CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES JULY 18, 2015
HECTOR TREAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESSERENO,J.:Where life or
liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly
within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction
and to try the case and render judgment thereon.[1]This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 2010[2]and Resolution dated 4
January 2011.Statement of the Facts and of the CaseThe pertinent
facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:Sometime in December
1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot
in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged
with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the
appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth,
who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding
the transfer of the title in the latters name. Hector informed
Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her
aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be
incurred:P20,000.00-Attorneys fees,P90,000.00-Capital Gains
Tax,P24,000.00-Documentary Stamp,P10,000.00-Miscellaneous
Expenses.Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who
issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared
[a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector
gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for
P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted
with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When
confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and
that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth
demanded the return of the money.To settle his accounts, appellant
Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No.
0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00,
deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. When
the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same
was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.
Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant
failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against
him.[3]On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office
of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both
of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:That on or about
the 23rdday of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA
the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt
Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the
accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection
with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266,
but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with
the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of
P130,000.00 less attorneys fees and the said accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja
in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.CONTRARY TO
LAW.[4]During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as
his own counsel, entered a plea of Not Guilty. Allegedly due to old
age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City,
petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the
case.On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision[5]finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph
(b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the
dispositive portion as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the
crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in
the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a
consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to
suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day ofPrision
Mayorto Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months ofReclusion
Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the
legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was
filed until the amount is fully paid.SO ORDERED.[6]We note at this
point that petitioner has been variably called Treas and Trenas in
the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the
name Treas, under which he was accused in the Information.On 24
August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[7]which
was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.[8]On 25
September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the
RTC.[9]The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July
2010, the CA rendered a Decision[10]affirming that of the RTC. On 4
August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.[11]On 25
January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review on Certiorari[12]before this Court. He
asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for
review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9
February 2011.On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for
Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the following
assignment of errors:1.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN
ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK
OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION2.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY
SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF
ESTAFA;[13]On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in
the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that 150,000
was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead,
the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the
money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the
place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and
notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner
claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was
actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his
residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct
proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable
presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati
City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check
provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its
De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the
prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material
to the crime ofestafahad occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.Petitioner thus
argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove
lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the
prosecution evidence.As to the second issue, petitioner claims that
the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming
there was misappropriation, it was actually she not Elizabeth who
was the offended party. Thus, the latters demand does not satisfy
the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the
offense ofestafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been
properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of
P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that
the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on
the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of
petitioners.On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution
directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the
latters Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a
Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days
within which to submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a
Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG
filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional
period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on
the Petition.In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not
err in convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that
petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court
with respect to the delivery ofP150,000 to him, and that there was
a relationship of trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth.
With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed
in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of
evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in
effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the
prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance, which is not the case here.With respect to the
second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of no valid demand
was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter
sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants
alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no
proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioners signature in
the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.The OSG, however,
submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive
clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health.The Courts
RulingThe Petition is impressed with merit.Review of Factual
FindingsWhile the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution
of the Petition requires a review of the factual findings of the
lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.As a rule,
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this
Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as
follows:(1)When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and
the trial court are contradictory;(2)When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;(3)When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from
its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;(4)When there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts;(5)When the appellate court, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;(6)When
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension
of facts;(7)When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion;(8)When the findings of fact are themselves
conflicting;(9)When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
and(10)When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are
contradicted by the evidence on record.[14]In this case, the
findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the
place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any
citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are
grounded on conclusions and conjectures.The trial court, in its
Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any
finding as to where it was committed:Based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth
Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed
the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he
could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount
entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax.As clearly narrated by private complainant
Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of
P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of
fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his
duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private
complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated
documents.[15]In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC,
petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing
any specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by
relying on conjecture, thus:That the said amount was given to
[Treas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the
prosecution. Accused Treas, on the other hand, never appeared in
Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is
suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence,
but on mere what ifs. x x xBesides, if this Court were to seriously
assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a reversal
of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it
cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him
by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day.
His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo
City because it was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR
office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show
that he did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave
to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his argumentation
in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.[16]For its
part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in
this wise:It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not
entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears
emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of
prosecutions evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He
failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the
amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hectors allegations
cannot be given evidentiary weight.Absent any showing of a fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have
been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the
case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a
witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate
tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will
not be disturbed on review.[17]The instant case is thus an
exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower
courts.Jurisdiction of the Trial CourtThe overarching consideration
in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory.
InIsip v. People,[18]this Court explained:The place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that
for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore,the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case.However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove
that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of
the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court.InFukuzume v. People,[19]this Court
dismissed a Complaint forestafa, wherein the prosecution failed to
prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within
the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court ruled:More importantly, we
find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish
that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him
with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within
the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere
in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. x x xIn the present case, the criminal
information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of
Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are
as follows: x x xThe crime was alleged in the Information as having
been committed in Makati.However, aside from the sworn
statementexecuted by Yu on April 19, 1994,the prosecution presented
no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's
sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated
elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed,
the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991,
P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was
there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove
that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires
and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were
given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony
of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had
been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went
to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of
selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that
he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the
said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu
agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid
Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu
suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as
defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the
latter's house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell
aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with
his money.x x xFrom the foregoing, it is evident thatthe
prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of
estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the
offense took place in the said city.Hence, the judgment of the
trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be
set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to
the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)In this case, the prosecution
failed to show that the offense ofestafaunder Section 1, paragraph
(b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction
of the RTC of Makati City.That the offense was committed in Makati
City was alleged in the information as follows:That on or about the
23rdday of December, 1999,in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]Ordinarily,
this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in
the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by
Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense
was committed. It provides in part:4.THAT on 23 December 1999,
[Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREAS the sum of
P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued
to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
B,5.THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the
latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS.
MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax,
documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR
TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale
covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto
attached as Annex C,6.THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups,
ATTY. HECTOR TREASissued to me a check for refund of the sum given
to him less the attorneys fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of
P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00.
x x x7.THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK
dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by
the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x[21]Aside from
the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was
presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of
its elements was committed in Makati City.Under Article 315, par. 1
(b) of the RPC, the elements ofestafaare as follows: (1) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of
such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by
the offended party to the offender.[22]There is nothing in the
documentary evidence offered by the prosecution[23]that points to
where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review
of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention
of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:QAfter the
manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what happened
next?AWe have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will
have to and she will work for the Deed of Sale.QAnd did he quote
any amount when you got to the expenses?AYes. I gave him ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSANDQWhat was the amount quoted to you?AONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.QDid he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND?AYes, sir.QAnd what is the breakdown of this ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?ATWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee,
NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is
intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for
other expenses for BIR.QAnd did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?AYes, sir.QDid he issue a receipt?AYes, sir.QIf shown to
you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?AYes, sir.QI am showing
to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the
pre-trial as exhibit B. This appears to be a receipt dated December
22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this
court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty.
Treas issued to you?AThis is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector
Treas.QNow, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was
given to Atty. Treas by you, what happened next?AWe made several
follow-ups but he failed to do his job.[24]Although the prosecution
alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a
bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense
ofestafaunder Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.Indeed, other than
the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements
of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that
an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be consideredmotu
proprioby the court at any stage of the proceedings or on
appeal.[25]Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by
express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the
sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by
law in the manner and form prescribed by law.[26]It has been
consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial
if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense
or it is not the court of proper venue.[27]Section 15 (a) of Rule
110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides
that [s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. This fundamental principle is to ensure that
the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a
different court from that of the province where the crime was
committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for
his witnesses and other evidence in another place.[28]This
principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance
constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health,
petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against
him.There being no showing that the offense was committed within
Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the
case.[29]As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue
raised by petitioner.At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to
note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly
militates against the petitioners conduct in handling the funds of
his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:Rule 16.01 A
lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the
funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those
others kept by him.When a lawyer collects or receives money from
his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees,
registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should
promptly account to the client how the money was spent.[30]If he
does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render
an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of
the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31]Moreover,
a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties
as they fall due or upon demand.[32]His failure to return the
client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.[33]It is a
gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.[34]InCuizon v. Macalino,[35]this Court ruled
that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal
honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of
public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that
petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in
trust, the recommendation should include an order to immediately
return the amount of 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate
rate of interest from the time of demand until full
payment.WHEREFORE, the Petition isGRANTED. The Decision dated 9
July 2010and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011issued by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 areSET ASIDEon the ground of
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409
isDISMISSEDwithout prejudice. This case isREFERREDto the IBP Board
of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON
LUAREZ,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court
of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City;
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Alexander A. Padilla for
petitioners.The Solicitor General for the People of the
Philippines.REGALADO,J.:Creative legal advocacy has provided this
Court with anotherprimae impressioniscase through the present
petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for
resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court may take
cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection
with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and,
thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place
outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.1The factual
background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken
from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals2on which there
does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:From the pleadings and
supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered that on
March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern
Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant
was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No.
25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On
March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search
Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of
the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the
situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the
Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was
then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property
Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents,
among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the
sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were
brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later
released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER
Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in
Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C.
Velasco.On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of
All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and
a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of
Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.On
September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the
challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the
prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the
validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls
under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation
of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be
served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing
court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court
(National Capital Judicial Region);. . .Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having been
denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners have
come to this Courtviathe instant petition, raising the sole
issue:WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION
FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A
WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.xxx xxx xxxRespondent Court of Appeals
rendered judgment,3in effect affirming that of the trial court, by
denying due course to the petition forcertiorariand lifting the
temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in
connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now
impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse
before us.We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced
by petitioners in support of their submissions. Their disquisitions
postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent
of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal
obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of law
enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they
do not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of
(1) the court which has the competence to issue a search warrant
under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional
range in the enforcement of such search warrantvis-a-visthe court's
territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate
are essentially discrete since the resolution of one does not
necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid
compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be
discussedseriatim.IPetitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in
the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the search
warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because
it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition
allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to
be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against
petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was
subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the
search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of
improper venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for
having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.The
basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the
institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court.
It would thus categorize what is only a special criminalprocess,
the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent
to acriminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed inspecific
courtsof indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the
requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search
warrant are completely different from those for the institution of
a criminal action.For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of
arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.4A search
warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing
issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court.5A search warrant
is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery.
It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity.6In American
jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and
provisions on search warrants,7such warrant is definitively
considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action
to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in
this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.Invariably,
a judicial process is defined as a writ,warrant, subpoena, or other
formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of
accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings,8or all
writs,warrants, summonses, andordersof courts of justice or
judicial officers.9It is likewise held to include a writ, summons,
ororderissued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a
person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the
judgment,10or a writ,warrant, mandate, or other process issuing
from a court of justice.112. It is clear, therefore, that a search
warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to
respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already
been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter
contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial
clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a
criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no
such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be
filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the
illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is
aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in
different venues under the rules fordelitos continuadosor in those
instances where different trial courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.In fact, to illustrate
the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position
may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section
15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions
and which we quote:Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.(b) Where an
offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any
other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip,
the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other
vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure
and arrival.(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in
the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and
tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any
municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during
such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of
international law.(d) Other crimes committed outside of the
Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the
charge is first filed. (14a)It would be an exacting imposition upon
the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to
unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant
in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate
venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if
compliance with that requirement would be under pain of
nullification of said warrant should they file their application
therefor in and obtain the same from what may later turn out to be
a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.Our
Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage,
and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 194812or the recent
Judiciary Reorganization Act,13have never required the
jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek
to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary
provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory
omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean
that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress
itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of
national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal
manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For
us to now impose such conditions or restrictions, under the guise
of judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably construed as
trenching on judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to a
judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been
omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced
therein.14Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively
easier to resolve if a criminal case has already been filed in a
particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure evidence
to be presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal
case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper application and
due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application
would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband
articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would
appear to be no further complications. The jurisdictional problem
would resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its
territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed
hereafter.3. Coming back to the first issue now under
consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the respective
territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts
which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions,15invite our
attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority
granted bylaw,16has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each
branch of a Regional Trial Court17over which the particular branch
concerned shall exercise itsauthority.18From this, it is theorized
that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an
application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support
for such position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this
Court, that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as
amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.We reject that
proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not
intended to be of general application to all instances involving
search warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had
been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were
issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as
emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants
filedonlyin the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with
multiple salas andonlywith respect to violations of the
Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised
Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the
aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue search
warrants would not apply tosingle-salacourtsandothercrimes.
Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the
Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure which would
be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.For that
matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that
Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts," was the source of thesubject matter jurisdictionof, as
distinguished from theexercise of jurisdictionby, the courts. As
earlier observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant to
the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
pertinent portion of which states:Sec. 18. Authority to define
territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall
define the territory over which abranchof the Regional Trial Court
shallexercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of thebranchconcerned for
purposes of determining the venue of allwrits, proceedings or
actions, whether civil or criminal, . . . . (Emphasis
ours.)Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by
an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by
said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is
basicallyregional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that
"(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to aregionwhich
shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the
Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within the
sameregionas public interest may require, and such assignment shall
not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which,
otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.In
fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars
Nos. 13 and 19, did notper seconfer jurisdiction on the covered
regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance
thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order
merely defines the limits of theadministrativeareawithin which a
branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the
jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars
only allocated to the three executive judges theadministrative
areasfor which they may respectively issue search warrants under
the special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise
pursuant to thejurisdictionvested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg,
129.Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the
conclusion that the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein,
to entertain and issue search warrants where the place to be
searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to
exclude other courts from exercising the same power. It will
readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to
provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its
predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of
requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search
warrants, if they had been filed with the executive judge, among
the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19
eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered instead
that such applications should immediately be "taken cognizance of
and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose
jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their
substitutes enumerated therein.Evidently, that particular provision
of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact,
however, that they were themselves directed to personally act on
the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other
judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and
practical to require them to so act only on applications involving
search of places located within their respective territorial
jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in the
nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among
them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not
a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth,
Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and
anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that provision, thus:4.
If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are
seized thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court,
said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7
dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and
decided by the judge to whom it has been assigned, and not
necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant. (Emphasis
supplied.)It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only
thecourtwhich has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the
search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners'
position that only thebranchof the court with jurisdiction over
theplace to be searchedcan issue a warrant to search the same. It
may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case
is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch
thereof, hasprimaryjurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and
where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive
judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the
offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall
haveprimaryjurisdiction.This should not, however, mean that a court
whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be
searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the
obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by
compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place.
Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court
which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued
by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations
provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified
just because it was implemented outside the court's territorial
jurisdiction.This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on
the permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search
warrants.IIAs stated inlimine, the affiliated issue raised in this
case is whether a branch of a regional trial court has the
authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its
territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query
in the negative. We hold otherwise.1. We repeat what we have
earlier stressed:No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search
warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided
for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within
the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time
wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction,
no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest,
and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of
arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing
judge,19said warrant does not becomefunctus officiobut is
enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On
the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly
set in our Rules at ten days20but there is no provision as to the
extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is
implemented on and within the premises specifically described
therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction
of the issuing court.We make the foregoing comparative advertence
to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would provide
conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent
specific mention thereof, and the same not being inferable by
necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are
presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the
framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not
be countenanced.A bit of legal history on this contestation will be
helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and
processes of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced
outside the province only with the approval of the former court of
first instance.21Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the
approval of the regional trial court.22On the other hand, while,
formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance
were enforceable throughout the Philippines,23under the Interim or
Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certainspecifiedwrits issued by
a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial
region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary
that said provision be set out in full:3. Writs and processes. (a)
Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be
enforced in any part of the region.(b) All other processes, whether
issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be
served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases,
without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.
(Emphasis ours.)We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear
to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The
rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a
regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial
region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs
and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a
search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No
legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly
provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of
enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the
interim Rulesexpresslyauthorizes its enforcement anywhere in the
country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph
(a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the
processes contemplated inparagraph (b).2. This is but a necessary
and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search
warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely
difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information
regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or
prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it
should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits
and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more
onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure
or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For
that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search
warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial
jurisdiction. In the landmark case ofStonehill, et al. vs.
Diokno,et al.,24the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and
the residences in Makati of therein petitioners were conducted
pursuant to search warrants issued by the Quezon City and Pasig
branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the
Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City,25but the same were
never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were
subsequently nullified for being general warrants.3. A clarion call
supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners,
dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal
searches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a
search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial
jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would
create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the
professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may
resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing
an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need
merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an
action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into
specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant,26and all
these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever
region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said
requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the
warrant27would discourage resort to a court in another judicial
region, not only because of the distance but also the contingencies
of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really
compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does
seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been made
against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and
anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but
persons and liberty.On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial
knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with
local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and
influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to
render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very
locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the
fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of
applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said places, with
the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further
well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and
verifiable data, is articulated by the courta quo, as quoted by
respondent court:This court is of the further belief that the
possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in
the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where the
issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions
in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to
be searched is located.28The foregoing situations may also have
obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial
pronouncement that, in theabsence of statutory restrictions, a
justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a
search warrant to be served in another district of the county and
made returnable before the justice of still another district or
another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters
involved.29In the present state of our law on the matter, we find
no such statutory restrictions both with respect to the court which
can issue the search warrant and the enforcement thereof anywhere
in the Philippines.IIIConcern is expressed over possible conflicts
of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in theexerciseof
jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and
the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of
personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal
case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our
jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation
was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited
scenario contemplated therein.Nonetheless, to put such
presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy
guidelines:1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall
have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by
and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant
may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of
the latter court which may or may not give due course to the
application depending on the validity of the justification offered
for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction
thereover.2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a
motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by
said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the
appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution
of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be
deemed waived.3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was
filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may
move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the
suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the
warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two
separate courts with different participations are involved in this
situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to
suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In
order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during
the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the
hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on
the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper
remedy in the appropriate higher court.4. Where the court which
issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and
is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all
personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be
transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is
pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation
therefor.5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the
same criminal offense is charged in different informations or
complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original
jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which
court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall
be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal
case.WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is
DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25795 October 29, 1966ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, AURORA
MEJIA VILLASOR, ROY P. VILLASOR,petitioners,vs.THE CITY JUDGE,
CESAR L. PARAS, TRINIDAD T. LAZATIN, and TERRA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,respondents.San Juan, Africa and Benedicto and Antonio
C. Amor and Associates for petitioners.Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco,
Zafra and Tayag for respondents.DIZON,J.:In the month of February
1964, petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as administrator of the
intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria Lazatin
(Special Proceedings No. 48181 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila), together with his co-petitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez and
Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of said spouses, entered into
a contract with respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for the development
and subdivision of three parcels of land belonging to said
intestate estate. Subsequently Lazatin transferred his rights under
the contract to the Terra Development Corporation. Months later,
petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-8344) for the
rescission of said contract for alleged gross and willful violation
of its terms. Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra Development
Corporation, in turn, filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City of
Angeles a complaint against petitioners for an alleged violation of
the provisions of Article 172 in relation to those of Article 171,
paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting a
preliminary examination in connection therewith, the City Fiscal of
Angeles filed with the Court of said City an information charging
petitioners with the crime of falsification of a private document
upon the allegation that they made it appear in the contract
mentioned heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor was the "guardian" of
the minor George L. Mejia and that Angelina M. Lopez was similarly
the "guardian" of the minor Alexander L. Mejia, when in truth and
in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of said minors
on the date of the execution of the document (Criminal Case No.
C-2268).Upon petition of the parties thus charged, the City Fiscal
of Angeles reinvestigated the case on March 7, 1965 to give them an
opportunity to present exculpatory evidence, and after the
conclusion of the reinvestigation the parties charged moved for the
dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of
Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense because the private
document that contained the alleged false statement of fact was
signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city. As the
resolution of this motion to dismiss was delayed and in the
meantime the City Court had set Criminal Case No. C-2268 for
arraignment, the defendants secured from said court several
postponements of the arraignment.Finally, in view of the City
Fiscal's continued failure to act on the motion to dismiss the
case, petitioners filed on November 26, 1965 with the City Court a
motion to quash upon the ground that said court had no jurisdiction
over the offense charged. The complainants in the case with the
conformity of the City Fiscal filed an opposition thereto, and on
February 3, 1966 the respondent judge denied said motion to quash
and reset the arraignment of all the defendants on March 5 of the
same year. In view thereof, petitioners filed the present action
forcertiorariand prohibition.Upon the foregoing facts the only
question to be resolved is whether or not the City Court of Angeles
City has jurisdiction to try and decide Criminal Case No. C-2268
for alleged falsification of a private document by the parties
named in the information.It is clear that petitioners are not
charged with havingused a falsified document, in violation of the
last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge
against them is that of having falsified a private document by
knowingly and willfully stating therein that Aurora M. Villasor and
Angelina M. Lopez were the "guardians" of their minor brothers
George and Alexander, respectively, when in fact they knew that, at
the time they made such written statement, it was Carolina M. de
Castro who was the judicial guardian of said minors.It is settled
law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense
was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Pagdayuman 5 Phil.
265). Thus, under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over
criminal offenses committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction.In the present case, it is the claim of petitioners a
claim supported by the record that Angelina M. Lopez and Aurora M.
Villasor signed the private document wherein they are alleged to
have made a false statement of fact, the first within the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati, and the second within the
territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City, both within the province
of Rizal.We now come to consider the question of when and where is
the offense of falsification of a private document deemed
consummated or committed. Upon this point, We have ruled clearly
and definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36 Phil. 146, that the crime of
falsification of a private document defined and penalized by
Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document is actually
falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such
falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use
for which it was intended.Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36 Phil. p.
207, We said:. . . The contention of counsel would seem to be that
the information was defective, in that it fails to set forth
expressly the place where improper and illegal use was made of the
falsified document, an allegation which counsel for appellant
insists was absolutely essential for the proper determination of
the court clothed with jurisdiction over the alleged offense. But
under the definition of the crime of falsification of a private
document as set forth in Article 304 of the Penal Code, the offense
is consummated at the time when and at the place where the document
is falsified to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a
third person, and this whether the falsified document is or is not
put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. It is
evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is committed is
the place where the document is actually falsified, and that the
improper or illegal use of the document thereafter is in no wise a
material or essential element of the crime of falsification of a
private document; . . . .Applying the above ruling to the facts
before Us, it would appear that if the private document subject of
the information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the
act of falsification the signing of the document and the coetaneous
intent to cause damage was committed and consummated outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles, and that whether
the falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the
illegal use for which it was intended, or was signed by the other
contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the City
of Angeles is in no wise a material or essential element of the
crime of falsification of the private document, nor could it in any
way change the fact that the act of falsification charged was
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City.
Thus, that the City Court of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the
offense charged is beyond question.Respondents, however, contend
that the motion to quash filed by the defendants necessarily
assumes the truth of the allegation of the information to the
effect that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City and that they may not be allowed to
disprove this at this early stage of the proceedings. This is not
exactly the law on the matter at present. It was the law applicable
to ademurrer now obsolete to an information. The motion to quash
now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is manifestly
broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited to defects
apparent upon the face of the complaint or information but extends
to issues arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the
circumstance that, among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section
2 of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal,
extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the accused
etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the
determination of which a preliminary trial is required.In the
present case, the portion of the record of the reinvestigation
which was submitted to the respondent judge for consideration in
connection with the resolution of the motion to quash filed by the
defendants shows beyond question that the offense charged was
committed far beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles
City.On the propriety of the writs prayed for, it may be said that,
as a general rule, a court of equity will not issue a writ of
certiorari to annul an order of a lower court denying a motion to
quash, nor issue a writ of prohibition to prevent said court from
proceeding with the case after such denial, it being the rule that
upon such denial the defendant should enter his plea of not guilty
and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal
questions covered by his motion to quash. In this as well as in
other jurisdictions however, this is no longer the hard and fast
rule.The writs ofcertiorariand prohibition, as extra-ordinary legal
remedies, are, in the ultimate analysis, intended to annul void
proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice. Thus, inYu Kong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47
Phil. 385, We took cognizance of a petition forcertiorariand
prohibition although the accused in the case could have appealed in
due time from the order complained of, our action in the premises
being based on the public welfare and the advancement of public
policy. InDimayuga vs. Fajardo, 43 Phil. 304, We also admitted a
petition to restrain the prosecution of certain chiropractors
although, if convicted, they could have appealed. We gave due
course to their petition for the orderly administration of justice
and to avoid possible oppression by the strong arm of the law. And
inArevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil. 627, the petition for certiorari
challenging the trial court's action admitting an amended
information was sustained despite the availability of appeal at the
proper time.More recently, We said the following inYap vs. the Hon.
D. Lutero, etc.,G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959:Manifestly, the
denial, by respondent herein, of the motion to quash the
information in case No. 16443, may not be characterized as
"arbitrary" or "despotic", or to be regarded as amounting to "lack
of jurisdiction". The proper procedure, in the event of denial of a
motion to quash, is for the accused, upon arraignment, to plead not
guilty and reiterate his defense of former jeopardy, and, in case
of conviction, to appeal therefrom, upon the ground that he has
been twice put in jeopardy of punishment, either for the same
offense, or for the same act, as the case may be. However, were we
to require adherence to this pretense, the case at bar would have
to be dismissed and petitioner required to go through the
inconvenience, not to say the mental agony and torture, of
submitting himself to trial on the merits in case No. 16443, apart
from the expenses incidental thereto, despite the fact that his
trial and conviction therein would violate one of his
constitutional rights, and that, on appeal to this Court, we would,
therefore, have to set aside the judgment of conviction of the
lower court. This would, obviously, be most unfair and unjust.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, the flaw in
the procedure followed by petitioner herein may be overlooked, in
the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice.Indeed,
the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles over the
criminal offense charged being patent, it would be highly unfair to
compel the parties charged to undergo trial in said court and
suffer all the embarrassment and mental anguish that go with
it.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the
offense charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No.
C-2268 of the City Court of Angeles City is not within the
jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, said court is
hereby restrained and prohibited from further proceedings therein.
Costs against the private respondents.
ERLINDA ILUSORIO V. BILDNER
CARPIO MORALES, J.:Respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily
Raqueo were charged by Erlinda K. Ilusorio (petitioner) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City with perjury arising
from their filing, on behalf of Lakeridge Development Corp. (LDC),
of a petition in the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
issuance of new owners duplicate copy of Certificate of Condominium
Title (CCT) No. 21578 covering a condominium unit in Makati. The
Information reads:On or about November 4, 1999, in Pasig City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and falsely subscribe and swear to a Petition for
Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21578 before Rafael Arsenio S. Dizon, a notary public
in and for Pasig City, duly appointed, qualified and acting as
such, and in which Petition said accused subscribed and swore to,
among other things, facts known to them to be untrue, that is: That
the Petitioners claim that the title was lost, which fact was
material matter and required by law to be stated in said Petition,
when in truth and in fact as the said accused very well knew at the
time they swore to and signed the said petition for Issuance of a
New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21578, that said statement appearing in paragraph 4 of said
Petition:4. Pending registration of the mortgage document with the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City, the petitioners had their
respective offices, renovated and by reason thereof, documents were
moved from their usual places and thereafter, sometime in the early
part of the second quarter of this year, when petitioners were
ready to have the mortgage documents registered, the said owners
duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 could no longer be located at the
places where they may and should likely be found despite earnest
and diligent efforts of all the petitioners to locate the same;was
false and untrue because the said title was in the possession of
the complainant, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, and the above false statement
was made in order to obtain a New Owners Duplicate Copy of
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, to the damage and
prejudice of complainant Erlinda K. Ilusorio.Contrary to law.[1]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Three similarly worded
Informations for perjury were also filed against respondents Sylvia
Ilusorio, Ma. Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor also before
the Pasig City MeTC arising from their filing of three petitions,
also on behalf of LDC, before the Tagaytay City RTC for issuance of
new owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 17010,[2] 17011[3] and 17012[4] covering properties located in
Tagaytay City.As the purported corporate officers of LDC,
respondents filed the above-mentioned petitions for issuance of new
owners duplicate copies of titles over properties located in Makati
City and Tagaytay City after the owners copies thereof could no
longer be found despite earnest and diligent efforts to locate the
same.Petitioner, alleging that she, as bona fide chairman and
president of LDC,[5] has in her possession those titles, filed her
opposition to respondents petitions.[6] Respondents forthwith
amended their respective petitions,[7] the amendments reading,
according to petitioner, as follows:4. On November 4, 1999, in the
belief that the aforesaid owners duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578
had been lost and can no longer be recovered, the petitioners filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a petition for the
cancellation and issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of CCT No.
21578 in lieu of the lost copy;5. However, after the jurisdictional
facts and evidence had been presented before the said court, the
above-named respondents, through their counsel, filed their
opposition to the petition on the ground that the said owners
duplicate copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578
allegedly is not lost and is actually in their possession and,
thereafter, in a subsequent hearing held on February 10, 2000, said
respondents, through counsel, presented before this Honorable Court
the duplicate copy of said CCT No. 21578;6. The owners duplicate
copy of CCT No. 21578, pursuant to law, should be in the actual
possession of the registered owner thereof and it is indubitable
that LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION is the registered owner
entitled to the possession and control of the evidence of ownership
of all corporate properties;7. The respondents have no authority
nor legal basis to take and continue to have possession of said CCT
No. 21578, not one of them being a corporate officer of LAKERIDGE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, the registered owner of said property;x x
x x9. The respondents, in the absence of any authority or right to
take possession of CCT No. 21578, should be ordered by this
Honorable Court to surrender the owners duplicate copy thereof,
which they continue to hold without legal and/or justifiable
reasons, not only for the purpose of causing the registration of
the mortgage thereof in favor of the mortgagee/petitioner, Ma.
Erlinda I. Bildner, but also for the reason that it is the
corporation, as owner of the property, who [sic] is entitled to
possession and control and therefore, said CCT must, pursuant to
law, be kept at the corporations principal place of business.x x x
x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)Using as bases
the contents of the original petitions filed in the Makati and
Tagaytay RTCs,[8] petitioner filed charges of falsification of
public documents and perjury against respondents before the Pasig
City Prosecutors Office.[9]By Resolution of April 6, 2000,
Investigating Prosecutor Edgardo Bautista, with the imprimatur of
the City Prosecutor, dismissed the falsification charges but found
probable cause to indict respondents for perjury.[10] Four
informations for perjury were accordingly filed before the MeTC
Pasig, one against respondents Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner and Lily F.
Raquero; another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria
Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; still another against
respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A. Ilusorio and
Aurora Montemayor; and the last against respondents Sylvia K.
Ilusorio, Maria Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor, docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 121496, 121497, 121498 and 121499,
respectively.After the consolidation of the Informations,
respondents moved for their quashal on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction due to improper venue, lack of bases of the charges as
the original petitions had already been withdrawn, and privileged
character of the pleadings.[11]Branch 72 of the Pasig City MeTC, by
Order[12] of June 13, 2001, ruled that venue was properly laid,
viz:To determine the correct venue (territorial jurisdiction)[,]
the vital point is the allegations [sic] in the complaint or
information of the situs of the offense charged. If the complaint
or information alleges that the crime was committed in the place
where the court has jurisdiction, then that court has jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case. (Colmenares vs. Villar, 33 SCRA 186).
In other words, what is important is the allegation in the
complaint that the crime was committed in the place which is within
the courts jurisdiction (Mediante vs. Ortiz, 19 SCRA 832).In the
instant cases, the information [sic] allege that the offenses were
committed in Pasig City. Hence, pursuant to the aforecited
doctrinal rulings, this court has the venue or territorial
jurisdiction over these cases. (Underscoring supplied)Nonetheless,
finding that respondents petitions are privileged, the MeTC, citing
Flordelis v. Judge Himalalaon[13] and People v. Aquino, et al.,[14]
granted the Motions to Quash, viz:However, the Court finds the
third ground[-privileged character of the pleadings] meritorious.
In the case of Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, (84 SCRA 477) which is
also a prosecution for Perjury, the Supreme Court held:x x x
xMoreover, it is likewise clear that any statement contained in an
appropriate pleading filed in court that is relevant to the issues
in the case to which it relates is absolutely priveleged [sic] and
it is the law that the same may not be made the subject of a
criminal prosecution. (People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.)Similarly,
the alleged perjurious statements in the instant cases are
contained in a Petition filed before the Regional Trial Courts of
Makati and Tagaytay Cities which are relevant to the case the same
being for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a
certificate of title alleged to be lost.x x x x.As the facts
charged herein do not constitute an offense and/or the information
contains averments which, if true, would nonetheless constitute a
legal excuse or jurisdiction [sic], quashal of the Information[s]
is thus in order.x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis
supplied)Reconsideration of the quashal of the Informations having
been denied,[15] petitioner appealed to the Pasig City RTC Branch
263 of which, by Decision[16] of January 25, 2006, affirmed the
ruling of the MeTC. After the denial of her motion for
reconsideration,[17] petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition for review on certiorari,[18] contending that:THE COURT A
QUO ERRED IN RELYING ON THE CASES OF FLORDELI[S] VS. HIMALALOAN (84
SCRA 477) AND PEOPLE VS. AQUINO (18 SCRA 555) [IN HOLDING] THAT
STATEMENTS MADE IN PLEADINGS, EVEN IF PERJURIOUS OR FALSE, ARE
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED AND NOT SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
(Underscoring supplied)Petitioner is of the view that People v.
Aquino[19] cited by the RTC does not apply in the present
controversy as that case involved a libel case and there is no
authority which states that the rules on absolute privileged
statements in pleadings apply to both crimes of perjury and
libel.[20]Neither, petitioner posits, does the also cited case of
Flordelis v. Himalaloan[21] apply wherein the Court sustained the
quashal of the therein information for perjury as the answer to the
complaint containing the alleged false allegations did not have to
be under oath.In their Comment, respondents initially burrow into
the petitions alleged procedural crack by underscoring the apparent
disregard by petitioner of the established policy of judicial
hierarchy of courts, pointing out that the petition should have
been first filed with the Court of Appeals.[22]On the merits,
respondents reiterate, in the main, the congruent rulings of the
MeTC and RTC that allegations made by the parties or their counsel
in a pleading are privileged in nature. Moreover, they contend that
since they had amended the original petitions, there were no more
bases for the charges of perjury.[23]A word first on the procedural
question raised by respondents. The present petition is one for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court (APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS), Section
2(c) provides that in all cases where only questions of law are
raised, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 45.[24] Indubitably, the issue
tendered in this case is a question of law, hence, there is no
violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts.On the merits,
the Court denies the petition on the ground that, contrary to the
lower courts ruling, venue of the Informations was improperly laid
in Pasig.The allegations in each of the Informations indicate Pasig
as the situs of the offense charged where respondents petitions
were notarized. Albeit the Informations referred to the subscribed
and sworn petitions of respondents as bases of the charges, there
is no mention therein that those petitions were filed in Makati
City and Tagaytay City. The Complaint-Affidavits,[25] which
initiated the criminal actions, reflect such jurisdictional
details. Consider this allegation:6. On November 4, 1999, MA.
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and LILY F. RAQUENO allegedly representing
LAKERIDGE filed a verified Petition for Issuance of a New Owners
Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City x x x x, (Emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)as well as this:06. On November 10, 1999,
AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR, SYLVIA ILUSORIO, and MA. CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO
allegedly representing LAKERIDGE filed three (3) verified Petitions
for Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate
of Title Nos. 17010, 17011 and 17012 before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City x x x x. (Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)The allegation in each of the four
similarly-worded Informations that perjury was committed in Pasig
is neither controlling nor sufficient to show that the Pasig MeTC
has jurisdiction over them. The purported perjurious petition
quoted in each of the Informations in fact indicates that, with
respect to the CCT of the Registry of Deeds of Makati the TCTs of
the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay, venue of the criminal action
arising therefrom is in Makati and Tagaytay, respectively.Perjury
is committed as follows:Article 183, Revised Penal Code. False
Testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmations. The
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person
who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included
in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify
under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which
the law so requires x x x x[26] (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)There are thus four elements to be taken into
account in determining whether there is a prima facie case of
perjury, viz:(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the
statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in the
statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.[27] (Citation omitted)It is the deliberate making of
untruthful statements upon any material matter, however, before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which
the law so requires,[28] which is imperative in perjury[29]Venue,
in criminal cases, being jurisdictional,[30] the action for perjury
must be instituted and tried in the municipality or territory where
the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any matter
was made, in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay.[31]It was in Makati
and Tagaytay where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became
manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance
or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners
duplicate copies of the CCT and TCTs may issue.Whether the
perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were
subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the
offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement.
So United States v. Caet [32] teaches, viz:It is imm