-
CountryReport
Egypt
H.A.Hellyer
November2019
http://grease.eui.eu
This Country Report offers a detailed assessment of religious
diversity and
violentreligiousradicalisationintheabove-namedstate.PublishedbytheGREASEproject,thisreportispartaseriescovering23countriesonfourcontinents.EachreportintheserieshasacorrespondingCountryProfile(issuedseparately)offeringmorebasicinformationaboutreligiousaffiliationandstate-religionrelationsinthegivencountry.BoththereportsandprofilesareavailableontheGREASEprojectwebsite.Countriescoveredinthisseries:Albania,Australia,Belgium,BosniaandHerzegovina,Bulgaria,Egypt,France,Germany,Greece,
Italy,Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Lebanon,Lithuania,Malaysia,Morocco,Russia,Slovakia,Spain,Tunisia,TurkeyandtheUnitedKingdom.
TheGREASEprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion'sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementnumber770640
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WhatistheGREASEproject?Involving researchers from Europe, North
Africa, theMiddle East, Asia and
Oceania,GREASEisinvestigatinghowreligiousdiversityisgovernedin23countries.Ourworkfocusesoncomparingnorms,lawsandpracticesthatmay(ormaynot)proveusefulinpreventing
religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on how
differentsocietiescopewiththechallengeofintegratingreligiousminoritiesandmigrants.Theaim
is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can be
governedsuccessfully,withanemphasisoncounteringradicalisationtrends.Whileexploringreligiousgovernancemodelsinotherpartsoftheworld,GREASEalsoattemptstounravel
theEuropeanparadoxofreligiousradicalisationdespitegrowingsecularisation.
We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has
failedbecausesecondgenerationyouthhavebecomemarginalisedandradicalised,withsometurning
to jihadist terrorism networks. The researchers aim to deliver
innovativeacademic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation
while offering insights
forgovernanceofreligiousdiversity.TheprojectisbeingcoordinatedbyProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidoufromTheEuropeanUniversityInstitute(EUI)inItaly.OtherconsortiummembersincludeProfessorTariqModood
fromTheUniversityofBristol (UK);Dr.H.A.Hellyer from
theRoyalUnitedServices Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr.MilaMancheva from
The Centre for the Study ofDemocracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Racius
from Vytautas Magnus University(Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from
the research communications agency
SPIA(Germany);ProfessorMehdiLahloufromMohammedVUniversityofRabat(Morocco);Professor
Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation(Turkey); Professor PradanaBoy
ofUniversitasMuhammadiyahMalang (Indonesia);Professor Zawawi
Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research DevelopmentCentre
(Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru
University(India);andProfessorMicheleGrossmanofDeakinUniversity(Melbourne,Australia).GREASEisscheduledforcompletionin2022.ForfurtherinformationabouttheGREASEprojectpleasecontact:ProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidou,[email protected]
http://grease.eui.eu/GREASE-Radicalisation,SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligion:BringingTogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectives
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Table of Contents
ReligiousdiversityinEgypt:socio-demographiccontext,institutionalframeworkandradicalizationchallenges......................................................................................................4Introduction:AnOverviewofEgypt.................................................................................................4
Egypt’sSocialMakeupandChallenges:.....................................................................................5Socialcomposition:................................................................................................................................5Thebirthandchallengeofradicalisation......................................................................................6
HistoryandCurrentStructureofState-OrganizedReligionRelations:.........................8Egypt’sregulatoryframeworkasarepublicunderAbdel-Nasser:.......................................8
Egypt’sregulatorycurrentframework:....................................................................................8
ReligiousExtremismChallenges:...............................................................................................11State’sCounter-RadicalizationEfforts:CasesandResponses.........................................13Lawandthejudiciary:Firstlinesofattack..................................................................................13ReligiousinstitutionsinEgypt’sWaronTerror........................................................................15Non-statealliances...............................................................................................................................16Regionalcooperation..........................................................................................................................17Militarycampaigns..............................................................................................................................17
Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................18
TimelineofmaineventsthataffectedreligiousdynamicsinrecentEgyptianhistory:................................................................................................................................................19References..........................................................................................................................................21
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Religious diversity in Egypt: socio-demographic context,
institutional framework and radicalization challenges Introduction:
An Overview of Egypt
Asacountrywithapopulationof108millionandahistorystretchingbackto7000BC,Egyptnaturallyhasalongmulti-layeredandrichhistoryofreligiousdiversity.1ButthereligiouslandscapeofmodernEgyptisfarlesslayeredincomparisontoitspast.
About90percentofEgyptiansfollowSunniIslamandtheremaining10percentfollowCopticOrthodoxChristianity.OtherconfessionsofChristianityandShi’iMuslimshaveamoredifficulttimefindingspacewithintheexistingregulatoryframework.Anyandallmembers
of other religious faiths are not recognized by the state. Judaism
remainsrecognizedbutonlyahandfulofitsEgyptiansfollowersareinthecountry.23
ThemostseriousthreattoreligiousdiversityinEgyptatthemomentstemsfromthepolarisation
in the country following the 2011-2013 period, which ended with
themilitary overthrow of the country’s first democratically elected
president,MohamedMorsi of theMuslimBrotherhood (MB), in July2013
amidmassprotests against hisshort,divisive rule.4Thiswas
followedbyan intensesecurity
crackdown,potentiallycontributingtothevulnerabilityofthecountrytonarrativesvis-à-visextremism.
A flurryofextremist Islamistorganizationsemergedstronger in
theaftermathof
thecoup,includingJundal-Islam,al-Murabitunand,mostimportantly,WilayatSinai:theso-called“IslamicState”resilientaffiliateinNorthSinai.ThelattertargetedChristiansandSunniMuslimswho
practice Sufism,whom they view as heretics, on top of
securitypersonnelandstateofficialswithdevastatingefficiencyinrecentyears.567
TheoverthrowofMorsicontributedtoadangerousschisminEgyptiansociety,wherehis
supporters began to deeply resent those sectors of society opposed
to
Morsi,particularlyChristians,whoparticipatedinmassagainstMorsi’sruleintheleaduptotheoverthrowandblamedthemforthestateviolencethatensued.HundredsofMorsisupportersrespondedbyattackingover220churchesandChristianpropertiesacross
1Pérez-Accino,José,"AncientEgyptgaverisetooneoftheworld'soldestChristianfaiths",NationalGeographic,19April2019,https://on.natgeo.com/2ZNgaRF2EgyptSurvey2017.Egyptiangovernment.https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=7195&Year=234483ElGergawi,Sherry,"EgyptmilitaryrestoringchurchesdestroyedfollowingMorsi'souster",AhramOnline,7February2016,english.ahram.org.eg/News/185985.aspx4Speri,Alice,"Egypt’sRabaaMassacreof1,000MorsiSupportersWent‘AccordingtoPlan’",VICENews,12August2014,https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/yw4k87/egypts-rabaa-massacre-of-1000-morsi-supporters-went-according-to-plan5“LiwaaAl-Thawra”,TahrirInstituteforMiddleEastPolicy(TIMEP),29March2017https://is.gd/TSrihB6“Hasam”,TIMEP,29March2017,https://is.gd/iLangP7Awad,Mokhtar;Hashem,Mostafa,“Egypt’sEscalatingIslamistinsurgency”,CarnegieMiddleEastCentre,21October2015https://is.gd/qVZM6I
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thecountry inresponsetothemassacresof
thepro-MorsiprotestcampsofRaba’al-‘Adawiyaandal-NahdainAugust2013.Egyptiansonbothsidesoftheconflict,withhelpfromrelentlesspropagandafromstate-controlledandpro-MBmediaoutlets,cametoseeeachotherasterroristswhowereexistentiallyintentondestroyingtheother.8
The military-dominated regime has repeatedly dismissed the idea
of
reconciliation.WhatisleftofEgypt’sdifferentpoliticalgroupsremaininshockwhilemutualfeelingsofanimosity
and distrust continues to grow unabated between Egypt’s
religiouscommunities.IncidentsofcommunalviolenceagainstChristianshavebeenontheriseinUpperEgypt;membersofSufiordersremainharassedbyIslamistextremistsinNorthSinai;
and citizens who have non-conformist views are reluctant to air
their viewspublicly.
Egypt’s Social Makeup and Challenges:
Social composition:
Totalpopulation: 99,363,807
Muslims 90.00%
Christians 10%
Bahais N/A
Non-believers
N/ASources:EgyptSurvey2017,CentralAgencyforPublicMobilizationandStatistics,Egyptiangovernment.https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=7195&Year=23448
and El
Gergawi,Sherry.“EgyptmilitaryrestoringchurchesdestroyedfollowingMorsi'souster”,AhramOnline.(2016.)EgyptistheArabworld’smostpopulouscentre,withapopulationof108million.9SunniMuslimsmakeupabout90percentofthispopulation,whiletheremaining10percentareChristian.10TheCopticOrthodoxChurchaccountfor90percentofEgypt’sChristians,whiletherestincludeAnglicanorEpiscopalianandProtestantdenominations;Jehovah’sWitnesses;Mormons;GreekandSyrianOrthodox;andArmenianApostolic.Thecountry,whichhasBahai11,Shi’iMuslim,andJewishcommunities,alsohasatheistandagnosticpopulations.However,therearenoreliableestimatesorfiguresforthesegroups.
8Coleman,Jasmine."EgyptelectionresultsshowfirmwinforIslamists,"TheGuardian.21Jan.2012.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/21/egypt-election-clear-islamist-victory9EgyptSurvey2017.Egyptiangovernment.https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/Publications.aspx?page_id=7195&Year=23448
10ElGergawi,Sherry,"EgyptmilitaryrestoringchurchesdestroyedfollowingMorsi'souster",AhramOnline,7February2016,english.ahram.org.eg/News/185985.aspx11TheBahai’sareanoffshootofShi’iIslam–thereligiondatesbacktothe19thcentury.ItisnotrecognisedasapartofShi’ismbyShi’iMuslims,nordoBahai’sconsiderthemselvesassuch.
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Accordingtogovernmentfigures,closeto28percentofEgypt’spopulationearn$28.6amonth,fallingbelowhalfoftheinternationalpovertylineof$1.9aday.12TheaverageEgyptianfamily,consistingoffourpeople,earnsabout$2600ayear.Furthermore,only56percentofhomesarelinkeduptothecountry’ssanitationsystem.13
TheaverageEgyptianfamily’seconomicwoesare,unsurprisingly,closelycorrelatedtotheauthoritarianruleunderwhichthecountryfellthroughoutitshistory.Pre-1952,thepopulationconsistedlargelyofpeasantswhogrewgrain,thecountry’smainsourceoffoodandexport.
WiththeriseoftheFreeOfficersmovementin1952,ledbytheArabnationalistGamalAbdal
Nasser, a welfare systemwas introduced, and the government promised
freeeducationforall,andpublicsectoremployment.Thesepoliciesresonatedwidelywiththemasses,whose
social contractwith the statemandated political acquiescence
inexchangeforupwardsocialmobilityformillionsofEgyptians.However,corruptionandmismanagement
of state funds eroded these benefits. For instance, the quality
ofeducationdeterioratedmassivelythatareportdescribedAbdalNasser’spromiseasa“falseentitlement,especiallyforthepoor,”saying“theeducationavailabletothemhasbeenofsuchpoorqualityastomakeitoflittlerealeconomicbenefit.”14
Furthermore,therapidlygrowingpopulation,whichmorethanquintupledsince1952,meantthatthegovernmentbecameunabletocreatejobsattherequiredpace.
The birth and challenge of radicalisation
Egypt’s President Sisi often describes extremism as the biggest
challenge facing thecountry today. Members of Egypt’s religious
minorities tend to agree, calling it
anexistentialthreattothediversityleftinthecountry.15
Undertheguiseofcombattingextremism,Sisi,asthedefenceministerin2013,ledthemilitaryoverthrowoftheIslamist-ledgovernmentandthefollowingcrackdown.Overthecourseofthefollowingweeksandmonths,therewasaspikeinattacksonchurchesandChristianproperty–particularlythedayofandfollowingtheforcefuldispersalofthepro-Morsisit-ins–leavingover220churchestorched,andprovidedanarrativethatledtoamilitantgroupinSinaicalledAnsarBaytal-Maqdisgainingmoreprominencethanhitherto.OpponentstothemilitaryanditscrackdownagainstMorsi’ssupportersfalsely
considered Christians to be disproportionately responsible for the
military’smove,whichlikewisefedintodiscoursethatproblematisedthemfurtherviahatespeechandincitementtoviolence.
12CentralAgencyforPublicMobilizationandStatistics’graphshowingpercentageofthoseunabletoaffordthecostofobtainingfoodonly(costofsurvival)https://www.capmas.gov.eg/Pages/IndicatorsPage.aspx?Ind_id=112113ibid14Birdsall,Nancy,"PuttingeducationtoworkinEgypt",CarnegieEndowmentCenterforInternationalPeace,25August1999https://carnegieendowment.org/1999/08/25/putting-education-to-work-in-egypt-pub-685%20Car
15 Sayed, Ashraf, “Countering terrorism is the most dangerous issue
for 2018: Sisi follows the Comprehensive Military Operation in
Sinai”, Veto, 9 February 2018, https://www.vetogate.com/3062805
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Theseeventstappedintoanexistingcrisisofradicalisationwithinthecountry,whichispartially
connected to the spread of purist Salafism in Egypt from the 1970s.
Largenumbersofmostlyblue-collarworkersmigratingtothenascent,oil-richeconomiesoftheArabianGulf,ledtotheintensificationofthepresenceofSaudi-stylepuristSalafism,invariousforms,someofwhichweremoreextremethanothers.16Thiscombinedwithotherfactors,includingtheglobalpost-9/11surge,furtherprovidedtheenvironmentformorereceptiverecruitstoradicalismincountrieslikeEgypt.17
The“ArabSpring”periodincluded,alongsidemovementsagainstauthoritarianregimes,themeteoricriseofISIS.Withitsflashyandshockingpropagandavideos,itcapturedtheimagination
of some of Egypt’s extremist Islamist-leaning youths. These
youthwereencouragedbymanyfactors,bothonthemacroorindividuallevel,totakeuparmsandjoinmilitants.
One such factor, thathasproved significant innarrativesof
extremists, is the state’srestrictive policies.Since 2013, human
rights organisations report that the
stateoversawviolationstobasicrightsinitsquesttocrackdownondissent,withmassarrestsandabuses.18With
state laws criminalizingmost formsofpeaceful
opposition,manyyouthsbecame receptive to the narrative that
violence is their only option. Inmanycases,youths claimed they were
motivated by the desire to retaliate against
staterepression,eveniftheywereoriginallyapolitical.
Geopolitical factors also facilitate theexistence and adaptionof
violent
actorswithinEgyptianborders,aswiththecasesofnorthernSinaiandtheWesternDesert.InSinai,geopolitics
intertwineswith structural grievances, includingpolitical and
economicfactors.
Fallingontheborder,wherethecentralgovernment’ssecuritygripisfragile,theNorthofthepeninsulabecameahotbedformilitantstotakeuprootandtorecruitaminorityof
the disgruntled population.Also,the region was idealforcriminal and
illegalpractices, which provided resources for militants and
secures their survival in thepeninsula.
Lack of proper religious education aids in the recruitment
process of youth
byradicals.Mediareportsonjailsanddetentioncentresshowthatthosewithoutsufficientreligiousknowledgearevulnerabletoradicalbrainwashing.
AccordingtoanotedresearcherontheMB’strajectories19,policiesofdetentioncentresthemselveswork
in favour of radicalisation.Withmanynon-violent prisoners
facingterrorism-related charges, scores endup jailedwith radicals
in the same cell,wheredebatesanddiscussionsbetween inmates can
result in the successful
recruitmentofyouth,eitherbypressureorpersuasion.
16Rock-Singer,Aaron,"Islamicmediaandreligiouschangein1970sEgypt",MPCJournal,23January2017,https://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/01/23/islamic-media-and-religious-change-in-1970s-egypt/17ByersD.,Bryan;JonesA.,James,"Theimpactoftheterroristattacksof9/11onanti-Islamichatecrime,"JournalofEthnicityinCriminalJustice,5:1,2007,p43-5618Roth,Kenneth,“Egypt:Eventsof2017”,HumanRightsWatch,https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/egypt19Ayyash,Abdelrahman,“Strongorganization,weakideology”,ArabReformInitiative,29thApril2019,https://is.gd/34SxEH
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Oneofthefactorsattractingmanyyouthstomilitantgroupsistheirneedtofulfilasenseofachievementandaccomplishment.Armedgroups’propagandasuccessfullymarketstheirvictoriesagainstofficialtroopsontheground.Withanoutreachandqualitythatareunprecedented,
thispropaganda
isunmatchedbyplayersofmainstreampoliticalIslamism,whocanneitherafford,noraretechnicallyequippedtocounterit.
Regional developments and foreign policy are also very
importantdeterminants inradicalisation.20After all, it is the
common element between the post-2011wave ofviolence and the ones
that followed the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan
andAmerican occupation of Iraq.Amidst the 2011 uprisings, Iranian
andRussianinterventions supporting theSyrian regimeagainst
themostly-Sunni
insurgentshavespurredmanyEgyptianyouthtotakesidesintheconflicttosupportciviliansandthevulnerable.21
History and Current Structure of State-Organized Religion
Relations:
Egypt’s regulatory framework as a republic under
Abdel-Nasser:
With Egypt becoming a republic in 1952, its three-star flag
resembling its
diversepopulationwasreplaced,andanArabnationalistidentityoverpoweredanyother.Eventhough
the state claimed it was a neutral protector of Egypt’s three main
religiouscommunities -- theMuslims,Christiansand Jews -- its
securityagenciesandpoliticalelitepursuedJewsand,toalesserextent,ChristiansforallegedtiestoIsrael.
AstheEgyptianstatewaspreoccupiedwiththestruggletotakebacktheSinaiPeninsulafromtheIsraelisandtransitionfromamonarchyintoarepublic,littleattentionwaspaidtorelationsbetweenreligiouscommunities.
ThischangedslightlyafterAbdel-Nasser,Egypt’snewruler,survivedanassassinationattemptandblameditonIslamistmovements
liketheMBandoversawacrackdownagainstthemin1956.Theepisodeendedwiththeexecutionoftheirfounder,Hassanal-Banna,andthearrestandabuseofmanyofitsfollowers.
Egypt’s regulatory current framework:
Since the
latePresidentAnwarElSadat’s1971constitutionaladjustments,
Islamhasbeenamainsourceof legislation,presumably
towinoverconservativesupport.Thecurrentconstitution,passedin2014andamendedin2019,isinlinewiththis.Likeitspredecessors,
itacknowledgesthethreeAbrahamicreligion,and its
thirdarticlesays
20Drevon,Jerome,“EmbracingSalafiJihadisminEgyptandMobilizingintheSyrianJihad”,MiddleEastCritique,25:4,18July2016,pp321-339,p9-1021Ahmed,NouranS.,“Towardunderstandingviolenceandrevisingcounter-violencepoliciesinsouthernMediterranean”,Euromesco,April2019https://is.gd/wJCITU
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thatJudaismandChristianityarethesourcesoflegislationforpersonalstatuslawfortheiradherents.
With time, relations between religious communities became a more
sensitive
issuedomesticallyandanissueofinternationalconcernastheextremistIslamistcrisisbegantodevelopfromthe1970s.
New rounds of repression in the 80s and 90s followed the 1981
assassination
byextremistsofAbdel-Nasser’ssuccessor,AnwarElSadat,formakingpeacewithIsraelin1973.
Stories of torture and killings in Egypt’s detention centres helped
both theBrotherhood and Salafi groups, like Ansar al-Sunna and
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyaa, gainsome sympathy in Egyptian society. This
paved the way to the current
chargedatmosphereofmistrustthatEgyptsuffersfrom.AsefBayatargues:
“The major difference lay in the fact that Egypt began to
develop a fairly
powerfulIslamistmovementsincethepresidencyofAnwarSadatwhopaidlipservicetotherising“Islamic
Associations” in the universities as a way to undermine the
Nasseristnationalists and communists as he was drawing close to the
West. These IslamicAssociationsgrewand,
intheprocess,gotradicalizedbythe1980sduring(PresidentHosni)Mubarak’srule,turningintotheinsurgental-Gama’aal-Islamiyyaandal-Jihad.TogetherwiththepowerfulMuslimBrotherhood,whohadmaintainedtheirnon-violentstrategy,andotheremerginggroups,Egyptexperiencedastrong“Islamicmode”duringthe1990sandearly2000s.Egypt’s
Islamismdevelopedbasicallyoutsideandeveninoppositiontoal-Azharortheinstitutionoftheulema.”22
TheEgyptstate’sapproachtoreligiousdiversity,since1952,wasandcontinuestobereactionary
and largely dormant,meaning the state only acts in order to contain
anoutburstofviolenceorissueperfunctoryreassurancesthatallEgyptianswereseenasequalperiodically.
Egyptians falling outside of the three Abrahamic religions -
like atheists,
Bahais,agnostics-haveandcontinuetobeunacknowledgedbythestateanditslaws.
The regime, however,maintains that article 64of the
constitution,which states that“freedomof religion is absolute,” has
and still doesprovide sufficient guarantees
forEgyptianstopracticeandholdothernon-Abrahamicbeliefs.
Butthisspecificationhasnotremovedbureaucraticlimitations,someofwhichdatebackto
the Ottoman-era, which restrain Copts’ ability to build places of
worship,
forexample.23Upuntil2016,Egypthadalaw,issuedin1934bytheinteriorministry,thatforbade
the building of churches near schools or railway stations.24In
2016, Copticleaderspraisedthepartial liftingofsomeofits
limitations,
likeomittingthepreviousrequirementofobtainingpermissionfromsecurityagenciesbeforebuildingchurches.
22Gokmen,Ozgur,“FiveyearsaftertheArabuprisings:AninterviewwithAsefBayat”Jadaliyya,30April2016https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/3322223Abouelenein,Ahmed;Abdellah,Mohamed,"Egyptianparliamentapproveslong-awaitedchurchbuildinglaw,"Reuters,30August2016https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-religion/egyptian-parliament-approves-long-awaited-church-building-law-idUSKCN1152KK24Mazel,Zvi,“AnewlawaimstomakebuildingchurchesinEgypteasier–Butwillitwork?",TheJerusalemPost,6September2016,https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/A-new-law-aims-to-make-building-churches-in-Egypt-easier-but-will-it-work-466890
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The2016lawdoesmaintaintheauthorities’righttochoosethesizeofthechurchbasedonthenumberofChristiansinitsarea—acalculationthatisdifficulttoassesssincethegovernmentdoesnot
accept independent tallies of Christiansby church leaders,
nordoesitcountthemitself.25
Other constitutional articles that do providemore protections,
like article 65,whichguarantees freedomof expression, is
constrained by the vaguelyworded penal
codearticlesof98(f),160and161.26Eventhoughtheconstitution’slegalauthorityoverridesthat
of the penal code, the aforementioned vaguely-worded articles are
routinelyemployedbyauthorities toprosecutepeople for
theirexpressedviews.27Since2011,therehavebeenatleast63suchcases,andin2017theUSCommissiononInternationalReligiousFreedomrankedEgyptsixthintheworldforharshblasphemylaws.28
Even when there are no penal or civil codes obstructing the
application of
liberalconstitutionalarticles,likearticle53thatcriminalisesreligion-baseddiscrimination,thestatehasfailedtoapplythem.Forexample,itisextremelydifficultforMuslimstochangetheirreligionstatusontheirnationalID,butitispossibleforChristianstochangetheirstoIslam.TheBahaiswere,accordingtopressreports,theonlynon-AbrahamicreligiousminoritytoevercomeclosetogettingrecognitionintheirnationalID.Aftersuingthegovernment,
all that they managed to achieve in 2009 was replace their
religiousidentificationwithadash(-).29
Outsidecivilrightsmatters,article2,whichstatesthattheprinciplesoftheShariaaretheprinciplesourceoflegislation,hashadlittleimpactonEgyptianlaws,whoseFrenchorigins(intermsofcivillaw)arearelicofthe19thcenturyFrenchoccupationofEgypt.Article2actsasa
restrainingmechanism in termsof legalprecedent, rather
thananactivepositivelaw-makingmechanism.
Thereare,however,signsthatthestate’sapproachtogoverningtherelationsbetweenreligiouscommunitiesmaychangeorbecomemoreproactiveinthenear-ormedium-term.PresidentSisihasbeenattendingChristmasmasscelebrationssince2016,whichsentanobjectivelysmallbutrareandsignificantmessageofinclusiontothepublicasheisthefirstEgyptianpresidenttodoso.30Atthesametime,theincreaseinprosecutionsofperceivedinsultstoreligionsignalledtomanyachangeofstate’spolicyofindifferencetowardsnon-conformiststhatwaspresentpriortotheriseofIslamistradicalisation.31
25Abouelenein&Abdellah26Barsoum,Marina."Egypt'santi-blasphemylaw:Defenceofreligionortoolforpersecution?"AhramOnline,15May2016,english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/151/216896/Egypt/Features/Egypts-antiblasphemy-law-Defence-of-religion-or-to.aspx27Ibid28"Rankingcountriesbytheirblasphemylaws",TheEconomist,13August2017,https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2017/08/13/ranking-countries-by-their-blasphemy-laws?fsrc=rss29"Egypt:DecreeEndsIDBiasAgainstBaha'is",HumanRightsWatch,15April2009,https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/15/egypt-decree-ends-id-bias-against-bahais30"Egypt'sSisiattendsCopticChristmascelebrationamidtightsecurity,"Xinhua.7January2018.www./xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/07/c_136877006.htm31Darwish,Passant."Egypt's'waronatheism',"AhramOnline.15January2015.english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/151/120204/Egypt/Features/Egypts-war-on-atheism.aspx
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Religious Extremism Challenges:
i) Violentnon-jihadi32current:Segmentsof
thewiderMB-inspireduniversewhich tookuparmsafter2013, are
theprincipal representative of this category.Those armed groups are
knownas
the“QualitativeCommittees”(QC),andcametolifeofficiallyandorganizationallyin2014,withthesupportofMohamedKamal.AmemberoftheMB’sGuidanceBureau,KamelledacurrentwithinthewiderMB-universethatendorsedamore‘confrontational’attitude,whichappearstohaveincludedcertaintypesofviolence.AstheMBfragmented,KamalemergedasthegodfatherandengineerofQC,andhispoliticalwingwasreportedlyableto
consolidate control oversome provincial bureaus along the Nile
Delta, includingFayoum, Alexandria, BaniSoueif,Minya, Giza,
Cairo,QalyoubiaandMunifiya,withfluctuatinginfluenceonsomebureaus.33ThefirstsuchgroupreportedlyfoundedunderKamal’s
supervision to deploy such violence was the Popular Resistance
andRevolutionaryPunishmentgroup(PRRP)in2015.Kamelwaskilledbysecurityforcesin2016.
Other groups includeLiwa’al-Thawra, which claimed the
assassination ofGeneralRegai, commander of the ninth armoured
division in Dahshur in2016.34Hasm(Sawa’idMisr) is another group
thatwas established in 2016 and hasconducted both explosive attacks
andtargeted policemen.It also attempted
theassassinationoftheformergrandmufti,AliGomaa,andthedeputyprosecutor,GeneralZakariaAbdelAziz.35
Othersmaller,short-livedgroupswerepossiblyexperimentsleadingtotheemergenceofQC.TheseincludeMaghouloun(Anonymous),Wala’a(SetonFire)andMolotov,whichprovided
instructionsonhowtouseMolotovcocktailsagainstpolice
forces.Anotherentity,called‘Edam(Execution),aimedatassassinatingpolicemenandthugshiredbysecurity
forces to chase and beat demonstrators. Finally, there were
theHelwanBrigades,whoweremostlyarrestedshortlyafterseveraloperations.36
Thesecurrents,madeupmostlyofMBsupporters,usedminimalreligiousinterpretationtojustifytheiruseofviolence,emphasizingontherighttouseviolencetodefendtheirlivesandagainst
those who kill the protesters.Generally speaking, this
category’sdiscourse focuseson conceptsof “resistance”, “revengeon
stateapparatusdue to its
32Weuse‘jihadi’hereasatermthatisusedgenerallyintheliterature,whilenotingthat‘jihad’isusedwidelyinIslamicliteratureinthesamewaythat‘justwar’isusedinCatholicdoctrines.Inotherwords,whilethewordhasbeeninstrumentalisedbyextremists,ithasaverynormativebasiswithinIslamicthought,anddoesnotautomaticallymeanextremism.Indeed,Muslimsofallnormativetypesviewthewordinapositivefashion.AsoneIslamicscholarmentioned,‘terrorismistojihadwhatadulteryistomarriage’.33Hamama,Mohamed,“InteriorministrypolicyinkstheendoftheQualitativeCommittees’Engineer”,MadaMasr,4October2016,https://is.gd/zORpss34“LiwaaAl-Thawra”,TahrirInstituteforMiddleEastPolicy(TIMEP),29March2017https://is.gd/TSrihB35“Hasam”,TIMEP,29March2017,https://is.gd/iLangP36VideopublishedbyAl-MasryAl-YowmallegedlyshowingHelwanBrigadesfightersintheirfirstappearancehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-OQMPeJk60U
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violations”and“restoringtheIslamicruleofMohamedMorsi”.37However,recentpublicstatementsissuedbythePRRPrevealashiftinthediscourseandthetechnicalaspectsof
the videos, which could imply the influence of extremist actors or
a possiblecollaboration.38
Theseviolent,non-jihadi groupsmainlyoperate in themainlandand,
apart from theaforementioned human targets, theyalso
attackedproperties, infrastructure,andeconomicinterests.
ii)
ViolentSalafi-Jihadicurrent:ThiscategorycomprisesofSalafi-JihadiactorsaffiliatedeitherwithISISorAl-Qaeda,orsomerelativelylocaljihadiactors.WhileitisknownthatbothISISandAl-Qaedamainlyoperateinremoteandborderareas,eitherintheSinaiPeninsulaortheWesternDesert,theyarealsoactive
in themainlandtosomeextent.Bothgroupsareknownfor theirhighly
advanced training, strategies and equipment as militias, and are
togetherresponsibleforsomeofthedeadliestoperationsagainstsecurityforces.
WithregardstoISIS-affiliatedactors,thisconsistsofAnsarBaital-Maqdis(ABM)whichdeclared
allegiance to ISIS in 2014 andrenamed itself asWilayatSinai (the
SinaiProvince).Mainly operating in Sinai, the group’s scope of
targets has significantlybroadened following the 2013 overthrow
ofMorsi, from primarily targeting the gaspipelinesbetweenEgyptand
Israeland IsraelisnearSinai, to thenattackingsecurityforces,
civilians accused of aiding security forces, and more recently
tourists,
likedowningtheRussianpassengerjetin2015;Christians,throughkillingthemorforcingthemtofleetheirhomesinSinai;andSufigroups,throughthe2017attackonamosquethatleftover305worshippersdead.Theyhavetakenhostages,mainlyforeigners.39
Thereisalsotheso-called“IslamicStateinEgypt”(ISE)(i.e.,ISISinEgypt),whichlikelymaintainsconnectionswiththeSinaiProvince.ISEismainlyactiveinthemainland,andsomeanalyststhinkitismostlycentredinCairoandGiza,withlesspresenceinothergovernorates.40IthasclaimedmajoroperationslikebombinganItaliangovernmentalofficeinCairo,andattacksonCopticchurchesinCairoandAlexandria.41Theirversionof
Salafi-Jihadism is derived from that of Al-Qa’eda, which regards
the state and itsapparatusasapostates.
As forAl-Qaeda-affiliateactors, theseareactive inbothSinaiand
thewesterndesert.One of their major armsisJundAl-Islam, which
conducted several attacks on
statefacilitiesinSinai.42However,Al-Murabitun,whichwasfoundedbyformerspecialforcesofficerHishamAshmawywhowaspreviouslyamemberinABM,isthemostprominent
37Awad,Mokhtar;Hashem,Mostafa,“Egypt’sEscalatingIslamistinsurgency”,CarnegieMiddleEastCentre,21October2015https://is.gd/qVZM6I38Mcmanus,Allison;Green,Jake,“Egypt’smainlandterrorismlandscape”,TIMEP,7June2016https://is.gd/kCS9mj39“WilayatSinai”,TIMEP,23July2014https://timep.org/esw/non-state-actors/wilayat-sinai/40Mcmanus&Green,ibid.41“IslamicStateInEgypt”,TIMEP,8May017https://is.gd/hEnWWX42“JundAl-Islam”,TIMEP,22July2014https://is.gd/KY67z3
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armed group believed to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda.It is active
in
thewesterndesertandLibyaandisreportedtoincludesomeformermilitaryofficers.43
Otherlower-profileviolent groupswith ties to Al-Qaeda andAshmawy
are Ansar
al-IslamandJabhatal-Tahrir.44Theformerisrecognisedforits2017attackinthewesternoasis
which left 58 officers andsoldiers killed. 45 Itcameback to the
scenebydeclaringnew attacks oneconomic propertiesof American
corporation forpetroleum“Apache”, by using IEDs, whilst threatening
British Petroleum,
Italiancorporation(ENI)andApachetoleavethecountryandtowithholdalltheiroperationsonEgyptland.46Anotheraffiliateofal-QaedaisAnsaral-Sharia,whichhasbeenactiveinEgyptsince2011.SomeofitsleadershavetieswithMuhammedal-Zawahiri,longbeforethe2011uprising.47Regionallinkswerepresentobviously,whetherwithSalafi-JihadigroupsinGazaorwithSalafi-JihadionesinMaliviaLibya.48
Ahomegrownjihadigroupthathassetitselfapartfrombothregionalandglobalactorslike
IS and Al-Qaeda, is AjnadMisr (Egypt’s Soldiers). 49 The
short-lived
groupdisappearedafteritsleaderHamamAttiya,whooperatedinIraqintheearly2000s,waskilledbysecurityforces.Thegroupwasflexibleinopeningitsdoorstomemberswhohold
no strong connections to other jihadi factions, and shared the same
principletargetsofpolicemen,militaryforcesandjudges.50
State’s Counter-Radicalization Efforts: Cases and Responses
Law and the judiciary: First lines of attack
EgyptwitnessedanunprecedentedlegislativeexpansionafterJune2013toconsolidatethecurrentregime’spriorities,andtoalsocontainallthreatstothatordercausedbyJanuary2011uprising.
Thefirstlegal-legislativetrackincludesthepresidentialdecreeontheTerroristEntitiesandListsLawno.8of2015.Thislegislationregulateslistsofthoseaccusedofterrorism-relatedcharges,basedonarequestsubmittedtotheAttorneyGeneral,pendingtheirtrial
before courts. Security services’ investigations alone are enough
to get a
nameaddedtotheterroristlist,withouttheneedtointerrogatethesuspect.Yet,thedecisiontolistsuspectsarefinalandisnotappealable,andbasedontheserequests,theassetsofthoselistedarefrozenandsuspectsarebannedfromtraveling.Thislawwasfollowedby
theTerrorist FundsLawno. 22of 2018,which tasks anewly established
judicial
43Zahran,Mostafa,“RegionalJihad:ContemporaryJihadistmovementsinEgypt”inbook:“WhatispoliticalinIslam?”(Maal-seyaseyfeal-Islam?),DarMaraya,2018,p13644Ibid45Walsh,Declan;Youssef,Nour,“MilitantsKillEgyptianSecurityForcesinDevastatingAmbush”,NewYorkTimes,21October2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/world/middleeast/egypt-ambush-hasm.html46https://www.facebook.com/ahmed.mawlana.16/posts/656155831520140?__tn__=K-R47Ibid48Verdictincasepubliclyknownas“MadinatNasrCell”,Manshurat,22October2014https://manshurat.org/node/128949“AjnadMisr”,TIMEP,22July2014https://timep.org/esw/non-state-actors/ajnad-misr/50Zahran,p138-140
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committee with creating lists of terrorist individuals and
entities. The
committeeconfiscatesalltheprivatepropertyofthoseintheaforementionedlists,addingthemtostatecoffers.Thecommittee’sdecisionsinthisregardarealsofinal.
Later, the Countering Terrorism Law (no. 94/2015) was issued,
providing a broaddefinition ofwhat constitutes a terrorist
act,whichmade the expression of
politicalprotestsusceptibletoprosecution.
Furthermore, the law includes unprecedented indicators of the
state’s
retaliatoryapproach.Itshieldsalltroopsenforcingthelawfromanycriminalresponsibilitywhenexhibitingforceinconfrontations.
Thelawalsopenalisestheconcealmentofterrorism-relatedinformation;theprovisionoflogisticalsupportforterroristoperations;andthefacilitationofperpetrators’escapewhetherbeforeoraftertheexecutionofterroristattacks.Onlyfirstdegreerelativesoftheaccusedareexempted.Aimedtoeliminateallbreedinggroundsforterrorism,thisprovision,
however, can be used to easily undermine the guarantees of justice
andimpartiality.
Amendments toexisting lawshavealsobeenratifiedwitha focuson
terrorism.ThisincludesArticle102aof thePenalCode,whichpenalizes
firstdegreerelatives if theywithheld information about the
existence and use of explosives. The law
intensifiespenaltiesforarmedforcesandpoliceofficersgettinginvolvedinterrorism,aspreviousperiodsrevealedthepresenceofmanyofthemwithintheranksofsomegroupsthatemergedintheaftermathof2011,especiallyafter2013.
Despitethisspreeofterrorism-focusedlegislations,Sisicriticizedthetraditionalcourseofjusticeasinsufficientandfutilewhenhandlingterrorism,andthatitrequireswideramendmentstoensureswiftnessinadjudicatingsuchcases.Thisswiftnesswasrevealedinthespeedwithwhichindividualsareaddedtolistsofterroristentities:thiscannowtakenomorethansevendays.Also,newamendmentstotheCodeofCriminalProcedurehaveensuredthatswiftnessofadjudicationintrialsandsentencingarecodified.Thiswasachievedbyensuringthatrulingscanbeissuedinabsentia.Swiftnesshasalsobeentangible
in authorities’ conduct of death penalties, eliminating any chance
ofbacktrackingorappealsincaseswherenewevidenceemerges.
Beyond the civilian judiciary system, military courts have also
been pivotal inprosecuting suspects of terrorism charged with
targeting army establishments
ormembersofthearmedforces,includingarmyconscripts.
Imposingastateofemergency,andtheenactmentoftheemergencylaw,particularlyinNorth
Sinai and following thebombingof SaintMark'sCopticOrthodoxCathedral
inAlexandriainApril2017,hashelpedtheregimereproducetheCourtsofStateSecurity,characterizedbytheirhastytrialsandunappealablesentences.
Furthermore,Law25of2018usheredthecreationoftheSupremeCouncilofCombatingExtremism,whose
task is todevelop counterterrorism strategies at thenational
andregional levels, including the drafting of developmental schemes
for
marginalizedregions,andtheputtingtogetherofeducationalcurriculathatservethesegoals.Securityapparatusesdominatethecouncil,andsecrecyengulfsitsdeliberationsanddecisions,allowing
for little tobeknownof its composition, role, and real
impact.TheGeneral
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Intelligence Directorate, the Military Intelligence, the
National Security
Agency(formerlyStateSecurity)andtheAdministrativeControlAuthority–whichisdirectlycontrolledbythepresident-areallrepresentedinthecouncil.
Religious institutions in Egypt’s War on Terror
i) MinistryofEndowments(MoE)
MoE’splaysaparticularlyactiveroleincombattingterrorismbyvirtueofitsauthorityover
mosques. The ministry’s main focus is to dismantle potential
channels ofcommunicationbetweenorganizationsofextremist Islamismand
lessradicalgroups,andthepublic,whichcantakeplacethroughmosquesandtheirfaculties.
As such, lawno.51of2014 stipulates that religious
sermonsmustbeauthorizedbyimams of Al-Azhar, and delivered only by
those appointed by the MoE. Temporarypermits issued for imams
todeliver sermonsallow for the
continuousmonitoringoftheircompliancetodistributedinstructions.
Informalprayerhalls,orsmallermosquesknownaszawaya,werebroughtundertheMoE’ssupervisionbydecreeno.64of2014.Since2013,theministryhasreportedlyshutdownnearly20,000zawaya.
The MoE also undertook initiatives to safeguard youth from being
recruited
byfundamentalists,whichincludethe"SchoolsofKnowledge"initiativethatwaslaunchedin
2017 and involves imams teaching religious curriculum to the public
in schoolsoperatinginmajormosques.
Similarly,manyfemalepreachershavebeenappointedtotrackwomenwhoaccountforthemajorityofdonationmadetosupportextremistgroupsaswellaspoliticalreligiousgroupsthatopposethestate.Abanonsuchfinancialactivitybynon-governmententitiesinmosqueshasalsobeenimposedbyaMoEdecree.
ii)
Al-AzharAl-Azhar,theworld’spre-eminentseatofreligiouslearningforSunniMuslims,isalsoactive
incombatingextremism,albeitatapredominantlyglobal level.Oneof
itsvitalinstruments is al-Azhar’s Observatory to Combat Extremism
with its social mediaplatforms, which uses 12 languages to spread
its interpretation of Islam and
tracksterroristoperationsinvariouscountriesandstudiesthem.
As for its role at home, al-Azhar’s efforts include
representatives holding communalsessions within local communities,
which in large part targets university studentsnationwide.
That being said, al-Azhar’s biggest contribution to the war on
extremism is
theamendmentsitmadetotheinstitution’slearningcurriculaafter2013.Theobjectivewastoreviseandeliminateexcerptsofthecurriculawhichareseentoinciteviolenceandhatred,especiallyagainstChristians,ordeemed
toooutdatedandclashwithmoderntimes.Theseupdatedcurriculaaresubjecttoassessmenteverythreeyears.
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iii) Daral-Ifta’(HouseofEdicts)Dar al-Ifta’ is another
government institution that launched its own
media-focusedMonitoringObservatorytoexamineradicalviewsandrefutethemonsocialmedia.
Theextenttowhichthesethreeinstitutionsimpactthefightagainstextremismremainsunclear.
Similarly, their outreach among youth and other social groups
cannot
beaccuratelyassessed.However,it’slikelythattheireffortsonthegroundarelimitedinimpactbecauseofthemulti-layeredgapsthatseparatethemfromaveragecitizensandtheirdailyhardshipsandconcerns.
Non-state alliances
AlthoughtheEgyptiancounterterrorismstrategyisa‘statist’one,thereareotherfactorswhichmustnotbeoverlooked.Thisis,forinstance,howthestateanditsbodiesco-optednumbersofcommunityforcesintheborderprovinces.This
isevident
inthewesternpartsofEgypt,whereSalafismhassignificantinfluenceandwherethestatereachedanunderstandingwiththetribestheretofacilitatethearrestofwantedterroristswhorelyon
logistical support from locals of these regions. Thus, the state
achieved a
tightercontroloverthewesternborderswithLibya,andalsosucceededinreleasingsecurityofficerswhowerekidnappedbyoutlawedterroristgroups
in
theseregions.Suchco-optationoftribesinvolvedpledgesofdroppinglegalchargesagainsttheirleadersandpayingcompensationtovictimswhofellduringclashesbetweengovernmenttroopsandarmedmilitants.Inexchangeforthat,tribesmenmustassistauthoritiesinenforcinglawandorderintheirregions,andincontrollingtheflowofweaponsacrossborders.
A similar pactwas achievedwith thepopulationofNorth Sinai,
althoughon amuchlarger and more complex scale. The state bodies and
the local tribes in Sinai
havereachedcertainunderstandings,manifestedinthe‘UnionoftheTribesofSinai,’anentitybringingtogetherpro-statetribesmen.
The state-tribes cooperation in North Sinai plays a role more
similar to that of
theAwakeningmovementinIraq.Thiscanbewitnessedthroughthepartakingoftribesmenincombat,andtheirinvolvementininspectingandinterrogatingterroristscapturedbythesecurityforces.ThiscooperationhasledtheABMterroristgrouptotargetleadersandmembersofpro-armytribes.
Inrecentyears,suchallianceswithSinai
localshavebeenonthedeclinebecausethearmy’s security strategy
shifted to relying primarily on evacuating entire
cities,demolishing many residential areas and agricultural land.
Unsurprisingly, this
hasseverelyimpactedthelivesandlivelihoodsoflocals.Therehavealsobeenreportsonabusesandviolationscarriedoutbysecurityforcesagainstlocalcommunities.
ElsewhereinEgypt,particularlyintheNewValley(oral-Wadial-Gedid)Governorate,such
forms of communal alliance completely vanished as the state uses
pureauthoritarianismtocontrolbothsecurityandadministrativeaspectsoftheregion.Asidefrom
the aforementioned rare incidents of communal collaboration,
Egypt’s war on
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terrorhasbeenpredominantlystate-controlled,andtwospecificexamplesofthestate’srejectionofcommunalcollaborationstandoutthemost.Thefirsttookplacein2014bythe
Salafi al-Nour Party and Da’wa movement, under the banner of ‘Egypt
WithoutViolence’,whichwasrejectedandstoppedbythestateunderthepretextofit
lackingcoordinationwiththeauthorities.
Similarly,asetofinitiativesputforthbytheConstructionandDevelopmentPartyofAl-Gama’aAl-Islamiyya,callingfornonviolencefrombothstateandanti-stategroups,failedtogainanytractioninEgypt’spoliticalsphere,andwasshunnedbythestate.
Regional cooperation
Onaregionallevel,theEgyptianstatecoordinateswithseveralneighbouringcountriesinthewaronterrorism.TheHamasmovement,anoffshootoftheMBwhichgovernstheGazastrip,hascometoaidtheEgyptiangovernmentthroughcommittingtoclosingjointbordersduringthecourseofthemostrecentmilitaryoperation.Hamasalsoprovidedintelligence
to the Egyptian military relevant to the fight against armed
groups.Furthermore,thegovernmentoftheGazaStripestablisheda100mdeepbufferzone,extendingalongthe13kmbordersitshareswithEgypt.
To the south andwest, Egypt coordinatedwith Sudan, andwith
theLibyanNationalArmy(LNA)underKhalifaHaftarintheiroffence,whichalsotargetsmilitantsassociatedwithIS.TherecentarrestofAl-Murabitun’sleadingfigureHishamAshmawi,theformerEgyptian
special forces officer,marks thepeakof this alliancebetween
theEgyptianstate,Haftar’sforcesandthegovernmentinTobruk.
Withinthiscontext,theEgyptianstatehasuseditsmembershipinthepan-ArabAnti-Terrorism
Convention to push forth its classification of theMB as a terrorist
group,whichwaspassedin2013.
Military campaigns
Inrelationtosecurityandmilitaryconfrontations,Egypt’sarmedforceshaveconducteda
series of military confrontations, mostly focusing in North Sinai
as the hotbed
ofmilitarygroups,butwhichalsoincludedpartsoftheDeltaanddesertswestoftheNilevalley.
Throughout these operations, official military statements
frequently announce
thesuccessofadvancesmadeagainstextremists,aswellaslossesinflictedintheranksofsecurityforces.However,itisdifficulttoverifyorchallengetheaccuracyofsuchdata,since
theanti-terrorism lawpenalises thepublicationof
falsenewsorstatementsonterrorist acts or counterterror operations
contrary to official Ministry of Defencestatements.
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Inasimilarvein,thestatepledgesdevelopmentprojectsinNorthSinaionadministrativeandeconomiclevels,butthesepromiseshavenotyetborneanyfruit,andthereisnotalkaboutprogramstorehabilitateradicalizedindividuals.
Conclusion
Althoughthestatemayhavemadeprogress in its fightagainst
terrorism,
thewaronterrorisnotover,andfutureroundsarelikelytobefiercer.Anti-terrorismpoliciesareunlikely
to be less political, while strategies would benefit from involving
moresubstantialsocietalinvolvement.
Egypt’s counter-radicalisationpoliticshavebeen fully
state-dominated,which canbeunderstood within the context of the
current regime’s rise. According to the state’snarrative,
Sisi’sregime saved the state and society from the post-2011 chaos
andterrorism,forwhichitblamessignificantfactionsofthesocietyfor.Withinthatcontext,societalefforts,initiativesorrecommendationsareexcluded;thestatedoesn’tseekanypartnership
with societal groups. Efforts to combat terrorism are
politicizedandpopulist, aimedat consolidatingpowerdynamics that
favour the currentwaronterrordynamic.
Capitalizingoninternationalcommunity’sfearofterrorism,theauthoritiesfocusonthewaronterrornarrativetoextendandexpandthelimitsofexception,makingitthenormforeverydaypolitics.Initswaronterror,thestateusesalltools.Thejudiciarysystemhas
become entangled in the politicized war on terror, leading to
accusation
ofunderminingitsownperceivedcredibilityandindependencewithnewlegislation.
Aspreviouslydiscussed,approximately90percentofEgyptiansareSunniMuslimsandthevastmajorityoftheremainderarefollowersofCopticOrthodoxChristianity.EgypthasahandfulofJews,Bahais,atheistsandMuslimsfromothersects,thatnumberinthelow
thousands. This, combinedwith the fact that Egypt has been run by a
stronglymilitary-influencedNasseriterepublicanmodelsince1952,limitspublicdiscussiononsuchasensitiveissueasreligiousdiversity,exceptinthemodesthatthestatesupports.(Between
the 2011 uprising and 2013, Egyptian activists interested in the
matterexperienced an opening in such discussions). Society cannot
address bigotry
andsectarianismeffectivelywhendoingsomaybeperceivedaschallengingpublicorder.
Thecredibilityof therolesofreligious
institutionsrolewasalsoskewedbyrelationswiththestate.ThisdecreasedtheirlegitimacyastrustedbodiescapableofdeliveringindependentandunbiasedviewsonreligiontoMuslims.State-approvedeffortsontheirpart
have often been perceived as unlikely to resonate with the masses.
While theMinistry of Islamic Endowments and Dar al-Ifta’have become
subordinate to
statenarratives,Al-Azharcontinuestovieforindependence,whichisonlymetbymorestatelimitations.Itisdifficulttogaugetheseinstitutions’impactontheground.
Ironically, actors who engaged in violence in 1980s and 1990s,
like
al-Gamaaal-IslamiaandAl-Jihad,aremorelikelytohaveacounter-radicalisationimpact.Theirpreviousexperienceand
their revisionsvis-a-vismodern jihadinarrativesasa
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conceptpossiblyworksintheirfavour.ThishistoryofjihadismenablesfactionsliketheSalafi
Call and Al-GamaaAl-Islamiyya to engage in intellectual debates
with Salafijihadists on modern discussions on jihad and relations
with state and the society.However, the credibility of these groups
among hard-linemainstream
Islamistswasimpactedbytheirpoliticalpositionspost-2013.
Onthemilitaryfront,thestate’ssecuritysurveillanceinthemainlandclaimsuccessesagainstmilitants,announcingcountlessraidsanddeathsininsurgents’ranks,andthefoilingofterroristattacksandplots.Theseclaimsaredifficulttoindependentlyverify.Coordinationwithneighbouringcountriesoverbordersprovedeffectiveincontrollingtheinfiltrationoffightersandweapons.
Non-statecircumstanceshavealsoworkedinthefavourofcombattingterrorism.ThisincludeddivisionswithintheMB,inwhichthetraditionalparthasbeenrumouredtocooperatewiththeauthoritiestocontainradicalizedMByouths,andrestricttheflowofmoneyintotheroguearmedgroupwhichwasledbyseniorMBleaderMohamedKamal,whowaskilledbysecurityforces.
TheextenttowhichadeclineinradicalismamongIslamistyouths,mainlytheMB,insideprisonsremainsunclear.Therearecontradictoryobservationsinthisregard,withsomevoicingtheopinionthatthere
isa fall inISIS’sappealamongtheseyouth,andothersassuming that many
youths were radicalized within prisons. With many of
thoseimprisonedbeingofayoungage,theycouldcompletetheirjailtermsof10to15yearsandbereleasedintothesocietywiththeriskoftakingonanewroundofviolence.51
Successesclaimedbysecurityapparatus inNorthSinaiaredifficult to
independentlyverify.Thearmy’sfrequentstatementsofvictories,albeitwelcomedbysupporters,aredoubtedbycriticswhocitecontinuedattacksonsoldiersandcivilianswhocollaboratewiththemilitaryinitswaronterror.Someconcludethatmilitants’replicationofattackstrategy
on checkpoints and soldiers’ inefficient weaponry are reflective of
flawedmilitarypolicies.
Meanwhile,thesituationinNorthSinaiforcivilianscontinuestoworsen,astheybearthebruntofwar.Therefore,althoughterroristnetworksfacelossesatthehandsofthemilitary,therootcausesforradicalisationstillexist,anddon’tseemtobeabatingsoon.
Timeline of main events that affected religious dynamics in
recent Egyptian history:
1) 1948: Following the establishment of Israel in mandated
Palestine, varioussentiments abound in Egypt, among both officials
and the public,
particularlyaboutperceivedsupportIsraelreceivedfromEgyptianCoptsandJews,resultingtensionsamongMuslimandnon-MuslimEgyptians.Nationalisticsentimentandresultingmeasuresleadstomanyinhistoricallynon-Arabcommunities(suchasJewish-Egyptians,Greek-EgyptiansandLatinEgyptians)todepart.
51 “Made in Prison”, Arij, https://arij.net/made_in_prison/
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2) 1952:Military endsmonarchy and takes over, andbegins campaign
to
co-optMuslim,Christiansandnon-religiouspublicfigures,movementsandinstitutions.
3) 1954: President Gamal Abdel-Nasser survives an assassination
attempt
andblamesitontheMuslimBrotherhoodgroup.Hebansthemandcracksdownonthemovement,whichisusedasarecruitmenttoollateron.
4)
1971:PresidentAnwarElSadatmakesIslamtheofficialreligionoftheStateinanapparentbidtogainconservativesupport.
5) 1981: President Sadat is assassinated by extremist Islamists;
his
successor,PresidentHosniMubarak,tightensstatecontroloverreligiousinstitutions,whichleadstotheunderminingoftheircredibilityandinfluenceinEgypt.CrackdownonIslamistsisheightened,andradicalizationnarrativesarestrengthened.
6)
2001:US-ledwaronterrorbegins,whichinturnisfollowedbyasurgeinappealofextremistideologyinEgypt,aidedbygrowingeconomichardships.
7)
2011:OverthrowofHosniMubarakleadstoanenvironmentofpoliticalfreedomandopenness,whichontheonehandallowsforextensivemediafreedom,andon
the other means that populist sectarian rhetoric becomesmore
visible incertainpartsofthepro-Islamistpublicsphere.
8) 2013:Morsi supporters fixateon roleof the church in supportof
themilitaryoverthrow, particularly after the crackdown; violent
backlash that sees
thedestructionofover200churchesandChristianbusinesses.
9)
2014-todate:Militarytightensgripovermosques,closingunlicensedonesandoutlawing
non-state-sanctioned Friday sermons. ISIS group rises to
moreprominence, targeting Christians in different parts of the
country, facing amassivecounter-terrorismeffortbythestate.
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“Thehiddenworldofmilitant‘specialcommittees’”,MadaMasr,22December2015,https://is.gd/5ucWoUHumanRightsWatch,"Egypt:DecreeEndsIDBiasAgainstBaha'is",15April2009,https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/15/egypt-decree-ends-id-bias-against-bahaisKamel,Kamel;Arafa,Ahmed,“MBdenouncesitsreligiouscommitteeandclaimsitdidnotcallforusingforceagainstsecurity”,Youm7,24August2015https://is.gd/vLYQxPLacroixS.,ShalataA.Z.(2016)TheRiseofRevolutionarySalafisminPost-MubarakEgypt.In:RougierB.,LacroixS.(eds)Egypt’sRevolutions.TheSciencesPoSeriesinInternationalRelationsandPoliticalEconomy.PalgraveMacmillan,NewYork,P38-39Manshurat,Verdictincasepubliclyknownas“MadinatNasrCell”,22October2014https://manshurat.org/node/1289Mazel,Zvi,“AnewlawaimstomakebuildingchurchesinEgypteasier–Butwillitwork?",TheJerusalemPost,6September2016,https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/A-new-law-aims-to-make-building-churches-in-Egypt-easier-but-will-it-work-466890Mcmanus,Allison;Green,Jake,“Egypt’smainlandterrorismlandscape”,TIMEP,7June2016https://is.gd/kCS9mjPérez-Accino,José,"AncientEgyptgaverisetooneoftheworld'soldestChristianfaiths",NationalGeographic,19April2019,https://on.natgeo.com/2ZNgaRFRock-Singer,Aaron,"Islamicmediaandreligiouschangein1970sEgypt",MPCJournal,23January2017,https://mpc-journal.org/blog/2017/01/23/islamic-media-and-religious-change-in-1970s-egypt/Roth,Kenneth,“Egypt:Eventsof2017”,HumanRightsWatch,https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/egyptSayed,Ashraf,“Counteringterrorismisthemostdangerousissuefor2018:SisifollowstheComprehensiveMilitaryOperationinSinai”,Veto,9February2018,https://www.vetogate.com/3062805
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TahrirInstituteforMiddleEastPolicy(TIMEP),“LiwaaAl-Thawra”29March2017https://is.gd/TSrihB:“Hasam”,29March2017,https://is.gd/iLangP“WilayatSinai”,23July2014,https://timep.org/esw/non-state-actors/wilayat-sinai/“IslamicStateinEgypt”,8May2017,https://is.gd/hEnWWX“JundAl-Islam”,22July2014,https://is.gd/KY67z3“AjnadMisr”,22July2014,https://timep.org/esw/non-state-actors/ajnad-misr/TheEconomist,"Rankingcountriesbytheirblasphemylaws”,13August2017,https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2017/08/13/ranking-countries-by-their-blasphemy-laws?fsrc=rssWalsh,Declan;Youssef,Nour,“MilitantsKillEgyptianSecurityForcesinDevastatingAmbush”,NewYorkTimes,21October2017,https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/world/middleeast/egypt-ambush-hasm.htmlZahran,Mostafa,“RegionalJihad:ContemporaryJihadistmovementsinEgypt”inbook:
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