Country Risk and Opportunities - Vietnam April 2011- IE Singapore

Country Risk & Opportunity

Vietnam

A Research Note prepared by TAC for IE Singapore

April 2011

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RiskMonitor VIETNAM April 2011

THIERRY APOTEKER CONSULTING Applied Economic & Financial Research

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Country Risk & Opportunity

Vietnam

April 2011

A Research Note prepared by TAC for IE Singapore

� TAC is a fully independent European research group providing advisory services on international economic and financial issues for financial investors and industrial companies, with a growing

customer base in Asia (Keppel, Sumitomo, BPI…).

� A focus on developing countries and emerging economies

� TAC also provides policy advisory services through research funded by multilateral or bilateral donors / institutions.

� TAC combines a very strong quantitative expertise with a customized approach to clients’ requirements.

Contacts: Dr. Thomas Choong ([email protected]), Senior Advisor for Asia


tel: +33 299 39 31 40

Heavy investment and key expertise in

quantitative developments

Full customization to fit each customer’s

requirement

Fundamental research capabilities based on transversal / horizontal expertise



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vietnam is a transition economy moving from a centrally planned to a market economy. This implies large structural reforms. It is accompanied by a major investment effort in order to increase production, improve infrastructures and enhance productivity and competitiveness. In parallel, Vietnam has adopted a strategy aiming at private sector development and a further integration into international trade.

The rapid economic development has resulted in an acceleration of urbanization and industrialization, while Vietnam became also a major exporter of agricultural commodities (rice, coffee…), offering large and attractive opportunities for international companies. Vietnam’s strategy will be pursued, as indicated by the Socioeconomic Development Strategy for 2011-2020 adopted in January 2011.

However, Vietnam has registered a visible slowdown in economic growth over the past few years, and is confronted with more difficult cyclical and structural challenges. Over the short-term, a tighter monetary policy and likely step-by-step depreciation of the Vietnamese Dong are going to constrain demand and weigh on the price advantage of imported products. In parallel, the banking sector is weak and may have to go through substantial changes. No major economic or financial shock is expected, however.

The overall political Risk Rating is somewhat poorer, notwithstanding the smooth transition to a new leadership decided in Jan.2011. Indeed, considerable progress still needs to be done on legal and regulatory framework, and great care should be exercised when coming to contractual details and arbitration clauses.

SCORES FOR FUNDAMENTAL BALANCES

The closer to the center the country is, the better the performance. A balance with score above 50 indicates a particular vulnerability.

MACRO INDICATORS

GDP (bn USD, 2010) 103.6

Population (mn, 2010e) 88.3

GDP per capita (USD, 2010e) 1 174

GDP growth (2010) 6.8

Inflation (2010) 9.2

Total imports (USD bn, 2010) 83.8

Imports from Asia (% of total, 2010e)

71.3

Foreign Direct Investment (USD bn, 2009)

7.6

VND Exchange rate against SGD (13/04/2011)

16 650

SCORES FOR POLITICAL RISK FACTORS

The closer to the center the country is, the better the performance. A balance with score above 50 indicates a particular weakness

RISK RATINGS

A Risk Rating above 60 indicates a high risk.



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DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES

Vietnam’s economic development is characterized by a rapid growth and improvement in living standards, albeit starting from a very low base (GDP per capita, on a purchasing power parity base, is only half the current level in China), a large population (88 mn persons in 2010, 98 mn expected in 2020), and a growing integration into world trade flows and supply chains.

This combination makes it a very attractive target for exporters and investors alike, especially in the areas or markets earmarked for acceleration in the 2011–2020 Socio-Economic Development Strategy:

� Industrialization and modernization, with large needs in equipment goods and industrial processes, accompanied by a fast urbanization pattern.

� Further integration into the global system, making Vietnam a “key” point in many supply chains, especially garments and shoes, electronics and agro-processing. The country still benefits from a very low level of wages, especially low- to mid-skills: an industrial worker in HCMC would fetch a monthly wage still one third of his equivalent in Shanghai.

� Ensuring social equity and environmental protection: this may prove more difficult to achieve, but is suggests that the emergence of a larger middle class will accelerate, and that environmental-friendly technologies and processes will benefit from Government’s encouragement or support.

TAC has developed a proprietary method for assessing the market potential of different emerging economies from a macroeconomic and trade perspective. The methodology uses more than 50 different indicators,

and allows computing a score for four critical areas indicating market potential:

� Development Potential, looking at the country’s attractiveness from a medium- to long-term perspective and its overall economic development issues.

� Trade Potential, assessing the attractiveness from an exporter’s perspective.

� Corporate Potential, focusing on the depth of the local corporate structure and the overall difficulty to establish corporate relationship, either through direct investment (and Joint-Ventures) or through acquisitions.

� Financial System Potential, looking at the functioning and depth of the local financial and banking markets. This gives an indication of the easiness / difficulty in securing local funding and having local financial backing.

All measures for Country Potential are from 0 (very low attractiveness) to 100 (highest possible attractiveness), but only the top three or five countries among the 72 included show scores above 25-30.

The tables below show Vietnam’s score for each area of the global attractiveness, among the countries having roughly similar scores, as well as Vietnam’s rank out of the 72 countries.

The results show a high degree of attractiveness for Development (rank: 14/72, above Thailand and Malaysia) and Trade (rank: 16/72), but lower performances for Corporate (rank: 38/72) and Financial System (rank: 52/72)

TAC Scoring of Business & Market Potential Where does Vietnam stand among 72 developing and emerging economies worldwide?



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FOCUS ON THREE AREAS FOR BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES

Urban Development & Infrastructures

Vietnam's urban development is characterized by a fast growing urban population (+3.3% per year over the last decade against 1.3% for the total population growth), which accounts today for 30% of the 88 mn population. Urban centers are critical for socio-economic growth, providing around 70% of the country’s GDP in 2009.

The urban population in Vietnam is expected to reach 52 mn in 2025, i.e. nearly 50% of the total population. Therefore, a development strategy combining modern technical and social infrastructures and sustainability of urban environment is required. The legislative framework intends to generalize the establishment of urban Master Plans, with population targets, connections at provincial levels, sanitation and water supply issues.

The major infrastructure investments are concentrated in the two largest urban centers, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC); the increasing and spreading influences of these cities on surrounding areas is taken into account in housing policies and the need for related commuting facilities. The government has decided to build Mass Rapid Transportation (MRT) systems in each of the two cities. The initial estimate for the total investment cost was USD 15 bn, but they appear to have been largely underestimated. The current MRT master plan of HCMC consists of six lines, with the entire network measuring 161 kilometers.

Financing urban infrastructures will remain however a key challenge, especially in the short run because of the cyclical difficulties and financial tensions. The other critical challenges deal with the need to adjust domestic policies so that investment inefficiencies are reduced, bureaucratic / administrative bottlenecks and regulatory uncertainties are improved, and private sector participation can be induced through a competitive setting ensuring economically viable projects.

Real Estate & Housing

Government housing policies have allowed a significant rise in number of houses and urban developments in recent years. The improvement in housing supply, combined with a strategy for low-income / social housing is now high on the government’s agenda.

Over the recent past however, affordability has become a key constraint as land prices and construction costs have soared; rapid monetary expansion had boosted real investors’ confidence, but credit tightening will reduce both the real estate demand and prices in the short term. Since it is quite likely that the increasing trend (for transactions as well as prices) will reassert itself over the medium-term, the current period could provide lower-cost /

price opportunities for future real estate developments.

In HCMC, strong competition has led to an excessive supply; therefore property developers and agents could face temporary financial difficulties. The largest share of housing units launched in 2010 were affordable housing in 2010, but mid-end and high-end segments are likely to dominate supply in 2011, with increased developments in land-affordable suburbs. Stock of office space will maintain a high growth path at least until 2014, with a structural pent-up demand for higher-quality office space; however prices should flattened as vacancy rates have increased as well.

In Hanoi, the implementation of the master plan has limited the over-supply risks. Completion or significant progress in infrastructure projects pushed up land prices. Rising housing demand and financial conditions (income growth relative to interest rates, terms and procedures) are still favorable for the city’s real estate market. Developers now focus on mid-end residential segment with diversified products. Office supply will substantially increase in 2011 and 2012, with the expected rate of absorption below additional stocks, thus lowering overall rent and price pressures.

Labor issues & development

Relatively cheap labor has been a key comparative advantage in export-oriented industry (table below).

Source: JETRO

However, a rising number of strikes in recent years have pointed to difficulties in industrial relations. Capacity bottlenecks in human resources and institutions are particularly critical, as Vietnam seeks to move from a low wage economy to a more knowledge-based economy in the long run. The unemployment rate is relatively low and stable, even though it increased slightly from around 2% in 2005 to above 2.5% because of the global financial crisis and the country’s economic slowdown. Women participation in total employment is large (48% in 2009). Skill levels of the labor supply remain low, though improving; 40% of the work force did not attend any school or only primary school and 65% did not receive any technical education (2007). Average labor productivity has been increasing at about 5% per year between 2000 and 2008, but it remains below most other ASEAN economies and China.



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GROWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE

Vietnam achieved a rather impressive 7.2% average annual growth in GDP since 2000, allowing a substantial reduction in poverty and a visible increase in standards of living, notably in urban areas. The structural factors behind such performances include the policy reforms initiated a decade earlier, a growing private sector, favorable demographic changes and a sharp rise in investment spending (the share of investment in GDP jumped from 27% in 1999 to 41% in 2007). A closer examination reveals however two different periods over the past ten years.

Between 2003 and 2006, Vietnam has had a faster and more balanced economic growth (8% on average per year), mostly because exports were boosted by the implementation of the bilateral trade agreement signed with the US; this agreement triggered a new wave of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country, enhancing domestic productive capacities. Despite a rapid increase in imports during the same period, the trade balance did not deteriorate, with a deficit hovering around USD 2.5 bn per year. The current account deficit (including trade in services and remittances from overseas Vietnamese) was reduced, coming very close to equilibrium in 2006.

From 2007 onwards, the external balances deteriorated sharply: on average the trade deficit over 2007-2010 reached USD 9.7 bn while the current account deficit was USD 8.4 bn. This has been the result of what we believe is a temporary period of transition for the Vietnamese economy: imports accelerated sharply as domestic demand got stronger while the domestic market was opened wider in relation with the WTO membership; further increases in FDI fueled massive imports of capital goods; the exchange rate was kept slightly overvalued to contain inflationary pressures at a time when competition with China for manufactured exports became even more acute. Most of such factors will progressively dissipate over the next few years, with increased capacities, a more competitive exchange rate and a modest constraint on domestic demand.

Economic growth has slowed since 2008 as Vietnam was hit by the global crisis when the domestic developments were already showing signs of increasing imbalances. Pressures on the exchange rate intensified and confidence was hit, at home and for overseas Vietnamese who reduced their remittances into the country. This deceleration in economic growth has continued in 2009, prompting the government to introduce expansionary policies, including tax cuts, acceleration of investment spending, interest rate subsidies and increases in social transfers. In 2010, such policies were partly reversed as international demand regained momentum and GDP growth reached a respectable 6.7% increase. The need to consolidate the previous imbalances (trade, currency) and correct the new ones (fiscal deficit, inflationary pressures) suggests that Vietnam will register a couple of years ahead of sub-potential economic growth (6% to 7% per year) and current account deficits should remain high. Over the longer-term however, the results from the current adjustment coupled with increased and improved productive capacities and infrastructure should ensure another period of faster development.

Technical Corner

TAC founds its risk analysis on a large set of complex quantitative models, based on the reading of six Fundamental Balances constructed by combining economic of financial indicators two-by-two, and by estimating risk threshold for each indicator.

The first of these Fundamental Balances is the Growth Balance, measuring the ability of a country to register a sufficient economic growth (horizontal axis on the chart below) without triggering unsustainable external imbalances (vertical axis).

Vietnam was clearly in the Lowest Risk area of the Balance up to 2006, and then moved into the Blind Run area, when external accounts deteriorated rapidly. 2010 sees an improvement, albeit insufficient to push Vietnam’s path back into the Lowest Risk area.



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EXTERNAL FINANCING

In spite of large current account deficits during the past few years, Vietnam has pursued a very cautious international financing strategy.

More than 10 years ago, the country benefitted from a bilateral restructuring of its foreign debt due to Russia and dating from the Soviet era. Total foreign currency debt was then reduced from USD 23.2 bn (December 1999) to USD 12.8 bn in December 2000, a very low level when compared to the country’s foreign currency revenues (88% in 2000, when 100% is usually considered as a simple yardstick for a structural reduction in debt constraints).

From 2000 to 2009, external debt rose substantially (USD 28.7 bn in December 2009 according to World Bank figures), but the very large increase in foreign currencies receipts allowed a rather dramatic decline in our yardstick, down to 41% in 2009. The cost of servicing this debt service remains low (USD 1.1 bn in 2009), as a substantial share is contracted with concessional conditions to multilateral organizations like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

A large proportion of Vietnam’s external financing requirements were met through a rapid increase in FDI over the past decade. Such FDI were a meager USD 1.5 bn per year on average in 2000-2004, moved to around USD 2 bn per year in 2005-06, and jumped between 2007 and 2009, with average annual inflows of USD 8 bn.

The ^positive impact of FDI comes not only because they do not create debt to lenders, but also because they bring significant improvements in technology, know-how and management, while simultaneously creating spill-over effects to the local industry.

FDI inflows are expected to remain large in the foreseeable future in line with the continuing trend of delocalization among Asian, US and European firms.

Vietnam also benefits from the many trade agreements signed with the largest partners (WTO, ASEAN, ASEAN+3, US, EU), the low level of wage cost and work ethic of the population, and a growing perception by many large foreign MNCs that Vietnam is an attractive way of not “putting one’s eggs in the same basket” after their inroads into China.

Technical Corner

The Debt Balance measures the structural quality of a country’s external financing and its ability to balance debt with more stable inflows of foreign direct investment. An indicator of external debt service (amortization and interest payments on the total amount of foreign currency debt, whoever the borrower) is shown on the vertical axis of the chart below. It is crossed with a complex indicator of financing stability (horizontal axis), which captures the relative importance of “stable” long-term capital (FDI) and more unstable sources of finance (portfolio and banking inflows).

During the whole 2003-2009 period, Vietnam remains in the Lowest Risk area of the Balance, with a very limited and declining debt service and (irregularly) increasing role of stable capital. The country is expected to remain in this favorable

area over the next few years.



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FOREIGN CURRENCY LIQUIDITY SITUATION

A recurrent issue facing developing economies registering a rapid growth path is related to short-term financial vulnerabilities. The short-term foreign currency assets and liabilities of any country are therefore important points to monitor for investors and exporters alike as they would point towards potential payment problems with local customers.

Vietnam is in a mediocre international liquidity situation, primarily because of the very low level of foreign currency reserves held by the central bank (State Bank of Vietnam, SBV).

One factor mitigating the liquidity risk is the low level of short-term debt due to foreign lenders. The total amount of debt maturing in less than one year is estimated slightly below USD 5 bn, i.e. less than the value of one month in imports (a standard practice of 90-day payment condition would suggest that such short-term debt could reach the value of 3 months of imports before being a worrying signal). As capital controls remain in place, short-term financial flows and short-term bank debt are very limited, reducing the risks of excessive short-term liabilities in foreign currencies.

Conversely, the SBV has never been able to accumulate large currency reserves, because of a very cautious attitude towards sovereign long-term debt when external deficits were small, and the difficulty in over-funding the deficits when they became larger. Such reserves reached a (modest) peak of USD 26 bn (barely more than 3 months of imports and less than a third of the domestic liquidity in Dong) in 2008Q1.

The foreign exchange reserves declined substantially since then, a result of large deficits, downward pressures on the Dong leading to market interventions by the SBV and vanishing confidence… when the global economic and financial crisis erupted.

The SBV reserves are estimated at USD 14 bn at the end of September 2010, a level which is low enough to prevent any substantial / renewed market intervention

of the SBV in the case of intense downward pressure on the currency, and low enough to trigger cross-border incidents with counterparties having a more difficult access to this foreign currency liquidity.

Until Vietnam achieves a more substantial cut in external deficits (not expected in 2011 and 2012) and restores a stronger confidence in its monetary and currency policies and directions, the liquidity situation is unlikely to improve much. Caution should therefore be exercised on payment modalities when dealing with Vietnamese corporates and importers, even though we exclude any major break or shock in payments to foreigners.

Technical Corner

The Liquidity Balance assesses the foreign currency situation of a country by looking at the relative level of currency reserves and the vulnerability related to the accumulation of short-term foreign currency liabilities.

On the vertical axis is computed an indicator of maximum potential service, which assumes a “worst case scenario” where no short-term financing can be rolled-over and need to be repaid on top of the annual amortization on long-term debt. On the horizontal axis is an indicator of forex liquidity, a measure of the reserves in foreign currency held directly by the central bank (excluding foreign currency assets of other sovereign entities).

On this Liquidity Balance, Vietnam’s path shows large oscillations in between the Lowest Risk and Blind Run areas, characterizing small liabilities and volatile assets in foreign currency. The last observation in 2010Q3 shows a Blind Run indicating potential but temporary payment problems.



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EXCHANGE RATE

One of the most difficult challenges for companies operating in or with Vietnam relates to the currency risk, i.e. the likelihood to see the value of the Vietnamese Dong (VND) depreciating against the SGD.

Since 1996, the foreign currency regime of Vietnam is a crawling peg against the US dollar. This policy was implemented in order maintain the price competitiveness of exports while limiting the risks of imported inflation. The pattern of currency depreciation is through regular small-step devaluations followed by periods of stability.

Exchange rate USD/VND – Jan. 2009 to Apr. 2011

Exchange rate SGD/VND – Jan. 2009 to Apr. 2011

The last devaluation occurred in February 2011 with a one-off adjustment of the central parity rate of 9.3% against the USD. Against the Singapore dollar, the depreciating trend is more regular, equivalent to around 19% on average per year since early 2009.

However, inflationary pressures have remained strong, and the depreciation only allowed keeping a neutral level of currency competitiveness.

Considering the persistent price pressures, a roughly similar depreciating trend is likely to continue over the near-term. The pace and timing of future adjustments will be determined by the evolution of the RMB (lower pressure on the VND when the RMB appreciates), the transmission of past devaluations and external shocks to inflation, and levels of FDI.

The SBV will aim at ensuring that the trend remains smooth enough to prevent financial disruptions or large moves away from local currency holdings and instruments. The reserves held by the SBV are too small to allow a direct management of the exchange rate through large market interventions: therefore, the authorities have little choice but to tighten the domestic monetary policy and contain demand expansion so that the external deficits and foreign currency borrowing requirements remain in check.

Technical Corner

The Foreign Exchange Balance looks more precisely into a key financial aspect of the country risk by measuring the relative valuation of the exchange rate in terms of international competitiveness as well as the dynamics in official foreign currency reserves against international interbank lending and domestic monetary aggregates

Our indicator of exchange rate competitiveness (vertical axis) measures the value of the VND against the currencies off Vietnam’s major competitors (i.e. countries exporting similar products in similar markets, e.g. Indonesia or China for Vietnam) and taking into account inflation differentials: it shows that the VND has remained in a “band” of relative neutrality since 2006, with a brief move into the more dangerous area of the Balance at the end of 2008.

On the horizontal axis is a complex indicator assessing the “quality” or volatility in foreign exchange reserves. The very large movements observed on this horizontal axis for Vietnam, and the 2010Q3 position clearly below the risk thresholds indicate strong limitations on the SBV to control currency pressures through reserve management.



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CYCLICAL SITUATION

Fueled by a rapid expansion in liquidity, booming credit and infrastructure / capacity bottlenecks, inflation has been and remains a concern in Vietnam. Economic policy will have to remain restrictive over the next few quarters and probably well into 2012.

Notwithstanding the benefits for Vietnam of higher commodity prices (the country being a large exporter), external shocks on energy and food prices have had a substantial impact on inflation, especially when such shocks occurred in a background of excessive monetary expansion, as in early 2008.

Inflation in Vietnam (year-on-year increase in CPI, %)

Source: IMF

In early 2008, Vietnam started to tighten drastically its monetary policy through higher reserve requirements for banks and hikes in interest rate: from January to June 2008, leading rates were increased from 8.25% to 14%, inducing a decline in inflationary expectations at the cost of a putting the brakes on domestic demand and generating tensions in financial institutions.

With the global crisis erupting when domestic demand was already weakening, authorities decided to quickly implement a set of stimulus fiscal and monetary measures. This has proved highly successful in avoiding a sharper slowdown in economic activity, but rapidly

translated into another stage of excessive liquidity: with real GDP growing by 6%-7% and money supply increasing by more than 22% in-between 2009Q2 and 2010Q2, the country became again vulnerable to confidence in the currency, to worries about the required fiscal stabilization, and to higher commodity prices. From the end of 2009 onwards started therefore another round of faster inflation; the March 2011 reading (+13.9% year-on-year) shows the challenges ahead.

These negatives developments have contributed to the Vietnamese government’s exit from fiscal and monetary easing towards fighting inflation and fiscal rebalancing, notably in terms of public spending cuts and a new aggressive monetary policy stance (leading rate up to 13% in mid-April 2011). The restrictive measures have started to have a cooling effect on economic activity, but further increase in interest rates are very likely over the next few quarters.

Technical Corner

The Cyclical Balance gives a view of the of the cyclical position of the country in a country risk perspective, and allows a measure both of the quality of the domestic economic policy and of the nature of the most sensitive risks, by looking at the de facto stance of the monetary policy and the momentum of domestic activity.

The real economic pressure index (vertical axis) gives an indication of the strength of the domestic demand momentum: the higher up the position, the stronger the demand. The monetary pressure index assesses the adequacy of money supply creation to economic activity and price pressures. A move to the right hand-side of the Balance indicates a higher inflationary risk.

Vietnam’s performances in our Cyclical Balance show a high volatility of the real economic pressure indicator suggesting frequent reversal and large changes in demand momentum, and a strong relation between exogenous shocks and domestic conditions. At the end of 2010, the country showed signs of Overheating, warranting a tightening in monetary and fiscal policies.



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BANKING SYSTEM

Expansion of bank credit has been extremely rapid over the past few years, in parallel to substantial changes in the financial sector and with limits on effective supervision and prudential control. With the persistence of tight policies and sub-potential growth over the short-term, tensions and difficulties are likely to surface in some of the country’s financial institutions.

Starting in 1987, Vietnam has switched from a fully centralized banking system, completely subordinate and instrumental to the achievement of government objectives in the productive state-owned sectors, to a more market-based financial system. This transition has included the gradual emergence of small and medium sizes private banks (including the Joint-Stock Banks, JSB) and the intensification of competition with foreign banks after the opening of the sector as a consequence of Vietnam accession to the WTO.

The banking sector is still largely dominated by five historic state-owned banks, namely the bank for Foreign trade of Vietnam (Vietcombank), the Industrial and Commercial bank of Vietnam (Vietindebank), the Investment and Development bank of Vietnam (BIDV) and the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (Agribank). However, the increase in competition coupled with the structural deepening of banking penetration induced a boom in domestic credits, which were multiplied by more than 3 in just 4 years. The banking sector has therefore become more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations as well as to exposure to asset market bubbles, including real estate.

To cope with the implicit financial risks, the Government has started to implement a series of measures designed to constrain rapid credit growth and force state-owned enterprises and commercial banks to be more careful in how they spend or lend money (Resolution 11 limiting bank’s exposure to non-productive activities, including real estate and securities markets). On the other hand, Vietnam is

expected to meet its commitment to the WTO by additional opening up its banking sector to foreign competition. Competition will therefore intensify again. In this background, the five large State-Owned Banks can be fully assimilated to the overall sovereign risk, while JSB and particularly either those exposed to asset markets or those part of an industrial group deserve a more cautious approach.

Technical Corner

The Banking System Balance gives a measure of the risks associated with imbalances in the overall banking situation of the country, through an appreciation of the links between activity and banks’ health on one hand, and the dependence of domestic banks on foreign financing on the other hand.

Vietnam’s path on this Balance is clearly a progressive increase in the Domestic Credit Risk. This is characterized by a rather limited recourse to foreign funding by Vietnamese banks (an important risk mitigation factor considering the prospects of currency depreciation, indicator of foreign financing on the vertical axis), but also by excessive credit distribution (domestic leverage, horizontal axis). Note that our indicator of domestic leverage can improve even without sharp consequences on overall funding resources if financial markets were more developed and/or if

banks’ capital were strengthened.



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Contacts: Dr. Thomas Choong ([email protected]), Senior Advisor for Asia


tel: +33 299 39 31 40

Country Risk and Opportunities - Vietnam April 2011- IE Singapore

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