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SIMEON DJANKOVRAFAEL LA PORTA
FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANESANDREI SHLEIFER
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law rms in 109 countries,
wemeasure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and
courts to evict atenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a
bounced check. We use these datato construct an index of procedural
formalism of dispute resolution for eachcountry. We nd that such
formalism is systematically greater in civil than incommon law
countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of
judicialproceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness
in judicial decisions, andmore corruption. These results suggest
that legal transplantation may have led toan inefciently high level
of procedural formalism, particularly in developingcountries.
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental proposition in economics holds that the secu-rity
of property and the enforcement of contracts are essential
forinvestment, trade, and ultimately economic growth to come
about[Montesquieu 1748; Smith 1776]. Many institutions serve to
se-cure property and enforce contracts. Some of them are
entirelyprivate, such as reputations and informal discussions
amongneighbors, and do not rely on the government [Macaulay
1963;Galanter 1981; Ellickson 1991]. Other institutions securing
prop-erty and enforcing contracts, such as regulators and courts,
aregovernmental. Regulatory agencies restrict private conduct
that
* We are indebted to Carl E. Anduri, and Melinda L. Eggenberger
of LexMundi, Samuel A. Nolen of Richards, Layton and Finger, and
Juan Carlos Boterofor extensive cooperation throughout this
project; to Erhard Blankenburg, Rich-ard Epstein, Judge Roger
Errera, Charles Fried, Oliver Hart, Roumeen Islam,Simon Johnson,
Louis Kaplow, Bert Kritzer, Lord Justice Law, Atif Mian,
BrianOstrom, Guy Pfeffermann, Eric Posner, Judge Richard Posner,
Mark Ramseyer,Alan Schwarts, Steven Shavell, Roberta Romano, Jeremy
Stein, Ivo Welch, LordWoolf, and three anonymous referees for their
comments; and to Jose Caballero,Claudia Cuenca, Theodora Galabova,
Mario Gamboa-Cavazos, Olga Ioffe, AlfredoLarrea, Margaret Michel,
Juan Manuel Pinzon, Alejandro Ponce-Rodriguez, Stef-ka Slavova,
Ekaterina Trizlova, and Lihong Wang for excellent research
assis-tance. We have also received considerable input on an earlier
draft from EdwardGlaeser and Lawrence Katz. This research was
funded by the World Bank, theInternational Institute of Corporate
Governance at Yale School of Management,and conducted with the
extensive cooperation of Lex Mundi and Lex Africamember rms. The
data used in this project are available at
http://iicg.som.yale.edu/.
2003 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology.The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, May 2003
453
http://iicg.som.yale.edu/http://iicg.som.yale.edu/
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might adversely inuence others, and courts resolve property
andcontractual disputes.
Economic theory does not tell us which of these mechanismsof
securing property and enforcing contracts is the best, and
inreality they are all far from perfect. Private security and
enforce-ment, while working well in some environments, often
degenerateinto violence. Indeed, Smith [1776] saw a tolerable
administra-tion of justice as one of the few proper functions of
government,enabling an ordinary citizen to seek justice against
richer andmore powerful offenders who control private enforcement.1
Publicregulation, likewise, while sometimes effective,2 is often
cor-rupted and captured by the very violators, such as
monopolistsand pollutants, it needs to restrain [Stigler 1971].
Economistshave been generally most optimistic about courts as the
institu-tion securing property and enforcing contracts [Coase
1960], andwith few exceptions (e.g., Johnson, McMillan, and
Woodruff[2002], and Bianco, Japelli, and Pagano [2001]) have
devotedlittle attention to analyzing their limitations. From the
point ofview of evaluating alternative institutional arrangements,
how-ever, it is crucial to understand the factors that make
courtsfunction more or less effectively.
In this paper we present an empirical study of the
effective-ness of courts as mechanisms of resolving simple disputes
in 109countries. We examine how a plaintiff can use an ofcial court
toevict a nonpaying tenant and to collect a bounced check. We
ndthat even these simple disputes are resolved extremely slowly
bycourts in most countries, taking an average of over 200 days.
Wealso nd huge variation among countries in the speed and qualityof
courts.
We try to explain this variation from the perspective of
threebroad theories. The development theory holds that courts,
likemany other institutions, work better in countries that have
richerand more educated populations [Demsetz 1967; North
1981].According to this theory, there are xed costs of setting up
insti-tutions, which only become socially worth paying once the
de-mand for themlargely driven by the level of economic
develop-
1. Likewise, commentators on transition from socialism see the
reform of thepublic legal system as an antidote to the violence
associated with private enforce-ment (e.g., Hay and Shleifer [1998]
and Hay, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996]).
2. Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer [2001] and Glaeser and
Shleifer [2001,2003] describe some circumstances in which
regulation is an efcient strategy forsecuring property rights.
454 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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ment becomes high enough. A poor society may rely on
informaldispute resolution; a richer one relies on more complex
contractsand needs courts to resolve disputes. Similarly, a better
educatedpopulation both raises the efciency of courts (if human
capital isan input) and the demand for them.
The incentive theory holds that the efciency of courts isshaped
by the incentives of the participants in dispute
resolution,including the judges, the lawyers, and the litigants
[Messick1999; Buscaglia and Dakolias 1999]. According to this
theory,courts work poorly when the participants have weak or
wrongincentives: judges do not care about delays; lawyers are paid
toprolong proceedings; defendants seek to avoid judgment.
Theimplication is that factors such as mandatory deadlines
forjudges, contingency fees for attorneys, and loser pays
rulesimprove court performance.
The third theorywhich is more novel and central to thispaperis
that performance of courts is determined by how thelaw regulates
their operation, what we call procedural formalismor formalism for
short. The main contribution of this paper is toexplain
theoretically and to measure empirically the determi-nants of
procedural formalism, as well as to assess its conse-quences for
the quality of dispute resolution in courts.
In a theoretical model of an ideal court, a dispute betweentwo
neighbors can be resolved by a third on fairness grounds,with
little knowledge or use of law, no lawyers, no written
sub-missions, no procedural constraints on how evidence,
witnesses,and arguments are presented, and no appeal [Shapiro
1981]. Yetin reality, all legal systems heavily regulate dispute
resolution:they rely on lawyers and professional judges, regiment
the stepsthat the disputants must follow, regulate the collection
and pre-sentation of the evidence, insist on legal justication of
claimsand judges decisions, give predominance to written
submissions,and so on. We examine the reasons for procedural
formalism aswell as its consequences for the performance of
courts.
To this end, in cooperation with Lex Mundi, the
largestinternational association of law rms, we describe the exact
pro-cedures used to resolve two specic disputes in 109
countries.These are the eviction of a residential tenant for
nonpayment ofrent and the collection of a check returned for
nonpayment. Wedescribe the cases to a law rm in each country in
great detail,and ask for a complete write-up of the legal
procedures necessaryto dispute these cases in court and the exact
articles of the law
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governing these procedures. We use the responses to
constructmeasures of formalism, dened as the extent to which
regulationcauses dispute resolution to deviate from the neighbor
model.
Research in comparative law and legal history suggests
thatformalism varies systematically among legal origins
[Berman1983; Merryman 1985; Damaska 1986; Schlesinger et al.
1988].In particular, civil law countries generally regulate dispute
reso-lution, including the conduct of the adjudicators, more
heavilythan do common law countries. Our data provide a striking
em-pirical conrmation of this proposition. Legal origins alone
ex-plain around 40 percent of the variation in our measures
offormalism among 109 countries. We also nd that adjudication
ismore formalized in the less developed than in the rich
countries.
We next turn to the three hypotheses on the determinants
ofjudicial quality. From the participating law rms, we
obtainestimates of the expected duration of our two disputes in
calendardays, from the original ling of a complaint to the
ultimateenforcement of judgment. In addition, we use assessments
ofjudicial quality from other data sources, covering such areas
asenforceability of contracts, access to justice, and corruption,
aswell as data from the World Business Environment Survey ofsmall
rms on the fairness, consistency, honesty, and other as-pects of
the legal system. We also collect data on per capitaincome and
educational level in each country, as well as severalmeasures of
incentives facing judges, attorneys, and litigants.
We nd that ceteris paribus higher procedural formalism is
astrong predictor of longer duration of dispute resolution.
Higherformalism also predicts lower enforceability of contracts,
highercorruption, as well as lower honesty, consistency, and
fairness ofthe system. These results hold both in ordinary least
squaresregressions, and in instrumental variable estimates where
legalorigin is used as an instrument for formalism. The results
hold forboth eviction and check collection. In our data there is no
evidencethat formalism secures justice.
We also nd some evidence consistent with the
developmenthypothesis, namely that countries with richer
populations havehigher quality courts. On the other hand, we nd
almost noevidence that the incentives of the participants in the
legal sys-tem inuence its quality.
Our ndings advance the previous research in three distinctways.
First, the paper takes the research on the quantitativemeasurement
of institutions in a new direction: the study of
456 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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courts. Finding objective measures of institutional structure
issometimes more useful than just focusing on survey assessmentsof
quality, as is often done, because it may point to the
specicdirections of efciency-improving reform. Second, with respect
tothe study of courts, the paper is novel in attributing both
theirefciency and their ability to deliver justice to the
characteristicsof the legal procedure, rather than to general
underdevelopmentof the country or to poor incentives. Third, the
paper links boththe lack of efciency of courts and their inability
to deliver justiceto the transplantation of legal systems. As such,
it supports thehypothesis that transplantation is in part
responsible for thestructure and quality of the existing
institutions.
II. THEORIES OF PROCEDURAL FORMALISM
According to Shapiro [1981], the essence of an idealized
uni-versal court is the resolution of a dispute among two neighbors
bya third, guided by common sense and custom. Such resolutiondoes
not rely on formal law and does not circumscribe the proce-dures
that the neighbors employ to address their differences. Yetcourts
everywhere deviate from this ideal. They employ profes-sional
judges and lawyers to resolve disputes. They heavily regi-ment
procedures, restricting how claims and counterclaims arepresented,
how evidence is interpreted, and how various partiescommunicate
with each other. Rather than holding an informalmeeting, many
courts assemble written records of the proceed-ings, and allow
disputants to appeal the decisions of a judge. Mostjurisdictions,
in short, heavily regulate their civil procedures.
The reasons for regulating dispute resolution are similar
tothose for regulation in general: the sovereign may wish to
controlthe outcome. He may wish to punish some conduct to a
greaterextent than a judge-neighbor would, to establish precedents,
or toreduce errors relative to informal adjudication. He may also
wishthat disputes be resolved in a consistent way across his
domains,so as to promote trade or political uniformity. Finally, he
maywish disputes to be resolved so as to favor himself and his
politicalsupporters, or to punish his enemies and opponents. To
achievethese goals, sovereigns regulate the judicial procedure so
thatjudges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words
ofthe law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either
itsforce or rigour [Montesquieu 1748, 1984, p. 194].
A further reason to regulate dispute resolution is that
infor-
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mal triad justice is vulnerable to subversion by the powerful.
Ifone of the two disputants is economically or politically
morepowerful than the other, he can encourage the supposedly
impar-tial judge to favor him, using either bribes or threats. The
otherside of this coin is access to justice: the less advantaged
membersof a society must expect justice rather than abuse from the
stateor powerful opponents. As the great German jurist Rudolf
vonJhering exclaimed, form is the sworn enemy of arbitrary rule,the
twin sister of liberty [1898, p. 471].
For these, and possibly other reasons, most jurisdictions inthe
world heavily formalize legal procedures. Moreover, as
legalhistorians clearly recognize, patterns of such regulation are
inti-mately related to the civil versus common law origin of the
coun-trys laws. These legal families originate in Roman and
Englishlaw, respectively, and were transplanted to many
countriesthrough conquest and colonization (by France, Germany,
andSpain in the case of civil law, and England in the case of
commonlaw). Although legal systems of most countries have evolved
sincecolonial times, key features of legal origin are often
preservedthrough the centuries [La Porta et al. 1998, 1999].
There are different theories of how legal origin has shapedlegal
procedure in general, and formalism in particular. Hayek[1960] and
Merryman [1985] attribute the differences to the ideasof the
Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In France
therevolutionaries and Napoleon did not trust the judges, and
codi-ed judicial procedures in order to control judicial
discretion.According to Schlesinger et al. [1988], in civil law
countries theprocedural codes are meant to be essentially
all-inclusive state-ments of judicial powers, remedies, and
procedural devices. Con-sistent with von Jherings logic, procedural
formalism was seenas a guarantee of freedom. In England and the
United States, incontrast, lawyers and judges were on the right
side of therevolutions, and hence the political process
accommodated agreat deal more judicial independence. In the common
law tradi-tion, a code is supplemental to the unwritten law, and in
con-struing its provisions and lling its gaps, resort must be had
tothe common law [Schlesinger et al. 1988]. As a consequence,
lessformalism is required in the judicial procedure.
Dawson [1960], Berman [1983], Damaska [1986], and Glae-ser and
Shleifer [2002] argue that the procedural differencesbetween common
and civil law actually go back to the twelfth andthirteenth
centuries. Glaeser and Shleifer [2002] attribute
458 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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greater formalism to the need to protect law enforcers from
coer-cion by disputing parties through violence and bribes. This
risk ofcoercion was greater in the less peaceful France than in the
morepeaceful England, where neighborly dispute resolution by
juries(coming closer to Shapiros ideal) was more feasible. The
differentapproaches to legal proceduremotivated by the different
lawand order environments of England and Francewere
thentransplanted through conquest and colonization to most of
therest of the world [Watson 1974; La Porta et al. 1998;
Berkowitz,Pistor, and Richard 2003].
The fact that most countries inherited signicant parts oftheir
legal procedures often involuntarilyis important for ouranalysis.
At the econometric level, it suggests that legal origincan be used
as an instrument for the degree of formalism of thelegal procedure.
At the substantive level, the nature of transplan-tation enables us
to distinguish two hypotheses. If countriesselect their legal
procedures voluntarily, then one can argue thatgreater formalism is
an efcient adaptation to a weaker law andorder environment.
However, if legal procedures are transplantedthrough conquest or
colonization, the efcient adaptation modeldoes not apply. Rather,
we can attribute the consequences of legalformalism to the
exogenously determined features of the legalprocedure, and in this
way consider the efciency of alternativerules.
III. DATA
III.A. Collection Procedures
Our data are derived from questionnaires answered by attor-neys
at Lex Mundi and Lex Africa member rms. Lex Mundi andLex Africa are
international associations of law rms, whichinclude as their
members law rms with ofces in 115 countries.Of these 115 countries,
Lex Mundi members in six did not acceptour invitation to join the
project, and these six jurisdictions(Burkina Faso, Cambodia,
Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Scot-land, and St. Kitts and Nevis)
were removed from the sample. Wehave received and codied data from
all the others.
The 109 cooperating law rms received a questionnaire de-signed
by the authors with the advice of practicing attorneys
fromArgentina, Belgium, Botswana, Colombia, Mexico, and theUnited
States. The questionnaire covered the step-by-step evolu-
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tion of an eviction and a check collection procedure before
localcourts in the countrys largest city. The focus on these two
specicdisputes has a number of advantages. First, they
representtypical situations of default on an everyday contract in
virtuallyevery country. The adjudication of such cases illustrates
theenforcement of property rights and private contracts in a
givenlegal environment. Second, the case facts and procedural
assump-tions could be tailored to make the cases comparable
acrosscountries. Third, the resolution of these cases involves
lower levelcivil trial courts in all countries (unless Alternative
Dispute Reso-lution is used). Because these are the courts whose
functioning ismost relevant to many of a countrys citizens, the
focus on thequality of such courts is appropriate in a development
context.For more complex disputes, additional issues arise, and it
maynot be appropriate to generalize our ndings. For example,
com-mercial arbitration is available in many countries to large
com-panies, though not to ordinary citizens. Perhaps even more
im-portantly, formalism may be essential for justice in
complexdisputes even when informality is adequate for the simple
caseswe consider.3
In presenting the cases, we provided the respondent rmwith
signicant detail, including the amount of the claim, thelocation
and main characteristics of the litigants, the presence ofcity
regulations, the nature of the remedy requested by the plain-tiff,
the merit of the plaintiffs and the defendants claims, and
thesocial implications of the judicial outcomes. Furthermore, to
un-derstand how courts work, we specied that there is no
settle-ment. These standardized details enabled the respondent
lawrms to describe the procedures explicitly and in full detail,
andallowed us to get around the problem that different
proceduresarise in different circumstances.4
The questionnaires provided to law rms were divided intotwo
parts: (1) description of the procedure of the hypothetical
casestep by step, and (2) multiple-choice questions. The
followingaspects of the procedure were covered: (1) step-by-step
descrip-
3. The collection of a bounced check also gets us away from the
concern thatrules governing the eviction of a nonpaying tenant are
shaped by a nationssocialist sentiment. The fact that the
structures of dispute resolution for evictionand check collection
are so similar is inconsistent with the view that socialismdrives
the results.
4. We have discovered that attorneys in even the largest law rms
in mostcountries are familiar with eviction and check collection
procedures, generallybecause they have worked on such cases for
their clients.
460 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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tion of the procedure, (2) estimates of the actual duration at
eachstage, (3) indication of whether written submissions were
re-quired at each stage, (4) indication of specic laws applicable
ateach stage, (5) indication of mandatory time limits at each
stage,(6) indication of the form of the appeal, and (7) the
existence ofalternative administrative procedures. Multiple-choice
questionswere used both to collect additional information and to
check theanswers at the initial stage. In addition, we asked
questionsabout the incentives of judges, attorneys, and the
litigants.
At each rm, the answers were prepared by a member of
theLitigation Department, and reviewed by a member of the
GeneralCorporate and Commercial Department. Two lawyers in each
lawrm, from different departments, were required to read,
approve,and sign the questionnaire. As an additional check, the law
rmswere required to indicate when a particular law governed
therelevant stage of the procedure, and to provide a copy of that
law.The answers provided by member law rms were coded using
thedescriptions of the procedures and answers to
multiple-choicequestions. In most cases, coding was followed by an
additionalround of questions to the completing attorneys aimed to
clarifythe inconsistencies in their answers.
III.B. Measuring Formalism
Comparative law textbooks and manuals of civil procedurepoint to
several areas where the laws of different countries regu-late
dispute resolution differently. In our choice of the areas ofsuch
regulation, we were guided by the 1994 International Ency-clopaedia
of LawsCivil Procedure published by Kluwer LawInternational. The
Encyclopaedia covers seventeen countriesfrom different legal
origins, and discusses such broad areas ofcivil procedure as
judicial organization, jurisdiction, actions andclaims, nature of
proceedings, legal costs, evidence, enforcementof judgments, and
arbitration. Some of the areas covered in theEncyclopaedia were not
relevant to the simple disputes we con-sidered. Others, such as
Alternative Dispute Resolution, are cov-ered briey in our survey,
although we focus on courts. Appendix1 presents the relationship
between the topics covered in theEncyclopaedias volume on Civil
Procedure for France and theindices used in this paper.
We focus on seven areas of formalism, and codify the
answersprovided by Lex Mundi rms from the perspective of the
neighbormodel. Below, we briey describe our approach to
organizing
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these data. The exact denitions of the variables are contained
inTable I.
The rst area covers the required degree of professionalismof the
main actors in the judicial process, namely judges andlawyers. This
covers three specic areas. First, a basic jurisdic-tional
distinction is between general and specialized courts. Forthe
simple cases we consider, access to specialized courts gener-ally
entails procedural simplication aimed at mass production(similar to
trafc courts in the United States). We therefore takethe resolution
of disputes in specialized courts to be closer to theneighbor model
than that in a general jurisdiction court.
Second, we distinguish between judges who have undergonecomplete
professional training, and arbitrators, administrativeofcers,
practicing attorneys, merchants, or any other laypersonswho may be
authorized to hear or decide the case. In somecountries (e.g., New
Zealand, United Arab Emirates) all disputesbetween landlords and
tenants are resolved by housing tribunalscomposed of neighbors or
by representatives of associations oflandlords and tenants. Such
nonprofessional judges are closer tothe neighbor model.
Third, in some countries it is mandatory to have an attorneyto
appear before the judge, while in others it is entirely voluntaryor
even prohibited. Evidently, the absence of legal representationis
closer to the neighbor model. Indeed, in the absence of
suchrepresentation, the judge frequently assumes the position of
amediator guiding the parties to an agreement.
Using the data provided by law rms, we combine these threepieces
of information to construct the professional versus lay-men index
for each of the two disputes for each country.
The second area we consider is the preeminence of writtenversus
oral presentation at each stage of the procedure, includingling,
service of process, defendants opposition, evidence, nalarguments,
judgment, notication of judgment, and enforcementof judgment. We
take oral presentation to be closer to the neigh-bor model, and
aggregate this information for each country andeach case into the
index of written versus oral elements.
The third area is the need for legal justication
(meaningreference to the legal reasons and articles of the law) in
thecomplaint and in the judgment, as well as the necessity of
basingthe judgment in the law as opposed to equity. In many
countriesa judgment must be justied by statutory law or settled
prece-dents. In other countries judgment must still be justied, but
in
462 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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TABLE IDESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES
This table describes the variables in the paper. Unless
otherwise specied, thesource for the variables is the survey of law
rms and the laws of each country. Allthe data for each country can
be found at http://iicg.som.yale.edu/.
Variable Description
Professionals versus laymen
General jurisdiction court The variable measures whether a court
ofgeneral or of limited jurisdiction would bechosen or assigned to
hear the case undernormal circumstances. We dene a court ofgeneral
jurisdiction as a state institution,recognized by the law as part
of the regularcourt system, generally competent to hear anddecide
regular civil or criminal cases. A limitedjurisdiction court would
hear and decide onlysome types of civil cases. Specialized
debt-collection or housing courts, small-claimscourts, and
arbitrators or justices of the peaceare examples. Equals one for a
court of generaljurisdiction, and zero for a court of
limitedjurisdiction.
Professional versusnonprofessional judge
The variable measures whether the judge, or themembers of the
court or tribunal, could beconsidered as professional. A
professional judgeis one who has undergone a completeprofessional
training as required by law, andwhose primary activity is to act as
judge ormember of a court. A nonprofessional judge isan arbitrator,
administrative ofcer, practicingattorney, merchant, or any other
laypersonwho may be authorized to hear and decide thecase. Equals
one for a professional judge, andzero for a nonprofessional
judge.
Legal representation ismandatory
The variable measures whether the law requiresthe intervention
of a licensed attorney. Thevariable equals one when legal
representationis mandatory, and zero when legalrepresentation is
not mandatory.
Index: professionals versuslaymen
The index measures whether the resolution ofthe case relies on
the work of professionaljudges and attorneys, as opposed to other
typesof adjudicators and lay people. The index is thenormalized sum
of (i) general jurisdiction court,(ii) professional versus
nonprofessional judge,and (iii) legal representation is mandatory.
Theindex ranges from zero to one, where highervalues mean more
participation byprofessionals.
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http://iicg.som.yale.edu/
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Variable Description
Written Versus Oral
Filing Equals one if the complaint is normallysubmitted in
written form to the court, andzero if it can be presented
orally.
Service of process Equals one if the defendants rst ofcial
noticeof the complaint is most likely received inwriting, and zero
otherwise.
Opposition Equals one if under normal circumstances
thedefendants answer to the complaint should besubmitted in
writing, and zero if it may bepresented orally to court.
Evidence Equals one if evidence is mostly submitted to thecourt
in written form, in the form ofattachments, afdavits, or otherwise,
and zeroif most of the evidence, including documentaryevidence, is
presented at oral hearings beforethe judge.
Final arguments Equals one if nal arguments on the case
arenormally submitted in writing, and zero if theyare normally
presented orally in court beforethe judge.
Judgment Equals one if the judge issues the nal decisionin the
case in written form, and zero if heissues it orally in an open
court hearingattended by the parties. The dening factor iswhether
the judge normally decides the case ata hearing. If the judge
simply reads out apreviously made written decision, the
variableequals one. Conversely, for an orallypronounced judgment
that is later transposedinto writing for enforcement purposes,
thevariable equals zero.
Notication of judgment Equals one if normally the parties
receive theirrst notice of the nal decision in written form,by
notice mailed to them, publication in a courtboard or gazette, or
through any other writtenmeans. The variable equals zero if they
receivetheir rst notice in an open court hearingattended by
them.
Enforcement of judgment Equals one if the enforcement procedure
ismostly carried out through the written courtorders or written
acts by the enforcementauthority, and zero otherwise.
464 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE I(CONTINUED)
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Index: Written versus oralelements
The index measures the written or oral nature ofthe actions
involved in the procedure, from theling of the complaint until the
actualenforcement. The index is calculated as thenumber of stages
carried out mostly in writtenform over the total number of
applicablestages, and it ranges from zero to one, wherehigher
values mean higher prevalence ofwritten elements.
Legal justication
Complaint must be legallyjustied
The variable measures whether the complaint isrequired, by law
or court regulation, to includereferences to the applicable laws,
legalreasoning, or formalities that would normallyrequire legal
training. Equals one for a legallyjustied complaint, and zero when
thecomplaint does not require legal justication(specic articles of
the law or case-law).
Judgment must be legallyjustied
The variable measures whether the judgmentmust expressly state
the legal justication(articles of the law or case-law) for
thedecision. Equals one for a legally justiedjudgment, and zero
otherwise.
Judgment must be on law(not on equity)
The variable measures whether the judgmentmay be motivated on
general equity grounds,or if it must be founded on the law. Equals
onewhen judgment must be on law only, and zerowhen judgment may be
based on equitygrounds.
Index: legal justication The index measures the level of legal
justicationrequired in the process. The index is formed bythe
normalized sum of (i) complaint must belegally justied, (ii)
judgment must be legallyjustied, and (iii) judgment must be on
law(not on equity). The index ranges from zero toone, where higher
values mean a higher use oflegal language or justication.
Statutory regulation of evidence
Judge cannot introduceevidence
Equals one if, by law, the judge cannot freelyrequest or take
evidence that has not beenrequested, offered, or introduced by the
parties,and zero otherwise.
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TABLE I(CONTINUED)
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Variable Description
Judge cannot rejectirrelevant evidence
Equals one if, by law, the judge cannot refuse tocollect or
admit evidence requested by theparties, even if she deems it
irrelevant to thecase, and zero otherwise.
Out-of-court statementsare inadmissible
Equals one if statements of fact that were notdirectly known or
perceived by the witness, butonly heard from a third person, may
not beadmitted as evidence. The variable equals zerootherwise.
Mandatory prequalicationof questions
Equals one if, by law, the judge must prequalifythe questions
before they are asked of thewitnesses, and zero otherwise.
Oral interrogation only byjudge
Equals one if parties and witnesses can only beorally
interrogated by the judge, and zero ifthey can be orally
interrogated by the judgeand the opposing party.
Only original documentsand certied copies areadmissible
Equals one if only original documents andauthentic or certied
copies are admissibledocumentary evidence, and zero if simple
oruncertied copies are admissible evidence aswell.
Authenticity and weight ofevidence dened by law
Equals one if the authenticity and probativevalue of documentary
evidence is specicallydened by the law, and zero if all
admissibledocumentary evidence is freely weighted by thejudge.
Mandatory recording ofevidence
Equals one if, by law, there must be a written ormagnetic record
of all evidence introduced attrial, and zero otherwise.
Index: statutory regulationof evidence
The index measures the level of statutory controlor intervention
of the administration,admissibility, evaluation, and recording
ofevidence. The index is formed by thenormalized sum of the
following variables: (i)judge cannot introduce evidence, (ii)
judgecannot reject irrelevant evidence, (iii) out-of-court
statements are inadmissible, (iv)mandatory prequalication of
questions, (v)oral interrogation only by judge, (vi) onlyoriginal
documents and certied copies areadmissible, (vii) authenticity and
weight ofevidence dened by law, and (viii) mandatoryrecording of
evidence. The index ranges fromzero to one, where higher values
mean a higherstatutory control or intervention.
466 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE I(CONTINUED)
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Control of superior review
Enforcement of judgmentis automaticallysuspended untilresolution
of the appeal
Equals one if the enforcement of judgment isautomatically
suspended until resolution of theappeal when a request for appeal
is granted.Equals zero if the suspension of theenforcement of
judgment is not automatic, or ifthe judgment cannot be appealed at
all.
Comprehensive review inappeal
Equals one if issues of both law and fact(evidence) can be
reviewed by the appellatecourt. Equals zero if only new evidence
orissues of law can be reviewed in appeal, or ifjudgment cannot be
appealed.
Interlocutory appeals areallowed
Equals one if interlocutory appeals are allowed,and zero if they
are always prohibited.Interlocutory appeals are dened as
appealsagainst interlocutory or interim judicialdecisions made
during the course of a judicialproceeding in rst instance and
before the nalruling on the entire case.
Index: control of superiorreview
The index measures the level of control orintervention of the
appellate courts review ofthe rst-instance judgment. The index
isformed by the normalized sum of the followingvariables: (i)
enforcement of judgment isautomatically suspended until resolution
ofappeal, (ii) comprehensive review in appeal,and (iii)
interlocutory appeals are allowed. Theindex ranges from zero to
one, where highervalues mean higher control or intervention.
Engagement formalities
Mandatory pretrialconciliation
Equals one if the law requires plaintiff toattempt a pretrial
conciliation or mediationbefore ling the lawsuit, and zero
otherwise.
Service of process byjudicial ofcer required
Equals one if the law requires the complaint tobe served to the
defendant through theintervention of a judicial ofcer, and zero
ifservice of process may be accomplished byother means.
467COURTS
TABLE I(CONTINUED)
-
Variable Description
Notication of judgment byjudicial ofcer required
Equals one if the law requires the judgment to benotied to the
defendant through theintervention of a judicial ofcer, and zero
ifnotication of judgment may be accomplishedby other means.
Index: engagementformalities
The index measures the formalities required toengage someone in
the procedure or to holdhim/her accountable of the judgment.
Theindex is formed by the normalized sum of thefollowing variables:
(i) mandatory pretrialconciliation, (ii) service of process by
judicialofcer required, and (iii) notication ofjudgment by judicial
ofcer required. The indexranges from zero to one, where higher
valuesmean a higher statutory control or interventionin the
judicial process.
Independent procedural actions
Filing and service The total minimum number of
independentprocedural actions required to complete ling,admission,
attachment, and service.
Trial and judgment The total minimum number of
independentprocedural actions required to completeopposition to the
complaint, hearing or trial,evidence, nal arguments, and
judgment.
Enforcement The total minimum number of independentprocedural
actions required to completenotication and enforcement of
judgment.
468 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE I(CONTINUED)
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Index: independentprocedural actions
An independent procedural action is dened as astep of the
procedure, mandated by law orcourt regulation, that demands
interactionbetween the parties or between them and thejudge or
court ofcer (e.g., ling a motion,attending a hearing, mailing a
letter, or seizingsome goods). We also count as an
independentprocedural action every judicial oradministrative writ
or resolution (e.g., issuingjudgment or entering a writ of
execution)which is legally required to advance theproceedings until
the enforcement of judgment.Actions are always assumed to be
simultaneousif possible, so procedural events that may befullled in
the same day and place are onlycounted as one action. To form the
index, we(1) add the minimum number of independentprocedural
actions required to complete all thestages of the process (from
ling of lawsuit toenforcement of judgment); and (2) normalizethis
number to fall between zero and one usingthe minimum and the
maximum number ofindependent procedural actions among thecountries
in the sample. The index takes avalue of zero for the country with
the minimumnumber of independent procedural actions, anda value of
one for the country with themaximum number of independent
proceduralactions.
Formalism index
Formalism index The index measures substantive and
proceduralstatutory intervention in judicial cases atlower-level
civil trial courts, and is formed byadding up the following
indices: (i)professionals versus laymen, (ii) written versusoral
elements, (iii) legal justication, (iv)statutory regulation of
evidence, (v) control ofsuperior review, (vi) engagement
formalities,and (vii) independent procedural actions. Theindex
ranges from zero to seven where sevenmeans a higher level of
control or interventionin the judicial process.
469COURTS
TABLE I(CONTINUED)
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Variable Description
Incentives of parties
Mandatory time limit foradmission
Equals one if the judge is required by law toadmit or reject the
lawsuit within a certainperiod of time, and zero otherwise.
Mandatory time limit topresent evidence
Equals one if the period in which the parties maycollect or
present evidence is xed by law to acertain number of days after
service or numberof days before hearing, and zero otherwise.
Mandatory time limit topresent defense
Equals one if the defendant is required by law tole the
opposition within certain time limit,either in terms of number of
days from serviceor number of days before the hearing. Thevariable
equals zero otherwise.
Mandatory time limit topresent defense
Equals one if the defendant is required by law tole the
opposition within certain time limit,either in terms of number of
days from serviceor number of days before the hearing. Thevariable
equals zero otherwise.
Mandatory time limit forjudgment
Equals one if the judge is required by law toenter judgment
within a specied period oftime after the conclusion of the hearing
or thenal pleadings, and zero otherwise.
Mandatory time limit fornotication of judgment
Equals one if the court is required by law tonotify the parties
within a specied period oftime after judgment is entered, and
zerootherwise.
Index: mandatory timelimits
The presence of mandatory time limits in theprocedure. The index
is calculated as theaverage of (i) term for admission, (ii) term
topresent evidence, (iii) term to present defense,(iv) term for
judgment, (v) term for compliance,(vi) term for notication of
judgment. Theindex ranges from zero to one, where highervalues mean
more mandatory deadlines.
Quota litis prohibited The variable equals one if quota litis
orcontingent fee agreements are prohibited bylaw in all cases, and
zero otherwise.
Loser pays rule The variable equals one if the loser is required
topay all the costs of the dispute, and zerootherwise.
470 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE I(CONTINUED)
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Duration in practice
Duration until completionof service of process
Estimated duration, in calendar days, betweenthe moment the
plaintiff les the complaintuntil the moment of service of process
to thedefendant.
Duration of trial Estimated duration, in calendar days,
betweenthe moment of service of process and themoment the judgment
is issued.
Duration of enforcement Estimated duration, in calendar days,
betweenthe moment of issuance of judgment and themoment the
landlord repossesses the property(for the eviction case) or the
creditor obtainspayment (for the check collection case).
Total duration The total estimated duration in calendar days
ofthe procedure under the factual and proceduralassumptions
provided. It equals the sum of (i)duration until completion of
service of process,(ii) duration of trial, and (iii) duration
ofenforcement.
Other judicial quality measures
Enforceability of contracts The relative degree to which
contractualagreements are honored and complicationspresented by
language and mentalitydifferences. Scale for 0 to 10, with
higherscores indicating higher enforceability. Source:Business
Environmental Risk Intelligence.Exact denition in Knack and Keefer
[1995].
Legal system is fair andimpartial
In resolving business disputes, do you believeyour countrys
court system to be fair andimpartial? The scale ranges from 1 to 6,
wherehigher scores mean a fairer and more impartiallegal system.
Source: World BusinessEnvironment Survey [2000, 2002].
Legal system is honest oruncorrupt
In resolving business disputes, do you believeyour countrys
court system to behonest/uncorrupt? The scale ranges from 1 to6,
where a higher score signals a more honestand uncorrupt system.
Source: World BusinessEnvironment Survey.
471COURTS
TABLE I(CONTINUED)
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Variable Description
Legal system is affordable In resolving business disputes, do
you believeyour countrys court system to be affordable?The scale
ranges from 1 to 6, where a higherscore means a more affordable
legal system.Source: World Business Environment Survey.
Legal system is consistent In resolving business disputes, do
you believeyour countrys court system to be consistent?The scale
ranges from 1 to 6, where a higherscore means a more consistent
legal system.Source: World Business Environment Survey.
Condence in legal system The questionnaire asks the managers the
degreeto which they believe the system will upholdcontracts and
property rights in a businessdispute. The scale ranges from 1 to 6,
where ahigher score means a higher degree ofcondence on the system.
Source: WorldBusiness Environment Survey.
Corruption A composite index for the year 2000 that drawson
fourteen data sources from seveninstitutions: the World Economic
Forum, theWorld Business Environment Survey of theWorld Bank, the
Institute of ManagementDevelopment (in
Lausanne),PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Political andEconomic Risk
Consultancy (in Hong Kong),the Economist Intelligence Unit and
FreedomHouses Nations in Transit. The score rangesbetween 10
(highly clean) and 0 (highlycorrupt). Source: Transparency
International(www.transparency.org).
Law and order Integrity of legal system in 2000. This
componentis based on the Political Risk Component 1(Law and Order)
from the PRS GroupsInternational Country Risk Guide
(variousissues). Rankings are modied to a ten-pointscale. Source:
Economic Freedom of the World[Gwartney, Lawson, and Block
2001].
472 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE I(CONTINUED)
http://www.transparency.org
-
equity rather than in law. In still other countries, judicial
deci-sions require no justication whatsoever. Since the
neighbormodel presumably does not call for such legal justications,
weaggregate this information into an index of legal
justication.
The fourth area is statutory regulation of evidence. The rulesof
evidence are sometimes considered to be a key factor in
differ-entiating the overall efciency of legal procedures among
coun-tries [Langbein 1985]. First, in some countries the judge
cannot
TABLE I(CONTINUED)
Variable Description
Other variables
Log of GNP per capita Logarithm of GNP per capita in 1999,
Atlasmethod, expressed in current US dollars. When1999 income data
in US dollars were notavailable, the latest available number was
used(1996 for Kuwait, 1997 for Cayman Islands,Gibraltar, Turks and
Caicos Island, 1998 forAnguilla, Bahrain, Netherlands
Antilles,United Arab Emirates). Income for Anguilla,the British
Virgin Islands, the CaymanIslands, Gibraltar, Monaco, the
NetherlandsAntilles, and the Turks and Caicos Islands isGDP per
capita (PPP) from the CIA WorldFactbook. Source: World
DevelopmentIndicators [2001].
Legal origin Identies the legal origin of the company law
orcommercial code of each country (English,French, Socialist,
German, Scandinavian).Source: La Porta et al. [1999].
Latitude The absolute value of the latitude of the capitalof the
country, scaled to take values betweenzero and one. Source: CIA
Factbook.
Average years of schooling Average number of years of schooling
receivedper person aged 25 and over in 1992 (lastavailable).
Source: Human Development Report[1994].
Ethnic fractionalization Ethnic fractionalization is computed as
oneminus the Herndahl index of ethnic groupshares. This calculation
considers theprobability that two persons, randomly chosen,from a
population belong to different groups.Source: Alesina et al.
[2003].
473COURTS
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request evidence not requested by the parties, a restriction on
theneighbor model. Second, the judge in some countries cannotrefuse
to collect or admit evidence requested by the parties, evenif the
judge feels this evidence is irrelevant to the case. This,
too,presents a restriction on the discretion of the judge in the
neigh-bor model. Third, hearsay evidence is not admissible in
somecountries while, in others, the judge can weigh it.
Presumably,the inadmissibility of out-of-court statements is a
restriction onjudicial freedom in the neighbor model. Fourth, in
some jurisdic-tions the judge must prequalify a question before it
is posed to thewitness while, in others, parties may ask witnesses
questionswithout such prequalication. We take the latter scenario
asmore compatible with the neighbor model. Fifth, in some
juris-dictions, only original documents and certied copies are
admis-sible, a restriction not present in other jurisdictions.
Presumably,the neighbor model would not have these restrictions.
Sixth, insome countries authenticity and the weight of evidence are
de-ned by law; in others they are not. In the neighbor model,
wewould not expect the evidence to be subjected to rigid rules
onadmissibility and weight. Seventh, in some countries, but
notothers, there is mandatory recording of evidence, designed
tofacilitate the superior authoritys control over the judge. We
donot take such recording to be consistent with the neighbor
model.As before, we aggregate these seven dimensions into the index
ofstatutory regulation of evidence.
The fth area of regulation of formalism is the control of
thesuperior review of the rst instance judgment. The scope of
ap-pellate review determines the level of sovereign control over
thetrial court proceedings [Damaska 1986]. In general, we take
thecontrol of a judge by a superior court as inconsistent with
theneighbor model, and consider a variety of mechanisms of
superiorreview. First, in some countries the enforcement of
judgment isautomatically suspended until the resolution of the
appeal, whichsubstantially reduces the importance of the rst
instance judg-ment. In others, the suspension of enforcement is
either nonau-tomatic, or even not allowed. We take the automatic
suspensionas being inconsistent with the neighbor model. Second, in
somecountries the review and appeal of judicial decisions are
compre-hensive. In others, more compatibly with the neighbor
model,only new evidence or issues of law can be reviewed on appeal,
orthe judgment cannot be appealed at all. Third, some countries,but
not others, allow interlocutory appeals (those of interim ju-
474 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
-
dicial decisions), which we take to be incompatible with the
neigh-bor model. We aggregate these three aspects of review into
anindex of control of superior review.
The sixth area is engagement formalities that must be ob-served
before a party is legally bound by the court proceedings. Insome
countries a lawsuit cannot be initiated unless a formalpretrial
conciliation is attempted between the parties. The noti-cation
procedures also vary markedly among countries. In someplaces, the
complaint can be notied to the defendant by theplaintiff himself or
by his attorney, or simply by mailing a letter.In others, the
defendant cannot be held accountable unless he isserved the claim
by an appointed court ofcer. Finally, in somecountries the judgment
is deemed notied to the parties whenpronounced in open court; in
others it must be personally notiedto the parties by a duly
appointed court employee. We submit thatentirely voluntary pretrial
conciliation and exible rules of noti-cation of process and
judgment are more compatible with theneighbor model. These three
dimensions are aggregated into theindex of engagement
formalities.
The seventh area is the count of independent proceduralactions
involved in pursuing a claim through a court, covering theling and
service of a complaint, trial and judgment, and enforce-ment. An
independent procedural action is dened as every stepin the
procedure, mandated by the law or by court regulation,which demands
interaction between the parties or between themand the judge or
court ofcer, such as ling a motion or attendinga hearing. We also
count as an independent procedural actionevery judicial or
administrative writ or resolution, such as issuingjudgment or
entering a writ of execution, which is legally re-quired to advance
the proceedings until the enforcement of judg-ment. Actions are
always assumed to be simultaneous if possible,so procedural events
that may be fullled in the same day andplace are only counted as
one action.5 In the idealized neighbormodel, there would be only
three procedural actions: (1) a claim-ant would request the judges
intervention, (2) the judge and theclaimant would together meet the
defendant and the judge would
5. We only count the minimum number of independent procedural
actionsrequired to bring the case to completion. Thus, the
appointment of a lawyer is onlycounted as a step if legal
representation is mandatory. Notications of interlocu-tory
decisions that do not require further interaction between the
parties and thejudge or court ofcer (as when the clerk makes an
entry into the notication book)are not counted as separate steps
since they are ancillary to the decision.
475COURTS
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issue a decision following a discussion, and (3) the
judgmentwould be enforced. As the evidence below shows, in some
coun-tries checks can be collected and tenants evicted in just 8 or
9steps, while in others it takes 40 to 45 stepsa far cry from
theneighbor model. We aggregate these counts into an index
ofindependent procedural actions and normalize the index to
fallbetween zero and one based on the minimum and the maximumnumber
of actions among countries.
Having assembled the data, we combine the seven subin-dexes into
the index of formalism. We scale each subindex to fallbetween zero
and one, so the formalism index falls between zeroand seven, with
seven representing, according to our conception,the greatest
distance from the neighbor model. The exact methodof the
construction of the formalism index is not crucial, since
thevarious subindexes generally point in the same direction as
towhich countries regulate adjudication more heavily.
III.C. Other Variables
Our data contain information on the quality of dispute
reso-lution. One measure of quality is an estimatein calendardays
of duration of dispute resolution by the lawyers who com-pleted the
questionnaires. Duration is measured as the number ofcalendar days
counted from the moment the plaintiff les thelawsuit in court,
until the moment of actual repossession (evic-tion) or payment
(check). This measure includes both the dayswhere actions take
place and waiting periods between actions.The participating rms
make separate estimates of the averageduration until the completion
of service of process, the issuance ofjudgment (duration of trial),
and the moment of payment or repos-session (duration of
enforcement).6 To the extent that we are inter-ested in the ability
of ordinary persons to use the legal system, theseestimates of
duration are highly relevant for efciency.
In addition to the data from the questionnaires, we use datafrom
surveys of business people on the quality of the legal system.These
include measures of the enforceability of contracts, corrup-tion,
and law and order. In addition, we use information fromsmall rm
assessments of various aspects of the quality of thelegal system,
including consistency, honesty, and fairness, con-
6. Law rms also provide us with estimates of the minimum and the
maxi-mum amount of time in calendar days each case could take given
its specics. Thisrequest helped lawyers to focus on the average
length of time and not just thinkabout the worst or best case they
had encountered.
476 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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tained in the World Business Environment Survey. These datawill
be used to shed light on the crucial question: does formalismsecure
justice?
Finally, we assemble some data to examine alternative
hy-potheses concerning the determinants of judicial quality.
FromLex Mundi member rms, we get data on whether judges
facemandatory time deadlines, whether lawyers are allowed tocharge
contingency fees, and whether losers in civil disputes mustpay the
winners legal fees. We also obtain data on 1999 percapita income in
each country, the average years of schooling, andethno-linguistic
and religious fractionalization. Fractionalizationmeasures are used
as controls because studies nd that fraction-alization has adverse
consequences for institutional performance[La Porta et al. 1999;
Alesina et al. 2003].
IV. FORMALISM AND ITS DETERMINANTS
Table II presents our data on procedural formalism,
withsubindexes and the overall index. Table IIa focuses on
eviction,and Table IIb on check collection. Countries are arranged
by legalorigin, and we report the means for each legal origin and
the testsof the differences in these means. For both check
collection andeviction, common law countries have least formalized,
andFrench civil law countries most formalized, dispute
resolution,with other legal origins in the middle. For eviction,
the differ-ences hold for all subindexes, but are stronger in some
areas(legal justication, number of independent procedural
actions)than in others (evidence, superior review). The differences
informalism among civil law countries (French, German,
socialist,and Scandinavian) are less pronounced, and typically not
asstatistically signicant (except that German and
Scandinavianorigin countries regulate less heavily than socialist
and Frenchones). For check collection the pattern of results is
similar, exceptthat one of the subindexes is lower in French civil
law countries thanin common law countries. The rankings of legal
origins hold alsowithin per capita income quartiles. These ndings
are broadly con-sistent with the thrust of the comparative law
literature.
Table III examines the consistency of this evidence across
thevarious subindexes measuring alternative aspects of
proceduralformalism, as well as across the two cases. The evidence
shows aclear picture of consistency. The various subindexes are
positivelycorrelated with the overall index within each case.
Moreover,
477COURTS
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480 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICST
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482 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICST
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0.67
0.75
0.67
0.13
1.00
0.00
0.21
3.42
Kaz
akh
stan
0.67
0.75
0.67
0.50
1.00
0.33
0.84
4.76
Lat
via
0.67
0.63
1.00
0.38
1.00
0.00
0.26
3.93
Lit
hua
nia
0.67
0.75
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.00
0.55
4.47
Pol
and
0.67
0.88
1.00
0.38
1.00
0.00
0.24
4.15
Rom
ania
0.67
0.75
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.00
0.50
4.42
Rus
sia
0.67
0.50
0.67
0.38
1.00
0.00
0.18
3.39
Slo
ven
ia0.
670.
751.
000.
501.
000.
000.
344.
26U
krai
ne
0.67
0.75
0.33
0.63
1.00
0.00
0.29
3.66
Vie
tnam
0.67
0.50
0.33
0.25
1.00
0.00
0.50
3.25
Mea
n0.
670.
720.
790.
380.
960.
060.
353.
93
Fre
nch
lega
lor
igin
Arg
enti
na1.
001.
001.
000.
131.
000.
670.
615.
40B
elgi
um
0.33
0.75
0.33
0.13
0.67
0.33
0.18
2.73
486 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICST
AB
LE
IIb
(CO
NT
INU
ED
)
-
Bol
ivia
1.00
1.00
0.67
0.38
1.00
1.00
0.71
5.75
Bra
zil
0.33
0.50
1.00
0.38
0.67
0.00
0.18
3.06
Chi
le1.
000.
750.
670.
500.
670.
670.
324.
57C
olom
bia
0.67
1.00
1.00
0.38
0.00
0.33
0.74
4.11
Cos
taR
ica
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.67
0.32
5.48
Cot
eD
Ivoi
re0.
670.
630.
670.
130.
670.
670.
243.
65D
omin
ican
Rep
ubli
c0.
330.
750.
670.
381.
000.
670.
294.
08E
cuad
or1.
001.
000.
670.
630.
670.
330.
634.
92E
gypt
1.00
0.75
1.00
0.50
0.00
0.33
0.21
3.79
El
Sal
vado
r0.
330.
881.
000.
880.
670.
670.
184.
60F
ranc
e0.
330.
751.
000.
130.
330.
670.
033.
23G
reec
e0.
671.
001.
000.
500.
000.
670.
163.
99G
uat
emal
a1.
001.
001.
000.
751.
000.
670.
265.
68H
ondu
ras
0.67
1.00
1.00
0.63
0.67
0.33
0.61
4.90
Indo
nes
ia0.
330.
880.
670.
500.
670.
330.
533.
90It
aly
0.67
0.86
1.00
0.00
0.67
0.67
0.18
4.04
Jord
an0.
670.
750.
670.
500.
000.
330.
613.
52K
uw
ait
0.67
0.88
0.67
0.13
0.67
0.67
0.21
3.88
Leb
anon
1.00
0.75
0.67
0.63
1.00
0.33
0.47
4.85
Lux
embo
urg
0.33
0.71
0.67
0.50
1.00
0.00
0.34
3.56
Mal
ta0.
000.
630.
330.
380.
670.
330.
112.
44M
exic
o0.
330.
881.
000.
500.
670.
331.
004.
71M
onac
o0.
330.
710.
330.
250.
330.
670.
112.
74M
oroc
co1.
001.
000.
670.
500.
670.
670.
214.
71M
ozam
biqu
e0.
670.
751.
000.
500.
670.
670.
244.
49N
eth
erla
nds
0.33
0.63
0.67
0.13
0.67
0.33
0.32
3.07
Net
her
lan
dsA
nti
lles
0.67
0.88
0.33
0.25
0.33
0.00
0.39
2.85
Pan
ama
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.25
1.00
0.67
0.92
5.84
Par
agua
y1.
001.
001.
000.
630.
670.
670.
955.
91
487COURTS
-
Pro
fess
ion
als
vers
usla
y