Crim Outline 2.0

Criminal Law Checklist

1. Objective Elements1. Act2. Possession 3. Omission

2. Culpability 1. Read-in rules:a. Concurrence Requirement2. Transferred intent3. Substituted (transferred) culpability 4. Imputation of a mental state (intoxication)5. Aggravation a. Depraved indifference murderb. Felony murder6. Mitigation (manslaughter extreme emotional distress)

3. Causation1. Factual cause2. Proximate cause

4. Inchoate 1. Attempt1. Result (shoot-n-miss)2. Circumstance (impossible attempt)i. Inherently Unlikely Attempt (MPC)3. Act (incomplete attempt)i. Renunciation 5. Imaginary Offense

4. Group Criminality1. Conspiracy2. Complicitya. Attempting to aid b. Aiding an attempt 3. Facilitation4. Corporate Liability

4. Defenses1. Absent Element / Failure of Proof Defense2. Offense Modifications / Specialized Defenses3. General Defensesa. Justifications i. Necessity / Lesser Evilii. Defensive Forcea. Self-Defenseb. Defense of Othersc. Defense of Propertyiii. Public Authority: iv. Mistake as to Justificationb. Excuses.i. Duress, insanity, involuntary intoxication, mistake, immaturityc. Non-Exculpatory Defensesi. Diplomatic immunity, SoL expiration, executive immunity, entrapment

Tee-Up Paragraphs

In accomplice liability, a principals conduct is imputed to the accomplice, when the accomplice demonstrates intent to aid the principals criminal conduct. The definition of aids is commonly known to be interpreted very broadly . __. The accomplice is still responsible for their own culpability (20.15) and can be prosecute for their own level of the offense. ___.

Criminal facilitation liability is imposed on those who effectively aid the principal, with recklessness as to their criminal conduct.

Conspiracy liability requires actors agreement with another with the purpose of committing a substantive offense. NY recognizes unilateral agreement if he thinks hes agreeing to a crime even when the other party is not agreeing back . All that is needed is that one of them engages in an overt act that which corroborates the agreement. See 105.20.

Attempt requires engagement in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such a crime. This commonly requires that an actor has intent as to the conduct and results that constitute the substantive crime.

Omission is a failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is imposed by law. The omission must be coupled with the requisite mens rea and causation to make the actor liable for a particular offenseSuch duties can be imposed by statute or imported from contract law or tort law. There is no general duty to rescue unless the actor caused the harm from which another needs to be rescued or the actor started to rescue.

Depraved indifference murder is one that demonstrates extreme recklessness an awareness of an unjustified risk of death.

The felony murder rule allows an actor to be held liable for a homicide that occurs in the commission of, flight from, or furtherance of a specifically recognized felony. It is a form of strict liability for it does not require any culpability as to the resulting death.

The actors conduct is a proximate cause when the harm foreseeably follows from that conduct.

Under the self-defense justification, an actor will not be liable for using force on another if he reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the unlawful force on him by the other actor.

Under the public authority justification, an authorized actor will not be liable for using force on another if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary

Under the necessity/lesser evils justification, an actor will not be liable for using force on another if such force is immediately necessary to protect against a substantially greater imminent harm.

Deadly force is necessary in self-defense to protect oneself from the imminent use of unlawful physical force by the assailant. The actor is justified in using deadly force only to resist force that is unlawful or in other words not justified. If the assailants use of force is justified, then the actor has no right to use force. If, however, the assailant was not justified in shooting him, then the actor retains his right to justified force.

Larceny is theft.

Robbery is the forcible theft of property.

The Legality Principle holds that no person should be punished unless his conduct has been specifically defined as criminal in a statute at the time of the commission of the crime.

I. Foundational Principles1. Nature and structure of criminal lawa. Featuresi. It is public law causes social harm and prosecuted by public attorneysii. Statute-centriciii. State prosecutesiv. Procedure differs (evidentiary standards, constitutional guarantees, BoP)v. Remedy differs (incarceration frequently)b. Operational/Conceptual Structure (see p. 46)Comment by Lenny: See p.46i. Offense (mens rea + objective elements)ii. Imputation doctrines (impute both objective facts & culpability requirements)iii. Defenses 2. Purposes and justifications of criminal law: a. Reasons to punish i. Retributive theoriesa. Overviewi. Driven by doing justiceii. Violators deserve punishment for past wrongdoingiii. Seems to demand actual harm/wrongiv. People as moral agents i.e. ability to make moral choicesb. Who should be punished and to what degreei. Deontological Desert means punishment as an end in itself based on the offenders moral blameworthinessii. Empirical Desert punishment based on communitys broadly shared intuitions of justice, which also encourages utilitarian goals:1. Compliance with the criminal justice system2. Avoid vigilantism3. Harness the power of stigmatization 4. Shaping social normsiii. Vengeful Desert: victim-oriented. Concerned with method of punishment.ii. Utilitarian theoriesa. Overviewi. Driven by avoiding future crimes (prevention)ii. Compatible with punishing risk, even absent harmiii. People as rational agents who respond to incentivesb. Who should be punished and to what degreei. Deterrence: implies punishment proportional to the seriousness of the crime to effectively deter/prevent the individual offender (specific deterrence) and send broader message to society (general deterrence)ii. Incapacitation: make future offenses impossible by imprisoning or otherwise controlling offender. iii. Rehabilitation: to take the offender out of the system entirely by removing the desire to commit further offenses (e.g. psychiatric care, therapy for addiction, job training).iii. Additional notes:a. Note that there is a lot to be said for the signaling function of the law (e.g. hate crimes)3. Legality and statutory interpretationa. The legality principle: criminal liability and punishment can be based only upon prior legislative enactment of a prohibition expressed with adequate clarity.i. Corollaries:a. Void of vagueness, rooted in Due Process clausei. Vague statute doesnt define anything clearly (enough)ii. Ambiguous statute clearly defines something, but its exact scope isnt clear in a particular caseb. Rule of strict construction (lenity) c. Prohibition of ex post facto lawsd. Abolition of common law offensesii. Reasoninga. Procedural fairness / notice to enable effective deterrenceb. Leave criminalization with the legislative branchc. Encourage consistent/fair adjudication and limit abuse of discretioniii. Challengesa. Inflexibilityb. Prevention of appropriate punishmentb. Statutory interpretation rulesi. Plain meaning rule: start with the plain meaning of the statute before using the following rules of construction if there is still ambiguityii. Rules of constructiona. Different language implies different meaningb. Catchall phrase is limited by the common factor of enumerated termsc. Expression of one thin excludes implication of anotherd. Special (specific) language controls the generale. Later statute controls the earlier statuteiii. Legislative historyiv. Rule of Strict Construction / Rule of Fair Import a. Rule of Strict Construction: When language of statute is not clear and subject to conflicting reasonable interpretation, the statute should be interpreted strictly against the government.b. Rule of Fair Import: Ambiguities shall be resolved in a manner that furthers the general purposes of the code and the special purposes of the particular provision involved (not frustrates the legislative policies behind the specific law in question). MPC 1.02(3) and NY 5.00

4. Proving crimes; the criminal processa. Life cycle of a criminal case (see pp. 1-21)b. Proving crimesi. Burden of Pleadinga. What?i. Burden of raising an issue (a/k/a burden of going forward)b. Who bears it?i. Prosecution for all elements of offenseii. Defense for (most) defensesc. Why have it?i. Enhance efficiency by making each party responsible for raising issues from which it will gainii. Enhance fairness by eliminating surpriseii. Burden of Productiona. Establishes how much evidence party must present for an issue (or case) to go to the fact finder if not satisfied, that issue (and perhaps the entire charge) will not go to juryb. For offense elements, must present enough evidence that some rational fact finder could find proof of guilt BRD (which is NOT the same as saying fact finder would or must do so)c. Who bears it?i. Prosecution for elements and defenses that negate elements (e.g., mistake)ii. Defense (usually) for affirmative defenses, though sometimes prosecution has burden of introducing evidence to disprove them (non-affirmative defenses may include consent)d. Why have it?i. Reduce surpriseii. Eliminate frivolous claimsiii. Ensure that jurys decision has minimally sound basisiii. Burden of Persuasiona. What is it?i. Ultimate burden of convincing the fact finder to decide in your favor (what people usually mean by burden of proof)b. Who bears it?i. Prosecution must establish all offense elements BRD (this is constitutionally required); also must refute many defenses BRDii. Defense may bear burden for some defenses (or mitigations)1. NY 25.00: defendant has burden for all affirmative defenses (must establish by preponderance of evidence)2. NY 125.20(2), 125.25(1): mitigation from murder to manslaughter is an affirmative defenseComment by Lenny: Notec. Why have it?i. Ensure that convictions are returned only when jury is sufficiently convinced of guilt want to have uniform standardc. Presumptions and inferencesi. MPC abandons mandatory presumptions in favor of permissive inferences

II. Culpability Elements / Mens Rea: mental state required to establish a crime.

7. Element analysis: a. Culpability levels MPC 2.02i. Purpose: conscious object or affirmative desire. You can have intent on the spur of the moment it does not only mean premeditation.a. Note: motive is irrelevant for element analysis though it might come into play when we get to affirmative defenses and sentencing.ii. Knowledge: awareness of fact (i.e. high probability of risk, practically certain) Knowledge can be imputed to get around willful blindnessiii. Recklessness: awareness of risk (i.e. substantial likelihood). This is the normal default culpability level for criminal conduct.iv. Negligence: unawareness of the risk but that a reasonable person should have perceived v. [Strict Liability]: not an MPC category in itself, but any imposition of liability without culpabilityb. Objective Elements: the level of culpability required can differ for each objective element of the office. Not every crime will have all three elements in the offense definition (see MPC 1.13 and NY in 15.00-15.15.i. Result:a. Definition: Not formally defined in MPC or NY. Usually refers to something that changes directly because of the conduct. Results are bound up with causation. Most crimes do not have a result element.b. Culpability: see chartii. Circumstance:a. Definition: Not formally defined in MPC or NY. Usually refers to any objective element that is not conduct or result. Usually it is something that does not change before or after the crime. Circumstance is where the action is.b. Culpability: see chartiii. Conduct / Actus Reus: a. Definition: Voluntary act - MPC and NY narrowly defined as bodily movement or omission. Conduct can be implied in a result element (e.g. causing injury to a police officer with no specific conduct listed)b. Culpability: See chart. i. MPC does not define reckless or negligent as to conduct.c. Read-in rules:i. Concurrence Requirement: demands culpability during the commission of the act constituting the offense (not at the time of result).a. Courts have been known to stretch the requirement when needed to achieve the justiceii. An element that requires a lower level of culpability is fulfilled with a higher amount of culpability. See MPC 2.02(5) and recognized in NY.iii. Where an offense definition leaves out a culpability requirement:a. MPC reads in reckless in 2.02(3)b. NY rule is much vaguer in 15.15(2). Read in the level that the conduct in question necessarily involvesiv. Where a stated culpability requirement applies to all objective elements unless there is a clear desire to limit scope of offense.a. See MPC 2.02(4)b. NY is similar in 15.15(1)v. Where rules conflict, use common sense and see which grammatical clause the culpability level modifies.

7. Negligence and strict liability: a. There is some debate as to the minimal level of culpability necessary to establish criminal liability. Those held liable under negligence and strict liability arguably lack a guilty mindb. These arguments are rooted in the different punishment theories (above). i. Retributive thinkers may demand an actual level of culpability beginning with recklessness. The best retributivists can do is actor deserves punishment for failing to think.ii. Deterrence thinkers may be OK with negligence, as a way to deter others in the public (general), but isnt it true that the actual actor is undeterrable (specific)? c. There is more academic debate about whether negligence should be defined against an objective or an individualized standard.i. Objective negligence: uniform standard; ignore personal traits of defendantii. Subjective negligence: judge reasonableness based on whats reasonable to expect of this particular persona. See MPC 2.02(2)(d) which looks what a reasonable person would do in the actors situation.b. NY in 15.05(4) looks at in the situation which may be the same standardiii. Strict liabilitya. For deterrence purposes, strict liability is as a way of setting firm limits on conduct. These might be seen as a strongly objective negligence standard: violation is per se unreasonable (797)b. MPC anti-strict liability see MPC 2.02(1)c. Generally courts have been hesitant to allow strict liability offenses other than public welfare offenses d. Other: Statutory rape

8. [Exculpatory] Mistake / Mistake of Fact: objective element present, but mens rea absent. See chart p. 157Comment by Lenny: See chart p. 157a. Actors culpability lacked the required mens rea even if the objective element is present. However, he may be liable for another offense.i. See problem: Stomach, Kidney, Whatever (161-62)Comment by Lenny: Look upb. An exculpatory or an inculpatory mistake is relevant in determining liability. Mistake about the legality (mistake of law) of what youre doing is irrelevant in determining liability. i. You can do something you think is illegal and have culpability as to what you are doing, but if it is not a defined offense, you wont be liable. Similarly, you can do something you think is legal and have culpability as to what you are doing, but if it is a defined offense, you will be liable.c. Mistake as a general defense (p.153) there exist recognized affirmative defenses for specific kinds of mistake.Comment by Lenny: Look upd. Substituted (transferred) culpability based on mistake: A mistake that negates culpability for one crime also demonstrates culpability as to another defined crime. He is held liable for the lesser crime. See Life saving necrophilia p. 162Comment by Lenny: Look up in Dressleri. Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.ii. See MPC 2.04(2); NY 15.20(1)(a)iii. Example: Thus, if the defendant kills Polly, honestly mistaking her for a swan, and killing swans is itself prohibited, then the defendant may be held liable under the Model Penal Code 2.04(2) for that degree of homicide that carries the same penalty as the crime (swanicide) he believed he was committing. In essence, the Model Penal Code constructs an artificial crime out of an attempt to commit one crime and commission of the actus reus (prohibited conduct) of another.

9. Imputation of a mental state (intoxication)a. Imputation in generali. Actor can be liable for an offense even though he does not satisfy all the offense elements if a rule imputes the missing elements (treat him as if he satisfies the imputed element). ii. These rules exist separate from the actual specific offense definitions.iii. Imputation can work for both objective elements (e.g. complicity, causing a crime by an innocent person) and culpability requirements (e.g. transferred intent, substituted intent, intoxication) or both (e.g. felony murder rules)iv. Reasons to impute are many (see notes)b. Intoxication i. Voluntary vs. involuntarya. Involuntary intoxication can be a full defense [excuse] in several accepted scenarios b. Voluntary intoxication is when actor knowingly introduces into his body something that he knows or ought to know [negligently] will cause intoxication (in MPC)ii. Shield & sworda. Intoxication can block the formation of a culpable state of mind and negate culpability (shield). i. When used for this purpose, no different from mistakes (or anything else) intoxication simply negates required culpability.ii. MPC 2.08(1), NY 15.25b. Intoxication can also impute culpability (sword). The law often imputes recklessness if offender would have been aware of the risk had he been sober even if he actually lacks the required mens rea. Practically this means that a negligent actor will be imputed with recklessness.i. e.g., MPC 2.08(2), NY 15.05(3)iii. Remember the concurrence rulec. Other imputation rules: complicity, felony murder, corporate liability

10. Aggravation (depraved indifference, felony murder) a. Depraved indifference murder: In cases where homicide occurs and actor demonstrates extreme recklessness, (more than usual recklessness), culpability is treated the same as intentional murder, under MPC 210.2(1)(b) and NY 125.25(2), rather than reckless homicide/manslaughter.Comment by Lenny: Look up definition of depraved indifference and paste it in.b. Felony murder: In cases where homicide occurs in the furtherance commission of, flight from, or furtherance of a specifically recognized felony even if actor demonstrates no culpability he is automatically treated as one who willfully murders. Felonies included are robbery, sexual attack, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or felonious escape.i. Far reaching with accomplice liability. You can be an accomplice in a bank robbery, when someone gets killed, you can be on the hook for that murder.ii. Common law circumscribes the scope of liability by imposing time, distance, and causal components. In addition if in the commission of a felony a killing results from a non-felon, common law usually does not apply felony murder rule to an adversary rather than the felon who commits the homicide during the felony.iii. Cannot attempt felony murderiv. MPC creates a presumption (the jury may find guilty of murder, but not automatic). See MPC 210.2(1)(b)v. NY aggravation is automatic. See NY 125.25(3)vi. The only thing that can circumscribe murder liability in a felony murder case is causation. See problem regarding a police officer killing another police officer during chase (p. 198-99)a. MPC 2.03(4)c. See chart in my notebook for this section.Comment by Lenny: Look upd. Note: mitigation and aggravation are imputation rules that almost singularly apply to murder.

11. Mitigation (manslaughter)a. Why mitigate:i. No one theory but seems to be agreement that the legal system admits peoples weakness and also deems them to be less blameworthy. People less able to control their actions.ii. Criticisms: mitigation partially accepts what instead it should punish to deter. Feminist critics say it women are frequent victims and men get off. b. Common law: an intentional homicide committed in sudden heat of passion as a result of adequate provocation mitigates the offense to voluntary manslaughter. Specifically the elements are as follows:i. Actor must have acted in the sudden heat of passion (e.g. jealousy, fear, desperation)ii. The passion must have been the result of adequate provocation that would make a reasonable person for the time being of normal response. a. A jury issue, no longer confined to old categories (e.g aggravated assault/battery, commission of a serious crime against a close relative, observation of spousal adultery)b. Words alone not enough iii. The actor must not have had a reasonable opportunity to cool off (jury issue)iv. There must be a causal link between the provocation, the passion, and the homicidec. Modern codes provide mitigation from murder to manslaughter when the homicide is committed under extreme mental disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuses, as would be experienced in the actors situation. This is a broader, more time-flexible and subjective standard than the common law. i. See MPC 210.3(1)(b) a. MPC demands that reasonableness be partially individualized as it is viewed from the perspective of the actors situation. As in the discussion of negligence there is a tension between objective standard and subjective standard (nature of provocation; self-control of actor). Ultimately the decision is left to the trial judge.b. Unlike common law heat of passion MPC formulation is broader. A provocative act is not required, nor does a provocation need to fall within a category. No rigid cooling off period.ii. NY 125.20(2), 125.25(1)(a)d. Note: mitigation and aggravation almost singularly apply to murdere. Diminished capacity: evidence of mental illness may negate mens rea required for the offense charged. States vary as to how much to admit evidence of diminished capacity into courts.

III. Objective Elements4. Act requirement; omission liabilitya. MPC requires a voluntary act (a physical movement) or omission, but there are a number of important exceptions:i. Intangible acts when an actor shows his agreement or command passively or silentlyii. Possession is defined as an act which is paired with requisite culpability (usually knowledge) and failure to divest oneself of the object. a. See MPC 2.01(4), NY 15.00(2).b. If you possess a bag, do you also possess the contents of that bag?iii. Omission a. Carries liability where the actor has:i. A legal duty to act as put forward by the offense definition itself or imported from contract, property, or tort law. Knowledge of duty is not required. Examples:1. Status relationship (Undertake to care of him?)2. Contractual obligation3. Statute4. Rescue (Create the peril? Begin to rescue?) ii. A capacity to actb. See MPC 2.01(3) and problems on 420, 427c. Note: omission liability still demands the proof of other elements of the offense and the corresponding culpability as to all elements (including omission itself), which is harder to show in omission cases. Additional question as to causation (had you stepped in, would it have made a difference?).i. This is one reason that omission liability traditionally is limited.ii. Other reasons: causation problems, line drawing with multiple people omitting, autonomy

5. Attempt: objective element absent, but mens rea presenta. Attempt falls in the scope of inchoate conduct represents the criminal laws minimal requirement for liability it punishes risk creation without the necessary result.b. Merger: Generally cannot be punished for inchoate attempt and the substantive crime c. Culpability (usually intent) is typically required as to the conduct, with the other culpability requirements following those of the substantive crime.d. The rest depends on which objective element is missing. See MPC 5.01. i. Result (i.e. shoot-n-miss)a. MPC demands a higher level of culpability (usually intent) as to the result. It will not hold actors liable for attempt where the substantive crimes are defined by the culpability of recklessness or negligence. There is no such thing as attempted reckless homicide.b. NY distinguishes between core and non-core elements.i. If core of offense requires a result, attempt liability is possible only if crime requires (and actor possesses) intent as to result. If the core of the offense does not require intent, then it is simply not possible to attempt that crime. (e.g. not possible to attempt depraved indifference murder)ii. But for result elements outside core, such as aggravating factors, attempt liability is possible even if less culpability (or no culpability) is required as to result. (e.g. possible to attempt first degree kidnapping without intent to cause death) ii. Circumstance (i.e. impossible attempts)a. MPC usually demands the same level of culpability demanded by the substantive crime.b. Inherently Unlikely Attempts: an actor who does something with culpability but such that is next to impossible to cause harm (e.g. voodoo). This is otherwise a real attempt but law carves out an exception for this category and assumes that cluelessness as to methodology implies harmlessness of offender or a lack of seriousness on their part. Such a person may get a defense or mitigation or may not be charged. MPC leaves it up to the discretion of the court.iii. Conduct (i.e. interrupted/incomplete crimes) a. There is a spectrum along which an idea becomes an actual attempt. The question is at which point to impose attempt liability. Tensions b/w easing burden on police and preventing people with barely formed criminal intentions from being needlessly prosecuted. A number of tests:i. Proximity Test requires significant closeness to the commission of the offense. NY has a version of this in its tends to effect test. Anything less than that is not attempt.ii. Substantial Step test like the one in MPC measures how much distance from pure intention to commit an offense an actor has gone, creates a more liberal standard from the prosecutions point of view. 1. See 5.01(1)(c)2. MPC also adds a requirement that actors conduct be strongly corroborative of his culpability. I.e. it could be a harmless act that evinces intent (e.g. preparing for a burglary)b. There is a renunciation possibility which is absent from definitions of substantive crimes, and which can wipe the whole slate clean. i. MPC requires complete and voluntary renunciation. Not complete if just a postponement until later. Not voluntary if influenced by apparent detection or apprehension. See MPC 5.01(4)ii. NY requires actual prevention. Otherwise, parallel to MPC. See NY 40.10(3), (5)e. In NY you cannot punish attempt to a risk of harm (e.g. attempted DUI), but MPC is less clear.f. Why punish attempt:i. Even harmless attempts actually cause social harm endangers people, harms general safety, violates societys moral fabric.a. Subjectivist theories such as those that permeate MPC will punish actors for their mens rea as evidenced by their actions. Would seem to punish just like for substantive crime.b. Objectivist theories including those evident in the common law demand manifest criminality and causes obvious social harm, at which point mens rea is relevant to determine liability. Absent substantive harm, would seem to punish less for inchoate than substantive crime.ii. Utilitarian doctrines: naturally believe punishing attempt is necessary for general deterrence and perhaps incapacitation of offenders who, left alone, would go for the substantive crime. There are subjectivist and objectivist currents in utilitarianism that imply alternatively lesser or equal punishment for the substantive crime.iii. Retributive doctrines: those attempting show blameworthiness no different from those that complete the crime. There are subjectivist and objectivist currents in utilitarianism that imply alternatively lesser or equal punishment for the substantive crime.g. New TwistsComment by Lenny: Reviewi. Attempting to aid (ineffectual accomplice) a. MPC 2.06(3)(a)(ii) same as complicity - complicity applies if one aids or agrees or attempts to aidb. NY less clear but seems the same.ii. Aiding an attempt (ineffectual principal)a. MPC i. 2.06(1) says crime must be committed; 2.06(7) requires proof of commission of offenseii. but, per 5.01(3), may be liable for attempt for trying to aid what would be an offense if committed; in fact, would-be accomplice liable for attempt although crime is not committed or attempted by other personb. NYi. 20.00 discusses liability when one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offenseii. NY cases make clear that one can be an accomplice to an attempt (i.e., attempt also counts as an offense)

6. Imaginary Offenses / Mistake of Lawa. Imaginary Offenses is when an actor is mistaken in his belief that his intended conduct and his mens rea constitute an offense. The legality principle demands that there be a prior statement of prohibition, without which there can be no criminal liability.

7. Causation is implied in every result element. Finds justification in desert theory.a. Factual cause (i.e. but-for cause, cause-in-fact)i. This is an empirical question. It is usually a hypothetical exercise would the result have occurred when it did if the actor had not performed his conduct?ii. There is no joint and several causation for simultaneous and indivisible harm the way there is in tort law.iii. Every offense has multiple but-for causes, which is why there is reason to limit causation further.iv. See MPC 2.03(1)b. Proximate cause (i.e. legal cause)i. This is a moral question - Can the result foreseeably follow from the actors conduct or is there a break in the chain of causation? See MPC 2.03(2)(b), (3)(b).ii. The following factors are considered:a. The extent of actors contribution to the result i. As opposed, for example, to an intervening cause. b. Actors intent as to the resultc. Foreseeabilityd. Intervening factors, especially volitional acts of othersi. This depends on our baseline expectations regarding how situation would have likely turned out without intervention (see hypos on p. 266)1. Generally, case law provides that the defendant bears criminal responsibility for the death/injury of a person who gets more injured seeking to extricate himself from a situation created by the defendant (even if contributorily negligent) or seeking medical treatment which turns out to be negligent.ii. Also depends on the volition of the intervening actor1. If the defendant batters then leaves the victim in the middle of the road, who is then accidentally injured by another independent driver, probably within scope; but if victim is intentionally robbed by a third party that is probably outside the scope of liability.e. [Policy]iii. NY has no causation provisions, but case law basically establishes the same rules as elsewhere (MPC 2.03) except it seems to be less concerned with intervening acts.c. Transferred intent:Comment by Lenny: Review, see Dressleri. See MPC 2.03(2)(a), (3)(a) is a type of general imputation rule ii. In NY it is only a rule that applies to homicide.

IV. Group Criminality5. Conspiracya. General notes::i. Agreement with another that one of those agreeing will commit the offensea. Modern codes treat conspiracy as a type of inchoate conduct (although some understand it as independent harm), which means generally cannot be punished for inchoate conspiracy and the substantive crime.i. NY: treats conspiracy as an inchoate crime in that it allows a renunciation defense and provides milder grading for conspiracy than for the substantive crime. However, unlike MPC, in NY you can be punished for inchoate conspiracy and the substantive crime.ii. MPC: You cannot be punished for both conspiracy and the substantive crime. 1.07(1)(b)ii. Practically, what is important is that conspiracy liability has procedural effects beneficial to prosecutors beyond the actual liability that it carries.a. Flexibility as to venue choices any jur. where conspiracy committed (e.g. MPC 5.03(4), NY 105.25)b. Defendants can be tried together in an efficient joint triali. Challenge of getting your individual story heardc. Hearsay evidence from a conspirator admissible (unlike usually)d. Fed system holds on to the Pinkerton Doctrine that parties to a conspiracy are treated as accomplicese. May expand SoLb. Agreement Requirementi. Requires that an agreement b/w two or more conspirators that one of them will commit the substantive offense (e.g. writing, nodding, even silence)a. Bilateral agreement: some jurisdictions require both parties to actually agreeb. Unilateral agreement: is the norm in modern code, which allow the actor to be held liable for conspiring even when the other party is not actively agreeing back (e.g. when the other party is an undercover cop or has immunity or is insane). This reflects the inchoate view of the crime of conspiracy. (NY)(MPC)c. Overt act: creates a slightly higher threshold than just agreement alonei. Overt act is less than a substantial step in attempt liability. It can be a legal thing such as making a phone call, attending a meeting.ii. Only one person in a group needs to undertake one overt act to be liable for conspiracy, which is a procedural advantage for prosecutors. iii. See MPC 5.03(5), NY 105.201. Note: MPC has a wide definition that includes actor agreeing toa. Commit the offenseb. [Impossible] Attempt to commit the offensec. Solicit another to commit the offensed. Aid another to commit the offensec. Culpability Requirementi. Even though only one overt act is enough to be liable for conspiracy, each individuals culpability must be provenii. MPC requires purpose of promoting and facilitating the commission of the substantive offense. But what does that mean?a. Like MPC rules for attempt, MPC commentary suggest this requires purpose as to result and conduct. MPC does not set a clear culpability requirement as to circumstances. b. According to Robinson, the better view would be to require whatever culpability is required for the substantive offense.iii. NY requires purpose only to the conduct element of the substantive crimea. (e.g. conspiracy to get drunk and drive around is conspiracy to reckless endangerment)b. In NY you cannot have an attempt at an inchoate offense.d. Limitations on Conspiracy - Scope and Durationa. Abandonment: after abandoning conspiracy before the substantive crime takes place def. can still be held liable for conspiracy, but not the substantive crime. i. MPC 5.03(7)(c)ii. NY b. Renunciation: no longer liable for conspiracy (similar to attempt) if there is complete successful thwarting of the substantive crime.i. MPC 5.03(6)ii. NY 40.10(4)e. Structurei. Chain conspiracy, such as the drug trade, you can be prosecuted for conspiracy even when you didnt explicitly agree as long as you are part of the same enterprise.ii. Wheel conspiracy such as street dealers who get their re-up from the same source, it might be harder to prosecute as one conspiracy.iii. Relevant because the number of counts of conspiracy the person may be guilty of.f. Otheri. MPC provides that a person with multiple criminal objectives is guilty of only one conspiracy if the multiple objectives are (1) part of the same agreement or (3) part of a continuous conspiratorial relationship. See MPC 5.03(3).

6. Complicitya. General notes::i. This is an imputation rule, so dont have to worry about causation ii. Different from conspiracy which is an inchoate offense, complicity imputes the perpetrators conduct to all accomplicesiii. A conspirator is only an accomplice if he does something to help and an accomplice is a conspirator if they join in the agreement/plan.iv. Fed system holds on to the Pinkerton Doctrine that parties to a conspiracy are treated as accomplicesb. Objective Elementsi. Assistance can include:a. Assistance by physical conduct (e.g driving getaway car, acting as lookout)b. Assistance by psychological influence (e.g encouraging, providing moral support, applauding, but not just passively standing there)c. Assistance by omission (where there is a duty) (not just failure to inform police or stop the crime)ii. MPC 2.06(3)(a)a. Solicits x to commit offenceb. Aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid x to commit offencec. Omits to aid with a legal dutyiii. The principals knowledge of assistance from the accomplice is not determinative. Indeed even if the principal is unconvictable (dead, immune, etc.) the accomplice can still be held liable.a. MPC 2.06(3)(a)(ii) and 2.06(7)c. Culpability Requirementi. The conduct of the principal is imputed but the culpability is your own as the accomplice. a. Accomplice has purpose/intent to aid that conduct, BUT accomplice need not have intent as to other elements of offense (circumstances, results); only needs whatever culpability the offense requiresi. One can thus be an accomplice to negligent homicide if one purposely aids someone drive drunk, who in turn is convicted of negligent homicideb. Contrast facilitation, which requires only knowledge/belief that one is aiding anothers conduct.ii. As a result, in MPC at least [2.06(6)] the principal and accomplice can be prosecuted for different grades of the same crime based on varying levels of culpability as long as:a. MPC 2.06i. As to aiding conduct: purpose (2.06(3)(a))ii. As to result: whatever culp offense requires (2.06(4))iii. As to circumstance: ? (commentary); should be whatever offense requiresb. NY 20.00:i. acting with mental culpability required for commission [of offense], he intentionally aidsii. As to aiding: intentiii. As to offense elements: whatever culpability offense requiresiii. MPC also has a defense of abandonment if accomplice terminates his participation before the crime is committed and he (1) neutralizes his assistance (2) gives timely warning ot the police or (3) attempts to prevent the commission of the crime

d. New TwistsComment by Lenny: Reviewi. Attempting to aid (ineffectual accomplice) a. MPC 2.06(3)(a)(ii) same as complicity - complicity applies if one aids or agrees or attempts to aid even if aid proves ineffectual.b. NY less clear but seems the same.ii. Aiding an attempt (ineffectual principal)a. MPC i. 2.06(1) says crime must be committed; 2.06(7) requires proof of commission of offenseii. but, per 5.01(3), may be liable for attempt for trying to aid what would be an offense if committed; in fact, would-be accomplice liable for attempt although crime is not committed or attempted by other personb. NYi. 20.00 discusses liability when one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offenseii. NY cases make clear that one can be an accomplice to an attempt (i.e., attempt also counts as an offense)e. Facilitationi. NY 115.00ii. Culpability: need not intend to aid; need only believe it probable one is aidingiii. Conduct: must in fact aida. Because of conduct rules, facilitation does not always include complicity can be accomplice but not facilitator if:i. Offense doesnt occurii. Conduct doesnt in fact aid7. Corporate Liabilitya. This is another imputation rule, to impute the conduct and culpability of the agents to the corporation.b. Most jurisdictions today permit corp. liability for traditional criminal offenses, very broadly, with almost any crime fair game when:i. Performed by corporate agents within the scope of their employmentii. In the furtherance of the corporations interestsiii. Authorized, tolerated, ratified by the corporate management.a. MPC and NY go further by holding liable when management recklessly tolerates something.b. MPC allows liability for minor violations and regulatory offenses by agents (even if unauthorized)i. Due Diligence defense may be availablec. Individual agents and the corporation can be held individually liable for the offensed. A verdict against a corporation in a criminal suit with its higher burden of proof, can hurt the defendant corporations position in civil trials.e. Codesi. MPC a. 2.07(1)(a),(3)(a)i. conduct by agent(see (4)(b)) acting in corps behalf within scope of employment (unless offense designates responsible agents), ANDii. offense is a violation, or statute outside Code expressing clear purpose to hold corporations liable (per (2), such purpose is to be assumed for strict-liability offenses)b. (1)(b), (3)(b): failure to perform specified dutyc. (1)(c): BOD or high managerial agent (see (4)(c)), acting in corps behalf and within scope of employment, authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated offensei. Unlike (1)(a) and (1)(b), this subsection may support liability for any crimed. 2.07(5)i. defense to (1)(a) violations where responsible high managerial agent exercised due diligenceii. burden of persuasion on defendante. 2.07(6): person who commits offense on corps behalf, or agent who fails to satisfy duty, is personally liable for offenseii. NY a. 20.20(2)(c)b. 20.20(a)c. 20.20(b)d. 20.25f. Discussion as to whether appropriate to criminally sanction corporations. A number of writers suggest that it would be better to sanction corporations with civil regulatory sanctions, since this is practical punishment, it is easier to prove with lower burdens of proof, and unclogs the criminal justice system from victimless corporate crimes.

V. Defenses1. Absent Element / Failure of Proof Defensea. This is not a defense but a result of applying normal rules of culpability and element analysis which result in an element of the offense definition being absent. Failure of proof. It is still up to prosecution to prove BRD that the defendant was not mistaken.2. Offense Modifications / Specialized Defensesa. These are rules built into the offense definition for certain categories of crime (e.g. renunciation in inchoate liability) 3. General Defensesa. Justifications i. General notes:a. Justifications exculpate the actor on the theory that the actors otherwise criminal conduct which under the circumstances is socially acceptable and does not deserve liability. (usually b/c avoided a greater harm)b. Justifications are based on the idea of balancing competing harms and the offenders lesser harm is justified to prevent some greater harm. Thus justifications are often explained on utilitarian grounds. c. The burden is usually on the prosecution to disprove a justification, essentially defs conduct is lawful. Its up to prosecution to prove BRD it is not.d. Interestingly, justification defenses are defined with respect to us of force, which makes them apply to serious offenses but appears to mean that they cannot apply to trespass, theft, etc.e. Note that when something is justified it cannot be legally resisted.Comment by Lenny: What about if something is excused?ii. Necessity / Lesser Evila. General notes:i. It must be the actors intention to avoid greater harm.ii. This defense is not actually used much. If used, it is invoked at a bench trial, and often rejected.iii. Demonstrates a utilitarian cost/benefit balancing.iv. See MPC 3.01-3.03 & NY 35.00-35.05v. Good luck trying to figure out what to do when one must balance human lives, especially innocent lives. Torture.b. Triggering conditions:i. Immediate threat to legally protected interests, where harm avoided is greater than harm causedc. Requirements:i. Necessary 1. Necessary in time (urgency) - an imminent threat is usually required before the defense can be invoked. Another more liberal definition is immediately necessary where the threat is not yet imminent but unless you act now, it will be too late.2. Necessary harm must be used, so the defense is not available where are less harmful (or legal) ways exist to protect the interests.ii. Proportionate1. Actors conduct must be affirmatively shown to be less harmful than the harm threatened2. This is not reasonable standard.3. Where legislation has anticipated the choice of evils and defined the proper balance anything that does not meet the statute is not eligible for the defense.iii. Defensive Forcea. General notes::i. Overwhelmingly based upon a reasonable belief standard, which is partially subjective and partially objective. 1. What this means is that you can be mistaken as to your need for defending yourself but can still get the justification defense if it was a reasonable belief in the moment.2. If the belief is unreasonable, some jurisdictions will deny the justification entirely, but in some will give actor a partial justification (see Mistake as to Justification below)ii. Note that a lot of difficult cases deal with the interplay of one actors force and anothers deadly forceiii. See MPC 3.04-3.06, 3.11 1. MPC uses a belief standard. However, it is modified by Section 3.0 which reincorporates a reasonableness component.iv. NY 35.10(4), 35.15-25b. Self-Defensei. Triggering conditions: are usually very specifically definedComment by Lenny: Cahill recommends going through them1. Unjustified physical aggressiona. MPC is screwed up and uses unlawful force to be clear that you are responding to physical aggression that is itself not justified in the first place.b. If A uses force and B is justified (to protect himself) in responding, but uses disproportionate force, A regains the right to defend himself (even if he might be liable for original violence)c. Note that if the attacker has fled, you are not justified in going after them with violence, since the triggering condition is gone.d. MPC prohibits use of force to resist an arrest by police officer, even if arrest is unlawful.ii. Requirements1. Necessary a. When you have to (see triggering conditions above)b. Retreat rule: i. Exception for your own dwelling2. Proportionate a. Unlike necessity justification, the proportionality rules are very explicitly spelled out by statute in order to rein in wanton violence and deadly force.b. The basic rule is that you can use force to protect against force and deadly force to protect against deadly force, however MPC allows deadly force for defending yourself against kidnapping and NY allows for robbery, rape, etc.i. Note NY definition of deadly force in 10.00(11) physical force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injuryc. Defense of Othersi. Generally the rules require you to place yourself in the position of the third person getting threatened with violence, and if they would be justified in using force for self-defense, you can be justified in using the same amount of force to protect them.ii. What about cases where an actor unreasonably? Generally the usual reasonableness standard applies (see above).iii. Retreat rules dont seem to apply in the defense of others scenariod. Defense of Propertyi. Generally deadly force is almost never allowed to defend property per se however can be justified in circumstance where it threatens life (e.g. when property in question is someones home)ii. Usually force needs to be used during dispossession or in hot pursuit. Once person is dispossessed, his privilege to defense of property is exhausted.iii. MPC oks non-deadly force to prevent the unlawful interference with property and force is immediately necessary. MPC also allows deadly force in limited circumstances1. the person against whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling or2. the person against whom the force is used is attempting to commit or consummate arson, burglary, robbery or other felonious theft or property destruction and eithera. has employed deadly force orb. there is a substantial threat of serious bodily harmiv. NY allows deadly force to prevent the commission of arson see 35.20iv. Public Authority: a. See MPC 3.03, 3.07, 3.08 & NY 35.10, 35.27, 35.30b. Special authorization:i. Except suicides, where laymen can be justified in preventing, if you dont have the authorization, you cannot take advantage of the justification.1. In MPC exception for those who are helping an officer effect an arrest on officers requestii. Can cover groups including law enforcement, military, peace officers, etc. c. Triggering conditions:i. Can be very broad, far more than defensive force scenario. It doesnt have to be an immediate threat of harm.1. MPC covers suicide, felonies, damage to property, or breach of the peaced. Requirementsi. Necessary1. Necessary to prevent commission of triggering conditions2. Proper purpose is again very broadii. Proportional1. Like self-defense, there are prescribed circumstances that are legislatively authorized when force can be used, especially when deadly force is permitted.a. Deadly force usually in context of felonies and threat of deadly force from felon.b. Discussion is whether police can use deadly force to apprehend fleeing, unarmed, non-violent suspects. 2. Tennesse v. Garner was a civil suit, not a criminal suit about the officers crime or lack thereof. But the courts interpretation of the 4th Amendment affects police department policy.v. Mistake as to Justificationa. General notes::i. Like all justification defenses, the mistake as to justification is the prosecutions burdenii. NY and other jurisdictions define justifications in terms of reasonable belief. 1. If the belief is found to be unreasonable, then the actor can be on the hook for the entire offense. All or nothing approach.2. Usual questions about what is reasonable apply.iii. MPC define justifications in terms of belief, with separate provisions that are then necessary to deny the justification for unreasonable belief.Comment by Lenny: See 10921. The difference, however, is that if the belief was unreasonable the culpability as to the perceived threat is imputed to the offense, which means that even if the actor does not get a full justification, he can still get a mitigation (i.e. imperfect defense) for the offense. MPC 3.09(1)-(2).2. Even if the conduct is justified as to one aggressor, actor will not get a justification for hurting innocent bystanders. MPC 3.09(3). Note that other jurisdictions may treat this differently.iv. Battered Spouse Syndrome1. Depends really on whether the battering spouse was murdered in battery confrontation or in a non-confrontational situation.2. Justification view legal issuesa. Was there an imminent threat? Could defendant have reasonably believed so? Stretches the standard of reasonableness as to imminent risk in the justification definition. b. if womans conduct is justified, does that mean abuser is not allowed to defend himself from it?3. Excuse view: a. Even unreasonable belief of imminent attack (e.g. in a non-confrontational case) can potentiaolly be excused b/c syndrome makes women lose their mental capacity to make rational choices. b. Concern with whether it makes battered women seem crazy or pathologizes them (this depends, though, on whether excuse is seen as more like insanity or duress)4. Evidentiary issuesa. evidence of past abuse usually allowedb. expert BWS testimony: trend is toward allowing (medical trend is toward recognizing syndrome), but sometimes expert must discuss syndrome without applying to particular defendant, or is barred from offering opinion as to what is reasonableb. Excuses.i. General notes::a. Excuses exculpate under the theory that the actor cannot be held responsible for his otherwise criminal conduct because of some quality that prevents him from being held accountable i. E.g. duress, insanity, involuntary intoxication, mistake, immaturityb. Excuses imply and open up the door to looking more broadly at the motivations of the actor much more than typical culpability analysis, which focuses on a particular bad act.c. This is usually an affirmative defense for the defendant to prove by preponderance of the evidence.d. See MPC 4.01-4.04, 4.08 & NY 25.00, 30.00, 40.00, 40.15ii. Insanity (NGRI)a. Policy Rationalei. Utilitarian: punishment counter-productive from specific deterrence point of view. Incapacitation can be accomplished in civil context.ii. Retributive: Perhaps they lack free will needed to have culpability.b. There are multiple tests to see if the defendant meets the legal definition of insanity, but they boil down to tests that look at either:i. Lack of control the conduct was not voluntary AND/ORii. Lack of cognitive ability to appreciate the reprehensibility oft eh behavior not culpable c. MPC 4.0(1) when actor lacks the substantial capacity to:i. (1) Cognitive prong: fails to appreciate the criminality of his conduct ORii. (2) Control prong: fails to conform his conduct to the requirements of the lawd. NY only has the cognitive prong (1)e. Its up to the jury to establish whether the mental disability requirement has been metf. Potential verdicts:i. Guilty Imprisoned, potentially with mental health services [GBMI guilty but mentally ill]ii. Not guiltyiii. NGRI Usually rerouted to a civil institution for further observation, which ideally are rehabilitative in their nature.g. It is very difficult to get the insanity defense, b/c of the shift in the burden of proof to the defendant and also the need for medical expert witnesses.h. Should we use civil confinement more often? What advantages, what concerns?iii. Mistake [of law]Comment by Lenny: Read Kahan 998-1000 liberal positivism v. legal moralisma. General notes:i. Ignorance of the law is no excuse.ii. The narrow exceptions are based on the estoppel rationale the presence of the government role in causing the mistake, rather than the actors blameworthiness.iii. See MPC 2.04(3)-(4) & NY 15.20b. Unavailable law:i. This almost never happensii. MPC 2.04(3)(a)c. Official misstatement: i. Secured from a public officer in charge of administration, interpretation, etc. (not your attorney)ii. MPC 2.04(3)(a)iii. NY 15.20(2)d. General Due Diligence Defense (NJ)i. NJ has a broader mistake of law excuse as long as the actor has done due diligence in good faith by all means available1. Do you hold all people to the same standard or a particularized standard based on their experience with the law2. Very narrowc. Non-Exculpatory / Extrinsic Defensesi. General notes::a. Criminal conduct is definitely there, but actor escapes liability for broader public policy reasons extrinsic to the criminal law altogetherb. E.g. diplomatic immunity, SoL expiration, executive immunity, incompetency to stand trial, double jeopardy, entrapment, and related exclusionary rulesc. A lot of these rules have to do with when the government cant do certain things. They deter wrongful prosecution and tie in with the legality principle.d. Tension between Due Process and the need to hold people accountable (e.g. Ignatow). Potential ways to narrow the scope of some of the non-exculpatory defenses.e. See MPC 1.06-1.11ii. Exclusionary Rulesa. Not true defenses but rather evidentiary rules following from 4th and 5th Amendments.iii. Immunitya. Diplomatic: reciprocal protection and prevention of reprisals against diplomatsb. Official: immunity for public officials for work within their dutiesiv. Entrapment (note there is no private entrapment defense, only for police)a. Objective only thing you have to do is prove police misconduct, e.g MPC 2.13, which is a defendant-friendly standardb. Subjective the thing to prove is that the actor would not have committed the offense but for the police conduct. This is a harder standard for defendants to make. (NY, Fed government follows subjective test) See NY 40.05c.

Culpability Definitions by Objective Element: MPC & NY

ResultCircumstanceConduct

Purpose

it is his consciousobject to causesuch a result it is his consciousobject to causesuch a resultaware of or hopes such circumstancesexist

N/A

conscious object to engage in suchconduct it is his consciousobject to engage in such conduct

Knowledge

aware that ispractically certainto cause sucha result N/A

aware of a high probability thatsuch circumstancesexistaware that such circumstances existaware his conductis of such nature

aware that his conduct is of such nature

Recklessnessconsciously disregards a substantial risk of aware result of and consciously disregards a substantial risk of resultconsciously disregards a substantial risk of aware circumstances of and consciously disregards a substantial risk of circumstances

N/A

N/A

Negligenceshould be aware ofa substantial risk of result fails to perceive a substantial risk of such result should be aware ofa substantial risk of circumstances fails to perceive a substantial risk of such circumstances

N/A

N/A

Age of consentActual agePerceived age of consentPerceived ageResult

16151617[Depends culp. req.]

16171615Attempt

16151415Full liability

16171817No liability [imaginary crime]

Attempt Provisions: MPC

ResultCircumstanceConduct

Purpose(1)(a) impossible attempts(1)(c) interrupted conduct

it is his conscious object to cause such a resultaware of or hopes such circumstances existconscious object to engage in such conduct

Knowledge(1)(b) shoot-n-miss

aware that is practically certain to cause such a resultaware of a high probability that such circumstances exist

aware his conduct is of such nature

Recklessnessaware of and consciously disregards a substantial risk of resultaware of and consciously disregards a substantial risk of circumstancesN/A

Negligenceshould be aware ofa substantial risk of resultshould be aware ofa substantial risk of circumstancesN/A

Attempt Provisions: NYfor core elements

ResultCircumstanceConduct

Purpose

it is his conscious object to cause such a resultN/Aconscious object to engage in such conduct

Knowledge

N/Aaware of a high probability that such circumstances existaware his conduct is of such nature

Recklessnessconsciously disregards a substantial risk of resultconsciously disregards a substantial risk of circumstances N/A

Negligencefails to perceive a substantial risk of such result fails to perceive a substantial risk of such circumstancesN/A

for non-core elements

Conspiracy Provisions: MPC

ResultCircumstanceConduct

Purposeit is his conscious object to cause such a resultaware of or hopes such circumstances existconscious object to engage in such conduct

Knowledgeaware that is practically certain to cause such a resultaware of a high probability that such circumstances exist

aware his conduct is of such nature

Recklessnessaware of and consciously disregards a substantial risk of resultaware of and consciously disregards a substantial risk of circumstancesN/A

Negligenceshould be aware ofa substantial risk of resultshould be aware ofa substantial risk of circumstancesN/A

Conspiracy Provisions: NY

ResultCircumstanceConduct

Purpose

it is his conscious object to cause such a resultN/Aconscious object to engage in such conduct

Knowledge

N/Aaware of a high probability that such circumstances existaware his conduct is of such nature

Recklessnessconsciously disregards a substantial risk of resultconsciously disregards a substantial risk of circumstances N/A

Negligencefails to perceive a substantial risk of such result fails to perceive a substantial risk of such circumstancesN/A

Accomplice Liability Generally

ResultCircumstanceConduct

Purpose

it is his conscious object to cause such a resultN/Aconscious object to Comment by Lenny: Intent to aid the conductengage in such conduct

Knowledge

N/Aaware of a high probability that such circumstances existaware his conduct is of such nature

Recklessnessconsciously disregards a substantial risk of resultconsciously disregards a substantial risk of circumstances N/A

Negligencefails to perceive a substantial risk of such result fails to perceive a substantial risk of such circumstancesN/A

Murder Provisions: MPC

ResultCircumstanceConduct

MurderPurpose

it is his consciousobject to causesuch a resultaware of or hopes such circumstancesexist

conscious object to engage in such conduct

Knowledge

aware that ispractically certainto cause such a result

aware of a high probability that such circumstances exist

aware his conduct is of such nature

Extreme IndifferenceRecklessness

Reckless Manslaughter Recklessnessconsciously disregards a substantial risk of result consciously disregards a substantial risk of circumstances N/A

Negligent HomicideNegligenceshould be aware ofa substantial risk of result should be aware ofa substantial risk of circumstances N/A

Felony Murder