Crimea annexation Lessons 2014

Annexation of Crimea: story and lessons

• ….BC… – Greek and Roman installations • from XV century – Ottoman empire • from 1783 – part of Russian empire• from 1954 – part (autonomous republic) of Ukraine within USSR• 24 August 1991 – Ukraine’s independence• 26 February – 18 March 2014 -Annexation by Russia

Crimea: historical backgroundCrimea: historical background

• Dacha area for Soviet nomenclature and “retirement resort” for ex-military

• Heavy militarized area

Crimea: strategic context Crimea: strategic context before 1990s before 1990s

• Population – 2,0 mln. (0,7 mln. – pensioners)

• Main supplies from Ukraine: water – 85%, electricity – 80%, gas – 70%

• Main GDP contributors: tourism, agriculture, vinery, fishery, chemicals

Crimea: strategic contextCrimea: strategic context 1990-2000s1990-2000s

• Economical crisis, gas – political instrument of Russia

• Ukrainian Armed Forces reduction, Black Sea Fleet division, Russian Naval bases in Crimea

• Promotion of “Russian world” idea in Crimea (as outcome of economy control):

parties and civil organizations;pensioners and ex-military;brunches of universities and institutions;Russian and Soviet history holidays, monuments;influence on Ukrainian civilian and military

authorities.

Promotion of “Russian world” idea

Promotion of “Russian world” idea

Promotion of “Russian world” idea

Promotion of “Russian world” idea

• Rotation of Russian personnel• Logistic prepositioning in Crimea• Sochi Olympics as “cover” for Russian military prepositioning and exercises, hidden deployment to Crimea to “enforce counter-terror” • Ukrainian security sector in Crimea demoralized after Maidan• “Political tourists” and pro-Russian organization protests• Hectic “elections” of alternative pro-Russian power• Local para-military units creation, critical infrastructure and entry points control

Crimea: 2014 Annexation /Crimea: 2014 Annexation /preparationspreparations

Hectic elections of alternative pro-Russian power in Sevastopol, 23 Feb 2014

“Political tourists” and pro-Russian organization protests in Sevastopol, Local para-military units creation, Feb 2014

• Seize of Crimean parliament by “green people”

• Ukrainian military and Coast guard units blockade

• Russian TV broadcast (instead Ukrainian)

• Pro-Russian psychological influence

• Stewarded Referendum

Crimea: 2014 AnnexationCrimea: 2014 Annexation

Annexation of Crimea pact, 18 March 2014

CrimeaCrimea 2014 Annexation2014 Annexation::Lesson LearnedLesson Learned

• Era of HYBRID warfare started:

informational superiority and psychological pressure, PSYOPS and INFOOPS

visible military potential

SOF as main instrument for high precision engagement

soft force of local population

treason of leadership

• Psychological conditioning and Ideology. Ukrainian

military were trained to see Russians as friends and brothers. Russians used it to accomplish mission of Crimea annexation.

• Passive Command and Control. UKR military trained to act after

receiving order rather than reacting if needed when the situation requires.

• Centralized C2 negatively affected in decision making Losing time instead of prompt response

CrimeaCrimea 2014 Annexation2014 Annexation::Lesson LearnedLesson Learned

• Intelligence systematically was used as tool of power rather than tool of operation. Withholding access to strategic warning information to all level of C2

• Overbearing Working Mentality Overchecking and overcontrol in system of managing security didn’t work and had damage effect on the morale and ability of commanders to act

• Training Classic warfare, old fashioned, insufficient resources (fuel, spare parts)

•Equipment (uniform, aircraft , warships) Warn out and old fashioned, not durable, uncomfortable to use.

CrimeaCrimea 2014 Annexation2014 Annexation::Lesson LearnedLesson Learned

• Territorial recruiting and social policy for military. Military in Crimea were mostly recruited from Crimea and were not able to fight with the pro-Russian population. Most of them (up to 80%) didn’t stay loyal to Ukraine. Lack of trusted and reliable social (particularly in housing) policy for Ukrainian military also affected their decision to stay within Crimea rather than to move to continental Ukraine

• Lack of security of critical infrastructure (Government buildings, airports, energy suppliers, transportation, TV and communication) Existing protection plan wasn’t activated because of Crimean security service and police treason. Military as supportive agency wasn’t activated and didn’t take a lead in crisis situation because of a gap in legislation.

• Unsecure location of military installations Many military HQs and units located within civilian infrastructure, neglecting secure perimeter, autonomous energy and water supply requirements and other measures of physical security.

CrimeaCrimea 2014 Annexation2014 Annexation::Lesson LearnedLesson Learned