CP Riano

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1CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER

CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER

Based on Justice De Leons Outline, Civil

Procedure by Riano, San Beda Reviewer, and

1997 Rules of Court

Digests (by Abdulwahid, Cabal, Comafay,Fuster, Leynes, Mendame, Mendez, Paras &

Regis) further summarized.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Difference between substantive and

remedial law

SUBSTANTIVE LAW REMEDIAL LAW

It creates, defines

and regulates rights

and dutiesconcerning life,

liberty or property,

which when violated

gives rise to a cause

of action.

It prescribes the

methods of

enforcing thoserights and

obligations created

by substantive law

by providing a

procedural system

for obtaining

redress for the

invasion of rights

and violations of

duties and by

prescribing rules as

to how suits are

filed, tried and

decided upon by the

courts.

Civil actions, criminal actions, and special

proceedings

(1) Civil actions

It is one by which a party sues another

for the protection of a right or the

prevention or redress of a wrong. Its

primary purpose is compensatory. Civil

actions may be:(a) Ordinary, or

(b) Special.

Both are governed by rules for

ordinary civil actions, subject to

specific rules prescribed for special

civil actions.

(2) Criminal actions

It is one by which the State prosecutes

a person for an act or omission

punishable by law. Its primary purpose

is punishment.

(3) Special proceedingsIt is a remedy by which a party seeks

to establish a status, a right or a

particular fact.

GENERAL PROVISIONS (Rule 1)

Rule-making power of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has the constitutional

power to promulgate rules concerning:

(1) Pleading,

(2) Practice, and

(3) Procedure.

Three (3) limitations on the SCs rule-making

power:

(1) The rules shall provide a simplified and

inexpensive procedure for the speedy

disposition of cases;

(2) shall be uniform for courts of the same

grade; and

(3) shall not diminish, increase, or modify

substantive rights.

Article 6, Sec. 30, Constitution

No law shall be passed increasing the

appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as

provided in this Constitution without its advice

and concurrence.

Procedural and substantive rules

Substantive law creates, defines, regulates,

and extinguishes rights and obligations, while

remedial or procedural law provides the

procedure for the enforcement of rights and

obligations.

Force and effect of Rules of Court

TheRules of Court have the force and effect of

law, unless they happen to be inconsistent

with positive law.

Power of Supreme Court to suspend theRules of Court

Whenever demanded by justice, the Supreme

Court has the inherent powerto

(a) suspend its own rules or

(b) exempt a particular case from the

operation of said rules.

May parties change the rules of

procedure?

General rule: They may not. This is because

these are matters of public interest.

Exceptions:

Matters of procedure which may be

Agreed upon by the parties Venue

may be changed by written agreement

of the parties (Rule 4, Sec. 4[b])

Waived Venue may be waived if not

objected to in a motion to dismiss or in

the answer. (Rule 16, Sec. 6);

MENDEZ, IVAN VIKTOR (2D, 13)

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judgment in default may be waived by

failure to answer within 15 days.

Fall within the discretion of the court

The period to plead may be extended

on motion of a party. (Rule 11, Sec.

11); rules of procedure may be relaxed

in the interest of justice.

JURISDICTION

It is the power and authority of a court to hear,

try and decided a case.

1. Generally

The statute in force at the time of the

commencement of the action

determines the jurisdiction of the

court.

Before looking into other matters, it is

the duty of the court to consider the

question of jurisdiction withoutwaiting

for it to be raised. If court has jurisdiction, such

must be exercised. Otherwise,

it may be enforced by a

mandamus proceeding.

If court has no jurisdiction, the

court shall dismiss the claim

and can do so motu proprio.

Doctrine of primary jurisdiction

The courts will not resolve a

controversy involving a question which

is within the jurisdiction of an

administrative tribunal. Doctrine of continuing jurisdiction

Once jurisdiction has attached to a

court, it retains that jurisdiction until it

finally disposes of the case. Hence, it is

not lost by

The passage of new laws

transferring the jurisdiction to

another tribunal except when

expressly provided by the

statute;

Subsequent filing of a notice of

appeal; The mere fact that a party who

is a public official ceased to be

in office; or

Finality of judgment (the court

still has jurisdiction to enforce

and execute it)

Elements of a valid exercise of

jurisdiction

(1) Jurisdiction over the subject matter or

nature of the case;

(2) the parties;(3) the res if jurisdiction over the

defendant cannot be acquired;

(4) the issue of the case; and

(5) Payment of docket fees.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is a matter

of substantive law.

Jurisdiction over the parties, the res

and the issues are matters of procedure.

Jurisdiction over the parties and the res are

covered by the rule on summons, while

jurisdiction over the issues is subsumed under

the rule on pleadings.

(a) As to subject matter

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is

conferred by the Constitution or by law.

Therefore, jurisdiction over the subject

matter cannotbe conferred by

(1) Administrative policy of any court;

(2) Courts unilateral assumption of

jurisdiction;

(3) Erroneous belief by the court that ithas jurisdiction;

(4) By contract or by the parties;

(5) By agreement, or by any act or

omission of the parties, nor by

acquiescence of the court; or

(6) By the parties silence, acquiescence

or consent

General Rule: It is determined by the

material allegations of the initiatory

pleading (e.g., the complaint), not the

answer of the defendant. Once acquired,jurisdiction is not lost because of the

defendants contrary allegation.

Exception: In ejectment cases, where

tenancy is averred by way of defense and

is proved to be the real issue, the case

should be dismissed for not being properly

filed with the DARAB.

It is determined by the cause of action

alleged, not by the amount substantiated

and awarded. Example: If a complaint

alleges a recoverable amount of P1M, RTC

has jurisdiction even if evidence proves the

only P300k may be recovered.

Note: Jurisdiction over the subject matter

CANNOT be waived, enlarged or diminished by

stipulation of the parties.

(b) As to res or property

Jurisdiction over the res refers to the courts

jurisdiction over the thing or the property

which is the subject of the action.

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by(1) Custodia legisplacing the property or

thing under the courts custody (e.g.,

attachment)


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(2) Statutory authoritystatute conferring

the court with power to deal with the

property or thing within its territorial

jurisdiction

(3) Summons by publication or other

modes of extraterritorial service (Rule

14, Sec. 15)

(c) As to the issues

Issue a disputed point or question to which

parties to an action have narrowed down their

several allegations and upon which they are

desirous of obtaining a decision. Thus, where

there is no disputed point, there is no issue.

Jurisdiction over the issue may be conferred or

determined by

(1) Examination of the pleadings

Generally, jurisdiction over the issues

is determined by the pleadings of theparties.

(2) Pre-trial

It may be conferred by stipulation of

the parties in the pre-trial, as when

they enter into stipulations of facts and

documents or enter into an agreement

simplifying the issues of the case (Rule

18, Sec. 2)

(3) Waiver

Failure to object to presentation of

evidence on a matter notraised in the

pleadings. Said issues tried shall betreated as if they had been raised in

the pleadings.

(d) As to the parties

The court acquires jurisdiction over the

Plaintiff

when he files his complaint

Defendant

i. Valid service of summons upon

him, or

ii. Voluntary appearance:

The defendants voluntary

appearance in the action shall be

equivalent to service of summons.

The inclusion in a motion to

dismiss of other grounds aside

from lack of jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant shall not

be deemed a voluntary

appearance. (Rule 14, Sec. 20)

Examples:

When defendant files The necessary pleading;

A motion for reconsideration;

Petition to set aside judgment

o f default;

An answer;

Petition for certiorari without

questioning the courts

jurisdiction over his person; or

When the parties jointly submit

a compromise agreement forapproval

BUT the filing of an answer should

not be treated automatically as a

voluntary appearance when such

answer is precisely to object to the

courts jurisdiction over the

defendants person.

La Naval v. CA: A defendant should

be allowed to put up his own

defenses alternatively or

hypothetically. It should not be the

invocation of available additional

defenses that should be construed

as a waiver of the defense of lack

of jurisdiction over the person, but

the failure to raise the defense.

Note: Jurisdiction over a non-resident

defendant cannotbe acquired if the action

is in personam.

2. Estoppel to deny jurisdiction

HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v. MELICOR(455 SCRA 460, 2005)

Since the deceased defendant participated

in all stages of the case before the trial

court, he is estopped from denying the

jurisdiction of the court. The petitioners

merely stepped into the shoes of their

predecessor and are effectively barred by

estoppel from challenging RTCs

jurisdiction.

FACTS: Bertuldo Hinog allegedly occupied and

built a small house on a portion of a property

owned by respondents Balane for 10 years at a

nominal annual rental. After 10 years, Bertuldo

refused to heed demands made by

respondents to return said portion and to

remove the house constructed thereon.

Respondents filed a complaint against him.

Bertuldo filed his Answer, alleging ownership of

the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of

Absolute Sale. Bertuldo died without

completing his evidence during the directexamination. Bertuldos original counsel was

replaced by Atty. Petalcorin who entered his


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appearance as new counsel for the heirs of

Bertuldo.

Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to

expunge the complaint from the record and

nullify all court proceedings on the ground

that private respondents failed to specify in

the complaint the amount of damages

claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees;

and that under Manchester doctrine, non-

payment of the correct docket fee is

jurisdictional.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are barred by

estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of

RTC

YES. The petitioners are barred from

questioning jurisdiction of the trial court.

Although the issue of jurisdiction at any stage

of the proceedings as the same is conferred by

law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may

be barred from raising it on the ground ofestoppel. After the deceased Bertuldo

participated in all stages of the case before the

trial court, the petitioners merely stepped into

the shoes of their predecessor and are

effectively barred by estoppel from challenging

RTCs jurisdiction.

3. Jurisdiction at the time of filing of

action

PEOPLE v. CAWALING

(293 SCRA 267, 1998)

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal

case is determined by the law in force at

the time of the institution of the action.

Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may

not be ousted from the case by any

subsequent events, such as a new

legislation placing such proceedings under

the jurisdiction of another tribunal.

Exceptions to this rule arise when: (1) there

is an express provision in the statute, or (2)

FACTS: Brothers Vicente and Ronie Elisan were

drinking tuba at the kitchenette of one of the

accused, Fontamilla. When they were about to

leave, they were warned by Luz Venus that the

six (6) accused consisting of Mayor Cawaling,

four (4) policemen and a civilian, had been

watching and waiting for them outside the

restaurant. Nevertheless, the two went out and

were chased by the armed men. Vicente

successfully ran and hid behind a coconut tree

while Ronie unfortunately went to the ricefield

and was shot to death there.An Information alleging murder was

filed in the RTC against the 6 accused. RTC

convicted them of murder. On appeal, the

appellants questioned the jurisdiction of the

RTC over the case, insisting that the

Sandiganbayan was the tribunal with

jurisdiction since the accused were public

officers at the time of the killing.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan had

jurisdiction

NO. The jurisdiction of a court to try a

criminal case is determined by the law in force

at the time of the institution of the action.

Once the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not

be ousted from the case by any subsequent

events, such as a new legislation placing such

proceedings under the jurisdiction of another

tribunal. Exceptions to this rule arise when: (1)

there is an express provision in the statute, or

(2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to

actions pending before its enactment.

Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended

by PD 1861 lists two requisites that mustconcur before the Sandiganbayan may

exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over

a case: (a) the offense was committed by the

accused public officer in relation to his office;

and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is higher

than prision correccional or imprisonment for

six (6) years, or higher than a fine of P6,000.

Sanchez vs. Demetriou clarified that

murder or homicide may be committed both by

public officers and by private citizens, and that

public office is not a constitutive element of

said crime. The relation between the crime andthe office contemplated should be direct and

not accidental.

The Information filed against the

appellants contains no allegation that

appellants were public officers who committed

the crime in relation to their office. The charge

was only for murder.

In the absence of any allegation that

the offense was committed in relation to the

office of appellants or was necessarily

connected with the discharge of their

functions, the regional trial court, not the

Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and

decide the case.

REGULAR COURTS (MTC, RTC, CA, SC)

(See San Beda Reviewer)

SPECIAL COURTS (Sandiganbayan)

(See San Beda Reviewer)

QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES

Securities and Exchange Commission

(Sec. 5.2, RA 8799)The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over


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Pending cases involving intra-

corporate disputes submitted for final

resolution which should be resolved

within one (1) year from the enactment

of this Code, and

Jurisdiction over pending suspension of

payments/rehabilitation cases filed as

of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.

Civil Service Commission

MAGPALE v. CSC (215 SCRA 398, 1992)

Under Section 47 of the Administrative

Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all

administrative disciplinary cases involving

the imposition of (d) removal or

dismissal from office.

The MPSB decision did not involve

dismissal or separation from office, rather,

the decision exonerated petitioner and

ordered him reinstated to his former

position. The MSPB decision was not a

proper subject of appeal to the CSC.

FACTS: Magpale, port manager of Philippine

Ports Authority-Port Management Unit (PPA-

PMU) of Tacloban, was found by the Secretary

of DOTC guilty of Gross Negligence on two

counts: (a) for his failure to account for the 44

units of equipment and (b) for failing to render

the required liquidation of his cash advances

amounting to P44,877.00 for a period of 4 yrs.

He was also found guilty of frequent and

unauthorized absences. He was meted the

penalty of dismissal from the service with the

corresponding accessory penalties.

He appealed to the Merit System and

Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service

Commission (CSC). The MSPB reversed the

decision.

PPA filed an appeal with the Civil

Service Field Office-PPA, which indorsed the

appeal to CSC. Magpale moved for the

implementation of the MSPB decision whichwas opposed by the PPA. MSPB ordered the

immediate implementation of its decision,

which became final and executory.

Respondent CSC reversed MPSBs

decision and held Magpale guilty.

ISSUE: Whether the law authorized an appeal

by the government from an adverse decision

of the MSBP

NO. Under the Administrative Code of

1987, decisions of the MPSB shall be final,

except only those involving dismissal orseparation from the service which may be

appealed to the Commission

While it is true that the CSC does have

the power to hear and decide administrative

cases instituted by or brought before it directly

or on appeal, the exercise of the power is

qualified by and should be read together with

Sec. 49 of Executive Order 292, which

prescribes, among others that (a) the decision

must be appealable.

Under Section 47 of the Administrative

Code, the CSC shall decide on appeal all

administrative disciplinary cases involving the

imposition of:

(a) a penalty of suspension for more than

30 days;

(b) fine in an amount exceeding 30 days

salary;

(c) demotion in rank or salary or transfer;

or

(d) removal or dismissal from office.

The MPSB decision did not involve dismissal or

separation from office, rather, the decisionexonerated petitioner and ordered him

reinstated to his former position. The MSPB

decision was not a proper subject of appeal to

the CSC.

Settled is the rule that a tribunal,

board, or officer exercising judicial functions

acts without jurisdiction if no authority has

been conferred by law to hear and decide the

case.

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

(HLURB)

SANDOVAL v. CAEBA(190 SCRA 77, 1991)

It is not the ordinary courts but the

National Housing Authority (NHA) which

has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and

decide cases of (a) unsound real estate

business practices; (b) claims involving

refund and any other claims filed by

subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer

against the project owner, developer,dealer, broker or salesman; and (c) cases

involving specific performance of

contractual and statutory obligations filed

by buyers of subdivision lot or

FACTS: Estate Developers and Investors

Corporation (Estate) filed a complaint against

Nestor Sandoval (Sandoval) in the RTC for the

collection of unpaid installments of a

subdivision lot, pursuant to a promissory note,

plus interest. Sandoval alleges that he

suspended payments thereof because of thefailure of the developer to develop the

subdivision pursuant to their agreement. The

RTC ruled in favor of Estate, and ordered


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Sandoval to pay. A writ of execution was

issued which thereafter became final and

executory.

Sandoval filed a motion to vacate

judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the

ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over

the subject matter. A motion for

reconsideration of the writ of execution was

also filed by petitioner. Estate opposed both

motions. RTC denied the motion to vacate for

the reason that it is now beyond the

jurisdiction of the court to do so. A new writ of

execution was issued.

Sandoval filed a petition alleging that

the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion

since the exclusive and original jurisdiction

over the subject-matter thereof is vested with

the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

(HLURB) pursuant to PD 957.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinary courts havejurisdiction over the collection of unpaid

installments regarding a subdivision lot

NO. Under Section 1 of Presidential

Decree No. 957 the National Housing Authority

(NHA) was given the exclusive jurisdiction to

hear and decide certain cases of the following

nature:

(a) Unsound real estate business

practices:

(b) Claims involving refund and any other

claims filed by subdivision lot or

condominium unit buyer against theproject owner, developer, dealer,

broker or salesman; and

(c) Cases involving specific performance

of contractual and statutory obligations

filed by buyers of subdivision lot or

condominium unit against the owner,

developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

The exclusive jurisdiction over the case

between the petitioner and private respondent

is vested not on the RTC but on the NHA. The

NHA was re-named Human Settlements

Regulatory Commission and thereafter it was

re-named as the Housing and Land Use

Regulatory Board (HLURB).

KINDS OF ACTION

1. As to cause or foundation

The distinction between a real action and a

personal action is important for the purpose of

determining the venue of the action.

(a) Personal

Personal actions are those other than real

actions. (Sec. 2, Rule 4)

Examples

Action for specific performance

Action for damages to real property

Action for declaration of the nullity of

marriage

Action to compel mortgagee to accept

payment of the mortgage debt and

release the mortgage

(b) Real

An action is real when it affects title to or

possession of real property, or an interest

therein. (Sec. 1, Rule 4)

To be a real action, it is not enough

that it deals with real property. It is important

that the matter in litigation must also involve

any of the following issues:

(a) Title;

(b) Ownership;

(c) Possession;

(d) Partition;

(e) Foreclosure of mortgage; or

(f) Any interest in real property

Examples

Action to recover possession of real

property plus damages (damages is

merely incidental)

Action to annul or rescind a sale of real

property

2. As to object

The distinctions are important(a) to determine whether the jurisdiction

of the defendant is required, and

(b) to determine the type of summons to

be employed

(a) In rem

An action is in rem when it is directed against

the whole world. It is for the determination of

the state or condition of a thing.

Examples

Probate proceeding Cadastral proceeding

(b) In personam

A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to

enforce personal rights and obligations

brought against the person and is based on the

jurisdiction of the person.

Its purpose is to impose some

responsibility or liability directly upon the

person of the defendant. In an action in

personam, no one other than the defendant is

sought to be held liable.

Examples

Action for sum of money


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Action for damages

(c) Quasi in rem

An action quasi in rem is one wherein an

individual is named as defendant and the

purpose of the proceeding is to subject his

interest therein to the obligation or lien

burdening the property.

Such action deals with the status,

ownership or liability of a particular property,

but which are intended to operate on these

questions only as between the particular

parties to the proceedings, and not to

ascertain or cut-off the rights or interests of all

possible claimants.

NOTE: These rules are inapplicable in the

following cases:

(1) Election cases;

(2) Land registration;

(3) Cadastral;(4) Naturalization;

(5) Insolvency proceedings;

(6) Other cases not herein provided for,

except by analogy or in a suppletory

character, and whenever practicable

and convenient.

(Sec. 4, Rule 1)

COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION (Sec. 5, Rule

1)

A civil action is commenced

by the filing of the original complaint incourt, or

on the date of the filing of the later

pleading if an additional defendant is

impleaded irrespective of whether the

motion for its admission, if necessary,

is denied by the court.

(with respect only to the defendant

later impleaded)

1. Condition precedent

matters which must be complied with before

a cause of action arises.

When a claim is subject to a condition

precedent, compliance must be alleged

in the pleading.

Failure to comply with a condition

precedent is an independent ground

for a motion to dismiss. (Sec. 1 [j], Rule

16)

Examples:

Tender of payment before consignation

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Prior resort to barangay conciliationproceedings

Earnest efforts towards a compromise

Arbitration proceedings, when contract

so provides

Katarungang Pambarangay (RA 7160)

Purpose: To reduce the number of court

litigations and prevent the deterioration of the

quality of justice which has been brought by

the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.

Only individuals shall be parties to KB

proceedings, no juridical entities.

Parties must personally appear in all

KB proceedings and without assistance

of counsel or representatives, except

for minors and incompetents who may

be assisted by their next-of-kin, not

lawyers.

Conciliation proceedings required is

nota jurisdictional requirement.

NOTE: Failure to undergo the barangay

conciliation proceedings is non-

compliance of a condition precedent.

Hence, a motion to dismiss a civil

complaint may be filed. (Sec. 1 [j], Rule

16).

BUT the court may not motu proprio

dismiss the case for failure to undergo

conciliation.

Initiation of proceedings

(1) Payment of appropriate filing fee

(2) Oral or written complaint to the

Punong Barangay (chairman of the

Lupon)(3) Chairman shall summon respondents

to appear the next working day

(4) Mediation proceedings for 15 days

(5) Should the chairman fail in his

mediation efforts within said period, he

shall constitute the Pangkat

Tagapagkasundo,

(6) If no amicable settlement is reached,

the chairman shall issue a certification

to file action.

All amicable settlements shall be(1) In writing;

(2) In a language or dialect known to the

parties;

(3) Signed by them; and

(4) Attested to by the lupon chairman or

the pangkat chairman, as the case

may be.

Effect

The amiable settlement and arbitration award

shall have the effect of a final judgment of a

court upon expiration of 10 days from date

thereof, unless:

(1) Repudiation of the settlement has

been made, or


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(2) Petition to nullify the award has been

filed before the proper city or

municipal ourt

Execution shall issue upon expiration of 10

days from settlement.

LUMBUAN v. RONQUILLO(489 SCRA 650, 2006)

While admittedly no pangkat was

constituted, the parties met at the office of

the Barangay Chairman for possible

settlement. The act of Lumbuan in raising

the matter to the Katarungang

Pambarangay and the subsequent

confrontation of the lessee and lessor

before the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat

is sufficient compliance with the

precondition for filing the case in court.

FACTS: Lumbuan (lessor) leased a lot to

respondent Ronquillo (lessee) for 3 years at a

rental of P5000/month. They agreed that: (a)

there will be an annual 10% increase in rent

for the next 2 years; and (b) the leased

premises shall be used only for lessees

fastfood business. Ronquillo failed to abide by

the conditions, and refused to pay or vacate

the leased premises despite Lumbuans

repeated verbal demands.

Lumbuan referred the matter to the

Barangay Chairmans Office but no amicable

settlement was reached. The barangay

chairman issued a Certificate to File Action.

Lumbuan filed an action for Unlawful Detainer

with MeTC of Manila which ordered respondent

Ronquillo to vacate the leased premises and to

pay P46,000 as unpaid rentals.

RTC set aside the MeTC decision and

directed the parties to go back to the Lupon

Chairman or Punong Barangay for further

proceedings and to comply strictly with the

condition that should the parties fail to reach

an amicable settlement, the entire case will be

remanded to the MeTC for it to decide the caseanew.

The CA reversed the RTC and ordered

the dismissal of the ejectment case, ruling that

when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as

when the mandatory mediation and

conciliation in the barangay level had not been

complied with, the court should dismiss the

case and not just remand the records to the

court of origin so that the parties may go

through the prerequisite proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the CA properly dismissedcomplaint for failure of the parties to comply

with the mandatory mediation and conciliation

proceedings in the barangay level

NO. It should be noted that although

no pangkat was formed since no amicable

settlement was reached by the parties before

the Katarungang Pambarangay, there was

substantial compliance with Section 412(a) of

R.A. 7160.

While admittedly no pangkat was

constituted, the parties met at the office of the

Barangay Chairman for possible settlement.

Thereby, the act of petitioner Lumbuan in

raising the matter to the Katarungang

Pambarangay and the subsequent

confrontation of the lessee and lessor before

the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is

sufficient compliance with the precondition for

filing the case in court. This is true

notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410(b)

of the same law that the Barangay Chairman

shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his

mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should be

construed together with Section 412, as well asthe circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to

the case. On this score, it is significant that the

Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay is

herself the Chairman of the Lupon under the

Local Government Code.

2. Payment of filing fee

Payment of the prescribed docket fee vests a

trial court with jurisdiction over the subject

matter or nature of the action. The court

acquires jurisdiction upon payment of the

correct docket fees. All complaints, petitions, answers, and

similar pleadings must specify the

amount of damages being prayed for,

both in the body of the pleadings and

in the assessment of the filing fees.

Manchester v. CA: Any defect in the

original pleading resulting in

underpayment of the docket fee

cannot be cured by amendment, and

for all legal purposes, the court

acquired no jurisdiction in such case.

BUT nonpayment of filing fees does

not automatically cause the dismissal

of the case. The fee may be paid within

the applicable prescriptive or

reglementary period.

HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v. MELICOR(455 SCRA 460, 2005)


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Non-payment at the time of filing does not

automatically cause the dismissal of the

case, as long as the fee is paid within the

applicable prescriptive or reglementary

period, more so when the party involved

demonstrates a willingness to abide by the

rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when

insufficient filing fees were initially paid bythe plaintiffs and there was no intention to

defraud the government, the Manchester

rule does not apply.

FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint against

Bertuldo for recovery of ownership of the

premises leased by the latter. Bertuldo alleged

ownership of the property by virtue of a Deed

of Absolute Sale. Bertuldo died without

completing his evidence during the direct

examination. Atty. Petalcorin replaced the

original counsel and filed a motion to expungethe complaint from the record and nullify all

court proceedings on the ground that private

respondents failed to specify in the

complaint the amount of damages claimed

as needed to pay the correct docket fees, and

that under Manchester doctrine, non-payment

of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional.

ISSUE: Whether the nonpayment of the correct

docket fee is jurisdictional in the present case

NO. While the payment of the

prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional

requirement, even its non-payment at the time

of filing does not automatically cause the

dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid

within the applicable prescriptive or

reglementary period, more so when the party

involved demonstrates a willingness to abide

by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus,

when insufficient filing fees were initially paid

by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to

defraud the government, the Manchester rule

does not apply.

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE v. ASUNCION(170 SCRA 274, 1989)

Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is

not accompanied by payment of the docket

fee, the court may allow payment of the fee

within a reasonable time but in no case

beyond the applicable prescriptive or

reglementary period. Where the trial court

acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the

filing of the pleading and payment ofprescribed filing fees but the judgment

awards a claim not specified in the

pleading, or if specified the same has been

left for the courts determination, the

additional filing fee shall constitute a lien

on the judgment. It shall be the

responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his

FACTS

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a

complaint against Uy for the consignation of a

premium refund on a fire insurance policy witha prayer for the judicial declaration of its

nullity. Uy was declared in default for failure to

file the required answer within the

reglementary period. Uy filed a complaint in

the RTC for the refund of premiums and the

issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment

initially against petitioner SIOL, but thereafter

included Philipps and Warby as additional

defendants. The complaint sought the

payment of actual, compensatory, moral,

exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's

fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the

suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did

not quantify the amount of damages sought

said amount may be inferred from the body of

the complaint to be about P50,000,000.

Uy paid only P210.00 as docket fee,

which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise

his objection for under-assessment of docket

fees.

Petitioners allege that while Uy had

paid P182,824.90 as docket fee, and

considering that the total amount sought in the

amended and supplemental complaint is

P64,601,623.70, the docket fee that should bepaid by private respondent is P257,810.49,

more or less. Not having paid the same,

petitioners contend that the complaint should

be dismissed and all incidents arising

therefrom should be annulled.

ISSUE: Whether or not a court acquires

jurisdiction over case when the correct and

proper docket fee has not yet been paid

YES. Where the filing of the initiatory

pleading is not accompanied by payment of

the docket fee, the court may allow paymentof the fee within a reasonable time but in no

case beyond the applicable prescriptive or

reglementary period. Where the trial court


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acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing

of the appropriate pleading and payment of

the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the

judgment awards a claim not specified in the

pleading, or if specified the same has been left

for determination by the court, the additional

filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on

the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of

the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized

deputy to enforce said lien and assess and

collect the additional fee.

The same rule applies to permissive

counterclaims, third party claims and similar

pleadings, which shall not be considered filed

until and unless the filing fee prescribed

therefore is paid.

CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2)

Cause of ActionA cause of action is the act or omission by

which a party violates the rights of another.

(Sec. 2, Rule 2)

Every ordinary civil action must be

based on a cause of action. (Sec. 1, Rule 2)

Elements:

(1) A legal right in favor of the plaintiff;

(2) A correlative obligation on the part of

the named defendant to respect or to

not violate such right; and

(3) Act or omission on the part of defendant in violation of the right of

the plaintiff, orconstituting a breach of

the obligation of the defendant to the

plaintiff for which the latter may

maintain an action for recovery of

damages or other appropriate relief.

Distinguished from right of action

Cause of action is the reason for bringing an

action, the formal statement of operative facts

giving rise to a remedial right, and is governed

by procedural law. A right of action is the

remedy for bringing an action and is solely

dependent on substantive law.

Right of action, elements

(1) There must be a good cause;

(2) A compliance with all the conditions

precedent to the bringing of the action;

and

(3) The action must be instituted by the

proper party.

Splitting a cause of action

Splitting of cause of action is the act ofdividing a single or indivisible cause of action

into several parts or claims and bringing

several actions thereon.

A party may not institute more than

one suit for a single cause of action.

(Sec. 3, Rule 2)

If two or more suits are instituted on

the basis of the same cause of action,

the filing of one or a judgment upon

the merits in any one is available as a

ground for the dismissal of the others.

(Sec. 4, Rule 2)

Applies also to counterclaims and

cross-claims.

Examples

Single cause of action (Cannot be filed

separately)

A suit for the recovery of land and a

separate suit to recover the fruits

Action to recover damages to person

and action for damages to same

persons car

Action for recovery of taxes and action

to demand surcharges resulting from

delinquency in payment of said taxes

Action to collect debt and to foreclose

mortgage

Action for partition and action for the

recovery of compensation on the

improvements

Action for annulment of sale and action

to recover dividends

Distinct causes of action (separate filing

allowed)

Action for reconveyance of title over

property and action for forcible entry

or unlawful detainer

Action for damages to a car in a

vehicular accident, and another action

for damages for injuries to a passenger

other than the owner of the car

Action to collect loan and action for

rescission of mortgage

Action based on breach of contract of

carriage and action based on quasi-

delict

JOSEPH v. BAUTISTA(170 SCRA 540, 1989)

Where there is only one delict or wrong,

there is but a single cause of action

regardless of the number of rights that may

have been violated belonging to one person.

Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted

from several wrongful acts, only one cause


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FACTS: Joseph, petitioner, boarded Perezs

cargo truck with a load of livestock. At the

highway, the truck driver overtook a tricycle

but hit a mango tree when a pick-up truck tried

to overtake him at the same time. This

resulted to the bone fracture of the petitioners

leg.

Petitioner filed a complaint for

damages against Perez, as owner, based on a

breach of contract of carriage, and against

Sioson and Villanueva, the owner and driver of

the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.

Petitioner impleaded Pagarigan and Vargas,

since he could not ascertain who the real

owners of the pick-up truck and the cargo

truck were. Perez filed a cross-claim against

the other respondents for indemnity, in the

event that she is ordered to pay.

The other respondents paid petitioner's

claim for injuries, so they were released fromliability. They also paid Perez for her claim of

damages. They thereafter filed a Motion to

Exonerate and Exclude themselves since

theyve already paid Joseph by way of

amicable settlement and Perezs claim for

damages. Perez filed an Opposition to the

motion since the release of claim executed by

petitioner in favor of the other respondents

allegedly inured to his benefit. RTC dismissed

the case.

ISSUE: Whether the judgment on thecompromise agreement under the cause of

action based on quasi-delict is a bar to the

cause of action for breach of contract of

carriage

YES. A single act or omission can be

violative of various rights at the same time, as

when the act constitutes a juridical a violation

of several separate and distinct legal

obligations. However, where there is only one

delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of

action regardless of the number of rights that

may have been violated belonging to one

person. Nevertheless, if only one injury

resulted from several wrongful acts, only one

cause of action arises.

There is no question that petitioner

sustained a single injury on his person, which

vested in him a single cause of action, albeit

with the correlative rights of action against the

different respondents through the appropriate

remedies allowed by law. Only one cause of

action was involved although the bases of

recovery invoked by petitioner against the

defendants therein were not necessarily

identical since the respondents were notidentically circumstanced.

DEL ROSARIO v. FEBTC(537 SCRA 571, 2007)

It is well established, however, that a party

cannot, by varying the form of action or

adopting a different method of presenting

his case, or by pleading justifiablecircumstances as herein petitioners are

doing, escape the operation of the principle

that one and the same cause of action shall

not be twice litigated.

FACTS: PDCP extended a P4.4 million loan to

DATICOR, which that DATICOR shall pay: a

service fee of 1% per annum (later increased

6% per annum) on the outstanding balance;

12% per annum interest; and penalty charges

2% per month in case of default. The loans

were secured by real estate mortgages oversix (6) parcels of land and chattel mortgages

over machinery and equipment.

DATICOR paid a total of P3 million to

PDCP, which the latter applied to interest,

service fees and penalty charges. This left

them with an outstanding balance of P10

million according to PDCPs computation.

DATICOR filed a complaint against

PDCP for violation of the Usury Law and

annulment of contract and damages. The CFI

dismissed the complaint. The IAC set aside the

dismissal and declared void and of no effect

the stipulation of interest in the loan

agreement. PDCP appealed the IAC's decision

to SC.

In the interim, PDCP assigned a portion

of its receivables from DATICOR to FEBTC for

of P5.4 M. FEBTC and DATICOR, in a MOA,

agreed to P 6.4 million as full settlement of the

receivables.

SC affirmed in toto the decision of the

IAC, nullifying the stipulation of interests.

DATICOR thus filed a Complaint for

sum of money against PDCP and FEBTC to

recover the excess payment which theycomputed to be P5.3 million. RTC ordered

PDCP to pay petitioners P4.035 million, to bear

interest at 12% per annum until fully paid; to

release or cancel the mortgages and to return

the corresponding titles to petitioners; and to

pay the costs of the suit.

RTC dismissed the complaint against

FEBTC for lack of cause of action since the

MOA between petitioners and FEBTC was not

subject to SC decision, FEBTC not being a party

thereto.

Petitioners and PDCP appealed to theCA, which held that petitioners' outstanding

obligation (determined to be only P1.4 million)

could not be increased or decreased by any act


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of the creditor PDCP, and held that when PDCP

assigned its receivables, the amount payable

to it by DATICOR was the same amount

payable to assignee FEBTC, irrespective of any

stipulation that PDCP and FEBTC might have

provided in the Deed of Assignment, DATICOR

not having been a party thereto, hence, not

bound by its terms.

By the principle ofsolutio indebiti, the

CA held that FEBTC was bound to refund

DATICOR the excess payment of P5 million it

received; and that FEBTC could recover from

PDCP the P4.035 million for the overpayment

for the assigned receivables. But since

DATICOR claimed in its complaint only

of P965,000 from FEBTC, the latter was

ordered to pay them only that amount.

Petitioners filed before the RTC

another Complaint against FEBTC to recover

the balance of the excess payment of P4.335

million.The trial court dismissed petitioners'

complaint on the ground ofres judicata and

splitting of cause of action. It recalled that

petitioners had filed an action to recover the

alleged overpayment both from PDCP and

FEBTC and that the CA Decision, ordering PDCP

to release and cancel the mortgages and

FEBTC to pay P965,000 with interest became

final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether FEBTC can be held liable for

the balance of the overpayment of P4.335million plus interest which petitioners

previously claimed against PDCP in a

previously decided case

NO. A cause of action is the delict or

the wrongful act or omission committed by the

defendant in violation of the primary rights of

the plaintiff. In the two cases, petitioners

imputed to FEBTC the same alleged wrongful

act of mistakenly receiving and refusing to

return an amount in excess of what was due it

in violation of their right to a refund. The same

facts and evidence presented in the first case

were the very same facts and evidence that

petitioners presented in the second case.

A party cannot, by varying the form of

action or adopting a different method of

presenting his case, or by pleading justifiable

circumstances as herein petitioners are doing,

escape the operation of the principle that one

and the same cause of action shall not be

twice litigated.

SC held that to allow the re-litigation of

an issue that was finally settled as between

petitioners and FEBTC in the prior case is to

allow the splitting of a cause of action, aground for dismissal under Section 4 of Rule 2

of the Rules of Court.

This rule proscribes a party from

dividing a single or indivisible cause of action

into several parts or claims and instituting two

or more actions based on it. Because the

plaintiff cannot divide the grounds for

recovery, he is mandated to set forth in his

first action every ground for relief which he

claims to exist and upon which he relies; he

cannot be permitted to rely upon them by

piecemeal in successive actions to recover for

the same wrong or injury.

Both the rules on res judicata and

splitting of causes of action are based on the

salutary public policy against unnecessary

multiplicity of suitsinterest reipublicae ut sit

finis litium. Re-litigation of matters already

settled by a court's final judgment merely

burdens the courts and the taxpayers, creates

uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable

time and energy that could be devoted to

worthier cases.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. CA(301 SCRA 367, 1991)

When a single delict or wrong is committed

like the unlawful taking or detention of

the property of another there is but one

single cause of action regardless of the

number of rights that may have been

violated, and all such rights should bealleged in a single complaint as constituting

one single cause of action. In a forcible

entry case, the real issue is the physical

possession of the real property. The

question of damages is merely secondary or

incidental, so much so that the amount

thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of

the court. In other words, the unlawful act of

a deforciant in taking possession of a piece

of land by means of force and intimidation

against the rights of the party actually in

possession thereof is a delict or wrong, or acause of action that gives rise to two (2)

remedies, namely, the recovery of

possession and recovery of damages arising

from the loss of possession, but only to

one action. For obvious reasons, both

remedies cannot be the subject of two

(2) separate and independent actions,

FACTS: PDC leased to Westin a parcel of land

with a commercial building for 9 years and 3

months, with a monthly rental of

approximately P600,000. Westin failed to payrentals despite several demands. The

arrearages amounted to P8,6M. PDC

repossessed the leased premises, inventoried


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the movable properties found within and

owned by Westin, and scheduled a public

auction for the sale of the movables, with

notice to Westin.

Westin filed a forcible entry case with

the MeTC against PDC for with damages and a

prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or

writ of preliminary injunction. A TRO enjoined

PDC from selling Westin's properties.

At the continuation of the hearing, the

parties agreed, among others, that Westin

would deposit with the PCIB (Bank) P8M to

guarantee payment of its back rentals. Westin

did not comply with its undertaking, and

instead, with the forcible entry case still

pending, Westin instituted another action for

damages against PDC with the RTC.

The forcible entry case had as its

cause of action the alleged unlawful entry by

PDC into the leased premises out of which

three (3) reliefs arose: (a) the restoration byPDC of possession of the leased premises to

the lessee; (b) the claim for actual damages

due to losses suffered by Westin; and, (c) the

claim for attorneys fees and cost of suit.

On the other hand, the complaint for

damages prays for a monetary award

consisting of moral and exemplary damages;

actual damages and compensatory damages

representing unrealized profits; and, attorney's

fees and costs, all based on the alleged

forcible takeover of the leased premises by

PDC. PDC filed a motion to dismiss the

damage suit on the ground of litis pendencia

and forum shopping. The RTC, instead of ruling

on the motion, archived the case pending the

outcome of the forcible entry case.

Westin filed with the RTC an amended

complaint for damages, which was granted. It

also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the

Issuance of a TRO and Motion for the Grant of

a Preliminary Prohibitory and Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction, which were all granted.

PDCs motion to dismiss was denied.

Thus, PDC filed with the CA a special

civil action for certiorari and prohibition. But

the CA dismissed the petition. It clarified that

since the damages prayed for in the amended

complaint with the RTC were those caused by

the alleged high-handed manner with which

PDC reacquired possession of the leased

premises and the sale of Westin's movables

found therein, the RTC and not the MeTC had

jurisdiction over the action of damages.

ISSUE: Whether Westin may institute a

separate suit for damages with the RTC afterhaving instituted an action for forcible entry

with damages with the MeTC

NO. Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of

Court provides that all cases for forcible entry

or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the

MTC which shall include not only the plea for

restoration of possession but also all claims for

damages and costs arising therefrom.

Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages

arising out of forcible entry or unlawful

detainer may be filed separately and

independently of the claim for restoration of

possession.

Under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised

Rules of Court, as amended, a party may not

institute more than one suit for a single cause

of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if

two or more suits are instituted on the basis of

the same cause of action, the filing of one or a

judgment upon the merits in any one is

available as a ground for the dismissal of the

other or others.

Westin's cause of action in the forcibleentry case and in the suit for damages is the

alleged illegal retaking of possession of the

leased premises by PDC from which all legal

reliefs arise. Simply stated, the restoration of

possession and demand for actual damages in

the case before the MeTC and the demand for

damages with the RTC both arise from the

same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by

PDC into the least premises. The other claims

for moral and exemplary damages cannot

succeed considering that these sprung from

the main incident being heard before theMeTC. Jurisprudence says that when a single

delict or wrong is committed like the

unlawful taking or detention of the property of

the another there is but one single cause of

action regardless of the number of rights that

may have been violated, and all such rights

should be alleged in a single complaint as

constituting one single cause of action. In a

forcible entry case, the real issue is the

physical possession of the real property. The

question of damages is merely secondary or

incidental, so much so that the amount thereof

does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In

other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in

taking possession of a piece of land by means

of force and intimidation against the rights of

the party actually in possession thereof is a

delict or wrong, or a cause of action that gives

rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery

of possession and recovery of damages arising

from the loss of possession, but only to one

action. For obvious reasons, both remedies

cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and

independent actions, one for recovery of

possession only, and the other, for therecovery of damages. That would inevitably

lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a

cause of action.


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What then is the effect of the dismissal

of the other action? Since the rule is that all

such rights should be alleged in a single

complaint, it goes without saying that those

not therein included cannot be the subject of

subsequent complaints for they are barred

forever. If a suit is brought for a part of a

claim, a judgment obtained in that action

precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second

action for the residue of the claim,

notwithstanding that the second form of action

is not identical with the first or different

grounds for relief are set for the second suit.

This principle not only embraces what was

actually determined, but also extends to every

matter which the parties might have litigated

in the case. This is why the legal basis upon

which Westin anchored its second claim for

damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation to Art. 1654

of the Civil Code, not otherwise raised and

cited by Westin in the forcible entry case,cannot be used as justification for the second

suit for damages.

CGR CORP. V. TREYES(522 SCRA 765, 2007)

Petitioners filing of an independent action

for damages grounded on the alleged

destruction of CGRs property, other than

those sustained as a result of dispossession

in the Forcible Entry case could not be

considered as splitting of a cause of action.

FACTS: CGR Corporation, Herman Benedicto

and Alberto Benedicto, petitioners, claim to

have occupied 37 ha. of public land in Negros

Occidental, pursuant to a lease agreement

granted to them by the Secretary of

Agriculture for a period of 25 years (to last

October 2000 to December 2024). On

November 2000, however, respondent Treyes

allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the

leased premises and barricaded the entrance

to the fishponds of the petitioners. Treyes andhis men also harvested tons of milkfish and

fingerlings from the petitioners ponds.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for

Forcible Entrywith the MTC.Another complaint

to claim for damages was also filed by the

petitioners against the same respondent

Treyes grounded on the allegations that Treyes

and his men also destroyed and ransacked the

Chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation and

decapitated the heads of the religious figures.

ISSUE: Whether during the pendency of aseparate complaint for Forcible Entry, the

petitioner can independently institute and

maintain an action for damages which they

claim arose from incidents occurring after the

forcible entry of Treyes and his men

YES. The only recoverable damages in

the forcible entry and detainer cases instituted

first by the petitioners with the MTC are the

rents or fair rental value of the property from

the time of dispossession by the respondent.

Hence, other damages being claimed by the

petitioners must be claimed in another

ordinary civil action.

It is noteworthy that the second action

instituted by the petitioners (complaint for

damages) have NO direct relation to their loss

of possession of the leased premises which is

the main issue in the first action they

instituted. The second action for claim of

damages had to do with the harvesting and

carting away of milkfish and other marine

products, as well as the ransacking of the

chapel built by CGR Corp. Clearly, the

institution of the two cases is not a splitting ofa cause of action, since both are concerned

with entirely different issues.

ENRIQUEZ v. RAMOS(7 SCRA 265, 1963)

An examination of the first complaint filed

against appellant in CFI showed that it was

based on appellants' having unlawfully

stopped payment of the check for

P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of

appellees; while the complaint in thesecond and present action was for non-

payment of the balance of P96,000.00

guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for

P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt

not covered by the security. The two

causes of action being different, section 4

of Rule 2 does not apply.

FACTS: Rodrigo Enriquez and the Dizon

spouses sold to Socorro Ramos 11 parcels of

land for P101,000. Ramos paid P5,000

downpayment, P2,500 in cash, and with aP2,500.00 check drawn against PNB, and

agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00

within 90 days. To secure the said balance,

Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged

the 11 parcels in favor of the vendors. Ramos

mortgaged a lot on Malinta Estate as additional

security, as attorney-in-fact of her four children

and as judicial guardian of her minor child.

Ramos failed to comply with the

conditions of the mortgage, so an action for

foreclosure was filed by the vendors-

mortgagees. Ramos moved to dismiss, allegingthat the plaintiffs previously had filed action

against her in the CFI of Manila for the

recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of


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the down payment on the price of the

mortgaged lands; that at the time this first suit

was filed, the mortgage debt was already

accrued and demandable; that plaintiffs were

guilty of splitting a single cause of action, and

under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court,

the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a

defense that could be pleaded in abatement of

the second suit.

CFI of Quezon City denied the motion

to dismiss. Defendant Ramos re-pleaded the

averments as a special defense in her answer.

The CFI ruled against defendant Ramos;

ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12%

interest, attorney's fees, and the costs of the

suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale

of the mortgaged properties in case of non-

payment within 90 days. Ramos appealed

directly to SC,

ISSUE: Whether there was splitting of cause ofaction

NO, there is no splitting of cause of

action in this case. An examination of the first

complaint filed against appellant in CFI showed

that it was based on appellants' having

unlawfully stopped payment of the check for

P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees,

while the complaint in the second and present

action was for non-payment of the balance of

P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The

claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct

debt not covered by the security. The twocauses of action being different, section 4 of

Rule 2 does not apply.

Remedy against splitting a single cause

of action

(a) Motion to dismiss (Sec 1 [e] or [f], Rule

16)

Withinthe time for but before filing theanswer to the complaint or pleading

asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss

may be made on any of the following

grounds:

xxx

(e) That there is another action

pending between the same parties for

the same cause;

(f) That the cause of action is barred

by a prior judgment or by the statute

of limitations

xxx

(b) Answer alleging affirmative defense

(Sec. 6, Rule 16)

Ifno motion to dismiss has been filed,any of the grounds for dismissal

provided for in this Rule may be

pleaded as an affirmative defense in

the answer and, in the discretion of the

court, a preliminary hearing may be

had thereon as if a motion to dismiss

had been filed.

NOTE: As to which action should be dismissed

(the first or second one) would depend upon

judicial discretion and the prevailing

circumstances of the case.

Joinder of causes of action

Joinder of causes of action is the assertion of

as many causes of action as a party may have

against another in one pleading. It is the

process of uniting two or more demands or

rights of action in one action.

This is merely permissive, NOT

compulsory, because of the use of theword may in Sec. 5, Rule 2.

It is subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action

shall comply with the rules on joinder

of parties;

i. The right to relief should arise

out of the same transaction or

series of transaction, and

ii. There exists a common

question of law or fact. (Sec. 6,

Rule 3)(b) The joinder shall not include special

civil actions or actions governed by

special rules;

Example: An action for claim of

money cannot be joined with

an action for ejectment, or with

an action for foreclosure.

(c) Where the causes of action are

between the same parties but pertain

to different venues or jurisdictions, the

joinder may be allowed in the RTC

provided

i. one of the causes of action

falls within the jurisdiction of

said court, and

ii. the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of

action are principally for recovery of

money, the aggregate amount claimed

shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Sec. 5,

Rule 2)

Misjoinder of causes of action

Misjoinder of causes of action is NOT a ground

for dismissal of an action. A misjoined cause ofaction may be severed and proceeded with

separately:

(a) on motion of a party, or


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(b) on the initiative of the court. (Sec. 6,

Rule 2)

FLORES v. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS(144 SCRA 277, 1986)

Application of the Totality Rule under Sect.33(l) BP129 and Sect. 11 of the Interim

Rules is subject to the requirements for the

Permissive Joinder of Parties under Sec. 6

of Rule 3.

In cases of permissive joinder of

parties, the total of all the claims shall be

the first jurisdictional test. If instead of a

joinder, separate actions are filed by or

FACTS: Binongcal and Calion, in separate

transactions, purchased truck tires on creditfrom Flores. The two allegedly refused to pay

their debts, so Flores filed a complaint where

the first cause of action was against Binongcal

for P11, 643, and the second was against

Calion for P10, 212. Binongcal filed a Motion to

Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

since under Sec. 19(8) of BP129 RTC shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the

amount of the demand is more than P20, 000,

and that the claim against him is less than that

amount. He averred further that although

Calion was also indebted to Flores, hisobligation was separate and distinct from the

other, so the aggregate of the claims cannot

be the basis of jurisdiction. Calion joined in

moving for the dismissal of the complaint

during the hearing of the motion. Petitioner

opposed the Motion to Dismiss. RTC dismissed

the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the

case following the Totality Rule

YES. The Totality Rule (under Sec. 33

of BP129 and Sec. 11 of the Interim Rules)

applies not only to cases where two or more

plaintiffs having separate causes of action

against a defendant join in a single complaint,

but also to cases where a plaintiff has separate

causes of action against two or more

defendants joined in a single complaint.

However, the said causes of action should

arise out of the same transaction or series of

transactions and there should be a common

question of law or fact, as provided in Sec. 6 of

Rule 3.

In cases of permissive joinder of

parties, the total of all the claims shall be thefirst jurisdictional test. If instead of joining or

being joined in one complaint, separate actions

are filed by or against the parties, the amount

demanded in each complaint shall be the

second jurisdictional test.

In the case at bar, the lower court

correctly held that the jurisdictional test is

subject to the Rules on Joinder of Parties

pursuant to Sec. 5 of Rule 2 and Sec. 6 of Rule

3 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, after a

careful scrutiny of the complaint, It appears

that there is a misjoinder of parties for the

reason that the claims against Binongcal and

Calion are separate and distinct and neither of

which falls within its jurisdiction.

UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC. v. CRUZ(529 SCRA 664, 2007)

Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a

contract restricts or confines parties

thereto when the suit relates to breach of

said contract. But where the exclusivity

clause does not make it necessarily

encompassing, such that even those not

related to the enforcement of the contract

should be subject to the exclusive venue,

the stipulation designating exclusive

FACTS: Uniwide Holdings, Inc. (UHI) granted

Cruz, a 5yr. franchise to adopt and use the

"Uniwide Family Store System" for the

establishment and operation of a "Uniwide

Family Store" in Marikina. The agreement

obliged Cruz to pay UHI a P50,000 monthlyservice fee or 3% of gross monthly purchases,

whichever is higher, payable within 5 days

after the end of each month without need of

formal billing or demand from UHI. In case of

any delay in the payment of the monthly

service fee, Cruz would be liable to pay an

interest charge of 3% per month.

It appears that Cruz had purchased

goods from UHIs affiliated companies FPC and

USWCI. FPC and USWCI assigned all their rights

and interests over Cruzs accounts to UHI. Cruz

had outstanding obligations with UHI, FPC, and

USWCI in the total amount of P1,358,531.89,

which remained unsettled despite the

demands made.

Thus UHI filed a complaint for

collection of sum of money before RTC of

Paraaque Cruz on the following causes of

action: (1) P1,327,669.832 in actual damages

for failure to pay the monthly service fee; (2)

P64,165.96 of actual damages for failure to

pay receivables assigned by FPC to UHI; (3)

P1,579,061.36 of actual damages for failure to

pay the receivables assigned by USWCI to UHI;

(4) P250,000.00 of attorneys fees.Cruz filed a motion to dismiss on the

ground of improper venue, invoking Article

27.5 of the agreement which reads:


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27.5 Venue Stipulation The

Franchisee consents to the exclusive

jurisdiction of the courts of Quezon City, the

Franchisee waiving any other venue.

Paraaque RTC granted Cruzs motion

to dismiss. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether a case based on several

causes of action is dismissible on the ground

of improper venue where only one of the

causes of action arises from a contract with

exclusive venue stipulation

NO. The general rule on venue of

personal actions provides actions may be

commenced and tried where the plaintiff or

any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where

the defendant or any of the principal

defendants resides, or in the case of a

nonresident defendant, where he may be

found, at the election of the plaintiff. The

parties may also validly agree in writing on anexclusive venue. The forging of a written

agreement on an exclusive venue of an action

does not, however, preclude parties from

bringing a case to other venues.

Where there is a joinder of causes of

action between the same parties and one

action does not arise out of the contract where

the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the

complaint, as in the one at bar, may be

brought before other venues provided that

such other cause of action falls within the

jurisdiction of the court and the venue liestherein.

Based on the allegations in petitioners

complaint, the second and third causes of

action are based on the deeds of assignment

executed in its favor by FPC and USWCI. The

deeds bear no exclusive venue stipulation with

respect to the causes of action thereunder.

Hence, the general rule on venue applies that

the complaint may be filed in the place where

the plaintiff or defendant resides.

It bears emphasis that the causes of

action on the assigned accounts are not based

on a breach of the agreement between UHI

and Cruz. They are based on separate, distinct

and independent contractsdeeds of

assignment in which UHI is the assignee of

Cruzs obligations to the assignors FPC and

USWCI. Thus, any action arising from the

deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to

the exclusive venue stipulation embodied in

the agreement.

Exclusive venue stipulation embodied

in a contract restricts or confines parties

thereto when the suit relates to breach of said

contract. But where the exclusivity clause doesnot make it necessarily encompassing, such

that even those not related to the enforcement

of the contract should be subject to the

exclusive venue, the stipulation designating

exclusive venues should be strictly confined to

the specific undertaking or agreement.

Otherwise, the basic principles of freedom to

contract might work to the great disadvantage

of a weak party-suitor who ought to be allowed

free access to courts of justice.

What is the totality rule?

Where the claims in all the causes of action are

principally for recovery of money, the

aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of

jurisdiction. (Sec. 5, Rule 2)

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3)

Parties (Sec. 1, Rule 3)

(1) Plaintiff

The plaintiff is the claiming party or theoriginal claiming party and is the one who

files the complaint.

It may also apply to a defendant

who files a counterclaim, a cross-

claim or a third party complaint.

(2) Defendant

The defendant refers to the original

defending party, and also the defendant in

a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the

third party defendant.

If a counterclaim is filed againstthe original plaintiff, the latter

becomes the defendant.

Who may be parties? (Sec. 1, Rule 3)

(1) Natural persons

(2) Juridical persons

(a) The State and its political subdivisions;

(b) Other corporations, institutions and

entities for public interest or purpose,

created by law; and(c) Corporations, partnerships and

associations for private interest r

purpose to which the law grants a

juridical personality, separate and

distinct from each shareholder, partner

or member. (Art. 44, Civil Code)

(3) Entities authorized by law, even if they lack

juridical personality

(a) Corporation by estoppel (Sec. 21,

Corporation Code);

(b) Partnership having a capital of P3,000

or more but fails to comply with the

registration requirements (Art. 1768,

Civil Code);

(c) Estate of a deceased person


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(d) A legitimate labor organization (Art.

242 [e], Labor Code);

(e) The Ramon Catholic Church;

(f) A dissolved corporation may prosecute

and defend in suits which:

a. Occur within 3 years after

dissolution; and

b. Are connected with the

settlement and closure of its

affairs (Sec. 122, Corporation

Code)

CLASSIFICATION OF PARTIES

Real party-in-interest

A real party in interest is the party who stands

to be benefited or injured by the judgment in

the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of

the suit.

Unless otherwise authorized by law or

these Rules, every action must beprosecuted or defended in the name of

the real party in interest. (Sec. 2, Rule

3)

Real interesta present substantial

interest as distinguished from a mere

expectancy or a future, contingent

subordinate or consequential interest.

It is material and direct, as

distinguished from a mere incidental

interest.

The owner of the right of violated is the

real party in interest as plaintiff, andthe person responsible for the violation

is the real party in interest as

defendant.

Not real party in interest

A person who has not taken part in a

contract

Third party who has not taken part in a

compromise agreement

Mere agent in a contract of sale

Lack of personality to sue

EVANGELISTA v. SANTIAGO(475 SCRA 744)

The term "lack of capacity to sue" refers to

a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such

as on account of minority, insanity,

incompetence, lack of juridical personality

or any other general disqualifications of a

party. "Lack of personality to sue refers to

the fact that the plaintiff is not the real

party- in-interest. The first can be a groundfor a motion to dismiss based on the

ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;

whereas the second can be used as a

ground for a motion to dismiss based on

FACTS: The Subject Property was part of a vast

tract of land called Hacienda Quibiga which

was awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by

the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a

Spanish title. Don Ismael Favila, claiming to be

one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of

Rodriguez, and pursuant to an SPA executedby his mga kapatid, assigned portions of the

property to the petitioners in exchange for the

labor and work they and their predecessors

have done on the property.

Petitioners were informed that

Santiago was planning to evict them; two of

them received notices to vacate. Their

investigations revealed that the property was

included in TCTs which originated from OCT

No. 670, and is now in the name of

respondent.

Petitioners filed an action fordeclaration of nullity of respondents

certificates of title on the basis that OCT No.

670 was fake and spurious.

As an affirmative defense, respondent

claimed that the petitioners had no legal

capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the

Complaint stated no cause of action. He

averred that since OCT No. 670 was genuine

and authentic on its face, then the OCT and all

land titles derived therefrom, are

incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive

against the petitioners and the whole world.

RTC dismissed the complaint on the

ground that the action filed was in effect an

action for reversion, and therefore should have

been initiated by the OSG, not private

individuals. In the end, it concluded that the

petitioners were not the owners of the subject

property.

CA affirmed the RTC, and likewise

dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents action is

properly based on petitioners lack of legal

capacity to sueNO. The term "lack of capacity to sue"

should not be confused with the term "lack of

personality to sue." The former refers to a


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plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on

account of minority, insanity, incompetence,

lack of juridical personality or any other

general disqualifications of a party, while the

latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not

the real party- in-interest. The first can be a

ground for a motion to dismiss based on the

ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;

whereas the second can be used as a ground

for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that

the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently

states no cause of action. In the present case,

this Court may assume that the respondent is

raising the affirmative defense that the

Complaint filed by the petitioners before the

trial court stated no cause of action because

the petitioners lacked the personality to sue,

not being the real party-in-interest.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint stated no cause

of action since petitioners had no personalityto sue

YES. Petitioners had no personality to

file the said action, not being the parties-in-

interest, and their Complaint should be

dismissed for not stating a cause of action.

The action is really one for the removal

of a cloud on or quieting of title and according

to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff in

such an action must have legal or equitable

title to, or interest in, the real property which is

the subject matter of the action. Petitioners

failed to establish any legal or equitable titleto, or legitimate interest in, the Subject

Property so as to justify their right to file an

action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.

Also, the title to and possession of the

Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-

in-interest could be traced only as far back as

the Spanish title of Rodriguez. Petitioners,

having acquired portions of the Subject

Property by assignment, could acquire no

better title to the said portions than their

predecessors-in-interest.

Standing to sue

DOMINGO v. CARAGUE(456 SCRA 744, 2005)

Judicial power is the power to hear and

decide cases pending between parties who

have the right to sue in courts of law and

equity. Corollary to this dictum is the

principle of locus standi of a litigant. He

who is directly affected and whose interest

is immediate and substantial has the

standing to sue. Thus, a party must show apersonal stake in the outcome of the case

or an injury to himself that can be

redressed by a favorable decision in order

to warrant an invocation of the courts

jurisdiction and justify the exercise of

judicial power on his behalf.

FACTS: Petitioners Domingo, Gangan and

Banaria are retired Chairmen, while Ursal and

Cruz are retired Commissioners of COA

(Commission on Audit) and the other

petitioners are incumbent officers or

employees of COA. All claim to maintain adeep-seated abiding interest in the affairs of

COA, especially in its Organizational

Restructuring Plan, as concerned taxpayers.

These petitioners claim that they

were divested of their designations/ranks upon

implementation of the COA Organizational

Restructuring Plan without just cause and

without due process, in violation of Civil

Service Law. Moreover, they were deprived of

their respective Representation and

Transportation Allowances (RATA), thus

causing them undue financial prejudice.

Petitioners now invoke this Courts

judicial power to strike down the COA

Organizational Restructuring Plan for being

unconstitutional or illegal.

Petitioners invoke Chavez v. Public

Estates Authority, Agan, Jr. v. Philippine

International Air Terminals Co., Inc. and

Information Technology Foundation of the

Philippines v. Commission on Elections where

the court ruled that where the subject matter

of a case is a matter of public concern and

imbued with public interest, then this fact

alone gives them legal standing to institute theinstant petition. Petitioners contend that the

COA Organizational Restr

CP Riano

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