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Countering Violent Extremism:Dialogue, Training, and Research
ele te rie ng ers
and Gulf Military Analysis. Content may have been edited for formatting purposes. All rights reserved. Reproduction and/or circulation of this document or of any individual
Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis as publisher.
Published in 2012 by the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA)
P.O.Box 502066, Dubai, UAEwww.inegma.com
Hedayah and/or
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Contents
Exe uti e umm r ....................................................................................................... 9
ulti is i lin r ers e ti es on Countering Violent Extremism .............................15
Rehabilitation First, Countering Inmate Radicalization Second: ...................................................................17 Setting Priorities in Dealing with Violent Extremist Offenders in PrisonTinka M. Veldhuis, Siegwart Lindenberg
From Caged Bodies to Caged Souls: ................................................................................................................23 The Case of Former Muslim Prisoners and The Importance of Religious CounselingGabriele Marranci
Unlocking the Terrorist Mindset: A Psychological Approach ......................................................................27Malkanthi Hettiarachchi
Countering Violent Extremism: The Evolving Role of Think Tanks ..........................................................33Rohan Gunaratna
essons e rne rom t e iel ....................................................................................41
Lessons Learned from the Saudi Experience in Rehabilitating ....................................................................43 and Reeducating People Involved in Terrorist ActsMansour Bin Said Al Qarni
Protecting Rights As a Counterterrorism Tool: The Case of American Muslims......................................49Sahar Aziz
The Management and Rehabilitation of Imprisoned IRA Terrorists: ..........................................................59 Lessons from Recent HistoryShane Bryans
Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: The Colombian Paramilitary Experience ...............65Peter Chalk
Muslim Diaspora Communities: Between Integration and Securitization ...................................................73Noman Benotman
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ressing C llenges t roug i logue r ining n ese r ............................ 77
21st Century Prosecutorial Tools for Preventing Terrorism ...........................................................................79David Scharia
The Case for Women in Combating Violent Extremism ...............................................................................83Edit Schlaffer
Long Time, No See: The Evolving Role of the United Nations in Countering Violent Extremism ......89Alistair Millar
Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Leveraging the OSCE’s ....93 Comprehensive and Co-operative Approach to SecurityMehdi Knani
What Can We do Against Violent Radicalization of the European Youth? ............................................. 101 Introducing RAN-PREVENTPeter Kreko, Clare White
The Measurement of Prevention: Where’s the Evidence? .......................................................................... 107Anthony Ellis, Andrew Cleary, Martine Zeuthen, James Khalil
A Proactive Approach in the Fight Against Extremism: ............................................................................. 111 Practical Steps in Confronting Islamophobia and Raising Public AwarenessMarwan Muhammad
Processes of Disengagement from Extremist Groups: How These Processes Can Be Reinforced .... 115Tore Bjørgo
iogr ies o ut ors ............................................................................................... 121
About INEGMA ..........................................................................................................130
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Exe uti e umm r
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is emerging as part of a wider more comprehensive set of international Counter-Terrorism (CT) policies as a way to address the threat of terrorism. While law enforcement, intelligence and security agencies, and military forces have been effective at addressing terrorists’ threats, these kinetic methods are not holistic or sustainable. Moreover, these traditional approaches may intentionally overlook ecologies that facilitate violence and terrorism. Accordingly, CVE by its very nature requires a multi-disciplinary approach that includes, but is not limited to, reaching out to and partnering with actors from all segments of society, such as local police, educators, social workers, religious leaders, youth groups, civil society and grass-roots organizations. Moving beyond traditional kinetic approaches, CVE aims to identify and utilize internationally-recognized best practices to mitigate the growth of violent extremists’ world views that inspire and seek to justify terrorism, as well as to restrict the flow of new recruits into violent extremist organizations and reintegrate former terrorists into society.
In September 2011, 29 nations and the European Union created the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) to provide the international community with a broad-based, action-oriented CT forum to confront challenges of common interest to participants. One of the five Working Groups created by the GCTF was the CVE Working Group, co-chaired by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United Kingdom (UK). At the inaugural GCTF Meeting, H.H. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Foreign Minister of the UAE, announced that one of the CVE Working Group’s deliverables would be the first-ever international center of excellence dedicated to CVE, Hedayah, to be located in Abu Dhabi. Hedayah will be a robust and world-class hub of CVE dialogue, training and research activities that caters to the needs of its stakeholders and partners in the international community.
10 Executive Summary
develop and shape successful activities and initiatives that integrate best practices and lessons learned from the international community. Doing so will require close collaboration with GCTF stakeholders, such as national and local authorities, ranging from education, media communications, community policing, and health. Hedayah will also work to establish partnerships with civil society and non-governmental organizations that often play important roles, particularly at the community and neighborhood level.
discipline as well as a tool for practitioners seeking to develop best practices in CVE policy. Practitioners and academics from around the world have contributed insights and expertise to describe the history, necessity and potential opportunities and challenges that lay ahead
Section I demonstrates a variety of multi-disciplinary perspectives and approaches to the
de-radicalization and reintegration. Tinka Veldhuis and Siegwart Lindenberg argue prisons should emphasize long-term rehabilitation and reintegration goals over short-term security goals like countering radicalization and recruitment among inmates. Gabriele Marranci suggests that former Muslim prisoners in the West are at higher risk of being radicalized
counseling and support for former prisoners in their post-prison communities. Malkanthi Hettiarachchi argues that the key to de-radicalization is in utilizing a psychological approach to engage terrorists and “unlock” their mindsets that reinforce or justify violence.
Finally, Rohan Gunaratna describes the development of CT and CVE research institutions, and posits that CVE research and activities should be based at academic institutions such as think tanks, or else they may lack the necessary theoretical and methodological rigor necessary for a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach.
Section II describes lessons learned in CVE using case studies from the Middle East, North America, South America and Europe. Mansour Al Qarni sheds light on the successful de-radicalization program carried out by the Saudi government that utilizes the positive role that religious education can play to engage those that have shaped their world views from extremist groups. Sahar Aziz uses a case study of American Muslims to argue that each nation must consider its unique economic, political and social circumstances to protect its citizens from violent extremism. Shane Bryans describes the complex role of prisons in the context of the IRA in Northern Ireland, revealing that prisons served both as an
11
opportunity for continued political radicalization and training, and at the same time as an environment for the IRA leadership to shape the IRA’s collective disengagement from its terrorist campaign.
Using the example of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self Defense Forces of Colombia), Peter Chalk describes the legal mechanisms used to demobilize and disarm
in the integration of Muslim communities in Western societies, and argues that certain European policies have led to further disengagement of Muslims with Western societies and the creation of new recruitment opportunities for violent extremists.
Section III posits new methods of countering violent extremism by addressing some of the
groups of people are best equipped to help counter violent extremism. First, David Scharia argues that terrorists before they succeed in committing their acts, while still respecting human rights
when addrthat women can play in civil society and community engagement.
Several other authors describe the role of existing organizations and institutions in the future development of CVE programs and activities. Alistair Miller argues that the United
(CVE) for decades without the overt intention of countering terrorism and therefore should assume a leading role in developing CVE programming. Mehdi Knani explains how the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as the largest regional security forum for dialogue and a platform for action, seeks to leverage its trademark comprehensive and co-operative approach to security in order to promote among its participating states a multi-dimensional understanding of the threat, and to support
against terrorism is too focused on repressive measures and not enough on preventive work, but that the newly-developed EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) connects and engages key researchers, social workers, religious and youth leaders, and policemen to help counter violence in local communities.
Finally, two authors build upon Malkanthi Hettiarachchi’s argument to utilize psychological Andrew
Cleary and his colleagues at Integrity Research and Consulting examine the importance of
12 Executive Summary
understanding key communities’ attitudes to violence and extremism when designing and implementing programming to counter violent extremism. Marwan Muhammad describes practical methods for governments to address Islamophobia and raise public awareness of what fuels humiliation, frustration and hate in violent individuals. Tore Bjørgo describes the reasons why individuals join extremist, terrorist or criminal groups, and more crucial to CVE, why they leave these groups.
Overall, the authors develop a consensus around the notion that counter-terrorism
focus on prevention, whether through the judiciary system within a state or through international bodies, policymakers must ensure inclusion of all individuals within a
1Multi-disciplinary Perspectives on Countering Violent
Extremism
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e bilit tion irst Countering Inm te i li tion e on : etting riorities in e ling it Violent Extremist en ers in rison
Tinka M. VeldhuisResearch Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague
Siegwart Lindenberg1
Professor of Sociology at the University of Groningen
IntroductionPrison authorities who are confronted with violent extremist offenders in their institutions face the difficult task of achieving multiple, seemingly incompatible or even conflicting objectives. On one hand, they are challenged to rehabilitate and reintegrate inmates so that they do not re-offend or return to criminal or violent extremist movements. On the other hand, they can encounter the need to combat violent radicalization and recruitment among the inmate population, to prevent acute security threats from materializing.
However, to realize each of these objectives appears to require conflicting interventions. For example, whereas rehabilitation efforts demand granting inmates a certain degree of autonomy to participate in (group) courses or therapies, countering violent extremist belief systems might demand restricting individual autonomy and contact between inmates.
How should prison systems manage these priorities to deal with this dilemma effectively and optimally serve institutional, national and international security? In this contribution, we will argue that policymakers should identify rehabilitation and reintegration as the overarching, highest-order priorities. Consequently, short-term security objectives like preventing inmate radicalization should be framed as sub-goals of rehabilitation and reintegration, to be pursued as a side-effect of realizing the major goal and hence subject to the constraint that the measures taken to achieve them do not undermine the longer-term goals. Prisons can make a sustainable contribution to a safer world but only if prison
Tinka M. Veldhuis, Siegwart Lindenberg18
regimes are balanced and structured to realize long-term goals (e.g. inmate reform with the intention to prevent recidivism and post-release radicalization).
The argument that will be unfolded throughout this contribution is three-pronged. Firstly, it will argue that emphasizing rehabilitation will serve to realize long-term goals of the prison system and, secondly, that doing so can simultaneously contribute to the realization of short-term goals. Thirdly, it is argued that prison regimes, which do not emphasize rehabilitation but are focused one-sidedly on realizing short-term objectives (e.g. restricting the autonomy and behavior of inmates to counter violent radicalization), are likely to prove unsustainable and self-undermining by causing undesired side-effects that increase rather than reduce security risks.
Managing Prison Objectives: A Delicate Balancing Act In managing priorities, policymakers first need to describe what kind of social change they aspire to bring about. The key point is to identify goals and their hierarchy.2 The ambitions of the prison system can be modelled according to high-level (long-term) goals and lower-level (short-term) objectives. Whereas long-term goals are formulated in general terms and identify more abstract desired end-states, short-term objectives are narrowly defined and are linked to specific descriptions of the achievements to produce the desired outcomes.
What are the long-term ambitions of the prison? Ultimately, the goal of the prison system – in cooperation with other criminal justice and counterterrorism policies – should be to increase societal safety. Thus, the prison can be expected to aim to counter recidivism (among "general" as well as violent extremist inmates), and reduce, or at least not increase, the risk of post-release violent radicalization.
In the shorter run, prisons are intended to achieve traditional objectives like protecting the public by isolating dangerous criminals, punishing them for their wrongdoing and discouraging others from breaking the law.3 For prisons confronted with violent extremism, countering inmate radicalization and recruitment efforts could become an acute, short-term objective.
Ultimately, in order to optimize realization of both short and long-term objectives and to maximize the prison’s contribution to countering extremism, policymakers would be well-advised to emphasize rehabilitation and reintegration as the most important responsibilities and to make other, short-term (security) objectives subordinate to the longer-term perspective.
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Firstly, prison regimes that prioritize rehabilitation and reintegration will be suitable to achieve longer-term goals and prevent recidivism and post-release radicalization. Rehabilitation aims to prevent perverse effects of being contained and deprived of control during imprisonment, and to change the skills and the cognitive and attitudinal characteristics of inmates in a way that prevents them from returning to crime upon release. To that end, rehabilitation efforts seek to make individuals resilient to criminogenic and potentially radicalizing factors such as lack of problem solving skills and self-control, traumatic life-events, peer pressure and political, social or individual frustrations and disappointments.4 As suggested in the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, inmate reform will be best served if inmates are involved in comprehensive rehabilitation programmes that commence at the moment the individual enters the prison and include educational and vocational training, psychological and religious counselling, after-care and community involvement.
Secondly, focusing on rehabilitation can contribute to the realization of short-term objectives, such as maintaining institutional security and countering violent radicalization in prison. The essence of rehabilitation is that it applies courses, trainings and therapies to change the thoughts and beliefs that pushed the individual to criminal behavior in the first place. On the whole, rehabilitation programs can make (violent extremist as well as "general") inmates more resilient to radicalizing factors in prison and to recruiting or intimidating fellow inmates. For violent extremist inmates in particular, engaging in dialogue with religious scholars or psychologists as part of a rehabilitation program might create an opening for a change in mind set towards a non-violent, less dogmatic worldview and undermine support for extremist movements or recruitment efforts.5 For rehabilitation to contribute to institutional security and countering violent extremism within prisons, however, it is important that rehabilitation programs are comprehensive and start as soon as the inmate enters the prison system.
In contrast, prison regimes that do not focus on rehabilitation but emphasize short-term (security) objectives run the risk of producing undesired outcomes and ultimately jeopardizing institutional and public safety. One could put forward a counter-argument to prioritizing rehabilitation by stating that the battle against violent extremism can be perfectly served in both the short and longer run without rehabilitation, namely by restricting violent extremist inmates in their behavior and social interaction within and beyond the prison walls. After all, violent ideologies will then have little chance to spread among the inmate population. Indeed, strict regimes can erect physical barriers against the spread of radicalization and recruitment efforts, but at what cost, if they simultaneously can cause effects that are counter-productive for virtually all goals and objectives except short-term control?
Rehabilitation First, Countering Inmate Radicalization Second
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Above all, severely restrictive regimes could induce experiences of exclusion, discrimination and stigmatization among the inmates, which can in turn provide fuel for recidivism and post-release radicalization.6 This risk becomes particularly grave if additional constraints are not based on individual risk assessments but target entire groups on general criteria (e.g. terrorism related offenders or members of a specific movement). Indiscriminate restrictions could open the door for accusations of discrimination and repressive state policies, which can in turn be perceived to legitimize a violent struggle against the government.7
Moreover, the introduction of unbalanced, one-sided prison regimes could cause spill-over effects to sympathizing communities. For instance, while severe monitoring of inmate communication can be deemed necessary to prevent inmates from coordinating criminal activities outside prison, such restrictions also strongly affect the inmate’s family and friends and can spread frustration and antagonism, creating unwanted community support for violent extremist causes. Lastly, detention or rehabilitation policies that are presented as special measures for ´terrorists´ or ´extremist inmates´ could label ex-inmates with a stigma they might find difficult to free themselves of. It is well known that ex-offenders are often confronted with stigmatization and substantial difficulties in finding a job or a house after being released into society, and that these problems increase the risk of recidivism.8 Carrying an additional ´terrorist´ label can hardly be expected to make rehabilitation and peaceful reintegration an easier task for ex-extremists.
ConclusionPolicy architects in the prison system are challenged to manage seemingly conflicting priorities and to design sustainable prison regimes that are fit to pursue rehabilitation and reintegration of regular as well as violent extremist inmates, while detaining them in a secure environment where violent ideological contagion can be minimized. In this contribution we have argued that the best way to optimize the prison’s input to public safety is to identify preventing re-offending and post-release radicalization as the most important, overarching goal and to combat prison radicalization with means that do not undermine this goal.
The implication of such a goal hierarchy is that institutional security in the prison, and hence inmate radicalization, should be framed as a problem of rehabilitation – and not the other way around. That is, rather than designing rehabilitation programs "around" security measures, security measures should be designed such that they contribute to, or at least not compromise rehabilitation. By no means do we suggest that prison regimes should be particularly lenient or that violent extremists cannot be subjected to restrictive measures.
Tinka M. Veldhuis, Siegwart Lindenberg
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Rather, we suggest that repressive interventions should be in accordance with rehabilitative aims and sensitive to the causes of (post-release) radicalization and recidivism.9
Above all, the correctional system could be recognized for its potential to actively assist in preventing violent outbursts of extremism, now and in the future, by addressing core motivations of violent radicalization and pursuing safe reintegration of violent extremist
opportunity to make a sustainable contribution to (inter)national security.
(Endnotes)
1 The authors wish to thank Mr. Eelco Kessels (ICCT – The Hague) for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
2 Siegwart Lindenberg,. “Cognition and Governance: Why Incentives Have to take the Back Seat.” In Handbook of Economic Organization. Cheltenham: Elga, in press.
3 Louis N. Robinson,. “Contradictory Purposes in Prisons.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 37, No. 6, pp. 449-457.
4 Francis T. Cullenand Paul Gendreau,. “Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects.” In National Institute of Justice Criminal Justice 2000, Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 2000.
5 If a comprehensive individual risk assessments has indicated that an inmate may be "irreconcilable" (e.g. not receptive to rehabilitative efforts) or intending to recruit, it may be necessary to (temporarily) segregate this individual from (speci c) other inmates, to prevent him from disturbing the rehabilitation of others .
6 Tinka M. Veldhuis, et. al, Terroristen in Detentie: Evaluatie van de Terroristenafdeling [Terrorists in Detention: Review of the Dutch Terrorism Wing]. The Hague: WODC, 2010.
7 Lindenberg, in press op cit.
8 Christy Visher, et. Al., Returning Home: Understanding the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 2004.
9 See also Tinka M. Veldhuis. “Designing rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist offenders: A Realist Approach.” ICCT Research Paper, 2012. http://www.icct.nl/download/
le/ICCT-Veldhuis-Designing-Rehabilitation-Reintegration-Programmes-March-2012.pdf
Rehabilitation First, Countering Inmate Radicalization Second
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rom C ge o ies to C ge ouls: e C se o ormer Muslim risoners n e Im ort n e o eligious Counseling
Gabriele MarranciDirector of the Study of Contemporary Muslim Lives, Dept. of Anthropology, Macquarie University
IntroductionDuring my research on Muslim prisoners and former prisoners in the UK, I realized the potential grievous consequences of a widespread lack of religious counseling for former Muslim prisoners.1 Although mainly Western governments, and consequently prison services, display ardent concern about security and extremism within prisons, the destiny of former Muslim prisoners seems to be of no interest, and this indifference has possible unfortunate consequences. Indeed, if the effects of the prison environment and the related issues discussed below are to become a potential threat, it will be so outside prisons rather than within them.
Prison, Religion and Emotions People, not usually religious or not educated in religious matters, may turn towards religion in particular phases of their lives. Their reasons to do so of course vary and the commitment may differ in degrees. Nonetheless, an element that is essential in the personal experience of any religion is faith. Faith may be performative in some cases, but despite all, the common denominator of the statement "I am Muslim" is that the person at least declares to have faith in his or her understanding of Islam.
Imprisonment is traumatic. Prisoners and former prisoners emphasize the emotionally powerful experience of initial incarceration. They have reported fear, wonder, objectification, disorientation, humiliation and claustrophobic physical sensations, together with a strong element of alienation and even dreamlike experience. Fear, in particular, marks the prisoners’ everyday life, as does the feeling of loss.2
Gabriele Marranci24
Since we are born, emotions and feelings are part of us and how we interact with the environment and how the environment interacts with us. The relationship between emotions and religious practice is not new and students have observed and discussed it since the eighteenth century. At the same time, there is no doubt that religion plays an important role in the lives of many inmates and a rather large number of Muslims have rediscovered and reconnected with Islam immediately upon entering prison.
One of the first things that Muslim prisoners receive upon their commitment to prison is a prayer mat and a translation of the Qur’an before being locked inside their cells for several hours. All prisoners interviewed for this study confirmed that receiving the Qur’an and the prayer mat reminded them of the wrongdoing they committed and the religion they left behind in their childhood.
As a prison imam stated, “emotions define Islam in here [prison]; it is my task to use their renewed faith and make it theologically sound and a life commitment.” The prison imam emphasized the need for religious education for inmates since a significant number of Muslim prisoners have little theological or even practical knowledge of Islam. The lack of Islamic knowledge (e.g. a basic knowledge of fiqh, but also the Qur’an itself and Sunna), combined with the reawakened faith through the reaction to what the prisoners imagine Islam is, facilitates the formation of what can be called Prison Islam.3
The gates of prison, other than in extremely few cases, will one day open and prisoners must readapt to life within mainstream society. Normally, release from prison comes with some conditions that the prisoner has to respect as part of his reintegration. Parole is a safeguard to help former prisoners readapt and rebuild their lives, and also a way of monitoring their progress and preventing reoffending.
Although many stories of rehabilitation are ultimately successful, a majority of experiences are marked by rejection, a lack of community support and mistakes in probation. These factors facilitate the risk that some former Muslim prisoners may recommit crimes or, more rarely and in specific circumstances, are exploited by radical groups or individuals. Often religion is not part of any aspects of probation, even when the former prisoner expresses and understands his life in religious terms (as many do).
The Importance of Professional Religious Counseling for Former Prisoners All Muslim former prisoners interviewed emphasized how they believed that their Muslim identity and their commitment to Islam were the best protection against the risk of winding
From Caged Bodies to Caged Souls: The Case of Former Muslim Prisoners and The Importance of Religious Counseling 25
up behind bars again. Religion also plays an important role among those former Muslim prisoners, who hope that, their families and loved ones will accept them back into their lives and homes. A considerable number of former Muslim prisoners are also parents, and contact with their children is an essential part of their attempt to change. Religion has a relevant role in this process since some prisoners, particularly women, feel that due to their renewed faith in Islam they may fulfill their parental role properly and provide their children with the moral values that they felt themselves to have previously lacked.
Yet nobody prepares the Muslim prisoners for the outside reality: the fact that mosques, Islamic institutions and many Muslims do not welcome former Muslim prisoners, that many mosques do not provide support outside prison and that they are badly organized to provide even preliminary assistance or advice to them when compared to Christian organizations, for instance.
Former Muslim prisoners lacking much needed support from relatives or the state will rarely find it within their own Muslim community, which today, as my research has shown, is still prone to reject them rather than address their needs. However, other groups, politicized and radical in their interpretation of Islam, are likely to sometimes offer what the mainstream community and the state fail to provide. A small number, depending upon their experience of prison, how they developed their "prison Islam" and the degree of isolation they endured, may join and possibly even be persuaded to commit worse crimes than before, including terrorism. Of course, the danger is limited, but as we also know, it takes only a few committed individuals to endanger the lives of many.
Recently some pilot projects have been initiated in order to provide a link between the Prison Service, probation officers and some religious organizations. One of these projects is Community Chaplaincy Project (CCP), which is based in Leeds, UK. The intention of this project is to provide pastoral care to prisoners not only during their sentence but also, and most importantly, afterwards. Not only does this uninterrupted pastoral care facilitate the reintegration of Muslim former prisoners within the community, and often within the family, but it also avoids the isolation and alienation that prisoners may experience if there is a lack in support received. Finally, all the elements above and the care of the prison imam, who knows the prisoner and his or her difficulties, can help to avoid that radical organizations or individuals who may exploit former prisoners.
It is essential to prevent radicalization and security threats that professional religious counseling is offered to religious Muslims as part of their probation and that religious institutions, such as mosques and Islamic centers, are integrated in the process to educate
Gabriele Marranci26
the general Muslim population to overcome the stigma attached to the experience of prison and facilitate the reintegration and rehabilitation of former Muslim prisoners not only within the Muslim community but also within mainstream Islam.
Conclusion
Yet the prison system appears to be over focused on security and the surveillance of Muslims. In doing so, the prison system misses some important aspects such as highly professional religious counseling. As recent research shows, environmental and contextual conditions
religious counseling is not provided. Yet as argued in this contribution, the situation is even
by mosques, Islamic institutions and even the general Muslim population. Professional religious counseling, if maintained outside prison as an optional part of probation, may help to prevent any risk of radicalization.
(Endnotes)
1 Gabriele Marranci, Faith, Ideology and Fear: Muslim Identities Within and Beyond Prison. (London: Continuum) 2009, pp. 134-153.
2 See Hans Toch, Men in Crisis: Human Breakdowns in Prison. (Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing Company), 1975.
3 Marranci, op. cit, pp. 63-88.
27
nlo ing t e errorist Min set: A s ologi l A ro
Malkanthi HettiarachchiChartered Clinical Psychologist and Expert on Terrorist Rehabilitation
IntroductionThe success of violent extremists is in their ability to convince the community of their fight for freedom or quest for justice due to threat or persecution. They demonstrate successes by keeping their supporters motivated and the enemy fearful. Terrorist groups project the face of the victim to its sympathizers and supporters, the face of the aggressor to the perceived enemy, and the face of the rescuer to the vulnerable community.1
The terror justifying ideology consists of three components.2 A perceived grievance which is the reason used to justify the use of terror; a perpetrator to be blamed for the grievance, who becomes the target of anger; a method that justifies the acts of terror through religion or historical narratives.3
Counter-terrorism initiatives focused on depleting the supply of recruits and funding could minimize the operational capability of terrorists. The kinetic response to terrorism is a familiar and essential aspect in reducing the immediate threat, while intelligence gathering is used to dismantle the active and potential threats. Engaging the “battlefield of the mind”4 is an equally important and a highly skilled task that requires a psychological approach.5 It is essential to engage with the terrorist to identify the thoughts and beliefs and create doubt in the mind of the terrorist. Psychological counseling skills help to build rapport, overcome resistance, and extricate thoughts and beliefs in a non-threatening manner. Identifying the cognitive errors or distortions in thinking, use the Socratic method of questioning to explore alternative perspectives and responses to the violence justifying narratives, facilitates working towards de-legitimizing the need for violence.
Malkanthi Hettiarachchi28
Radicalized into Violence
Radicalization is to become “extreme.” Ideology is a set of beliefs to which the individual subscribes based on political, religious, social and/or personal injustices. The individual forms a narrative that is rational and justifies terror techniques. These acts of terror inflicted on others do not cause dissonance due to the moral justification for actions.6
Through indoctrination the individual is mentored into justifying acts of terror. Rationalization permits the individual to engage in violence without the accompanying psychological distress. The individual will refer to the doctrine that supports the violence and use the arguments presented by the mentors.
Grooming of a terrorist: Commitment to the terrorist ideology is nurtured through mentorship. The terror justifying narrative becomes part of the new history of the individual and community. The mentors manipulate thinking to ensure loyalty and commitment to the terrorist hierarchy. Unless the individual is exposed to experiences that counter the single narrative, justification for violence continues. Within rehabilitation, the misguided beneficiaries”7 individuals are supported to re-assess their thinking patterns based on their interaction and re-engagement with civil society and the different other. Cognitive dissonance may occur when the terrorist begins to question all what he/she was groomed into believing and doing. Psychological counseling is essential to support the individual to make sense of a different reality and adjust into the community.
Recruitment: Propaganda does not need to be true, but needs only to be believed. Charismatic leaders and recruiters use disinformation, misinterpretation of events, and actual injustices to provide the basis for rationalizing the need to group. Some were challenged “are you a man or a boy”8 while others were told “you will die anyway after 30-40 years so you might as well do something important for yourself, family and the cause.”9 Young people followed as their peers joined the group, the attraction of wearing a uniform and holding a weapon, the power that was wielded over the community, were more exciting than staying at home and studying. The dissemination of information through the print and electronic media, by word of mouth, lectures, street theatre, recruitment drives in schools and public places, celebration of the terrorist martyrs help to swell the numbers of terrorist networks. Once the individual is convinced of the terror justifying ideology, the search for information becomes selective.10 Since 2006 the forced recruitment of one member from each family was meant to expand family loyalty of the community to the Tamil tigers while expanding its membership. This act was
Unlocking the Terrorist Mindset: A Psychological Approach 29
received with anger as parents objected to their children been removed from the home.
Sustenance: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), one of the world’s most ruthless terrorist groups, developed standard methods for retaining their rank and file. Training included lectures on the narrative for a separate state, mentorship, the flow of disinformation, anger generated over terrorists who died in battle or in suicide attacks, the terrorist leader venerated as a God, salaries that helped to sustain the families, extensive punishments and incarceration of those that attempted to leave the group.11
Unlocking the Terrorist MindsetTerrorists function on the basis that their actions are justified. Winning “Hearts and Minds” approach is used within terrorist rehabilitation to build rapport and overcome resistance.12 One has to win the heart to be able to win the mind.
Winning the heart is through ensuring livelihoods, supporting the beneficiary to re-engage with one’s spirituality, culture, society and family by providing educational, vocational, spiritual and recreational rehabilitation. Gradually the beneficiary begins to engage, commence a discourse and share experiences. Winning the mind starts once the individual, feels valued, respected and secure in a non-threatening environment. Several programs were conducted to reach the mind. Meditation and mindfulness training, psychological and creative therapies that included mentorship training, counseling, emotional intelligence, forum theatre, music, dance, art therapy and a range of other activities. These programs help to gradually expand the individuals thinking and experiences and the beneficiary begins to question their thoughts, beliefs and actions.
Relapse PreventionRehabilitation occurs in an artificial environment, where beneficiaries have their basic needs met, with no responsibility for self-sustenance and sustenance of family. Therefore, preparation of the individual to re-engage in society is essential.13
The challenges faced by beneficiaries upon reintegration are many: livelihood needs, skills to face society as a civilian, coping with anger of own community, managing offers made to engage in criminal activity, or indeed meet with those who are likely to want to regroup.
After-care programs needs to ensure that the necessary support systems are in place for the beneficiary to adjust to the community upon reintegration and steer clear of crime.
Malkanthi Hettiarachchi30
Psychological counseling services within the After-care program could help with this transition and adjustment phase.
Community Engagement programs are essential to maintain contact with the community and reduce the potential for disinformation and misinformation. Community awareness programs as well as community dialogue for reconciliation14, school exchange programs, and events and occasions are made into opportunities for the communities to intermingle, helps to reduce communal mistrust.
ConclusionRadicalization happens from within, and the person is transformed by an ideology and wishes to live by it, promote it, and die for it. In De-radicalization the person is transformed fr
behavior and values he/she wants to be a part of or adopt. Invalidating the distorted images propagated and maintained of the "other" by the terrorist organisation. Psychological counselling facilitates this attitudinal change and prepares the individual to reconnect with family, friends, community and society. It provides the best opportunity to begin to lead life as an individual away from violence.
(Endnotes)
1 The Drama Triangle is a psychological and social model of human interaction used in psychology and psychotherapy, described by Stephen Karpman, in Fairy Tales and Script Drama Analysis, 1968. Accessed: http://karpmandramatriangle.com/pdf/DramaTriangle.pdf
2 A.W. Kruglanski, M.J. Gelfand, and R. Gunaratna, “Aspects of deradicalization” in R. Gunaratna, J. Jerard, and L. Rubin, (eds), Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter Radicalisation: New approaches to counter-terrorism, Routledge, New York, 2010.
3 Al Qaeda, a religiously motivated terrorist group targets those they consider are against Islam and occupation of Islamic countries. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are politically motivated and target those who opposed their separatist agenda.
4 R. Gunaratna, Terrorist Rehabilitation: A global imperative, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Vol. 6, NO. 1, April 2011, 65-82.
5 M. Hettiarachchi, Psychological Aspects of Radicalization, 2010, accessed: http://www.rsis.edu.
Unlocking the Terrorist Mindset: A Psychological Approach 31
sg/publications/conference_reports/RSIS_PakistanReport_2010.pdf
6 Cognitive dissonance is the discomfort experienced when engaging in actions that con ict with one’s moral or social stand.
7 Sri Lanka referred to terrorist that enter rehabilitation as “bene ciaries” and were considered to have been “misguided” by the terrorist for a period of 30 years.
8 Interview with Tamil tiger terrorist, May 23, 2011.
9 Interview with former Tamil tiger terrorist, May 30, 2011.
10 Selective information is the focus on information that usti es one’s perceptions, thoughts and beliefs that rationalizes actions of the terrorist group.
11 A terrorist that wished to leave had to serve a prison sentence of 6months+ which deterred most from leaving.
12 M Hettiarachchi, Sri Lankan initiative in the rehabilitation of former Tamil tigers, 2010, accessed: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/conference_reports/RSIS_PakistanReport_2010.pdf
13 The mentorship program conducted within rehabilitation, Sri Lanka, consists of Diversity, Peace-building, Interpersonal relating and the role of the man and woman in society.
14 Sri Lanka’s rst National Reconciliation Conference was in November 2011, Role of the Business Community in reconciliation in January 2012, Role of Education in Reconciliation in March 2012, Role of Women in Reconciliation in July 2012.
33
Countering Violent Extremism: e E ol ing ole o in n s
Rohan GunaratnaHead of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and Professor of Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
IntroductionTo understand and respond to terrorism, over 100 think tanks are currently engaged in teaching, research, networking and outreach activities.1 While most specialist think tanks work on terrorism and counter-terrorism, few work on counter violent extremism. Like terrorism, if countering violent extremism is a discipline, it should be based at an academic institution or else it may lack the necessary theoretical and methodological rigor and an interdisciplinary approach.2
The focus of most security think tanks is to work with governments where they mostly conduct contract research and engage in policy advocacy on behalf of governments. But in addition to working with governments, it is also paramount for think tanks to work with community partners to engage susceptible communities vulnerable to extremist ideologies.
First Generation of Think TanksSpurred by the beginning of the contemporary wave of terrorism in 1968, the first generation of counter-terrorism think tanks originated in the West. RAND staff Brian Michael Jenkins, since 1972, and Bruce Hoffman, since 1981, systematically studied terrorism. In the UK, the discipline of terrorism studies was founded by Paul Wilkinson. Wilkinson was previously associated with and directed the Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism in London that functioned from 1989-1999. Together with Hoffman, Wilkinson established the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews in 1994.
Rohan Gunaratna34
The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) was created in response to the bombing of a Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. The first dedicated American think tank to study terrorism, MIPT dedicated itself to the training and professional development of American law enforcement officers both in crime and terrorism prevention.
The first counter-terrorism research think tank outside the West3 was established in China. The China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations launched the Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies in 2000.4
Second Generation of Think TanksSpurred by 9/11, the second generation of think tanks emerged both in the global north and south. In July 2002, a terrorism research programme was established within the Institute for Defence and Security Studies, now the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, at Nanyang Technological University. The programme was subsequently upgraded into the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research on February 20, 2004. Since 2003, its ideological response unit, spearheaded and staffed by clerics, built government capacities to rehabilitate terrorists and counter extremism in communities.5
The United States Military Academy at West Point established a Combating Terrorism Center on February 20, 2003. Russ Howard, a former Special Forces Officer, who was the head of the Department of Social Science, was its founding Director. Also founded in 2003, the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute is a non-partisan “think and do” tank working on terrorism issues.6 The Fletcher School for Law and Diplomacy created the Jebsen Center for Counter Terrorism in 2005.7 Due to a lack of continuity in funding, the Center was closed down in 2006. The Australian government supported the development of university and non-university think tanks to counter violent extremism after the terrorist attack in Bali in October 2002. The Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism at Macquarie University, Australia was established in 2005.8 The Global Terrorism Research Center at University of Monash was established in 2006.
To guide counter-terrorism research to secure the US homeland, several government institutions have provided grants to US and foreign think tanks. They range from the United States Institute of Peace to the Office of Naval Research and the Department of Defence. A U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence - The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism - was established at
Countering Violent Extremism: The Evolving Role of Think Tanks 35
the University of Maryland at College Park in 2005.9 The International Centre for the Study of Terrorism at the Pennsylvania State University was launched in London on May 20, 2006.10 The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization was launched in London in January 2008. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism at The Hague was launched on May 31, 2010.
To work on terrorism and other transnational threats, the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, established an Africa Peace and Security Program11 and University of Hargeisa, Somaliland created the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP).12
Non-University Think TanksSeveral hundred non-university affiliated think tanks conduct research and counter violent extremism. While some are government or government supported, others are corporate or privately funded think tanks registered as NGOs.
Established in 1997, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, is South Asia’s leading counter-terrorism and counter insurgency think tank. The Pak Institute for Peace Studies, a research and advocacy counter-violent extremism think-tank was established on January 10, 2006.13 Located in Kabul, Afghanistan, the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies conduct research and training on counter-insurgency.14 Located in Dhaka, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute serves as a platform to bring the specialist counter-terrorism agencies and other security stakeholders together.15 The Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies launched the Bangladesh Centre for Terrorism Research.16 The Institute of International Peace Building (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian) in Jakarta17 and the Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research were established in early 2008.
With its origins in November 2007, the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation builds partnerships through collaborative research and policy analysis and by providing practical advice.18 The Foundation for Defense of Democracies launched the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization in 2010. Two of the best US resources to counter-extremism are The Middle East Media Research Institute19 and The Jamestown Foundation.20
In the UK, in addition to the British government, charities also support several think tanks. Created in 2008, Quilliam Foundation is the “world’s first counter-extremism think tank set up to address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalised world.”21
Rohan Gunaratna36
A number of foreign and defence ministries support research institutes with specialist
specialist centres is the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s Terrorism Research Group.22
research centre, Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism on July 1, 2003.23
Many security think tanks with counter-terrorism specialists run terrorism research pr
Policy produces timely reports on terrorist threats and invites terrorism specialists from around the world to participate in their activities.24 Similarly, the long standing Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., consults on terrorism with the government, runs projects and hosts conferences.25
also launched a programme to counter extremism through civil society.26
Some think tanks lack in-house speciality in countering violent extremism. Such think tanks then invite specialists and convene meetings to discuss the threat of violent extremism. For example, the Chatham House,27 the International Institute for Strategic Studies,28 the Ditchely Foundation,29 Wilton Park30 and other similar organizations address topical security issues including terrorism and counter-terrorism.
In the Middle East several think tanks work on security measures in collaboration with research programmes on terrorism and extremism. However, with the exception of Israel and Turkey, there are no dedicated think tanks focusing on terrorism in the Middle
December 1, 2003.31
Turkey was established in July 2007.
Campaign for Dialogue in Saudi Arabia. Although there are government think tanks working on terrorism in the Middle East, there is no dedicated academic think tank
of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism in Abu Dhabi to be launched in the near future.
While a variety of US based think tanks do work on threats in Latin America, there are no specialized think tanks on Latin American soil dedicated to countering violent extremism. While there are no dedicated African think tanks engaged in counter extremism, there are
Countering Violent Extremism: The Evolving Role of Think Tanks 37
a dozen think tanks working on security in general that cover counter-terrorism,32 counter extremism33 and peace building. 34 Most counter-extremism work conducted by NGO think tanks are project based. Depending on the funding received from governments or other private donors, they launch initiatives in counter-extremism.
ConclusionAt the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed a shift from traditional military security to non-traditional security. The think tanks rose up to the challenge posed by non-state armed actors. Today, insurgents, terrorists and extremists from ethno-political, politico-religious and left/right wing ideologies participate, support and advocate violence. To find solutions to threats, think tanks serve as the ideal platforms as they bring together specialists from diverse disciplines and cultures. The challenge is to reach the widest possible audience and to influence leaders in governments, corporations, and the community.
(Endnotes)
1 Benjamin Freedman, “Terrorism Research Centres: 100 Institutes, Programs and Organisations in the Field of Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Radicalisation and Asymmetric Warfare Studies,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 4, No 5 (2010)
2 Interview, Bruce Hoffman, Director, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, August 15, 2012
3 The exception to this is the Institute for Counter-Terrorism, which was founded at the Interdisciplinary Center in Israel in 1996.
4 China Institutes of Contemporary Relations, <http://www.cicir.ac.cn/english/organView.aspx?cid=382>
5 Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Mohamed Redzuan Salleh, Jihadism studies in counter ideology: Time for initiation in universities, RSIS Commentaries ; 085/10; S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, July 28, 2010 < http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0852010.pdf> <Accessed August 27, 2012>
6 The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, <http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/about/mission.cfm> , <Ajccessed August 28, 2012>
7 The Fletcher School, Tufts University, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/About/Fletcher-History>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
Rohan Gunaratna38
8 Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University; <http://mq.edu.au/about_us/faculties_and_departments/faculty_of_arts/centre_for_policing_intelligence_and_counter_terrorism/about_pict/>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
9 The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, <http://www.start.umd.edu/start/about/overview/mission/>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
10 International Center for the Study of Terrorism, The Pennsylvania State University, <http://www.icst.psu.edu/About.shtml>
11 Institute for Peace and Security Studies, <http://www.ipss-addis.org/>
12 Observatory of Con ict and Violence Prevention, <http://www.ocvp.org/>
13 Pak Institute for Peace Studies, <http://san-pips.com/>
14 Centre for Con ict and Peace Studies, <http://www.caps.af/>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
15 Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, <http://www.bei-bd.org/about-bei.php>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
16 Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, , <http://bipss.org.bd/index.php/page/about-bipss>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
17 Yayasan Prasati Perdamaian, <http://www.prasastiperdamaian.com/about/vision-and-mission/>, <Accessed August 27, 2012>
18 Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, <http://www.globalct.org/about_background.php>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
19 The Middle East Media Research Institute, <http://www.memri.org>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
20 The Jamestown Foundation, <http://www.jamestown.org>,<Accessed August 28, 2012>
21 Quilliam Foundation, < http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/about/>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
22 Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, <http://www.f .no/en/Terra/Sider/default.aspx> ,<Accessed August 28, 2012>
23 Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism < http://www.searcct.gov.my/>,<Accessed August 28, 2012>
24 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, < http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/about/
Countering Violent Extremism: The Evolving Role of Think Tanks 39
research-programs/stein-program-on-counterterrorism-and-intelligence/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
25 Center for Strategic and International Studies, <http://csis.org/category/topics/defense-and-security/terrorism>,<Accessed August 28, 2012>
26 Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/csmd/>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
27 Chatham House, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/security>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
28 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, <http://www.iiss.org/programmes/transnational-threats-and-political-risk/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
29 The Ditchley Foundation, <http://www.ditchley.co.uk/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
30 Wilton Park, < http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/en/about-wilton-park/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>
31 Centre for Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, <http://www.coedat.nato.int/history.htm>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
32 African Centre for Security and Strategic Studies, <http://www.afcesss.org> , <Accessed August 28, 2012>, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, <http://africacenter.org/> , <Accessed August 28, 2012> , Institute for Security Studies, http://www.issafrica.org/default.php, <Accessed August 29, 2012>
33 Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance, <http://kmya.org/>, <Accessed August 28, 2012>
34 African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, http://www.accord.org.za/.
2Lessons Learned from the Field
43
essons e rne rom t e u i Ex erien e in e bilit ting n ee u ting eo le In ol e in errorist A ts
Mansour Bin Said Al QarniSenior Advisor, Mohammed bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care
IntroductionSaudi Arabia was exposed to the terrorism phenomena as much as any other active society, and the peril was confronted according to a security policy implemented along with an intellectual campaign. Such step seemed to be an optimal solution in the aftermath of the deadly terrorist attacks of 2003. Moreover, the use of non-conventional measures - i.e. the intellectual fight dubbed as “the soft strategy” aiming at fighting intellectual and doctrinal justifications of extremism – represented a major aspect in KSA’s efforts to fight terrorism and violence.
The abovementioned strategy is embodied in the programs of the Mohammed bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care, considered to be one of the most prominent rehabilitation and vocational institutions successfully applying the soft approach towards terrorism. It is built on the absolute conviction that the battle against terrorism is not only based on the retaliation by force and security measures, it also relies on a simultaneous security – intellectual joint endeavor, emphasizing wisdom and serenity in addressing and convincing such lured category of people, in order to provide them with intellectual reform and cure. It is a therapeutic trend aiming at supporting those involved in intellectual misleading, and a preventive trend aiming at protecting the society from such misleading.
Strategy of the Saudi ExperienceThe Saudi experience in intellectual campaign and rehabilitation efforts, through the programs of the Mohammed bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care, relies on three major strategies: Prevention – Rehabilitation – Care. Such strategies are implemented through three programs: Counseling – Rehabilitation – Aftercare program. These programs rely,
Mansour Bin Said Al Qarni44
for therapy and rehabilitation, on academic programs essentially embodied in religious, psychological and social programs as well as other professional programs.
The Center’s Strategy was triggered by a holistic vision to treat the central cause, namely religious extremism and intellectual misleading, taking into consideration that the lured individuals are an integral part of the Saudi society where they were born and raised. Hence their intellectual, social, and professional rehabilitation and their reintegration in the community will contribute to the objectives of social and economic development. In order to achieve such vision, the center endeavored to benefit from the academic and practical experiences in the society, in the religious, social and psychological domains through academic seminars and professional counseling, in order to prepare the “arrested and beneficiary” individuals1 to reintegrate in the society after their discontinuity thereof, and overcome all difficulties in this regard.
Objectives of the CenterThe Center has general objectives, namely contributing to the dissemination of the moderation and rejection of extremism and luring ideas, endeavoring at achieving intellectual, psychological, and social equilibrium within the targeted categories, in addition to emphasizing the role of the State in fighting terrorism, confronting misconceptions, and protecting and tending its citizens. Nevertheless, it is committed to general objectives summarized as follows:
Providing counseling for arrested individuals in order to address their misconceptions and uncertainties, and refuting them by referring to the Holy Koran and the Sunnah of the Prophet;
Correcting the misconceptions of arrested individuals, and replacing them with sound teachings that comply with the moderation and tolerance of Islam;
Implementing holistic preventive campaigns for raising awareness in all locations that are susceptible of fostering extremism; targeting all social categories while focusing on the youth;
Attracting competent, eligible and reliable specialists to conduct the Center activities.;
Providing mechanisms that expand the knowledge and know-how of released convicts, and raise their awareness regarding the risks incurred from their misconception;
Lessons Learned from the Saudi Experience in Rehabilitating and Reeducating People Involved in Terrorist Acts 45
Providing the daily needs for mislead individuals’ families, and following-up on their academic, health and social conditions;
Communicating with released individuals in order to ensure their perseverance on the righteous path, and supporting them to avoid any recurrence of such misconceptions, for the sake of the national interest; and
Conducting accurate academic studies and researches for cases that were followed-up inside the detention facility or care center.
Benefits of the Saudi ExperienceThe intellectual campaign within the Mohammed bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care yielded outstanding results given the fact that it is a relatively recent initiative. It earned international appraisal from many international political, security and religious authorities in the world, as reported by global news agencies.
Nevertheless, such positive results as per intellectual curing for mislead victims, especially their social reintegration, were not the only benefits of the Center; other benefits included:
Achieving the religious obligation by the competent officials, as per counseling and refuting all justifications for such misconceptions, based on the Prophet’s (Peace be Upon Him) saying: “Religion relies on advice.” Hence the Saudi Government is performing a religious duty by providing counseling for arrested individuals in security cases;
Emphasizing the true religious teachings and revealing the misconceptions of some involved individuals, whereas the latter misunderstood the religious texts and teachings, hence required rehabilitation and reeducation;
Intellectual dialogue convinced most of the arrested individuals who declared they abandoned the misconceptions, which is a social achievement by the Center;
The Saudi society was quite relieved by such counseling, and perceived it as a State endeavor to protect all citizens from misconceptions and harm;
Such counseling thwarted the evil plans of Al Qaeda and all its supporting factions, because the State, through religious awareness campaign, managed to enfeeble and undermine their misleading “religious” teachings;
Mansour Bin Said Al Qarni46
Psychologically, the counseling provided the mislead victims with an insight to understand their acts and motivations, while addressing and orienting their true needs and helping them enhance their personalities and their capacities, as well as developing their communication and interaction skills with their entourage, and training them to control their aggressive reactions which can be devastating for the factors of welfare in society and replace them with positive reactions that can be addressed for the good of the whole society; and
Socially, the arrested and beneficiary individuals acquired many skills that contributed to their social reintegration, such as controlling socially unacceptable behaviors (such as anti-social behaviors), the ability of social interaction, and the ability to engage in social customs, values, ideals, ethics and standards, as well as developing their nationalist values and loyalty toward all instances and institutions of our nation.
Lessons Learned from the Saudi ExperienceSuch positive aspects and benefits reflect the encouraging outcome of the Saudi experience in rehabilitating and reintegrating the individuals involved in extremist doctrines and acts of violence. One notices that it imposed an important fact in the fight against terrorism, through all religious, psychological and social rehabilitation included therein, as an important partner, or even a substitute, for the security measures. Based on the said experience, one may say it provided many important lessons including:
Security interference is not considered the only solution anymore for defeating violent and extremist organizations, with the intellectual strategies increasingly proving to be effective in restraining the acts of violence, their growing members, or their dissemination of extremist doctrines which leads to violence.
The intellectual dialogue and discussion with those victims of misconceptions has given an inclusive concept for the reasons of misleading, with the main reason being the ignorance of the true religious teachings, which lured a large number of individuals.
Identifying the means and processes used by the misleading groups in order to lure youth to join them and convince them of their misleading concepts.
Perusing the reasons and circumstances that encourage youth to take the path of violence and reject their natal society and environment, to accept such pervert doctrines contradicting their initial teaching.
Lessons Learned from the Saudi Experience in Rehabilitating and Reeducating People Involved in Terrorist Acts 47
Acquiring convincing dialogue skills with the lured individuals, as well as techniques of refuting the said misconceptions, revealed through the numerous discussions with them, which benefitted the specialists involved in such discussions.
Uniting efforts between specialists and law enforcement individuals against extremist misconceptions, which established a bond between both parties involved in physical and intellectual security respectively.
Refuting many rumors and misinformation claiming that law enforcement bodies are corrupt and practice unnecessary violence and torture against detainees. Indeed, the participation of independent specialists, who met a large number of detainees, allowed an insight of the legal procedures within the detention facilities, in addition to one-on-one direct interviews with detainees.
The availability of counseling positively impacted detainees’ families and gave them a positive impression of the State, and convinced them that it is endeavoring to rehabilitate their children without having recourse to extreme measures, which relieves their parents and beloved ones.
Confirming the correct religious teachings based on the tolerance of the Islamic Sharia, as well as ethical principles and values, and national loyalty. Such concepts should be emphasized and valued in the society through preventive awareness raising programs implemented by the Centre in the society. Such endeavor should target localities susceptible of fostering extremism through religious leaders and specialists, while focusing on youth and students.
Reconsidering the Islamic speech of some preachers and teachers, whereas the moderation and tolerance of Islam are observed. Moreover religious fatwas are not approached without religious qualification, upon referral to eligible scholars of Islam. Educational environment is also reconsidered thoroughly.
The society regained its self-confidence, hence its capacity to modify the misdemeanors and misconceptions of its individuals. As a result, it recovered its customs, traditions, and values which were impaired by a lured category that threatened the social security.
Revealing the importance of the family in the rehabilitation and reintegration process of the said youth, due to the psychological and familial orientation provided to their families, which attenuated the troubles, tensions and conflicts of which the family
Mansour Bin Said Al Qarni48
Importance of the social participation through various institutions, especially educational institutions, in establishing social security, which was revealed through seminars, conferences and intellectual programs addressing the intellectual campaign against terrorism.
of the grief caused, include: counter reactions, accountability, thorough reconsideration and consolidation of the internal scene by emphasizing religious concepts and national
misconceptions, and a pillar for social security.
on mutual cooperation, based on providing information, studies, researches, and consultancies, as well as channeling and assessing experiences.
Conclusion
have achieved outstanding results in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, not only temporarily but on the long term as well. Indeed, they targeted the misconceptions on which the misleading theorists relied in order to lure more and more followers, which consolidated the conviction that the security or military measures in doctrinal crimes, while still an unavoidable priority,
approaches became a primordial requirement for establishing security, and that was the pivot for the Saudi experience, considered to be a national achievement and pride, boasting
majority was aware of the great peril which the extremist doctrine represented on the social security, hence on social development.
(Endnotes)
1 centers.
49
rote ting ig ts As Counterterrorism ool: e C se o Ameri n Muslims
Sahar AzizAssociate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University
Developing effective strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE) has proven to be elusive. Despite the plethora of conferences, reports, and expenditures, governments continue to struggle to find the right formula to decrease politically motivated violence.1 Because the underlying causes of violent extremism are complex and country specific: no one size fits all solution. Each nation must consider its unique economic, political, and social circumstances when seeking to protect its citizens from violence perpetrated by extremists. But government officials should be careful that their CVE strategies do not exacerbate the underlying marginalization, discrimination, and disenfranchisement that create fertile grounds for terrorist recruitment.
This paper argues that America’s domestic CVE practices create a paradox: law abiding citizens and residents who openly and legally express their oppositional views or orthodox religious practices are targeted by the state in the form of surveillance, infiltration, investigation, entrapment, and prosecution.2 Thus, targeted communities reasonably suspect that the campaign against homegrown terrorism is not so much about public safety as it is about irrational bigotry.3 Members of these communities become less willing to cooperate with law enforcement because they view CVE as merely political scapegoating at the expense of their liberty and livelihoods.4 When contextualized within America’s aggressive police tactics in the 1960s and 1970s against civil rights, Black Nationalist, and anti-war groups and coupled with the disproportionate focus on African Americans in the ongoing War on Drugs, such suspicions are not far-fetched.5
Accordingly, this paper makes three recommendations that address the paradox of punishing the innocent for openly expressing grievances shared by the guilty, or worse merely sharing the same immutable characteristics. First, an effective program to counter violent extremism must prioritize protecting the ability of individuals to exercise civil and
Sahar Aziz50
human rights without fear of state retribution. Second, the American governments must balance the tight rope between engaging Muslim communities to protect them from hate crimes or bolster public safety and heightened attention to Muslims that signals to the public that Muslims warrant extra scrutiny from the state.6 Selective engagement risks a backlash where the majority resents what it perceives as favoritism towards Muslims or interprets engagement efforts as legitimizing suspicion of Muslims. Either response often leads to private acts of discrimination or violence in employment, schools, mosques, and public places.7 Third, CVE programs that empower communities as stakeholders in preserving public safety and protection of rights must be careful not to perpetuate existing disparities within Muslim communities along gender, age, class, and race. Insensitivity to internal tensions risks placing the government as an enabler of intra-community gender bias, intra-community ethnic conflicts, and class divisions.
In the end, the legitimacy of CVE policies hangs in the balance. The extent to which governments are able to uphold individual rights while preserving public safety directly contributes to defeating the use of violence as a means of seeking justice.
Defining the ProblemBefore solutions can be developed, the problem must be accurately defined. An effective CVE strategy distinguishes between internationally-based violent extremist acts and those that are purely domestic. In the case of post-9/11 violent extremist acts perpetrated by a Muslim in the US had mostly a connection to an international actor or entity. In stark contrast, most violent extremism by non-Muslims is purely domestic such as the case of right wing militias, neo-Nazis, White Supremacists, Patriot groups, and anti-abortion violent extremist.8
Internationally-based terrorism often arises from conflicts abroad wherein the U.S. is either engaged in hostilities or heavily influential in the domestic affairs of a nation. Opponents of the U.S.’s role seek to expand the theater of conflict to within America’s border. Because it is impossible for an insurgency group, militia, or political organization to militarily “defeat” the United States, victory is often defined as extricating America’s military or political influence from that particular nation. Thus, terrorism is a tool employed in an asymmetrical conflict to influence government policy and actions.9
Because of their familiarity with the country, American residents or citizens are more attractive recruits than a temporary visitor coming from abroad. But whether recruitment efforts are successful depends on domestic factors including, but not limited to, equal
Protecting Rights As a Counterterrorism Tool: The Case of American Muslims 51
opportunity for social mobility, non-violent avenues for expression of dissent and grievances, equal opportunities in employment and education, and the general integration of minority communities. It is highly unlikely, though certainly not impossible, that a gainfully employed, educated, and politically empowered individual will resort to violence in furtherance of a political agenda. Thus, CVE strategies should focus as much on addressing social and economic disparities as they do on policing illegal activity.
Similar to government approaches to Anglo or devout Christian American violent extremists, American Muslims should not be collectively punished because they share the same race, ethnicity, or religion of terrorists.10 For example, after the horrific September 11th attacks, tens of thousands of Arab and Muslim Americans – as well as non-Arab, non-Muslims thought to “look like Muslim” - were collectively punished with arrest, detention, and deportation notwithstanding that the 9/11 hijackers were all temporary visitors to the United States.11 None of them resided in the United States, much less had U.S. citizenship. No US resident was ever charged with aiding them in any way. But because superficial and invidious criteria were used to search for the suspects, a diverse group of communities were lumped together as suspects and punished accordingly.
Beyond the normative non-discrimination principles integral to American values, focusing on individuals rather than communities in anti-terrorism initiatives has a utilitarian benefit. By punishing innocent Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians who prior to 9/11 had negligible collective grievances against the government, US officials made it difficult to obtain the trust and cooperation of communities targeted by foreign groups’ calling for violent extremism inside the United States.12 Moreover, the government’s discriminatory and selective counterterrorism corroborated terrorists’ narrative that America had declared war on Muslims and Islam both within and outside its borders.
For the most part, foreign groups have been unsuccessful in recruiting American residents and citizens in joining their politically motivated violent agendas.13 But this is less attributable to the government’s CVE strategies than to American Muslim communities’ integration within American society and their strong economic and social status prior to 9/11.
Thus, countering violent extremism that do not prioritize civil and human rights jeopardize American Muslims’ hard earned achievements, resulting in an adversarial relationship with the government. Although the past ten years of collective punishment have proven that American Muslims do not resort to violent extremism when faced with such adversity, it has significantly soured relations and trust in the government. Furthermore, CVE efforts
Sahar Aziz52
suffer from a legitimacy deficit as they become viewed more as biased politics rather than impartial policing in the interest of public safety.14
Prioritize Civil and Human Rights in Strategies to Counter Violent ExtremismViolent extremism is a tool employed in furtherance of a political agenda often based on perceptions or realities of subjugation, oppression, and marginalization.15 By suppressing the freedom of religion, speech, and expression, the government enables terrorist recruiters to provide an alternative means for vulnerable recruits to seek justice. Similarly, by failing to meaningfully address inequality in public services, education, and job opportunities, the government creates a cohort of people with little to lose and potential receptivity to extremist recruiters’ claims that hard work and patriotism are self-defeating. Coupled with severe mental health problems or desperate financial straits, the result can be predictably volatile.
Thus, governments should simultaneously refrain from enforcing anti-terrorism laws in such a way that infringes on the rights of individuals, particularly in less empowered minority communities, and proactively mitigate societal inequities based on race, religion, ethnicity or other immutable characteristics. Indeed, the more open, visible expressions of political dissent or Islamic piety that occur, and the more aggressive the state’s defense of Muslims’ civil rights, the more effective the hindrance of extremist recruiting.
Meaningfully Engaging and Defending Muslim Communities Government officials are both enablers and defenders of post-9/11 discrimination against Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians. On the one hand, they face public pressure to aggressively counter “Islamist” terrorism through an extensive arsenal of national security powers developed in response to 9/11. The government realized soon after 9/11 that it had little understanding of the diverse Muslim communities across the country, resulting in scorched earth detention, deportation, and prosecutorial tactics in the years immediately following 9/11.16
Meanwhile, the same agencies are legally obligated to protect Muslim communities from hate crimes, discrimination, and violent acts based on unlawful bias. Some of these illegal acts arise from selective counterterrorism enforcement, and ensuing publicity, against Muslims that some members of the public took as signals that Muslims are a disloyal and suspect fifth column thereby deserving discrimination.
Protecting Rights As a Counterterrorism Tool: The Case of American Muslims 53
Thus, the government needs avenues for gathering intelligence about Muslim communities as well as a means to protect these communities from bias-motivated crime. Community engagement, also called community outreach, has become the mechanism of choice. Under the auspices of improving government-community relations, government officials convene regular meetings with (primarily male) Muslim leaders to discuss grievances and obtain community support for countering terrorism. Although community engagement is a good governance tool, few of the communities’ systemic civil rights and liberties concerns are meaningfully addressed through changes in policies and practices. Indeed, litigation or public censure in elite media outlets is far more effective in reforming policy than community engagement meetings.17 Moreover, government officials do not seem to make the connection between the legitimizing effect of their selective counterterrorism efforts and public acts of discrimination, or worse they do not care.
For community engagement to be an effective aspect of countering violent extremism strategies, the government must stop using the meetings as intelligence gathering exercises as well as produce tangible reforms to policies that disparately impact Muslims. Otherwise, government officials will be engaging with purported leaders of no repute within the communities and willing to tell the government whatever it wants to hear to be part of the “in group” of invitees.
Incorporate the Diversity of Muslim Communities Along Gender, Race, Class, and AgeCVE programs that empower communities as stakeholders in public safety and protection of rights must be careful not to perpetuate existing disparities within Muslim communities along gender, age, and race. The experiences of new immigrants as opposed to third or fourth generation Americans are starkly different irrespective of a shared religious or ethnic background. Similarly, class differences and educational levels contribute to people’s worldview and perceptions of their government. And many Muslim communities are still lead primarily by males. Thus, insensitivity to these circumstances risks making the government an unwitting enabler of gender bias, intra-community ethnic conflicts, and political disputes.
An effective community engagement component of countering violent extremism must proactively include adequate representation of women, racial and ethnic groups, ages, and socio-economic classes that reflect the demographic of that particular community. The result will be robust and engaging discussions among two equal stakeholders – the government and its constituency.
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ConclusionIn developing its countering violent extremism strategy, the U.S. government should focus on three key policies: 1) shift from a traditional heavy-handed policing approach to a more rights-based approach that creates political space for airing grievances free of government retaliation; 2) actively protect Muslim communities from hate crimes and bias-based violence through prosecution and public condemnation of anti-Muslim bias ; and 3) reform community engagement programs to require proof of tangible reform based on communities’ expressed concerns, include women, youth, and various ethnicities, and prohibit government intelligence gathering in community engagement meetings.
Absent these reforms, among others, CVE programs will be dismissed as pretext for invidious discrimination to scapegoat politically vulnerable minorities for the failings of
(Endnotes)
1 See, e.g., Andrew Johnson & Emily Dugan, Wealthy, Quiet, Unassuming: The Christmas Day Bomb Suspect, The Independent (Dec. 27, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/wealthy-quiet-unassuming-the-christmas-day-bomb-suspect-1851090.html (reporting that when a suspect’s father informed the U.S. embassy in Nigeria of his son’s activities, the of cial brie ng the case con rmed that the United States had known of the suspect’s terrorist ties for at least two years prior to the attempted attack); see, e.g., Michael Brick, Man Crashes Plane into Texas I.R.S. Of ce, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19crash.html; see Joan Walsh, Why so Little Attention to Vernon Hunter?, Salon.com (Feb. 22, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://www.salon.com/2010/02/23/vernon_hunter/ (reporting that Joseph Stack’s victim was a Vietnam veteran and IRS employee). But see Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, The White House (December 2011) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ les/sip- nal.pdf (outlining broad principles for countering violent extremism). Despite the issuance of a national strategic implementation plan, there is yet to be a coherent and consistently applied CVE plan on the ground that addresses violent extremism both by Muslims and non-Muslims such as neo-Nazis, White Supremacists, and Patriot militia groups. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, DHS Crushed This Analyst for Warning About Far-Right Terror, Wired (Aug. 7, 2012) available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/dhs/all/.
2 See Chris Hawley & Matt Apuzzo, NYPD In ltration of Colleges Raises Privacy Fears, Associated Press (Oct. 11, 2011) available at http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/NYPD-in ltration-of-colleges-raises-privacy-fears; Jeanne Theoharis, The Legal Black Hole in Lower Manhattan: The Unfairness of the Trial of Muslim Activist Syed Fahad Hashmi, Slate Magazine (Apr. 27, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2252117/ (Fahad Hashmi was placed in pretrial solitary con nement for three years based on charges that he had aided a friend in storing “military gear,” such as raincoats, ponchos, and waterproof socks, in his London apartment, which
Protecting Rights As a Counterterrorism Tool: The Case of American Muslims 55
later delivered to al-Qaeda, political statements he made at Brooklyn College in 2002 (reportedly calling America “the biggest terrorist in the world”), and his membership in a New York-based political group, Al Muhajiroun.); see also Larry Neumeister, Syed Hashmi, American Student, Pleads Guilty to Helping Al Qaida, Huf ngton Post (April 27, 2010, 8:32 PM), http://www.huf ngtonpost.com/2010/04/27/syed-hashmi-american-stud_n_554211.html (Hashmi accepted a plea bargain on the eve of trial due in part to his concerns he could not get a jury untainted by the pervasive stereotypes of Muslims as terrorists.).
3 Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, "NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases", Associated Press (Aug. 21, 2012) (reporting that despite extensive resources spent on spying on Muslim student associations, Muslim-owned businesses, and mosques, NYPD did not produce any leads or terror cases).
4 See Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, "FBI Mosque Spying Case: Judge Dismisses Part of Lawsuit Against the FBI", Huf ngton Post (August 16, 2012, 8:37 PM), http://www.huf ngtonpost.com/2012/08/14/fbi-mosque-spying-case-ju_n_1777645.html (FBI informant hired to act as Muslim convert, in ltrate Muslim community, record conversations and attempt to solicit terrorist sentiments); Documents Show NY Police Watched Devout Muslims, Wall St. J. (Sept. 6, 2011, 6:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/APfd1a04fa820c44bd820aae6bc75d33e3.html; see also Joe Coscarelli, NYPD Even Spied on the Muslim Leaders Who Were Helping Them, N.Y. Mag. (Oct. 6, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2011/10/nypd_even_spied_on_the_muslim.html (reporting that an imam was the target of New York City Police Department surveillance at the same time that he was welcoming of cers into his mosque and attending hearings with Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly).
5 Stephen Dycus, Arthur L. Berney, William C. Banks, Peter Raven Hansen, "National Security Law", Aspen Publishers (August 17, 2011) (summarizing the history of COINTELPRO and the FBI’s targeting of political groups engaged in political dissent).
6 See Sahar F. Aziz, "Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America", 47 Gonz. L. Rev. 429, 492 (2011) citing, Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash: Enforcement and Outreach, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (“Since September 11, 2001, the Civil Rights Division has engaged in an extensive program of outreach to Muslim, Sikh, Arab, and South-Asian American organizations. This outreach has included meetings of senior Civil Rights Division of cials with community leaders to address backlash-related civil rights issues ....”).
7 See Spencer Ackerman, "Justice Department Of cial: Muslim "Juries" Threaten "Our Values", Wired (Oct. 5, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/islamophobia-beyond-fbi/all/1 (reporting that Justice Department of cials communicated that the “U.S. is at war with the Islamic religion”); See Jaihyun Park et al., Implicit Attitudes Toward Arab-Muslims and the Moderating Effects of Social Information, 29 Basic & Applied Soc. Psychol. 35 (2007) (noting implicit bias among Americans in favor of white-and black-sounding names over Arab-and Muslim-sounding names); See Barry Leibowitz, Anti-Muslim Hate Crime? Woman Says She Was Followed by Car, Pepper-Sprayed Near Ohio Mosque, CBS News (Dec. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20026330-504083.html (reporting that a Muslim woman was “attacked with
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pepper spray outside an Ohio mosque,” while “the attacker told her to leave the country”).
8 See, e.g., Alex Dobuzinskis, "Southwest Apologizes to Muslim Booted off Plane", Reuters (Mar. 16, 2011,7:13PM),(reporting that a Muslim woman was kicked off an airplane because a crew member mistook her as saying “It’s a go” to someone on her cell phone when she in fact said “I’ve got to go”); Hate Map, S. Poverty Law Ctr., http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (detailing the number of organizations in the United States that are dedicated to anti-Muslim activities); Jerry Markon, "Justice Department Sues on Behalf of Muslim Teacher, Triggering Debate", Washington Post (Mar. 22, 2011 (reporting the case of an Illinois school district that refused to grant a Muslim woman time off to make pilgrimage to Mecca).
9 Ekaterina Stepanova, "Terrorism in an Asymmetrical Con ict: Ideological and Structural Aspects", Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Research Report No. 23 (2008) http://books.sipri.org/ les/RR/SIPRIRR23.pdf.
10 Of ce of Intelligence & Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Pub. No. IA-0257-09, (U//FOUO) "Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment" (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf; see also Audrey Hudson & Eli Lake, Napolitano Stands by Controversial Report, Wash. Times (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/16/napolitano-stands-rightwing-extremism/?page=all.
11 For a general description of the distinctions between the Arab, Muslim, Middle Eastern, Sikh, and South Asian communities, see Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words that Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. City L. Rev. 33, 43-48 (2009).
12 See John Doyle et al., "Anti-Terror Program “Kept New York Safe”, NYPD Says", N.Y. Daily News (Aug. 24, 2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-24/local/29943085_1_terror-plots-cia-nypd-s-intelligence-unit. For example, after news media reports exposed the New York City Police Department’s pervasive spying on mosques, one New York City mosque-goer responded by stating “from now on, I can’t feel safe in my own mosque because someone might be sitting behind me spying.” Id; Colin Miner et al., F.B.I. Says Oregon Suspect Planned “Grand" Attack, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/us/28portland.html?scp=2&sq=Mohamed%20Osman%20Mohamed&st=cse; Trevor Aaronson, The Informants, Mother Jones, Sept./Oct. 2011, at 41, available at http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants (“The Portland case [of Mohamed Osman Mohamud] has been held up as an example of how FBI stings can make a terrorist where there might have been only an angry loser. “This is a kid who, it can be reasonably inferred, barely had the capacity to put his shoes on in the morning," [a former FBI agent] says.”); Thomas Watkins, Suit Claims FBI Violates Muslims’ Rights at Mosque, ABC News (Feb. 23, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=12977749 (“Plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the FBI said ... that the agency’s use of a paid informant to in ltrate California mosques has left them and other Muslims with an enduring fear that their phones and e-mails are being screened and their physical whereabouts monitored.”).
13 See, e.g., Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Terrorism Since 9/11: An Accounting 3
Protecting Rights As a Counterterrorism Tool: The Case of American Muslims 57
(2011), available at http://sanford.duke.edu/centers/tcths/about/documents/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_Since_911_An_Accounting.pdf (“There were ... more than 20 terrorist plots by non-Muslims in the United States in 2010, including attacks by Joseph Stack, who ew a plane into an IRS building in Austin, Texas; Larry Eugene North, who is suspected of placing bombs in mailboxes across eastern Texas; and George Jakubec, who was accused of manufacturing explosives in his home in Escondido, California.”)
14 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Newburgh Terrorism Case May Establish a Line for Entrapment, N.Y. Times, June 16, 2010, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/nyregion/16terror.html (reporting that an FBI informant allegedly entrapped four young Muslim men with “promises of a $ 250,000 payment and a BMW,” convincing them to plan synagogue bombings and military-plane shootings, despite the four men being “so ill-equipped to plan an attack that none had a driver’s license or a car”); Amanda Ripley, The Fort Dix Conspiracy, Time, Dec. 17, 2007, at 46, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1691609,00.html (commenting on allegations that an FBI informant “brainwashed” and tricked six young men accused of plotting an attack on Fort Dix: “if the rumors of entrapment become so corrosive that no one in the Muslim-American community feels safe talking to the FBI, then the government has lost its best potential ally”); see also Ctr. for Human Rights & Global Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States pp. 19-38 (2011), available at http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/targetedandentrapped.pdf (documenting multiple cases where government informants played a leading role in planning and implementing attempted terrorist acts, thereby raising concerns of de facto entrapment of Muslim targets).
15 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press (April 16, 2004); Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, University of Pennsylvania Press (January 3, 2008); Marc Sageman, Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities, Jamestown Foundation (March, 31, 2007).
16 See Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words that Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. City L. Rev. 33, 33-40 (2009) (summarizing the various ways in which the government selectively targeted Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians in the months after 9/11).
17 See ACLU.org, Latif v. Holder, ACLU Challenges Government No Fly List (July 30, 2012) http://www.aclu.org/national-security/latif-et-al-v-holder-et-al-aclu-challenges-government-no- y-list (Ninth Circuit unanimously rules that trial should go forward regarding secret no y list without reasons given to persons placed on the list); see also Ryan Singel, Judge Halts NSA Snooping, Wired, (August 17, 2006) http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2006/08/71610 (Court rules warrantless wiretapping unconstitutional in ACLU v. NSA); see also Marks, Alexandra, Privacy Advocates Fight for Ground Lost After 9/11, The Christian Science Monitor, (April 3, 2007), p. USA2 (Bush administration suspended program during appeal); see also Rubin, Alissa J.; Rahimi, Sangar, Bagram Detainees Named by U.S., New York Times, (January 17, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/asia/17afghan.html?_r=1 (names of detainees at GITMO released because of Freedom of Information Act lawsuit initiated by the ACLU).
59
e M n gement n e bilit tion o Im risone I A errorists: essons rom e ent istor
1
Expert of the United Nations and Council of Europe on Detention
IntroductionFrom the late 1960s to the late 1990s the terrorist organization known as the IRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) perpetrated an intense campaign of violence, as part of its campaign to end British rule in Northern Ireland and to create a united Ireland. During this period, the IRA was responsible for the deaths of 1,781 people, including civilians, police and military personnel.2 It is estimated that between 8,000 and 10,000 IRA members were imprisoned at some point during the period of the campaign.3
The IRA did not achieve its objective of a unified Ireland during its thirty year campaign of violence and by the late 1990s decided to abandon terrorism, for a variety of strategic, organizational and psychological reasons. This "collective disengagement" led it to renounce violence and accept a political settlement that fell short of meeting the traditional objectives of terrorist groups.4
This paper focuses on lessons that can be drawn from how IRA prisoners were managed and rehabilitated during the period before and after the 1998 peace agreement.
Management of IRA PrisonersOne of the most pressing problems for those seeking to manage terrorist prisoners is deciding where and how to contain them. The two primary options available are to concentrate the prisoners in one or several prisons, or to disperse them throughout the prison system.5 In Northern Ireland, terrorist prisoners were concentrated.
As a result of the concentration policy, opposing terrorist prisoner factions effectively took
Shane Bryans60
control of their accommodation areas, segregating themselves from the other side and other "criminal" prisoners.6 This led to them being able to engage in a range of activities including: intimidating prison staff; maintaining organizational structure and paramilitary discipline; conducting ideological and practical training for members;7 planning and successfully executing escape plans; and generally continuing to contribute to “the struggle” (as the campaign was known) from the confines of the prison.8 One positive impact, however, of the decision to concentrate IRA prisoners was that it was easy for the authorities to identify who was in control and to discern the roles played by different prisoners.
A fundamental aspect of any terrorist organization’s existence is its ability to recruit and integrate new members. One might, therefore, reasonably expect this to be true of organizations in the prison environment. However, this was not the case in Northern Ireland. The IRA made no effort to recruit or indoctrinate new members in prison, in part because of their self-imposed segregation from "criminal" prisoners. Instead, IRA efforts in prison were directed towards reinforcing and indoctrinating existing members who had been jailed, which prison authorities were unable to prevent.
Disengagement and De-radicalisation during the ConflictSome individual IRA prisoners become disillusioned and disengaged from terrorism during the conflict.9 However, the opportunity to do so in prison was limited, given the influence of the IRA prison leaders, the cohesive nature of the IRA organizational structure in prison, and the decision to locate IRA prisoners together. The authorities found it impossible to systematically target individuals for disengagement or de-radicalisation.
Imprisoned terrorists can have a significant impact on collective disengagement from terrorist campaigns. They can persuade their community to participate in peace initiatives, engage in electoral politics, mobilize their supporters to invest in peaceful negotiations, and put down their arms in a permanent and unequivocal manner. This was the case with the IRA. From the IRA cease-fire declarations in the 1990s, through the gradual emergence of the peace process, the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, and the final decommissioning of IRA weaponry and explosives, a crucial role was played by IRA prisoners.
Prisoners contributed to the shifting of the republican culture from a practice of war to a practice of politics. Part of the changes prisoners helped facilitate was a shift in the IRA’s culture and practice. Prison was a key site where, over time, the hierarchical nature of the IRA was successfully challenged, which enabled it to become more open to change. In turn, this helped to tip the balance in favour of a political path towards securing the peace
The Management and Rehabilitation of Imprisoned IRA Terrorists: Lessons from Recent History 61
agenda. In short, prisoners helped to shape the reinvention of the Republican Movement away from the use of physical violence to one of peaceful negotiation.10
Reintegration of IRA Prisoners back into SocietyIt was only after the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998 that attempts were made to reintegrate individual IRA prisoners. The GFA included proposals for the early release of prisoners as an incentive for non-signatories to de-commission arms and work towards a peaceful resolution; this was not an amnesty (as sought by prisoners) but a conditional release. All politically motivated prisoners were released by the summer of 2000, regardless of the length of sentence, provided that they were not affiliated to an organization that was continuing with terrorist activity.11 In Northern Ireland, 450 prisoners were released early, including 241 Republicans. Of these, only 16 had their release licences revoked for participating in terrorist-related activity and were later returned to prison.12
The Government recognised the importance of measures to facilitate the reintegration of these IRA prisoners into the community by providing support prior to and after release, including assistance directed towards availing of employment opportunities, retraining or re-skilling, and further education. In the initial years following the GFA, support for ex-prisoners and their organizations came mainly from non-governmental and community organizations which were funded by the European Union. These groups contributed significantly to training and retraining, supported the process of healing, revealed a wide level of community involvement, and encouraged self-help.
In reality, released ex-IRA prisoners faced the same range of practical difficulties that confront any prisoner on release, including finance, housing and employment. An additional challenge was that there was often reluctance by ex-IRA prisoners to engage with statutory and community bodies.13 A number of former IRA members took up (or resumed) criminal activity following release and have been involved in drug dealing, extortion and robberies.
Collective disengagements are typically executed as a result of calculated strategy on the part of group’s leadership. In such cases, individual terrorists have no alternative but to return to society, some still ideologically adherent to the group’s former objectives – those who collectively disengage because they have no other choice are not necessarily "de-radicalised" and the early release scheme placed no official emphasis on the psychological well-being or change of its participants. Indeed, a number of IRA terrorists continued their violent campaign in breakaway organization.
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ConclusionThe ending of the conflict in Northern Ireland is a good example of a negotiated end to terrorism and of collective disengagement.14 Like other negotiated settlements, it took a long time to bring to a conclusion, with many false starts and violence along the way. Lessons can be drawn from the way IRA prisoners were managed during the thirty year conflict. Four of the key issues that emerged are highlighted here.
One challenge for the authorities is deciding to what degree terrorist prisoners should be given opportunities for self-determination and to "resist" in prison. This will have an impact on the policy decision of whether to concentrate prisoners in one location, and the degree to which prisoners should be permitted to organise and educate themselves. In the case of the IRA, their highly organized prisoner resistance assisted in reconfiguring the political conflict outside the prison. Such resistance was the result of organization and discipline, intellectual debate, systematic knowledge acquisition, and the honing of strategic manoeuvers. Equally, IRA leadership development and resistance in prison was instrumental in devising and promoting the peace initiative and was key in consolidating support for attaining a united Ireland through exclusively peaceful means.
It has been suggested that the most difficult and unpalatable part of the peace process was the release of terrorist prisoners.15 In part, this was because the interests of victims of terrorism were not explicitly addressed. While accepting that the collective disengagement of the IRA would probably not have taken place unless terrorists were offered significantly reduced sentences, greater consideration could have been given to restorative justice approaches prior to, and following, the early release of IRA prisoners. This would contribute to the long term prospects for victim recovery and community healing.
The Government underestimated the serious psychological trauma that a substantial minority of ex-IRA prisoners displayed, which had an impact on their ability to successfully reintegrate into society.16 Release from prison often proved highly traumatic, with issues to do with personal security, emotional problems, relationship problems with partners and families. Difficulties in readjusting to life outside prison included anxiety, depression, anger, fear and isolation, drug and alcohol dependency and attempted suicide.
It is now acknowledged that more should have been done to ensure the effective reintegration of ex-IRA prisoners both before and after release. An important issue that was underestimated at the time is that reintegration was not just an issue for the ex-prisoners but for society as a whole. Society itself may need to change to ensure the inclusion of ex-terrorist prisoners. The state has to concede legitimacy to former combatants who become
Shane Bryans
The Management and Rehabilitation of Imprisoned IRA Terrorists: Lessons from Recent History 63
involved in running community support organizations. Legislative and policy changes are often required to ensure that there is no discrimination against former terrorists based on their earlier terrorist activity.
In summary, reintegration of terrorist prisoners is not just about the prisoners themselves: it requires investment in local communities and, to gain greater public support, mechanisms for restorative justice.
(Endnotes)
1 Dr. Bryans is writing in a personal capacity and his views do not necessarily re ect those of any organisation for whom he works.
2 Thornton, Chris and others. Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died Through the Northern Ireland Troubles. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing. 2004.
3 Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie. The Provisional I.R.A. London: Corgi Books. 1988.
4 Rogelio Alonso. “Leaving terrorism behind in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country.” Chap. 6 in Leaving Terrorism Behind – Individual and collective disengagement. Oxford: Routledge, 2009.
5 Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin. Radicalization or Rehabilitation - Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008.
6 Chris Ryder. Inside the Maze: the untold story of the Northern Ireland Prison Service. London: Methuen, 2001.
7 Tracey Irwin. “Prison education in Northern Ireland: learning from our paramilitary past”, Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 42 (5) 2003: p. 471–84.
8 Imprisoned IRA terrorists maintained a sustained campaign of continuing resistance in prison including: attempting (and often succeeding) in escaping; ; use of prisoners’ bodies as weapons by refusing to wash, shave or cut their hair and smeared their excrement on to the walls of their cells, and participating in hunger strikes (during the 1980s, 10 IRA prisoners died as a result of hunger strikes which created a signi cance propaganda victory for the IRA in the UK and worldwide); making consistent allegations of mistreatment at the hands of the authorities as part of a deliberate strategy; refusing to cooperate in the formal prison activities and creating parallel structures in the prison for administration and education purposes; refusing to carry out prison work or to share cells; using time in prison to develop and re ne their ideological and strategic thinking, and to distribute such material both within and without the prison; seeking to use prisoners more generally as vehicles
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for propaganda and information campaigns; using coded communication or variations in language to communicate internally and with associates and organisations outside the prison.
9 John Horgan. Walking away from Terrorism – Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements. Oxford: Routledge, 2009.
10 Claire Delisle. Leading to Peace: Prisoner Resistance and Leadership Development in the IRA and Sinn Fein. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2012.
11 Brian Gormally. Conversion from War to Peace: Reintegration of Ex-Prisoners in Northern Ireland. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2001.
12 John Horganand Kurt Braddock. “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalisation Programmes.” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, (2010): pp. 267-291.
13 Some prisoners also resisted notions of reintegration because of a desire not to display any signs of weakness (such as social or psychological needs), because they rejected the label that they were "criminals", or because it insinuated that they not already integrated into the community.
14 Audrey Kurth Cronin. How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
15 Michael Von Tangen Page. “A "Most Dif cult and Unpalatable" Part: The Release of Politically Motivated Violent Offenders.” in A Farewell to Arms? From Long War to Long Peace in Northern Ireland. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2000.
16 Bill Rolston. Review of literature on republican and loyalist ex-prisoners. Ulster: University of Ulster. 2011.
Shane Bryans
65
emobili tion is rm ment n eintegr tion: e Colombi n r milit r Ex erien e
Peter ChalkSenior Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation
Historically, Colombia has developed an extensive “toolbox” of legal instruments for demobilizing and disarming illegal armed groups and reintegrating their members into mainstream society. These mechanisms reflect the numerous sub-state groups that have operated in the country, and the emphasis that the government has given to consolidating environments that can best support a successful transition from active to post-conflict settings. This short contribution will discuss how these procedures were applied to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC or United Self Defense Forces of Colombia), which for the decade after its formation in 1996 emerged as a prominent threat to national security - both in terms of political violence and drug trafficking. It argues that while the program eliminated the short-term AUC challenge, it failed to fully expunge the country’s militia problem, laid the ground for the re-emergence of criminal organizations and ultimately served to dent the perceived legitimacy of the State.
The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)Colombian paramilitaries originally emerged as civil defense units to safeguard the population in areas where the State was unable to provide sufficient security on its own. Most of their attention was focused on rebuffing the threat from two main insurgent movements – the Moscow-oriented Fuezeras Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Coombia) and the Cuban-influenced Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN, or the National Liberation Army). In 1996, most of these groups agreed to coalesce under the umbrella of the AUC, which proclaimed itself to be an “anti-communist advance guard” that had been set up to defend private property and free enterprise.1 This unification helped to significantly expand the influence of what until then had been largely marginal players in the Colombian conflict theater, endowing a disaggregated paramilitary milieu with central coordination, funding and
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at least for a time a coherent doctrine.2
Despite presenting itself as a patriotic movement committed to the protection of the State, the strategy of the AUC essentially mirrored those of the guerrillas. The movement sought to entrench its local control through the routine murder of political officials, law enforcement personnel and suspected enemy sympathizers. During the first two years of its existence alone, some 19,652 deaths were attributed to militants enforcing so-called “private justice.”3 The AUC also systematically began to extend its links to the drug trade and, indeed, by the end of the 1990s had effectively morphed into a dedicated narco-trafficking syndicate that dominated the supply of Colombian cocaine to the US market.4
Recognizing the growing threat posed by the AUC and the toll it was taking on the State’s security resources, then President Álvaro Uribe made eliminating the movement a priority in his government’s “Plan Patriota.”5 The objective was to find a way of enticing paramilitaries to give up their arms and re-enter civilian life in order to allow the military to focus all of its attention on defeating FARC and the ELN – the two organizations that were viewed as the main instigators of domestic instability (as opposed to the AUC, which was regarded more as a symptom of the country’s internal unrest). To this end, the Justice and Peace Law (JPL, or Law 975), was passed by Congress in July 2005.
The Justice and Peace Law (JPL)The JPL, which derived from the 2003 Santa Fé de Ralito Accord, served as the main framework for instituting the collective demobilization of the AUC.6 It was overseen by the Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz (OACP or High Commissioner of Peace), which was authorized to negotiate with, and award legal benefits to members of illegal armed groups that satisfied the definition of such entities as set out under international humanitarian law (IHL). To qualify an organization had to be able to exercise sufficient territorial control, under a responsible command, to conduct sustained and concerted military operations in pursuit of a specific political or ideological objective. The Colombian government adopted this conceptualization to differentiate paramilitaries (as well as FARC and the ELN) from “ordinary” criminal groups that had no right to enter a DDR program and which could only “normalize” their situation through surrender.7
Under the JPL, any AUC unit that wished to demobilize would first present a membership list and inventory of weapons to be decommissioned. The members would then moved to a pre-designated cantonment area while their names were verified and checks were carried
Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: The Colombian Paramilitary Experience 67
out to see if they were wanted for serious crimes or major human rights abuses. Those identified as senior AUC members or perpetrators of mass murder and/or other atrocities were transferred to maximum-security prisons while the cases against them were processed. They would then be prosecuted under an alternative sentencing scheme that limited their jail terms to eight years so long as they confessed their entirety of their crimes, returned all stolen property and contributed to victim reparations. 8
More junior/rank and file combatants that were not wanted for large-scale atrocities would wait in the cantonment area until they were issued with a certificate from the Comité Operativo para la Dejación de Armas (CODA, or Committee for Laying Down Arms) verifying that they wished to demobilize. These fighters would then enter into an 18-month social reintegration program that entitled them to range of benefits, including: a monthly stipend of 358,000 pesos ($179); health insurance; education; job training; counseling; and living accommodations. At the end of the process the former combatants were awarded a lump sum payment of two million pesos ($1000) so long as they agreed to invest this money in a proyecto productivo (productive project) with other demobilized paramilitaries.9
Assessment of the AUC DDR ProcessMore than 30,000 members of the AUC agreed to enter the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) program and by 2006 the group had officially disbanded. Many of its ex-members provided the police and intelligence services with invaluable information that was subsequently used to identify hidden weapons caches, disrupt drug syndicate networks and recover kidnap victims. Moreover in areas where there had been a large paramilitary presence, murders fell by 16 percent, thefts by 12 percent and assaults by 15 percent.10 On the surface, therefore, the program appeared to be a success.
However, the DDR process soon became a subject of heated criticism – both among paramilitaries and the population at large. One major problem had to do with resources. When the JPL was originally formulated, the Uribe administration estimated the size of the AUC at no more than 12,000 members. The fact that over double this number eventually demobilized placed an enormous burden on the entire program and and it quickly became overwhelmed – something that was further compounded by the marginal support it received from the private sector. More than 75 percent of those who agreed to abandon their campaign of violence never received any vocational training – much less a job – prompting charges that Bogotá had not lived up to its side of the bargain. Initial dissatisfaction soon translated into widespread disillusionment, driving many to once again
Peter Chalk68
take up arms and establish a whole new generation of illegal armed groups.11
These reconfigured entities, which are euphemistically referred to as bandas criminals emergentes or BACRIM, have since emerged as a significant security threat in their own right, engaging in a broad spectrum of organized criminal activity that ranges from drug trafficking and gun running to kidnapping and extortion.12 According to the Intelligence Directorate of the Colombian National Police, more than 5,300 reconstituted paramilitaries were arrested between 2006 and the end of 2009, with a further 1,100 killed in combat.13 In 2010 BACRIM carried out more unilateral violent actions than guerrillas and in some heavily affected departments such as Magdalena and Córdoba were responsible for over 40 percent of internal displacement.14
The resource issue also had a direct negative impact on allowing for a full and comprehensive investigation of the numerous cases that the JPL generated. Indeed, in many instances only a handful of prosecutors were available to follow up on highly complex crimes where evidence was hidden, witnesses intimidated or murdered and illegal property “hidden” in the name of third parties. It is almost certain that prominent AUC members escaped prosecution simply because the government could not provide the necessary prosecutorial means to ensure conviction. 15
A third difficulty lay in the alternative sentencing component of the DDR process, which was widely castigated for effectively exempting those AUC members who were found guilty of serious offences from the full force of the law. Human rights advocates were particularly critical, noting that paramilitaries were responsible for some eighty percent of the massacres that took place during the decade of their operational existence.16 Several commentators further pointed out that the bulk of those implicated in these crimes followed no political or ideological agenda and, therefore, were ineligible to enter the DDR program under the Uribe administration’s own stipulations. Subsequent revelations that members of the government, army and intelligence services had links with certain paramilitary entities deepened cynicism of the entire process, triggering a highly embarrassing political scandal that came to be known as “paragate.”17
ConclusionAlthough the AUC demobilization process was successful in removing a prominent illegal organization from the Colombian conflict it suffered from three fundamental flaws. First the program lacked adequate funding to ensure effective implementation and cover unforeseen contingencies/delays. As argued this merely weakened paramilitary belief in the peace
Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: The Colombian Paramilitary Experience 69
dividend and prompted many to once again take up arms. Second, the eligibility criteria for inclusion in DDR were opaque, generating criticism that the Uribe administration was
numbers of hardened criminals onto the street undermined faith in the impartiality of the justice system and served to seriously dent the perceived legitimacy of the government.
the two remaining insurgent entities in the country, FARC and the ELN. A number of commentators have concluded that the failure of the paramilitary demobilization process is symptomatic of a wider institutional paralysis in the Colombian state that limits its capacity to comprehensively terminate rather than merely transition political violence and guarantee long-term public order.18
(Endnotes)
1 Mauricio Romero, “Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the Paramilitaries in Colombia,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 14 (2000): 51-69; Bilal Saab and Alexandra Taylor, “Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia,” Studies in Con ict and Terrorism 32/6 ((2009), 461.
2 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 54.
3 Castilla Echand a, El Con icto Armado y las Manifestaciones de la Violencia en las Regiones de Colombia (Bogot : Presidencia de las Rep blica de Colombia, O cina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2000), 69.
4 Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact and Response (Santa Monica, CA: 2011), 18.
5 Plan Patriota ran from August 2002 to August 2006 and focused mainly on re-establishing national control over all Colombian municipalities and major tracts of rural territory. For more details see Tom Marks, Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for “Democratic Security” ((Carlisle, PA: U.S. War College, July 2005).
6 The Colombian government distinguished between collective and individual demobilization. The latter is a highly bureaucratized process that takes 24 months to complete and is governed by Law 782 (2002). For further details see Douglas Porch and María José Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” Studies in
Peter Chalk70
Con ict and Terrorism 31/6 (2008): 527.
7 See International Crisis Group (hereafter referred to as ICG), Dismantling Colombia’s New Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender, Latin America Report No 41, June 2012, 3.
8 Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 528; ICG, Dismantling Colombia’s New Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender, 3.
9 Paula Torres, Yaneth Giha, Sergio Jaramillo, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009), 14; ICG, Dismantling Colombia’s New Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender, 3; Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, 18-19.
10 Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 530.
11 See Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 528; Ralph Rozema, “Urban DDR-Processes: Paramilitaries and Criminal Networks in Medellín, Colombia,” Journal of Latin American Studies 40/3 (2008): 444, 448; and Sebastian Chaskel and Michael Bustamante, “Colombia’s Precarious Progress,” Current History (February 2008): 80-81.
12 In 2009, government authorities had identi ed eleven main organizations (down from 36 in 2007), four of which remained at the forefront of national security concern: The Don Mario Gang, which had an estimated 1,077 members under arms; the Ejército Revolucionario Papular Anticommunista (ERPAC), which had around 725 members; the Rastrojos, which was about 1,200-strong; and Los Paisas, the smallest of the four with approximately 172 operatives. Author interviews, Colombian National Police, Bogotá, March 2009. For further details of these groups see Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, 20; Jerry McDermott, “Generational Shift: Colombia’s Evolving Drug Cartel,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (February 2010): 43-44; and Andy Webb-Vidal, “Back from the Dead,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (May 2009): 40.
13 Author interviews, Colombian National Police, Bogotá, March 2009.
14 ICG, Dismantling Colombia’s New Illegal Armed Groups: Lessons from a Surrender, 2; Jorge Restrepo, Juan David González and Alonso Tobón, “Pramilitarismo: la amenaza sigue viva,” Razón Pública, March 07, 2011; and Angélica Arias Ortiz, “Lass bacrim retan a Santos,” Arcanos 17 (2012): 12.
15 Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 534.
16 Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” 531.
Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: The Colombian Paramilitary Experience 71
17 Myles Frechette, Colombia and the United States – The Partnership: But What is the Endgame? (Carlisle Brracks, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, February 2007), 33-36.
18 See, for instance, Porch and Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” and Peter Waldman, “Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia?” International Journal of Con ict and Violence, Vol. 1 (2007): 72.
73
Muslim i s or Communities: et een Integr tion n e uriti tion
Noman BenotmanPresident, Quilliam Foundation
The Post 9/11 era marks a transition in the ongoing debate of the integration of Muslim Diaspora communities in Western societies. The Global War on Terror which followed the attacks of September 11, 2001 has placed the integration of these communities in a newer and unprecedented context that links community cohesion and securitization. This is largely due to the fact that the key perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks were residents of Western countries who had managed to take advantage of the disintegration of the Muslim Diaspora. The Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bus and subway bombings of 2005 have exacerbated the conflict between Western governments and the Muslim Diaspora. As a result, old Muslim bodies, arrangements and institutions have become weak and irrelevant, thus raising questions of whom speaks on behalf of the Muslim Diaspora in the West.
A Muslim’s country of origin and race still plays a more crucial role than religion in shaping the structure of these communities. However, the Global War on Terror has increased the role that extremists play in the disintegration and disengagement of the Muslim community, especially among vulnerable youth. It has enabled them to utilize the concept of religion and turn it into a unifying nationality, thus aiming to create one distinctive Muslim community for functional purposes. This new identity is based on separatist ideas such as “us” and “them” or “Muslim” and “Kuffar” (infidels), and has become increasingly powerful among second and third generation Muslims who were born and bred in Western societies. Religion has been used as a new mechanism to create a new religious identity and transform religion into nationality. Language is another factor which has been utilized by extremists to serve this aim, by encouraging communities to speak the Arabic language which is associated with Islamic teachings in order to create a unifying language for these communities. There are three different areas in which the integration of Muslims in Western societies has failed: (i) socio-economic issues, (ii) civil-cultural issues, (iii) religious issues. The level of achievement of Muslims in the West in these areas is very low and varies across communities. After
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September 11th this failure was linked to the securitization problem which often impeded their integration and led to further marginalization since the focus of government policies became on prevention rather than inclusion. Several interviews conducted with Muslim community members after the Global War on Terror have highlighted this dangerous situation. When examining the issue of integration among Muslim communities in the West, three typical existing patterns have been identified:
Inward Integration Instead of integrating with wider society, many Muslim communities in the West have been
adopting an inward integration model. That is, members integrate on a wide scale with their own Muslim communities based on elements of their ethnic background, culture, common language and country of origin. The differences between the Muslim communities are often enormous, stressing the need for any integration model to address and approach the Muslims in the West as various communities, rather than one single entity.
Outward Convergence For years, Islamists and other extremists have been taking advantage of the shattered situation
of Muslims in the West and have identified ways to integrate them under one Islamic banner. Sensitive issues such as Palestine, Kashmir and Iraq have been used to bring together Muslim communities under unified goals, thus nurturing the existing grievances over Western foreign policies in an attempt to create one Islamic community. As a result, separate Islamic education systems have increased among these communities, and inter-marriages between Muslims of different cultural backgrounds have become the norm. By doing so, extremists hoped to create a religious Islamic identity that transcends ethnic and cultural differences. This does not necessarily mean that all Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islamism is considered extreme ideology, but rather that extremists have adopted and manipulated these views to meet their end goals.
Integration with the Home Nation Instead of integrating with their wider societies, many Muslim communities in the West are
moving towards integration with their countries of origin. They follow closely television channels and news from their countries of origin, while spending less effort in learning about the culture, social affairs, life skills and or laws of their host countries. Many of them choose to spend the summer holidays back in their countries of origin on a yearly basis, and arranged weddings that transcend geographical boundaries have become something
Muslim Diaspora Communities: Between Integration and Securitization 75
of the ordinary. In North African Muslim communities for example, many members are working towards building their future in their home countries, by buying properties and land back home. In a visit to a middle class Saudi family in London, it was obvious that the house has less than the minimum furniture. When asked about the reason, the family replied that it wants to give the children a feeling of “no home” so that they would be ready to leave the UK anytime in the future. In another case, a Muslim doctor of North African background from Manchester stated that none of his children speak English and that they have all been home-schooled in order to avoid mixing with the wider British
home countries and cultures to their host societies in the West.
become wider, unless governments combine their local experiences with global trends of integration. So far, governments have been dealing with damage control rather than introducing collective and real approaches to tackle the integration problem of Muslims from all aspects, regardless of the security problem. Muslims are still viewed by many in the West as immigrants even when referring to second or third generations who themselves were born in the West. A persistently reinforcing narrative exists within Muslim communities in
relations between Muslims in the West and their broader societies. Minority extremist actions persistently reinforce this narrative; the extreme far right in the West and the extremist
a new environment of disintegration that is used by extremist factions as fertilized grounds
involve not just social and economic isolation but also a much increased chance of separatist
because of the breeding ground that is often created for the open preaching of religious hatred and a range of assorted religio-political grievances.”1 Broader social concerns within Muslim communities, such as discrimination, integration or socio-economic disadvantage, should be treated distinctively and not as part of counterterrorism agenda, which has been proved to be counter-productive and serves to isolate these marginalized Muslim communities while securitizing social justice and civil right issues.
(Endnotes)
1 Shamit Saggar, “Integration and Identity Politics” Ch. 4 in Pariah Politics Understanding Western Radical Islamism and What Should Be Done (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2009.
3Addressing Challenges through Dialogue,
Training, and Research
79
21st Centur rose utori l ools or re enting errorism
David Scharia
on bringing criminals to justice should be replaced with a more elaborate approach that recognizes the role prosecutors should play in preventing terrorism. One of the gravest
strategy that focuses on prosecuting terrorists before they succeed in committing their acts while respecting human rights and due process standards.
of such acts. Such legislation has to be drafted clearly and to balance itself with the rights of
United Nations and other major international and regional organizations have concluded
to terrorism, should be prohibited for preventive purposes because they may be indicators of a subsequent terrorist attack. Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) contains
for terrorism. Similarly, Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) calls upon all States to
is that States, in order to prevent terrorist acts, also need to prosecute certain preparatory
prevent the act itself.
is adopted pr Cases inv
uncovered, the less evidence there is to use for court proceedings. However, any delay may
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result in a successful attack. Another challenge is how to intervene without infringing on fundamental rights, in particular, freedom of association, freedom of speech and freedom of religion. A relatively new and worrying phenomenon law enforcement agencies need to look at in this regard is that of the terrorist acting alone or “lone wolf.”
Another challenge prosecutors face in such cases is that counter-terrorism investigations
the political will of all member states to become parties to international and regional
legal assistance. Mechanisms and instruments for cooperation should be established and supported by the international community. matters is not just a requirement under Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) but also a key to Member States’ success in bringing terrorists to justice, and should therefore be enhanced and supported.
st century is the need of prosecutors to rely on intelligence in order to be able to bring
rely very often on special investigative techniques (e.g. interception, electronic surveillance, co
Without using these techniques, it will be highly unlikely that these agencies will have the needed information leading to printelligence and information obtained through special investigative techniques and their use as evidence in terrorism cases is, and likely to remain, one of the major challenges in leading a successful preventive prosecutorial strategy.
One of the associated challenges is that law enforcement agencies are no longer the sole source of probative intelligence and that counter-terrorism prosecutions rely increasingly on
more States tend to focus their attention on preventing terrorism, the more they would
challenge is that prosecutors need to rely more and more on cooperation with the military and on evidence gathered by the military or by military intelligence. Such information
81
could serve both to trigger an investigation and, once the investigation was under way, to provide useful evidence.
Cooperation with intelligence agencies presents its own challenges. Law enforcement agencies were trained and equipped to investigate crimes and collect evidence, even when using special investigative techniques, in accordance with criminal procedural codes and laws. They organize their work so that the evidence gathered could be used in court and challenged by the defense counsel. They essentially measure their success in terms of the number of convictions achieved. Intelligence agencies, in contrast, focus their efforts on identifying national security threats, and military intelligence is concerned with the gathering of operational intelligence for military use. Such agencies do not draw their legal authority from the same sources as law enforcement agencies. They work in accordance with different standards and do not seek to meet the requirements of the courts. This situation poses a number of challenges with respect to prosecutors’ performance of their duties.
In many countries the efforts to prosecute terrorists before terrorist acts occur blurred the jurisdictional “firewall” that had traditionally divided law enforcement agencies (including prosecutors) from intelligence services. Prosecutors in many countries need to be able to work more closely with the intelligence community, thereby increasing the efficiency of investigations and prosecutions. Prosecutors are required to become engaged in counter-terrorism investigations at an earlier stage. Cooperation within the framework of coordination mechanisms and joint task forces allows them to help intelligence agencies collect admissible intelligence and avoid steps that might hamper the criminal process. The key to establishing such cooperation is the exercise of political will at the highest levels within both the prosecution and the intelligence agencies.
This new environment also requires change in the “culture” of the intelligence community. It requires developing guidelines and operational protocols both for the prosecution service and for the intelligence community. Prosecutors need to be able to educate intelligence agencies in order to help them understand the complexity of evidentiary standards and due-process guarantees and to make them aware that the information they gathered and the materials they captured might be used at some point in criminal proceedings.
Another challenge in this respect is that for many countries the relationship between their respective States’ intelligence and prosecution services could no longer be considered bilateral. Many States have established several intelligence agencies with a counter-terrorism mandate. Efforts to coordinate inquiries and prosecutions in a manner that ensured
21st Century Prosecutorial Tools for Preventing Terrorism
David Scharia82
protection of legally recognized rights need to take into account the geographical and functional division of counter-terrorism intelligence collection among several ministries, by the desire to protect sensitive sources and methods, and by the concern to protect civil liberties.
into admissible evidence information gathered in covert investigations. In common-law jurisdictions this is among the biggest challenges faced by counter-terrorism prosecutors, because the use of intelligence material in criminal proceedings presented an apparently irreconcilable dilemma: how to balance the objective of protecting information and source, on the one hand, with the need to ensure defense rights and equality, on the other. To
especially informants, undercover agents and representatives of the intelligence community. Prosecutors need to develop techniques to protect such witnesses and provide guarantees to the defense; determining which witnesses (e.g. justice collaborators; victims, undercover agents and/or informants) qualify for protection; the procedural protections in place; the use of witnesses’ pre-trial statements; the use of technology (e.g. image and voice distortion, video conferencing); and particular challenges, gaps, and areas in which common practices might be developed or shared.
As could be seen from this short piece, the challenges prosecutors face in handling terrpractical good practices. Every solution developed will have to adhere to the fundamental
proportionality should be respected in the use of special investigative techniques. Covert investigations should be used with great care, oversight and control mechanisms ensuring protection and upholding of rule-of-law and human rights standards. On the practical level this new challenge should lead to a deeper discussion on the relationship between prosecution, on the one hand, and law enforcement and intelligence communities, on the
of authority. In addition, it is important to develop a relationship of trust with all agencies involved in prevention of terrorism. Consequently, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) has been very active in working with states on
the 21st century is a noble and worthy cause.
83
e C se or omen in Comb ting Violent Extremism
Edit SchlafferExecutive Director, Women Without Borders
In October 2000, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan stated, “For generations, women have served as peace educators, both in their families and in their societies. They have proved instrumental in building bridges rather than walls.” That same month, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for an “increased representation of women at all decision-making levels…and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;” “the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;” and to “incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations…” This UN Security Council Resolution thus draws on the broad recognition of women’s central role in peacekeeping and the fundamental contributions they make to re-building post-conflict societies.
Over a decade later, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked to a young woman in Tunis, who had asked her about wearing the hijab, “Why extremists always focus on women is a mystery to me. But they all seem to. It doesn’t matter what country they’re in. They want to control women. They want to control how we dress, they want to control how we act, they want to control everything about us.” Secretary Clinton’s remarks highlight the power of women within the security sphere—the same power that extremists seek so desperately to control. Women must therefore be equipped with the tools and knowledge to exert their influence to positively affect the education of youth, to ensure that they are not drawn into the extremist paradigm.
To date, however, women’s contributions to combating violent extremism at the grassroots level as well as the inclusion of their experiences, views, and suggestions at the policy level have been almost entirely neglected. The analogy between women in peacekeeping and women in combating violent extremism is clear: Just as women can actively work to build bridges after a conflict has taken place, so too can they identify and work to counter extremist currents, and engage in bridge-building programs to break the process of cyclical
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revenge, particularly in situations before and during community-based tensions.
This contribution highlights some best practices to consider when addressing violent extremism and radicalization, specifically with regard to the role that women can play. We have seen over and over again that in cases of war, insecurity and terrorism and violence, women are the first victims and they always pay the highest price. But women are driven to protect their families and to safeguard their daily lives, so they are best placed to be a new, committed, creative force for stability and security. At the same time they hold key strategic positions in their communities, as mothers, educators, and community leaders.
SAVE, Sisters Against Violent Extremism, opens up the potential for agency and activism by building political, religious and emotional bridges.
The following case studies exemplify ways in which women targeted by terrorism and violent extremism can play a significant role in the prevention of radicalization and community cohesion.
Not Revenge, but ReconciliationRobi Damelin is an Israeli woman whose son, David, was killed by a Palestinian sniper at a checkpoint about nine years ago. David was a 29-year old peace activist and lecturer, and when it came time for him to join the army, he seriously considered refusing on moral grounds. Robi encouraged him to join the army, however, as she felt that he would serve as an example to the other Israeli soldiers as to how it is possible to treat Palestinians with dignity and respect.
After just over a week in the army, David was shot and killed.
Rather than seeking revenge, Robi says that “After David was killed, I wasn’t sure what I wanted to do but I did know that I wanted to prevent other families from experiencing this pain, both Israeli and Palestinian. I understood very clearly that Palestinian mothers shared the same pain as I had.” Robi joined the Parents Circle-Bereaved Families Forum, a group of 500 bereaved Israeli and Palestinian families who are seeking a non-violent end to the conflict. These families actively work to break through the traditional barriers of religious, national, historical, and even externally imposed boundaries to build bridges to the “enemy,” and to find ways of seeking out commonalities to promote knowledge of the other and to prevent further deaths.
The Case for Women in Combating Violent Extremism 85
Robi is accompanied by Siham Abu Awwad, a Palestinian mother from Beit Umar. The Israeli army arrested Siham’s mother when she was 14, and she suddenly had to take on full responsibility for raising her brothers and sisters. Israeli soldiers killed her brother, Yussuf, a few years later, and all of her brothers and her son have been jailed. Rather than seeking revenge for the loss of Yussuf and all of the suffering that has pervaded her life, Siham has decided to join forces with Robi. They firmly believe that if Israelis and Palestinians can get to know each other on a personal, human level, they will begin to change the deeply entrenched, politically-driven stereotypes that drive hatred and can ultimately culminate in devastating acts of violent extremism.
Breaking Through Stereotypes: Demystifying the Cliché of “The Palestinian Mother”This is the story of Bothaina, a Palestinian mother in Nablus. During the Second Intifada, Bothaina’s 17-year-old son, Ahmed, was studying for his high school exams. He was a good student, and did not seem to have any political affiliations. One fateful evening in September, he left their home to go to town, supposedly to photocopy his class notes. He did not return home that evening, and Bothaina and her husband stayed up all night looking for him, to no avail. The next day, as they were once again driving around looking for Ahmed, they suddenly heard news over the radio that a 17-year old boy named Ahmed had blown himself up. On his way to his intended target, a Jewish settler had stopped Ahmed and asked to see his ID; Ahmed then immediately detonated the device. Reports differ on whether one or three people were killed in the attack, but Ahmed’s intention to cause harm and terror was clear.
Despite common media portrayals of Palestinian mothers ululating and praising God when their sons become martyrs, Bothaina—and all the other mothers with whom I spoke in Palestine—is not celebrating her son’s suicide bombing as a heroic act.
Even now, Bothaina still regrets deeply that she was not able to intervene in her child’s actions. Every minute, Bothaina says, she begs God to forgive her son.
Bothaina sends clear messages both to other parents as well as boys contemplating becoming suicide bombers: “I present a message to the mothers to look after their children very carefully, more than they do now. She must watch her son, to see which direction he is going in. And I want to say to other boys that they must realize how their parents and relatives will feel after [they become martyrs]. We don’t want to lose them in a few seconds. When they leave to do something like that, the son does not have any feelings
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serve as a call to action to other mothers whose children are at the brink of radicalization. And they will – hopefully – also cause youths who are thinking of engaging in acts of violent extremism to think twice about how their decisions will devastate their families and communities.
Our SAVE partner in Islamabad arranged for a group of seven women from the Swat valley - formerly the touristic hope of the country, the so-called “Switzerland” of Pakistan before the Taliban established a stronghold in the area - to travel to Islamabad so Women
children, told me how they reacted when Fazlullah, locally known as the “Radio Mullah,”
Fazlullah strategically recognized the power women can wield over their families and
woman’s most valuable belongings are her wedding jewelry, which also ensures her status in the community. Women must be married to gain legitimacy within the society. After
jihad. Some even encouraged their sons and husbands to join his group, to supposedly pay their tribute to Islam and Fazlullah’s struggle.
Soon, however, the women realized that Fazlullah only brought violence and misery. Family members who refused to join or publicly disagreed with his ideologies and methods were symbolically and brutally murdered in the street as a bloody warning to others. Even in the face of such gruesome threats, the women of Swat are now determined to defeat Fazlullah and the death and destruction he represents. Halda, one of my interview partners, insists: “If Fazlullah comes to our area again and the men fail to stop him, then we women will take
and power of women in the Swat Valley and to directly and explicitly call on them to support a cause. He tried to use them. But the women soon saw through him when they
the dangers of his ideologies and consequent actions.
The Case for Women in Combating Violent Extremism 87
Challenging the Security SystemIn India, Vinita Kamte’s husband, Ashok Kamte, a senior Mumbai police officer was called to duty during the November 2008 attacks in the city. Kamte shot and injured Ajmal Kasab, the only surviving terrorist, leading to his arrest, but then succumbed to his own injuries. After the attacks, Vinita, who is a lawyer by training, began asking questions about why her husband, a high-ranking police officer, hadn’t been wearing a bulletproof vest, and why he had to pick up four different guns before finding one that did not backfire. Vinita’s long and difficult struggle to find out the truth around her husband’s death, during which she twice invoked the “Right to Information Act,” India’s most powerful civilian tool, has led the responsible officials to even more closely scrutinize their equipment, to be better prepared should another attack occur. Vinita took on the country’s entire security and defense system, and became a leader in her own right. She shook up the complacent monolith of Mumbai bureaucracy.
ConclusionNothing will bring back a lost loved one, but nevertheless, family members and victims need to work towards closure. Moving from victimhood to agency is for many the best strategy, for they can not only find personal closure but can also contribute to the global fight against terrorism. In countries such as Pakistan, India, and Indonesia, where victims have long been sidelined, a new brand of female leaders in this particular group is emerging. They focus on the human breakthrough that is vital for the parties targeted by violent extremism on both sides of the divide and will lead the way toward a new counter-terrorism paradigm.
SAVE’s experiences and extensive interviews to date confirm that violent extremists do not simply begin to engage in extremist actions overnight, but rather undergo a process of descent into extremism that others, most significantly their mothers, can often detect. By sensitizing women to the role that they can play in combating violent extremism, non-traditional approaches to security can be identified and implemented that will contribute significantly to creating a safer and more secure world.
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ong ime No ee: e E ol ing ole o t e nite N tions in Countering Violent Extremism
Alistair MillarExecutive Director, Center for Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation
Although the causes of violent extremism are mostly local, the ideologies that help to foment political violence can be broadcast by extremists and then received by would-be terrorists in real-time thousands of miles away. Understanding and addressing the drivers of terrorism are the keys to the long-term prevention of global terrorism. It is increasingly understood by experts that the relationships between structural factors and radicalization and recruitment, including perceived or real injustices, weak governance, political repression, and a lack of education and economic or political opportunities need more attention. Since its inception,
body has been working to counter violent extremism (CVE), or, in UN parlance, “counter the appeal of terrorism,” long before these terms surfaced in policy circles, and without
other entities within the UN system have long been helping to address the causes of socio-political marginalization, improve governance, and promote more resilient state-society
and countering the narrative of militant groups. Yet the UN system has only fairly recently begun to try to understand the issue of radicalization, where its comparative advantage in addressing this process lies, and where UN entities should assume the leading role.
term approach to countering and preventing terrorism in 2004 when he established a
General’s recommendations the General Assembly adopted by consensus the UN Global
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Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006, which included four pillars: (a) addressing underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, (b) preventing terrorism, (c) building capacity, and (d) protecting human rights—and recognized the important contributions of a vast array of traditional and nontraditional actors who could contribute to multilateral counterterrorism efforts. The adoption of the Global Strategy was an important milestone for cooperative international efforts to address terrorism, because for the first time it linked the “hard” and “soft” elements of counterterrorism. Its pillars recognized the importance of both prevention and interdiction, and of addressing the enabling environment for violent extremist groups and ideologues, while reaffirming the importance of human rights and the rule of law to the efficacy and sustainability of counterterrorism efforts, acknowledging that the lack of either can contribute to the spread of terrorism.
The Global Strategy also reflected the concern among a growing number of UN member states that the post-9/11 response to terrorism did not make enough of an effort to prevent terrorists from becoming radicalized and recruited in the first place. Furthermore, by that time the US-led Global War on Terrorism, with its emphasis on kill or capture tactics had created a negative impression of international counterterrorism that was helping drive terrorist recruiting efforts. It reinforced concerns that the counterterrorism agenda was shaped by too small a group of states with little or no engagement by a broader group of affected states. By the mid-2000s the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the European Union, among others, started to develop their own strategies with a focus on preventing, as well as pursuing, terrorism. The Security Council followed suit, with its own strategy and by mandating its main counterterrorism bodies, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its Executive Directorate (CTED), a limited role in assisting states in their prevention and CVE efforts. Adopted in 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1624, which calls on states to adopt measures to prevent incitement of terrorism, provides those bodies with a mandate to engage with states on issues such as social and educational policies and the promotion of community dialogue. With these CVE-related mandates in place, the UN is now in a position to play an essential and important role with other stakeholders, including states and groups of states, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), to increase awareness of the need to take a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism.
The key challenge is implementing the Global Strategy within the UN and at the country level in a way that involves not only states and local UN actors but also nongovernmental actors at the community level among vulnerable populations, where efforts to counter the appeal of violent extremism are most needed. At the UN level, a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) has been created to bring more than thirty relevant UN entities, plus Interpol, together to help break down the bureaucratic stovepipes that
Long Time, No See: The Evolving Role of the United Nations in Countering Violent Extremism 91
exist between these entities. A collection of working groups has been established by the CTITF to undertake practical projects to address specific themes or issues related to Global Strategy implementation. The working groups enable entities such as UNESCO and CTED to work together on common issues, including countering violent extremism, whereas before concerns with regard to their respective mandates would have prevented practical cooperation between such bodies. The CTITF Working Group on “Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes” has brought together relevant stakeholders from across the UN, from civil society, and dozens of member states to analyze the role of counter-narratives and effective messengers who can deliver these narratives via the internet. Bringing together diverse entities within the UN is a positive result, but the suspicion and unwillingness of some of its constituent entities, such as UNDP, to fully engage with the CTITF and Global Strategy-related activities remains a serious challenge.
A working group was also established on “Addressing Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism,” which attempted to catalogue programs undertaken by UN member states to understand and counter the appeal of terrorism. The response rate from member states was low1 and the Working Group disbanded. However, one of the co-chairs of the Working Group, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) has continued with an initiative on “Countering the Appeal of Terrorism” which aims to “rehabilitate and reintegrate into society individuals who have been involved in terrorist activities.”2 Increased interest from member states in funding activities within the UNICRI initiative, including work on rehabilitating prisoners, is part of a trend where the UN, through its CTITF, its working groups, and its individual entities are paying increased attention to developing programming to counter violent extremism. The UN has also been doing important work with survivors of terrorism around the world. This has helped to raise awareness of victims, who are credible messengers when it comes to developing narratives that counter the appeal of terrorists’ invective ideologies.
ConclusionThe United Nations has an important role to play in countering violent extremism. It has developed and adopted a comprehensive strategy for addressing upstream factors that can fan the flames of extremism and political violence. The Global Strategy also provides a blueprint for member states, regional organizations to refine their own approach to preventing recruitment as well as going after terrorists—an approach that requires the active involvement of a wide variety of governmental and nongovernmental actors, beyond the realm of the traditional, state-run security apparatus. Above all, the UN has now accumulated six decades of experience on improving governance, enhancing the rule of law,
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and helping to create educational and economic or political opportunities. Understanding
violent extremism.
(Endnotes)
1 Only thirty-four of 192 states responded to surveys sent to them by the working group. See UN CTITF, “First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes” (United Nations Interregional Crime and Just Research Institute, 2008). Available online at: http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf accessed August 15, 2012.
2 See UNICRI “Dialogue, Understanding and Countering the Appeal of Terrorism” (June 27, 2012). Available online at: http://www.unicri.it/news/2012/20120627_dialogue_understanding/index.php accessed August 15, 2012.
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Countering Violent Extremism n i li tion t t e to errorism: e er ging t e CE s Com re ensi e n Coo er ti e A ro to e urit 1
Mehdi KnaniProgramme Manager on Countering VERLT, Action against Terrorism Unit, Transnational Threats Department, OSCE Secretariat
The participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – the largest regional security organization with 57 States (to date of this arti-cle in August 2012) from Europe, Central Asia and North America – have consistently condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, stressing that no circumstance or motive can justify terrorism. At the same time, they recognized as early as December 2001 that to mitigate the threat of terrorism to the maximum extent possible in the long run countries cannot limit themselves to military and law enforcement responses. Adopt-ing the OSCE Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, they highlighted the need to address “the various social, economic, political and other factors, including violent separatism and extremism, which engender conditions in which terrorist organizations are able to recruit and win support.”
OSCE participating States further emphasized that the Organization’s comprehensive and co-operative approach to security provides comparative advantages in combating terrorism by identifying and addressing these factors through all relevant OSCE instruments and structures. This multi-dimensional approach underlines that alongside politico-military aspects of security, the protection and promotion of human rights as well as economic development and environmental sustainability are inextricable parts of security and stabil-ity. It also underlines that multi-stakeholder collaboration is required on all levels in order to meet modern security threats and challenges, across borders, but also within countries between governmental and non-governmental actors.
One could argue that most, if not all OSCE activities, contribute at least indirectly to the international efforts to prevent terrorism and address the conditions conducive to its
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spread, as outlined by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Indeed, different OSCE executive structures – including the Secretariat, independent institu-tions and 16 field operations – are active in areas such as conflict prevention, fostering economic development and good governance, promoting the rule of law and full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, each operating within the confine of dif-ferent mandates.
This article however focuses on how the OSCE, as a "forum for dialogue, platform for ac-tion", contributes most immediately to countering “Violent Extremism and Radicalization that lead to Terrorism”, commonly referred to as VERLT. It provides a short overview of key thematic mandates and areas of work, and then outlines current efforts to utilize the Organization’s multi-dimensional expertise, convening power and geographical reach to address niche issues and provide systematic assistance to requesting participating States.
Key Thematic Mandates and Areas of Work Related to Countering VERLTThe OSCE has initially tackled VERLT from four main thematic angles, which the Trans-national Threats Department/Action against Terrorism Unit (TNTD/ATU) seeks to build upon in an overall program on countering VERLT. Promoting the rule of law and promot-ing and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is mainstreamed throughout all these efforts. Participating States have indeed undertaken, as a cornerstone OSCE coun-terterrorism commitment, to fully comply with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.3
Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes: Recruitment for and incitement to terrorism were first tackled in the context of countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. OSCE participating States adopted two decisions in this regard in 2004 and 2006,4 which have served as the basis for a program of expert workshops run since 2004 by TNTD/ATU, allowing national and international experts to share information, review existing legal and policy frameworks, showcase good practices, forge closer working ties, and promote relevant human rights aspects. Currently, TNTD/ATU is organizing a series of four online expert workshops on the use of the Internet as tactical facilitator by terrorists; terrorist use of social networking tools; right wing extremism/terrorist use of the Internet; and institutionalizing public-private partnerships to combat terrorist use of the Internet. Besides TNTD/ATU, the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media addresses issues of Internet governance and pluralism, promoting full compliance with OSCE press freedom commitments.5
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Strengthening Criminal Justice Response: Countering VERLT has been further addressed by TNTD/ATU from a criminal justice response perspective, through its programs of training and legislative training workshops, in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), to assist OSCE participating States in meeting their commitments as regards to the international legal framework against terrorism, including the implementation of all United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the fight against terrorism, as well as cooperation in criminal matters related to terrorism.6 The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) also provides key expertise on rule of law and human rights in countering terrorism, including: A manual on “Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights”7 and a related training module delivered to over 15 locations to counterterrorism practitioners; a practical training module under development in cooperation with the Transnational Threats Department/Strategic Police Matters Unit (TNTD/SPMU) for law enforcement officers on human rights in counterterrorism investigations; technical assistance/advice, upon request, on the implementation of international anti-terrorism instruments and the compliance of national anti-terrorism legislation with international standards.8 Both the OSCE Secretariat and ODIHR are also mandated since 2004 to promote solidarity with victims of terrorism.9
Promoting Tolerance and Non-Discrimination: OSCE participating States firmly reject the identification of terrorism and violent extremism with any religion or belief, culture, ethnic group, nationality or race.10 ODIHR provides assistance to participating States in the implementation of their commitments to fight intolerance and discrimination, as un-derlined in a number of Ministerial Council Decisions since 2003. ODIHR organizes awareness raising activities and capacity building activities for government officials and civil society on how to combat intolerance and discrimination and how to facilitate mutual respect and understanding, as well as on freedom of religion or belief. With the view to preventing intolerance and discrimination, before they are manifested, ODIHR imple-ments educational projects to raise awareness of different forms of prejudices and hostility. For this purpose, ODIHR developed country-specific teaching materials on anti-Semitism with the Anne Frank House Amsterdam, and developed a guide, in cooperation with the Council of Europe and UNESCO, providing “Guidelines for Educators on Countering Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims: Addressing Islamophobia through Edu-cation.” Upon request of participating States, ODIHR provides reviews of anti-terrorism legislation, anti-discrimination and hate crime legislation, as well as of laws related to free-dom of religion or belief, to help lawmakers ensure that legislation is in line with OSCE commitments and other international human rights standards. Moreover, three Personal Representatives have been appointed by the successive OSCE Chairmanships since 2004 to promote greater tolerance and combat racism, xenophobia and discrimination across the
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OSCE region; upon invitation from participating States, Personal Representatives visit and discuss tolerance and non-discrimination issues with government officials and civil society representatives. ODIHR maintains an online Tolerance and Non Discrimination Informa-tion System, providing easy access to OSCE/international reference materials as well as thematic and country information.
Promoting Public-Private Partnerships: The importance of co-operation between state authorities, civil society, the media and the business community was highlighted by a specific OSCE Decision, which mandates the OSCE Secretariat to promote Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in its counter-terrorism related activities.13 TNTD/ATU has organized a series of regional, sub-regional and national conferences, which have emphasized the role of PPPs in countering VERLT and facilitated government outreach and dialogue with non-governmental stakeholders to explore opportunities and modalities for partnership.
Current Efforts: Harnessing the OSCE’s Multi-Dimensional Expertise and Providing Systematic AssistanceCountering VERLT emerged distinctly on the OSCE’s counterterrorism agenda with the adoption in 2007 of a Ministerial Statement in support to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,14 in which participating States explicitly called on the Organization to counter VERLT from a multi-dimensional perspective. The following year, another decision was adopted calling upon participating States to make use of the OSCE executive structures in countering violent VERLT in their respective countries.15 These decisions provided the basis and impetus for a renewed reflection on the role the Organization could play, which led to series of initiatives to try and carve a distinct OSCE contribution to countering VERLT.
TNTD/ATU established an overall awareness-raising and capacity building program with the inter-related objectives of (1) promoting a multi-dimensional understanding of VERLT, broader than intelligence or law-enforcement driven, to inform the formulation of context-specific preventive actions which complement criminal justice response to VERLT; (2) addressing human-rights aspects and supporting the formulation and implementation of human-rights compliant policies and measures to counter VERLT; and (3) encouraging multi-stakeholder collaboration, both in terms of whole-of-government approach and co-operation between public authorities and civil society, the media and the business community at national and local levels.
Taking this program forward, TNTD/ATU first organized a series of four VERLT-
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related regional and sub-regional conferences and workshops between 2008 and 2010 to facilitate the exchange of views, lessons learned and good practices about the threat of VERLT and measures to effectively counter it. In collaboration with other Secretariat Units and ODIHR, TNTD/ATU now seeks to harness the OSCE’s multi-dimensional expertise to tackle specific VERLT-related issues. The first ever joint TNTD/ATU-ODIHR activities have been two expert roundtables that focused on preventing women terrorist radicalization (December 12, 2011, Vienna) and the role and empowerment of women in countering VERLT (March 12-13, 2012); a third roundtable in October 2012 discussed youth engagement in countering VERLT. TNTD/ATU is also working with TNTD/SPMU and ODIHR to promote the use of community policing to prevent terrorism and countering VERLT through the organization of national seminars and the development of a guidebook to provide guidance to senior police professionals as well as community leaders/organizations.
Furthermore, TNTD/ATU seeks to engage interested participating States in more systematic, tailored capacity-building projects, where possible in co-operation with relevant OSCE field operations. The OSCE Office in Tajikistan is already actively engaged since 2009 in the first ever OSCE VERLT field program upon a request from Tajikistan. This program consists of three stages, including a survey-based country-wide assessment of VERLT trends;16 targeted capacity-building activities for government and civil society stakeholders; and support to the formulation of a national counter-radicalization policy. TNTD/ATU is exploring the possibility for similar programmatic engagement with other participating States by organizing a series of national seminars on countering VERLT. Consultations are ongoing with Kyrgyzstan in partnership with the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, and Bosnia and Herzegovina has officially requested OSCE assistance in developing and implementing a national action plan to counter VERLT.
ConclusionIn conclusion, the efforts of the OSCE are driven by the conviction that regional and sub-regional organizations can be instrumental as force multipliers and delivery mechanisms for counterterrorism assistance, including in the field of countering VERLT. By seeking close coordination with the United Nations and other regional organizations, the OSCE strives to make a difference drawing on its comparative advantages, namely a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security as well as a unique geographical reach and multi-dimensional expertise.
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(Endnotes)
1 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily re ect those of the OSCE Secretariat or any other OSCE executive structure or body.
2 OSCE Ministerial Council, The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, MC(9)/DEC/1, Annex, December 4, 2001, http://www.osce.org/mc/22645
3 OSCE Secretariat, Overview of OSCE Counter-Terrorism Related Commitments, update as of April 1, 2011, http://www.osce.org/atu/26365.
4 OSCE Ministerial Council, Decision No.3/04 on Combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, December 7, 2004, http://www.osce.org/mc/42647; Decision No.7/06 on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, December 5, 2006, http://www.osce.org/mc/23078.
5 See, for instance, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Amsterdam Recommendations on the Freedom of the Media and the Internet, June 14, 2003, http://www.osce.org/fom/41903 ; Joint Declaration by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, December 21, 2005, http://www.osce.org/fom/27455.
6 Overview of relevant OSCE Commitments, op. cit.
7 OSCE/ODIHR, Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights: A Manual (2007), http://www.osce.org/odihr/29103.
8 OSCE/ODIHR has developed an online legislation database intended as a resource for lawmakers in the OSCE region accessible at http://www.legislationline.org.
9 OSCE Permanent Council, Decision No. 618 on Solidarity with victims of terrorism, July 1, 2004, http://www.osce.org/pc/35030.
10 See, for instance, OSCE Ministerial Council, Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, op. cit.; OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, December 7, 2002, http://www.osce.org/mc/42536; Decision No. 6/02 on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination, December 7, 2002, http://www.osce.org/mc/40521 ; Decision No. 10/05 on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination: Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding, December 6, 2005, http://www.osce.org/mc/17462.
11 OSCE/ODIHR, Council of Europe, UNESCO, Guidelines for Educators on Countering Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims: Addressing Islamophobia through Education (2011), http://www.osce.org/odihr/84495.
12 OSCE/ODIHR, Tolerance And Non Discrimination Information System, http://tandis.odihr.pl/.
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13 OSCE Ministerial Council, Decision No.5/07 on Public-Private Partnerships in Countering Terrorism, November 30, 2007, http://www.osce.org/mc/29569.
14 OSCE Ministerial Council, Ministerial Statement on Supporting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, November 30, 2007, http://www.osce.org/mc/29544.
15 OSCE Ministerial Council, Decision No.10/08 on Further Promoting the OSCE’s Action against Terrorism, MC.DEC/10/08, December 5, 2008, http://www.osce.org/mc/35526.
16 See, Michael Taarnby, Islamist Radicalization in Tajikistan, an Assessment of Current Trends (2012), based on a survey conducted by the Centre for Socio-Political Studies “Korshinos,” which was supported and funded by the OSCE Of ce in Tajikistan, with a contribution from the Government of Denmark.
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t C n e o Ag inst Violent i li tion o t e Euro e n out Intro u ing AN EVEN
Peter KrekoDirector, Political Capital Institute and Co-Chair of WG RAN-PREVENT
Clare WhiteChief Executive, The Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Foundation for Peace and Co-Chair of WG RAN-PREVENT
Following the horrifying terrorist act of Anders Behring Breivik in Norway on July 22, 2011, in which 77 lives were taken sending shockwaves through Europe, there was some hope that this event, paradoxically, could positively change Europe’s political landscape. Anti-Muslimist political forces would lose ground all over Europe as a result of the sobering experience, seeing how far their rhetoric can lead, and crude anti-immigrant political discourses would be replaced by more sophisticated, more moderate political approaches. This case would help to raise the awareness of the youth and strengthen their democratic commitment, making it obvious that violence is not an acceptable tool for reaching a political goal. Police and the security forces would be more vigilant to stop extremist actions and mainstream political forces will be more successful to narrow the scope of radical anti-Muslimism.
In fact, we could see the opposite happening last year. While Breivik’s vision of activating networks of the Knights Templar have not been realized thus far, several violent terrorist acts proved that Breivik’s act would not be the last. Just a few examples: In December 2011, in Florence, Italy, a member of the neo-fascist group CasaPound Italia shot two Senegalese street vendors and wounded another three. In August 2012, a 19-year-old Iraqi man was stabbed to death by five men in central Athens. But of course terrorist acts are not only committed against Muslims: In March 2012 Mohamed Merah, a 23-year-old French citizen of Algerian descent, killed three children and a teacher at a Jewish school in Toulouse, France. These cases, together with the discovery of the National Socialist Underground in Germany that has killed at least 9 immigrants in the last decade, clearly
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revealed that Breivik is not alone, and young fanatics who developed a similar ideology and conspiracy theories pose an increasing threat to the nations of Europe. And of course, politically motivated ethnic violence exists in Eastern Europe as well, even if the victims are typically not Muslims or their “supporters” but the Roma.1
The theory that, after the Breivik act, voters would turn their back on anti-Muslim radical right political forces also proved to be only a pipedream. While the Norwegian Progress Party (the party that Breivik was a member of long before he committed his act of terror) lost one-third of its votes in the local elections only two months after the terrorist acts - still remaining the third strongest political force – this was rather the exception than the rule. The Danish People’s party, with a similar anti-immigrant rhetoric, kept its position on the parliamentary elections in the same month. In 2012, the National Front with the leadership of Marine Le Pen in France, frightened voters with the image of Muslim cultural and political takeover in France and Europe in its election campaign, reached its best electoral results in the party’s history. The Golden Dawn in Greece that promised to plant landmines along the Turkish-Greek border in order to reduce immigration, could gain seven percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections2 and already enjoy around 15 percent support among younger voters. Furthermore, we can see in several cases that mainstream forces are co-opting the anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim discourses of the radical right rather than trying to remove it from the public discourse.
While there is no need to fear that fascist movements will rise across Europe,3 there are some clear indications that the threat of radical right violence is increasing. The electoral demand for the chauvinistic, authoritarian, anti-establishment political ideologies and anti-immigrant sentiments, along with the forces that exploit these tendencies are on the rise.4 According to a survey by Demos UK, more than a quarter of the Facebook-supporters of populist radical right forces think that violence can be an acceptable political tool if it leads to the right outcome – and this figure is shockingly high in some cases: 43 percent among fans of French Bloc Identitaire, 47 percent among CasaPound Italia, 39 percent among Jobbik, 37 percent among British National party, and 34 percent among English Defence League members.5 According to Political Capital’s calculations on EVS 2008 data, more than one in twenty respondents in the EU say that terrorism can be justified in some cases (see Graph 1). And while most of the politicians of the radical right strongly condemned Breivik’s acts, some “emphatic” voices could be heard, from far-right politicians in Hungary (László Toroczkai, a Jobbik-ally), England (Stephen Yaxley-Lennon from EDL), and Italy (Mario Borghezio from Lega Nord).
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Gr 1: C n errorism be usti e or Must it be Con emne
(% of answers "under certain circumstances can be justi ed", source: EVS)
downturn and growing public support for far-right extremism appear to be completely unfounded. Even in Western countries where prejudices have been on the rise, the situation was not aggravated by ever-increasing economic concerns but rather by a strengthening loss of national and cultural identity. A key driver in Breivik’s “crusade” was to stop the cultural Muslimisation of Europe.
Along with creeping fears of immigration and loss of national identity, disillusionment with traditional institutions of representative democracy is a growing phenomenon across Europe.
while criticizing and rejecting the “tired”, “incompetent”, “paralyzed” democratic system and its ”politically correct” language is what can make the new kind of radical right movements more attractive, catchy and trendy among the youth. If the traditional establishment and the “mainstream” is perceived to be liberal, tolerant and peaceful, revolutionary ideas should go against liberalism, tolerance and social peace. We can add that, historically, the youth has always been more receptive to revolutionary, or even extreme, ideologies and easier to be mobilized and recruited by violent political movements and groups. While the social, ethnic and ideological backgrounds of those who commit acts of terror are quite diverse, almost all violent terrorists, for example, are young males.
Malmström, established6 an EU-wide network in September 2011, on the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. RAN aims to connect key groups of people involved in countering
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violent radicalization across the EU. Thus, researchers, social workers, religious leaders, youth leaders, policemen and others working on the ground in vulnerable communities are able to exchange ideas and best practices. As a "network of networks’ RAN will include groups, associations and platforms with concrete and practical involvement in preventing radicalization issues. The network will produce best practices and policy advice to the EU and at a member State’s level.
The idea behind RAN, and especially the Prevention of Violent Radicalization Among the Youth Working Group (RAN-PREVENT) is that prevention is the only long term solution to violent radicalization that deals with the root cause of issues within societies and not just the symptoms. So far, the fight against terrorism is too focused on repressive measures and not enough on preventive work, while traditional legislative and law enforcement measures to repress right-wing extremism have spectacularly failed to prevent such violent actions. Setting up new methods to combat the violent ideologies at the local level, delivering counter narratives and including people is crucial to our preventive approach.
The Youth Working Group brings together front line practitioners (individuals, police, third sector organizations and agencies) working "on the ground" with vulnerable people (under the age of 26) who may be vulnerable to becoming involved in extreme behavior and political violence. It aims to capture and disseminate approaches in practice, learning from those in Europe actually working with young people vulnerable to violent radicalization, with the aim of improving future practice in the prevention of violent extremism. Possible topics to deal with in the working group are the social and psychological characteristics of the possible violent extremists, their attitudes towards violence, processes of violent radicalization and deradicalization, points of intervention and approaches to inclusion.
The longer list of themes that will be explored is as follows:
Including the voice of victims in Preventing Violent Extremism;The role of former combatants and former extremists in preventing violent extremism;Points of intervention – where does this take place? (including detecting attitudes and behaviors at an early stage);Credible voices, who is most suited to serve as the communicator/messenger;Holding difficult conversations – What does this look like? How does the conversation start?;Process of violent radicalization – what are the factors that contribute to the process; how do actors recognize the phenomenon?;Process of "deradicalization" – how does this take place? (A focus on this in terms of how
Peter Kreko, Clare White
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people are actually doing this – what works in practice);
Approaches to inclusion – exploring examples of best practice projects encouraging greater participation and understanding amongst communities;
How to improve connectivity and outreach; what is the role of civil society actors, religious organizations, family members, schools, etc.?;
Information sharing between agencies – exploring how well this works/ does not work and identifying gaps, both related to practical information sharing and in terms of privacy and other human rights concerns;
Approaches to "the problem" – how services are joined up/ disjointed and trusted by/
bringing together approaches to prevention that have a proven track record of success, which focus on persuasion, de-mystifying "the other" and myth-busting rather than the sometimes repressive measures undertaken by the judicial system, (see a preliminary map of these activities on graph 2, RAN-PREVENT will provide a framework of good practices for policy
Gr 2: relimin r M o re ention A ti ities
Prevention through legislation and law enforcement: the legal route
Prevention through Persuasion: The Psychological Route
Changing/forming the ideological framework
Changing/forming the social environment
Changing/forming the attitudes towards outgroups (Muslims,
Jews, Gipsies, etc.)
Changing/forming attitudes about violence
Demolishing conspiracy theories, providing counter-narratives
Democracy education, civic education
Community building programs
Exit strategies for members of rad. groups
Targeted programs for youth at risk
Anti-bullying interventions
Testimonies of victims
Testimonies of ex-perpetrators
Tolerance education
Controlled interactions (e.g. mosaic-method)
Clare White106
(Endnotes)
1 http://www.soros.org/voices/killing-time-lethal-force-anti-roma-racism
2 For the second time after the party spokesperson slapped one of his political rivals during a live TV show during the electoral campaign.
3 While some Eastern European parties like the Jobbik party in Hungary used to play with Fascist nostalgia, the only genuinely Neo-Fascist political force in the European parliaments is the Greek Golden Dawn). Most of the new political forces on the contemporary radical right are not comparable to radical right movements before WW II.
4 http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/2012/derex_ess5_english.pdf
5 http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/thenewfaceofdigitalpopulism
http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/populismineuropehungary
6 http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/malmstrom/launch-of-anti-radicalisation-network/
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e Me surement o re ention: ere s t e E i en e
Integrity Research & Consultancy
IntroductionThe ultimate challenge of CVE work is that success lies in a non-event – i.e. in the prevention of instances of violence. This poses a formidable problem to the measurement and evidencing of successful impact. It demands a wider set of indicators and a new approach to the assessment of contextual contributions to change. Such assessment is not geared to conventional "measures of effect" as utilized by the military and security sectors from where CVE programming has traditionally emanated. In such systems directly attributable impacts are prioritized, causality is often assumed, and behavioral, unintended or negative effects are often missed, or worse, ignored.
To measure the impact of CVE programming we need to take a step back and understand what we are measuring the impact against. We need to ask ourselves what indicators may be used to identify positive trends and success and what the baseline is that we are using as a starting point for our assessment. We need to address attitudes (what constitutes extremism) as much as behaviors (instances of violence) and be able to analyze the relationship between the two and whether changes in one affect instances of the other.
The authors recognize the complexity of the concept "violent extremism" and the normative values it suggests. They also recognize the multiplicity of influences contributing to the production of violent or radical attitudes and behaviors and the difficulty of proving a causal relationship between the two. Their research approach carefully differentiates between attitudes and behaviors, and seeks to understand the linkages in both localized and trans-national communities.1
Anthony Ellis, Andrew Cleary, Martine Zeuthen, James Khalil108
Horn of Africa Research
study was carried out to assess local perceptions of violence and "extremism" in sample communities in Somaliland and coastal Kenya. Focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders were held, including international organizations delivering humanitarian programming, representatives from civil society organizations, youth groups and elders. Local research partners facilitated meetings with representatives from relevant communities.
extremism present in Somaliland and coastal Kenya, to experience some of the logistical
pilot is a precursor to the design and delivery of a larger-scale longitudinal survey across
violent attitudes and behaviors in the region and map regional sources of inspiration and
Challenges and Insights: VocabularyOne of the key challenges faced when undertaking the research was the sensitivity around terminology concerning "violent extremism" or "terrorism". Such terms are often imbued with objective meaning but it is crucial to understand how these concepts are contested. Researchers must work to understand what the words meant to themselves and to any local research partners, the people and communities in the research area and those who would be reading the research.
As an example of how this impacted, many of the international organizations we interviewed were working on aspects of society related to security such as border control,
using such terminology because of concerns about being perceived as a "security" rather
absolute anonymity to those interviewed by focusing discussion on the context of their
programming, irrespective of the terminology that they applied.
To have led with such vocabulary in the focus groups with community members would
The Measurement of Prevention: Where’s the Evidence? 109
also have skewed the discussion and presented the research team as subjective and agenda-driven. The approach taken was to focus on violence as a material phenomenon and discuss the various actors present in the environment that were perpetrating violence or seeking to prevent it. Listening to individuals and groups articulate answers to those questions enabled further discussions about causes of violence, and an examination of community attitudes and beliefs around "normal / abnormal" "tolerant / intolerant" "moderate / extreme" and so on.
Challenges and Insights: Local politics and Context: Blaming the "Outsiders’It was found that community members in both Mombasa and Hargeisa were using the words "terrorist" or "terrorism" in particular and learned ways, often articulating their own community identity through the marginalization and labeling of "outsiders". Direct questions about "violent extremism" generally did not produce nuanced information except from community members who had previously worked with international organizations on such issues.
When asked about what groups contributed to insecurity in their communities, a common response was "unemployed young men". This highlighted the point that, when asked, "inside" groups were also identified as drivers of insecurity. Problems coming from within were seen as understandable and resulting from challenges that the men were exposed to, yet something where society still had a role to play and a degree of responsibility. "Violent extremism" however was articulated as coming from outside groups and often seen as a "bad influence" on the community. The two phenomena were seen as separate, though the research showed that on further questioning the two were closely intertwined.
Challenges and Insights: Unemployed Young Men Many interviews thus pointed towards youth groups being the prime source of insecurity in the communities. Unemployed young men were described as marginalized and disillusioned, with limited prospects in their lives to be able to change the situation. The men are seeing trends and narratives impacting their communities from the "outside" world, but feel disconnected and unable to engage and take control of their own lives or the direction of communal life. Being a part of a group and securing income is attractive, as is gaining a particular position within the group and thereby becoming "someone", important and respected by others. Some development actors interviewed were addressing the economic and social aspects of these challenges, but young male disempowerment and threatened identity often lay beyond their scope. The research conducted highlighted
Anthony Ellis, Andrew Cleary, Martine Zeuthen, James Khalil110
into account in its design, monitoring and evaluation.
Conclusion
articulated at the policy and the community levels, understanding contributory local
a more comprehensive baseline assessment.
Building CVE programming from such an evidence-base will allow us to measure and evaluate its impact against a baseline of understanding. Continuing to collect relevant data throughout the programming cycle will enables the monitoring and evolution of how the problem is conceived over time to ensure that it is driven by local needs, informed by local knowledge and responsive to the concerns of the community. Only by building local knowledge and being sensitive to the impacts on local communities can the best-suited and
(Endnotes)
1 The authors’ approach to research into Radical Attitudes and Behaviors, is available on request by email to [email protected].
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A ro ti e A ro in t e ig t Ag inst Extremism: r ti l te s in Con ronting Isl mo obi n ising ubli A reness
Spokesperson, Association against Islamophobia
From Humiliation to RadicalismFrom a sociological perspective, we can study the typical member of a radicalized group in the context of European and North American major cities. We often find these groups very active in deprived areas and on the Internet. Among the members, we will find a small number who are able to construct and articulate some form of ideology, while the vast majority join the movement for other reasons, mainly the need to be part of a community and find (simple) answers to the (difficult) questions they have.
In the case of “Islamic jihadi movements”, the proposed ideology is quite simple: It starts with a radical vision of Islamic principles, revisited as a means to legitimate the construction of an alternate vision: “Them” versus “Us”, fulfilling a clash-of-civilizations type of ideology. Those propagating such an idea usually have little knowledge of what the study and implementation of Sharia as a social/ideological/legal framework represents. They mostly use some peripheral arguments taken out of contexts to make their point appear Islamically valid and will most of the time opt for the harshest position in all matters of social life. Any religious figure not adhering to this vision is considered deviant. Any Muslim not following their definition of Islam is deemed off the straight path.
The critical fact here is not for marginal figures to build an extreme form of ideology. This happens in any sort of society at all times, far below any significant level in statistics. What is critical, though, is the fact that more young men and women join such groups in an attempt to fulfill their need for social inclusion and religious affiliation. Clearly, this results from a failure to include them in the wider society as active members of a common project, as well as a stigmatization of what is most important to them: their religious identity.
Marwan Muhammad112
When being asked for the reasons why they joined a radicalized group or got away from their natural social group (family, university, local mosque, etc.), they will most of the time relate to experiences of Islamophobia: systematic “random checks” at airports when they have a beard, discriminations in the working environment, insults and threats in the streets, women being assaulted for wearing the hijab or the niqab, children being excluded from school for being perceived as religious, etc.
These real experiences produce humiliation and participate in the construction of a “them” versus “us” dichotomy. This makes the radical ideology sound credible when it is formulated. For these reasons, it is critical for us to be pro-active and to fight Islamophobia by all means in order to stop this spreading feeling among the Muslim youth that they are not part of the community, that this society is by essence anti-Islam and that all sorts of choices in social life have to be presented in the form of an antagonism, if we truly want to avoid the radicalization of some of them.
Islamophobia in the MakingIslamophobia as an ideology is very different depending on the context, both from a chronological and geographical perspective. In the context of Europe and North America, we can clearly identify two streams of thought in the building of Islamophobia:
1. A right wing/neo conservative Islamophobia: This ideology presents Islam and the Muslims as aliens to the society. They are perceived as a threat to be kept under close watch, with rhetoric including classical examples of Crusade-inspired forms of hate speech or the “enemy within” colonial theme, as well as pure racist statements against Arabs, Africans, or Asian perceived as reference ethnic groups for Muslims. This ideology presents the American and European identity as a white, Judeo-Christian one, threatened by Islam and the Muslims from all angles: military, economic, cultural, etc.
2. A left wing/progressive Islamophobia: This ideology is more present in Western Europe and is articulated around concepts that are perceived as core values of our societies: Secularism, women’s rights, freedom of speech, etc. These ideas, when applied to Islam and the Muslims, will tend to be manipulated in order to be used as means of exclusion. For example, secularism in France (called “laïcité”) will legitimate a number of discriminations against Muslims in the working environment, in schools and in the public sphere: hijab has been banned from public schools, some employees are fired because they observed the Ramadan fast, access to restaurants or gyms is being denied on religious grounds, etc.
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Depending on the context, one of these two streams of thought makes most of Islamophobia. Clearly, right wing Islamophobia has been the main driver of hate crimes and discrimination in post 9/11 United States, while Netherlands and France are more relying on the secularist approach to legitimate what NGOs and supranational organizations now clearly identify as violations of freedom of religion and human rights (including Collective Against Islamophobia-CCIF, Amnesty International, OSCE, Council of Europe, etc.). Only for France in 2011, we have registered 298 cases of hate crimes and discriminations, 94 percent of which are targeting women.
Fighting IslamophobiaIslamophobia, as a phenomenon, takes different forms: Ideological production, anti-Muslim campaigns, hate crimes and discriminations. For this reason, the response has to be defined in a holistic approach. We need to combat Islamophobia on all fronts, within a disciplined, methodical and constructive process:
Academic: Produce research to analyze Islamophobia as a phenomenon and provide evidence to break some of the arguments used to fuel the hate against Islam and the Muslims. Institutional: Monitor hate-crimes and discrimination against Muslims in order to quantify the phenomenon and identify the trends. Only with a sound data gathering framework will we be able to genuinely address Islamophobia. Campaign: Promote communication campaigns that aim at breaking clichés against Islam and the Muslims. This can be done through artistic work and creative forms of campaigns (social networks, street marketing, etc.).Psychological: Support the victims of Islamophobia by helping them overcome the stigma and including them in projects with their fellow citizens.Legal: Incite the victims to take legal action whenever possible, in order to create precedents and deter future perpetrators.
Governments must take an active part in this fight against Islamophobia and understand that a genuine attempt to maintain security on their soil needs to include a proactive approach to what fuels humiliation, frustration and hate. True success in the fight against terrorism and radicalization is not for us to arrest random people in airports, but rather to make sure that all our citizens have the feeling that they are part of one and the same society, in which they each have a great role to play, never at the expense of their identity.
A Proactive Approach in the Fight Against Extremism
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ro esses o iseng gement rom Extremist Grou s: o ese ro esses C n e ein or e
Tore Bjørgo
During recent years, there has been an increasing interest in understanding not only how and why individuals join ent types of extremist, terrorist or criminal groups but also in the processes of how and why they leave.1
through concepts like radicalization/deradicalization, engagement/disengagement or
terms than only relying on traditional repressive strategies for countering terrorism and other forms of violent extremism.
into the process of disengagement and deradicalization but the latter processes are not simply a reversal of the former. People may join such groups for one type of aim or another,
circumstances.
radicalization/deradicalization on the one hand, and engagement/disengagement on the other. Radicalization/deradicalization refers to processes of change at the level of values, attitudes and ideology. Engagement/disengagement refers to changes at the level of behavior
activities. Research has shown that this is often not the case. Many individuals radicalize
Tore Bjørgo116
without ever engaging in active militancy and some of those who join such activities tend to change their values and worldview as a result of their engagement rather than as a reason for joining. Similarly, others end their active involvement in militant groups and activities but retain their militant views. In other words, they disengage without being deradicalized.
end of active involvement in militant activities – or should full deradicalization – with a
the latter is more ambitious and may also involve greater mental barriers against re-engagement in violent activism. However, it can be questioned whether deradicalization is really a necessary policy goal as long as militant activists actually disengage and end their involvement in violent and militant activities.
How do the processes of disengagement actually happen? What are the factors that promote disengagement? Individual decisions to join or leave are usually the product of a mixture of factors and motivations working in tandem. Various forms of disillusionment
in joining and leaving criminal or militant groups are quite generic, and that these patterns are relevant to terrorist organizations as well as extremist youth cultures, street gangs or organized crime groups.
Processes of engagement and disengagement may be understood in terms of push and pull factors.2 Push factors are negative forces and circumstances that make certain social
and rewarding alternatives into crime/extremism or towards a life out of crime/extremism. Although these processes operate both by pushing and pulling individuals into militant groups and activities, and by pushing and pulling them out of such groups and activities, w push-factors to facilitate disengagement from militant groups:
Disillusionment with the (unattainable) goals of the groupDisillusionment with the violent methods and who are victimized by the groupDisillusionment with the leaders of the groupDisillusionment with the social relations within the groupLoss of position and status within the groupCannot take the pressure any moreCompeting loyalties between group and family obligations
It is important that each of these push factors can be reinforced by various interventions.
Processes of Disengagement from Extremist Groups:How These Processes Can Be Reinforced 117
Examples could be to increase the sense of political failure of the group, demonstrating how their brutal methods turn their constituencies against them, and that their violence
also involve sending credible messages that their violence is considered immoral and unacceptable by people the activists respect (e.g. parents or religious authorities). Other measures may focus on discrediting the leaders of the group, increasing external pressure by police or intelligence interventions, or sowing dissent and paranoia within the group by
pull factors which may attract a person to leave the terrorist path due to a more rewarding and pro-social alternative:
Availability of an exit from the extremist group; providing a good excuse to leave
Education and job trainingEconomic supportNew social networksA new romantic partner outside the groupEstablishing a familyLonging for a peaceful and ordinary life without the stress and pressure of activism
Even these pull factors may alsoobstacle to disengagement from terrorism is often that the only realistic alternative to
intervention would be to provide other and more rewarding exits to terrorists at large as well
of rehabilitation back into society in exchange of fundamental changes in behavior on
testifying in court against their former comrades and leaders, or public renouncement
economic support to their families or themselves, new social networks, or even help to get
the knowledge that getting a wife and children is often a turning point in life for militant
underground activities, an ordinary peaceful civilian life becomes increasingly attractive. For leaders of militant groups, the possibility of getting involved in a political process may
Tore Bjørgo118
be more attractive than remaining in a dead-locked armed struggle.
An increasing number of countries have now introduced various forms of deradicalization or rehabilitation programs to open an exit for individuals and groups involved in terrorism
at large. Some try primarily to achieve changes in values and ideological outlook among the participants (deradicalization), whereas others are more concerned about changes in behavior by making militants end their involvement in violent activities through
only provide counseling and psychological support. If they are implemented well, such programs do have a potential to make valuable contributions to reducing terrorism and violence. However, this is not a silver bullet. Such programs should be seen as one element among others within a more comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.
(Endnotes)
1 For a brief overview of the research literature, see Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (London: Routledge 2009), pp. 5-10.
2 Push and pull factors and how they can be reinforced are discussed more in detail in Tore Bjørgo “Processes of disengagement from violent groups of the extreme right”, in Bjørgo and Horgan (2009), and in Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik & Tore Bjørgo (2012). Ex-pirates in Somalia: Disengagement Processes and Reintegration Programming. Research report, Centre for Peace Studies, University of Tromsø. http://www.nb.no/idtjeneste/URN:NBN:no-bibsys_brage_28573
Biographies of Authors
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Sahar F. Aziz is an Associate Professor of Law at the Faculty of Texas Wesleyan University School of Law since 2011. Prior to joining Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, Professor Aziz was an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law Center where she taught national security and civil rights law. Aziz served as a senior policy advisor for the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) where she worked on law and policy at the intersection of national security and civil rights. Prior to joining DHS, Aziz was an associate at Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLP in Washington, D.C. where she litigated class action civil rights lawsuits alleging a nationwide pattern and practice of gender discrimination in pay and promotion.
Noman Benotman is President at the Quilliam Foundation. He is leading Quilliam’s work on de-radicalization processes in the UK and abroad, working to raise international awareness of Jihadist recantations, co-ordinating Quilliam’s outreach to current and former extremists and using Quilliam as a platform from which to share his inside knowledge of al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups with a wider audience. In 1989 he travelled to Afghanistan where he fought against the Soviet Union, taking part in battles around Khost, Gardez and elsewhere. After the Soviet withdrawal, he helped set up the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group which aimed to violently overthrow Colonel Gaddafi and establish an "Islamic state" in Libya. In 1994, he moved to Sudan where he forged close links with Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other key members of al-Qaeda. Since 1995 he has lived in London where he was initially part of the "Londonistan" scene alongside other senior extremists such as Abu Qatada and Abu Musab al-Suri before gradually distancing himself from Islamism. During the last few years, he has played a key role in the disbanding of the LIFG and the issuing of its "refutations". He is also well known as one of the most public critics of al-Qaeda, appearing widely on international media such as CNN and Al-Jazeera as well as taking part in a range of international conferences.
Tore Bjørgo (PhD) is Professor at the Norwegian Police University College and Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). His main fields of research are political extremism and terrorism; racist and right-wing violence; disengagement from violent groups; crime prevention; and policing. He has (co) authored or (co)edited eleven books, including Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (2009). He was the initiator of the first “Exit” project to promote disengagement from racist groups in Norway, a project that was later adopted in other countries. Bjørgo was
iogr ies o Aut ors
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one of the first scholars to point to disengagement as a possible strategy to reduce terrorism.
Shane Bryans (PhD) is a Visiting Professor at Staffordshire University Law School, UK and a Senior Associate of the International Centre for Prison Studies (Essex University, UK). He has visited more than 17 countries to provide advice and support on their prison systems. This has involved missions to a number of European countries and Libya, Pakistan, Palestine, Haiti, Uganda, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia. He spent three years living in Turkey as the Council of Europe’s advisor to Turkey on its Penal Reform and Judicial Modernization Programme. A number of these missions involved work on the management, assessment and de-radicalization of terrorist prisoners. Bryans has also written a number of books on prison management and numerous articles on prison theory and management. He has worked as an operational prison director and prison policy specialist for over 25 years.
Peter Chalk (PhD) is a Senior Policy Analyst with the RAND Corporation. He is an internationally recognized expert on terrorism, maritime crime, and low-intensity conflict and is author of numerous books, book chapters and journal articles on these subjects. He has also testified on several occasions before the US Congress. Chalk is Associate Editor of Studies in Conflict Terrorism and serves as an Adjunct Professor with the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. He is also a visiting scholar with the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York and a specialist correspondent for Jane’s Intelligence Review and Oxford Analytica in London, U.K.
Andrew Cleary is one of the Founding Directors of Integrity Research and Consultancy, based in Cairo, Egypt. He leads on Integrity’s research and analysis projects and activities. Cleary is an experienced manager and researcher, with a specialization in managing field research in fragile environments. He has coordinated teams of researchers and analysis of primary data in challenging environments like Afghanistan for both the private sector and governmental clients. Specific projects Cleary has undertaken include fieldwork design and management of surveys with sample sizes up to 16.000 in Afghanistan, and design and management of a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of USAID-funded media programming.
Anthony Ellis is one of the Founding Directors of Integrity Research and Consultancy and is responsible for client management, security sector clients and day-to-day management at the London Head Quarters. Ellis is a formally trained negotiation and mediation specialist with a focus on conflict-resolution, security-sector reform, training and mentoring and good governance. From a ten year career as an officer in the British Diplomatic Service,
Biographies of Authors 125
including postings to Yemen, Afghanistan, Cyprus, UK desk officer roles on Pakistan and North Africa counterterrorism and Arabic-language training in Syria, Anthony has extensive experience of UK counterterrorism efforts from a project management and operational perspective. He has also provided operational management, human-rights and analysis training to law-enforcement and security officials throughout the developing world.
Rohan Gunaratna (PhD) is Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Gunaratna serves on the advisory board of International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague. He debriefed detainees in the U.S., Asia, Middle East including high value Al Qaeda detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is author and editor of 15 books including the international bestseller “Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror” (Columbia University Press). He chaired the inaugural International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation, February 2009 and the International Conference on Community Engagement: Countering Extremism to Build Social Resilience, September 2011.
Malkanthi Hettiarachchi is a Chartered Clinical Psychologist and has worked in community and inpatient settings, as well as within forensic settings such as prisons, detention and rehabilitation centres. She led the specialist team that assessed over 9000 terrorists. She has experience in psychometric assessment and treatment of a range of mental health problems. Hettiarachchi is trained in Cognitive Behavior Therapy and EMDR which is widely used in the treatment of trauma and in a range of emotional and behavioral disorders. She has experience in setting up of services, conducting supervision for mental health, psychology and nursing staff; conducting staff training for security forces personnel, teachers and members of the community. She has presented at several conferences on terrorist rehabilitation: The Hague, Spain, Singapore, Pakistan, and in Sri Lanka. Hettiarachchi has visited detention facilities in Libya, Philippines, Pakistan, and the Maldives and South America. She has conducted training for staff on psychosocial skills, rehabilitation and deradicalization of terrorist cadres in Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.
James Khalil (PhD) is a Conflict Specialist at Integrity Research and Consultancy. As a former analyst with the Ministry of Defense, he was responsible for monitoring and evaluation of campaign progress during deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. He has also designed and analyzed various mixed method (quantitative and qualitative) research projects for clients such as the United States Department of Defense, USAID and NATO, with a particular specialization in perception surveys in challenging environments such as South Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan. He also has thematic expertise in the onset and
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dynamics of internal conflicts, developed as Technical Lead on numerous Ministry of Defense research projects.
Siegwart Lindenberg (PhD) is Professor of Cognitive Sociology in the Department of Sociology and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS), University of Groningen, at the Tilburg Center for Behavioral Economic (TIBER), Tilburg University, both in the Netherlands. He is a member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. His interests lie in the development, test and application of theories of social rationality that deal with the influence of the social environment on norms, cooperative and antisocial behavior, and on forms and failures of self-regulation.
Gabriele Marranci (PhD) is the Director of the Study Contemporary Muslim Lives research hub and has recently joined the Department of Anthropology at Macquarie University. He is also an Honorary Associate Professor at the Centre for the Study of Islam in the UK, Cardiff University and was until recently Associate Professor within the Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. Marranci is an anthropologist by training working on Muslim societies and his research focuses on youth, religion, cosmopolitan society and multiculturalism, and radicalization processes. He is the author of four monographs and has also published edited books and articles in international peer-reviewed journals.
Alistair Millar is Founder and Director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, a nonpartisan policy institute dedicated to building stronger partnerships to prevent terrorism. He also teaches graduate level courses on counterterrorism and US foreign policy at The Johns Hopkins University, where he received the 2010-2011 Excellence in Teaching Award for Advanced Academic Programs. Millar is also a nonresident Senior Fellow at The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute. He has written numerous chapters, articles, and reports on international counterterrorism efforts, sanctions regimes, and nonproliferation. Millar is author, with Eric Rosand, of Allied against Terrorism: What’s Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment.
Marwan Muhammad is a French author and the spokesperson for the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF). Ex-trader and statistician by training, he has extensively written on the use of data for social sciences, especially in the context of discriminations and anti-terrorism policies. Muhammad is frequently invited by universities and supra-national organizations (OSCE, ENAR, OCI, etc.) in a position of expertise to comment on the use of personal data and the biases of ethnic/religious profiling.
Biographies of Authors 127
David Scharia (PhD) is the Legal and Criminal Justice Coordinator of the United Nations Security Council Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED). In his role, Scharia provides legal advice to the Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) on States’ implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions on countering terrorism and coordinates the work of the Legal Group at CTED. Before assuming this role, Scharia served as a Legal Expert within CTED and his responsibilities included legal aspects of the fight against terrorism. He also liaised on behalf of the CTC with international, regional and sub-regional organizations such as the EU, Council of Europe, US DOJ, FATF, MONEYVAL, OSCE, World Bank, NATO – center of excellence, and relevant UN bodies. During 2011-2012, Scharia was a National Security Law Scholar at Columbia University Law School. Scharia also has various publications and frequently lectures on terrorism in international forums.
Edit Schlaffer (PhD) is the Founder of Women without Borders, an Austrian-based international NGO, in 2002. Her research and activities focus on women in international politics, women as agents of change and driving forces in stabilizing an insecure world. In 2008, Schlaffer launched SAVE – Sisters Against Violent Extremism, the world’s first women’s counterterrorism platform. SAVE brings together women from around the globe who are determined to create a united front against violent extremism. Schlaffer has received numerous accolades for her work promoting women in the security arena; Secretary Clinton has twice highlighted SAVE’s contributions to the field, in 2010 she was named one of Women’s Enews’ 21 Leaders of the 21st Century, and in 2011 she was named one of Newsweeks’ 150 Movers and Shakers.
Mansour Bin Said Al Qarni (PhD) is a Senior Advisor at the Mohammed bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care, Saudi Ministry of Interior. The Center looks to reintegrate former Islamic extremists into mainstream society. He holds a BA degree in Security Sciences from the King Fahd Security College, a BA degree in Sharia Sciences from the University of Imam Muhammad bin Saud, a Master’s degree in Educational Psychology from King Faisal University and most recently completed a Doctorate in Social Sciences where he focused on Criminology from the Naif Arab University.
Tinka Veldhuis is a Research Fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) - The Hague. She is also a Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" and a Ph.D. fellow at the Department of Sociology of the University of Groningen and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS). Her research interests include detention and rehabilitation policies for violent extremist offenders, radicalization and de-radicalization, (counter) terrorism,
128
and counter-terrorism policy evaluation. In 2010, she was involved in evaluation research commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, to evaluate the government’s terrorist detention policy.
Clare White is Chief Executive at The Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Foundation for Peace, the only U.K. organization founded by victims of terrorism which supports others affected by political violence, conflict and acts of terror. White is also Co-Chair of the "Prevent" working group within the European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), an EU-wide umbrella network of practitioners and local actors involved in countering violent radicalization. White also Chairs the inter-agency group Critical Incident Response Advisory Group (CIRAG), and is a member of the Hate Crime Scrutiny Panel for Merseyside & Cheshire Crown Prosecution Service, United Kingdom.
Martine Zeuthen is Head of Programme Design and Evaluation at Integrity Research and Consultancy. Zeuthen leads on Integrity’s Programme Design and Evaluation and also its Migration and Displacement practice. She is a research anthropologist and specialist in qualitative data collection in fragile and conflict-affected communities. She has extensive experience of coordinating research, international development projects and evaluations among hard to access populations. Zeuthen is also an expert in qualitative data collection and analysis, participatory approaches, facilitating focus group discussions and conducting interviews. She has carried out independent and collaborative long-term fieldwork in Syria, Denmark and the Philippines as well as various shorter research-based evaluations in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Palestine and South Sudan.
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