Crim Cases

Chang vs. People 496 SCRA 321

People vs. CA and Tangan 352 SCRA 599

People vs. Callet 382 SCRA 43

People vs. Sales 658 SCRA 367

Romera vs. People 434 SCRA 467

People vs. Torpio 431 SCRA 9THIRD DIVISIONROBERTO E. CHANG and PACIFICO D. SAN MATEO,

Petitioners,- versus -

PEOPLEOFTHE

PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.G.R. No.165111

Present:QUISUMBING, Chairperson,CARPIO,CARPIO MORALES,TINGA, andVELASCO, JR.,JJ.Promulgated:July 21, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:On appeal is the July 2, 2004 Decision and August 23, 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan[1]finding herein petitioners Roberto E. Chang and Pacifico D. San Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt ofviolation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sentencing each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Six (6) Years and One (1) Month as minimum to Fifteen (15) Years as maximum and perpetual disqualification from public office.Petitioner Roberto Estanislao Chang (Chang) was the Municipal Treasurer ofMakatiwho was tasked to, among other things, examine or investigate tax returns of private corporations or companies operating withinMakati, and determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of Income Tax assessed on them and collect payments therefor.Petitioner Pacifico D. San Mateo (San Mateo) was the Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division, Makati Treasurers Office.By Information dated June 20, 1991, petitioners were, along with Edgar Leoncito Feraren (Feraren), a Driver-Clerk also of the Makati Treasurers Office, charged before the Sandiganbayan to have willfully, unlawfully and criminally demanded and received the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P125,000) from Group Developers, Inc. (GDI) through its employee Mario Magat (Magat) in consideration of the issuance by petitioners of a Certificate of Examination that it had no tax liability to the Municipality, albeit it had not settled the assessed deficiency tax in the amount ofP494,000.[2]Thus the Information read:That on or about June 19, 1991, in Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ROBERTO ESTANISLAO CHANG, a public officer being the incumbent Municipal Treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila and as such is tasked among others, to examine or investigate corporate tax returns of private corporations or companies operating within the municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, to determine their compliance and/or insufficiency of Income Tax Assessments thereon, and to collect payments corresponding thereto, while in the performance of his official duties as such found Group Developers Inc., to be owing the municipality in the form of tax liabilities amounting to Four Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Pesos (P494,000.00), conspiring and confederating with Pacifico Domingo San Mateo, Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division, Municipal Treasurers Office, Makati, Metro Manila, and EdgarLeoncitoFeraren, Driver-Clerk, Municipal Treasurers Office, Makati, Metro Manila, who are both public officials, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally demand the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00) from the said corporation, through Mario Magat, an employee of said corporation, in consideration of the issuance of a Certificate of Examination that it had no tax liability to the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, which he in fact issued to the said corporation, notwithstanding the fact that the latter has not paid any amount out of theP494,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Gathered from the evidence for the prosecution is its following version:By virtue of Letter-Authority No. M-90-245 dated June 18, 1990 issued by the Office of the District Treasurer (District IV), Makati Treasurers Office examiners Vivian Susan C. Yu and Leonila T. Azevedo conducted an examination of the books of accounts and other pertinent records of GDIcovering the period from January1985 to December 1989 in order to verify the true and correct amount of tax due from its business operations.[3]The examiners found that GDI incurred a tax deficiency inclusive of penalty in the total amount ofP494,601.11, the details of which follow:Deficiency in the payment for business taxes in 1986 to 1990P271,160.00

Deficiency in the payments for Mayors Permit & Garbage Fee14,730.00

Surcharge Interest208,711.11

Total Amount DueP494,601.11[4]

The Office of the Treasurer thus issued an Initial Assessment Notice[5]datedJanuary 25, 1991to GDI for it to pay the tax deficiencywithin four days from receipt.No word having been received by the Office of the Treasurer from GDI, it issued a Second Assessment Notice[6]datedFebruary 14, 1991, reminding GDI to settle the amount duewithin three days from receipt.The assessment notices were personally received by Mario Magat (Magat), Chief Operating Officer of GDI,in April 1991.Magat thereupon referred the matter to the Accounting Department which informed him that the computations and worksheets requested from the municipal auditors to enable it to validate the assessment[7]had not been received.Magat was later able to talk via telephone toSan Mateowho had been calling GDIs Accounting Department and requesting for someone with whom he could talk to regarding the assessment.OnMay 15, 1991, Magat andSan Mateomet for lunch at the Makati Sports Club.[8]Chang later joined the two, and the three agreed that if GDI could payP125,000 by the end of May 1991, the assessment would be resolved.[9]OnMay 29, 1991,San Mateowent to Magats office at GDI to pick up the check for the settlement of GDIs deficient tax liability.When Magat handed over to San Mateo Interbank Managers Check No. 301715603[10]in the amount ofP125,000 dated May 29, 1991 payable to the Municipal Treasurer of Makati, San Mateo refused to accept the same, he uttering that Magat may have misunderstood their agreement as the money would not be going to the Municipality.Magat thereupon asked if Chang knew about the matter andSan Mateoreplied that that was the agreement as understood by Chang. Magat then informedSan Mateothat he still had to consult with the top management of GDI because what he understood was that GDI was settling the correct amount of taxes to the Municipality.[11]After consultation with the management of GDI, Magat repaired onMay 30, 1991to the offices ofSan Mateoand Chang at the Makati Treasurers Office during which he was told that the payment was to absolve GDI from its tax liability and if no payment is made, they would find ways to close GDI.[12]OnJune 6, 1991, Magat met again for lunch withSan Mateoand Chang at the Makati Sports Club.Magat tried to convince the two that GDI wanted to pay the correct amount of tax to the Municipality.He was advised bySan Mateoand Chang, however, that GDI had only two options:pay theP494,601.11to the MunicipalityorP125,000to them.[13]Magat thus consulted with Victor Puyat, president of GDI.Referral of the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was considered.[14]OnJune 12, 1991, Magat met with then NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco who advised him to file a complaint with the NBI.On even date, Magat thus gave a sworn statement[15]before the NBI.After the lapse of several days, Magat contactedSan Mateoand asked him if their position was still the same to which the latter replied in the affirmative, he adding that if no payment was made, GDI would be closed.Magat thereafter toldSan Mateothat he would deliver theP125,000 onJune 19, 1991at the Makati Sports Club.[16]On the morning ofJune 19, 1991, Magat informed the NBI that the payment was to be made that day around lunchtime.The NBI immediately formed a team to conduct an entrapment.On the request of the NBI, Magat brought hundred peso bills to be added to the boodle money to be used in the entrapment operation.The genuine as well as the boodle money and the brown envelope where the money was placed were then laced with fluorescent powder.[17]A few minutes before11:30 a.m.ofJune 19, 1991, Magat together with some NBI operatives, arrived at the Makati Sports Club.Two of the NBI agents went with Magat to the restaurant and pretended to play billiards while Magat occupied one of the tables.[18]At11:30 a.m.,San Mateoarrived and joined Magat at his table.The two took lunch after whichSan Mateostood up and watched those playing billiards. At12:00noon, Chang and his driver Feraren arrived and joined Magat at the table.After Chang and Feraren were through with their lunch, Magat told Chang andSan Mateothat GDI was ready to pay and asked them if they could give him the Certificate of Examination showing that GDI had no more tax liability to the municipality.Chang thereupon handed to Magat the Certificate of Examination[19]issued to GDI with an annotation reading NO TAX LIABILITY INVOLVED, following which Magat gave Chang the brown envelope.Chang then passed the brown envelope on to his driver Feraren who in turn passed it on toSan Mateowho opened it and peeped at its contents.At that instant, the NBI agents announced that they were being arrested.[20]After their arrest, Chang,San Mateoand Feraren were brought to the NBI headquarters where their respective hands were tested and found positive for fluorescent powder.[21]The defense, on the other hand, proffered the following tale:On the invitation of GDI through one of its accounting clerks and a certain Atty. Villarosa,San Mateomet with Atty. Villarosa for lunch in April 1991during which the latter requested for a reduction of the tax liability of GDI as it was experiencing financial difficulties.San Mateoturned down the request.[22]In thefirst week of May 1991,San Mateomet for lunch with Magat, on the latters invitation at the Makati Sports Club.At said meeting, Magat reiterated the request of Atty. Villarosa butSan Mateojust the same turned it down.[23]OnMay 29, 1991, Magat invitedSan Mateoto repair to his office at GDI, he advising him that there was already a check in the amount ofP494,610.11.San Mateodid go to Magats office where he was given a white envelope containing a managers check payable to the Municipal Treasurer ofMakatiin the amount ofP125,000.He did not accept the check, however, as he did not have authority to accept any payment less than that which was due from GDI.[24]Magat later went toSan Mateos office at the Municipal Treasurers Office and tried to convince him to accept theP125,000 check but to no avail.[25]OnJune 17, 1991, Magat called onSan Mateoat the latters office and conveyed Puyats invitation to Chang for lunch onJune 19, 1991at the Makati Sports Club.San Mateoin turn relayed the invitation to Chang through the latters driver, Feraren.[26]OnJune 19, 1991, Magat,San Mateo, Chang and Feraren met for lunch at the Makati Sports Club.After lunch,San Mateosaw a brown envelope being tossed and suddenly placed in front of him.As he held the brown envelope, several persons shouted Arestado kayo, NBI ito. The NBI operatives got hold of the brown envelope[27]and apprehendedSan Mateo, Chang and Feraren while Magat disappeared.[28]The Sandiganbayan, by the assailed Decision[29]ofJuly 2, 2004, convicted herein petitionersSan Mateoand Chang and acquitted Feraren, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Roberto E. Chang and Pacifico D. San Mateo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and are hereby sentenced to each suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum and to each suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.

Anent accused Edgar L. Feraren, judgment is hereby rendered finding him NOT GUILTY for the violation of sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby ACQUITTED. Consequently, the personal bail bond posted by accused Edgar L. Ferraren is hereby ordered cancelled and the Hold-Departure Order issued against the same accused is hereby revoked and declaredfunctus officio.[30]Hence, the present petition, faulting the Sandiganbayan to have gravely erred in:I.

. . . HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED AND THAT THEELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSEUNDER SECTION 3 (B) OF RA 3019 HAVE BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

. . . HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY ON THE PART OF PETITIONERS IN COMMITTING THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITELACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

III.

. . . HOLDING THAT THEFAILURE OF PETITIONER ROBERTO E. CHANG TO TAKE THE WITNESS STAND TO REBUT THE PIECES OF EVIDENCEPRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION, IS FATAL TO HIS CAUSE,OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT PETITIONER, WHO IS ENTITLED TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY.

IV.

. . . NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THEIRGUILT NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[31](Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners argue that the elements of the offense for which they were charged were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.On the presence of fluorescent powder in their hands, petitioners claim that it was the result of involuntary contact when Magat tossed to them the brown envelope.At all events, petitioners claim that the circumstances surrounding the supposed pay-off fail to show community of purpose or design which is the critical element of conspiracy.Maintaining their innocence, petitioners proffer that what transpired was not an entrapment but an instigation, which is an absolutory cause in criminal prosecution.They point out that when Magat went to the NBI on June 12, 1991, no date, time or place was as yet known to them for purposes of the planned entrapment, leading to no other conclusion except that all the activities on . . . June 19, 1991, the day of the supposed pay-off in the amount ofP125,000, were all orchestrated by. . . Magat so as not to lose face with the NBI.[32]Finally, petitioners proffer that the failure of Chang to testify does not imply guilt, he being entitled to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.The petition fails.Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

Peligrino v. People[33]restates the elements of the above-quoted offense as summed up inMejia v. Pamaran,[34]to wit:(1) the offender is a public officer (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.From areview of the records of the case, this Court finds that all the above-stated elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution.Petitioners were undisputedly public officers at the time of the commission of the offense.The prosecution, as reflected in the above statement of its version, not only established creditably how the offense charged was committed.It established just as creditably how petitioners conspired to commit the crime.Upon the other hand, the defense failed to overturn the evidence for the prosecution.Petitioners disclaimer of having demanded or requested anything from GDI to settle its assessed deficiency tax does not persuade in light of,among other things, San Mateos willingness and interest to meet in April, first week of May and May 29, 1991 by his own account, with the officials of GDI outside his office, despite thereceipt in April 1991by Magat of the First and Second Deficiency Assessment Noticesgiving GDI four and three days, respectively,from receiptto settle the assessed deficit taxes; the admitted refusal of San Mateo to accept the check dated May 29, 1991 forP125,000 which was payable to the order of the Municipality; and petitioners handing over to Magat the Certificate of Examination dated May 28, 1991 on which was annotated NO TAX LIABILITY INVOLVED.San Mateos justification behind such refusal that he had no authority to accept an amount less than the assessment amount is too shallow to merit belief, he being the Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division of the Treasurers Office, who had, on those various meetings, gone out of his way to negotiate the settlement of the assessed deficiency tax.As to petitioners argument that what transpired onJune 19, 1991was an instigation and not an entrapment, the same fails.There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, themens reaoriginates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.[35]From the evidence for the prosecution, it was clearly established that the criminal intent originated from the minds of petitioners. Even before theJune 19, 1991meeting took place, petitioners already made known to Magat that GDI only had two options to prevent the closure of the company, either to pay the assessed amount ofP494,601.11to the Municipality, or pay the amount ofP125,000to them.Respecting the failure of Chang to testify, it bears noting that the evidence for the prosecution did establish beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy as it did his and San Mateos guilt.The burden of the evidence having shifted to him, it was incumbent for him to present evidence to controvert the prosecution evidence.He opted not to, however.He is thus deemed to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED.The challenged Sandiganbayan decision isAFFIRMED.SO ORDEREDFIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 103613.February 23, 2001]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ELADIO C. TANGAN,respondents.

[G.R. No. 105830.February 23, 2001]ELADIO C. TANGAN,petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard heading south.He had just come from Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation.At the same time, Generoso Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in the same direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle, Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada Hotel.Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan.Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generosos way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangans path.Tangan blew his horn several times.Generoso slowed down to let Tangan pass.Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed.Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane.As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-turn.Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle.Tangan also stopped his car and got out.As the Mirandas got near Tangans car, Generoso loudly retorted, Putang ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko?Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives.Tangan pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, Huwag mo akong dinuduro!Sino ka ba, ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo? Tangan countered, Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo? With this, Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat.The subsequent events per account of the parties respective witnesses were conflicting:According to the prosecution witnesses, particularly, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda and when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter but because the arm of the accused was extended, the muzzle of the gun reached to about more or less one foot away from the body of Generoso Miranda. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall and while still conscious, Generoso Miranda told Manuel Miranda, his uncle, to get the gun.Manuel Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her.The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was able to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.

On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness by the name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of the gun and during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused.According to the accused, he lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting Generoso Miranda.[1]After the gun went off, Tangan ran away.Meanwhile, Generoso lay on the ground bloodied.His uncle, Manuel, looked for the gun and ran after Tangan, joining the mob that had already pursued him.Tangan found a policeman who allowed him to enter his patrol car.Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew.Then he went back to where Generoso lay and there found two ladies, later identified as Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi.Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought to the hospital in his car.He was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital but he expired on the way.Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.[2]After a reinvestigation, however, the information was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm,[3]and he was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.[4]On arraignment, Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but moved to quash the information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on various grounds.The motion to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition forcertiorariwith this Court.[5]On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two cases was ordered.[6]During the trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following:that the amount of P126,000.00 was incurred for the funeral and burial expenses of the victim;[7]that P74,625.00 was incurred for attorneys fees; and that the heirs of Generoso suffered moral damages, the amount of which is left for the courts to determine.After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide.The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor; consequently, the trial court ordered him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months ofprision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.[8]Tangan was released from detention after the promulgation of judgment[9]and was allowed bail in the homicide case.Private complainants, the heirs of Generoso Miranda, filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 102677, challenging the civil aspect of the courta quos decision, but the same was dismissed for being premature.On the other hand, Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00.[10]His subsequent motion for reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt were denied by the Court of Appeals.[11]The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65, docketed as G.R. No. 103613, naming as respondents the Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate courts judgment be modified by convicting accused-appellant of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance.[12]Subsequently, the Office of the Solicitor General, this time acting for public respondent Court of Appeals, filed a motion for extension to file comment to its own petition forcertiorari.[13]Discovering its glaring error, the Office of the Solicitor General later withdrew its motion for extension of time.[14]Tangan filed a Reply asking that the case be submitted for decision.[15]Meanwhile, Tangan filed a separate petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 105830.[16]Since the petition forcertiorarifiled by the Solicitor General remained unresolved, the two cases were consolidated.[17]The Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation in G.R. No. 105830, asking that it be excused from filing a comment to Tangans petition for review, in order to avoid taking contradictory positions.[18]In the recent case ofPeople v. Velasco and Galvez,[19]we held that the prosecution cannot avail of the remedies of special civil action oncertiorari, petition for review oncertiorari, or appeal in criminal cases.Previous to that, we categorically ruled that the writ ofcertioraricannot be used by the State in a criminal case to correct a lower courts factual findings or evaluation of the evidence.[20]Rule 117, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is clear:Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:

(a)the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;

(b)the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a pleas was entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c)the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party, except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.

Based on the foregoing, the Solicitor Generals petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65, praying that no mitigating circumstance be appreciated in favor of accused-appellant and that the penalty imposed on him be correspondingly increased, constitutes a violation of Tangans right against double jeopardy and should be dismissed.We now come to the petition for review filed by Tangan.It is noteworthy that during the trial, petitioner Tangan did not invoke self-defense but claimed that Generoso was accidentally shot.As such, the burden of proving self-defense,[21]which normally would have belonged to Tangan, did not come into play.Although Tangan must prove his defense of accidental firing by clear and convincing evidence,[22]the burden of proving the commission of the crime remained in the prosecution.Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals appreciated in favor of Tangan the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13 (1), in relation to Article 11 (1), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:ARTICLE 11.Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1.Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First.Unlawful aggression.

Second.Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

Third.Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

x x xx x xx x xARTICLE 13.Mitigating Circumstances. The following are mitigating circumstances:

1.Those mentioned in the preceding Chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.

Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused.[23]In order that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.[24]Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense.Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete,[25]because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis.[26]There is no question that the bullet which hit the victim was fired from the caliber. 38, which was issued to Tangan by the Philippine Navy.The cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound of the abdomen, caused by the bullet fired from a gun of the said caliber.The prosecution claimed that Tangan shot the victim point-blank in the stomach at a distance of about one foot.On the other hand, Tangan alleged that when he grappled with Generoso and Manuel Miranda for possession of the gun, it fell to the ground and accidentally fired, hitting the victim.When the testimonies of witnesses in open court are conflicting in substantial points, the calibration of the records on appeal becomes difficult.It is the word of one party against the word of the other.The reviewing tribunal relies on the cold and mute pages of the records, unlike the trial court which had the unique opportunity of observing first-hand that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness deportment on the stand while testifying.[27]The trial courts assessments of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great weight and respect on appeal and is binding on this Court,[28]particularly when it has not been adequately demonstrated that significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded by the court below which, if considered, might affect the outcome hereof.[29]The rationale for this has been adequately explained in that,The trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, and carriage and mien.[30]Equally, when a person fabricates a story, he usually adopts a simple account because a complex one might lead to entanglement from which he may find it hard to extricate himself.Along the same line, the experience of the courts and the general observations of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness delivers in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.[31]Aside from this, it is not also unusual that the witness may have been coached before he is called to the stand to testify.Somewhere along the painstaking review of the evidence on record, one version rings the semblance of truth, not necessarily because it is the absolute truth, but simply because it is the best approximation of the truth based on the declarations of witnesses as corroborated by material evidence.Perforce, the other version must be rejected.Truth and falsehood, it has been well said, are not always opposed to each other like black and white, but oftentimes, and by design, are made to resemble each other so as to be hardly distinguishable.[32]Thus, after analyzing the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court found that:When the accused took the gun from his car and when he tried to get out of the car and the two Mirandas saw the accused already holding the gun, they started to grapple for the possession of the gun that it went off hitting Generoso Miranda at the stomach.The court believes that contrary to the testimony of the accused, he never lost possession of the gun for if he did and when the gun fell to the ground, it will not first explode or if it did, somebody is not holding the same, the trajectory of the bullet would not be perpendicular or horizontal.[33]The Court of Appeals agreed -The finding of the lower court that Generoso Miranda III was shot while the accused and the Mirandas were grappling for the possession of the gun immediately after the accused had taken his gun from inside his car and before the three allegedly fell to the ground behind the car of the accused is borne out by the record.The court also agrees with the court below that it was the accused-appellant who shot and killed Generoso Miranda III.If the accused-appellant did not shoot Generoso III during the scuffle, he would have claimed accidental killing by alleging that his gun exploded during the scuffle instead of falsely testifying that he and the Mirandas fell to the ground behind his car and the gun exploded in the possession of Manuel Miranda.The theory of the prosecution that the shooting took place while the three were grappling for the possession of the gun beside the car of appellant is completely in harmony with the findings and testimony of Dr. Ibarrola regarding the relative position of the three and the precarious nearness of the victim when accused-appellant pulled the trigger of his gun.Dr. Ibarrola explained that the gun was about two (2) inches from the entrance wound and that its position was almost perpendicular when it was fired.It was in fact the closeness of the Mirandas vis--vis appellant during the scuffle for the gun that the accused-appellant was compelled to pull the trigger in answer to the instinct of self-preservation.[34]No convincing reason appears for the Court to depart from these factual findings, the same being ably supported by the evidence on record.In violent deaths caused by gunshot wounds, the medical report or the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim must as much as possible narrate the observations on the wounds examined.It is material in determining the truthfulness of the events narrated by the witnesses presented.It is not enough that the witness looks credible and assumes that he indeed witnessed the criminal act.His narration must be substantiated by the physical evidence available to the court.The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the target was about 2 inches but definitely not more than 3 inches.Based on the point of exit and the trajectory transit of the wound, the victim and the alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made and the position of the gun was almost perpendicular when fired.[35]These findings disprove Tangans claim of accidental shooting.A revolver is not prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger.If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver.[36]Having established that the shooting was not accidental, the next issue to be resolved is whether Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense.The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending himself but from the victim.A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient.[37]Likewise, the exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault.[38]There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls.Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun from him.It may be said that the former had no intention of killing the victim but simply to retain possession of his gun.However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result of the gunshot wound, though the shooter may not have the intention to kill, does not absolve him from culpability.Having caused the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for all the consequences of his felonious act.He brought out the gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but anticipating that the gun may be taken from him, he fired and fled.The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is not supported by evidence.By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one who provoked the former.The repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done by Generoso, may be irritating to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to incite provocation for the other party to act violently.The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation under Article 13, paragraphs 4 and 6,[39]have no factual basis.Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete self-defense is different from sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance.As an element of self-defense, it pertains to its absence on the part of the person defending himself; while as a mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its presence on the part of the offended party.Besides, only one mitigating circumstance can arise out of one and the same act.[40]Assuming for the sake of argument that the blowing of horns, cutting of lanes or overtaking can be considered as acts of provocation, the same were not sufficient.The word sufficient means adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.[41]Moreover, Generosos act of asking for an explanation from Tangan was not sufficient provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to kill or injure Generoso.[42]For the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation to be appreciated, it is required that (1) there be an act, bothunlawfulandsufficientto producesuch a condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.[43]In the case at bar, Tangan could not have possibly acted upon an impulse for there was no sudden and unexpected occurrence which wuld have created such condition in his mind to shoot the victim.Assuming that his path was suddenly blocked by Generoso Miranda due to the firecrackers, it can no longer be treated as a startling occurrence, precisely because he had already passed them and was already the one blocking their path.Tangans acts were done in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness, for which no mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation can arise.With respect to the penalty, under the laws then existing, homicide was penalized withreclusion temporal,[44]but if the homicide was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty shall be death.[45]The death penalty, however, cannot be imposed on Tangan because in the meantime, the 1987 Constitution proscribed the imposition of death penalty; and although it was later restored in 1994, the retroactive application of the death penalty is unfavorable to him.Previously, the accused may be prosecuted for two crimes:(1) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and (2) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. 1866.[46]P.D. 1866 was amended by R.A. No. 8294,[47]which provides that if an unlicensed firearm is used in murder or homicide, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance and no longer considered as a separate offense,[48]which means that only one offense shall be punished murder or homicide.However, this law cannot apply retroactively because it will result in the imposition on Tangan of the maximum period of the penalty.Moreover, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,[49]the aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information.Being favorable, this new rule can be given retroactive effect as they are applicable to pending cases.[50]In any case, Tangan was acquitted of the illegal possession case.Consequently, Tangan should be sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion temporal.Pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, if the prescribed penalty is composed of three periods, and there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the medium period shall be applied.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which, in view of the attendant circumstances, may be properly imposed, which in this case isreclusion temporalmedium with an imprisonment range of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.The minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be the next lower degree which isprision mayorwith a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.[51]Hence, petitioner Tangan is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum.The death indemnity of P30,000.00 was correctly increased by the appellate court to P50,000.00 in line with jurisprudence.[52]Moral damages are awarded in criminal cases involving injuries if supported by evidence on record,[53]but the stipulation of the parties in this case substitutes for the necessity of evidence in support thereof.Though not awarded below, the victims heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 which is considered reasonable considering the pain and anguish brought by his death.[54]WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED.The appealed decision subject of G.R. No. 105830 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:(1)Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties.(2)Tangan is ordered to pay the victims heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P42,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses, P5,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan,andPardo, JJ.,concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 135701 May 9, 2002PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL,accused-appellant.

PUNO,J.:

The accused, ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL was charged with Murder before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 30. The crime was allegedly committed as follows:1"That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 15, 1996, atBarangayTambulan, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one ALFREDO SENADOR with the use of a knife with which the said accused was then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon said victim the following injury, to wit:

A stab wound measuring two (2) cm. in length, 0.3 cm. in width and eleven (11) cm. in deepness located at the left side of the trunk, about two (2) cm. above the left clavicular bone. The wound was directed downward and slightly to the right.

which injury or wound caused the death of said ALFREDO SENADOR shortly thereafter.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code."

When arraigned on June 11, 1997, the accused pled "not guilty."2The prosecution presented the testimonies of Dr. Rogelio Kho, Lecpoy Senador, Eduardo Perater, Manuel Gabonales and Francisca Senador. For the defense, the accused, Elbert Callet, PO3 Roy Balasabas,BarangayCaptain Dominador Calijan and Nilo Callet testified.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 15, 1996, at 5:00 p.m., the victim, Alfredo Senador, his 12-year old son, Lecpoy Senador, and Eduardo Perater were at the flea market ofbarangayTambulan, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. There were many people in the vicinity. Some were playingcara y cruzwhile others were playing volleyball.

Alfredo, Lecpoy and Eduardo were beside each other as they watched acara y cruzgame. Alfredo sat close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot. Lecpoy and Eduardo sat on a piece of wood and on a stone, respectively.

Out of nowhere, the accused, Elbert Callet, appeared behind Alfredo and stabbed the latter on the left shoulder near the base of the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife. Instinctively, Alfredo stood up and managed to walk a few meters. When he fell on the ground, Lecpoy and Eduardo rushed to help him but to no avail. Alfredo died shortly thereafter.

Manuel Gabonales was also at the flea market at that time. At 5:00 p.m., he saw people running away from the place where there was acara y cruzgame. Next, he saw Alfredo and the accused. Alfredo was soaked in blood while the accused was running towards the basketball court. He asked Alfredo what happened to him. Alfredo replied that the accused stabbed him. The accused was then standing at the basketball court. Manuel helped Lecpoy and Eduardo carry Alfredo under a mango tree. He thought of bringing Alfredo to the hospital when he saw blood oozing from his mouth. After a moment, Alfredo died.

Dr. Rogelio Kho, Municipal Health Officer at Tayasan, autopsied the body of Alfredo on September 16, 1996. The doctor found a stab wound on the left shoulder of Alfredo, near the base of the neck. He opined that the victim died due to "severe hemorrhage and irreversible shock due to stab wound."3The defense gave a different account of the stabbing incident.

Allegedly, at 3:00 p.m., the accused, Elbert Callet, played volleyball near the flea market. After two (2) games, he stopped playing. It was past 4:00 p.m. He stayed at the flea market and watched as others played volleyball. While watching the game, he was hit on the left side of the body by Alfredo's elbow. He asked Alfredo why he hit him. Alfredo retorted, "Are you angry?" Next, Alfredo grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it. He pleaded with Alfredo to let go of his arm, but Alfredo warned that he would be his third victim if he would get angry with him. As Alfredo was pulling out a hunting knife from his waist, he (the accused) managed to stab him first. Thereafter, he ran towards the municipal hall to surrender.

Dominador Calijan, theBarangayCaptain of Tayasan, happened to be at the basketball court near the scene of the crime. He encountered Alfredo along the road after the stabbing incident. Alfredo had a stab wound on the lower nape. Calijan asked Alfredo who stabbed him and the latter gave the name of the accused. He directed hisbarangay tanodsto arrest the accused.

Barangay tanodsNilo Callet and Jesus Dagodog were able to catch up with the accused three (3) kilometers away from the scene of the crime. He was still holding the hunting knife and refused to surrender it for fear that the relatives of Alfredo would retaliate. Thebarangay tanodsescorted him to the municipal hall. Along the way, they asked him why he stabbed Alfredo. The accused replied that he could not help it and that everything happened too fast. Upon reaching the municipal hall, the accused surrendered the hunting knife. He was turned over to PO3 Roy Balasbas for investigation.

After the trial, the accused was found guilty of murder. Thefalloof the trial court's decision4states:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused ELBERT CALLET Y SABANAL guilty beyond a scintilla of doubt for the crime of MURDER penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance, the accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties provided under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused is ordered to pay the legal heirs of Alfredo Senador the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death.

Costs against the accused."

Hence, the appeal. The accused contends that:5"1. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED KILLED THE VICTIM WITH TREACHERY;

2. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE;

3. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ACCUSED DID NOT INTEND TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG."

We affirm. The conviction of the accused is clearly supported by the evidence.

Two (2) eyewitnesses positively identified the accused, Elbert Callet, as the one who fatally stabbed the victim, Alfredo Senador. Eyewitness Lecpoy Senador testified as follows:6"(PROS. HERMOSA):

Q: About that time 5:00 'clock in the afternoon on September 15, 1996, where were you and your companions situated or stationed since you said you were particularly at the flea market?

x x x x x x x x x

A: We were in Tambulan.

Q: In what particular place were you at the flea market?

A: In the place where there was a "cara y cruz".

x x x x x x x x x

Q: What were you and your father as well as Eduardo Perater doing at that moment at 5:00 o'clock on September 15 at the place where there was a game of "cara y cruz"?

A: We were looking at the "cara y cruz".

Q: While you were looking at the "cara y cruz" game, do you recall if there was an unusual incident that happened?

A: Yes, there was.

Q: What was this unusual incident that happened?A: My father was stabbed.Q: Who stabbed your father?A: Elbert Callet.Q: Elbert Callet whom you just identified a while ago?

A: Yes.

x x x x x x x x x

Q: Where was Elbert Callet in relation to your father when he stabbed your father?

A: At the back of my father.Q: What was the position of your father when he was stabbed by the accused?A: He was sitting.Q: Where was your father hit if you know?A: Left shoulder.Q: What happened after Elbert Callet stabbed your father?

A: My father walked.

Q: Towards what place?

A: Towards the area where there was a volleyball game.

Q: And what eventually happened to him?

A: He fell down.

Q: And then, what happened after he fell down?

A: We carried him to a place where there was a mango tree.

x x x x x x x x x

Q: What happened or what transpired after you brought your father towards the mango tree?

A: My father died.

Q: After stabbing your father, what did Elbert Callet do if he did anything?

A: He ran away.

Q: What did he use in stabbing your father?A: Hunting knife."(emphases ours)

Another eyewitness, Eduardo Perater, testified as follows:7"(PROS. HERMOSA):

Q: All right, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, can you recall if there was an unusual incident that happened?

A: Yes, there was.

Q: What was that unusual incident?A: There was a stabbing incident.Q: Who was stabbed?A: Alfredo Senador.Q: Who stabbed Alfredo Senador?A: Elbert Callet.Q: The same Elbert Callet whom you just identified a while ago in the courtroom?

A: Yes.

Q: What was the position of Alfredo Senador when he was stabbed by Elbert Callet?A: He was sitting down.Q: Will you please demonstrate to us the manner how Alfredo Senador was sitting down at the time when he was stabbed by the accused in this case?

A: (Witness in squatting position, he was sitting with his buttock on his right foot).

x x x x x x x x x

Q: Where was Elbert Callet situated when he stabbed Alfredo Senador?A: At the back of Alfredo Senador.Q: Was there any argument between Alfredo Senador and Elbert Callet before Alfredo Senador was stabbed?A: There was none.x x x x x x x x x

Q: How many times did Elbert Callet stab Alfredo Senador?

A: Only one (1).

Q: Was Alfredo hit when he was stabbed by Elbert Callet?

A: Yes.

Q: In what part of the body of Alfredo Senador was hit?A: In the left shoulder.x x x x x x x x x

Q: What happened after Alfredo Senador was hit by the stabbing of Elbert Callet?

A: He stood up.

Q: What did Elbert Callet use in stabbing Alfredo Senador?A: A hunting knife.x x x x x x x x x

Q: What about Elbert Callet, what did he do after stabbing Alfredo Senador?

A: He ran away.

Q: What did he do with his knife which he used in stabbing Alfredo senador?

A: He carried it with him."

(emphases ours)

We give full faith and credit to the testimonies of Lecpoy and Eduardo. Their testimonies were vivid with details. They were clear and consistent with each other.

The accused laments that Lecpoy Senador is a biased witness, being a son of the victim. We are not convinced.

The fact that Lecpoy is a son of the victim would not necessarily make him untrustworthy. This Court has ruled that "(b)lood relationship between a witness and the victim does not by itself impair the credibility of witnesses. On the contrary, relationship may strengthen credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime."8Significantly, there is no showing that this young eyewitness has any ill motive to testify falsely against the accused.

To be sure, even without the testimony of Lecpoy, the testimonies of Eduardo Perater and Manuel Gabonales would suffice to convict the accused. They are disinterested witnesses.9Their identification of the accused as the assailant is beyond question.

Still assailing the credibility of the eyewitnesses, the accused points out that in the joint affidavit10of Lecpoy and Eduardo, it was stated that the victim was "standing with his back facing Elbert Callet." However, they contradicted their affidavit when they testified at the trial that the victim was "sitting, with his buttocks resting on his right foot."

The cited inconsistency will not exculpate the accused. We quote with approval the following observations of the trial court:11"In the instant case, the direct and candid testimonies of eyewitnesses Lecpoy Senador and Eduardo Perater clearly showed that the killing of Alfredo Senador was attended by treachery. Alfredo Senador was sitting with his buttocks on his right foot watching the game of "cara y cruz" when Elbert Callet who was at the back of the victim stabbed him using a nine (9) inch hunting knife hitting him near the base of his neck. The victim was not in a position to defend himself from the accused who deliberately and consciously positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim to ensure the accomplishment of his evil desire without risk to himself. The location of the stab wound at the left side of the trunk about two (2) centimeters from the base of the neck and four (4) centimeters above the left clavicular bone with a deepness of eleven (11) centimeters directed downward and slightly to the right also suggests that the accused deliberately and consciously selected that part of the human body to ensure the instantaneous death of the victim. Although the counsel of the accused tried to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses by pointing that in their joint affidavit dated 20 September 1996 Lecpoy Senador and Eduardo Perater stated that Alfredo Senador was "standing" when he was stabbed,the said discrepancy could not in any way affect the categorical, candid, consistent and straightforward declaration of the said eyewitnesses made in open court that Alfredo Senador was sitting when he was stabbed by the accused. Discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do no necessarily discredit the witnesses(People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19).This is because it is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit being taken ex parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate(People vs. Castillo, 261 SCRA 493). Moreover, as noted by this Courtthe word "standing" was superimposedafter the original typewritten word was erased using a snopic (sic) or white substance." (emphases ours)

In addition, we note that Lecpoy and Eduardo did not countersign the superimposition in the subject affidavit. In the absence of clear proof that they confirmed the change, they should not be bound by it.

The accused invokes self-defense for his acquittal. In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. Thus, he must present clear and convincing evidence that the following elements are present, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.12The accused failed to discharge this task.

The accused alleged that he and the victim had hunting knives during their encounter. After the victim's elbow hit the left side of his body, the victim grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it with his right arm. A verbal exchange ensued between them and then the victim, using the left arm tried to unsheathe the knife that was tucked at his left side. However, the victim was not able to pull out the knife because it got entangled with his shirt tucked in his pants. In defense, the accused allegedly pulled out his own knife that was tucked in the right side of his waist using his left arm and stabbed the victim on the left shoulder. He then retreated and left as the victim was still trying to approach him.13The version of the accused does not inspire belief. The incident happened in plain view of many witnesses at the flea market. He even claimed he was with a certain Guale and one Sonny Boy at that time.14Yet, nobody corroborated his story. Indeed, his narration on how the victim "attacked" him is improbable. In the witness chair, he admitted that the victim was bigger than him and that his left hand was restrained by the victim.15It is thus incredible how he could pull out his knife from his right side, with the use of his left hand,16raise that knife high enough to hit the shoulder of the victim and inflict an 11-cm. deep wound upon him. It is more probable that the victim was sitting down when the accused attacked him from behind as the prosecution witnesses testified. Equally incredulous is the claim that after being injured, the victim still tried to approach and attack him, hence, he had to retreat. The accused's uncorroborated plea of self-defense cannot be entertained, especially when it is, in itself, extremely doubtful.17The Information charged that evident premeditation and treachery attended the commission of the crime. The evidence failed to prove evident premeditation. Evident premeditation requires proof of: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.18The records show that the prosecution did not adduce any evidence to prove these elements.

Treachery oralevosiaexists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.19The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the killing of the victim to murder. The stabbing was from behind, done in a sudden and unexpected manner while the victim was sitting close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot, and while his attention was focused on the on-goingcara y cruzgame.20Clearly, the victim was not able to defend himself from the mode of attack.

The trial court also correctly credited the accused with voluntary surrender to mitigate his liability. Voluntary surrender requires that the offender had not been actually arrested; that he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and that the surrender was voluntary.

The records reveal that the accused ran toward the municipal building after the stabbing incident. On his way to the municipal building, he admitted to Barangay Tanods Nilo Callet and Jesus Dagodog that he stabbed the victim. Although he did not immediately turn over his weapon to them for fear of retaliation from the victim's relatives, he did so as soon as they reached the municipal building. Undoubtedly, the conduct he displayed was spontaneous as it shows his interest to give himself up unconditionally to the authorities, thus saving the State the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture.21The accused also claims that his liability should be mitigated by the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong. We are not persuaded.

The lack of "intent" to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.22As the killing was attended by treachery, the accused is liable for the crime of murder. The prescribed penalty therefor isreclusion perpetuato death.23In view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the trial court correctly meted the penalty ofreclusionperpetuaagainst the accused.

The civil indemnity awarded in favor of the legal heirs of the victim, Alfredo Senador, in the amount ofP50,000.00 is in accord with the Court's current policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from, finding the accused, ELBERT CALLET, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12995, and sentencing him to sufferreclusion perpetuaand to pay the legal heirs of the victim, ALFREDO SENADOR, the amount ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs, isAFFIRMED.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaFIRST DIVISIONPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 177218

Appellee,

Present:

CORONA,C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,and

VILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.

NOEL T. SALES,Promulgated:

Appellant.October 3, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NDEL CASTILLO,J.:A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed.However, he may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries, respectively.The Information[3]for parricide contained the following allegations:That on or about the 20thday of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 oclock in the evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several] times, the different parts of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter in length and one [and] a half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d] the death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the latters heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]On the other hand, the Information[5]in Criminal Case No. RTC03-789 alleges that appellant inflicted slight physical injuries in the following manner:That on or about the 20thday of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 oclock in the evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the victims heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the charges of parricide[7]and slight physical injuries[8]respectively.The cases were then consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by the defense.[9]During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the father of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of the incident, appellants family was living in the conjugal home located inBarangaySan Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the police.[10]Thereafter, trial ensued.The Version of the ProsecutionOn September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night.When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearbyBarangayof Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them.When the two kids reached home at around 8 oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them.Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house.With Noemars and Juniors hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood.During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed.Maria noticed a crack in Noemars head and injuries in his legs.She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of Junior.Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness.Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead.However, appellant refused to believe her.Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor.He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital.Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a hospital.As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.Noemars wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day.His body was never examined by a doctor.The Version of the DefensePrior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate occasions without the permission of their parents.Each time, appellant merely scolded them and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to them.During those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents permission on September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received information that his sons stole a pedicab.As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior.When his sons finally arrived home at 8 oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of wood as thick as his index finger.He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were side by side.After whipping his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar was chilling and frothing.When Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was seven kilometers away from their house.Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in breathing.The pupils of Noemars eyes were also moving up and down.Appellant heard him say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain.However, they waited in vain since a vehicle never came.It was then that Noemar died.Appellant thus decided to just bring Noemar back to their house.Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child.He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing.In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him.Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness after 15 minutes.His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.The death of Noemar was reported to the police by thebarangaycaptain.[11]Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.[12]Ruling of the Regional Trial CourtIn a Joint Decision,[13]the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the Informations.In the crime of parricide, the trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar.But the trial court appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales, beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC03-782 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Noemar Sales, the amount ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity;P50,000.00 as moral damages;P25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised Penal Code.Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.SO ORDERED.[14]Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[15]which was given due course in an Order[16]dated September 21, 2005.Ruling of the Court of AppealsHowever, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.The dispositive portion of its Decision[17]reads as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal isDENIED.The assailed decision dated August 3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical Injuries, respectively, isAFFIRMED.Pursuant toSection 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.SO ORDERED.[18]IssuesHence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:ITHE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.IITHE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.[19]Our RulingThe appeal is without merit.The Charge of ParricideAppellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but denies battering Noemar to death.He believes that no father could kill his own son.According to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness and froth in his mouth.He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction where they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital.However, Noemar had difficulty in breathing and complained of chest pain.He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria, who testified that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.The contentions of appellant fail to persuade.The imposition of parental discipline on children of tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior.A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper punishment.They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their minor children.It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment.A deviation will undoubtedly result in sadism.Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the family dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar incidents.This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in disgrace.Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could look for the children and bring them home.From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger.This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs.It was only when Noemars body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped the beating.Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act.His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the childs life.It bears stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise of discipline.Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to discipline Noemar and not to kill him.However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code states:Art. 4.Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:1.By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.x x x xIn order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.[20]Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony.As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired.Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit.This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence.While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemars cadaver was never examined.Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his contention, the latters testimony did not help as same was even in conflict with his testimony.Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Marias testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:Art. 246.Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty ofreclusion perpetuato death.Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused.[21]In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a person was killed.Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father.Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead.Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after.Noemars Death Certificate[22]was also presented in evidence.There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed the deceased.Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior.Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house.The whipping continued even outside the house but this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes indiscriminately.For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their father in the head.Because the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemars frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child.While Noemars birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered.[23]As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under oath.[24]Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband.These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit so Grave a WrongThe trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after thebarangaycaptain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture[25]which is the essence of voluntary surrender.However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons.He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim.[26]The Award of Damages andPenalty for ParricideWe find proper the trial courts award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, andP50,000.00 as moral damages.However, the award of exemplary damages ofP25,000.00 should be increased toP30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[27]In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[28]As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable byreclusion perpetuato death. The trial court imposed the penalty ofreclusion perpetuawhen it considered the presence of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed.This is because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different penalty since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetuaas the proper prison term.Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:Art. 63.Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x xIn all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:x x x x3.When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.x x x xThe crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties ofreclusion perpetuato death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty ofreclusion perpetuaand not the penalty of death on appellant was thus proper.[29]The Charge of Slight Physical InjuriesThe victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree.He recalled to have been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.[30]Maria corroborated her sons testimony.[31]Juniors testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries.He issued a Medical Certificate for his findings and testified on the same.His findings were (1) muscular contusions with hematoma on the right side of Juniors face just below the eye and on both legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could have been sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied.When asked how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks.[32]But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in a week.[33]We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries.His testimony deserves credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria, and supported by medical examination.We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.Penalty for Slight Physical InjuriesWe likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC.Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication.Hence, the trial court correctly meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:ART. 266.Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:1.Byarresto menorwhen the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during the same period.x x x xThere being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period.The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days ofarresto menorin its medium period.WHEREFORE, the appeal isDENIED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting Noel T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSthat the award of exemplary damages is increased toP30,000.00.In addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.SO ORDERED.SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No.