Introduction
Coup d’état is one of the three ways, next to democratic elections and
hereditary succession, of gaining political power in a state. It is the quintessence
of political usurpation. Political power is in this case seized in a violent manner
and, subsequently, it is also preserved by means of violence. Until recently, coup
d’état was one of the primary methods of obtaining political power, especially in
South America and Africa and to a lesser extent also in Asia. Although always
formally illegal and legally inadmissible without any exceptions - a fortiori
publicly violating the constitutional order - it has been used in practice and
generally accepted by those actors of a political game who aspire to become
rulers of a respective country.
While both elections and electoral procedures that are inherent to
democratic competition for political power and the means of gaining political
power based on succession to a throne, which is relevant for absolute
monarchies, have been a subject of interest for researchers and political
observers - and thus have been broadly and thoroughly examined - a coup d’état,
although an important political aspect inevitably connected with the
phenomenon of gaining political power, has been left aside. Certainly, single
coups, often spectacular, accompanied by a special atmosphere and specific
political color, have drawn much attention and have been widely commented on
in the media. These, however, usually attract only short-term attention and bring
about rather superficial evaluations. At times, particular coups have been
described in detail by historians or political scientists. These analyses, however,
have concentrated solely on the course of events, dealing with them mostly from
a factual perspective. Unfortunately, coup d’état itself, as a generic political
phenomenon, has been seldom a subject of deeper reflections, which would not
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be restricted only to an introduction and description of a particular coup and its
induced effects, but would endeavor to examine its essence alone.
Scientific work in the field of political science research, which addresses
the topic of coup d’état, understanding it as a phenomenon having specific
characteristics, is very humble and contains only few valuable aspects.
Moreover, these studies are usually outdated, coming from sixties, seventies or
eighties of the 20th century. To put it simply, concerning the research of coup
d’état, what prevails is a historical perspective that focuses on the uncovering of
facts and events connected with the particular efforts of an illegitimate seizure of
power. On the contrary, there is a lack of studies in the political sciences which
concentrate on the mechanisms of coup d’état.
An aim of the author of this book is to present strictly theoretical political
science analyses of coup d’état or, at least, to put down the bases upon which it
is possible to construct a theory of coup d’état. Such a theory shall firstly
consider the essence of coup d’état as a method of gaining power and,
consequently, address its specificity. The study shall also point out the
similarities and differences existing between coup d’état and other phenomena,
such as revolution, rebellion, civil war and guerilla warfare, which result in the
destruction of an existing political order or its substantial transformation.
Finally, it shall address the mechanisms of coup d’état, which determine its
success or failure. The structure of the book is organized to meet these
assumptions and the following needs of the analysis.
In Poland, there is a certain tradition of coup d’état. A dramatic attempt to
save the independent state at the end of the First Republic (Pierwsza
Rzeczypospolita), which had its climax with the passing of the Constitution on
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the 3rd of May 1791, was conducted in an atmosphere of coup d’état - the
systemic reforms were carried out in a manner strongly violating the existing
legal and institutional order. More than one hundred and twenty years later, two
months after regaining Poland’s independence, a group of right-wing political
activists, led by Colonel Marian Junasztajtis and Prince Eustachy Sapieha,
unsuccessfully attempted to pursue a coup d’état and gain power during the
night from the 4th to the 5th of January 1919. In May 1926, the main protagonist
of the independent Poland, Marshal Józef Pi�sudski, disenchanted by a weak and
ineffective democracy, took over state power using a coup d’état, which took the
form of a short, but intensive, civil war (379 killed, 920 wounded).
On December 13, 1981, the general of the army, Wojciech Jaruzelski,
introduced martial law in defense of a weakening communist regime, by which
he seriously violated effective legal norms, including the Constitution of the
Polish People’s Republic. Jaruzelski’s actions have been presented abroad and
also in Poland as a coup d’état. For example, the famous and recognized
historian Norman Davies, who specializes on Poland, said that the imposition of
martial law was “the best coup d’état in the history of modern Europe.“3
However, to call the imposition of martial law a coup d’état is completely
incorrect, because from the modern point of view we talk about a coup d’état
only if it results in a change of state power and the destruction of the status quo.
Thus, coup d’état is not defined by activities which aim to save the existing
political regime, even if they were conducted in opposition to effective laws,
which was the case in Poland in 1981. Jaruzelski’s steps can neither be
understood as a so-called self-coup, which is a very atypical form of coup d’état
- though there are a few, but not primary, similarities. Although the actor of a
self-coup is the head of state who in defense of his interests and political
3 Gazeta Wyborza, 13-14 September 2008.
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calculations focuses on spreading his power and eliminating control, sometimes
drastically violating the law, the essence of self-coup lies in the fact that one
state institution goes against other state institutions, resulting in a change of the
existing constitutional order and political transformations. This was not the case
in Poland in December 1981. General Jaruzelski forced a solution for the
situation based on his power, and it was unanimously accepted by all state
institutions, which saw it as their rescue. A whole governing group thus
identified with the illegal movement of its leader. This group not only preserved
its position, but as a consequence of the neutralization of an anti-regime,
democratic opposition, it also reinforced its position.
After the system transformation in Poland in the year 1989, coup d’état,
unexpectedly, became a frequently used expression and an integral part of
political vocabulary. At times, various politicians, whose political positions had
been weakened or who had been explicitly pushed away from the power
structures, threatened loudly with a coup d’état, claiming themselves to be its
purported victims. Naturally, such statements were not supported by any
arguments, and they represent a flagrant abuse of the term. The fact that
prominent actors of political life at that time often used the term coup d’état
shows, on the one hand, their low level of education which resulted in them
claiming a term they did not understand; while on the other hand, and this is
even more important, it, unfortunately, shows a low level of maturity within the
Polish democratic political system. These reasons together require that an
analysis of the phenomenon of coup d’état not only attract the attention of
researchers, but with regards to Polish political experience, it should become a
necessity. Since, within political competition in Poland, we still encounter the
temptation to resort to coup d’état, though only verbally - but knowing that from
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words to acts it is never too far - then the analysis of this phenomenon is
important also with respect to the refinement of political thought and action.
Coup d’état is not an unknown phenomenon in the context of other
countries of Central and Eastern Europe either. In the Baltics coups d’état have
taken place quite often, some of them successful, some not. Similarly so in
Bulgaria and Romania, while to the contrary in Hungary, where the long-time
dictatorship of Miklós Horthy had effectively controlled political life and nipped
any expression of political opposition in the bud. However, certain signs of coup
d’état appeared in Horthy`s government itself. When, in October 1944, after
Horthy had announced the end of Hungarian participation in the Second World
War, he was removed from his office by the fascist movement Arrow Cross,
which was led by Ferenc Szálasi, who governed the country under the protection
of a German occupation army. Even in Czechoslovakia, which enjoyed the
reputation of an oasis of democracy in the whole region of Central and Eastern
Europe, there was an attempt of a coup d’état, though this was a theatrical
matter. Over the night from the 21st to the 22nd of January 1933, a group of
fascist conspirators, led by Lieutenant Ladislav Kobsinka, tried to organize a
coup d’état in Brno, which ended up being a total disgrace. Speaking of
Czechoslovakia, however, it must be mentioned that the way in which
communists came to power after the Second World War represented a classic
form of coup d’état, which was quite a political rarity in this part of the world.
The author of this book would like to thank several people. These are the
reviewers of the text doc. PhDr. Stanislav Balík, PhD. and prof. dr. hab. Micha�
Choro�nicki. Other assistants include prof. dr. hab. Antoni Dudek, doc. dr. hab.
Artur Gruszczak, dr. Danuta Kabat-Rudnicka, doc. PhDr. Michal Kubát, Ph.D.,
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prof. dr. hab. Zbigniew Rudnicki and prof. dr. hab. Jan Wiktor Tkaczy�ski.
Without their kind support it would not have been possible to have access to
many books, publications and materials necessary for a theoretical examination
of the phenomenon of coup d’état. I am indebted to doc. PhDr. Ji�í Vykoukal
Ph.D. for enabling to publication of the book in English. Moreover, I thank Mrs.
Zuzana Lamošová for her wonderful translation of my work from Czech to
English. Also I am grateful to Mrs. Iwona Bzowska for technical assistance.
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