Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World Varun Gauri, Daniel M. Brinks, Editors May 12, 2010
Courting Social Justice:
Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rightsin the Developing World
Varun Gauri,Daniel M. Brinks,Editors
May 12, 2010
WDR 2004: Routes of accountability
Governance Systems: Actors, Capacities and Accountability
Political Actors & Institutions• Political Parties
• Competition, transparency
Executive-Central Govt
Service Delivery & Regulatory Agencies
Subnational Govt & Communities
Check & Balance
Institutions•
Parliament• Judiciary• Oversight
institutions
Civil Society & Private
Sector•Civil Society
Watchdogs•Media
•Business Associations
Cross-cutting Control Agencies (Finance, HR)
Citizen
s/Firm
s
Citizens/Firms
Cit
izen
s/F
irm
s
Citizens/Firms
Source: Sanjay Pradhan Outcomes: Services,
Regulations, Corruption
Reform Intended Goals Examples
I. Improve access to information
•Influence policy•Make providers accountable
•Right-to-information•Information campaigns•Score cards
II. Establish redress mechanisms
•Enable user ability to enforce standards/rights
•Administrative (e.g. ombudsmen)• Courts• Community oversight
III. Link provider pay to performance
•Focus teachers on learning• Focus doctors on quantity & quality of care
•Capitation grants to local governments•Merit pay for teachers•Health providers paid according outputs and outcomes•Third party auditing
Reform Strategies
Courts and social change
“A court’s contribution, then, is akin to officially recognizing the evolving state of affairs, more like the cutting of the ribbon on a new project than its construction.”
Gerald Rosenberg 1991
Constitutional social and economic rights and markets“Some positive rights establish government interference with free markets as a constitutional obligation. For countries that are trying to create market economies, this is perverse.”
Cass Sunstein 1993
Constitutional social and economic rights“Courts are ill-suited for the evaluation and making of the tradeoffs implied by many positive rights.”
Frank Cross, 2001
Elite capture
“The constitutionalization of rights is … evidence that the rhetoric of rights and judicial review has been appropriated by threatened elites to bolster their own position in the polity.”
Ran Hirschl 2004
New approaches
“All over the world, courts are developing principles to adjudicate claims that the government has failed to respect social and economic guarantees.”
Cass Sunstein 2004
Judicial enforcement revisited“Weak-form judicial review can recognize social welfare rights in a way that has no larger implications for government budgets than do judicial decisions enforcing such first-generation rights as the right to free speech.”
Mark Tushnet 2004
Empirical questions for our research How much, and what kinds, of SE rights
litigation do we see? What explains legalization? Who benefits from legalization? Direct and
indirect beneficiaries? When does policy change arise?
What factors explain who benefits? What is the contribution of courts to
democratic governance?
SE Rights jurisprudence is now widespread, for example: Colombia T-760 (2008), T-025 (2004) Costa Rica Sala IV ruling lowered AIDS mortality 80% Polish Constitutional Court invalidated eviction law that
did not guarantee replacement housing New York state and Kentucky apex courts directed
legislatures to rewrite education budget and curriculum Supreme Court of Philippines struck down a law
deregulating energy prices Egyptian administrative courts recently directed
government to set a minimum wage
Sampling
Five countries Brazil India Indonesia Nigeria South Africa
Two sectors, principally Health Education
Sub-national jurisdictions and sub-sectors
Illustrative cases from our sample The right to health implies the right to:
receive medical treatment or medication at little or no cost gain admission into a hospital emergency room irrespective
of ability to pay or medical condition expanded health programs for migrant workers obtain civil damages for negligent substandard care prosecute a criminally negligent provider be informed regarding and have the power to withhold
consent for a medical procedure keep health records confidential limit excessive pricing for medications limit the length or extent of patent protection for
medications modify terms of private insurance contract be released from prison to receive medical treatment breathe free from pollutants in the environment
Illustrative cases from our sample The right to education implies the right to:
require local or national government to spend more require due process before expelling university
students challenge whether a school has sufficient infrastructure limit the fees that schools can charge challenge competency testing in a particular language require schools to have functioning water or electricity open private religiously affiliated schools disallow corporal punishment in an independent school require a public school to accommodate students with
disabilities allow the government to limit tuition increases in
private schools
Social and economic rights as claims to change rules governing behavior: A typology
State
Providers Recipients
Courts
Regulation Provision or Financing
Provider/recipient obligations
1. State Provision of Services to Recipients
2. State Regulation of Providers
3. Provider/recipient rights and duties
The Main Argument: Judicial “imperialism” and counter-majoritarianism are rare
The life-cycle of public-policy litigation:
1. Litigants place cases on the courts’ docket2. There is a judicial decision3. Bureaucrats, politicos, or private parties respond4. The original litigants, or others, follow up
The product of this four-stage process is “legalization.” Each stage involves a choice by one or more strategic actors, who act in partial anticipation of the following stage.
Legalization and the Logic of Judicial Decision Making
Cases Per 10 Million InhabitantsRio Grande do Sul (Brazil) 8930
Brazil 1250
South Africa 3
India 2
Nigeria 0.6
Indonesia 0.3
How much litigation, and what kinds?
Brazil
Indo’sia
S.Africa
Nigeria
India
Health Rights Cases in Brazil
ImpactREG
PROVOBLIG
0
23
23000
Brazil Health
Brazil Education
Health and Education Rights Cases in India, 1950-2006
ImpactREG
PROVOBLIG
2
230
23000
India Health
India Education
Key SE Rights Cases in South Africa Government of the Republic of South Africa v
Grootboom, 2000 Minister of Public Works v Kyalami Ridge
Environmental Association, 2001 Khosa v Minister of Social Development, 2004 Mashavha v President of the RSA, 2004 Minister of Public Health v TAC, 2002 Interim Procurement, 2004 Minister of Health v New Clicks, 2005 Westville, 2006
ImpactREG
PROVOBLIG
0
23
23000
South Africa Health
South Africa Ed-ucation
Education Rights Cases in Indonesia
ImpactREG
PROVOBLIG
0
23
23000
Indonesia Health
Indonesia Educa-tion
Key Health and Education Rights Cases in Nigeria Adewole and Others v Alhaji Jakande and
Others, 1981 Archbishop Okogie and Other v Attorney
General of Lagos State, 1981 Mohammed Abacha v The State, 2005
ImpactREG
PROVOBLIG
0
23
23000
Nigeria Health
Nigeria Education
Impact of Court Cases
Nigeria and Indonesia on one end; South Africa, India, and Brazil on the other
More health than education impact (except in Nigeria and Indonesia, which involve atypical cases)
Provision: a narrow remedy, as in Brazil, or a diaglogical rulings Regulation: big potential impact, but enforcement can be difficult
(industrial polluters in India); distrust of market mechanisms Obligations: increasing in future Legalization follows legislation (more public health spending in
Brazil and S Africa and more provision cases as well; opposite in India, where more impact from regulation)
Collective and Individual Cases
Health Education
Individual Collective Individual Collective
Brazil 7248 141 237 56
India 61 91 93 19
S. Africa 3 8 2 9
Indonesia 3 4 0 5
Nigeria 9 3 12 3
The Distribution of Benefits: Ratio of indirect to direct beneficiaries Direct beneficiaries:
neither rich nor poor Indirect beneficiaries:
sometimes the poor Policy area inequality
(dialysis vs childhood diseases)
Health Education
Brazil 17 1
India 13,195 1,696
Indonesia 201 42,775
S Africa 521 51
Nigeria 8 309
Explanations 1: Demand-side factorsWho sues, and who doesn’t? CSO/NGO mobilization (Charles Epp)1. South Africa’s novel collective claims requires litigation-
oriented civil society2. Demand structure explains greater number of health
claims Maybe not1. But Brazil’s mobilization (with real budgetary impact) is
the result of individual uncoordinated actions2. India’s legal mobilization is large, even if litigation-
oriented civil society is not3. Litigation demand can generate support structure So overall – we do not think that a vibrant CSO
community is a necessary condition for litigation impact
Explanations 2: The supply sideWhy do courts support some claims and not others? Civil law versus common law not determinative Legal texts not determinative: sub-national differences,
Nigeria versus India Judicial autonomy, which depends on the appointment
process; need political and social autonomy Legislative framework and latent policy infrastructure So overall, we place significant emphasis on the judicial
supply-side structure
Explanations 3: The ResponseWhat explains compliance? Dominant political orientation of the government
(Brazil and movemiento sanitarista)
Well-organized claimant (TAC v Grootboom; right to food v right to education in India)
Dialogical judicial rulings(South Africa Kate – a “dialogue” with provincial govts,
Brazilian Ministerio Publico administrative inquiries,
Indonesia Con Court ruling on education,
India and vehicular pollution)
→Accountability: responsibility, standards, penalties
The Role of Courts in Democracies
Removing “political obstacles” in systems “immune to political correction”
Sounding “fire alarms” in two ways when the bureaucracy is not complying
(allies are the political officials) when policy change is needed (ally is
the organized public)
Two summary analytic points
Justiciability of SE rights is not a question that should be posed in the abstract
The concerns associated with SE rights adjudication – imperial judges, runaway deficits, crumbling democratic faith – are bogeymen
Normative conclusions
Unlock procedural obstacles Nonpartisan judicial appointments Freedom of information laws Judicial competence and specialized courts Access to legal services for poor Promote civil society litigants and
autonomous public sector agencies Focus on private obligations cases and
horizontal application
Unlocking procedural obstacles If you build it, they will come PIL in India, similar petitions in Costa Rica
Sala IV Build court capacity to handle letter petitions Journalistic partnerships
Nonpartisan judicial appointments Judicial services commissions Application of RTI to courts Disclosure of judicial assets Some autonomy to appoint own members
Right to information laws
Key effect of SE rights cases is to reveal and scrutinize hidden or obfuscatory information
Cost of CNG conversion, ARV rollout plan, grain stocks in famine
Judicial competence and specialized courts New non-adversarial procedures SE rights infuse civil cases, apply horizontally Policy expertise Maybe embed some of them in executive
agencies or administrative law
Access to legal services for poor
Likely to have limited impact acting alone Follow trail blazed by middle class plaintiffs
Civil society organizations and autonomous public sector agencies Trail- blazing work in medications cases Largest impact when joint consumption Regulation cases crucial for poor Legal and policy capacity of these
organizations Multi-faceted strategies and capacity Regional strategies
Restraint against self-regard, narrow sympathies, and group divisions“The restraining power of the judiciary does not manifest its chief worth in the few cases in which the legislature has gone beyond the lines that mark the limits of discretion. Rather shall we find its chief worth in making vocal and audible the ideals that might be otherwise silenced, in giving them continuity of life and expression, in guiding and directing choice within the limits where choice ranges.”
Courting Social Justice:
Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rightsin the Developing World
Varun Gauri,Daniel M. Brinks,Editors
May 12, 2010
Legalization follows national models of welfare provision
ImpactREG
PROVOBLIG
0
23
23000
Brazil Health
Brazil Education
India Health
India Education
Indonesia Health
Indonesia Education
South Africa Health
South Africa Educa-tion
Nigeria Health
Nigeria Education
1
10
100
1000
10000
Nigeria Health
South Africa Health
Indonesia Health
India Health
Brazil Health
Impact