the total
number of the political parties reached to 14. They together vehemently protested against the
government and demanded the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto‟s government. The stance of the
opposition parties gained momentum when Mir Murtaza Bhutto was assassinated in the broad
day light in Karachi. It proclaimed that the government could not maintain law and order
situation and must be dismissed (Jr, 1997, p. 120).
In the words of Mohammad Waseem, the yellow cap Scheme and the most publicized
project of Lahore-Islamabad Motorway increased the vote bank of the PML (N). The PML
(J) succeeded to bunch 6 seats in the National Assembly and 18 in the Provincial Assembly.
The PPP, therefore, succeeded to defeat Nawaz Sharif in Punjab via coalition with the PML
(J). Subsequently, Manzoor Wattoo was made the Chief Minister in the Punjab. In the
province of Balochistan, Jamoori Watan party of Akbar Bugti and the PKMAP won elections
in Baloch and Pakhtun belt respectively. Sherpao, with the support of the centre, became able
to bring down the government of Muslim League under Sabir Shah in NWFP (later KP).
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Sherpao broke all records of political tactics that could not be defined in political terms, while
bringing the independents in his own fold in order to win no-confidence vote against Sabir
Shah. Despite the PPP government in Sindh under Abdullah Shah as the CM, the MQM
became a constant thorn from the opposition side. Therefore, Karachi suffered from violence
during three years of Benazir Bhutto‟s rule (Kamran, 2008, p. 155).
Besides, the crisis of economy, the PPP was suffering from crisis on political level
too. The real problem for the PPP was the Punjab even still. The Chief Minister Main
Manzoor Wattoo felt a bit cornered and did not withstood the appointment of Faisal Salah
Hayat as a Principle Advisor over his head. The rupture in the relations became visible when
Main Manzoor Wattoo tried to break the chains in the shape of the PPP appointee over his
head. In the words of Ian Talbot, Mian Manzoor Wattoo made secret contacts with the PML
(N) which paved the way for no-confidence vote against him. As a result, he was replaced
with Sardar Arif Nakai who was a seasoned politician from Kasur District, Punjab (Pakistan)
His selection as the CM Punjab ruptured the relations between the President Farooq Ahmed
Khan Leghari and the PM Benazir Bhutto as Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari wanted Makhdom
Altaf to be the CM of the province. He resented too much this decision of the Prime Minister
(Kamran, 2008, p. 159).
Nawaz Sharif was embroiled with the PPP government into his business problems in
1995. All opposition parties seriously considered that Nawaz Sharif should replace Manzoor
Watoo who belonged to the PML (J). Moreover, Manzoor Watoo‟s government was brought
down when fifteen ministers resigned due to his illegal actions. The government of the PPP
imposed Governor Rule in the Punjab till the establishment of pro-PPP government. This
signified unbearable attitude with respect to the opposition parties (Musarrat, 2013, p. 267).
158
The elections to National and Provincial Assemblies were held on 6th
and 8th
October
1993 respectively. Benazir Bhutto‟s PPP made a decisive victory in the National Assembly
elections and clinched 86 seats. 72 and 15 seats came in the lap of PML (N) and Independents
respectively. The MQM boycotted the elections. In the light of the result of the elections that
not any party was able to get clear cut majority. The PPP formed government in alliances
with the PML (J) led by Hamid Nasir Chatta in the center. The PPP also succeeded in the
formation of government in the Punjab and Sindh in alliance with other political parties.
Mian Manzoor Watoo was made the Leader of the House in the Punjab Assembly. Pir Sabar
Shah of the PML (N) with help of NAP made coalition government in the NWFP (later KP)
and became the CM of the province. However, the coalition government of the PML (N) was
dismissed and replaced with the PPP government under Sherpao as the CM (Porte, 1996).
Qazi Hussain Ahmed said that all the parliamentarians of the JI would resign before
Dharna. In-house change would mean give and take. The president Farooq Ahmed Khan
Leghari should help us to change or transform the system. He is not a man who is the part and
parcel of the particular culture within the PPP. The assemblies had to dissolve at any cost.
Qazi Hussain Ahmed appealed to the woman to participate in Dharna along with their
children. Besides, he demanded accountability before the elections. The opposition parties
proclaimed the support of the Dharna. Raja Zafar Ul-Haq met Qazi Hussain Ahmed and
proclaimed his and his party support. The JWP of Nawab Akbar Bugti also announced to
join hands with Qazi Hussain Ahmed in Dharna. Gen Hamid Gul, Imran Khan also
proclaimed to participate in Dharna, However, Hamid Nasir Chetta refused to participate
(Ahmed P. G., p. 601).
The elites do not hesitate to level charges against one another and attempt to dominate
one another when the matter of power is involved. They even invite the army to intervene
into politics in order to dominate the rivals. In Benazir„s second term in office, the opposition
159
led by the PML (N) time and again invited the army to intervene into the politics. Moreover,
Benazir Bhutto expelled her mother Nusrat Bhutto from the PPP when her mother sought her
to leave the leadership of the PPP for her son Murtaza Bhutto who had come back from exile.
In retaliation, Nusrat Bhutto declared that she would not allow the supporters of Benazir
Bhutto to attend the death anniversary of ZA Bhutto. However, Benazir Bhutto was adamant
to attend the event. As a result of the clash between the supporters of Murtaza Bhutto and of
Benazir Bhutto, men of Murtaza Bhutto were killed. Nusrat Bhutto called Benazir‟s
government worse than Zia‟s government. In response, Benazir Bhutto alleged that there
were some RAW agents among the supporters of Murtaza Bhutto who had provoked the
clash (Amin, 1995, pp. 140-141).
The political elites attempt to have the support of the army even at the cost of
maligning their rivals. During Benazir Bhutto‟s second term in office, the Washington Post
published a story consisting of Nawaz Sharif‟s interview in which he revealed that the COAS
had suggested him to make money from drug-trafficking. However, Nawaz Sharif denied to
have given that interview to the newspaper and announced that he would pursue the
newspaper in the court. Although the newspaper stood by its news but that could be an
attempt of the government to despise the opposition in the eyes of the army (Amin, 1995, p.
142).
3.5. Benazir, the Army, and the Crisis:
It is thought that the role of military could not be ignored in the crisis that paved the
way for the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto‟s government in 1996. Since the death of General
Zia ul-Haq in an air crash in 1988, the army did not intervene directly in the affairs of the
state, however, it did play its role behind the scene. The role of General Aslam Baig in 1990
and General Abdul Waheed Kakar in 1993 in their respective tenures in the affairs of the state
160
are significant examples to be considered. The COAS General Jahangir Karamat acted on the
orders of the President Farooq Leghari immediately and deployed the personnel of the army
at important points in Islamabad on Nov 5th
, 1996 in order to arrest Asif Zardari, the spouse
of Benazir Bhutto. It was how the army is involved in the civilian affairs.
Benazir Bhutto‟s government was dismissed in November 5th
, 1996. The military
extended its full support to the presidential decision. Besides, it also apprised the President
Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari of Benazir Bhutto‟s corrupt practices and of growing
resentment about her among the ranks. However, she did not expect that the President would
remove her from the office. The President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari had apprised her of
the military intentions that it wanted her to be removed from the office. On the contrary, the
COAS warned her that the President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari wanted to dismiss her
government. (Khan, 1996).
The President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari made Accountability Commission on the
demand of the military, and the main goal was to end corruption in the state. However, the
Commission acknowledged that it had failed to institute any case on the basis of not enough
evidence against politicians, Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari. Consequently,
the establishment‟s plan to disqualify Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif dismantled. The two-
the PPP and the PML (N) had been the main contenders in the elections held on 3th February
1997 (Burns, 1996).
The COAS Jahangir Karamat sought to remove the misperceptions between the Prime
Minister Benazir and the President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari but he soon realized that
Benazir was adamant to make any kind of reconciliation with the President. In addition to, in
the meantime, the opposition staged a protest and demanded the dismissal of the government.
Consequently, the President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari in consultation with the army
161
dismissed the government of Benazir Bhutto in 1996. The dismissal of the government of
Benazir was in coup style as the army took control of important buildings of the state. It
controlled the PM‟s House and IB Headquarters. The Islamabad Air Port was closed down
for several hours (Rizvi H. A., 1998, p. 105) .
This time, Benazir Bhutto was moving cautiously with regard to relations with the
army and avoided any kind of hostility with the top hierarchy of the army. The retirement of
Chairman of Joint Chief Gen. Shamim Ahmed was managed with tact not like that of the
Sarohi‟s episode. This proved that how much she was cautious about her relations with the
army. In the same way, the selection of the Air Chief and the Naval Chief was made with
ease and without any hue and cry. General Karamat was made the COAS on 12 January 1996
when Gen.Waheed Kakar was retired. In the military and political history, for the first time
the senior most General was made the COAS. His appointment was hailed in all quarter of
the state both political and opinion makers. The military wanted to roll back the operation
clean up in the province of Sindh. Benazir Bhutto approved its decision without any delay.
This brought her in a position to confront the MQM when she accepted their demand
(Shafqat, 1997, pp. 241-42).
Benazir Bhutto tried her best to protect the corporate interests of the army. Besides,
she vehemently worked to have arms from different quarter especially from the USA. She
also withstood the pressure of the IMF and the World Bank to abridge the budget of the
defense. Rather she increased the Defense budget. It was, therefore, the Defense budget had
been increased by one quarter of the total budget during 1993-94. Despite the fact that
Benazir Bhutto sought to make happy the army, she could not be able to complete her term in
office (Kamran, 2008, pp. 157-58).
3.6. Nawaz Sharif’s Second Term: An Analysis of Pragmatics of the Crisis
162
Mian Nawaz Sharif had got sweeping majority in the elections held in 1997. As a
result, he formed government in the center as well as in the provinces. But the differences
between his handpicked COAS and him along with his authoritarianism set a stage for the
military coup on 12th
October 1999. Nawaz Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharruf as
the COAS on the pretext that he had no significant influence in Punjabi-Pashtun dominated
army on account of his ethnicity. So he would not be able to pose any problems for his
government (Rizvi, 1999, p. 183).
Nawaz Sharif made his own way to make government in the center after gaining
sweeping majority in the elections held on February 3rd
, 1997. However, the PPP met with
humiliating defeat in the elections winning less than 20 seats out of the 217 seats of the
National Assembly. Unfortunately, the trust and faith the public had put in his person had
been disgraced with haughtiness via his authoritarian way of governance. In order to
consolidate his position, Nawaz Sharif decided to repeal the 8th
amendment of which he had
been a victim during his first term in office (1990-1993). As a result, he passed the13th
amendment from the parliament. He considered this amendment a safeguard in case of
confrontation with the President (Kukreja, 2007, p. 251).
Nawaz Sharif, in his second term, succeeded to restore parliamentary system in the
state via two important amendments i.e. 13th
and 14th
of the Constitution. With the approval
of these amendments, the Prime Minister became the centre of power and the President
remained only a nominal head with no powers which he had previously enjoyed. Both the
amendments bestowed too much power in the Prime Minister and in the party leader which
could be dangerous if used arbitrarily and without any check (Mahmood, 2000, p. 401). But
the critics were reported to have remarked that all these were aimed at to strengthen his
position as Prime Minister rather than to save democracy from derailment in future.
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In the presence of favorable circumstances at his disposal, Nawaz Sharif committed a
political blunder to lock himself in confrontation with the judiciary. The Contempt of Court
Case was being pursued in the Supreme Court against him in November 1997. The President
and the Parliament in the leadership of Nawaz Sharif were divided on the issue. The former
extended his support to the judiciary whereas the later to the Prime Minister. On top of this,
judiciary was also divided into two blocs. As a result, the three organs of the government
were engaged in confrontation with each other. In such state of affairs, the Chief Justice was
dismissed, and the President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari resigned from the post amid
threats of impeachment. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif‟s party workers invaded the premises of the
Apex Court in 1997 at the time when the proceedings in the Contempt of Court Case were
underway against him. He, although, succeeded in the conflict, however, his disrespect for
rule of law left indelible scars on his belief in democracy.
The senior members of the party were not happy when he ignored them and even not
consulted when Rafiq Tarar was made the President of Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif and his close
associates took the decision who would be the next President of Pakistan. He was so
intoxicated by his authority that he even underestimated the Parliament and reduced its status
to a rubber-stamp parliament. Moreover, he outclassed General Zia ul-Haq in his attempt of
superseding the legislatures who even did not use to know what amendment was in the offing
and forced them to pass an anti-dissent law.
Nawaz Sharif had in his kitchen cabinet senators headed by his father. Being a man
of corporate sector, he was of the belief that everything could be bought out even politicians
and officers. His autocratic nature of politics pushed his political party to the point of break
up, however, the ruling factor was the only reason that kept the party intact. There were
reports to have been mini-rebellion in the party when he introduced Shariat Bill in 1999
without taking into confidence the members of the party.
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The factor which is considered one of the factors of the downfall of Nawaz Sharif was
the issue of governance. There was the rise of sectarian and ethnic violence across the state.
The government of Nawaz Sharif failed to overcome the growth and the sponsorship of this
menace. The city of Karachi, in particular, was in the grip of ethnic violence. The killings and
torturing were rampant and random in the city. Democracy could not be blamed for this
violence. Rather, the politicization of the issue as well as the absence of good governance that
pushed the state into the conundrum was among the reasons (Mahmood, 2000, p. 403). As a
result, the government proclaimed to impose the Governor Rule in Sind on 30th
October 1997
and alleged the MQM for the law and order situation in the province.
Nawaz Sharif, in his second term in office, brought 14th amendment to control and
block the way of corruption and blackmailing at the hands of the party members and the
allies. In the past years, the politicians threatened the parties and the prime ministers with
withdrawal of their support if their demands were not met. Otherwise, they would join the
rival bloc. This culture promoted corruption and kickbacks among the political elites to have
the loyalty of the members and allies.
However, the amendment, many thought, was brought to control the opposition. Nawaz
Sharif arrested those who wrote critical letters against him and also penalized the newspapers
that published them. Najam Sethi and Hussain Haqqani were prominent figures among the
arrestees. The relations between Nawaz Sharif and the President Leghari deteriorated when
Nawaz Sharif was engaged in conflict with the chief justice of Pakistan Sajjad Ali Shah. The
President was on the side of chief justice and provided him with moral support. He was
unable to dismiss Nawaz Sharif‟s government. As a result, he resigned on December 2, 1997.
Rafiq Tarar who was a supreme judge became the President on December 31, 1997
(Wynbrandt, 2009, pp. 247-248). It is worth mentioning that Justice (R) Rafiq Tarar was a
close family friend (Anwar Syed, 1997, pp. 119-120).
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Nawaz Sharif kept continued the cases against Benazir Bhutto. These cases were
instituted by the President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari against her and her husband Asif Ali
Zardari. The Accountability Commission was replaced with Accountability Cell. It was
housed inside the premises of the Prime Minister‟s Secretariat. Its role was enlarged with the
passage of time to hunt down the politicians, businessmen and journalists who were opposed
to Nawaz Sharif (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 155).
Nawaz Sharif antagonized political stakeholders via his autocratic ways. The PPP, in
alliance with fourteen political parties, demanded of him to put an end to the political
victimization and to hold new general elections in the state. The Taliban‟s rise to power in
Afghanistan gave a hope to the Islamists in Pakistan who demanded Taliban type government
in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif sought to increase his powers using Sharia (Islamic laws) over
parliament, judiciary, and provinces (Rizvi, 1999, p. 180).
Nawaz Sharif sought to have rapprochement with India. To materialize this, he invited
Indian Prime Minister Mr. Vajpayee to Pakistan. As a result, Mr. Vajpayee visited Lahore.
However, the military and the Islamists were averse to his policy and resented Mr.
Vajpayee‟s visit. The Islamists especially Jamaat-e-Islami described Mr. Vajpayee as
Pakistan‟s national enemy. It threatened the government to block road roads and held
demonstrations at various points in the city. As a result, several ambassadors went back who
had been invited to the dinner hosted in honour of Mr. Vajpayee. Nawaz Sharif sought to
arrest Qazi Hussain Ahmed. However, he failed to arrest him. As a matter of fact, Qazi
Hussain Ahmed stayed at the army rest house. According to the news of the Urdu daily
Khabrain, the Chief of the MI Major General Ehsan ul-Haq advised the JI to stage protest
against Vajpayee‟s visit (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 159).
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Nawaz Sharif, on the basis of the parliamentary majority, passed the law that
authorized him to supervise the accountability process. As a result, he got convicted those
who had served in Benazir Bhutto‟s government. Besides, he too ignored the judiciary and
wanted to appoint his close aide Saifur Rahman as the Head of the Accountability process.
He employed that authority arbitrarily against Benazir Bhutto and her associates. In addition
to, Mr.Nawaz Sharif got the law passed from the parliament granting the police unlimited
powers in order to deal with the growing ethnic violence in Karachi and in the Punjab. As a
result of the law passed recently from the parliament, he formed Special Courts to conduct
summary trials against those involved in terrorist activities. In November 1998, the Supreme
Court declared the establishment of the summary courts in the province of Sindh as illegal.
However, it gave its verdict in favour of the establishment of the Special Courts on February
17th
1999 (Jan, 1999, p. 181).
The relations between the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the President Farooq
Ahmed Khan Leghari deteriorated over the appointment of the governor of Sindh. The PML
(N) sought to appoint the candidate of the MQM as the governor whereas the president
wanted Lt.General Moeen Uddin Haider as the Governor of Sindh.The relations saw low ebb
when Nawaz Sharif was compelled to give Senate ticket to the President Farooq Ahmed
Khan Leghari‟s relative Maqsood Leghari. Nawaz Sharif was the most powerful Prime
Minister after Z.A Bhutto. He was, in a position, to take up quarrel with the President Farooq
Ahmed Khan Leghari and consequently, he took that. As a result, the President Farooq
Ahmed Khan Leghari resigned on December 2, 1997 (Kamran, 2008, p. 165).
3.7. The Crisis of Democracy: Nawaz Sharif versus the Opposition
The PML (N) and the MQM, although, had no soft corner for one another but the
factor of the PPP brought them into an alliance. Both considered the PPP as a common
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enemy and wanted to keep Benazir Bhutto out of power. The PML (N) and MQM alliance
was the classic example of dictum which says that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
However, their alliance broke down when the MQM sought to implement the agreement
agreed upon in February, 1997. The MQM left ministries both in the center and province to
register complain as the PML (N) had not paid any heed to it in the decision making. Besides,
the MQM demanded an enquiry into the killings in Karachi via the UN. The government,
although, managed to bring them back into alliance but the differences soon cropped up over
the law and order situation in Karachi. The ANP also withdrew its support from the
government of Nawaz Sharif when his government failed to meet the demand of renaming
the province of the N.W.F.P as Pakhtunistan. On top of this, the unilateral support of the
government to the Kalabagh Dam also widened the gulf between the two. Moreover, the 15th
amendment also jeopardized the working relationships between the center and the provinces
(Kukreja, 2007, pp. 252-254).
Besides, Nawaz Sharif unilateral decisions and underestimating the COAS‟ request of
the formation of the NSC amid the fragile situation the state was passing through in terms of
deteriorating economic conditions and external security threats gave birth to differences
between the two. The COAS‟ request was resented. It was, therefore, The COAS General
Jahangir Karamat instead of apologizing preferred to resign.
Nawaz Sharif directed the military top brass “to proceed against the principal actors in
this episode and get rid of them.” On the other hand, Musharraf had the obvious knowledge
that “if heads were to roll, his would be the first (Qadir, 2002, p. 29).” As a result, General
Pervez Musharruf toured extensively across the garrisons in order to explain his position on
the Kargil Issue as well as to retain their trust in his person. The Islamist political parties also
agitated against Nawaz Sharif and his government with placards that proscribed: “Remove
Nawaz, save the country‟ and „Kargil retreat is betrayal” (Reuters, 1999).
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On 10 October 1999, in the light of the Washington Post report, the relations between
Nawaz Sharif and the military top brass suffered from deterioration over the former decision
to withdraw immediately from Kargil. This decision virtually put the military in opposition to
the government. The report further explained that the military spokesman Brigadier Rashid
Qureshi “acknowledged „dissatisfaction‟ in the army over Sharif‟s decision to pull back from
the border, but he insisted the military is eager to work with civilian officials to save Pakistan
from disaster” (Constable, 1999).
It was publically known that Nawaz Sharif style of government was highly
personalized. It was confined to only few close associates. The cabinet had only two briefings
on the Kargil issue, however, it failed to discuss its political fallout, and the party leadership
as well as the government was less prepared to tackle the situation diplomatically. Moreover,
he failed to develop broad based consensus with the main political opposition that is the PPP
regarding any national crisis. The Lahore Peace Process was on such occasion where the
government failed to develop prior consensus with the opposition parties including its former
regional coalition partners like the ANP, MQM and BNM.
Nawaz Sharif, instead of trusting party leadership, trusted his brother Shahbaz Sharif
(the CM of the Punjab) to manage the crisis arising out of the Kargil issue. This shows that
Nawaz Sharif too much believed in nepotism and personalization. Shahbaz Sharif performed
as the spokesperson of the government in the post Kargil phase. He was criticized along with
the credibility of the government by the opposition. Besides, he had the portfolio of the
Defense Minister. Many of the opinion that he had allowed PML ministers such as Chaudhry
Nisar, Mushaid Hussain, and his brother Shahbaz Sharif to interfere in the affairs of the army.
This interference was resented among the ranks.
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Both Nasir and Shahbaz Sharif acted as messengers between the Prime Minister and
the GHQ. This type of situation between the government and the GHQ gave way to thoughts
to analyze the circumstances between Kargil issue and the October 1999 coup. Shahbaz
Sharif‟s role as a broker and crisis manager touched pinnacle when he along with the ISI
Chief Lt. Gen Ziauddin visited the USA from 14-25 September 1999 and assured their hard
stance against the Taliban and pledged to hunt down Osama Bin Laden. They also registered
their reservation against the possible overthrow of Nawaz Sharif government by the army. In
response, the writer quoted an American official who said, “We hope there will be no return
to the days of interrupted democracy in Pakistan.” (Shafqat, 2009, pp. 302-03).
Nawaz Sharif failed to find any solution to the growing violence between the Para-
military forces and the supporters of the MQM. As a result, he declared a state of emergency
in the province of Sindh on 28 May 1998 to put hand on the problem. However, he failed to
get any success even instituting the state of emergency. In the meantime, an alliance in the
name of PONAM was established under the leadership of Ajmal Khattak in October 1998.
This movement demanded a confederation under a new constitution on the base that the
existing state was under the sway of the Punjab.
In addition to, another alliance in the name of GDA was formed, which struggled to
remove the Nawaz Sharif from power in March 1999. The alliance consisted of nine parties
including the PPP. In the presence of such situation, Nawaz Sharif was locked with the
military into conflict over transfers, promotion and sacking. Those factors combined worried
the military (Indurthy, 2004, p. 263).
The Kargil conflict put a lot of effects on the politics of the polity. The national level
political parties especially the PML (N) and the PPP remained silent over the issue. However,
the religious parties contested the issue and attempted to take mileage from the issue to cater
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for public support. It made comments about the army role in the affairs. They had of the
opinions that the army got meaningful achievements in the battle, however, Nawaz Sharif lost
them on the political grounds who succumbed to the Indian-induced US pressure and called
back the troops from the strategic position. After the Washington Declaration, they
vigorously demanded Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resignation or removal. As a result of
such situation, the political parties and political process lost credibility in the eye of the
military. At the elite level, the Kargil conflict deteriorated relations between the ruling PML
(N) and the religious parties (Shafqat, 2009, p. 281).
3.8. Causes of Rivalry: Nawaz Sharif versus Musharruf
After consolidating his position while repealing the Presidential powers of dismissal,
Nawaz Sharif succeeded in getting passed an amendment to the Constitution. In the light of
the said amendment, the member of the legislature if go against the discipline of his
respective political party, he would be disqualified and would not be liable to challenge his
disqualification in any court of law (Syed A. H., 1998, p. 119). The amendment made this
certain that the members of Nawaz Sharif‟s parliamentary party neither could speak nor vote
against him. Otherwise, they would lose their respective seat in the Parliament.
Nawaz Sharif paid no attention to General Karamat‟s advice to put an end to
polarization, vendettas, and wrong policies. Rather he advised the COAS General Karamat
either to resign or proclaim a coup. General Karamat, by nature, was not a coup-maker and
had acumen of character in his person. In such a state of affairs, he resigned from the
ostentatious position of the COAS prior to the due date of his retirement. Nawaz Sharif had
consulted his friends in order to nominate the COAS‟s successor in the event of much
anticipated resignation of General Karamat. He nominated General Pervez Musharruf to be
the next COAS.
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General Pervez Musharruf belonged to the Muhajir community and hailed from
Karachi. He superseded two senior generals and was made COAS on 28th
October. Mr.
Asghar Kidwai was the common friend of Nawaz Sharif and of General Pervez Musharruf.
He had played a significant role to cobble the relations between them. As a result, Nawaz
Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharruf as the COAS. Asghar Kidwai was a banker and
was the main protagonist in the Mehran Bank Scandal. The scandal was concerned with the
ISI‟s role in the distribution of money among the members of the IJI during the general
elections of 1990. It is worth mentioning that Nawaz Sharif was the head of the IJI. It is also
equally important that Nawaz Sharif appointed Mr. Asghar Kidwai as an ambassador to
Kenya. He even remained ambassador during Pervez Musharraf‟s regime (Haqqani, 2005 , p.
158). Chaudhry Nisar also pleaded for Gen. Pervez Musharraf to be made the COAS
(Mahmood N. , 2017, p. 6).
Nawaz Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharraf while superseding two senior
Generals of Pakhtun and of Punjabi origin. General Pervez Musharraf belonged to Muhajir
community and Nawaz Sharif was of the opinion that he would not be a trouble maker.
However, the differences between the two emerged on Kargil issue. In a bid of face saving,
they put its responsibility upon one another. The Kargil operation broke the ties between
Nawaz Sharif and the army. Nawaz Sharif was blaming the army as it kept him completely
ignorant about the issue (Sattar, 2007, p. 259). So, on the Kargil Issue, political leadership
and military establishment engaged in accusation and counter-accusation.
That sort of affairs brought the two sides to a political crisis which could only be
defused if one side had removed the other from the power echelon. On top of that, the general
impression prevailed among the masses that Benazir and Nawaz Sharif both in their terms in
office played such havoc with democracy in the state that put the credibility of parliamentary
democracy at stake (Tonchev, 2003, p. 10). In such circumstances, Nawaz Sharif attempted to
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remove the COAS, and appointed the ISI chief Lieutenant General Ziauddin. The COAS
General Pervez Musharraf was on state visit to Sri Lanka. However, his subordinates acted,
and dismissed his government unceremoniously on 12th
Oct, 1999 (Kukreja, 2007, pp. 255-
257).
On taking charge as the Prime Minister in 1997 Nawaz Sharif took the risk going
against the military establishment seeking an amendment to the Constitution in order to
dispense the all-powerful President of the right to dissolve the assemblies at his personal
whim. The military leadership regarded the move of the Prime Minister as an attack on their
interests. That brought Nawaz Sharif closer to his political end (Tonchev, 2003, p. 10).
The army was not happy at the resignation of General Karamat in 1998. This made
the position of Nawaz Sharif weak as there were public rallies that criticized the policies of
his government. He had the gut feelings of the imminent coup. He took safety measures
beforehand and replaced the COAS when he was on visit to Sri Lanka. However, his action
prompted the coup rather than avoided (Wynbrandt, 2009, pp. 251-252).
General Pervez Musharraf had the apprehensions that the COAS would be changed as
a result of the Kargil misadventure. He, therefore, made a plan before proceeding onto
foreign visit. His companions of the Kargil misadventure were taking care of the plan. In the
meantime, Nawaz Sharif played an ill-fated card and changed the COAS. He appointed
Lieutenant General Ziauddin as the COAS. However, his government was dismissed, and
martial law was imposed. In addition to that, the martial law in 1999, as a matter of fact, was
perpetuated by Generals who were the part of the Kargil misadventure and who wanted to
save their jobs (Ahmed S. S., 2016). This show how elites struggle for power even putting
principles at stake for personal gains.
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The President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari and the army had become apprehensive
of the dictatorship of the Prime Minister. The President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari had no
balancing powers over the Prime Minister other than of the judiciary‟s. At the behest of the
Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari and the COAS General Karamat, the Chief Justice Sajjad Ali
Shah girded up to confront Nawaz Sharif (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 156).
After Atal Behari Vajpayee‟s Lahore visit, the army was seriously concerned about
Nawaz Sharif‟s personalized and erratic decision-making style and was thought improper for
Pak-India relations. It had thoughts that they could damage the security of the state. Robert
Wirsing‟s recent account stood witness to this institutional clash during March and June 1999
(Wirsing, 25–36).
In the words of Owen Bennett Jones, during a mid-September corps commanders
meeting, “the generals decided that the army could not move without clear justification. But
if Sharif tried to sack Musharraf, the corps commanders agreed, and then they would act: to
lose two army chiefs in the space of a year would be unacceptable.” (Jones, p. 39).
After mid-September core commander meeting, Lt. Gen Tariq Pervez, the Corps
Commander of Quetta, met in private with Nawaz Sharif. He apprised him of the matter that
if he had dismissed Pervez Musharraf from the COAS position, the military would retaliate.
As a backdrop, Nawaz Sharif sent Shahbaz Sharif and Lt. Gen Ziauddin on visit to
Washington to get support of the USA. As a result, he received supporting statements from
the US officials on 20 September against the intervention of the army. Pervez Musharraf was
made the Chief of the Joint Committee of Staff in October. This move was either to make
Pervez Musharraf happy or providing an easy outlet to him from this coveted position.
Pervez Musharraf demanded immediately resignation from Lt. Gen Tariq Pervez after
knowing his back-door contacts with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (Shafqat, 2009, p. 304).
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During Nawaz‟s second term in office, General Pervez Musharraf sought to revive the
direct role of the army in the affairs of the state. Without the prior permission of the Prime
Minister, the general crossed the LOC in Kargil sector and engaged India. The pressure of the
USA on the Sharif‟s government helped withdraw forces from Kargil. As a result of that
withdrawal, the general got angry and staged a coup in October 1999 and sent Nawaz Sharif
on exile (Naidu M. , 2002, p. 99).
The cause that initiated political crisis belonged to when Nawaz Sharif made General
Karamt resign in October 1998 before his retirement. This gave birth to resentment between
the military and political leadership in the person of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The
Ex-Chief was the chairman of CJCSC which is the supreme body of the forces. This
committee consisted of the three service chiefs wherein the senior most replaces the outgoing
chairman by rotation. However, Nawaz Sharif kept the post of chairmanship vacant for five
months from November 1998 to March 1999. This was another indicator of resentment in the
relation between the political leadership and the military.
One another reason that deteriorated relations between Nawaz Sharif and Gen. Pervez
Musharraf was the appointment of Lt. General Ziauddin as the DG ISI without informing
Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The DG ISI reports directly to the Prime Minister and the two have
close relations with each other. In other words, the DG ISI not only provides intelligence
information regarding external and internal politics, but also acts as a political advisor to the
Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif did not show any kind of trust in the person of Gen. Pervez
Musharraf. This lack of trust became evident when Gen. Pervez Musharraf was adamant to
appoint joint chief until April 1999.
In the light of reports, the joint chief was to make the operation head of Nuclear
Command and Authority and the post was to upgrade from three stars General to the full four
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stars General and to bring it at par with the COAS. If that plan was implemented, General
Ziauddin might have been made the COAS and Gen. Pervez Musharraf the CJSC. However,
the adventure in Kargil deteriorated the relations between the army and the Prime Minister to
a point of no return (Chengappa, 1999, pp. 1437-38).
Nawaz Sharif‟s rough dealing of the army set new trends in the political history of
Pakistan. It was against the backdrop of the political history of the polity as most of the time,
the civilian governments were sent home by the military-civil-bureaucracy oligarchy. The
trend set the supremacy of the civilian over the army which was forlorn thought in the polity
of Pakistan (Kamran, 2008, p. 167).
Nawaz Sharif played an ill-fated card when he dismissed Gen. Pervez Musharraf from
the post of the COAS on 12 October 1999 and appointed the ISI director Lt. Gen- Khawaja
Ziauddin as the new COAS. He was a close-family loyalist (Kamran, 2008, p. 174).
Moreover, General Pervez Musharraf brought the issue to front which antagonized the army
in the real sense of the word. He was of the opinion that Nawaz Sharif had sought to weak the
army. He added further that “All my efforts and counsel to the government it seems were of
no avail. Instead, they now turned their attention on the Army itself. Despite all my advices,
they tried to interfere with the armed forces, the last remaining viable institution. Our
concerns were conveyed, in no uncertain terms, but the government of Nawaz Sharif chose to
ignore all these and tried to politicize the Army, destabilize it and tried to create dissension in
the ranks.” www.hinduunity.org/articles/politics/howpakigotrifodsharif.
The personal tussle between Nawaz Sharif and Gen. Pervez Musharraf made the
former to dismiss the later from the coveted position of the COAS. This dismissal bounced
back in the form of coup. Such feuds provided space to corruption and to politicians in order
to realize their vested interests. Consequently, the bad governance becomes the norm of the
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day, and bureaucrats and other civil servants failed to deliver to the masses (Mackenzie, p.
106). It is held that the military interfered in the politics as it realized that Nawaz Sharif had
attempted to distort its significant position in the polity (Chadda, 2000).
Over the growing ethnic problems and economic deterioration, General Karamat said,
“we could not afford polarization, vendetta and expedient policies”. The Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif showed resentment over his statement. However, General Karamat was
reluctant to go back on his statement or to take his statement back and resigned from the post
of COPS three months before his retirement. Nawaz Sharif took advantage of this
appositively and appointed General Pervez Musharraf (an Indian immigrant) superseding two
senior generals both of Pakhtoon and of Punjabi origins. He was of the opinion that General
Pervaiz Musharraf would be no trouble maker. However, he resented his decision later too
much (Rizvi, 1999, p. 181).
Nawaz Sharif met the President Bill Clinton on 4th
July and agreed to call back the
Pakistan army to the position of the Line of Control. Besides, he accused Gen. Pervez
Musharraf, the COAS, of the Kargil adventure. However, Gen. Pervez Musharraf held that it
was a totally joint decision. Such sort of affairs made Nawaz Sharif think to get rid of
General Pervez Musharraf. He decided to replace him with General Khawaja Ziauddin when
the former was on the plane coming from the foreign visit. However, the army reacted
quickly and deposed Nawaz Sharif and arrested him (Owen, 2002).
The Kargil conflict evokes contradictory images and responses among Pakistani
elites. Nawaz Sharif immediately responded to General Pervez Musharraf‟s assertion with
regard to the Kargil issue and said that he had no knowledge about the Kargil issue. He was
completely kept ignorant of it. He even claimed that he came to know about it via Indian
Prime Minister Vajpayee (Siddique, 2006, pp. 38-39). These allegations and counter
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allegations about the issue remained doubtful and ambiguous. Both civil and military elites
made the facts more and more obscure. Their opinions regarding it remained fragmented.
3.9. Dismissal of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif: The Role of Judiciary
The judiciary did not restore Benazir Bhutto‟s and Nawaz Sharif‟s government in
1996 and 1999 respectively as they both did not enjoy good relations with the judiciary. This
relation will be cleared in the given paragraphs.
Benazir Bhutto embroiled her government with the judiciary when she sought to
appoint judges in 1994. The government appointed twenty judges to the Punjab High Court.
Among which thirteen belonged to the PPP who were jiyallas (political activists) of the PPP
and three belonged to the PML (J), the coalition partner of the PPP. It was a matter of
concern that those appointed judges had hardly any experience at the High Court level.
(Times, 1994)
In 1998, the COAS General Jehangir Karamat revealed his perception on the
problems of governance during the government of Nawaz Sharif and suggested the
constitution of NSC. However, Nawaz Sharif sacked Karamat amid speculation that the later
had sided with the Chief Justice of Pakistan Sajjad Ali Shah and the President Laghari in
1997. The history of association between the judiciary and civil-military bureaucracy even
dates back much earlier to the Tamizuddin Case and the Dosso Case in which the Supreme
Court of Pakistan legitimatized the bureaucratic-military coup in 1954 and 1958 respectively
(Newberg, 1995, p. 31).
Nawaz Sharif engaged himself into conflict with judiciary over the latter drive
towards judicial activism. Actually, the Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah via somoto action
sought to open the cases regarding the government involvement in the wheat shipping
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contract from the USA and alleged illegal distribution of the residential plots by the prime
minister. The latter case made the conflict sharp between the two (Kamran, 2008, pp. 165-
66).
The tussle between Nawaz Sharif the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice of Pakistan
Sajjad Ali Shah got increased when the Apex Court invalidated summary trail courts in the
light of anti-terrorism law in august 1997. As a result, Justice Sajjad Ali Shah was made to
resign from the august office and Justice Saeeduz Zaman Siddiqi was made the Chief Justice
of Pakistan Apex Court. Consequally, Nawaz Sharif became invincible after making the
President and the Chief Justice leave their offices (Kamran, 2008, p. 166).
3.10. Elections, Leadership, Systemic Factors, and the Crisis: An Analysis
The rivalry among the elite groups is more naked in the elections and they leave no
stone unturned to defeat the rival. As a result, elections are not free and fair. In the absence of
free and fair elections, stable democracy could not be established in the polity. Consequently,
those who come into powers least believe in democratic norms and principles.
The elections of 1993 were the subsequent aftermath of the conflict between the
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif wanted to
come out of the influence of the President and his cronies. This set a stage for the removal of
his government by the President by means of his power under Article 58-2(b). The elections
held in 1993 had the same script as that of 1988 and of 1990. However, the characters were
not the same. This time the designers of the elections sought to break the anti-PPP vote. As a
result, the IJI was disbanded.
The votes of the JI were segregated through making a new elite group under the name
of PIF. Fragmentation in the Nawaz League was given air. As a result of fragmentation, the
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PML (J) under Hamid Nasir Chatta was founded. This made weak the votes of Nawaz Sharif
in the Punjab. The JUI was supported to make alliance with the PPP in the NWFP and the
MQM was supported in the province of Sind to refuse to take part in the elections. This
alliance making although, appeared to be the normal routine or process of the elections but
inappropriate indulgence of the state apparatus and intelligence agencies put doubts on the
transparency of the elections.
The polling-day rigging was not of the mark as it had no enormous implications for
the results of the elections. Besides, the post-polling rigging was also of no significance as
Benazir Bhutto did not face any problem in the formation of government in the centre and the
election of Farooq Laghari as the President who was her true confidant. The government of
the PPP was removed in 1996 and elections were held in 1997 by the interim government
under the Prime Minister Malik Miraj Khalid. However, the interference of the President
House and agencies could not be ruled out (Gilani, 2008, pp. 15-20).
3.11. Analysis of Discussion: Elite Theory in Perspective
Sociologically speaking, the military is not a separate entity. It reflects the society like
that of other institutions in the country. Almost all the state institutions including the army are
in the hands of ruling elites. Politics, bureaucracy, and business are actually the most favorite
means for the elites to rule the people on perpetual basis. Politicians, bureaucrats and
corporators are the most enthusiasts about the military intervention because military
interventions best suit to their interests. Actually, no military dictator could afford to
displease these elites, so they become the part and parcel of the military setup to rule the
people. These elites invite the military into politics and take advantages. Besides these, elites
are clones to another and could be found in every other institutions of the state. If the military
intervenes in the political arena, it means, the extension of the same elite‟s hold on power.
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The ruling elites in Pakistan constantly change and new elites enter in the already existed web
of elites and behave in the same way as the other do. There is no break in their chain but only
so-called break to exploit the general masses. The military officials are repaid in the form of
significant careers that is ambassadors, ministers, advisor, special envoy etc after their
retirement. Thus the ruling elites, military, politicians, and corporators entertain one another
interests although present themselves apparently as opponents to the general masses
(Rabbani, pp. 4-9).
Benazir Bhutto became the prime minster in 1988. Her brother Mir Murtaza Bhutto
sought to come to Pakistan. However, she wanted him to get himself clear from the courts in
Pakistan in order to give a message of the rule of law to the public. On the contrary, he
sought to come at any cost whatsoever. As a result, the relations between them aggravated
even further and reached to a point of no return (Bhutto, 1994). Mir Murtaza Bhutto
criticized Benazir Bhutto in the public with vigorous speeches and statements. The media
described this battle between Murtaza and Benazir as “the battle of the Bhuttos (Moore,
1994).”
In the presence of the anarchy in Karachi, Benazir Bhutto decided to deal the situation
in Karachi with iron hand. She sought to “combine the power of the state with the PPP‟s
support base” to flash out “criminals and insurgents (Bhutto, 2005).
The Editor of “the Friday Times” Najam Sethi was of the opinion that “Benazir
Bhutto had its coming. She was an arrogant, reckless, capricious and corrupt ruler who
surrounded herself with sycophants, lackeys and flunkeys and squandered away a second
opportunity to serve the people of Pakistan” (Jr, 1997, p. 121). Bhutto clearly made mistakes
in her confrontation with the political opposition and the judiciary as well as in running the
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government. Her greater mistake, however, might have been to trust the Pakistani
establishment to support her elected government through its full term.
In her second term in office, Benazir Bhutto adopted a juvenile approach towards the
military and the ISI. She decided that she would not antagonize them if she was to stay in
power. She mellowed down her attitude towards them as well as her hard stance on the policy
towards India. In addition to, she supported the Kashmir cause, and accepted the rise of the
Taliban to power in Afghanistan. However, she failed to check the growing corruption as
well as to end animosity with Nawaz Sharif. Moreover, certain quarters mainly Islamists
vehemently demanded accountability of the government from her.
Benazir Bhutto started her second term in office in 1993 with much stronger position
than five years earlier. Her position was strong because the most important province the
Punjab had been in her grip. A majority of analysts had the opinions that this time Benazir
Bhutto would be able to complete her term. Their opinions came to the surface when her
most trusted Lieutenant Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari became the president. He defeated the
acting president by 274 to 269 votes (Waseem, 1994, pp. 191-204).
The struggle for power continued unabated among the stakeholders of the troika and
their associates. Benazir Bhutto re-assumed the office of prime minister in October 1993. The
PPP became successful forming its government in Sindh and in the Punjab. This time, the
PPP seemed to be more invincible than it was in its first term. The PPP candidate for
presidency outclassed his rival faction candidate in the person of Mr.Wasim Sajjad. This
brought into its lap a new era in the politics of Pakistan where the head of government and
the head of the state were expected to toe the same line (Ziring, 1997, p. 550).
Moreover, The President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari gave assent to the long-
standing demand of the military and made National Defense and Security Council. The
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council had the powers to advise the government on security and economic issues. It
consisted of ten members. The President was the head of the council. The Prime Minister,
four cabinet ministers, the chairman of the JCOS, and the chiefs of the three-armed forces
were among the members. The political parties opposed the council, and objected the
political role given to the military. However, Nawaz Sharif‟s PML welcomed the council and
remarked the presence of the army in the council as the stabilizing factor. He did so only to
make sure the favour of the army (Susan Berfield and Shahid-ur-Rehman, 1997).
The opinions are divided on the matter that who was responsible for the Kargil
misadventure. Nawaz Sharif or the military was responsible for this fiasco never resolved
satisfactorily. This blame game, however, in the opinion of Niaz Naik, was, as a matter of
fact, a struggle for power over who really wields power in the so-called democratic Pakistan
(Zaidi, 1999, p. 3173).
It was held that Nawaz Sharif with the President Clinton on July 4th
, 1999 and
subsequent signing of the Washington Declaration put an end to his fate. The public had the
perception about Nawaz Sharif as he had no vision and failed to comprehend the state‟s
interests and national goals. In a number of accounts by significant media person presented
him as a clueless leader. Among them Shaheen Sehbai, the correspondent for Dawn in
Washington DC and Bruce Riedel were significant. Nawaz Sharif was worried over the
developing crisis or mounting crisis. He felt his hold on power weak and was apprehensive of
the army who sought to give tough decision (Sehbai, 1999)
Benazir Bhutto assumed her office and took oath as the Leader of the House on 19th
October 1993. She proclaimed that the state had faced with serious economic problems. She
also realized that the public had lost the confidence in the current political system. She held
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responsible for that loss of confidence the attitude of the politicians. The masses want change
of the system not mere change of the faces she reiterated (Sarwar, 1994).
It was held that the Kargil conflict provided the political and the mainstream political
parties with an opportunity to reconsider their relations with the army and with religious
parties as well as a way for political consensus. However, the political leadership failed to
seize the opportunity. Had Nawaz Sharif after Washington Declaration consulted the political
parties, religious groups and military, perhaps a consensus could be developed over the issue
among the power elites. However, the ruling civilian leadership who was obsessed with
threats to its continued rule spent its energy how to dominate the army (Shafqat, 2009, p.
288).
The president Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, in a letter to the Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto, showed resentment over the draft of the accountability bill. It was passed from the
cabinet and was introduced into the Assembly without prior information to the president. This
was a breach of the article 46 of the Constitution. According to the side article, the Prime
Minister must apprise the president of the cabinet decision and suggestion about legislation.
Nawaz Sharif, the opposition leader, also showed reservation over the draft bill and
said that it was a conspiracy to make judiciary hostage and constitutional institution as
subservient or submissive. In the light of the bill 32 members of the assembly were
authorized to dismiss or send any judge to home forcefully. The accountability of the judges
of the superior court could not be given to Asif Zardari and Nawaz Kokar.
The bill would be resisted at any cost. Benazir Bhutto and his husband would face the
music of accountability. Benazir Bhutto must make this clear on what mission Asif Zardari
had been out of the state. He must resign otherwise she would be made resign forcefully.
Qazi Hussain Ahmed also reiterated if the prime minister was sincere about the
accountability, she must resign and present herself for accountability. Imran Khan had also
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the opinion that the president should dismiss the government and give an opportunity to the
new government (Ahmed P. G., pp. 601-602).
The general public as well as politicians welcomed the coup in 1999 and received
General Pervez Musharruf with high words tagging him with epithets like the saviour of
Pakistan. Importantly enough, even a single member of the deposed ruling PML (N) neither
condemned the coup nor resisted and left the deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif alone
to his fate. It was tragedy that the deposed Prime Minister Nawaz had neither support of the
public nor even of his party members (Rashid, 2009, p. 1).
3.12. Conclusion:
In the foregoing discussion, it is held that circumstances that made democracy
suffered from crisis were as a matter of fact engineered and were mainly out of the struggle
for power among the leadership in collaboration with the systemic factors. Benazir Bhutto
was engaged with the president Farooq Ahmed Khan Laghari over the rivalry for power and
both attempted to dominate each other. She was also engaged with the opposition, the army,
and the judiciary over so-called matters. However, as a matter of fact, each struggle for
power. Similarly, Nawaz Sharif rivaled for powers with the president Farooq Ahmed Khan
Laghari, General Pervez Musharraf, the opposition, and the judiciary. Each concentrated only
on how to consolidate his position and least bothered about democracy. Nawaz Sharif, in his
attempt to make his position more and more invincible sacked the COAS and appointed his
own loyalist. This move put the democracy at stake and was derailed in 1999 in a military
coup. Although there were so-called matters over which there were differences among the
leadership as well as systemic factors but actually each sought to dominate the other out of
struggle for power.
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Chapter: 4
Crisis of Democracy, Role of Leadership, and Systemic Factors: An
Analysis
4.1. Introduction:
This chapter attempts to analyze critically the role of leadership in the person of
Benazir and of Nawaz Sharif in their respective terms in office as the head of the government
and the head of the opposition as well as of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, of Farooq Ahmed Khan, and
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of General Pervez Musharruf who had rivaled for powers. This rivalry produced political
crisis which gave way to the political and apolitical factors of the system to play their role in
deepening the crises. Consequently, democracy was suffered and governments as well as
assemblies were dissolved before their stipulated time allocated in the Constitution.
The chapter also analyzes the role of the systemic factors that influenced the political
system of Pakistan and played their role in deepening the crisis of democracy in the period.
The factors were in fact an integrated group of elites both political and apolitical and played a
decisive role in the crisis of democracy. Besides, it was a perpetual and manipulating factor
in the crisis and worked as a group comprised of political-religious-civil-military-judicial
elites. The group collaborated with the man at the helm on the basis of similar interests
against the common rival.
4.2. Analyzing the Role of Leadership, and Systemic Factors in the Crisis:
Most states in South Asia adopted democracy as a form of political system after
achieving independence from the British in 1940s. Many have the perception that democracy
becomes successful in India and failed in Pakistan in the light of Freedom House survey of
2004. If the number of the registered parties could be an indicator of a real democracy, then
Pakistan must top the list in the democracies of the region. Moreover, the elections-centric
democracy in the region is not an enough indicator of democracy. The reality is the other way
round. This type of democracy has allowed the elites to exploit the people power in order to
further their own interests. The people of influence and of wealth dominate the political
system in most of the states of South Asia. They have no real connection with common
people who are actually the real power brokers. This type of system made democracies
exclusive in the region. The dominant narrow circle of elites consists of landlords,
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bureaucrats, Industrialist, military men etc rules. This reflects the concentration of political
power in the few hands (Baqai, 2005, pp. 45-51).
To a question that why democracy is failed in Pakistan, a Nobel Laureate Amartya
Sen, during his lecture at the University of Cambridge, replied and explained that the
following factors could be identified with the failure of democracy in Pakistan. First and
foremost, the Quaid-e-Azam, who was liberal democrat and was opposed to authoritarianism,
died early and failed to institute that liberal ethos in the new state. Secondly, elites, who
played actively in the establishment of Pakistan when migrated to the new state in the name
of Pakistan, were reluctant to give way to democratic traditions as they had fears of losing the
electoral contests because they had thoughts that they did not possess any roots in their
respective constituencies in the newly adopted state.
Third and most important factor, there was a deadlock between the East and the West
Pakistan leadership. The West Pakistan leadership was fearful of the East Pakistan
dominance in the domain of population as compared to that of the West Pakistan‟s. The East
Pakistan would dominate any legislature on account of its numerical superiority. The West
Pakistan leadership, who had migrated from India, thought that it was they who had helped
create Pakistan. It was, therefore, they did not want to lose power and was shy of ushering in
democracy in the newly established Pakistan as that all meant the dominance of the East
Pakistan.
Fourthly, there was almost no industrialization in the newly established Pakistan. So
there were no social groups which could promote social groups in the state. The landlords
who possessed political as well as economic powers were opposed to the promotion of
democracy in the state. Lastly, the feuding politicians gave way to the civil-military
bureaucracy to have powers in their hands. As a result, the civil-military bureaucracy thought
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itself to be good to take the state on the path of progress. And that was how civil-military
elites became entrenched in the body politic since the independence. Besides, the security
matters with respect to India also provided them an opportunity to strengthen their grip on
powers (Zaidi, 2005, pp. 5173-74).
The rulers, political parties, leaders, and even civil society groups support democracy
only at the conceptual level in the polity of Pakistan. Every politically active quarter seeks
democratic governance and decision making in a political and economic sphere. They think
and suggest free and fair election, rule of law, justice, and accountability across the board for
those who exercise powers. However, it is a tragedy that there are grave problems faced to
such thinking at the operational level in the polity. History stands witnessed to instances
where principles had been flaunted many a time. The majority of the rulers both civilian and
military have employed the power for their personal use and adopted an authoritarian way of
governance. Personal loyalty is of worth acceptance for them. The members follow the
dictates of a political leader without any rationalization whether such dictates are democratic
or undemocratic. Such rulers use state power and resources. Simply, elitism rules the state
(Rizvi H. A., p. 2).
It is significant to note that it is the elites in any society that occupy the ruling position
or the place of powers and authority. This is not something surprising. However, they do not
share powers with the majority of the society who has the potential to cause the instability if
they are not appropriately dealt with (Malik, 1997).
In simple words, democracy is not the rule of the majority or mere holding of
elections in order to form governments, but it is much more. It is the rule of law,
transparency, and justice in all institutions of the state. Unfortunately enough, that type of
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democracy has never been present in the political history of the polity of Pakistan. Instead
power politics, prevalence of personality-based politics, injustice, and inequalities have ruled
high in the political sphere of the state. Democracy has suffered in Pakistan from lack of
democratic values. Besides, centralism was promoted instead of democratic decentralism.
Moreover, it has been remained in the control of both public and military leadership. The
elites who wield power have the opinion that the general mass possesses no capacity for
democracy and they need to rule the state with their own whims and intensions (Akhtar,
2009, p. 42).
Historically speaking, the prevalence and ascendency of authoritarianism go back to
the polity dependency on military on account of security matter the nascent state was faced
with in 1947. As a result, the civilian leadership became inclined towards army (Jalal, 1995).
It is since then military elites had been given the opportunity to determine the policy and the
role of civilian government or the parliament was nowhere to be seen in this regard (Rashid,
2001). In the foregoing sentences, it is the politicians who provided the army with an
opportunity to play its role in civilian affairs even it was left with its own option to make
policy with respect to the state. There was no civilian surveillance over military and this was
how it took the advantages of the weaknesses of the politicians.
Military bureaucratic elites‟ dominating role on account of security concern with
India and the Cold War alliance with the USA provided an open opportunity to consolidate
its role in the politics of the state vis-à-vis the political feuds among politicians helped to
have powers in its hands in October 1958. (Keendy, February 21,2003) However, in the
military rule, aid from the USA also provided an opportunity to a chunk of urban-industrial
elites to grow economically. Inequality and political division along with regional and ethnic
lines provided an opportunity to the political rival Z.A. Bhutto of General Ayub Khan who
went public against him.
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In the East Pakistan the public under Mujeeb Ur Rehman demanded rights. As a
result, General Muhammad Ayub Khan handed power over to his successor General Yahya
Khan who failed to control the political agitation in this part of the polity and ultimately
announced first ever general elections in 1970. In the elections, the AL got majority in the
East Pakistan whereas the PPP obtained majority in the West Pakistan. The stakeholders, in
the West Pakistan, were not willing to transfer powers to the majority party although the
democratic traditions stand the other way round. These delaying tactics resulted in the
separation of East Pakistan (Zaheer, 1994). This episode shows that how military elites were
inclined to the West Pakistan political elites as their action with regard to the transfer of
power stands witness to it.
The political elites, once again, were locked in rivalry for power. The allegations of
rigging in 1977 general elections against the ruling elites provided the way to the military to
take power in its hands in July 1977. The PNA was a rival elite group to Z.A Bhutto. In order
to curtail the role of the military elites, in such situation, Z.A Bhutto made certain historical
changes in the army. The changes consisted of the restructuring of the military high
command, sacking high military official or reassigned new responsibilities. This all
antagonized the army. Besides, he created FSF to decrease the dependence of the government
on army. However, that was considered as he was striving to consolidate his power through
authoritarian means.
The deadlock between the opposition and Z.A Bhutto provided the military an
opportunity to impose martial law and became successful to have the favor and support of the
rival groups of political elites. The religious elites were in the forefront to provide to the
military their support. The JI extended its support to the regime of the military in the years to
come. General Zia Ul Haq became president for next five years in the referendum held in
1984. He used the rubber stamp parliament to justify his laws and orders. Besides, he got the
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power through eight amendment to the 1973 Constitution that empowered the president to
dissolve the national assembly, appoint COAS, judges of the Apex Court, and Provincial
Governors.
After consolidating his position, he lifted martial law and the so-called era of
democracy started in October 1985 (Jalal, 1995). It is since then military elites had been
given the opportunity to determine the policy and the role of civilian government. The
parliament was nowhere to be seen in this regard (Rashid, 2001). It could be held about the
martial laws enforced in the state that it is the political elites who provided them with an
opportunity and later on collaborated and consolidated their respective regimes. It reflects
that elites share powers whether there is democracy or martial law in the state. Their main
objective is to have power at the cost of any form of government present in the state.
When transition to democracy occurs then why the process of consolidation suffers
from crisis. Now a question is how the crisis comes into being, who are the stakeholders, and
how democracy is made suffers from the crisis. Democracy was revived in November 1988.
However, it failed to sustain in the years to come. A number of factors such as the leadership
crisis were responsible for the instability of the civilian rule (Kundi, 2003).
Democracy derailed not because of the military it was actually the struggle for power
among the elite which brought an end to democracy at different times in the period and
finally this struggle for power between the leaders out of personal clash put a perpetual seal
on its very existence. It is a big tragedy that democracy never had been introduced or
practiced in the polity of Pakistan as the state has been remained under the bureaucratic-cum-
parliamentary rule or military rule for most of its history. As a result, the democratic
institutions were not allowed to grow at their own will (Mahmood, ,2000, p. 365).
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The polity of Pakistan is in the grip of elites (ashrafia). These include landlords,
industrialist, military top brass, judiciary, business turned-politicians, bureaucrats, religious,
and spiritual leaders. The economy of Pakistan serves the interests of these privileged classes.
The ruling elites which are 2% of the whole population represent or own 95% of the national
resources (Alaiwah, 2012).
The period 1988-99, in simple words, was democratic in spirit. However, the crisis
was no doubt generated by the power elites out of their rivalries for powers. The struggle for
power between the PPP and the IJI led by Nawaz Sharif‟s PML was actually the extension of
the ideological war between General Zia-ul-Haq and Z.A Bhutto with the sole support of
civil-military bureaucracy (Haqqani, 2005, p. 68).
Weak type of political leadership, dearth of socio-economic development,
constitutional, and judicial weaknesses are the aspects of the failure of democracy in
Pakistan. On top of these, military intervention had hampered democratic transition and did
not allow any government to complete its political tenure since 1947 (Shah, 2004). It is held
at the hands of many who think “political militarism” (Kees Krooninges and Drik Kruijt,
2002) is the main cause that always derails democracy in the polity of Pakistan. However, it
is the other way round. It is the political elites who open the gates for the military in the
political affairs out of their personal feuds.
Inexperienced politicians, when come to have power in their hands, look always for
such a source that could provide them with help to maintain powers. So, they seek to find
such help in someone else rather than in the public. Such political elites are in search of
partners who could help them against their rival elites. Leadership was also responsible for
downplaying the democratic norms for personal gains and it is not the military but it were
they, who, if in opposition, through their so-called politics of opposition attempted to bring
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down the ruling majority. For this purpose, they did not hesitate to take the help of the
military to go for new elections. Moreover, the judiciary historically extended its support to
military and legalized its regimes in the checkered history of Pakistan from General
Muhammad Ayub Khan to General Zia Ul Haq to General Pervez Musharraf (Shah, 2004).
In the polity of Pakistan, elites use ethnic identity only to further their political as well
as economic interests. Democracy is not, in simple words, the rule of the majority or holding
of elections to form a government rather it is an idea consisting of rule of law, accountability,
and justice in all the institution of the state. These features of democracy have never been
materialized in the polity of Pakistan. There is in practice power politics, cult of personality,
and injustice. The state has suffered from the centralization of power, and the absence of
democratic principles. The nations have suffered for democracy. Despite sacrifices, it has
never had the fruits of democracy.
In Pakistan, the rulers have acquired powers via doubtful means and applied more
doubtful means to retain such powers. Some have achieved powers although through legal
means but have floundered their role through arbitrary rule. Democracy has been in the grip
of both civil and military elites. They had created the impression that the masses are not
capable of democracy, so they need to implement their own thoughts to run the state
(Akhtar).
Pakistan has experimented with parliamentary and presidential political system. The
colonial background was on the back of the political elites who adopted parliamentary
political system in the state. The Constitutions of 1956 and of 1973 are the instances in
points. The military, in contrast, attempted to give presidential political system. The 1962
Constitution of General Ayub Khan, and General Zia Ul Haq‟s via 58-2(b) exercised
presidential powers within the ambit of parliamentary system are instances to note. The
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political elites became able to remove the presidential powers in 1997 in order to get
parliamentary system. This is a matter of grave concern that the same parliamentarians, who
had voted to null and void 58-2(b), supported General Pervez Musharraf to revive the 58-2(b)
giving him the presidential powers.
Political elites create crisis on account of political and economic gains. As a result,
democracy could not be sustained or consolidated in the state. Similarly, the political elites
support the military to stay in power in return for political and economic benefits. They have
worked and taken portfolios as ministers in the military setup. In the political history of
Pakistan, the elites both civil and military have brought centralization of powers. They failed
to take into consideration the regional voices and thought them as anti-state. Although the
leadership both political and apolitical accepted the federation but they have worked against
its spirit. Actually, they wanted to turn Pakistan into an authoritarian polity. This
authoritarianism dissolved assemblies in the checkered history of the polity.
Z.A Bhutto was the first elected prime minister who dissolved the government of the
NAP in Balochistan in February 1973. This became a norm in the days to come. Nawaz
Sharif, who became PM again in 1996, removed Sindh government in August 1999. This was
when his party lost majority in the House when the MQM broke its alliance with the PML
(Akhtar, 2009, p. 33). How could democracy embed if political elites are ready to make any
amendment for personal benefits and often have played their role inviting army for the sole
purpose of strengthening their hold on power?
The military, an important class of elites, have enjoyed a ruler type “praetorian”
(Kundi, 2000) role most of the political history of Pakistan. They are the ruling class of elites
and have determined political and economic conditions of the state. Similarly, Kenneth Fidel
(1975) has pinpointed the role of the military in developing countries as the most important
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aspect of politics in those states. Eric Nordlinger defined the role of army in his seminal
work, “Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments”. He categorizes the role of
military as a moderator, as a guardian, and a ruler type. In the same way, Samuel E. Finer
(1962) defines the role of military in his work “The Men on the Horseback: The Role of
Military in Politics” as of influencing, of blackmailing, of displacement and of encroachment
on powers. In politics of 1990s, in which government after government was dismissed,
therein the role of military was significant as it collaborated with the president who replaced
civilian governments. This role places the role of the army in the period as of ruler type role.
The political scene has been dominated by politicians in the state. They dismissed
government using their institutional powers out of their rivalries. They formed new political
parties and groups to play against one another. There were frequent charges of corruption,
nepotism against politicians. General Zia ul-Haq was the first president who used 58-2(b) and
dissolved the so-called elected government of Mr. Muhammad Khan Junejo. This practice
continued in the years to come. Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolved Benazir Bhutto‟s government
in 1990 and of Nawaz Sharif in 1993. Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari dissolved Benazir
Bhutto‟s government in 1996. Nawaz Sharif repealed 58-2(b) after becoming the prime
minister in 1997. He nominated his trusted man Rafiq Tarar as the president after securing
resignation from Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari. This made Nawaz Sharif near-absolute prime
minister. He locked in controversy with the COAS General Pervez Musharraf over the Kargil
War of 1999. He sacked General Pervez Musharraf in his absentia and appointed General Zia
Uddin as the COAS. The army refused to accept him as the COAS. General Pervez
Musharraf with the help of Core Commanders seized powers and deposed Nawaz Sharif in a
military coup in 1999 (Dawn, 1999) (Dawn, 1993).
Benazir Bhutto assumed the office of the prime minister in December 1988, however,
she had to face two main problems or grudges she had from the legacy. One was related with
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when her father Z.A Bhutto nationalized the Itefaq foundry in 1972. This foundry belonged to
Nawaz Sharif‟s family. As a result, she got enmity with the Sharif‟s family. This also set the
business community of Pakistan against her. The other was related with the army that thought
her inexperienced and unprofessional. Besides, it doubted her credential as she was not the
part of the establishment. Moreover, it was apprehensive of her that she might not seek the
revenge of her father‟s assassination (Cohene, 2005, p. 100).
There were certain steps that antagonized the military. The gulf between the political
leadership, and the army elites widened. The Russian troops left Afghanistan in February
1989. However, the war in the neighboring provinces did not come to an end. The war lords
were fighting against one another for the control of the state. Dr. Najibullah, who was
Marxist, had the control of Kabul. Pakistan‟s ISI under Lt. Gen Hamid Gul confined its
assistance to the Islamists groups who were fighting Dr.Najibullah‟s government. They failed
to take Jalalabad, a strategic city, which was under the control of Dr.Najibullah (Haqqani,
2005, p. 191). Wali Khan spoke in strong words against Lt. Gen Hamid Gul that he
lengthened the war and inflicted problems on Afghans and the people of the Frontier province
(Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 316). In May 1989 Benazir Bhutto replaced Lt. Gen Hamid Gul by Lt.
Gen Shams-ur- Rehman as the ISI Chief. Lt.Gen Hamid Gul was the architecture of the IJI
and a key figure in the Afghan war. This widened the gulf between Benazir Bhutto and the
military. It also antagonized Wali Khan who broke his coalition with her (Cohene, 2005, p.
231).
The dismissal of Nawaz Sharif‟s government and military coup was challenged in the
Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court validated the coup in the light of Law of
Necessity as the elected government failed to control the state of affairs in the state. The
military was justified in seizing power in order to bring order (Nawaz, 2008, p. XXXI). Such
a role of the judiciary is questionable. It is the custodian of the Constitution and of the
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parliament sovereignty. However, it has become, time and again, a facilitator to provide an
easy way to military in the light of Law of Necessity (Nawaz, 2008, p. XXXI).
The threats to democracy, in the state of Pakistan, have been from the collaboration
among the elites for their personal benefits and from their engagements in feuds for personal
gains. The Formation of the IJI was the regrouping of the rival elites to block the way of the
PPP which was the rival elite group. In the form of party, the PPP was antagonistic to the
military dictator and sought democracy through any way possible. The IJI used Islam and
General Zia ul-Haq to take the advantage of the religion and criticized the PPP as secular.
The religious elites were also not at par with the PPP. They kept themselves at a distance
from the PPP and of Bhutto‟s legacy in 1988. The organizational weakness of political
parties in Pakistan also did not allow democracy to flourish as they themselves did not stand
for democratic ideals.
Benazir Bhutto‟s inclination towards organization and development of the party was
also suffering from lack of enthusiasm. This discouraged many followers of the PPP and left
the party. She reposed her belief in new entrants who had no capability for organizing the
party. This made PPP a weak organization. Benazir Bhutto did not want to share power with
the others. Therefore, she went out of the MRD which show her lust her power.
The president Ghulam Ishaq Khan manipulated the PPP once it went out of the MRD.
The president Ghulam Ishaq Khan planned to transform the majority of the PPP that it had
obtained in the 1988 elections into a minority. So, he attempted to influence the provincial
elections and was reluctant to give the province of the Punjab to the PPP as the province was
considered important for the stability of any government. However, Benazir Bhutto was
allowed to make government in the center after striking deal with the president on certain
issues. The deal was materialized on the following matters: the control of the Afghan Jihad,
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no interference in the affairs of the military, acceptance of Sahebzada Yaqoob Khan as a
foreign minister, and making promise to extend support to Ghulam Ishaq Khan in his efforts
to stay on as a president. Moreover, Benazir Bhutto remained silent over the repeal of 8th
amendment to the Constitution only to stay in power. (Nasr, 1992).
In the foregoing discussion, it is revealed that how much elites take care about
democracy. Their main purpose is to have power at any cost for which they don‟t hesitate to
have alliance or to compromise on principles and make alliance with military and
bureaucracy. In this process, they allow their principles to liquidate only to benefit one
another. Moreover, Benazir Bhutto failed to honour coalition partner of her government
which she promised to do. She, in her first term in office, attempted to dominate the majority
of the MQM using Sindhi nationalist card. As a result, the coalition between the MQM and
the PPP broke. The MQM joined the IJI and formed COP in the parliament. In the meantime,
the military elites also attempted to take advantage of the MQM being a party of ethnic elites.
As a result, the government retaliated and violence in Karachi erupted.
Since independence, there is close nexus between the military and politicians. The
retired army man takes active part in politics. They are nominated to important position
abroad as ambassadors. The politicians involve them in foreign policy. It is a dismal scenario.
Every government has tried its best to please army by giving political role. Benazir Bhutto
gave ISI the management of the foreign affairs and even General Yaqoob Khan continued as
foreign minister in her first term in office. It is worth mentioning that the very Yaqoob Khan
served as a minister during Zia‟s regime.
Benazir Bhutto, although campaigned against military dictatorship, assured the
military that she would not do such things that could damage its representation. This pledge
Benazir Bhutto made with the COAS Aslam Baig immediately before elections to the high
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office. In addition to this, understanding with army, bureaucracy, business man, and feudals
also play an important role in the affairs of the state. As a matter of fact, it is the alliance
among these elements that have ruled the state since independence. This ruling coalition
never and ever allowed power to slip out of their hands (A.G.Naidu, 1989). If the nexus
among the politicians, military, bureaucrats, and feudals is to survive, each member would
work or act in the line the other wants, otherwise, rivalry results and this rivalry makes
democracy suffer.
In the view of Samina Yasmeen (1994), Nawaz Sharif‟s dismissal was more or less
was the result of as the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan sought to be re-elected for another term
of five years. On finding no green signals, he used his presidential powers and dismissed
Nawaz Sharif. Although the Supreme Court invalidated the president Ishaq Khan‟s decision
and provided the political representation a chance to move ahead. However, the politicians
from the opposition were interested in their benefits and sided with the president in his war
with Nawaz Sharif and democratically elected government was refrained from completing its
full term.
Balk Sher Mazari was appointed as the caretaker Prime Minister when Nawaz Sharif
was dismissed in 1993. He was a dissident of Nawaz Sharif‟s. The political parties hailed the
move of the president Ishaq and joined hands with him. The PPP was in the forefront. In the
past, Benazir Bhutto although resented the 58-2(b), however, this time she supported the
decision of the president. She was given ministries in the interim set up. Farooq Ahmed Khan
Leghari, her trusted lieutenant, became the interim minister. Similarly, her husband was
sworn as a member of Interim cabinet. In the same way, JUI, JUP, TI, and PML also joined
the interim setup (Yasmeen, 1994, pp. 572-588).
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In the foregoing discussion, it is revealed that elites change their loyalties when there
is an opportunity being offered. And the rivals do not hesitate to join hands with
undemocratic moves of the president if they find any chance to damage their rivals. The rival
elites enjoyed amenities being offered without any hesitation or taking care of democratic
norms. Moreover, the 8th
amendment was used arbitrary in 1990s and brought an end to the
regime if the president found it against his wishes. The letter “E” in eight-amendment
possesses a meaningful connotation as the amendment brought an end to respective regimes
in the lost-decade of democracy (1988-1999).
Besides, it is maintained that in the presence of available democratic means with
respect to the removal of the Prime Minister from his office like the means of the vote of no
confidence why the president invoked the article 58-2(b) for the removal of the Prime
Minister from his office. It reveals that the rival elites having prejudice against the rival elite
group to such a degree that they even ignored the available democratic devices. Ignoring such
devices make the president as well as the rival elites mala fide in their disposition towards
democracy.
Politicians joined hands with the military against political opponents whom they
wanted to oust from power. General Hamid Gul, then ISI chief, sought the help of Qazi
Hussain Ahmed to restrain Benazir Bhutto from powers as he eulogized Islamists‟ role in
Afghanistan especially of the JI. In his opinion, the Jihad in Afghanistan could be suffered if
Benazir Bhutto had come to power. Moreover, Brigadier Imtiaz shared intelligence
information with Islamists. According to them, Benazir Bhutto had promised with the
American government to roll back the nuclear programme.
Benazir Bhutto also had plans to stop jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. This welded
the army and politicians especially Islamists together against a common political opponent in
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the person of Benazir Bhutto and the PPP. The JI joined the IJI and campaigned against
Benazir Bhutto vehemently. It openly accused Benazir Bhutto of rolling back of the nuclear
programme at the behest of the USA. General Hamid Gul also succeeded in winning the
support of the JUI and acquired a Fatwa (a religious decree) on the status of woman that
proclaimed that a woman cannot lead an Islamic state. Besides, the Islamists were also pro-
Zia who was the rival of Benazir Bhutto and the PPP.
Consequently, the Islamists, along with the military, struggled against Benazir Bhutto
and the PPP. Most importantly, there were two leaders in the alliance of the IJI. They rivaled
for power too. One was Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi who was a senior politician from the province
of Sindh. He had worked as a cabinet minister in ZA Bhutto‟s government in 1970s. The
other was Nawaz Sharif who was the most influential in the IJI alliance. He was an
industrialist from the Punjab. He had the blessings of General Zia ul-Haq who had appointed
him the Chief Minister of the Punjab. He was striving for the presidentship of the PML. It
was the biggest among the coalition partners in the IJI alliance. Currently, Muhammed Khan
Junejo was heading the PML (Haqqani, 2005 , pp. 130-131).
Benazir Bhutto had animosity with the establishment. The establishment tries its best
to remove her from the office. For this, she by herself was responsible as she most of the time
provided it with opportunities to take advantage of (Yasmeen, 1994, p. 573). She was
thought as the symbol of a democratic Pakistan. It was hoped that her election to the office of
Prime Minister would bring an end to the role of the establishment in the politics. She also
pledged to set an example in Asia and would strive to encourage the spread of democracy
along with those struggling for (Ziringan, 1990, pp. 127-128).
Benazir Bhutto‟s stance was liberal, and it could bring an end to the long-established
hegemony of the establishment in the politics of the state. Besides, she emphasized on
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democracy and had the opinion that democracy was the unifying factor in the polity like
Pakistan. She denounced the narrow interpretation of Islam as the unifying factor. Besides,
she sought good friendly relations with India (Crossette, 1988).
Benazir Bhutto‟s weaknesses as a leader are worth considering. There were many
stories of corruption attached` with her name. She had no acumen for administration as she
used to listen to the dictates of her kitchen cabinet. Her kitchen cabinet consisted mainly of
those people who were her cronies and she considered their words without any second
thought (Gustaaf Houtman and Akbar Ahmed, 2008, p. 4).
The interim Prime Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and the Information Minister
provided the IJI campaign with a ready start. They accused Benazir Bhutto and the PPP of
links with Zionist lobby. The Interim Information Minister spoke of Benazir Bhutto as pro-
Zionist. He said, “Why [Bhutto] had hired the services of the American public relations
expert Mark Siegel” who was identified as a “well-known Zionist.” Unfortunately, the
caretaker government worked beyond its constitutional mandate and violated the function of
holding free and fair elections in the state. It described Benazir Bhutto as a great danger to the
security of Pakistan‟ because she opposed the president, the military establishment and the
country‟s judiciary (Ziring, p. 119).
The IJI members came out with teething criticism against Benazir Bhutto and her
mother Nusrat Bhutto. It not only criticized their abilities and right to rule an Islamic state but
also alleged that they both had close relations with the USA as well as with Indo-Zionist
lobby. The said lobby had close contact with India and Israel and had opposed Pakistan
Nuclear Programme. Besides, the IJI also accused her of selling out of nuclear programme
and campaigned against her patriotic credentials. Moreover, the government-run newspapers
published articles in which her person was demonized as a threat to Pakistan. One newspaper
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published such a letter which was addressed to the staff member of the US Senate Committee
on Foreign Relation (Delegation, 1991, pp. 38-39).
Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari became the President of Pakistan when Ghulam Ishaq
Khan resigned from the presidency. He belonged to the province of the Punjab. He was a
Baloch Sardar (tribal chief). In addition to, he was a retired civil servant and had intimate
relations with the establishment of the state. He had been the member of the PPP since 1970s.
He was a trusted lieutenant of Benazir Bhutto. He stood by her in difficult circumstances
even in the days of General Zia ul-Haq. Despite such relations, when his authority was
challenged, he aligned with establishment and dismissed her government using his powers
under 58-2(b) (Haqqani, 2005 , p. 146).
Nawaz Sharif sought to increase his powers with the help of the intelligence bureau.
This brought the IB at par with military intelligence services. An American Reporter, Steve
Coll called this maneuvering as Pakistan‟s political culture of shadow games. In addition to,
he remarked, “unproven reports abound of secret wiretappings, video tapings and sexual
blackmail schemes. And nearly everyone of prominence believes his or her telephone is
bugged.” He further quoted Pakistani newspaper reports about Sharif “crooning love songs to
a girlfriend in Bombay who may be an Indian spy” based on the intelligence agencies‟
wiretaps of the prime minister‟s phone. A separate newspaper report, attributed to a different
intelligence service, accused Bhutto of “using her Karachi home as the secret headquarters of
a terrorist organization backed by India (Coll, 1991).” This all stands as evidence to the
characteristics of politic in Pakistan and the role of the military as a kingmaker.
The COAS General Asif Nawaz tried his best to normalize relations between Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in order to end this politics of confrontation the state was faced
with since 1988. However, Nawaz Sharif went on back foot as his insider in the army warned
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and informed him that the normalization of relations with Benazir Bhutto would bring an end
to his support from the military which he had previously enjoyed. And, General Asif Nawaz
was the COAS only, not an army in his person. Acting on the advice of his adviser, Nawaz
Sharif lost the opportunity to perform his role in the consolidation of democracy in the state.
General Asif Nawaz had the belief that relations between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
was a necessity for democracy to be consolidated in the state. However, he failed to
materialize his thought of consolidating parliamentary democracy in the state (Nawaz G. A.,
1992).
Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister as a result of the sweeping majority in the
general elections 1997. However, just nine months after his elections as the Prime Minister,
his obsession for powers created fears that the polity might not suffer from another crisis. He
reassumed the office from which he was ousted via presidential order in 1993. This time, he
sought to secure his position and resolved to spend full five years in the office. For this
purpose, he sought to bring under control the powers of the President, of the military, of the
parliament, and of the judiciary. However, he was warned in the national dailies many times
of his way of rule which would risk democracy prompting the military to take over that had
ruled the state for almost thirty years.
In the struggle for power, Nawaz Sharif made a departure in the last hours when the
army Chief General Karamat informed him that he would not be able to stand the
constitutional crisis. This occurred when Nawaz Sharif was engaged with the judiciary in
controversy over the appointment of judges. The latter sought to appoint five more judges to
the existing strength of the judges of the Supreme Court. He was of the opinion that the
Supreme Court did not need any more judges. In the opinions of the critics, Nawaz Sharif
thought the potential candidates as his own enemies. If they become judges, they might open
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cases of corruption against him and could be disqualified. However, he agreed to the
appointment of judges when the COAS General Karamat warned him.
The army gave the impression that it acted its role only to defuse the crisis between
the Prime Minister and the judiciary and had not been a party to any conspiracy. However,
the critics were of the opinion that the threat from the COAS General Karamat was a
reminder to the Prime Minister pinpointing that the military was the finale in the corridors of
powers. In contrast, Nawaz Sharif was portrayed in many newspapers as offensive in mood
this time compared to his being impulsive in his first term (Burns, 1997).
Nawaz Sharif inclined towards authoritarianism with each passing day. He started
certain ways to mellow down the presidency and the judiciary especially after conducting
nuclear tests in May 1998. The Prime Minister and his close confidants thought themselves as
invincible and pursued policy on do-it-alone basis. As a result, national coalition and
consensus-building suffered from decay and weakness. The Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
was all set to assert his authority during the second phase of his rule between, May 1998 and
the Kargil issue. He removed the Chief Justice of Pakistan, the president, and bringing an end
to the provincial coalition government that he had tacitly made during his first-year rule. He
also replaced the Chief of Air Force and Navy. He finally made General Karamat resign in
October 1998 before his retirement date. He appointed Gen. Pervez Musharraf after
superseding two senior generals.
By the end of 1998, Nawaz Sharif was in control of the two third majority of the
parliament and got entrenched his hold over the presidency, the judiciary, and the army.
Moreover, the chasm between civil-military saga widened when Nawaz Sharif appointed the
COAS and replaced the ISI‟s Chief Lt.Gen Nasim Rana with Lt.Gen Ziauddin three days
later on 10 October 1998. This decision was resented among the rank. His third phase started
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with the Lahore Peace Process. It was disturbed by the Kargil episode and come to an end in
October 1999 (Shafqat, 2009, pp. 298-99).
All chiefly politicians and political parties in Pakistan had the belief that democracy
was the cure of all ills the state was faced with. And it is the only single factor that is
responsible for the problems that the state had suffered from. They had opinion that those
problems could be solved if the people of Pakistan were given the right to vote to elect their
true representatives. However, it is a naked fact that they thought democracy nothing else
than right to vote only (Ali, 1987, p. 697).
The opposition in Pakistan always looks for the opportune time to take advantage of
the situation. All political parties and politicians except the ruling party welcomed General
Pervez Musharraf‟s Coup as they all wanted to get rid of the ruling party which could not be
removed on constitutional basis. This has been a practice since 1977. The political parties
which are not in the power extend their help to the president or to the army in order to
dismiss the ruling majority in the hope to form theirs in its place. It is noted with concerns
that seeking advantage at the cost of others is not a new phenomenon in the politics of
Pakistan. They call to the military to intervene out of their enmity with the ruling majority to
„save democracy' and to 'save' the country (Zaidi, 2002, pp. 4539-4540).
The political parties which are sitting on the opposition benches provide an
opportunity to the apolitical forces to intervene leaving aside other constitutional means to
make accountable the ruling majority. As a matter of fact, they want to have power at the cost
of sacrificing democracy. They do so purely out of rivalry with the ruling majority.
Democracy in Pakistan has become of praetorian type. The military controls and
manipulates it for its own interests. The military has become entrenched in the body politics
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of the state and thinking democracy without its influence is a wishful thinking (Zaidi, 2005,
p. 5174).
Politicians as well as the establishment made political groups and parties out of their
personal interests. They had played their role against such amendments which was not in
their interests. The 14th
amendment was a case in point. It is worth mentioning that floor
crossing has been one among other factors that could be identified with the crisis of
democracy in Pakistan. Nasreen Akhtar has the opinion that the military has been the chief
factor among the other factors of the crisis of democracy in Pakistan. It has deteriorated the
democratic institution like political parties in the state. However, she also makes this point
that the military government could not have been lasted long if political elites had not co-
opted. It fragments political elites and offers opportunities (Akhtar, pp. 45-46).
Categorically speaking, the judiciary, in the checkered history of Pakistan, has
supported military elites and their respective regimes in the light of the Law of Necessity.
This kind of role has diminished its role as the guardian of the Constitution, and the protector
of the sovereignty of the parliament. It has been identified with as the power broker, and the
facilitator in the light of the Law of Necessity (Akhtar, 2009, p. 52).
It is a matter of great concern that those, who voted against the 58-2(b) in 1997, voted
again to revive the powers of the President under the said article of the Constitution and
brought Seventeenth Amendment. This stands witness to the characters of the politicians who
do not believe in parliamentary democracy and easily available for sale in return for personal
benefits. In the presence of such politicians, democracy is a wishful thinking in Pakistan
(Akhtar, arts.monach.edu.au).
In Pakistan, it is not customary with the ruling coalition to do such a legislation that
could make the parliament an important organ of the government. This type of legislation
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could not be identified with any political party in the political history of Pakistan. This
political sharing has no meanings once the elections over in the state. The political elites have
their faith in money and use it in order to furnish loyalties. As a result, this practice has made
the politics a plaything, and made it even more corrupt. Moreover, the political parties are
identified with autocracy as well as with authoritarian leadership in Pakistan. Besides, the
politicians collaborate with the military in order to get their political objectives. They offer no
resistance to the involvement of the military in the political affairs (Newberg, 1994 , pp. 166-
168).
Since independence, the polity of Pakistan has been ruled by the military for more
than twenty-six years. Even, it played its role indirectly, when democracy was restored in the
polity. In the views of Roy Macridis and Steven Burg, the military in Pakistan has taken the
advantage of the crisis, of the conflict over powers among the politicians, as well as of the
worst kind of circumstances the state whenever suffered from. In addition to, Nordlinger is of
the view that the military, in Pakistan, has performed its role as a moderator in order to keep
the political situation in control, and sometimes as a ruler when it captured powers. It has also
played its role as a moderator during the rule of ZA Bhutto, of Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990,
and 1993-1996), of Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993, and 1997-1999). However, when its interests
were threatened, it took the political power and became the rulers of the state. The coups of
General Ayub Khan, of General Zia ul-Haq and of General Pervez Musharraf are cases to be
noted (Indurthy, 2004, p. 261).
Even after the lapse of sixty years of its independence, Pakistan is still lingering from
want of stable and representative democracy. For half of its existence, the state was ruled by
military with alternation of weak civilian rule. Between 1947 and 1958, the state was
governed by military civil-bureaucracy‟s oligarchy that was never and ever interested in
establishing true democracy. However, during 1971-77, and 1988-1999 democracy was
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restored in the polity, but the political leadership was never democratic in attitude and even in
practice in the aforementioned periods. The political history stands witness to the types of
democracy that were best suitable to the interests of the leadership both civil and military.
These variants of democracy obstructed the development of the true and genuine
democracy. First and foremost type was that of basic democracy between 1959 and 69. It was
instituted by General Ayub Khan. Under this type of democracy, one hundred thousand
representatives known as basic democrats were elected locally. They constituted an electoral
college to elect the President. This was not the direct rule by the people in reality. General
Ayub Khan‟s enmity or inclination towards democracy was evident from the fact that he
banned political parties and political activities across the state in 1959 via PODO and, EBDO.
Besides, he also abrogated the 1956 Constitution and promulgated 1962 Constitution only to
have presidential type in order to have powers in his own hands. This system of democracy
flopped as it heavily depended on the role of bureaucracy.
The second type of so-called democracy was given by Z.A Bhutto in 1971-77. Under
this system, the legislature was formed via party based general elections for the first time in
the polity. He gave first broad censuses-based Constitution envisaged parliamentary
democracy in the state. However, he mutilated later his own Constitution via his authoritarian
ways of rule. He, most of the time, resorted to section 144 to ban any sort of public gathering
only to suppress the opposition and exercise emergency powers. His drive of islamization to
appease religions elites gave nothing and the religious elites joined the PNA to protest against
rigging in election 1977. As a result, his handpicked Gen.Zia ul-Haq dismissed his
government on July 5, 1977.
The third version of democracy was that of General Zia ul-Haq who gave limited
democracy. He held a referendum to take approval to his system and held non-party based
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elections in 1985. He distorted 1973 Constitution and introduced the killer article the 8th
amendment in the 1973 Constitution and acquired the power to dismiss the civilian
government any time liked. He had the powers to elect and dismiss Prime Minister,
Governors and Judges to the Apex Court and High Courts. This system came to an end with
the death of General Zia ul-Haq.
The other type of democracy was between 1988-99 in which the parliament has no
autonomy in decisions concomitant with the bitter animosity between Benazir Bhutto and
Nawaz Sharif who served twice alternately from 1988-1999. There was bitter controversy
over the appointment of the COAS of Armed Forces, Judges Appointment and Governors of
the provinces. Rampant corruption, the loss of faith in democracy left the political leadership
nowhere. The political leadership when dismissed by the president, the other did not offer
any opposition to the president. This mistrust among the leaders was one of the main reasons
that obstructed the development of democracy. Time and again, the politicians including
political parties aligned with the army and the president to distort democracy rather than
address its problems collectively. This was their mutual squabbling and undemocratic ways
that paved the way for military to strike coup in October1999 (Misra, pp. 21-27).
From the above discussed types of democracy two types of democratic leaders (so-
called) come to surface. The first version was included General Ayub Khan and General Zia
ul-Haq who worked for the benefit of the armed forces in the garb of democracy. They were
always remained apprehensive of democratic movements. The second version of leadership
consisted of democrats from political parties, whose political attitude when in powers
damaged the developments of democracy in the formative phase of Pakistan.
The PML was overtaken by landlords with no concern for vibrant governance. These
landlords as want in democratic acumen did not like to arrive at the decision making through
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discussion, debates, and compromise. As a result, these ruling elites did not allow
developments of democracy in the beginning. The two constituent assemblies between 1947-
54 and 1955-56 wasted their time in their discussion over the role of Islam and the nature of
economic problems without any fruitful results.
In the same way, when true parliamentary democracy was established in 1970s.
Political leaders played their role the other way round. They obstructed the development of
democracy via authoritarian ways or attitudes. Z.A Bhutto sought absolute power while
putting aside the democratic norms and principles. Banning of public gathering under article
144, electoral rigging, using the state agencies against the opponents and enemies were some
of the political factors that did not allow democracy to take roots in the state.
In the same vein, Benazir Bhutto failed to have the soul of democracy. She had
confrontation with the president, the opposition, judiciary and the army over the issues like
the appointment of COAS, judges, and sought the government of her party in the provinces
where the opposition had the government mainly out of struggle for powers. This
confrontation was purely a confrontation over power struggle. The case of Nawaz Sharif as
the head of the government presented the same dismal picture. After a decade of
confrontation and mismanagement, democracy from 1988-99 failed to grow into a vibrant
alternative to the army rule in the polity. As a result, both leaders Benazir and Nawaz Sharif
were exiled from the state by the military who were once an ally to the military alternatively
(Misra, pp. 30-31).
Martial law in the polity of Pakistan so far has been staged, the politicians either have
invited the military to interfere or have acknowledged the martial law once the military has
taken powers in its hands. Martial law against Z.A Bhutto was actually instituted by the
politicians who invited General Zia ul-Haq to take the powers when protested against Z.A
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Bhutto over alleged rigging in the 1977 elections and demanded of him to dismiss his
government. Gen. Zia ul-Haq accepted their requested and stayed for 11 years in the civilian
domain. In the same way, Gen. Pervez Musharraf‟s coup was also endorsed and welcomed by
the politicians who wanted Nawaz Sharif out of the power in 1999.
However, from 1988-1999, it was not directly involved in the political affairs, but the
politicians constantly invited it to involve in the political process and affairs and in the
dismissal of the elected government in the period. It was involved one way or the other but
with active support from the politicians. The political history of Pakistan is replete with the
involvement of the army but the responsibility for this cannot be put on the army but it is the
politicians who want to have the support of army to have power in their hands (Zaidi, 2008,
pp. 8-9).
The army played an important role in politics of 1990s. It had influence over foreign
affairs, domestic affairs, and played a role of mediator to cool down the relations between the
feuding politicians and state institutions. The restoration of democracy in the polity was
either semi-democratic restoration or military backed. The elected institutions were
dominated by the non-representative institutions mainly by bureaucracy and military that had
no inclination towards transformation that could result into the rise of status of the elected
institutions particularly the parliament. However, both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
failed to resolve the differences and to introduce a system in which real politics could be
observed and promoted party-based politics (Veena Kukreja and M.P. Singh, 2005, p. 17).
Nawaz Sharif got a landslide majority in the 1997 elections. Using that majority, he
amended the Constitution and slammed the president of the powers he enjoyed under the
Constitution regarding the dismissal of the prime minister. Besides, he also got overthrow the
feuding Chief Justice with the help of his own fellow judges. He made the president resign
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with the backup of the army chief. The Punjab, the largest province, was being ruled by his
brother Shahbaz Sharif. He got his arch rival Benazir Bhutto exiled instituting corruption
cases against her. Moreover, he also made Gen.Karamt resign for impropriety.
In the end, he like Z.A Bhutto thought that he was invincible. To strengthen his grip
on power more and much more, he appointed Gen. Pervez Musharraf as the COAS while
superseding two senior Generals. He was of the opinion that Gen. Pervez Musharraf would
not be a trouble maker to whatever he would do as he was from the Muhajir community and
had no strong ethnic base. His government was characterized by random corruption, sectarian
violence, and economic crisis. After destroying the civil institutions, Nawaz Sharif attempted
to imprison the press and adopted religious laws to strength his grip on power.
Nawaz Sharif‟s attempts resulted into the struggle between the civilian autocratic rule
and the military dictatorship. He wanted to have civilian control over the army whereas the
army elites emphasized on an institutionalized role of the army in the state affairs. This
deadlock in the relations came to the surface in abundance during the Kargil issue (Veena
Kukreja and M.P. Singh, 2005, p. 61). General Shahid Aziz acknowledged in his interview
with Hamid Mir in the programme “Capital Talk” on Jeo News (Pakistan) that COAS
General Pervez Musharruf wanted to enforce martial law in the state in 1999. It is revealed
that both Nawaz Sharif and General Pervez Musharruf sought to have powers without any
care for democracy in the state.
To substantiate and theorize the discussion in the light of the power elite theory, a
brief background of the leaders, who were the part and parcel of the ruling elites in 1988-99,
is being presented.
Ghulam Ishaq who was the manager of economy during the Zia ul Haq‟s rule and
remained the chairman of the senate from 1985 onwards become the president in 1988 after
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the death of Gen.Zia ul-Haq in an air crash. He was a Pashtun civil servant from the District
of Bannu (KP) born in 1915. He joined the NWFP (later-KP) civil service and served in
various capacities. He was made the home secretary of NWFP after the independence. In
1965, he became the Secretary of Development and Irrigation West Pakistan government. He
became the chairman of Water and Irrigation Development Authority in 1961. He also served
as Secretary Finance and was cabinet secretary during 1970-71. During coups in 1977, he
was serving as Secretary General Defense. Zia ul-Haq made him the Federal Minister and
thus managed the economic affairs of the military regime.
In 1985, Ghulam Ishaq was made the Chairman of the Senate obviously at the will of
his mentor General Zia ul-Haq and finally became the president as a result of the death of
General Zia ul Haq in an air crash. He played an important part in the politics of the troika.
He resigned from the post in 1993 due to the deadlock between him and the Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif. General Aslam Baig belonged to Azamgarh (UP. India) was born in 1931. He
got commissioned in the Pak army in 1952. He was made the COAS after General Zia ul-
Haq‟s death (Talbot I. , 2005, pp. 421-428).
Benazir Bhutto, who was the daughter of Z.A Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of
Pakistan, was the graduate of the Harvard and Oxford Universities. She got prominence in the
politics after her father execution by General Zia ul Haq. This gave a new direction to her
political career and served as the Prime Minister of Pakistan twice from 1988-1990 and 1993-
1997 (Kamran, 2008, pp. 136-37).
Nawaz Sharif belongs to a Kashmiri family which migrated to Lahore from India
during partition of India in 1947. His father, Main Muhammad Sharif, was a successful
businessman and also transferred his business acumen to his son. He was the graduate of the
Government College Lahore. After graduation, he joined the family business. He is known as
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the first industrialist and businessman who achieved prominent position in Pakistan. He
became a man of success during Zia ul-Haq‟s era and remained as the Finance Minister
(1981-1985) and the CM of the Punjab from 1985 onwards. He succeeded in making
formidable political base in the province of the Punjab (Kamran, 2008, p. 144).
The polity of Pakistan has been in the grip of civil bureaucracy. Some of them made
their way into politics and this tradition continued for a long time. Among those bureaucrats-
turned-politicians Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Iskandar Mirza, Aziz Ahmed, Altaf Gohar, Rao
Abdur Rashid, Agha Shahi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, AGN Qazi Roedad Khan, and Sartaj Aziz
are significant. Bureaucracy in Pakistan has lost the real purpose that was serving the public
instead of its masters (Ahmed, 2009, p. 111).
As result of the dismissal of the PPP government, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the
opposition leader, became the caretaker Prime Minister. This brought his long-standing wish
fulfilled. Ghulam Mustafa Kar (once the PPP stalwart), Rafi Raza, Sartaj Aziz and Illahi Bux
Soomoro took oaths as the caretaker ministers. In the province of Sindh, the governor
Fakharuddin G Ibrahim refused to dissolve the assembly. He was therefore, replaced with
Mahmood A. Haroon who without any delay dissolved the assembly and Jam Sadiq Ali
became the caretaker CM in the Sindh.
Amir Ghulistan Janjua dissolved the government of Sherpao and Mir Afzal Khan was
nominated as the CM of the NWFP. He was a business and industrialist giant. Besides, he
was the minister in Z.A Bhutto‟s government in 1970. Mir Hamayun Khan Marri became the
new CM of Balochistan when Lt.Gen. Musa Khan at the behest of Nawab Akbar Bugti
dissolved the assembly. It is noted that the caretaker CM was the son-in-law of the former
CM Nawab Akbar Bugti.
216
However, the change of the CM in the Punjab was too much cosmetic. Nawaz
Sharif‟s government was not dismissed by the Governor Main Azhar rather, he was given
time to advice the Governor to dissolve the government. Ghulam Haider Wyne who was a
close confidant of Nawaz Sharif was made caretaker CM of the Punjab. This shows how the
establishment was anti-PPP. Besides, the caretaker set-up mainly comprised of people who
were anti-PPP or dissidents of the PPP.As a result, the policies of the caretaker set-up were
against the PPP which largely destroyed the image of the caretaker set-up as partisan.
Besides, the rivals went so low that they even did not hesitate to call Benazir Bhutto as Kafir
and a terrorist. The government also provided the PPP with no space and victimized and
tortured its activists and supporters (Kamran, 2008, pp. 149-151).
Nawaz Sharif challenged the dismissal and the dissolution of assembly in the
Supreme Court. After 21 days, the Supreme full bench presided over by the Chief Justice
Nasim Hassan Shah reversed the orders of the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and declared
that it was not within the ambit of the presidential powers conferred upon him by the
Constitution to dismiss the government. For the first time, in history, the Supreme Court
worked against the executive authority and reversed his decision (S.Yasmeen, p. 581).
Benazir Bhutto started her second term in the office with caution and sought to have
good relations with political personalities and political parties. She showed a lot of
accommodation for her political allies. The case of the PML (J) was a case in point. She gave
important slots to the political figures. Nawab Zada Nasrullah Khan was given the Chairman
of the Kashmir Committee, Fazal-Ur-Rehman was made the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Committee and Malik Qasim was made the Chairman of the Anticorruption Committee in the
National Assembly. Besides, Malik Qasim with the support of the PPP became the Leader of
the House in the Senate of Pakistan.
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Moreover, Jatoai‟s son was included in Sindh government. In the same way, Balkh
Sher Mazari‟s, Mustafa Khar‟s and Nasrullah Khar‟s son were given the portfolios of
ministers in the Punjab government. However, she failed to have conciliation with Nawaz
Sharif and the hostility between the two continued without any stop. She instituted cases of
corruption against Nawaz Sharif and PML (N) leaders by December 1995, almost 140 cases
were made against Nawaz Sharif and his associates. However, Benazir Bhutto‟s government
was careful and did not arrest the leaders of PML (N) on large scale (Shafqat, 1997, pp. 240-
41). This was how elites entertain their near and dears for the sake of personal survival.
In the polity of Pakistan, the army is generally identified with instituting political
instability and always sought to extend its control over the state political institution.
However, it could not have got this hegemonic position without the tacit help from the
politicians, civil bureaucracy, judiciary or even civil society groups (C.Fair, 2011) (Jalal,
1990). (Siddiqa, 2007).
Analyzing the matter why democracy failed to take roots in the polity like Pakistan. The
military have assumed almost hegemonic position and have controlled almost every
institution. Almost none among the politicians-the real inheritor of democracy-dare to
challenge its hegemonic position. In addition to, the political parties-the vehicles of
representative democracy-themselves do not exhibit genuine democratic culture within
except the JI and virtually have suffered from personality cults that represent the interests of
the elites rather of the masses who seek real democracy in the state.
During 1990s, the political parties sought the assistance of the military in order to
undermine their opponents, dissolve the parliament and hold new elections. The military also
took advantage of the weaknesses of the politicians whom it thought weak and despise.
(Sumit Gangulya and C. Christine Fair, 2013, p. 138). The lack of leadership is responsible
218
for ill-organized and indiscipline political parties and no integrity of character prevailed
among the politicians. This is the chief anomaly responsible for the failure of democracy in
the polity (Mahmood S. , ,2000, p. 54).
In fact, it is the political parties that win the elections and have powers, but their
authoritarian types of rule bring them discredit and as a result fail to continue in the office
and gave way to the military to rule. Thus, the military actually rule at the cost of the political
parties which are not able to deliver what they promise during elections campaign. The
political parties in Pakistan have failed to convince the supporters and have become a private
entity only seek to perpetuate powers no matter how. They seek to reap the fruit of
democracy without first sowing the seed of it within their own ranks. As a result, a political
culture which is distorted in many ways comes into being and fails to contribute to
development of democracy in the polity (Rabbani, p. 7).
Pakistan army‟s corporate interests pervade a large portion of every economics sector
of the state. The military industrial complex is the best suitable phenomena to describe the
corporatism of the military. In the words of Dr Ayesha Saddiqa, the Pakistan army private
business could be worth as much as $10bn. It is the complex making everything from cement
to cornflakes and had 12m acres agriculture land. It has business places in every major city of
the state. It runs bakeries, has banks, insurance companies and universities (Rabbani, p. 8).
The PPP had the claims that it was another name for democracy. However, it claims
seem hollow as General Tikka Khan from Rawalpindi who had lost elections was made the
Governor of the Punjab. It was a matter of common sense that a man whose constituency had
no confidence in him how he would enjoy the confidence of the whole province. In the same
way, Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar was appointed as the Attorney General, who had also lost elections.
219
This shows the democratic tradition of the PPP. It was nothing short of entertaining blue-eyed
ones (Rizvi Y. , 1988).
Another factor that played its role negatively in the development of democracy are the
political parties with almost no exception, and are dominated by elites, who get votes on the
basis of their social status. To be a political leader in Pakistan one needs to enjoy political
back ground thus the leadership is based on dynastic grounds. Dynastic leadership hinders the
development of leadership not only in the polity but also within party does not allow a leader
from any kind of social background (Syeda Waqar and Prof.Mark Olssen, 2012, pp. 18-20).
The oddest thing that kept affecting the politics of Pakistan was the confrontation
between the PPP and the PML (N). This confrontation between the PPP led by Benazir
Bhutto and PML (N) led by Nawaz Sharif identified the features of the politics in Pakistan.
Since 1988, the hostile politics and the politics of personality as well as the struggle for
powers had set trends that distorted the party politics in the polity (Khan Faqir,Fakhrul Islam
and Shahid Hassan Rizvi, 2015, p. 209). In the period after Zia‟s Regime, there were
competition, conflict among political parties, ethnic, and regional nationalities and power
struggle in upper echelon in Islamabad (the capital of Pakistan) (Kapur, 1991, p. 150).
The political elites have so far failed to develop within the state a viable democracy in
line with the vision of the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The Muslim league and its
offshoots in pre-and after partition and the PPP in 1970s were taken by the landlords who
constrained political process and used the developments for their own purposes while ruling
in the name of public. However, they reduced politics only to economic exploits in order to
distribute them among the various factions of the political elites. Each group of the political
elites was engaged in personal politics only for personal gains at the cost of the national
interest (The Dynamics of Power: Military, p. 14).
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The state failed to establish institutions like parliament, judiciary and political parties
mainly due to the absence of constitutionalism. As a result, poor quality of leadership,
judiciary, and the lack of organized political parties created problem for democracy and a
vacuum was left which had been fulfilled by the repeated military interventions.
Consequently, the state of Pakistan suffered from the downfall of political
institutionalization. A vacuum already in place was filled by organized institution i.e. the
army (Syeda Waqar and Prof.Mark Olssen, 2012, pp. 2-8). It is held that “politicians,
diplomats, and military establishments have their own identities and interests that are not
always shared by those for whom they supposedly speak” (William, Krause & M C, 1997).
The landlords constitute the very basis of elites in the polity of Pakistan. Their
influence has been remained on the political and judicial system in the polity. They are
industrialist and majority of the political parties are influenced and even owned by the
landlords. They are deeply entrenched in the society not allowing any development of true
democracy. They get their votes on the basis of their personal influences. When they come
into powers, they grind their own axe. Their corruption and nepotism have played havoc with
institutions (Syeda Waqar and Prof.Mark Olssen, 2012, pp. 23-24).
Benazir Bhutto thought democracy to be the cure of ills in the polity. She reiterated
that politicians in collaboration with army-civil bureaucracy undermined democracy in the
state for personal advantage along with judiciary and religious party which act as instruments
for intelligence agencies. However, practically, she failed to realize such thoughts (Omer
Farooq Zain and Bushra Ali, 2009, p. 359).
Benazir Bhutto took the office of prime minster in 1988 after making deal with the
president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who wanted to be elected as the president and sought the
support of Benazir Bhutto. She pledged to provide him full support. However, the difference
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between the two arose on the appointment of the COAS and Apex Court judges. Her
government was dismissed. It is important to talk that the constitution of the state amended
many a time. However, this amendment was meant only for the benefits of the rulers. They
had no affect on the lives of the common man. The state suffered from bad governance. The
civilian leadership failed to deliver during this democratic era. The political leaders played
havoc with the institutions during the so-called democratic era (Shamshad BiBi and Dr.
Mussawar Hussain Bukhari, 2013, p. 18).
The government of Nawaz Sharif was pathetic from every angle. Bureaucracy, police,
and public service were afflicted with corruption and political favoritism. Nothing could be
hoped of the government. His government was restored on 26th
May on the orders of the
court. However, Nawaz Sharif and the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan had to resign on the
intervention of the military. Nawaz Sharif‟s government suffered from deadlocks and
problems on account of its relations with the army and with the president, economic
mismanagement, breaking of alliance with the MQM and ANP. Most importantly, he failed
to make the parliamentary democracy strong amid the confrontation between the government
and the opposition parties.
In the same way, Benazir Bhutto‟s government was not less bad than that of Nawaz
Sharif‟s. She had given freehand to her husband Asif Ali Zardari to use political powers with
no care of democracy. The political history reflects that there had remained a constant
struggle for political powers. The worst side of the politics in the so-called decade of
democracy was the tussle between the PPP and its rival PML (N). Both instituted cases of
corruption against each other when in powers. The confrontation between the two resulted
into protest, wheel jam strikes, and shutter down, and what not. Both the parties failed to
bring an end to their bitter animosity. Benazir Bhutto‟s second government was dismissed by
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the president Farooq Ahmed Khan in November 1996 amid charges of corruption and extra-
judicial killings.
Nawaz Sharif came to power in 1997 with strong majority. However, he played
havoc with his authority. Billions were embezzled and entertained his cronies with lucrative
jobs, and bounties. The politicians were on sale in the so-called decade of democracy. Such
sort of affairs raised question on leadership behavior. Where was the rule of law? Where was
the democratic behavior about which the leaders speak when seeking votes from the masses?
As a result of this type of behavior, coup once again sealed the fate of democracy in October
1999 (Shamshad BiBi and Dr. Mussawar Hussain Bukhari, 2013, pp. 19-20).
The Kargil conflict brought to the surface a significant behavior on the part of the
elites. General Pervez Musharraf, in his memoirs, proclaimed that Nawaz Sharif was
completely apprised of the Kargil operation. Besides, the operation was successful. However,
the Prime Minister demonstrated leadership of low profile and succumbed to the US pressure.
He called back troops from Kargil (Musharraf, 2006 , pp. 95-98). This may be biased
opinion. But the Kargil issue was not the main matter as result of which coup was proclaimed
in 1999. As a matter of fact, there was a personal conflict out of struggle for power and
dominance.
The long rule of the army embodies the army in the body politic of the state. As a
result, there are intimate relations between the army and the politicians. Many retired
Generals actively participate in the politics. They have been remained in the cabinet as well
as in diplomatic mission. In addition to, the army has a great say in the affairs especially in
the affairs of Afghanistan and of India. The ISI, the chief institution of the army, plays an
important role in this regard. This agency remained active in the period under Benazir Bhutto.
Benazir took in her cabinet General Yaqoob Khan as a foreign minister. This shows the
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domination of the army. Politicians always sought to have cordial relations with the army
(Naidu, 1989, p. 324).
Benazir Bhutto‟s first cabinet consisted of feudals, and lawyers, professionals. Her
cabinet comprised of feudals in the second term in office. Similarly, Nawaz Sharif‟s cabinet
consisted of businessman, lawyers, professionals, and feudals in his first term in office. In the
same way, his cabinet comprised of businessman and feudals in his second term in office.
The composition of their respective cabinets reveals their tendencies towards democracy.
Similarly, the composition of the parliament analyses the social background of its members
that in turn reveals the degree of democracy in the state. There was no representation of the
middle class in the parliament despite the fact being the backbone of democracy in a
democratic polity. The elite-composition of the parliament reveals almost no parliamentary
development that could promote democracy. The elites lacked mutual trust and badly
informed about the rules and regulation of the parliamentary work. As a result, they devoted
little time to debate and deliberation and drafting. Consequently, they failed to transform the
National Assembly into the forum of deliberation and drafting. This is explained in the tables
below.
Composition of Cabinets 1988-1998: Federal Ministries and Ministers
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Feudals Business Lawyers/Professionals Generals Women Ulemas Minorities Unidentified Total
Benazir Bhutto 15 1 14 3 4 - 1 6 44
(1988-90)
Nawaz Sharif 12 9 12 1 - 1 2 2 39
(1990-93)
Benazir Bhutto 17 3 13 2 1 - 1 2 39
(1993-96)
Nawaz Sharif
(1997-1999) 8 6 8 1 2 - - 1 26
Source: Saeed Shafqat, the Pakistan Development Review, January 28-31, 1999.
224
Social Class Background of National Assembly Members
1988 1990 1993 1997
Landlords
and Tribal
leaders
156 106 129 126
Businessmen
/
Industrialists
20
38
37 39
Urban
Professionals
9
46
26
32
Religious
Leaders
15 11
8
3
Retired
Military
Officers
7
3 5
2
Others - 3 3
2
Total 207 207 207 207
Source: The Pakistan Development Review, January 28-31, 1999
Parliamentary parties and their leadership paid little attention to the issues and
development. The National Assembly failed to hold fewer sessions during its 15 years of
parliamentary democracy (1985-1998). Moreover, its legislation history during those years
was almost zero. To analyze the matter even more, 11 sessions were held during Benazir
Bhutto‟s first term in office and the number was 11 to 31 during her second term in office. In
the same way, there were 17 sessions held during Nawaz Sharif‟s first term in office. There
were 20 sessions in his second term. This is explained in the table below.
Parliamentary Government National Assembly Total Average Days
(1988-1999) Sessions Days Duration Benazir Bhutto 11 218 20 PM. 1988-90
Nawaz Sharif 17 417 25
PM. 1990-93
Benazir Bhutto 31 525 17
225
PM. 1993-96
Nawaz Sharif 20 140 17
PM.1997-1999
Source: Secretary, National Assembly, Islamabad. Complier: Saeed Shafqat
It is worth mentioning, that the duration of all such sessions were short and brief. It
could be concluded that the members of the National Assembly failed to transform the
National Assembly into a forum for consensus-building and representative of the masses. The
elite-members sought to work on ordinances and paid no heed to debate and legislation. The
leaders and the parliamentary political parties failed to combine diverse interests and to
resolve the issue in the National Assembly through debate. As a result, the resolution of
issues has been remained a practice outside of the parliament in the political history of
Pakistan. As a result, the National Assembly failed to work as an institution that could play
its role in the promotion of democracy in the state (Shafqat, 1999, pp. 291-93).
The political parties make mass protest against the violation of their rights in the
world. However, the political leaders use the mass mobilization for their own advantages in
Pakistan. This is how the political parties have become a useful instrument for extra-
parliamentary policies in Pakistan. Besides, the leaders use the political parties for building
democratic norms and values. They also use them to perform a role in legislative work in the
parliament. The leaders failed to transform the political parties in Pakistan. They failed to
make them a legislative instrument in the parliament.
The outstanding characteristics of the political parties in Pakistan are making,
breaking and remaking of alliances and coalitions. As a result, consensus building on any
issue has become a forlorn thought in Pakistan. The political parties on the opposition
benches and in government seldom agree on any issues promoting the politics of consensus-
building. Instead, they engaged in controversy and policies of confrontation. The parties in
226
power attempt to keep dominance over the opposition parties. In response, the political
parties in opposition make extra-parliamentary alliances to bring down the ruling party. Their
main goal is to dismiss the government rather to compel the government for dialogue. History
is replete with such alliances, which attempted to bring down the government. DAC (1968),
PNA (1977), MRD (1983), IJI (1980), PAT (1998) are instances.
The above-named alliances were formed either to pressurize the government or the
president to dismiss the government. Since 1984, the president and the military had
performed active role in the dismissal of the elected governments. It is held that the president
in consonant with the political parties dissolved the governments in 1990, and in 1993.
However, the president and the judiciary performed actively to dismiss the elected
government in 1996. The political leaders failed to form any legal framework to resolve the
issues in the parliament. The parliamentarians adopted such policies that promoted
authoritarianism rather than democratic norms and values as well as respect for law. They
hardly bore any political opposition.
Nawaz Sharif formed Khidmat Committees, Ehtsab Cell and Open Kutcheries in his
second term in office. They were the instances that showed the authoritarian attitude of the
government and weakened the strength of the representative institutions. In the 1960s, and
1970s, political parties were dependent on party workers who were actively involved in the
organization of the respective party at grass root level. However, the workers had been
replaced by media in 1990s. The party leaders depended upon media rather than on the party
workers. As a result, the party leader and party workers lost the connection which they used
to enjoy in the past and in return, the party suffered from political decay (Shafqat, 1999, pp.
293-95).
227
The political parties have the history of fragmentation in Pakistan. Most of the parties
were formed on the basis of individual‟s personal respect or on his personal patronage.
Besides, they lacked ideologies or party structures. Having such a background, the PPP was
no exception. The PPP, although existed in all the four provinces of the state but it was a
loose organization of different people who were more loyal to their individual interests rather
than to the interests of the party. Its members were largely from land owning class who were
selected on basis of their political influence in their respective regions rather than on their
inclination to the party.
Benazir Bhutto failed to form the party on the bases of an effective structure. She
made its base through patronage with the support of the people work program. Moreover,
main decisions were enforced. Besides, Benazir Bhutto gave ministerial positions to the
individuals on the basis of their political influence. She ignored the element of capability. As
a result, the government failed to affect any performance. Besides the 1989-1990 Budget, the
party failed to pass any legislation. However, the members of the PPP had their own
explanation for their low performance. They had of the opinion that the PPP had no majority.
That may be true, but the government even failed to introduce any type of legislation in the
parliament.
Benazir Bhutto frequently faced allegations against her ministers. The case against
Begum Rehan Sarwar, the Minister of State for Women Affairs, was a case in point. Benazir
Bhutto was invited to inaugurate the computer center. The computers had been disappeared
from the center after inauguration within 24 hours. Benazir Bhutto discovered that the
computers were hired for the occasion. She obtained resignations from her cabinet when she
survived the vote of no-confidence in November 1989. However, she failed to drop them. She
feared that they would join the opposition benches in the no-confidence move and would
dismiss her government. She did not send their resignations to the President. She was well
228
aware of their corruption. However, the low parliamentary majority did not allow her to go
against them (Bray, 1990, p. 112).
The COP was a complex of political parties that had certain interests. It was not a
unit for a particular goal. It was the largest part of the IJI. This was the alliance of nine
political parties that had been formed before elections in 1988.The largest component of the
IJI was the PML. It was led by former Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo. Nawaz
Sharif and Jamaat-i-Islami had a lot of influence in the alliance. The second important
component of the COP was the Mohajir Qaumi Mahaz. The MQM formed alliance with the
PPP in December 1988. However, it made a secret alliance with the IJI in September 1989
and openly joined the COP in the following month during no-confidence motion. The COP
gave a lot of stress on Islam in theory but its programme was not different from the PPP in
practice. The battle between the political stakeholders revolved around personalities. It was
not based on ideology.
Each claimed to provide better administration and government. However, none was
met. The ruling and opposition benches were engaged in political horse trading and
defections that destabilized the government of the day. Like many other democracies,
Pakistan needs an opposition that is prepared to accept the democratic behavior. However,
each attempted to harm other through any means available. In such a situation, democratic
institutions were difficult to develop or could sustain its existence (Bray, 1990, p. 112).
5.3. Conclusion:
In November 1988, elections were held in the state on the basis of political parties. As
a result, assemblies were revived which ushered in hopes for democratic era in the state.
However, governments were dismissed during the period and none could be able to complete
its constitutional five years term. It could be maintained that the greatest hurdle in the way of
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democracy in Pakistan has been the behaviour and attitude of political leaders and elites.
They failed to develop a legal mechanism that could be helpful in sorting out political
differences, developing political consensus, and amicably resolving the political problems
through negotiations. Democracy could not be developed without the elite consensus. It is a
matter of great concern that elites who struggle for democracy once come into power become
authoritarian and undemocratic. They become autocratic and violate the rule of law and do
not tolerate any kind of political opposition.
It is the task of the leadership to devise a mechanism which could be helpful in the
establishment of political game based on trustworthy principles. The case of Pakistan brings
forth two reasons. First and foremost, there is a growing disjoint in the belief of the political
leadership on democracy and growing bend towards authoritative tendencies. Secondly, there
was a lack of coordination among the political leadership. On one hand, they wished and
struggled for democracy and sought greater participation from the masses and promised rule
of law. On the other hand, however, they behave authoritatively when in power.
From 1988-1999, both Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto emerged as a new kind of
leadership. Both had tendencies towards the upholding of the rule of law and democracy.
Both in a limited way contributed towards the democracy as opposition leaders. However,
both presented strong tendencies towards authoritarianism when assumed power in their
respective terms in office. Both violated the rule of law and failed to respect the rights of the
minority and attempted to suppress the opposition. Both in their respective terms in office
failed to engage opposition into dialogue to create consensus on issue in turn contributing
towards democracy.
Both promoted undemocratic norms that promoted mutual distrust and failed to
promote accommodation-building and dialogue across the political domain. The political
230
parties, the PPP and the PML (N), had been remained the major political parties and
dominated the political stage of the state. Besides, they shared 62% of the total votes polled
in the elections. However, both the parties failed to deliver good governance. They promoted
governance crisis and divided the society. Both lost an opportunity to engage opposition on
issues of political importance and would have helped in the promotion of consensus-building
and reconciliation.
Conclusion
This research basically revolves around two questions to substantiate the crisis of
democracy the state suffered from in the period 1988-99. As a matter of fact, the crisis was
the logical result of the rivalries between the leadership and an integrated group of elites
called the systemic factors. This group had been remained a constant and uniform factor in
the period. It consisted of political-religious-military and bureaucratic elites. It had rivalries
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with the prime minister and demanded the removal of the government from the chief rival
who had powers to dismiss.
The researcher has attempted to operationalize those rivalries as the crisis existed
among the leadership that was repeated and escalated and gave way to the integrated group of
elites to play their role in deepening the crisis. Consequently, democracy was suffered in the
period 1988-99. The researcher has measured those rivalries with relevant instance to
substantiate the questions.
In the light of the questions, the researcher finds that the crisis was emerged out of the
personal struggle for powers. The leadership in the person of Benazir Bhutto, of Nawaz
Sharif, of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, of Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, and of Pervez Musharraf in
their respective term in office had been engaged in rivalries over political and economic
gains. In this struggle, the systemic factors the researcher calls them an integrated group of
elites and claims the main contribution of the research joined hands with the president/COAS
against the prime ministers in their respective terms and were instrumental in the dismissal
the government of the rival in the lost-decade of democracy (1988-99).
The rivalries revolved around the crisis over the quest for dominance over the rival
elite. These rivalries between Benazir Bhutto and the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan were on
military and judicial appointments, Benazir Bhutto‟s attempts to oust Nawaz Sharif from
power in the Punjab. He was the blue-eyed boy of the president and of the army. Besides, he
was the major adversary of the PPP.
Benazir Bhutto replaced the Head of the ISI and the chief of the Joint Committee of
Staff. Ghulam Ishaq Khan resented her move. She also attempted to take the Afghan foreign
policy from the army and wanted to give back to the civilian authority. This made the
232
president and the army worried and realized that she was not abiding what she had pledged
before taking the office of the prime minister in 1988.
The Presidential power of the dissolution of the Assemblies was going to end possibly
in March 1990. As a result, the Prime Minister would become the center of the power. It was
this power shift that made the President and the IJI worried. The IJI, therefore, demanded of
the President to dismiss the government of the PPP before it was too late.
The differences occurred between Benazir and the President Ishaq over the former
recommendations regarding changes in the internal policies. However, the President always
rejected the proposed changes and used to advise her to get them pass from the parliament.
The President knew well that she could not do so as she had no majority there. Besides this,
the President Ishaq appointed General Asif Nawaz following the likely retirement of General
Aslam Baig in August 1991. However, Benazir was least bothered in this matter.
Benazir Bhutto also engaged in rivalries with the systemic factors over power and
made hectic efforts to prove the other unsuccessful. She did not enjoy good relations with the
opposition. The main tussle was between her and Nawaz Sharif who was the CM of the
Punjab. Nawaz Sharif was the nominee of the IJI. This was an alliance made out of the secret
planning of the president and the army who did not want Benazir to be the prime minister.
Benazir Bhutto had alliance with the MQM. This alliance was resented by the Sindi
nationalists. However, the MQM broke its alliance in Sindh. This made her office weak.
Benazir Bhutto in her first term in office had rivaled with the provincial government
for powers. She even did not use to invite the CMs of the opposition parties that had
government in Baluchistan and in the Punjab. Similarly, she also discriminated the
aforementioned provinces in the uplift programmes. In response, the opposition parties were
bent upon to dismiss her government by aligning themselves with the president Ghulam Ishaq
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Khan who had already engaged with Benazir Bhutto in rivalry over struggle for political and
economic gains.
There were resentments over funds allocations between the IJI and the PPP. Benazir
allocated funds to the provinces, but she engaged the district members of the PPP to use those
funds. She was also engaged in confrontation with the judiciary over the appointment of
judges to the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
Although, the PPP had majority in the province of Sind, but it entered into alliance
with the MQM. However, the alliance broke when ethnic violence over Sindhi and non-
Sindhi controversy erupted in Karachi and Hyderabad. Besides, the PPP failed to deliver
what it had pledged in its elections‟ manifesto. The MQM withdrew its support from the PPP
in 1989. In response, the government launched an operation against its activists across Sind.
In that operation, MQM activists were either gunned down or they received fatal injuries. The
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan also referred to the operation as one of the reasons of the
dismissal of the government of the PPP in 1990.
The government of the PPP was faced with the Shariat bill. The bill was passed
unanimously with amendments in the Senate of Pakistan on May 13th
, 1990. It was pledged
that every aspect of the daily life would be lined in the light of sharia. It had vast
implications. If it had implemented, it would have been affected judiciary, economy, and
mass media. Besides, the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan would have got powers to declare
the decisions of the courts null and void if it had been found unislamic. It was a severe test to
Benazir‟s government.
If Benazir had extended her support to the bill, her office would have been in danger
and if she had declined her support, she would have been accused of as an enemy to Islam.
On July 19th
, Benazir Bhutto said in response to the questions of the media persons at Lahore
234
airport, that she would keep intact the supremacy of the parliament and did not think proper
cutting hands and ears of the human beings. She was criticized in the religious sphere over
the statement. That was how she antagonized the religious elites who had already harbor
enmity toward her due to their rightist inclinations.
In the election campaign, some of the religious elites of the IJI even spoke of Benazir
Bhutto and her mother as gangsters in bangles. She was tagged as the spearhead of western
culture. She was propagated as a westernized woman. Their opponents airdropped her and
her mother‟s swimming costume pictures over various cities in the state. They proclaimed
that she would corrupt the morality of the people if allowed to come in power. Benazir
Bhutto was faced with criticism from the religious section of the society while assuming the
office in 1988. Some of the ulemas (religious elites) even came with fatwa (religious edict)
and proclaimed that a woman could not rule an Islamic state.
Benazir Bhutto‟s political attitude was transformed into bitterness when Nawaz Sharif
campaigned publically to malign the government. The PPP used unconstitutional means
against the PML (N) government under Sabar Shah in NWFP (later KP). The PPP leadership
employed various tactics using money and brought down the PML (N) government in the
province. As a result, it enforced Governor Rule in the province. Later, the PPP formed its
own government in the province. Demonstrations and protest started across the province
maligning openly the PPP government. Nawaz Sharif proclaimed that this was
unconstitutional and against the norms of democracy. The opposition, in the National
Assembly, boycotted and protested publicly to malign the government and its undemocratic
moves.
It is thought provoking that how political elites played a game against each other to
have power in their hands. On one hand, efforts were being made to restore normal relations
235
between the center and the provincial government. On the other hand, the COP convened a
National Convention in which a charge sheet of corruption, nepotism, financial irregularities,
and mismanagement against the government of the PPP was presented. The conveners
demanded direct action of the President in the interests of the nation.
An electoral alliance in the name of IJI was made to counter the PPP in the general
elections being held in 1988 in order to keep the PPP from sweeping the elections realizing
its popularity in the masses. The idea of this alliance was floated by the ISI chief General
Hamid Gul who told COAS Aslam Baig if the PPP swept the elections, it would pose danger
to the many causes dear to the army. The COAS Aslam Baig accepted this in his interview
with the Herald in 2001.
In September-October 1988, two officers of the ISI were tasked to launch an
operation “Midnight Jackals” in order to win over the national assembly members of the PPP
to help succeed the vote of no-confidence against Benazir. That was revealed by the officer in
his interview with the News on July 9, 1994.
Nawaz Sharif and the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan engaged in confrontation out of
struggle for powers in his first term in office which resulted into the dismissal of the
government in 1993. The rivalries between the two revolved around the appointment of the
COAS, Nawaz Sharif‟s attempt to repeal the 8th
amendment, the probe of the Veena Hayat
case, and differences over the 12th
amendment.
Nawaz Sharif started his first term in office amid good relations with the president in
1990. However, with the passage of time, relations between Nawaz Sharif and the president
became worse. Serious differences emerged over the appointment of the COAS in the wake
of the sudden demise of General Asif Janjua. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif sought to repeal the 8th
amendment that had granted the power to the president to dismiss the prime minister, and to
236
dismiss the assemblies. However, Ghulam Ishaq Khan wished to preserve the safety value
against martial law.
The bonhomie between the President Ishaq and him proved short-lived when he sought to
take steps to curtail the President‟s powers. In such atmosphere, the opposition headed by the
PPP demanded for fresh elections in the state. The President dismissed Nawaz‟s government
after securing support of the army and of the opposition. This sort of affairs reflects that the
elites go against one another for the sake of power so deep that they even do not hesitate to
make undemocratic endeavours to prove their rivals a failure.
Differences began to emerge between the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz
Sharif over the former‟s humiliation at the time of his speech to the joint secession of the
Parliament at the hands of the opposition. However, he had to complete his speech amid
slogan „Go Baba Go‟. Nawaz Sharif, although, reprimanded the behavior of opposition as
undemocratic and immoral but there was no active response from him and his party against
the humiliation of the President.
The Commission under Lt. Gen. Muhammad Shafiq (Retired) created irreparable rift
in the relationship of the president and of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif when the later
wanted to probe the case of Veena Hayat in which the president Ishaq Khan‟s son-in-law was
allegedly involved.
Differences emerged between the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif over the 12th
amendment. Despite the objection of the president, the
amendment was passed on 2nd
July 1991which was resented on all forums.
Benazir Bhutto sought rapprochement with the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan. She
assured Roedad Khan that she would support the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan against
237
Nawaz Sharif so that he might not be able to repeal the 8th
amendment and obtain dictatorial
powers. Roedad Khan was a civil servant and a friend of Ghulam Ishaq Khan.
Nawaz Sharif also faced problems from the allied political parties. The cracks in the
IJI coalition started appearing as the IJI was opposed to his policy to join the international
coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War (1990-91).
When Nawaz Sharif was engaged in confrontation with the President Ishaq Khan,
Benazir Bhutto, initially, sought to have alliance with Nawaz Sharif against the President but
she failed to achieve her objectives. Consequently, she sought to have the help of Roedad
Khan, a confidant of the President and a former bureaucrat, to make rapprochement with the
President. This is the sorrowful aspect of political elites that how they compromise for their
personal interests and work against democracy.
The tussle between the President Ishaq and Nawaz Sharif became worst with the
passage of time. In the meantime, the opposition led by the PPP gave a call for a Long March
if their demand for fresh elections had not been met. The COAS Waheed Kakar assured the
opposition and made agree the President Ishaq and Nawaz Sharif to resign.
In 1992, Nawaz Sharif suffered from ill fate as the IJI, which was a forced marriage
solemnized by ISI, began to disintegrate. The NPP of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the JI of Qazi
Hussain Ahmed, and the MQM of Altaf Hussain left the alliance on account of differences
with Nawaz Sharif and his government. In addition to, the twelve members of the MQM also
resigned from the National Assembly. Such changes in the configuration of the IJI although
posed no major problem for the continuity of Nawaz Sharif‟s government in the centre but
Nawaz Sharif did lose two-third majority in the National Assembly required for an
amendment in the Constitution.
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Nawaz Sharif had the blessings of General Zia in going up in the political career.
Being a progeny of General Zia, he enjoyed the support of the army even after his death in air
crash in 1988 near Bahawalpur (Pakistan). The men in the uniform were happy with him.
That status of having good relations with them, he had earned on account of his enmity
toward the PPP. He did not exhibit even an iota of reservation over the COAS Aslam Baig‟s
open criticism on the government policy toward the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91.
On the Gulf War (1990-91), the stance of the government and the COAS was divided.
The COAS Aslam Baig wanted to extend support to Iraq and spoke against the hegemony of
the USA. In addition to, the Islamists also rose in protest and staged demonstrations in the
capital city Islamabad and demanded of the government to support Iraq against the USA and
allied forces. The scenario gave birth to apprehensions that the COAS might probably stage a
coup in the state. Nawaz Sharif and his close associates had such apprehensions.
Benazir Bhutto took the office of the Prime Minister in 1996. However, she engaged
in controversy with the president Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari over the appointment of
judges, law and order situation in the province of Sindh, and the murder of Mir Murtaza
Bhutto‟s death. It is worth mention that the president Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari was her
true loyalist and her nominee. He involved in controversies out of rivalries for powers with
the passage of time.
The differences between Benazir and the President Leghari occurred when the later
complained of the law and order situation in the province of Sind in particular and in the rest
of the state in general. However, Benazir least bothered the request of the President. The
situation went from bad to worse when the government of Benazir empowered the state
agencies, and the police to tackle the situation with iron hands. The law enforcing agencies
worked actively under the watch of Home Minister General Nasirullah Babar.
239
The relations between Benazir and the President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari
deteriorated more and more when the former alleged the President in the murder of her
brother Mir Murtaza via police encounter in the broad day light in Karachi in 1996. She had
the opinion that he was killed on the orders of the President Farooq Ahmed Leghari.
The relations between the President Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari and the PM Benazir
Bhutto also became deteriorated when the former wanted the proper implementation of the
case against Shafi Muhammadi. However, Shafi Muhammadi again came with severe
criticism against the Chief Justice which was resented by the President Farooq Ahmed Khan
Leghari too much. He was of the opinion that Shafi Muhammadi had support of the
government as he had been the PPP loyalist.
Moreover, the PPP government proposed Pakistan Petroleum limited deal. Among the
bidders, Mr. Sadrudin Hashwani was the chief beneficiary. Mr.Sadurdin Hashwani was a
business tycoon and an hotelier. The president handed down back the draft ordinance and
advised to set up multi-billion lottery to raise fund for 50th
independence celebrations. He
reiterated that the deal did not look transparent and advised that it must be passed through the
parliament.
Benazir Bhutto was not happy at the president Leghari‟s independent move with
regard to asserting his authority. To teach him a lesson, she included Nawaz Khokhar in her
cabinet as a cabinet minister. She knew well that the president Leghari would resent Nawaz
Khokhar‟s inclusion. Nawaz Khokhar was the man who had proclaimed that the President
Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari was involved in the Mehran Bank scandal.
The politics of confrontation between the PPP and the PML (N) reached to the lowest
point when the PPP succeeded to replace the coalition government of the PML (N) and the
ANP in the province of the NWFP. The provincial president of the PPP Aftab Ahmed Khan
240
Sherpao succeeded in winnowing down the loyalties of the independents and of the two
members of the PML (N) of the provincial assembly. As a result, the opposition launched
“Save NWFP Campaign”. It is worth mentioning that the PPP proclaimed the Governor Rule
in the province before forming its government in the province.
The JI campaigned vigorously against the government in the summer of 1996. The
campaign was so violent that the JI lost three of its party activists in clash with police. In the
meanwhile, PML (N), the JI, and nine other opposition parties gave call for a strike that
paralyzed the life in Karachi. The MQM and some other political parties joined hands with
the PML (N) and the JI. With this, the alliance of the opposition enlarged, and the total
number of the political parties reached to 14. They together vehemently protested against the
government and demanded the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto„s government. The stance of the
opposition parties gained momentum when Mir Murtaza Bhutto was assassinated in the broad
day light in Karachi. It proclaimed that the government could not maintain law and order
situation and must be dismissed.
Qazi Hussain Ahmed said that all the parliamentarians of the JI would resign before
Dharna. In-house change would mean give and take. The president Farooq Ahmed Khan
Leghari should help us to change or transform the system. He is not a man who is the part and
parcel of the particular culture within the PPP. The assemblies have to dissolve at any cost.
Qazi Hussain Ahmed appealed to the woman to participate in Dharna along with their
children. Besides, he demanded accountability before elections. The opposition parties
proclaimed the support of the Dharna. Raja Zafar Ul-Haq met Qazi Hussain Ahmed and
proclaimed his and his party support. The JWP of Nawab Akbar Bugti also announced to
join hands with Qazi Hussain Ahmed in Dharna. Gen Hamid Gul, and Imran Khan also
proclaimed to participate in Dharna, However, Hamid Nasir Chetta refused to participate.
241
Nawaz Sharif assumed the prime minister office in 1997 after land sliding victory in
the general elections in 1997. However, with the passage of time, he engaged with the
president Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari over the contempt court being pursued in November
1997 against him. This rivalry divided the judiciary into two blocs. Thus, the three organs of
the government were engaged in tussle with each other.
Nawaz Sharif‟s autocratic nature of politics also antagonized the members of his
party. The matter was that when he sought to introduce Shariat Bill in 1999 without taking
into account the members of the party, there were reports about the mini-rebellion in the
party. Moreover, there were resentments among the members of the party when he ignored
their selection to the office of the president. They were not even consulted. It was said the
decision regarding Rafiq Tarar who was a family friend to have been nominated as the
president was taken by Nawaz Sharif and his close cronies.
The alliance broke between the PML (N) and the MQM when the MQM sought to
have implemented the agreement made in February 1997 and surrendered ministries in the
centre and province over not paying any heed to it in the decision making. He imposed the
Governor Rule in Sindh in 1997.
Nawaz Sharif also deteriorated his relations with the ANP. The ANP withdraw its
support from his government when the government failed to meet its demand of renaming the
province the NWFP as Pakhtunistan. Moreover, the unilateral support of the government to
the Kalabagh Dam also widened the gulf between both. Nawaz Sharif also engaged with the
military and finally with the COAS General Pervez Musharraf over the Kargil issue. The
military resented the resignation of Gen. Karamat and withdrawal from the Kargil on the
intimation of the president Bill Clinton. As a result, Nawaz Sharif replaced the COAS Gen.
242
Pervez Musharraf with his family friend Gen. Ziauddin. This provoked the army and he was
dismissed in a military coup in October 1999 and democracy was derailed.
The role of the opposition was not democratic in the so-called democratic decade. It
used to join hands with the president to prove the ruling party a failure and welcomed
frequently the dismissal of the president. The role of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif during
their respective periods in opposition speaks volume about the undemocratic behaviour of the
opposition.
As far as the elections are concerned, the rivals outdid each other in order to high jack
the general elections. The general elections held during the decade of democracy were not
devoid of rigging. Before the 1988 elections IJI was formed to block the way of the PPP and
the president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the military were involved in the rigging in order to
give majority of seats to the IJI in the elections 1988.
The elections held in 1993 had the same script but this time the characters were
different. The engineers of the elections were engaged in breaking the anti-PPP vote. The IJI,
therefore, was dissolved. Its votes were separated through the formation of PIF. Factions in
the Nawaz Sharif led PML were encouraged. One such faction was formed in the name of the
PML (J) under Hamid Nasir Chetta. It weakened the vote bank of Nawaz Sharif in the
Punjab. Although Nawaz Sharif was granted mandate in the 1997 elections but he
disrespected the mandate through authoritarian rule.
The researcher has attempted to theorize the discussion in the light of power elite
theory with reference to the crisis of democracy in Pakistan and conceptualized and
operationalised the concept of elite. Power elite factor is the most basic in the crisis of
democracy in Pakistan. The competition among the various classes of elites historically for
power put democracy at fragile position. In this struggle for power a group named in this
243
dissertation as an integrated group of elites took advantage of the situation and played its role
in maximizing the crisis.
Besides, this group provided the power elite in this case the president of Pakistan
with a rationale to substantiate the dissolution of the government of the day. Continued
rivalry among elites generated crisis and kept continued the crisis of democracy in Pakistan in
1990s. In chaos there is an opportunity for many, it is said. In the opinion of C. Wright Mills
(1959,181) “power has to do with whatever decisions men make about the arrangements
under which they live, and about the events which make up the history of their times… men
are free to make history but some are much freer than others.”
Elite theory seeks to describe and explain that how power is distributed in the state.
According to the theory, a small minority wields powers that coordinates and cooperates to
have power in their hands. If they fail to satisfy the interests of the members of the group, a
rival group comes into being and thus struggle for power begins. In this struggle, they
manipulate and are manipulated. For this ruling majority, different theorists have used
different terminologies. Mills has called it power elite, Pareto has termed it as governing
elite, Marx called them as ruling class, and Floyd Hunter as top leaders.
There are many writers who presented their theories regarding elite role in the
politics. Among them, C.W. Mills (1956) presented the theory of power elite. He divides the
power structure in the USA into government, military and corporate sector. He says that if
they are taken together, they make high circle. Moreover, he was of the view that those at the
top of the corporate, military and federal institutions form a single ruling majority. He calls
this ruling majority as power elite. They share common schooling, and social background.
They facilitate one another with regards to power distribution as politicians hold important
244
positions at corporate boards and the military men hold important positions in politics. He
says that power elites are the nation‟s controlling force.
In order to understand the political system of Pakistan, one must have the knowledge
of who are the real power-holders in Pakistan, where did they come from, what are their
interests, how is the political and economic power distributed among them, what means do
they use to get this power, and what are their political resources. The answer to these
questions brings the researcher to study elite classes. They are divided as traditional, colonial
and emergent. In traditional elites are included landowning elites, religious elites. In the same
way, colonial elites consist of bureaucratic and military elites whereas industrial and
professional elites are included in the emergent elites. Power elites emerge from among the
aforementioned classes of elites who are the power-holders in the political system of Pakistan
and provide governance in the body politic. They get their objectives through making
alliances (Asaf Hussain, 1979).
Pakistan suffered immediately from the problems of survival in 1947. Among the
multitude of problems, the lack of resources to shoulder its very existence is worth of
considerations. Such sort of circumstances provided an opportunity to the elites of the state to
play their part in the ruling affairs of the state. This was how elite entrenched themselves in
the state in the start of its early years. The elites consisted of wealthy landlords, industrial
giants, and top military officials and to an extent, the ulema, or religious clergy. The
members of these groups cooperate and coordinate with each other for the purpose that the
power should have been remained within their circle. There are two aspect of democracy in
Pakistan. Theoretically, the constitution of Pakistan promotes the equality among the citizens
of the state. However, practically, it is the elites only who harvest the benefits of democracy.
245
These elites cooperated and coordinated to have power in their hands at the cost of
what may come. That is why the history of Pakistan is replete with the crisis of democracy in
the form of frequent dismissal of assemblies, military coups, disintegration and what not.
Actually, the period (1988-199) was the rule of elites in the name of democracy. The power
struggle was among the prime minister, the president and the systemic factors called an
integrated group of elites.
The opposition, the political parties and their alliances, the judiciary and the army
played their role in deepening the crisis of democracy. It is said that how systemic factors
rigged elections and made political alliance to have their cronies in powers. The systemic
factors as well as the leaders were the conglomeration of elites who represented their
respective classes.
The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was a bureaucrat who made to the seat of the
president and remained in office till 1993. He resigned from office due to the standoff
between him and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The President Farooq Ahmed Khan was
also a bureaucrat and remained in office till 1996. He also resigned due to conflict with
Nawaz Sharif in his second term in office. In the same way, the President Rafiq Tarar was a
retired judge and a family friend of Nawaz Sharif. He was dethroned when General Pervaiz
Musharruf imposed martial law in 1999. Benazir Bhutto belonged to the feudal family and
was the daughter of the prime minister of ZA Bhutto. She headed the government twice in the
lost-decade of democracy (1988-99). Her government was dismissed amid confrontation and
rivalry. Nawaz Sharif was an industrialist and remained the prime minister twice in the
decade. His government was also dismissed amid rivalry and confrontation. C. Wright Mills
theory substantiates the case of Pakistan upon having such a background, and the researcher
holds that Pakistan was in the grip of power elites. The crisis of democracy in the decade was
mainly due to their conspiracy and counter-conspiracy, and political opportunism.
246
In the light of the role of leadership and of the systemic factors, it is held that
democracy without democrats was present in 1990s. The leadership who belonged to the elite
background considers democracy nothing short of the holding of elections only. They did not
believe in the true ideals of democracy. They shared powers with the fellow elites and rivaled
with the fellow elites. It was the rule of elites in disguise. The researcher comes to the
conclusion after analyzing the role of leadership in the so-called decade of democracy that it
was elitocracy that was present in the period 1988-99. There was no democracy in the state of
Pakistan in 1990s. The researcher proclaims that he has coined the term “elitocracy” to
describe the so-called democracy by combining elite and democracy.
In short, the researcher claims that his main contribution is the role of integrated
group of elites which is called in this research as systemic factors. This group of elites was a
constant factor in the decade and helped the chief rival (President/COAS) to dismiss Prime
Minister from the office in the period (1988-1999). This group was the complex of the power
elites. He has also explored the rivalries among the power elites both leadership and systemic
factor. The crisis of democracy in the decade was mainly driven by conspiracy and counter-
conspiracy among the power elites. The struggle for power maximized political opportunism
to the extent that further escalated the rivalries and the tension within the power elites. The
time period under his investigation can be described as the era of elite rule and may not be
fully described as democratic or otherwise. The researcher called it the era of elitocracy.
The popular and semi-academic discussion regarding civil- military tension and crisis
of democracy generally lead to a conclusion that the institution of military is the main cause
and politicians are the main victims in the derailment of democracy. Whereas the researcher
finds himself in partial agreement with the above stated conclusion, his research has
concluded the complex process of power struggle and internal rivalries among the power
elites. Based on rigorous study of these processes, his thesis conclusion is that mutual
247
rivalries among the power elites both systemic factor and leadership against each other result
into the derailment of democracy.
The following are the recommendations:
Powers elites both leadership and systemic factors should throw petty issues that
revolved around their inter-rivalries and should promote democracy and its ideals.
This would create an environment of consensus and politics of understanding would
help consolidate democracy. That would in turn solve the problems of the masses.
The leadership and the systemic factors should have belief in democracy in letter and
spirit. There are two aspects of democracy. Theoretically democracy safeguards the
rights of the masses without any discrimination. But there is problem in the
implementation in the state. It is, therefore, democracy fails practically to play role in
the state out of inter-power-elites (leadership and the systemic factors) struggle for
political and economic gains. Democracy is the rule of the people. The political and
non-political forces should respect the mandate of the masses and should perform
their constitutional role as prescribed in the constitution of the state. This would create
and promote democratic culture and as a result institutions would be strengthened in
the state. Once democracy is allowed to consolidate, there would be no crisis of
democracy in state.
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Appendices:
Pareto Mosca
267
Governing Elites Non-Governing Elites Political Elites Ruling Elites
Sub-elite
(Technocrats,
Managers, civil
S servants)
Masses Masses
Figure: 01. Two Version of the Elite Model
268
Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World
Authoritarian Orders
(Asabiyya) (Theocracy)
(Republicanist) Pseudo-Democracies (Islamicist)
Republican Democracy Liberal Democracy Islamic Democracy
Patterns of Democratic Transformation in the Muslim World
269
Table. 1
Number of Regime Changes in Different Time Periods
Type of regime
change
1990-1999 2000-2014 2000-2005 2006-2014
Democratization 40(38 countries) 34(31 countries) 14(14 countries) 20 (20countries)
De-
democratization
13(12 countries) 34(28 countries) 13(12 countries) 21 (20 countries)
Source: Freedom House – Electoral Democracies data.
Table. 2
Societal Power as Seen by the Three Models
Model Chief source of
power
Key power
groups
Role of masses Function of state
Class
Control of
society‟s
productive
resources(wealth)
Ruling
class(owners
and controllers
of the corporate
system)
Manipulated
and exploited by
the ruling class
To protect
capitalist class
interests and
reproduce class
system
Elitist
Control of key
institutions,
primarily the
corporation and
the executive
branch of the
federal
government
Relatively
cohesive power
elites made up
of top corporate
and government
leaders
Manipulated
and exploited by
the power elite
To protect
interests of
dominant elites
and their
institutions
Pluralist
Various political
resources,
including wealth,
authority, and
votes
Elective
political
officials, interest
groups and their
leaders
Indirectly
control elites
through
elections and
interest group
pressures
To referee the
arena of interest
groups and
create political
consensus
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