WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 1 MAS CRI MI
NALPROCEDURE: PRELI MI NARY I NVESTI GATI ONCASES TABLEOFCONTENTS
G.R. No. 168811 Marilyn Co vs Republic
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2 G.R. No. 158236 Ligaya Santos vs Domingo Orda Jr.
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10 G.R. No. 149148 Mendoza-Arce vs Office of Ombudsman
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22 G.R. No. 131144 Advincula vs
CA.................................................................................................................................
31 G.R. No. 127107 Dimatulac vs Villon
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37 G.R. No. 72301 Ponsica vs Ignalaga
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63 G.R. No. 164268 Torres Jr. vs Aguinaldo
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77 G.R. No. 106087 Go vs CA
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87 WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 2 MAS G. R. NO.
168811MARILYNCOVSREPUBLIC Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 168811 November 28, 2007 MARILYN H.
CO and WILSON C. CO, Petitioners,vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. EUFRONIO K. MARISTELA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30, and JOCELYN FRANCIA,
Respondents. D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court
is a petition for review1 assailing the 3 January 2005 Decision2
and 30 June 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 82155. The Antecedent Facts On 15 May 2001, at around 5:00
p.m., Miguel Antonio Francia (Miguel) was shot dead in front of his
house in Caramoan, Camarines Sur by Sgt. Roberto Reyes4 (Sgt.
Reyes), a member of the Philippine Army. Jocelyn Francia (Jocelyn),
Miguels widow, filed a complaint for Murder against Sgt. Reyes and
John Does. Mayor Marilyn H. Co (Mayor Co) and Wilson C. Co
(petitioners)5 were included as principals by induction. The motive
for the killing was allegedly Miguels shift of loyalty to Mayor Cos
political opponent. Sgt. Reyes and the John Does in the complaint
were allegedly Mayor Cos bodyguards. While Miguel was at the
Caramoan Municipal Hospital, Sgt. Reyes, SPO2 Ramil Araas (SPO2
Araas), and a John Doe allegedly entered the Francias house against
Jocelyns will. They searched for papers and other effects, and
caused chaos and disarray in the house. Accordingly, Jocelyn also
filed a complaint for Violation of Domicile against Sgt. Reyes,
SPO2 Araas, and John Doe. The accused alleged that Miguel was drunk
and unruly, and indiscriminately fired his 9 mm pistol. Sgt. Reyes,
who was at the vicinity, accosted Miguel and fired a warning shot.
However, Miguel pointed his pistol at Sgt. Reyes. Sgt. Reyes was
forced to shoot Miguel who was hit at his right thigh. Sgt. Reyes
and his companions brought Miguel to the Caramoan Municipal
Hospital where he died due to loss of blood. WMSU LLB 2A 2015
CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 3 MAS After the preliminary investigation,
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Jose, Camarines Sur
issued a Joint Resolution6 dated 30 August 2001, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, let the
case against SPO2 Ramil Araas, Roberto Reyes, Mayor Marilyn Co,
Wilson Co and other John Does for Murder be dismissed for lack of
probable cause and an information for Homicide be filed against
Sgt. Gilbert Reyes, P.A.[,] with the proper court[,] his
allegations of self-defense being evidentiary in nature and another
information for Violation of Domicile against Sgt. Gilbert Reyes
and another John Doe be filed with the proper court, as the case
against SPO2 Ramil Araas, for lack of probable cause[,] is hereby
dismissed. SO RESOLVED.7 Jocelyn filed a petition for review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a Resolution8 promulgated on 25
June 2002, the DOJ resolved: WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is
hereby MODIFIED. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur is hereby directed to file the Information for murder
against respondents SPO2 Ramil Araas, Sgt. Gilbert Reyes, Mayor
Marilyn Co, Wilson Co and John Does, and another information for
violation of domicile against respondents SPO2 Ramil Araas, Sgt.
Gilbert Reyes and a certain John Doe. The Provincial Prosecutor is
further directed to report to this Office the action taken within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof. SO ORDERED.9 On 2 July 2002,10
Provincial Prosecutor Agapito Rosales filed a new Information for
Murder against the accused. The accused filed a motion to suspend
proceedings pending the motion for reconsideration of the DOJs 25
June 2002 Resolution. Jocelyn, through a private prosecutor, filed
a motion for issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused.
Jocelyn thereafter filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Alfredo
Cabral (Judge Cabral) for loss of trust and confidence due to the
delay in the issuance of the warrants of arrest. Judge Cabral
granted Jocelyns motion and the cases were transferred to the sala
of Judge Eufronio K. Maristela of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30 (trial court). In an Order11 dated
13 September 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend
proceedings as well as the motion for the issuance of warrants of
arrest. Instead, the trial court set the cases for preliminary
investigation of Jocelyn and her witnesses to determine probable
cause. During the scheduled preliminary investigation on 23
September 2002, only Dr. Minerva Balmacea-Aguirre of Caramoan
Municipal Hospital appeared. Jocelyn and her witnesses did not
appear for fear for their lives. The private prosecutor moved for
the suspension of the judicial determination of probable cause as
he was filing a petition for change of venue. In an Order dated 14
October 2002, the trial court held in abeyance the presentation of
additional evidence for judicial determination of probable cause.
However, this Court subsequently denied the private prosecutors
motion for change of venue. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F.
Sales 4 MAS In an Order dated 19 May 2003,12 the trial court held
that no probable cause exists against the accused for the crime of
Murder. The trial court dismissed the Information for Murder but
upheld the Information for Homicide against Sgt. Reyes. The trial
court issued another warrant of arrest against Sgt. Reyes. The
private prosecutor moved for reconsideration of the 19 May 2003
Order. On 13 August 2003,13 the trial court granted the motion and
set the presentation of additional evidence for judicial
determination of probable cause on 29 August 2003. Meanwhile, on 12
August 2003, Jocelyn executed an Affidavit of Retraction/Desistance
absolving the accused, particularly petitioners, from liability for
Miguels death. On 28 August 2003, the private prosecutor filed an
Omnibus Motion to Admit Affidavit of Desistance of Private
Complainant Jocelyn Francia and to Dismiss the Case. On 29 August
2003, neither the government nor the private prosecutor appeared at
the scheduled hearing. None of the witnesses stated in the subpoena
appeared. In an Order dated 21 October 2003,14 the trial court
dismissed the Information for Murder against SPO2 Araas, Sgt.
Reyes, John Does, and petitioners for lack of probable cause. The
trial court again sustained the Information for Homicide against
Sgt. Reyes. The private prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration. In its Order dated 17 December 2003,15 the trial
court denied the motion. Jocelyn, joined by Miguels sons Antonio
Francia II and Mark Anthony Francia (collectively, the heirs of
Miguel), filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailing the 21 October 2003 Order of the trial court. The
heirs of Miguel alleged that the 21 October 2003 Order was issued
despite Jocelyns submission of an Affidavit withdrawing her
Affidavit of Desistance and despite her lack of affirmation in open
court of the Affidavit of Desistance. The heirs of Miguel further
alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Information for Murder for lack of probable cause to
sustain the charges against the accused. The Ruling of the Court of
Appeals In its 3 January 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals set
aside the trial courts 21 October 2003 and 17 December 2003 Orders.
The dispositive portion of the 3 January 2005 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is impressed
with merit. Perforce, the questioned Orders dated October 21, 2003
and December 17, 2003 are hereby reversed and set aside for being
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or in
excess of jurisdiction. The respondent court, therefore, is hereby
ordered to enforce the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
promulgated on 25 June 2002 (Annex I, pp. 153 to 161, Rollo) and in
pursuance thereto, to re-admit the information filed by Provincial
Prosecutor Agapito B. Rosales dated July 4, 2002 (Annex "J", p.
162, Rollo). SO ORDERED.16 The Court of Appeals distinguished
between a preliminary investigation for the determination of
sufficient ground for the filing of information on one hand, and
preliminary examination for the determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest on the other. The Court of
Appeals ruled that in this case, the incident before the trial
court was the determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the accused. The trial court was not
tasked to WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 5 MAS determine
whether there was a probable cause to prosecute the accused for the
crime of Murder. The determination of probable cause to prosecute
the accused for Murder falls within the jurisdiction of the
prosecutor. This was already settled with the issuance of the 25
June 2002 Resolution by the Secretary of Justice and with the
filing of an Information for Murder before the trial court. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court went beyond its
jurisdiction when it assumed the duty and function of the
prosecutor. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its
30 June 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, petitioners came to this Court, raising the following
arguments:17 1. The Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the
order of the trial court considering that there was clearly no
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners. 2. The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it found that the trial court arrogated unto itself the
functions of the public prosecutor. The Issue The sole issue in
this case is: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in reversing the trial courts 21 October 2003 Order which
dismissed the Information for Murder against petitioners, SPO2
Araas, Sgt. Reyes, and John Does for lack of probable cause. The
Ruling of this Court The petition has no merit. Preliminary
Investigation Should be Distinguished from Preliminary Examination
In this case, what was brought before the trial court was the
preliminary examination. The trial courts jurisdiction is limited
to the determination of whether there is probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused. Instead, the
trial court assumed the function of the prosecutor by determining
whether there was probable cause for the filing of the information
for Murder. In Salta v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court already ruled
that Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longer
authorizes Regional Trial Court Judges to conduct preliminary
investigations. In Castillo v. Villaluz,19 the Court reiterated:
Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Court of First Instance)
no longer have authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
That authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13, 14
and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, was removed from
them by the 1985 Rules on WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales
6 MAS Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, which
deleted all provisions granting that power to said Judges. x x x
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
declared effective on October 1, 1988, did not restore that
authority to Judges of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did
not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having
authority to conduct preliminary investigations. This is not to
say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost
the power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of
determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance
of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant). Such a power indeed, it
is as much a duty as it is a power has been and remains vested in
every judge by the provision in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the
1973 and the present (1987) Constitutions securing the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it
beyond the competence of mere Court rule or statute to revoke. The
distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an RTC Judge may
no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain whether
there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint
or information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading is
filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable cause
justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. x x x.20 The Court
again reiterated this rule in People v. Inting21 where we further
explained: Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for
trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the
course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion
about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the
Prosecutor. x x x We reiterate that preliminary investigation
should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for
the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the
information or it is an investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first
kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is
part of the prosecutions job. The second kind of preliminary
investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination
is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. x x x22
Clearly, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
assuming the function of the prosecutor.1wphi1 It should have
limited itself to the determination of the existence of probable
cause for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest against the
accused. The Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the trial
courts Order which dismissed the information for Murder filed
against the accused. Petitioners Arguments are Evidentiary in
Nature Petitioners further allege that the Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the order of the trial court because there is clearly
no probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest
against them. Petitioners allege that the admitted facts show that
their co-accused who are law enforcers were WMSU LLB 2A 2015
CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 7 MAS performing their functions to
maintain order and enforce the law. Petitioners further allege that
the physical evidence, consisting of the injuries suffered by
Miguel, eliminates the element of treachery. Petitioners allege
that the location of the wound totally negates intent to kill.
Petitioners also allege that there is no evidence of abuse of
superior strength. The fact that Miguel was taken to the hospital
only 15 minutes after he was shot was nobodys fault and should not
be taken as an attempt to hide intent to kill. Finally, petitioners
allege that the only evidence linking them to the crime is hearsay
in character. Again, the trial court went beyond the determination
for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The trial court made a
judicial determination of probable cause for the filing of an
information against the accused. Petitioners arguments are matters
of defense and are evidentiary in nature. They are best left for
the trial court to resolve after a full-blown trial on the
merits.23 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 3 January
2005 Decision and 30 June 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 82155. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice WE CONCUR: ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ* Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice A T T E S T A
T I O N I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO**
Associate Justice Acting Chairperson C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 8 MAS CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Acting Chief Justice Footnotes * As replacement of
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per
Administrative Circular No. 84-2007. ** Acting Chairperson. 1 Under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Rollo, pp. 65-83.
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate
Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente,
concurring. 3 Id. at 84-85. 4 Also referred to as Sgt. Gilbert
Reyes. 5 Sgt. Reyes, SPO2 Araas, John Does, and petitioners are
collectively referred to as the accused in this Decision. 6 Rollo,
pp. 111-130. Signed by 3rd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor and OIC
Esperidion R. Solano, with 2nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Eulogio
I. Prima recommending approval. Provincial Prosecutor Agapito B.
Rosales approved and signed the Joint Resolution. 7 Id. at 130. 8
Id. at 180-187. 9 Id. at 187. 10 Id. at 189. 5 July 2002 in the RTC
Order of 13 September 2002. 11 Id. at 189-193. 12 Id. at 200-202.
13 12 August 2003 in the CA Decision. 14 Rollo, pp. 194-198. 15 CA
rollo, p. 36. 16 Rollo, pp. 82-83. Emphasis in the original. WMSU
LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 9 MAS 17 Id. at 28. 18 227
Phil. 213 (1986). 19 G.R. No. 34285, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 39. 20
Id. at 42-43. Emphasis in the original. 21 G.R. No. 88919, 25 July
1990, 187 SCRA 788. 22 Id. at 792-794. See also AAA v. Carbonell,
G.R. No. 171465, 8 June 2007. 23 See Redulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 167973, 28 February 2007, 517 SCRA 110. WMSU LLB 2A 2015
CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 10 MAS G. R. NO.
158236LIGAYASANTOSVSDOMINGOORDAJR.Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 158236 September 1,
2004 LIGAYA V. SANTOS, petitioner,vs. DOMINGO I. ORDA, JR.,
respondent. D E C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 72962 granting the petition for certiorari filed
by Domingo I. Orda, Jr. and nullifying the Orders2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 258 dated July 5, 2002 and
July 23, 2002 in People v. Ligaya V. Santos, et al., for murder,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-0921 and 01-0425. The
Antecedents On January 17, 2001, Dale B. Orda, a college student
and son of respondent, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila Domingo
Orda, Jr., was shot by a male person on a motorcycle at the corner
of Ayala Boulevard and San Marcelino Street, Manila. Dale was then
seated at the passengers seat at the back of their car, while his
father was at the wheel. Fortunately, Dale survived the shooting.3
At about 6:20 p.m. on April 2, 2001, another son of the respondent,
Francis Orda, a twenty-year-old senior engineering student of the
Mapua Institute of Technology, was shot to death at Saudi Arabia
Street corner Sierra Leone Street, Better Living Subdivision,
Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City. Gina Azarcon, a helper at the
Bakers Brew Coffee Shop at the corner of Saudi Arabia and Somalia
Streets, Barangay Don Bosco, gave a sworn statement to the police
investigators on April 1, 2001, declaring that three male persons
perpetrated the crime, two of whom shot the victim inside his car.4
On April 7, 2001, Azarcon gave a supplemental affidavit pointing to
and identifying Rolly Tonion and Jhunrey Soriano as two of the
assailants.5 An Information was filed in the RTC of Paraaque City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-0425 on April 18, 2001, charging
Rolly Tonion alias "Komang" and Jhunrey Soriano with murder for the
killing of Francis Orda.6 The accused filed a petition for bail.
The prosecution presented Gina Azarcon as its witness in opposition
to the petition. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 11 MAS On
June 7, 2001, Ernesto M. Regala and his son, Dennis C. Regala, a
barangay tanod of Barangay 659, Arroceros, Ermita, Manila, executed
separate affidavits before the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Paraaque City. Ernesto narrated that at about 10:00 p.m. on April
1, 2001, he sent his son, Dennis, to deliver collections from the
public toilet at Arroceros to Barangay Chairman Ligaya Santos. When
Dennis had not yet arrived by 11:00 p.m., he decided to fetch his
son. While they were in Santos office, Dennis and Ernesto heard
Santos saying, "Gusto ko malinis na trabaho at walang bulilyaso,
baka makaligtas na naman si Orda." They saw Santos give a gun to
Rolly Tonion, who was then with Edna Cortez, a certain Nognog,
Ronnie Ybaez, and another male companion. Dennis then gave Ernestos
collection amounting to P400 to Santos. At 11:00 p.m. on April 2,
2001, Cortez told Ernesto that the son of the assistant city
prosecutor was ambushed at the Better Living Subdivision, and that
the latter was fortunate because the bullet intended for him hit
his son instead.7 For his part, Dennis alleged that at 9:00 a.m. on
April 3, 2001, Tonion asked him to return the gun to Santos for
him, but that he refused to do so. On April 15, 2001, Santos asked
him to monitor the activities of the respondent and his son at the
store owned by the latter, located at the LRT Station at Arroceros.
The respondent executed an affidavit-complaint dated June 7, 2001
and filed the same in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque
City, charging Santos, Cortez and Ybaez with murder for the death
of his son Francis.8The case was docketed as I.S. No. 01-F-2052. In
her counter-affidavit, Santos denied the charge and claimed that
the affidavits executed by Ernesto and Dennis were all lies. She
averred that she was in their house in Cavite City on April 1, 2001
and returned to Manila only in the early morning of April 2, 2001.
Her alibi was corroborated by the affidavits of Anthony Alejado,
Marianito Fuentes, Normita Samonte, and Lilian Lemery. She also
denied Dennis claims that she asked him to monitor the activities
of the respondent and his son on April 15, 2001. She alleged that
the respondent filed the charge and other baseless charges against
her to enable him to gain control over Plaza Lawton where his store
was located. Cortez also denied the charge. She claimed in her
affidavit that Santos was not in her office on April 1, 2001, it
being a Sunday. She alleged that the affidavits of Dennis and
Ernesto were lies. On July 31, 2001, the investigating prosecutor
issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Santos and
Cortez for murder.9 An Information for murder was, thereafter,
filed on August 29, 2001 against Santos and Cortez, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 01-0921.10 On August 30, 2001, Azarcon executed
an affidavit implicating Barangay Kagawad Christopher Castillo, his
brother Girlie Castillo, and Robert Bunda for the killing of
Francis. On the same day, the respondent executed an
affidavit-complaint charging them for the same crime.11 On
September 7, 2001, the trial court issued an Order requiring the
prosecutor to submit additional evidence against Cortez.12 Sabino
M. Frias, thereafter, executed an affidavit on September 18, 2001,
implicating Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers, Bunda, and Pedro
Jimenez, the driver of Santos, in the killing of Francis.13
Meanwhile, Santos, Cortez, and Ybaez filed a petition for review of
the resolution of the prosecutor in I.S. No. 01-F-2052 in the
Department of Justice (DOJ).14 On their motion, the trial court
suspended the proceedings against Santos and Cortez and the
issuance of warrants for their arrest. However, on September 12,
2001, Azarcon executed an affidavit recanting her statement against
the Castillo brothers and Bunda.15 WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty.
F. Sales 12 MAS In the meantime, during the hearing on October 23,
2001, the prosecution terminated the presentation of its
testimonial evidence in Criminal Case No. 01-0425 on the accused
Tonion and Sorianos petition for bail and offered its documentary
evidence. The accused presented Azarcon as their first witness to
prove their innocence of the crime charged. On November 12, 2001,
the public prosecutor issued a Resolution in I.S. No. 01-H-3410
finding probable cause for murder against the Castillo brothers and
Bunda. On November 28, 2001, the public prosecutor filed a motion
to amend information and to admit amended information against them
as additional accused.16 The accused, thereafter, filed a petition
for review of the resolution of the public prosecutor before the
DOJ on January 7, 2002.17 They also filed a motion to suspend
proceedings and the issuance of warrants of arrest in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-0425 and 01-0921 and a motion to admit newly
discovered evidence, namely, Azarcons affidavit of recantation.18
The public prosecutor opposed the motion and filed a motion to
admit second amended information with Pedro Jimenez as additional
accused.19 On February 5, 2002, the trial court issued an Order
denying the motion of the accused Castillo brothers and Bunda and
ordering the issuance of warrants for the arrest of Santos and
Cortez.20 The court then issued the said warrants based on its
finding of probable cause against them21 for lack of probable cause
to recall the warrants of arrest, and to examine the witnesses. The
court, however, denied the motion on the ground that it had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over their persons and it had not yet
received any resolution from the Secretary of Justice on their
petition for review. On February 20, 2002, the trial court issued
an Order denying the petition for bail by Tonion and Soriano,22
ruling that the evidence of guilt was strong. In the meantime,
Ernesto and Dennis recanted their affidavits.23 During the trial on
April 23, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 01-0425, accused Tonion and
Soriano presented Dennis as their witness.24 On April 26, 2002, the
trial court issued an Order admitting the second amended
Information against the Castillo brothers, Bunda, and Jimenez and
ordering the issuance of warrants for their arrest.25 On April 29,
2002, the said warrants were issued by the court. On June 11, 2002,
Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez issued a Joint Resolution
reversing the assailed resolution of the public prosecutor and
directing the latter to withdraw the Informations against Santos,
Cortez, Bunda, the Castillo brothers, and Jimenez. The Secretary of
Justice found Azarcon, Frias, Dennis, and Ernesto incredible
witnesses because of their recantations, to wit: WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolutions are hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Paraaque City is
hereby directed to cause the withdrawal of the criminal
Informations for murder filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 258, Paraaque City, against respondents LIGAYA SANTOS, EDNA
CORTEZ and RONNIE YBAEZ (I.S. No. 01-F-2052) and against
respondents CHRISTOPHER and GIRLIE CASTILLO and ROBERT BUNDA (I.S.
No. 01-H-3410) and to report to this Department the action taken
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED.26 On June 27,
2002, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration thereof.
However, the public prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the
Informations in the two cases on June 20, 2002 in compliance WMSU
LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 13 MAS with the joint
resolution of the Secretary of Justice. On July 2, 2002, the
respondent filed a comment/opposition to the motion to withdraw the
Informations filed by the public prosecutor, contending: I- THAT
COMPLAINANT HEREBY ADOPTS ITS POSITION RAISED IN ITS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (COPY ATTACHED
AS ANNEX "A"). HENCE, THE DETERMINATION OF THE INSTANT MOTION IS
STILL PREMATURE ESPECIALLY SO THAT ALL THE ACCUSED-MOVANTS ARE
STILL AT LARGE, EVADING SERVICE OF ARREST WARRANT, IN WHICH CASE
THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF; II- THAT THE LATE (SIC)
FINDINGS OF NO PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ACCUSED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE IS NOT BINDING; III- THAT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS
JUDICIOUSLY AND SOUNDLY ADJUDGED THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE;
and, IV- THAT TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT MOTION WOULD ONLY
CREATE CHAOS AND INJUSTICE.27 Pending resolution of the motion for
reconsideration, the trial court issued an Order on July 5, 2002
granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the
Informations in the interest of justice and equity.28 The trial
court ruled that such withdrawal would not prevent the refiling of
the Informations against the accused who would not be able to
invoke double jeopardy, considering that the court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over their persons. The private complainant
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order which was not
opposed by the public prosecutor. Nonetheless, on July 23, 2002,
the trial court issued an Order denying the motion on the ground
that it could not order the refiling of the Informations if the DOJ
and the public prosecutor refused to do so.29 The respondent
forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) assailing the orders of the trial court. On March 19, 2003,
the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition. The appellate
court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
the withdrawal of the Informations without making an independent
evaluation on the merits of the case. Santos filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision and a supplement to the said
motion, which was opposed by the respondent. On May 6, 2003, Santos
and Cortez were arrested based on the warrants issued by the trial
court. On May 22, 2003, the CA issued a resolution denying the said
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Santos filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court contending as
follows: A.) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY AND ACTED
ARBITRARILY IN NULLIFYING THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE
PROSECUTIONS MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE INFORMATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
NOS. 01-0921 AND 01-0425 PURSUANT TO DOJ JOINT RESOLUTION DATED 11
JUNE 2002. B.) THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
DIRECTLY REINSTATING THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THE
WARRANTS OF ARREST, WITHOUT AFFORDING THE WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc
Atty. F. Sales 14 MAS TRIAL COURT THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE ITS
JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE OF DETERMINING WHETHER TO PURSUE OR DISMISS
THE COMPLAINTS PURSUANT TO ITS OWN EVALUATION OF THE CASE AND
EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE DOJ JOINT RESOLUTION FINDING LACK OF
PROBABLE CAUSE.30 The threshold issue is whether or not the trial
court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in granting the public prosecutors motion
to withdraw the Informations and in lifting the warrant of arrest
against the petitioner on the Secretary of Justices finding that
there was no probable cause for the filing of the said
Informations. The petitioner avers that the trial court did not
abuse its judicial discretion when it granted the motion of the
public prosecutor to withdraw the two Informations as ordered by
the Secretary of Justice in his Joint Resolution on the finding
that there was no probable cause against the accused therein to be
charged with murder. The petitioner asserts that, by allowing the
withdrawal of the Informations without an independent assessment of
the merit of the evidence and without prejudice to the refiling
thereof, the court did not thereby order the dismissal of the cases
for insufficiency of evidence. The petitioner posits that, after
all, the trial court had not yet acquired complete criminal
jurisdiction to resolve the cases because it had not yet acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused. The petitioner
argues that the CA erred in relying on the rulings of this Court in
Crespo v. Mogul31 and Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.32 because
the said cases involve the withdrawal of the Informations and the
dismissal of the cases for insufficiency of evidence. In contrast,
the public prosecutor filed a motion merely to withdraw the
Informations and not to dismiss the cases due to insufficiency of
evidence. In its comment on the petition, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) avers that the decision of the CA is in
conformity with the rulings of this Court in Balgos, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan,33 Dee v. Court of Appeals,34 Roberts, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals,35 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,36 Jalandoni v. Drilon37
and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.38 The OSG asserts that
the rulings of this Court apply whether the motion filed by the
public prosecutor was for the withdrawal of the Informations due to
lack of probable cause or insufficiency of evidence. The OSG avers
that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
all the accused, either by their respective arrests or by the
filing of pleadings before the court praying for affirmative
reliefs. In her reply to the comment of the OSG, the petitioner
insisted that she did not submit herself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court by filing her motion to quash the Informations for lack
of probable cause and to examine the witnesses before the issuance
of the warrant of arrest against her. As the trial court itself
held, it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over her person. In
nullifying the assailed orders of the trial court, the appellate
court ratiocinated as follows: To support these assigned errors,
petitioner contends that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse
of discretion when he granted the Motion to Withdraw Informations
filed by his trial prosecutor based on the Joint Resolution of the
Department of Justice and in denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. We resolve to grant this petition considering that
this contention is impressed with merit. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc
Atty. F. Sales 15 MAS The rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is
that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court
is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction
and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after
the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation (Crespo v. Mogul, 151
SCRA 462). However, if the trial court has failed to make an
independent finding of the merits of the case or make an
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case, but
merely anchored the dismissal of the case on the revised position
of the prosecution, the trial court has relinquished the discretion
he was duty-bound to exercise because, in effect, it is the
prosecution through the Department of Justice which decides what to
do and that the trial court was reduced into a mere rubber stamp,
in violation of the ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul (Martinez vs. Court
of Appeals, 237 SCRA 576, 577), which is the situation obtaining in
this case considering that the dismissal of the criminal cases
against private respondents was based solely on [the]
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice because the reliance of
public respondent Judge was based solely on the prosecutors
averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the
dismissal of the case against private respondent which is an
abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a
prima facie case, in blatant violation of the courts pronouncement
in Crespo vs. Mogul (Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, 327 SCRA 588).
Moreover, public respondent having already issued the warrants of
arrest on private respondents which, in effect, means that a
probable cause exists in those criminal cases, it was an error to
dismiss those cases without making an independent evaluation
especially that the bases of the probable cause are the same
evidence which mere made the bases of the Joint Resolution dated
June 11, 2002 of the Secretary of Justice. Consequently, the
dismissal order dated July 5, 2002 having been issued upon an
erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the same must have to be
set aside.39 We agree with the appellate court. In Crespo v.
Mogul,40 the Court held that once a criminal complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or
dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within
the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial
court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the
Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment
of the accused.41 The only qualification is that the action of the
court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People or the private complainant to due process of
law.42 When the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to
withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the
Secretary WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 16 MAS of
Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of
subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of
Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.43 In
resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the
Information filed by the public prosecutor on his own initiative or
pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for
insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or
for lack of probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely
and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice that no crime was committed or that the
evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient
to support a judgment of conviction of the accused. As the Court
emphasized in Martinez v. Court of Appeals,44 the trial court must
make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the
case and the evidence on record of the prosecution: Secondly, the
dismissal was based merely on the findings of the Acting Secretary
of Justice that no libel was committed. The trial judge did not
make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the
case. Reliance was placed solely on the conclusion of the
prosecution that "there is no sufficient evidence against the said
accused to ascertain the allegation in the information" and on the
supposed lack of objection to the motion to dismiss, this last
premise being, however, questionable, the prosecution having
failed, as observed, to give private complainant a copy of the
motion to dismiss. In other words, the grant of the motion to
dismiss was based upon considerations other than the judges own
personal individual conviction that there was no case against the
accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the
prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases
like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there
was, indeed, no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this
conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required was the trial judges own assessment of such
evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise
of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecutions word for
its supposed insufficiency. As aptly observed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the
merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the
revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished
the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what
to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in
violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul. The dismissal order
having been issued in violation of private complainants right to
due process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of judicial
discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err in setting aside said
dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court for
arraignment of petitioner as accused therein and for further
proceedings. Indeed, it bears stressing that the trial court is not
bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it
is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the
case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial courts
duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.45 WMSU LLB
2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 17 MAS The trial court may make an
independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the
affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended
to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the
court may order the latter to produce before the court;46 or any
evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the
time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor. In this case,
the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the
merits of the cases and the evidence on record or in the possession
of the public prosecutor. In granting the motion of the public
prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court relied
solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as
gleaned from its assailed order: For resolution is the Motion to
Withdraw Criminal Informations filed on June 21, 2002 by the Office
of the City Prosecutor, this jurisdiction, to which a
Comment/Opposition thereto was filed by private complainant Domingo
I. Orda, Jr. on July 2, 2002. It appears that the motion is in
compliance with the Joint Resolution of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) promulgated on June 11, 2002 directing said Office to cause
the withdrawal of the criminal informations for murder against the
accused, Ligaya V. Santos, Edna Cortez, and Ronnie Ybaez, in Crim.
Case No. 01-0921 (I.S. No. 01-F-2052) and against Christopher
Castillo, Girlie Castillo, and Robert Bunda in Crim. Case No.
01-0425 (I.S. No. 01-H-3410), copy of which was received by this
Court on June 19, 2002. The Court, after going over the
Comment/Opposition filed by the private complainant, vis--vis the
Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the DOJ, is
of the firm belief and honest opinion and so holds that meanwhile
that the Motion for Reconsideration of the private complainant is
pending before the DOJ, justice and equity dictates that this Court
has to give due course to the Motion to Withdraw the Criminal
Informations, specially so that warrants for the arrest of all the
accused have been issued. No injustice, prejudice, or damage will
be suffered by the private complainant considering that if ever his
Motion for Reconsideration will be granted by the DOJ, said
criminal informations may be refiled and the principle of double
jeopardy cannot be invoked by all the accused as the Court has not
yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons. Upon the other hand,
the warrants of arrest will serve as swords of damocles hanging
over the heads of the accused if the Court will rule otherwise.47
In granting the public prosecutors motion, the trial court
abdicated its judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the
Secretary of Justice. Worse, as gleaned from the above order, the
trial court knew that the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice had not yet become final and executory because the
respondent, the private complainant, had filed a timely motion for
the reconsideration thereof which had not yet been resolved by the
Secretary of Justice. It behooved the trial court to wait for the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice on the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent before resolving the motion of
the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations. In fine, the
trial court acted with inordinate haste. Had the trial court
bothered to review its records before issuing its assailed order,
it would have recalled that aside from the affidavits of Azarcon,
Ernesto and Dennis, there was also the affidavit of Frias
implicating the petitioner and the other accused to the killing of
Francis and that it even gave credence to the testimony and
affidavit of Azarcon when it denied Tonion and Sorianos petition
for bail. Moreover, the trial court found probable cause against
the petitioner and issued a warrant for her arrest WMSU LLB 2A 2015
CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 18 MAS despite the pendency of her petition
for review in the Department of Justice, only to make a complete
volte face because of the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice. The bare fact that the trial court had issued warrants of
arrest against Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers, and Bunda,
who were the petitioners in the Department of Justice, did not
warrant an outright grant of the public prosecutors motion to
withdraw the Informations. The court had already acquired
jurisdiction over the cases when the Informations were filed;
hence, it had jurisdiction to resolve the motion of the public
prosecutor, one way or the other, on its merits. While it may be
true that the accused could be incarcerated, as warrants of arrest
had already been issued against them pending the resolution of the
respondents motion for reconsideration, the same does not justify
ignoring the rules and running roughshod over the rights of the
respondent. Justice and equity is not for the accused alone; the
State and the private complainant are entitled thereto, as well.
Moreover, the petitioner had submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of the court when she filed her motion to examine the witnesses,
and suspend the proceedings and the issuance of a warrant for her
arrest. The trial court committed another travesty when it denied
the motion for reconsideration of its July 5, 2002 Order, on its
ratiocination that In todays hearing on the Motion for
Reconsideration, considering that the Public Prosecutor informed
the Court that their office will no longer file any opposition
thereto, the said Motion for Reconsideration is denied considering
that the filing and the withdrawal of an Information is purely an
executive function and the Court cannot order the refiling if the
Department of Justice or the Public Prosecutors Office refuses to
do so. 48 This is so because the July 5, 2002 Order of the court
had not yet become final and executory when the private complainant
filed her motion for reconsideration of the said order.49 Until and
unless the July 5, 2002 Order shall have become final and
executory, the Informations filed with the court were not yet
considered withdrawn. On the other hand, if the trial court had
granted the motion for reconsideration of the respondent and set
aside its July 5, 2002 Order, there would no longer be a need to
refile the Informations. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Puno*, Austria-Martinez**,
Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Footnotes * On official
leave. ** Acting Chairman. 1 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes
Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Bennie A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz
and Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc
Atty. F. Sales 19 MAS 2 Penned by Judge Raul E. De Leon. 3 Rollo,
p. 263. 4 Id. at 11. 5 Id. at 134. 6 Id. at 136. 7 Id. at 140-142.
8 Id. at 139. 9 Id. at 174-176. 10 Id. at 177. 11 Id. at 179. 12
Id. at 502. 13 Id. at 195-197. 14 Id. at 182-190. 15 Id. at
193-194. 16 Id. at 229. 17 Id. at 233-245. 18 Id. at 246-248. 19
Id. at 249. 20 Id. at 251-252. 21 Id. at 253. 22 Id. at 254-262. 23
Id. at 267-270. 24 Id. at 271-306. 25 Id. at 307. WMSU LLB 2A 2015
CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 20 MAS 26 Id. at 321. 27 Id. at 340-341. 28
Id. at 68-69. 29 Id. at 70. 30 Id. at 26. 31 151 SCRA 462 (1987).
32 327 SCRA 588 (2000). 33 176 SCRA 287 (1989). 34 238 SCRA 254
(1994). 35 254 SCRA 307 (1996). 36 278 SCRA 656 (1997). 37 327 SCRA
107 (2000). 38 338 SCRA 511 (2000). 39 Rollo, pp. 62-63. 40 Supra,
note 31. 41 Odin Security Agency, Inc. v. Sandiganbayan, 365 SCRA
351 (2001). 42 Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575 (1994).
43 Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra. 44 Supra, note 42. 45
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How, supra. 46 Section 8, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 47 Rollo, pp.
68-69. 48 Id. at 70. 49 Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70 provides:
WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 21 MAS SECTION 13. Motion
for reconsideration. The aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
from receipt of the resolution on appeal, furnishing the adverse
party and the Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and
submitting proof of such service. No second or further motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc
Atty. F. Sales 22 MAS G. R. NO.
149148MENDOZA-ARCEVSOFFICEOFOMBUDSMAN SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No.
149148. April 5, 2002] SUSAN MENDOZA-ARCE, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS),
PRIMOC.MIRO,DEPUTYOMBUDSMAN,REGIONALTRIALCOURTROXASCITY,
EXECUTIVEJUDGE,HONORABLESALVADORGUBATON,OFFICEOFTHECITYFISCAL,
HONORABLE JULIUS ABELA, SANTIAGO B. VILLARUZ, respondents. D E C I
S I O N MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the
resolution, dated April 20, 2001, of the Office of the
Ombudsman(Visayas),findinga prima facie
caseforviolationof3(e)ofR.A.No.3019(Anti-Graft
andCorruptPracticesAct)andArt.171oftheRevisedPenalCodeagainstpetitionerSusan
Mendoza-Arce, and the order, dated June 29, 2001, denying her
motion for reconsideration. The facts are as follows: Respondent
Santiago B. Villaruz is one of the oppositors in Special Proceeding
Case No. V-6433,
entitledIntheMatterofthePetitiontoApprovetheWillofRemediosBermejo-Villaruz,
deceased, v.NicolasP.Villaruz.[1]
Thecase,originallyassignedtotheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC), Branch 15,
Roxas City, of which Judge Roger B. Patricio was presiding judge,
was later re-assigned to Branch 19 of the same court, presided over
by Judge (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Sergio Pestao.[2]
RespondentSantiagoB.Villaruzwasoriginallytheadministratoroftheestateofhismother
Remedios Bermejo Villaruz. However, in an order issued by the trial
court on June 10, 1998, he was removed as such for patent neglect
of his legal duties and failure to comply with the court orders. In
hisplace,respondentseldestbrother,NicolasB.Villaruz,Jr.,wasappointed
regularadministrator,
uponfilingandapprovalbythisCourtofanAdministratorsBondintheamountoffiftythousand
pesos (P50,000.00).[3] In a motion, dated July 1, 1998, Nicolas
filed a motion for the approval of his bond, furnished by the
Philippine Surety & Insurance, Inc., in the amount of
P50,000.00. Santiago and his brother Jose
Ma.VillaruzopposedNicolasmotionandprayedthatJoseMariabeinsteadappointedregular
administrator.[4]
Attachedtotheiroppositionwasacertification,datedAugust31,1988,executed
bytheirmotherRemediosbeforeshepassedaway,authorizingSantiagototakepossessionof
and/or to manage her nipa lands, which were then in his care, for a
period of 20 years or during her lifetime, whichever was longer.
Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz also gave Santiago the option of leasing
thepropertiesfor P120,000.00ayearpluslandtaxes.[5]
Theoppositorslikewisesubmittedan
agreement,datedFebruary6,1993,executedbythethreechildrenofRemediosBermejo-Villaruz,
in which they agreed to honor the lease until August 23, 2008.[6]
WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 23 MAS In an order, dated
September 22, 1998, Judge Patricio denied the oppositors
opposition, while
recognizingthevalidityofthecertificationexecutedbyRemediosBermejo-Villaruzandthe
agreement of the heirs, and stated that the administration of the
new administrator was subject to them.No
mentionoftheagreementwas,however,madeinthedispositiveportionoftheorder,
which simply read: WHEREFORE, premises considered, for lack of
merit, oppositors Opposition and Motion dated July 15, 1998 is
denied, while action on petitioners Motion to Approve
Administrators Bond dated July 1, 1998 is held in abeyance until
after petitioner submits to this Court, within ten (10) days from
receipt of this order, an updated certification from the Supreme
Court to the effect that the Philippine Phoenix Surety &
Insurance, Inc. has no pending obligation and/ or liability to the
government insofar as confiscated bonds in civil and criminal cases
are concerned.[7] On October 12, 1998, Judge Sergio Pestao, to whom
the case was in the meantime reassigned, approved the
administrators bond of respondent Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. in an
order which stated: It appearing from the Certification issued by
the Supreme Court that Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance,
Inc. has no pending obligation and/ or liabilities to the
government insofar as confiscated bonds in civil and criminal cases
are concerned, the Administrators bond filed by petitioner Nicolas
B. Villaruz, is approved. Send copy of this Order to petitioner
through his counsel, to the Clerk of Court of this court, and to
the oppositors through their counsel.[8] After receiving a copy of
Judge Pestaos order, respondent Susan Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court
VI of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, prepared a Letter of
Administration (LOA) which read: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That by order of this Court dated October 12, 1998, issued by
Honorable Sergio Pestao, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
19, Roxas City, Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. has been appointed
Administrator of the estate of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz, deceased,
with full authority to take possession of all property/ies of said
deceased in any province or provinces in which it may be situated
and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of
said property, he having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court.
Said Administrator shall within three months from the date of this
appointment return to the Court a true inventory and appraisal of
the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into
his possession or knowledge and shall render a true and just
account of his administration to the Court within one year and at
any other time when required by the Court. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I
sign and seal these presents in Roxas City, Philippines, this 16th
day of October 1998. (sgd.) Susan Mendoza-Arce (t)SUSAN
MENDOZA-ARCE The LOA was based on the form prescribed in the Manual
for Clerks of Court.[9] Accordingly, on
December7,1998,administratorNicolasB.Villaruz,Jr.,accompaniedbythreearmedsecurity
WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 24 MAS guards and
respondents Deputy Sheriff Charles Aguiling, took possession of the
entire estate of the decedent, including the nipa lands which had
been leased to respondent Santiago B. Villaruz.[10] This gave rise
to the present action. In a letter-complaint to the Ombudsman,
dated March 25,
1999,respondentSantiagoB.Villaruzallegedthatpetitionercommittedtwocrimesinissuingthe
LOA, to wit: 1.
FalsificationbyapublicofficerunderArticle171,par.3oftheRevisedPenalCode,by
attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them. 2.
Corruptpracticeinviolationof3(e)oftheAnti-GraftandCorruptPracticesAct(R.A.No.
3019)bycausinganyundueinjurytoanyparty,includingtheGovernment,orgivinganyprivate
partyanyunwarrantedbenefit,advantageorpreferenceinthedischargeofhisofficial
administrativeorjudicialfunctionsthroughmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithorgross
inexcusable negligence.[11]
Attachedtohisletter-complainttotheOmbudsmanwere
affidavitsexecutedbyrespondent
SantiagoB.Villaruzandhisemployees,namely,TeresitaB.Bechayda,RamonBenliro,Jr.,GarryB.
Bonales, Romeo S. Bolante, and Sulpico B. Blanco.[12] In his
affidavit, respondent accused petitioner
ofactingwithmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithandgrossinexcusablenegligencebyfalsely
attributingtoJudgePestaotheappointmentofNicolasB.Villaruzasnewadministratorand
investing him with full authority to take possession of all
property/ies of the decedent, because the fact was that it was
Judge Patricio who had appointed Nicolas administrator of the
estate subject to
thetermsandconditionsoftheleaseagreementinfavorofrespondentSantiagoB.Villaruz.
Respondent claimed that he had been deprived of income in the
amount of P33,000.00 every week,
aswellasofthebancasandboatsusedinhisbusiness,asaresultoftheissuanceoftheorderin
question.[13] In her report, dated May 13, 1999, Graft
Investigation Officer Estrela Alma A. Singco stated that the
allegations in the complaint warrant further investigation and
recommended that petitioner be ordered to file her
counter-affidavit.[14]
Inhercounter-affidavit,datedJune23,1999,petitioneradmittedissuingtheLOAinfavorof
NicolasB.Villaruz,Jr.Sheclaimed,however,thatsheactedincompliancewiththeorderof
PresidingJudgeSergioPestaoandthat,inpreparingtheLOA,shemerelyadoptedthelegalform
prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court, whichhad been
approved by this Court. She said she
issuedtheLOAinline[with]myofficialfunctionswhich[are]ministerialinnatureanddevoidof
any bad faith and with manifest partiality.[15]
Inareply-affidavit,datedJune29,1999,respondentSantiagoB.Villaruzreiteratedthe
argumentsraisedinhisletter-complaintandassertedthatlegalformsaremereguidelinesinthe
preparationoflegaldocumentsandthatrespondentusurpedthefunctionsofthebranchclerkof
court when she issued the LOA.[16] In a resolution, dated April 20,
2001, Ricardo A. Rebollido, Graft Investigation Officer II, found
probablecauseagainstpetitioner.Basedontheaffidavitsandcounter-affidavitssubmittedbythe
parties,hefoundpetitionerguiltyofthechargebymakingitappearthatitwasJudgePestao,
instead of Judge Patricio, who had appointed Nicolas B. Villaruz as
administrator, without regard to
theleaseagreementinfavorofrespondentSantiagoB.Villaruz.
TheGraftInvestigationOfficer found that although petitioners duties
were ministerial, she should have read the order recognizing the
lease. The resolution concluded, WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F.
Sales 25 MAS All things considered, respondent [now petitioner
Susan Mendoza-Arce] in the discharge of her official administrative
or judicial functions, through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence caused undue injury to
complainant and gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
to Administrator Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. who has been the one
reaping the fruits and products of the said 120 hectares of nipa
lands the fruits and products of which lawfully and rightfully
belong to complainant as lessee. WHEREFORE, premises considered,
this Office finds a prima facie case against respondent ATTY. SUSAN
MENDOZA-ARCE for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act, and
for the crime of Falsification of Official Document under paragraph
3, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Let the corresponding
Informations be filed before the proper court.[17]
Petitionermovedforareconsideration,maintainingthatherofficialduties
asaclerkofcourt
wereministerialinnatureandthatshemerelytriedtocomplywiththedispositiveportionof
orders and decisions of the trial court. She pointed out that
neither the order, dated June 10, 1998, nor the order, dated
September 22, 1998, issued by Judge Patricio mentioned the lease of
nipa lands and that it was only in the text of the order, dated
September 22, 1998, that said lease was referred
to.Indischargingherofficialduties,sheargued,shecouldnotbeguiltyof
manifestpartiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence, as asserted by complainant.[18] In an order, dated June
29, 2001, the Graft Investigation Officer found no new matters or
issues raised therein which would justify the reversal or
modification of our earlier findings, and held that
inanyeventthegroundsreliedbyrespondentareevidentiarymatterswhichcouldwellbe
ventilated before the court of justice. Hence, this petition.
WefirstdisposeofaproceduralissueraisedbyrespondentSantiagoB.Villaruz.Inhis
Comment,datedOctober12,2001,respondentinvokesRule65,4ofthe1997RulesofCivil
Procedureandcontendsthatthepetitionforcertiorariinthiscaseshouldhavebeenfiledinthe
Court of Appeals. This provision states in pertinent parts: SEC. 4.
When and where petition filed.- The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether
or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension
of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Thecontentionhasnomerit. In Tirol,Jr.v.delRosario,[19]
weheldthatalthoughasa consequence of the decision in Fabian v.
Desierto[20] appeals from the orders, directives, or decisions
oftheOmbudsmaninadministrativecasesarenowcognizablebytheCourtofAppeals,
neverthelessincasesinwhichitisallegedthattheOmbudsmanhasactedwithgraveabuseof
WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 26 MAS discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule
65maybefiledinthisCourttosetasidetheOmbudsmans orderorresolution.
In Kuizonv. Desierto,[21]
weagainheldthatthisCourthasjurisdictionoverpetitionsforcertiorariquestioning
resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases. Coming now to the merits, we find the petition meritorious.
Tobeginwith,in Posadasv.Ombudsman,[22]
weheld:Therule,ofcourse,isthatacriminal prosecution cannot be
enjoined. But as has been held, infinitely more important than
conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is
respect for the citizens right to be free not only
fromarbitraryarrestandpunishmentbutalsofromunwarrantedandvexatiousprosecution.In
thatcase,theOmbudsmanorderedtheprosecutionofcertainofficialsoftheUniversityofthe
Philippinesin
Diliman,QuezonCityforpreventingtheNationalBureauofInvestigationfrom
arresting without warrants student-suspects in the killing of a
fraternity member. The question was
whethertherewasprobablecauseforviolationofP.D.No.1829,whichmakesitunlawfulfor
anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders. The Court found none
andenjoinedtheOmbudsmanandhisagentsfromprosecutingtheU.P.officials.Theattempted
arrest was declared illegal and petitioners to be simply protecting
the rights of the students.
Indeed,whilethisCourtspolicyisoneofnon-interferenceintheconductofpreliminary
investigations, leaving the investigating officers with a latitude
of discretion in the determination of probable cause,[23]
nonetheless exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, to
wit:
1.Whennecessarytoaffordadequateprotectiontotheconstitutionalrightsofthe
accused; 2.
Whennecessaryfortheorderlyadministrationofjusticeortoavoidoppressionor
multiplicity of actions; 3. When there is a prejudicial question
which is sub judice; 4. When the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority; 5. Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6. When double jeopardy is
clearly apparent; 7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense; 8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; 9. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; 10. When there is clearly no
prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.[24] In this case, we hold that the Office
of the Ombudsman (Visayas) acted without or in excess of
itsauthoritywhenitorderedthefilingofinformationsagainstpetitionerforviolationofR.A.No.
3019,3(e)andtheRevisedPenalCode,Art.171,par.3,despitetheabsenceofprobablecause,
defined as such ground as engenders a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, warranting the filing of the case in court.[25] First.
Petitioner Arce allegedly violated 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
by including the phrase
withfullauthoritytotakepossessionofallproperty/iesofsaiddeceasedinanyprovinceor
provinces in which it may be situated . . . in the LOA she prepared
in Special Proceeding Case No. V-6433. This provision states: WMSU
LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 27 MAS SEC. 3. Corrupt
Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful: .... (e) Causing any undue injury
to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions. The elements of the
offense are: 1. That the accused are public officers or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them; 2.
Thatsaidpublicofficerscommittedtheprohibitedactsduringtheperformanceoftheir
official duties or in relation to their public positions; 3. That
they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a
private party; 4. That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and 5.
Thatthepublicofficershaveactedwithmanifestpartiality,evidentbadfaithorgross
inexcusable negligence.[26] Theseelementsmustallbeproven.[27]
Inthiscase,thereisnobasisforthefindingthatin
issuingtheLOAinquestionpetitioneractedwith
partiality,orbiaswhichexcitesadispositionto
seeandreportmattersastheyarewishedforratherthanastheyare,withbadfaith,which
connotesnotonlybadjudgmentornegligencebutalsoadishonestpurposeorconscious
wrongdoing,abreachofdutyamountingtofraud,norwithgrossnegligence,whichisnegligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a
dutytoact,notinadvertentlybutwillfullyandintentionally,withaconsciousindifferenceto
consequences as far as other persons are concerned.[28]
TheManualforClerksof Courtdescribestheclerk
ofcourtasanofficeroftheCourt,apublic
officer,andanofficerofthelaw,[although]thepositionisnotthatofajudicialofficer,norisit
synonymous with the Court. . . . The office is essentially a
ministerial one.[29] Petitioner performed a
ministerialdutyinpreparingtheletterofadministrationbasedonthedispositiveportionsofthe
orders dated September 22, 1998 and October 12, 1998. She merely
copied substantially the form
forlettersofadministrationprescribedintheManualforClerksofCourts.
TheLOAmaynotbe accurate for lack of reference to the lease
agreement in favor of respondent Santiago B. Villaruz, but
itcannotbesaidwithcertaintythatsheactedeitherwithgrossnegligenceorfromsomecorrupt
motive.Thefactisthat,insteadofemployingherownwords,sheusedphrasesintheManual
prescribed by this Court. Second. The Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) found a prima facie case for falsification under
Article171,par.3oftheRevisedPenalCodeagainstpetitionerbecauseshestatedintheletterof
administration that Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. had been appointed
administrator by Judge Sergio Pestao when what the latter did was
to approve the administrators bond.
WedisagreewiththeOmbudsmansfindings.
Art.171,par.3oftheRevisedPenalCode provides: WMSU LLB 2A 2015
CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 28 MAS Falsification by public officer,
employee, or notary or ecclesiastical minister. The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage
of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts: . . . . 3. Attributing to persons who
have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them.
Criminalintentmustbeshowninfeloniescommittedbymeansof dolo,suchas
falsification.[30]
Inthiscase,thereisnoreasonablegroundtobelievethattherequisitecriminal
intent or mens rea was present. Petitioner prepared the letter of
administration on the basis of the order of Judge Pestao, dated
October 12, 1998, approving the administrators bond filed by
Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. By the approval of hisbond, Nicolas B.
Villaruz, Jr. qualified as administrator so that in a sense,
therefore, the statement in the letter of administration [t]hat by
order of this Court dated October 12, 1998, issued by Honorable
Sergio Pestao, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
RoxasCity,NicolasB.Villaruz,Jr.hasbeenappointedAdministratoroftheestateofRemedios
Bermejo-Villaruz,deceasediscorrect.
Therewasnothingwillfulorfeloniousinpetitionersact warranting her
prosecution for falsification.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTEDandtheresolutiondatedApril20,2001,oftheGraft
InvestigationOfficer,asapprovedbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,andhisorder,datedJune29,
2001, are hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint of respondent Santiago
B. Villaruz against petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce for violation of
R.A. No. 3019, 3(e) and for falsification committed by a public
officer under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code is DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., no part. Close relations to counsel of a party. [1]
Order dated September 22, 2002; Rollo, pp. 38-40. [2] Orders dated
June 10, 1998, September 22, 1998, and October 12, 1998; id., pp.
35-41. [3] Order dated June 10, 1998; id., pp. 35-37. [4] Order
dated September 22, 1998; id., pp. 38-40. [5] Certification of
Remedios B. Villaruz dated August 23, 1988; Records, p. 17. [6]
Agreement of Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., Jose Ma. B. Villaruz, and
Santiago B. Villaruz dated February 6, 1993; Records, p. 18. [7]
Rollo, pp. 38-40. [8] Id., p. 41. [9]
Rollo,p.42;TheManualforClerksofCourt,p.612
(1991)prescribedtheformforLettersof Administration as follows: WMSU
LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 29 MAS Know All Men By These
Presents:
ThatbyorderofthisCourtdated_______,19__,issuedbyHon.__________,Judgeofthe_____Court,
Branch__________hasbeenappointedAdministratoroftheestateof_____,deceased,withfull
authority to take possession of all property of said deceased in
any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to
perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said
property, he/ she having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court.
Said Administrator shall within three months from
thedateofthisappointmentreturntotheCourtatrueinventoryandappraisaloftherealand
personalestateofthedeceasedwhichhavecomeintohispossessionorknowledge,andshall
render a true and just account of his administration to the Court
within one year and at any other time when required by the Court.
INWITNESSWHEREOF,Isignandsealthesepresentsin_____,Philippines,this_____dayof_____,
19__. [10] Affidavit of Santiago B. Villaruz dated March 25, 1999;
Records, pp. 3-8. [11] Letter-complaint dated March 25, 1999;
Rollo, pp. 16-17. [12] Records, pp. 23-27. [13] Affidavit of
Santiago B. Villaruz dated March 25, 1999; Records, pp. 3-8. [14]
Records, pp. 46-47. [15] Id., pp. 50-51. [16] Id., pp. 59-66. [17]
Rollo, pp. 21-28 (emphasis in the original). [18] Id., pp. 29-33.
[19] 317 SCRA 779 (1999). [20] 295 SCRA 470 (1998). [21] G.R. Nos.
140619-24, March 9, 2001. [22] 341 SCRA 388 (2000). [23]
Sebastian,Sr. v. Garchitorena,343SCRA463(2000);Camanag v.
Guerrero,268SCRA473 (1997); Fernando v. Sandiganbayan, 212 SCRA 680
(1992). [24] Posadas v. Ombudsman,341SCRA388(2000);Venus v.
Desierto,298SCRA196(1998); Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990).
[25] Rules of Court, Rule 112, 1. [26] Bunye v.
Sandiganbayan,306SCRA663(1999);Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,272SCRA563(1997); Ponce de Leon v. Sandiganbayan, 186
SCRA 745 (1990). [27] Avila,Sr. v.
Sandiganbayan,307SCRA236(1999);Fernando v. Sandiganbayan,212SCRA680
(1992). [28] Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan 238 SCRA 656 (1994);
Alejandro v. People, 170 SCRA 400 (1992). [29] Manual for Clerks of
Court (1991), p. 2. [30] See Revised Penal Code, Art. 3. WMSU LLB
2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 30 MAS WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc
Atty. F. Sales 31 MAS G. R. NO. 131144ADVINCULAVSCA Republic of the
Philippines SUPREME COURT SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 131144 October
18, 2000 NOEL ADVINCULA, petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, HON. EDELWINA PASTORAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br.
91, Bacoor, Cavite, HON. HERMINIO P. GERVACIO, Provincial
Prosecutor of Cavite, AMANDO OCAMPO and ISAGANI OCAMPO,
respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.: NOEL ADVINCULA, in this petition for
review, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals which set
aside the resolution of the Secretary of Justice ordering the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite to file an Information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms against private respondents Amando Ocampo
and Isagani Ocampo. As found by the Court of Appeals, on 1 October
1993 at around three o'clock in the afternoon, private respondent
Isagani Ocampo was on his way home when petitioner Noel Advincula
and two (2) of his drinking companions started shouting invectives
at him and challenging him to a fight. Petitioner, armed with a
bolo, ran after Isagani who was able to reach home and elude his
attackers. Petitioner kept cursing Isagani who eventually left. A
certain Enrique Rosas told private respondent Amando Ocampo, father
of Isagani, that petitioner had chased his son with a bolo. Amando
then got his .22 caliber gun, which he claimed was licensed, and
confronted petitioner who continued drinking with his friends. But
petitioner threatened to attack Amando with his bolo, thus
prompting the latter to aim his gun upwards and fire a warning
shot. Cooler heads intervened and Amando was pacified. He left to
check on his son. Later, however, he saw petitioner's drinking
companions firing at petitioner's house.1 Petitioner however has a
different version. According to him, on 1 October 1993 he and his
friends were having a conversation outside his house when Isagani
passed by and shouted at them. This led to a heated argument
between him and Isagani Then Isagani left but returned with his
father Amando and brother Jerry. Isagani and Amando were each armed
with a gun and started petitioner who ran home to avoid harm but
private firing at respondents Isagani and Amando continued
shooting, hitting petitioner's residence in the process.2 A series
of criminal complaints were filed by petitioner on one hand and
private respondents on the other. But the controversy in this
petition arose from the complaint filed by petitioner on 5 April
1994 for Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents
before the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite. Petitioner's complaint
was supported by his complaint-affidavit, the affidavit of one
Federico San Miguel, photocopies of photographs showing bullet
holes on petitioner's residence, and certification of the Firearms
and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that private
respondents had no records in that office. WMSU LLB 2A 2015
CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 32 MAS After private respondents submitted
their counter-affidavits, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, with
the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor, dismissed on 26 May 1994
petitioner's complaint against private respondents for Illegal
Possession of Firearms for lack of evidence. According to the
Provincial Prosecutor After a close and careful study of the
records of the instant case, undersigned finds and so holds that
the evidence presented by the complainant is not sufficient to
engender a well founded belief that the crime for Illegal
Possession of Firearms has been committed and the respondents are
probably guilty thereof. While it is true that respondent Amando
Ocampo was possessing a gun on the date of the incident per the
allegations in his counter-affidavit that he fired a gun upwards to
prevent complainant from further assaulting him yet the possession
of said firearm cannot be considered illegal or unlawful as the
same is covered by a firearm license duly issued by the chief of
the Firearm and Explosives Office. With respect to respondent
Isagani Ocampo, no convincing evidence has been presented by the
complainant except the allegations appearing in his affidavit and
that of his witness which is not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case for charging the former with Illegal Possession of
Firearms. Even the slug depicted in the xeroxed photo copies marked
as Annex "E" of the complaint do not show that said slugs were
fired from different firearms hence it can be presumed that the
same were fired from the gun of respondent Amando Ocampo an
indication that during the incident, only the latter was in
possession of a firearm.3 On 21 October 1994 petitioner filed a
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice insisting that
the pieces of evidence he presented before the Provincial
Prosecutor were sufficient to make a prima facie case against
private respondents and prayed that the dismissal of his complaint
be set aside. Private respondents filed their opposition thereto
stating in essence that Amando's gun was licensed and that there
was no proof other than petitioner's self-serving statement that
Isagani had carried a firearm. In his Resolution of 6 June 1996 the
Secretary of Justice granted petitioner's appeal and ordered the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite to file the corresponding charges
of Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents. As
the Secretary of Justice held There is no dispute as to the fact
that respondent Amando Ocampo, by his own admission, was in
possession of a firearm. His defense that it was duly licensed,
however, by the records of the Firearms and Explosives Office
(FEO). Granting, however, that said firearm was duly licensed by
the Philippine National Police, no evidence was submitted to prove
that he is possessed of the necessary permit to carry the firearm
outside of his residence. In other words, his possession of the
firearm, while valid at first, became illegal the moment he carried
it out of his place of abode. With regard to respondent Isagani
Ocampo, his bare denial cannot overcome his positive identification
by complainant and his witnesses. Physical evidence, such as the
bullet marks on the walls of complainant's residence, indeed
strengthen the latter's allegation that respondents actually fired
at him. The case was nevertheless dismissed on the ground of lack
of evidence. This is erroneous. In cases falling under violations
of PD 1866, it is not indispensable that the firearm used be
presented in evidence as long as the possession and WMSU LLB 2A
2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 33 MAS use thereof have been duly
established by the testimony of several witnesses. (People v.
Jumanoy, 221 SCRA 333).4 On 25 June 1996, pursuant to the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cavite filed two (2) separate Informations against Amando and
Isagani Ocampo for Illegal Possession of Firearms before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Crim. Case No.
B-96-141 and B-96-142, respectively. On 17 December 1996, private
respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of
Appeals questioning the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In
giving due course to private respondents' petition, the Court of
Appeals agreed with the position of the Solicitor General A
judicious examination of the records will show that there is no
probable cause to hail petitioners for trial for illegal possession
of firearms. The weakness of the case against petitioners is
highlighted by the failure of the Information to allege the
identity of the firearms allegedly possessed by petitioners at the
time of the incident. No guns were seized or recovered from them.
There is no corpus delicti. It could not therefore be ascertained
with verisimilitude that petitioners did not have the license to
possess or carry guns. Given the mutual recriminations which were
generated by the incident, it would have been facile for any of the
protagonists to concoct a charge of illegal possession of firearms
against their adversary . . . In crimes involving illegal
possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of proving
the elements thereof, viz.: The existence of the subject firearm
and the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the
same. Negative allegation of the lack of a license is an essential
ingredient of the offense which the prosecution must prove. How
could the people prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners
committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms when the
firearms are not even identified with certainty . . .5 On the basis
of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals granted private
respondents' petition and set aside the disputed Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. Hence, this petition. The main issue to be
resolved is whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting private
respondents' petition and in setting aside the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. In determining this question, we need to
address these questions: (a) Was there sufficient evidence to
warrant the filing of charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms
against private respondents; and (b) May the Court of Appeals set
aside the Decision of the Secretary of Justice when the
corresponding Information has already been filed with the trial
court? The Court of Appeals found that no charges for Illegal
Possession of Firearms could be filed against private respondents
for two (2) reasons: First, as to private respondent Amando Ocampo,
he had the requisite license to possess the firearm, which was
established by sufficient evidence on record. Second, as to private
respondent Isagani Ocampo, there was no convincing evidence that he
was in possession of a gun during the incident involving him, his
father and petitioner, except for the eyewitness account of
petitioner and one Federico San Miguel. WMSU LLB 2A 2015 CrimProc
Atty. F. Sales 34 MAS Indeed, the rule is well settled that in
cases of Illegal Possession of Firearms, two (2) things must be
shown to exist: (a) the existence of the firearm, and (b) the fact
that it is not licensed.6 However, it should be noted that inPeople
v. Ramos,7 citing People v. Gy Gesiong,8 this Court ruled: " . . .
Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the firearm outside his
residence without legal authority therefor." This ruling is
obviously a reiteration of the last paragraph of Sec. 1 of PD 1866
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition .
. . The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without
legal authority therefor. The Secretary of Justice, in his
contested Resolution, thus made the following findings: Even if
Amando had the requisite license, there was no proof that he had
the necessary permit to carry it outside his residence; and
Isagani's plain denial could not overcome his positive
identification by petitioner that he carried a firearm in
assaulting him. These are findings of fact supported by evidence
which cannot be disturbed by this Court. Besides, the rulings
relied upon by the Court of Appeals and private respondents deal
with the quantum of evidence needed to convict persons for Illegal
Possession of Firearms. This petition arose from a case which was
still in its preliminary stages, the issue being whether there was
probable cause to hold private respondents for trial. And probable
cause, for purposes of filing criminal information, has been
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The determination of its existence lies
within the discretion of the prosecuting officers after conducting
a preliminary investigation upon complaint of an offended party.9
Their decisions are reviewable by the Secretary of Justice who may
direct the filing of the corresponding information or to move for
the dismissal of the case.10 The procedure is in no wise in the
nature of a trial that will finally adjudicate the guilt or
innocence of private respondents. The requisite evidence for
convicting a person of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms
is not needed at this point. It is enough that the Secretary of
Justice found that the facts, as presented by both petitioner and
private respondents, would constitute a violation of PD 1866.
Hence, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in directing the filing of criminal Informations against
private respondents, and clearly, it was error for the Court of
Appeals to grant private respondents' petition for certiorari. The
Court of Appeals also took note of the fact that petitioner's
appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed out of time. Per DOJ
Circular No. 7 dated 25 January 1990, the aggrieved party has
fifteen (15) days to appeal resolutions of, among others, the
Provincial Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint. Petitioner
filed his appeal four (4) months after receiving the Provincial
Prosecutor's decision dismissing his complaint. This
notwithstanding, the Secretary of Justice gave due course to the
appeal. It can be surmised then that DOJ Circular No. 7, while
aimed at facilitating the expeditious resolution of preliminary
investigations, does not tie the hands of the Secretary of Justice
if he thinks that injustice will result from the dismissal of the
criminal complaint when there is a good ground to file it. Assuming
arguendo that the Secretary of Justice was not able to establish
probable cause to direct the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
charges of Illegal Possession of Firearms against private
respondents, the filing of the Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals was not the proper remedy for private respondents.
It should be noted that when the Petition was filed, the WMSU LLB
2A 2015 CrimProc Atty. F. Sales 35 MAS Information was already
filed by the Provincial Prosecutor with the Regional Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite. The criminal case commenced from that time at its
course would now be under the direction of the tr