Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience

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Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysicsof Experience

“A philosophy that tells us to explain things by breaking them into partswill not help us when we confront the question of understanding the thingsthat have no parts”, Lee Smolin, The Life of the Cosmos.

Abstract: This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative toatomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics ofconsciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerningcontemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to thetheory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that anall pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. Fromthis assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holisticovertones is developed. In particular, I argue that such universalconsciousness serves as the ground for the emergence of individualconscious creatures. The result is a theory with significant conceptualresources which presents novel means for confronting some of the mostrecalcitrant problems facing contemporary panpsychism: in particular, thesubject combination problem, and the problem of entailment associated withit. In so doing, cosmopsychism places itself as an viable alternative toatomistic varieties of panpsychism as well as to orthodox physicalistaccounts of consciousness. 

1. Introduction

Over the last two decades there has been a modest yet

persistent revival of interest in panpsychism, as well as in

other substance monistic alternatives to orthodox physicalism.

In general, however, debates as to whether physicalism ought

to be revised or replaced, as well as regarding the precise

form of the desired alternative, have been predicated on the

assumption that the challenger (panpsychism, panprotopsychism,

neutral monism, or whatever else it may be) must follow the

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rule that a proper explanation of subjectivity and the raw

feels of human experience is one which is grounded exclusively

in micro-level facts. Recently, though, this, too, have began to

change. Several authors working within a broadly-speaking

panpsychist framework have began to explore the contrary

hypothesis according to which the mental lives of individual

subjects are grounded, ultimately, in an all encompassing

universal mind, and only derivatively in facts about micro-

level components (see Jaskolla and Buck 2012, Mathews 2011,

Nagasawa and Wager, forthcoming). On a more abstract level of

inquiry, there has also been a surge of interest in

metaphysical holism (token monism), with arguments favouring

the priority of the cosmos as a whole to any of its proper

parts (Schaffer 2010), or even espousing the claim that a

single cosmic entity, the “blobject”, is the only concrete

object there is (Horgan and Potrč 2000). The present paper is

meant as a contribution to this emerging trend. I present and

motivate cosmopsychism, a view according to which an omnipresent

cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate there

is and the definitive ground of all spatiotemporally localized

centres of consciousness. In broad outlines, cosmopsychism is

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a panpsychist theory of mind; yet, in its holistic commitments

it functions as an alternative to the atomistic thinking which

dominates work on panpsychism in contemporary analytic

philosophy. Aside from laying the foundations for a holistic

panpsychist outlook, much of the paper is dedicated to an

effort to show that the present approach is well-poised to

deal with key problems afflicting contemporary panpsychism. In

particular, I offer novel avenues for confronting the

remarkably difficult subject combination problem, and the problem of

entailment associated with it. Complementarily, I also address

certain concerns and criticisms directed at the position I

defend. Specifically, (a) the charge that cosmopsychism

generates problems which mirror-image those of atomistic

panpsychism, in particular the so-called decomposition problem;

and (b) that it threatens to eliminate individual subjects,

submerging them in an engulfing oceanic consciousness. Along

the way, I will also touch upon similarities and differences

with other works of cognate orientation. I begin, however,

with a general discussion of panpsychism and of some of the

problems it faces.

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2. Panpsychism: Some Foundational Issues

Panpsychism is the view that mind abides in all things. More

exactly, it is the view that every concrete system, or object,

either has a mind of its own or is ultimately constituted by

systems endowed with minds of their own (cf. Hartshorne 1977).1

The first disjunct of the previous sentence is easy enough to

grasp: obviously, some concrete things have minds of their own

– ourselves, to be sure, and (we are confident) many other

animals around us. In general panpsychists tend to be rather

generous, compared to other theorists, in ascribing mind and

consciousness to natural systems other than the obvious

candidates just mentioned. Yet, contrary to a common

misconception, panpsychism does not imply that every concrete

system has a mind of its own. This is where the second

disjunct becomes relevant. It is open for panpsychists to hold

that some systems – marble statues and automobiles intuitively

come to mind – do not have mental lives of their own. In

particular, so goes the idea, there is nothing it is like to

be a marble statue or an automobile. Still, panpsychists are1 By ‘ultimately’ it is meant ‘in the final account’ which is to say that even if neither a given system S, nor its immediate lower-level constituents, have minds of their own, a finite number of iterations of theconstitution relation will eventually lead to more basic constituents whichdo have minds of their own.

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committed to the view that concrete systems which do not have

minds of their own are nevertheless ultimately constituted of

systems which do. Thus, it is in this relaxed sense, and in

this sense only, that panpsychism implies that mind, and in

particular consciousness, dwells in all concrete things –

natural or artificial.

Yet, while panpsychism does not imply that all concrete

systems possess minds of their own, it entails that the most

fundamental systems, the ultimates of nature, do.2 This, in turn,

implies that mind has an irreducible presence at the very core

of reality. Noticeably, however, asserting that the ultimates

of concrete reality exemplify mental features says precious

little about the nature of these ultimates. In other words,

panpsychism, as such, leaves the nature of its mind-endowed

ultimates underdetermined, or underspecified. The task of

filling the blanks is left for specific theories; and, in

doing so, such theories go beyond their mere formal commitment

to panpsychism.

2 It can be argued that panpsychists have to motivate the idea that all ultimates are endowed with minds of their own, rather than only some of them (see Strawson 2006). I shall not be concerned with this question, however, because the view which I am about to defend, cosmopsychism, holds that there is only one fundamental entity and that this entity is consciousthrough and through, so the problem does not arise for this version of panpsychism.

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As innocent as this last observation may sound it is

nevertheless of significant consequence. In particular, it

implies that panpsychism has no necessary conceptual

affiliation with micropsychism, properly understood.

Micropsychism is commonly understood as the view that some

physical ultimates are intrinsically experiential,

instantiating phenomenal properties, while panpsychism is seen

as a special (and stronger) variant of this view which holds

that all physical ultimates instantiate phenomenal proeprties

(see Goff 2009, Strawson 2006). From a strictly logical

perspective, however, this interpretation is flawed for,

clearly, the term ‘micropsychism’ implies that the mind-

endowed ultimates are micro-level entities, and this is a

condition which is nowhere specified in the abovementioned

characterization of panpsychism. Thus, once micropsychism is

seen for what it really is, namely as the view that all

ultimates are micro-entities and that some of these micro-

entities are mind-endowed, it becomes evident that panpsychism

is not a subspecies of this genus: the association is

contingent rather than necessary.

So far, we’ve discussed metaphysical issues, but

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panpsychism also has an important methodological ingredient.

As an explanatory framework, it faces the imperative of

demonstrating that its ontological assumptions are

instrumental in explaining mind and consciousness as we know

them, that is, as we find them in ourselves and in other

macro-level organisms around us. This is to say that facts

about mind-endowed ultimates must play a role in explaining

macro-level mental facts, in particular facts about macro-

level experience, which are not explicable otherwise. It will

soon be shown that this imperative looms large behind some of

the most pressing problems afflicting panpsychism at the

present.

3. The Combination Problem: What it is and why it Matters

As noted above, panpsychism entails that the ultimates of

concrete reality are mind-endowed, but it does not entail that

such ultimates are micro-level entities. Nevertheless, there

is a strong tendency among present-day philosophers working on

the subject to identify ultimates with the smallest and

simplest of micro-level entities. On this assumption, the most

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pressing task panpsychism faces is to explain how such tiny,

simple conscious entities ground the reality of macro-level

consciousness. A popular generic response to this question

holds that macro-level conscious subjects are compounds, whose

macro-level phenomenology is the compositional product of the

coming together the combination of micro-level conscious

entities. In other words, on this view, micro-level

consciousness grounds macro –level consciousness by literally

composing, or combining, it. Such a view is often described as

constitutive panpsychism (see Chalmers 2013, Coleman 2014).

Constitutive panpsychism is an attractive view in many

respects (see Chalmers 2013) but it comes with a price: the

combination problem.

It is easy to understand what the combination problem (or,

as shown below, a family of closely related problems) is, and

why it matters. Constitutive panpsychism yields the

desideratum to explain how a “mental chemistry” involving

recursive combination of microphysical entities could give

rise to macro-level subjects and their macro-phenomenal

qualities. In Chalmers’ words, it procures the demand to

explain “how the experiences of fundamental physical entities

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such as quarks and photons combine to yield the familiar sort

of human conscious experience that we know and love”

(forthcoming, 1). The combination problem is the problem of

responding satisfactorily to this challenge.

Still, nothing in what I said so far conveys the true

gravity of the problem or explains why it occupies such

centre-stage in contemporary discussions of panpsychism. To

get a better grip on the issue we need to bear in mind the

dialectical context which accompanies the revived interest in

the panpsychist outlook. The renewed interest in panpsychism

is largely associated with a growing sense of disillusionment

concerning the ability of mainstream physicalist theories of

mind to truly accommodate the reality of consciousness. Those

who express such misgivings are typically of the opinion that

theories of consciousness grounded in the standard physicalist

framework, be it in its type-identity guise or in its token-

identity semblance, run into a cul-de-sac when faced with the

so-called hard problem of consciousness (see Chalmers 1995).

Panpyschism carries a promise to overcome this theoretical

impasse. By postulating phenomenal properties as ontologically

fundamental it avoids what seems to be the most notorious part

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of the hard problem, viz., explaining the ontological

transition from a wholly insentient realm of purely material

existence to a realm of experience. In avoiding this

commitment to the radical emergence of consciousness one avoids

the apparent unintelligibility of such emergence, hence

escaping that which seems to make the hard problem insoluble.3

This is where the combination problem has its bite.

Critics of panpsychism argue that the problem of explaining

how micro-phenomenal subjects, or states, or qualities, or

processes combine to form macro-phenomenal subjects, or

states, or qualities, or processes is just as formidable as

the hard problem afflicting physicalism (see for example,

Carruthers and Schecter 2006; Goff 2006, 2009; Van Cleve

1990). If the critics are right, this is bad news for

panpsychism, or at any rate for constitutive panpsychism, in

particular since given the dialectical context described above

the attractiveness of the panpsychist alternative is largely

dependent on its ability to succeed where (orthodox)

3 For a discussion of radical emergence see Seager and Allan-Hermanson (2010), as well as van Gulick (2001). Galen Strawson vividly illustrates the problematic status of radical emergence by describing it as implying that there is nothing “about the nature of the emerged-from (and nothing else) in virtue of which the emerger emerges as it does and is what it is” (2006, 15), hence it is something which “not even God can understand” (Ibid, 24).

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physicalism seems to fail, namely, in avoiding making the

reality of consciousness a hopelessly unintelligible fact.4

It follows, then, that panpsychists must rise to the

challenge and engage with the combination problem. The bar for

success is clear: it consists of an effective response to the

charge that the combination problem is, for panpsychism, as

devastating a problem as the hard problem is for orthodox

physicalism. Optimally, such a response would consist in

solving the combination problem, or in finding a way around

it; short of that, the minimal requirement for success is to

show that the problem, though perhaps not yet solved, or

dissolved, does not manifest the disheartening quality of

appearing totally hopeless. A convincing argument exploiting

one, or more, of these possible channels of refuge should

suffice to break the analogy with the hard problem and keep

the alarmists at bay. The good news, then, is that,

strategically, there are many ways in which to approach the

problem. The bad news is that there is more than one problem

to solve…

4 This is not to suggest, however, that the hard problem is the only consideration motivating panpsychism (for additional arguments in favor of panpsychism see Griffin 1998; and Mathews 2011).

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4. The Varieties of Combination

William James (1890, 58-62), to whom the combination problem

is usually traced, argued that elementary units of

consciousness neither join together to collectively constitute

complex units of consciousness, nor do they logically

necessitate the existence of such mental compounds. Yet, the

precise nature of James’ “elemental units” and “mental

compounds” remains somewhat vague. Reading James, it is

possible to interpret the text in two different ways, namely,

as referencing a micro-macro relation between either experiences,

or experiential subjects (cf. Coleman, 2014). William Seager

(1995), who introduced the problem into present-day

discussions of panpsychism, followed James in remaining

ambiguous on this point. What was clear to both Williams,

however, was that to the extent that there is a combination

problem it consists in the apparent failure of micro-

phenomenal facts to make the appearance of macro-phenomenal

facts intelligible and expected, or, in other words, to entail

macro-level consciousness.

Recently, however, researchers began to pay greater

attention to precise formulations of the combination problem,

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and this led to the realization that different

conceptualizations give rise to distinct combination problems.

As a result, it is common now to distinguish between several

sub-problems falling under the banner of the ‘combination

problem’ (see Chalmers, forthcoming; Coleman 2014). In a

recent paper, Chalmers (Ibid) offer a useful synopsis of the

troubled terrain of combination problems. Chalmers argues that

the combination problem can be broken down into three major

sub-problems. These are:

1) The Subject Combination Problem: How do micro-subjects

(assumed to be micro-physical subjects) combine to yield

macro-subjects (e.g., conscious organisms like

ourselves)?

2) The Quality Combination Problem: How do micro-level

phenomenal qualities combine to yield macro-level

phenomenal qualities, i.e., qualities such as are found

in the experiences of recognizable macro-subjects?

3) The Structure Combination Problem: How does micro-

experiential structure combine to yield macro-

experiential structure, e.g., of the sort exemplified by

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the complex spatial structure of visual and auditory

fields?

The list is not exhaustive. Other combination problems, as

well as specialized variants of the three major sub-problems

mentioned above, have been identified.5 Combination problems,

then, are a dime a dozen but how serious are they really? In

particular, could any of them be as daunting for panpsychism

as the hard problem appears to be for standard physicalism?

To repeat, what makes the hard problem particularly

troublesome for those who acknowledge its point, at any rate

is the fact that it appears insoluble, or in other words

hopeless.6 It follows that if the combination problem is to be

judged as being of comparable magnitude this must be because

at least one of its well-recognized variants can be shown to

be equally hopeless-looking when approached from a broadly

conceived panpsychist perspective. At the very least, finding

one of the combination problems hopeless would show that

constitutive panpsychism is in serious trouble, and since

5 Some of the more noticeable ones are the grain problem (Lockwood 1989, Maxwell 1978), the palette problem (Chalmers forthcoming, Dainton 2011), and the structural mismatch problem (Chalmers, Ibid). 6 To be more precise, the problem appears hopeless when considered from an orthodox physicalist perspective (as is usually the case).

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constitutive panpsychism is currently the most prominent breed

among panpsychist varieties the implication would be that

panpsychists must return to the drawing-board and reconsider

some of their basic assumptions.

But are we anywhere near this point? The reigning

sentiment among contemporary analytic philosophers interested

in the topic is that there is, indeed, something about the

nature of consciousness which gives the combination problem

distinguished venom (see Chalmers forthcoming, Coleman 2014,

Goff 2009, Seager 2010). My own impression is that many

variants of the combination problem (e.g., the quality

combination problem, Chalmers’ structural mismatch problem,

the palette problem, and the grain problem), while no doubt

difficult to solve, are nevertheless such that, at the present

point in time, we have no good reasons to consider them

hopeless. That is, we have no good reasons to suspect that

they are insolvable in principle. My intuition may be wrong, and

the point is certainly worthy of further discussion, but for

the time being we can leave all of this aside because,

unfortunately, there is a major variant of the combination

problem which does look hopeless. And one hopeless-looking

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combination problem is one problem too many.

5. Deconstructing Constitutive Panpsychism: Coleman on the

Subject Combination Problem

The most decisive pessimist concerning the prospect of

validating constitutive panpsychism is Sam Coleman (2014).

Coleman’s pessimism is based on an argument whose upshot is

that the subject combination problem, arguably the most

recalcitrant combination problem around, is insolvable.

Coleman’s argument is meticulous and insightful. It strikes

right at the heart of the problem. If correct, it cuts heavily

against the explanatory aspirations of constitutive

panpsychism. Put schematically, the argument can be

reconstructed as follows:

1) An adequate theory of consciousness must explain the

existence of macro-subjects.

2) Subjects are inherently perspectival. Indeed,

3) Having a point of view is the kernel of subjectivity.

Therefore,

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4) An adequate explanation of the existence of macro-

subjects involves an explanation of the existence of

macro-perspectives (by 1-3).

5) Constitutive panpsychism entails that macro-perspectives

are compounds, emerging as micro-perspectives combine

with each other to form a perspectival whole.7 But,

6) Points of view do not combine. Hence,

7) Constitutive panpsychism fails to explain the emergence

of macro-subjects (by 4-6). Wherefore,

8) Constitutive panpsychism is at a dead-end (by 1&7).

Step one is uncontroversial. The existence of macro-subjects

like ourselves is one of the non-negotiable data which any

theory of consciousness must be capable of accommodating, but

since macro-subjects do not qualify as ontological

fundamentals their existence must be explicated by reference

to other, more basic entities. Step two is where Coleman’s

argument begins in earnest. Being a subject, he argues, is

7 By referring to emergence in the present context I do not mean radical emergence, a mysterious process marked by the fact that the emerger carries no traces whatsoever of that from which it has emerged (see section three);rather, I use ‘emergence’ in a weaker sense popular in contemporary scientific discourse, a sense which corresponds, roughly, to the idea of a qualitatively novel complex whole, with novel causal powers, spontaneously arising from interactions between lower-level component parts (see Deacon 2013, 174).

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essentially connected to the possession of a phenomenological

point of view, namely, of a unique experiential portal to

reality. Having such a uniquely individualized perspective is

what distinguishes a particular conscious subject from other

sentient beings. From here, it is a short distance to the

suggestion that the possession of a uniquely particularized

experiential point of view in, and upon, the world is the most

conspicuously defining feature of being a subject; or in

Coleman words: “a subject, then, can be thought of as a point

of view annexed to a private qualitative field” (2014, 30).

This is where step three is being engaged.

Given the centrality of the notion of individual

perspective in explicating subjectivity it seems only natural

to conclude (per step four) that if we wish to explain the

existence of macro-subjects we must also explain the coming

into being of individual macro-perspectives. Such an

explanation is, perforce, an adequacy criterion for a theory of

consciousness but it is the specifics of the theory itself

which determine the particular shape it takes. In the case of

constitutive panpsychism the template for explanation is that

of combination, as macro-subjects are presumed to be compounds,

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i.e., to be literally constituted out of a multiplicity of

congregating micro-subjects (hence, step five).

According to Coleman, chemistry provides us with a proper

model for combination. When Hydrogen and Oxygen atoms join to

form a water molecule they are modified in the process; for

example, they become (oppositely) charged. Nevertheless, the

components continue to exist within the whole and the causal

powers of the whole are intelligibly grounded in the causal

powers of its constituents: for example, the fact that a water

molecule is a dipole, which, in turn, accounts for many of the

chemical dispositions of water, is intelligibly traceable to

changes in the arrangement of the charges of the constitutive

hydrogen and oxygen atoms. If this model generalizes, we

should expect the individual perspectives of micro-subjects to

survive (modulo certain contextual changes) as components within

the unified perspective of the emerging macro-subject,

partaking in the compound subject’s take on reality.

But, says Coleman (and this is the crucial step in the

argument, step six), a perspective just isn’t the kind of

thing that can be composed of lower-level, more limited

perspectives. Let S be a macro-subject endowed with a single

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perspective P, and let p(si) stand for the perspective of an

arbitrary micro-subject si. Constitutive panpsychism seems to

be committed to a metaphysical picture which implies that

there is a collection of micro-subjects {s1…sn} such that {s1…

sn} combine to constitute S, and {p(s1)…p(sn)} combine to

constitute P(S). But according to Coleman such a picture is

“precluded by the metaphysical logic of points of view” (Ibid,

34). Constitutive panpsychism requires P(S) to exist alongside

{p(s1)…p(sn)} while being made out of these micro-perspectives

(recall the analogy with water molecules) but Coleman argues

that this requirement cannot be satisfied.8 The very existence

of P(S) as a coherent perspective precludes the lesser points

of view from surviving as ingredients within it. Conversely,

the survival of {p(s1)…p(sn)} spells the collapse of P(S).

Coleman sees no absurdity in the suggestion that S’s

phenomenal field is the product of the qualitative contents

associated with the phenomenal fields of {s1…sn} for when it

comes to qualities, he argues, we do have coherent models for

combination (see Coleman’s paper for a detailed discussion),8 As mentioned before, the micro-perspectives may be subject to modification within the context of the whole so as a point of technical fact we should, perhaps, visualize a modified collection of micro-perspectives {p(s1*)…p(sn*)}. Technicalities aside, however, the essential point here is the co-existence of micro-perspectives alongside the macro-perspective which, presumably, they constitute.

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but the combination of qualities is no substitute for the

combination of perspectives – and it is the latter which

proves itself especially problematic for constitutive

panpsychism.

Coleman supports his claim with a simple example. He asks

us to imagine two micro-subjects, Red and Blue, such that Red

sees only red, while Blue sees only blue. Red and Blue combine,

in turn, to form a macro-subject, call it Mac, which

integrates their phenomenal worlds into a single perspective.

The problem, says Coleman, is that Red’s and Blue’s

perspectives do not survive as points of view within Mac’s unified

perspective. For example, Red’s take on the world is that of

seeing red, to the exclusion of all else, but Mac’s

perspective defies this condition: it may contain seeing blue,

in addition to seeing red, or it may simply consist of seeing

purple. What Red and Blue contribute to Mac, in respect of

their experiences, are the contents of their experiences, which

survive as intelligible ingredients (modified or not) within

Mac’s unified experience, but the original perspectives have

disappeared from sight.

The upshot, then, is that perspectives do not combine and

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hence neither do subjects. It follows that constitutive

panpsychism falters on the subject combination problem and has

no proper means of explaining the emergence of macro-subjects

(hence step seven in the argument). And since such an

explanation is mandatory (as per step one) constitutive

panpsychism is caught in a blind-alley (step eight, QED).

That Coleman may have hit on something important is

suggested by the explanatory power of his insight. First, we

can now make better sense of William James’ assertion that

“[t]he private minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound

mind” (James 1890, 160), since, if Coleman is correct, there

is an explanation for the intuition, echoed in James’ words,

that minds do not combine molecule-style. Second, Coleman’s

argument also sheds light on other arguments directed against

the combination of subjects such as the argument from the

conceivability of panpsychist zombies (Goff 2009). If the

postulation of micro-subjects duly arranged does not explain

the existence of a macro-subject then there is no entailment of

macro-subjects from micro-level facts, from which it follows

that the scenario of panpsychist zombies cannot be excluded.9

9 A panpsychist zombie is a creature which satisfies the following three conditions: (1) it is physically identical to a sentient creature (say, a human being); (2) its ultimate micro-constituents are all subjects of

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In sum, Coleman’s argument spells bad news for

constitutive panpsychism, which given the popularity of this

position among present-day panpsychists is bad news enough.

However, it leaves non-constitutive panpsychism unscathed.

Nevertheless, Coleman sees little hope for panpsychism,

regardless of any particular creed. His pessimism is based on

the conviction that panpsychists are caught in a vicious

dilemma. I turn next to consider this dilemma, and to offer a

channel of refuge from its unpleasant implications.

6. Panpsychism at a Crossroads: Or, how to avoid being

Impaled on the Horns of a Dilemma

If constitutive panpsychism is at a dead-end it makes sense

for panpsychists to put their hopes in non-constitutive

panpsychism, abandoning the idea that the individual

perspectives of macro-subjects are literally constituted out

of lower-level subjects. One idea which has been given some

consideration is that as micro-level subjects merge they fuse

into a unified macro-subject, and in the process lose their

experience; yet (3) it lacks any experiential life of its own, i.e., there is nothing it is like to be such a creature (cf. Goff 2009).

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individual identities altogether (see Seager 2010).10 Coleman,

however, remains sceptical. The problem, he argues, lies in

what has already been established, namely, that “pre-existing

subjects can make no intelligible contribution to the unified

subjectivity of a subject they generate in respect of their (the

predecessors) subjectivities” (2014, 36).

Thus, if micro-subjects fuse into macro-subjects, then,

Coleman insists, “their product is not structurally related to

its antecedents” (Ibid, 37). In other words, the coming into

being of macro-subjects turns out to be an instance of

radical, brute emergence: a case in which the relevant property

macro-level subjectivity cannot be explicated by reference

to the properties of lower-level entities.11 Brute emergence,

however, is detrimental; in particular since, as mentioned

above, the appeal of panpsychism as an alternative to

physicalism is largely contingent on the perception that it

avoids brute emergence.

Thus, according to Coleman, panpsychism faces a cruel

dilemma. Constitutive panpsychism fails because subjects do10 For the idea of fusion as a model of property emergence see Humphreys (1997). 11 It may be noted that Seager denies that fusion panpsychism involves radical emergentism. I suspect Coleman’s response is that fusion panpsychism may avoid emergentism with respect to phenomenal qualities, but not with respect to phenomenal subjects.

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not combine; while non-constitutive panpsychism fails because

it entails brute emergence. And since these two options are

considered the only options available there is no refuge left:

panpsychism, Coleman concludes, is indefensible.12 A careful

look, however, reveals loopholes in Coleman’s dilemma. In

particular, it just isn’t the case that non-constitutive

panpsychism is necessarily conducive to brute emergence. For

apart from emergent panpsychism (EPP) and constitutive

panpsychism (CPP) there is also what I call foundational

panpsychism (FPP). FPP (not to be confused with the

epistemological doctrine of foundationalism) is the view that

1) Ontological ultimates are subjects of experience.

2) The relation between the subjectivity of ultimates and

the subjectivity of macro-phenomenal subjects is neither

that of combinatorial constitution (as per CPP), nor of

complete irrelevance (as per EPP) but, rather, of partial

grounding.

12 Coleman’s way out of the tangle is to drive a wedge between qualia and subjectivity, giving up the idea that ontological ultimates must be subjects of experience while retaining the idea that qualia are primordial.The result is a shift away from panpsychism and towards a neutral monism in which qualia are fundamental but subjectivity is seen as a reducible feature of nature. Since this solution amounts to abandoning panpsychism, there is a clear motivation for panpsychists to search for alternative solutions.

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The key concept here is that of partial grounding. Grounding

is a metaphysical relation of dependence, usually understood

as holding between facts.13 To say that a given fact A (say,

the fact that x is ) grounds another fact B (say, the fact

that y is ) is to say

(i) That A is a more fundamental fact than B. And,

(ii) That B holds in virtue of A.

Grounding, or at any rate strict grounding (see Fine 2012), is

usually understood as an asymmetric, irreflexive, transitive,

and non-monotonic relation, establishing a strict partial

ordering of facts (see Raven 2012, Rosen 2010). Partial

grounding (partial strict grounding, strictly speaking) is

contrasted with full grounding. If B holds in virtue of A,

such that A, considered in isolation, is sufficient for B,

then A is said to be a full ground for B. In many cases,

however, A, although relevant for the grounding of B, is not

13 There is a thriving literature on the notion of ground and its formalcharacteristics (see, e.g., Audi 2012; Fine 2012; Raven 2012; Rosen 2010;Schaffer 2009; Trogdon 2013). Here I simply borrow the bare minimumnecessary for the present discussion.

27

itself sufficient for a full grounding of B. If A is but one

among various facts which, individually, do not suffice to

ground B but which do so collectively then it is said to be a

partial ground for B (Fine 2012, Rosen 2010).14

Thus, let A stand for “the ultimates of concrete reality

are phenomenal subjects”, B for “there are macro-subjects in

the universe”, x ≺ y for “x is a partial ground for y”, and

[P] for “the fact that P”. Then FPP can be rephrased as

follows:

1) (X) X is a fact & X = [A].

2) [A] ≺ [B].

In other words, FPP affirms the fact that the ultimates of

concrete reality are phenomenal subjects, as well as the claim

that this fact is a partial ground for the fact that there are

macro-phenomenal subjects in the universe. By stressing that

14 For technical reasons, partial grounding is defined in a way which does not exclude full grounding. In other words, the formal definition of partial grounding states that a partial ground for is either a full ground for or one of a plurality of facts that fully ground (see deRosset, forthcoming; Fine 2012). However, since I am concerned with a situation in which full grounding is excluded, I shall ignore this technical subtlety hereafter and take partial grounding to correspond to the intuitive notion of a plurality of facts collectively grounding without it being the case that any single member of the collective is a full ground for .

28

the relation between [A] and [B] is that of partial grounding,

FPP sets itself apart from both EPP and CPP. The disparity

with EPP consists of the fact that, as a general rule, partial

grounds are explanatorily relevant factors. If [A] is a partial

ground for [B] then [B] is intelligibly traceable, in part, to

[A]. In other words, there is something about [A] in virtue of

which [B] obtains, and knowledge about [A] generates valuable

information for explaining [B]. Thus, in contradistinction

with EPP, FPP does not give up on the attractive idea that the

fact that ultimates are subjects of experience plays a crucial

role in explaining the fact that macro-phenomenal subjects

like us exist.

At the same time, FPP also differs from CPP. To begin with,

it seems mistaken to identify grounding with constitution. For

example, while the existence of Aristotle grounds the

existence of Aristotle’s singleton it does not constitute the

latter.15 Second, even if it turns out that “[A] grounds [B]”

implies that “[A] constitutes [B]” it does not follow that FPP

15 This point is obscured by the fact that grounding is often described as aconstitutive form of determination (see Fine, 2012). Clearly, however, grounding covers different types of constitutive determination, of which material constitution, the kind of relation which interests us here, is but one (others being realization, temporal causation, truth-making, singleton set formation, and so on). I thank Simon Langford for a useful discussion of this topic.

29

collapses to CPP because it does not follow that [A]

constitutes [B] in the relevant sense of “constitution”

implied by CPP.

As noted above, CPP is committed to compositional

constitution16; but constitution need not be compositional. A

classical example of constitution is that of a statue made of

a piece of clay, where the clay constitutes the statue all by

itself. In such a case, it seems odd to say that the clay

composes the statue, seeing that the ordinary sense of the

word ‘composition’ pertains to the combination of distinct parts,

or elements, into a single whole.17 Moreover, as I argue below

(see section 7.3), the phenomenal perspectives of macro-

subjects are neither composed, nor decomposed, from the

phenomenal perspectives of ultimates. Finally, since [A] is

but a partial ground for [B] it follows that [B] does not hold

solely in virtue of [A], and this, again, is in contrast to

the dictates of CPP. As seen earlier, CPP implies that the

16 This point is made particularly clear by Coleman (2014, 24). 17 Admittedly, this is a point of some dispute. Some authors seek to do justice to common sense and reject the idea that the clay composes the statue (see Baker 2007, Evenine 2011); while others see no fault in considering the statue a single-part composition, viz., a limit case of thecomposition relation (e.g., Johnston 2005, Westerhoff 2004). See Evenine (2011), however, for an argument that an explanation of constitution in terms of single-part composition is conceptually inane insofar as the only reason to consider the whole (the statue) as composed of a single proper part (the clay) is that the “part” constitutes the whole.

30

phenomenal perspectives of macro-subjects are constituted in

full by the phenomenal perspectives of ultimates, properly

arranged just as water molecules are constituted, without

residue, by oxygen and hydrogen atoms properly arranged.

Hence, FPP’s commitment to partial grounding is inconsistent

with the full grounding relation which CPP presupposes.

I conclude, then, that FPP constitutes a genuine conceptual

alternative to the likes of both CPP and EPP. If such an

alternative can be made to work this would mean that there is

a way to avoid the unsavoury implications of Coleman’s dilemma

and that the doomsday scenario it spells for panpsychism can

be laid to rest. It may be noted, however, that FPP is a generic

position, capable of assuming many different forms. The

particular version developed below takes us further afield

from standard conceptions of panpsychism. For while present-

day panpsychism is dominated by an atomistic and pluralistic

outlook, taking ultimate subjects of experience to correspond

to the various kinds of tiniest entities mandated by

contemporary physics, I defend a holistic and monistic version

of panpsychism according to which there is only one ultimate

subject of experience, the cosmos itself.

31

7. Cosmopsychism: A Theoretical Proposal

Cosmopsychism is a veritable heterodoxy in contemporary

philosophy of mind, even within the ranks of contemporary

panpsychism. Nevertheless, interest in this metaphysical

option is beginning to pick up. In recent years, several

authors came out with theoretical proposals that are

unabashedly cosmopsychist and to which my own proposal bears

similarity. Among these, one may count, in particular, works

by Jaskolla and Buck (2012), Mathews (2011), and Nagasawa and

Wager (forthcoming).18 My own account is kindred in spirit to

the last two, and in particular to Mathews’.19 If there is

something to distinguish the present proposal, then, it lies

18 Other relatively recent sources worth mentioning in this respect are Pockett (2000) and Sprigge (2006). 19 Jaskolla and Buck argue that the cosmos, or the absolute, is the only entity that exists. This sets their proposal within the province of existencemonism and renders it unattractive to priority monists (see 7.1 below), although, at times, it seems as if all they really mean is that the cosmos is the only ontological ultimate, a claim which would render their view nominally identical to priority monism (for a critique of their position see Nagaswa and Wager, forthcoming). Nagasawa and Wager’s proposal is, perhaps intentionally, somewhat scant. Hence, while less vulnerable to criticism it is also not as informative as one could wish. Mathews’ cosmological panpsychism is similar in spirit to the theory I advance here but there are also some important differences between our respective positions.In particular, since Mathews’s restricts the ontology of selves to self-maintaining systems, her ontology of selves is confined to the biological sphere: apart from the absolute itself, all selves are biological entities.

32

not with the endorsement of cosmopsychism as such but, rather,

with the emphasis I lay on certain themes which are either

unaddressed or that remain underdeveloped in the works just

mentioned. In particular, I take special care to address the

concerns discussed in sections 5 and 6. Thus, the theory

presented below aims to be satisfactory with respect to the

following goals:

(I) Showing that a cosmopsychist conception of mind is

consistent with FPP, and hence that it can avoid the

pitfalls of CPP and EPP.

(II) Demonstrating how an FPP of this holistic sort

provides a template within which it is possible to

coherently explain the coming into being of individual

subjects, and in particular of macro-level subjects, paying

particular attention to the notion of individual

perspective.

(III) Demonstrating how the theory can accommodate

certain anticipated problems. For example, the problem

of the entailment of macro-level subjects (or what comes

down to the same thing: the problem of panpsychist

33

zombies), and the decomposition problem (see section

7.4).

7.1. Basic Postulates

Naturally, the first postulate of cosmopsychism is that the

cosmos as a whole is the only ontological ultimate there is, and that it is

conscious. In what follows I shall refer to this cosmic

conscious entity as the absolute.20 Cosmopsychism presents an

inverse picture to the standard view in contemporary

panpsychism: instead of taking the smallest constituents known

to science to be ontologically fundamental it identifies the

absolute as the single ultimate reality. However, the core

metaphysical commitment of panpsychism, namely, the contention

that ultimates are bearers of consciousness, remains invariant

amid this reversal of perspective.

The second theoretical commitment of the model is to priority

monism as defined by Schaffer (2010), namely, to the view that

the cosmos as a whole, is prior to its parts in the sense that

20 Short of a neologism, any term of choice would convey certain connotations which go beyond what is intended in the text. In choosing the term ‘absolute’ I must qualify myself by adding that I do not intend it to be understood as conveying all the attributes historically associated with it by absolute idealists and others.

34

every proper part of the cosmos depends on the whole,

asymmetrically. On this view, the one is the ground of all

things, all concrete entities, while the many exist in it, and

through it, as “moments”, namely, as events of various

durations, and as process configurations, i.e., systems or

objects, of varying scales and of varying degrees of

stability. Making the whole prior to the parts reverses our

conception of which entities are basic, and it also implies

that no part, big or small, is either immutable or separable

from the rest of nature.

Priority monism is contested not only by pluralists (e.g.

Sider 2007) but also by some monists. In particular, Horgan

and Potrč (e.g., 2000; 2012) defend a view which they call

blobjectivism, and that Schaffer describes as existence monism,

according to which there is but one concrete particular: the

universe as a whole, or the “blobject”.21 The blobject

manifests local structural and qualitative variability, and

this variability is often identified, colloquially, with a

plurality of objects, events, and processes. Nevertheless,

21 Kriegel (2012) argues for yet another variant of monism Kantian monism which, he argues, strikes middle ground between existence monism and priority monism. On this view, the cosmos is noumenally non-decomposable but phenomenally divisible to parts.

35

Horgan and Potrč insist, since the blobject has no parts true

statements concerning the properties of such colloquially

identified parts correspond to reality only indirectly in that

they enable us to say how things are, physically, with the

blobject without actually corresponding to real entities. It

is beyond the pale of the present paper to engage this dispute

in depth. Nevertheless, I would like to clarify my reasons for

situating cosmopsychism within a priority monist framework.22

The idea that there is only one concrete particular is

undeniably counterintuitive. We are strongly inclined to

believe that our world contains a plurality of concrete

particulars; and, no less so, each one of us is inclined to

believe that he or she is a clearly demarcated individual a

real subject. In line with this intuitive mode of thinking

panpsychism appeals to the subjectivity of ultimates in order

to explain the subjectivity and unique individuality of macro-

subjects, not in order to dispense with such subjects. And

since cosmopsychism, as I understand it, is a variant of

panpsychism, it would be odd if it were to lead us to the

conclusion that there are neither objects, nor subjects, in

22 I thank an anonymous referee for this journal for encouraging me to clarify my reasons for endorsing priority monism.

36

the universe but for the absolute itself. Hence, barring

overriding reasons to conclude otherwise, there is a clear

motivation for cosmopsychists to avoid existence monism.

For my part, I see no overriding reasons in favour of

existence monism. Without going into details, suffice it to

say that I find the major arguments which Horgan and Potrč

(e.g., 2000; 2012) put forward in support of their view the

argument from parsimony and the argument from vagueness

unconvincing.23 In addition, their version of existence monism

is burdened with a complicated and oblique semantics (see

Kriegel 2012, Schaffer 2012). Finally, I am not convinced that

Horgan and Potrč sufficiently motivate the claim that their

jelly-like universe is, indeed, devoid of any proper parts. In

particular, since they allow for the blobject to contain meta-

stable sub-organizations it is in principle possible for one

to argue that such sub-organizations do not merely have the

appearance of concrete objects (as even Horgan and Potrč would

agree) but that they really are objects.24 In sum, in the

23 For a critique of the argument from parsimony see Kriegel (2012), and Schaffer (2007; 2012); for a critique of the argument from vagueness see Lowe (2013), and Schaffer (2012). 24 The idea that objects are meta-stable process configurations is popular among process theorists (see, e.g., Bickhard 2000; Rescher 1996; Ulanowicz 2009). Usually, this idea comes along with the claim that it fits well withthe field ontology and the symmetry (including symmetry breaking) principles of contemporary physics.

37

absence of compelling reasons in favour of existence monism,

priority monism is a much more reasonable choice for

cosmopsychists since it enables us to hold on to the idea that

there is a plurality of subjects while maintaining that only

the absolute is an ultimate subject, and that all other

subjects depend, for their existence, on the reality of the

absolute.

The third postulate of the theory is the lateral duality principle

according to which the absolute exemplifies a dual nature: it

has a concealed (or enfolded, or implicit) side to its being, as

well as a revealed (or unfolded, or explicit) side; the former is

an intrinsic dynamic domain of creative activity, while the

latter is identified as the outer, observable expression of

that activity.25 These two complementary dimensions can be seen

as the holistic equivalents of the distinction fundamental

to atomistic Russellian panpsychism between quiddites

(categorical bases, intrinsic natures) and the observable

regularities which they ground. The revealed dimension of the

absolute constitutes the structural domain of observable

25 This distinction is roughly similar to Spinoza’s distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata (Ethics part I, proposition 29), but it can befound in many other sources, from indigenous North-American worldviews (see, e.g., Whorf, 1950), to absolute idealism (e.g., Hegel, 1974), to the cosmologies of Teilhard de Chardin (1959) and David Bohm (1980).

38

regularities, the proper province of scientific inquiry, while

the concealed dimension corresponds to an inscrutable

categorical domain which grounds this observable order. In a

sense, then, our model sustains a holistic version of the

Russellian picture endorsed by most contemporary

panpsychists.26,

Fourthly, the model assumes that the absolute can be

likened to a vast, dynamically fluctuating, ocean (or field).

In accordance with the lateral duality principle, this ocean

has two complementary sides: concealed, and revealed. Since

there is nothing outside the absolute, its revealed side must

be thought of as revealed to observers constructed and

situated within the ocean (cf. Mathews 2011).27 To such

observers, it appears as a spatially extended medium, evolving

in time, and differentially structured into various phases and

configurations. In short, it appears as what, in common

parlance, we identify as physical nature. The concealed side,

26 For an explication of Russellian panpsychism see Chalmers (2013), and Seager (2006). For more general discussions of Russellian monism, or the Russellian view, see, for example, Alter and Nagasawa (2012), Lockwood (1989), and Pereboom (2013). 27 The problem of constructing models of reality which do not presuppose external observers, and in which all possible observations are restricted to observers situated within the universe, is a theoretical and a practicalchallenge in physics (see Davis and Gribbin 1992, 102-107; Smolin 2001, chapter 3).

39

however, is presumed, on the present account, to be an

intrinsically sentient medium, a vast ocean of consciousness. Needless

to say, the phenomenal contents of this medium, the ebbs and

flows of experience coursing it, are private and inscrutable.

In other words, the observers mentioned above face an

asymmetry between the revealed and the concealed dimensions of

the absolute: the methods and modes of acquaintance which

grant them access to the former do not provide access to the

latter.28

Here, again, there is a visible similarity to atomistic

Russellian panpsychism according to which inscrutable

phenomenal properties constitute the intrinsic natures of the

world’s physical ultimates (e.g., of such entities as quarks

and electrons). In both cases, the atomistic and the holistic,

the assumption that the ultimates of concrete reality are

intrinsically endowed with phenomenal properties is

legitimized by its putative explanatory power, viz., by the

fact that it is instrumental in explaining familiar macro-

level consciousness, and that it does so without invoking

28 This need not suggest that it is utterly impossible to access the absolute’s mind; rather, it serves merely to stress that such an accomplishment cannot be achieved by relying on the ordinary channels of knowledge and perception.

40

radical emergence. Thus, the very same logic which motivates

panpsychism as an alternative to physicalism applies, mutatis

mutandis, when it comes to cosmopsychism.

It is worth stressing, however, that the distinction

between a revealed and a concealed order, or dimension, of

reality does not amount to ontological dualism: i.e., to the

affirmation of the existence of two utterly distinct domains

of being, inexplicably fastened together. Rather, there is

only one ocean and it is an intrinsically sentient medium, a

sea of consciousness. At the same time, this oceanic plenum is

a dynamic entity whose incessant activity and heterogeneous

distribution of intensity give rise to various quasi-

independent patterns and configurations, co-evolving in mutual

interaction. Now, some of these emergent forms those which

qualify as genuine subjects (see below) are such that they

are capable of perceiving structural patterns of these

interactions, which, in turn, are internally presented as an

ordered external layout, an environment. The revealed side of

the absolute is, on the present account, nothing more than the

sum total of these presented environments: it is the absolute

in its appearance as an exterior complement to the subjective

41

realities of created selves. .

The fifth basic postulate of the model concerns the

character of cosmic consciousness as it appears in relation to

individual creature’s consciousness. On the present account,

cosmic consciousness is on par with the Vedic notion of pure

consciousness in that, like the latter, it serves as a deeper

layer of consciousness grounding the particular streams of

consciousness of individual creatures (more precisely, for

reasons that are explained below, the relation between cosmic

consciousness and individual creature consciousness is that of

partial grounding). Cosmic consciousness may be likened to the

vacuum in quantum field theory. Just as the vacuum is really a

plenum, constantly teeming with spontaneous activity, so we

may think of cosmic consciousness as an inner expanse

constantly teeming with a spontaneous buzz of qualitative

feel. And just as the vacuum serves as a relatively homogenous

background against which local field excitations, and patterns

thereof, are discerned as events and entities (i.e., as the

particles and systems of our world) so we may think of cosmic

consciousness as a background against which local interference

patterns are discerned as phenomenal states, viz., as the

42

states characteristic of the consciousness of individual

creatures (more on this below). Thus, on this view, the

universal medium which grounds the particular states of

consciousness of individual creatures is an intrinsically

sentient medium, or as I call it elsewhere (Shani 2014), an

endo-phenomenological expanse. As such, it is a locus of

experience even in the absence of any stimulation or

manipulation, but at the same time it also serves as raw

material and a crucible for the construction of the

conspicuously localized states of consciousness of individual

creatures.

A sixth theoretical assumption of the model is that

individual entities, by which I include both physical systems

and events and mental phenomena such as thoughts, feelings,

imageries, etc., are dynamic constructions within the

absolute. All created entities, that is, all entities apart

from the absolute itself, are dynamic configurations within

the whole.29 More specifically, the kind of things we tend to

29 It is worth stressing that the fact that the absolute is an ontological ultimate does not mean that it cannot be structured. The idea that ultimates must be structureless is a dogma of atomistic metaphysics which need not go unchallenged. Suffice it to mention here the following two points. First, a structured entity need not consist of separable (independently existing) components which in themselves are structureless; rather, it may consist of internal differentiations (i.e., patterns of organization) within an inseparable dynamic whole. The latter mode of

43

identify as “objects” are meta-stable process configurations,

i.e., cohesive entities in which opposing forces and

tendencies are balanced and brought to equilibrium. But no

matter how stable or long-enduring, all concrete systems are

nothing but dynamic differentiations within the absolute; all

are predicated on an underlying flux from which they emerge

and to which they ultimately dissolve. Moreover, no system is

an island unto itself – all are interwoven in a continuous web

of interrelationship, all are interconnected. Sometimes the

connections are visible, as is often the case with the

components of an ecology or an economy (though, of course,

many connections remain occluded), and sometimes they are

invisible, as in the hidden symmetries which bind various

particles within the standard model of particle physics, but

no system is truly atomic, that is, none is free of internal

(i.e., constitutive) relations to other entities.

The seventh, and final, theoretical assumption of the

model concerns the manner in which individual entities are

thinking about structure is perfectly legitimate (and it plays an importantrole in theories of self-organization, for example). Second, it is doubtfulthat there are unstructured concrete particulars in the first place. For example, in the standard model of particle physics the status of fundamental particles (favorite candidates for the role of unstructured atomistic building-blocs) is far from that of unstructured entities since they are identified as modes of excitation of in other words as patterns within quantum fields.

44

related to the absolute. If the metaphor for the absolute

ground within which, and against which, individual entities

are formed as patterns of local disturbance is that of an

ocean of seamless activity, how are we to visualize those

entities themselves? Here, my proposal is identical to that of

Mathews’ (2011) who notes that we can use aquatic metaphors to

account for the status of concrete individuals within an

underlying ontology of energy fields. We can think of local

disturbances coursing the ocean as currents, waves, streams,

eddies, bubbles, ripples, and the like, and we can imagine

that some of these interfere to become vortices (an alternative

metaphor is that of a soliton) of enduring stability, the latter

corresponding to the persistent systems and objects of our

ontology (more on that below).30 Needless to say, however, such

objects are never completely separable from either the ocean

or each other the whole is implicated in each and every

congealed sub-organization.

30 Jeans uses similar metaphors to describe the picture which modern physicspresents us with, envisioning physical reality as an ongoing stream with deep currents which “throw up bubbles and eddies on the surface” (1943, 193), the latter correspond to what we identify as separate individual entities (see also Bohm 1980, 240-245). It is interesting to note also thatvortices can be rather enduring, as exemplified by the Great Red Spot on Jupiter, a storm system which has endured for centuries

45

7.2. Cosmopsychism and Creature Consciousness I: Small

Subjects, Big Subjects, No Subjects

With this general picture in mind, we can now confront the

task of explaining how the reality of individual subjects, in

particular macro-subjects like us, is rendered possible within

the present model. Before doing so, however, I would like,

first, to fix the terminology. I shall use the term relative to

refer to any concrete system, or object, other than the

absolute. Apart from the absolute, then, all individual

subjects are relatives. However, not all relatives are

subjects: for, as I will argue, many systems in nature lack

the unity of consciousness requisite of subjecthood. In other

words, while some relatives are subjects others are non-

subjects, i.e., cohesive enduring systems bereft of unitary

consciousness. Non-subjects may be described as pure objects but

this term must be understood in a qualified sense implying

only that such objects lack unified subjectivity, but without

the stronger imputation that their existence is totally

independent of consciousness (see below). Finally, unless

specified otherwise all reference to subjects should be

46

understood as pertaining to created subjects, namely, to

subjects other than the absolute itself.31

In order to explain how cosmopsychism accommodates the

reality of subjects a host of related questions must be

addressed in mutual consideration. These include questions

such as: how do relatives emerge (or arise) within the

absolute; what is the basis for the bifurcation between

subjects and pure objects; is cosmopsychism committed to the

reality of micro-subjects (and if so, at what level, or

levels, are they identified); and finally, how does the model

address the problem of explaining the reality of macro-

subjects and of the relation of such subjects to the absolute.

While I shall have something to say about all of these issues

my primary concern is with the last question. All other issues

will serve as auxiliaries to the task of explaining how

cosmopsychism accounts for the reality of macro-subjects.

Consider, first, the emergence of relatives within the

matrix of the absolute, and let us begin by focusing on the

revealed dimension of such systems. In essence, the picture is31 My focus on subjects and objects need not be interpreted as an endorsement of substance metaphysics (over process metaphysics, for example). Rather, it reflects a concern with persistent, substantival entities. Our concern with subjects is complemented by the contrast with objects, and both types of entities are persistent, substantival features of reality.

47

clear. A relative is a “vortex” surging from the oceanic

background. It is a cohesive system with a characteristic

organization, or form, maintained through dynamic balance

between opposing forces and tendencies. Its cohesiveness, and

the fact that the system manifests within relatively well-

defined boundaries a dynamical regime which differs from that

of its surroundings, set it apart as a quasi-independent

region, just as the boundaries of a vortex’s spirals and

funnel differentiate a whirlpool, or a storm system, from its

ambience. And in being physically integrated, as well as

functionally differentiated from its environment, the system

exhibits an external, revealed aspect insofar as it appears to

the outside world as an enduring localized source of

synchronized causal powers, a “there” which must be

distinguished from the “here” of other systems interacting

with it. Noticeably, this characterization applies to

relatives on all levels of organization. The same interference

principles behind the coalescence of flow patterns to the

simplest of stable structures, or “vortices”, also apply in

the creation of more complex structures, namely, of

mega-“vortices” in which synchronized ensembles of lower-level

48

structures combine to form coherent complex wholes. In short,

the process is iterative, allowing for steady ascent in scale,

integration, and complexity.

Yet, this is only part of the story since the lateral

duality principle implies that no concrete system consists

merely of a revealed form, an observable causal structure,

without also comprising a concealed intrinsic dimension. In

particular, since, as mentioned before, the revealed order of

reality is grounded in the concealed. Moreover, we have also

assumed, in turn, that the concealed dimension of reality is a

sentient medium, an endo-phenomenological expanse. It follows

that all concrete objects, all relatives, are abodes of

consciousness; or to put it otherwise, that no stable

configuration of matter fails to incorporate consciousness in

its midst. To paraphrase Whitehead (see, e.g., 1929/1985, 29),

no relative is a vacuous actuality: occupying space and moving

through it while lacking intrinsic experiential qualities

altogether.

However, that all relatives are loci of experience does not

imply that they are subjects of experience. For the fact that a

given system S involves consciousness does not imply that S is

49

endowed with a unified consciousness, namely, with a

consciousness that propagates throughout the system and,

working as an integral unit, coordinates information,

activities, and experiences on a scale which matches that of

the system’s revealed physical form. In short, that instances

of experience are realized within S’s boundaries does not

imply that S is a conscious subject. Rather, a much more

plausible hypothesis is that whether or not S is endowed with

a unified consciousness depends on the nature of its causal

organization. Some organizations are conducive to the

propagation and integration of consciousness throughout the

system, while other organizations inhibit such unification.

The idea that the unity of consciousness is predicated on

mechanisms of integration between differentiated states and

processes is commonplace in neuroscience-based consciousness

research (see Baars 2005, Crick and Koch 1990, Dehaene and

Naccache 2001, Edelman and Tononi 2000). Yet, while the

orthodox assumption is that integration generates

consciousness ipso facto, we assume, in contrast, that

consciousness is primeval and that the relevant mechanisms of

integration, whatever they are, merely serve to weave together

50

small islands of sentience into bigger and bigger landmasses.32

Noticeably, framing the problem of unified subjectivity in

terms of the success, or failure, to integrate the

experiential domains of microscopic components into

macroscopic experiential wholes presupposes that the most

elementary components are themselves rudimentary subjects of

experience. Such an assumption is a staple of atomistic

panpsychism where it is usually taken as an axiom. From a

cosmopsychist standpoint, however, this idea cannot be taken

for granted since even the most elementary microscopic

entities are derived from the absolute, whence forth it must

be shown that the derivation yields subjects rather than pure

objects.

Consider, then, the simplest of relatives, i.e., the most

elementary “vortices”. As mentioned before, such systems are

dynamically differentiated, and therefore demarcated, from

their oceanic ambience. What needs to be added to this picture

is attention to the fact that, as a result of such

demarcation, the sentient medium inside the “vortex” becomes

uniquely regimented. Moreover, this regimentation of the

32 Noticeably, even a self-proclaimed panpsychist such as Christof Koch (2012) remains committed to the visibly non-panpsychist idea that informational integration generates consciousness.

51

internal experiential milieu is reciprocally connected to the

revealed structure, as well as the history, of the system.

Hence, as the “vortex” becomes differentiated from its

surroundings its experiential dynamics separates too forming

patterns which reflect, and respond to, the system’s

conditions.33 This localization process consists, then, in the

intensification and ordering of experience, as well as in the

concentration of focus, within limited and relatively well-

defined boundaries creating a knot, or bulge of

consciousness with an appearance of self-containment, which

serves to separate the system’s inner reality from the inner

reality of the ocean surrounding it. While the two

experiential realities remain connected deep down the

connection is obscured by the crystallized ego-structure, the

self-centred mental occupation of the individual “vortex”. The

result is an individual self (however primitive) engulfed in

its own experiences and concerns while being ignorant of the

deeper layers which bind it to the ground of all things.

33 An analogy with ordinary vortices may be helpful in illustrating this point concerning internal structuring. For example, as a whirlpool forms and stabilizes in a bathtub the flow dynamics within its boundaries becomesmarkedly different from that of its surroundings, consisting of such phenomena as a narrowing tube of flow lines, and of ripples, waves, and eddies on the water surface. In other words, the medium within the vortex boundaries (water, in this case) is structured in systematically different ways than it is outside those boundaries.

52

Yet, while the theory implies that simple relatives are

veritable subjects, its approach to complex relatives is more

nuanced. As mentioned above, our working hypothesis is that

some complex relatives enjoy unified consciousness whereas

others do not, and that the difference depends on the

particular manners in which such systems are weaved together,

namely, on the types of organized wholes that they are. The

idea that organization is a key for the making, or breaking,

of macro-level subjectivity seems unassailable. We are all

acutely aware of the existence of fundamental differences

between animate and inanimate macro-level objects, for

example, between the real Queen Elizabeth and her Madame

Tussauds’ replica, and few of us are inclined to deny that the

Queen is a conscious subject while the wax statue isn’t.

Moreover, we also know that if we carry our componential

analysis far enough we shall fail to find any visible

differences between the subatomic components constituting the

Queen and those constituting the statue. This serves to rule

out the idea that material constitution, irrespective of

organization, is the key for the explanation of the

difference.

53

For the present theory, however, there is yet another reason

to stress the significance of organization. Having assumed

that consciousness abides in all things, and that simple

relatives are subjects, we must strive to explain how is it

that on some occasions consciousness scales up, culminating in

macro-level subjects, while on other occasions it fails to do

so, with the result being macro-level objects devoid of

integral subjectivity. In other words, if we accept this

picture the fact which stares us in the face is that certain

types of macro-level systems are such that their

characteristic organizations serve to sustain unified

subjectivity while others are endowed with organizations which

thwart such unity.

To mark this contrast, I introduce a terminological

distinction between two general categories of cohesive macro-

level compound systems: esonectic and exonectic. An esonectic

system (from eso – inner, and nexus – connection, binding) is a

compound whole whose micro-constituents are interrelated in

such a manner that the system is not only cohesive in respect

of its outward revealed form but is also unified in respect of

its concealed experiential domain. In other words, esonectic

54

systems are internally interwoven: the endo-phenomenological

reservoirs of their micro-components join together in a

coherent fashion, giving rise to a unified experiential

domain. By contrast, an exonectic system (from exo – outer,

external) is a compound whole whose micro-constituents are

interrelated in such a manner that the system is woven

together only on the outside: it has a cohesive exterior, but

it lacks a macro-level inner dimension to match with its

macro-level revealed form the endo-phenomenological

reservoirs of its micro-components remain secluded from each

other and do not bind together. The result is a system which

not only lacks unified subjectivity but whose behaviour as an

organized whole gives no indication that it contains pockets

of consciousness in its midst. In sum, esonectic systems

correspond to genuine macro-level subjects, while exonectic

systems correspond to pure objects.

Admittedly, the distinction between esonectic and exonectic

systems is more than a tad speculative. At the moment, there

is no generally agreed upon theory on which one could rely in

order to explain what it is, precisely, which makes some

cohesive wholes experientially unified while preventing others

55

from being so. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude

from this that the distinction is unmotivated or non-

illuminating. To begin with, it is undeniable that there is a

vital need to explain the difference between macro-level

systems which clearly are conscious, such as humans and

animals, and macro-level systems which, like the wax statue,

seem, to all ordinary appearances, to be lacking in

consciousness. The above distinction provides a general scheme

for an explanation of this sort. In particular, it enables us

to conceptualize how the reality of purportedly mindless

entities such as tables, rocks, and wax statues could be

accommodated by a panpsychist, and more specifically a

cosmopsychist, ontology.34

Moreover, the esonectic-exonectic divide fits well with

empirical knowledge regarding characteristic differences in

material organization between prototypical conscious entities

such as brain-endowed organisms and prototypical non-conscious

entities such as minerals. Mentioning a few contrastive

features should suffice to illustrate the point. Minerals are

34 I take this distinction to provide a sound rebuttal to critics of panpsychism, such as Searle (1997), who argue that the theory is absurd since it leads to the (seemingly) idiotic notion that tables, chairs, and wax statues are conscious. If these systems are exonectic than they are not conscious, and the accusation is groundless.

56

made of crystalline structural formations of remarkable

uniformity and repetitiveness reflected on various scales

(cells, lattices), the structural bonds binding their

components together are rather strong (on the scale of

millions of electron volts), and communication between

spatially separated parts is virtually non-existent. In

contrast, the corresponding trademark features of biological

brains and bodies are the exact opposites: a remarkable

variability of structural and functional components, weak

structural bonds, and massive communication between components

all over the system. All of these features are considered

fundamental for macro-level consciousness. Weak structural

bonds are necessary for flexible modification, regulation, and

adaptation of processes, activities, and behaviours; while the

combination of differentiation (through structural and functional

variability) and integration (through global resonance and

information transfer) is considered by many leading

researchers to be a key characteristic of consciousness (see

Tononi 2012, as well as the references above).

These fundamental differences suggest that there are

principled reasons why we should expect consciousness to scale

57

up in humans and animal but to fail to do so in minerals. For

suppose, as we have just done, that both types of systems are

composed of tiny conscious components. Given the material

organization of minerals there is reason to expect that such

components will remain largely isolated from each other: each

confined to a local, rigidly configured “cell”, unable to

communicate, or to resonate, with topographically remote

locations. In contrast, the dynamical regime of brain-bound

organisms gives reasons to expect the contrary: the

permeability of organic boundaries, and the intense

interconnectedness, synchronous resonance, mutual sensitivity

through information transfer, and reciprocal modulation of

sub-systems, states, and processes suggest a plethora of

possible channels for binding the experiential reservoirs of

individual micro-components into an integral whole.

In sum, despite being widely speculative the distinction

between esonectic and exonectic systems is no hand waving. It

is a natural distinction to make if one operates within a

broadly panpsychist framework, and the distinction makes good

sense given what we know about the nature, and the magnitude,

of the differences between the structure and dynamics of

58

living subjects, on the one hand, and of familiar middle-sized

inanimate objects such as rocks, or wax statues, on the other

hand. Once accepted as a working hypothesis, it enables us to

complete the journey back to macro-level subjectivity.35

7.3. Cosmopsychism and Creatures Consciousness II: The

Problem of Perspective

Esonectic binding may help explain the emergence of macro-

level relatives endowed with unified phenomenal fields but

this, in itself, does not yet fully address the problem with

which this paper is mostly concerned, namely, defending the

idea that there is a valid sense in which the existence of

individual conscious perspectives in macro-level subjects

depends on the fact that the ultimates of concrete reality are

themselves subjects and, as such, the owners of individual

perspectives. Translated into cosmopsychism, the problem is to

show that the fact that the absolute is graced with a

35 I should stress, however, that I take no dogmatic stance on thisissue. There are alternative explanations for the divide between animateand inanimate macro-level objects consistent with panpsychism, includingexplanations which do not exclude the possibility that so-called “inanimateobjects” are conscious after all albeit in a very different way than ourown kind of consciousness.

59

perspective grounds the fact that relative subjects like us

are endowed with our own individual perspectives. Let us label

the first fact (concerning the absolute) AP and the second

fact (concerning relative subjects) RP, and let [X] stand, as

before, for “the fact that X”. In what follows I defend the

idea that [AP] serves as a partial ground for [RP].

To say that [AP] is a partial ground for [RP] implies that

while [RP] depends on [AP] it also amounts to something more

and is not exhausted by this particular dependency

relationship. Such a state of affairs is expected if there is

a certain aspect under which the perspectives of relative

subjects are anchored in the perspective of the absolute, and

another aspect under which they assert their independence. I

believe that this dialectic captures faithfully the situation

in front of us. Each concrete perspective of each relative

subject has what I call a specific character, namely, a unique

individual profile which cannot be derived from any other

perspective (or combination thereof); but, at the same time,

all of these perspectives share a generic character, or a basic

template, which is, in turn, derived from the subjective,

perspectival nature of the absolute. Thus, in respect of its

60

generic character, each conscious perspective of each relative

subject is grounded in the fact that the absolute is itself a

subject and, as such, the owner of a first-person point of

view, but in respect of its specific character it is an

independent entity which neither grounds any other

perspective, nor being grounded by any. This dialectical

stance provides a blueprint for addressing Coleman’s dilemma

(see section six) since it enables us to maintain that no

perspective is literally a part of any other perspective

while, simultaneously, hold on to the claim that [AP] is

explanatorily relevant for [RP]. However, before making any

reasonable claim for success more needs to be said, first,

about the distinction between specific character and generic

character.

The specific character of a perspective P is its

individuating form, namely, a concrete pattern of interwoven

relationships which P embodies and which distinguishes it from

all other perspectives. Each subjective perspective

constitutes a unique outlook, viz. a singular way of relating to

things from an intentional conscious standpoint: of

perceiving, feeling, categorizing, synthesizing, anticipating,

61

evaluating, selecting, preparing for action, and so on.36 Such

unique way of relating to things intentionally is manifested

dynamically as a coordinated network of interrelated

dispositions, or attitudes, which maintains its structural

integrity over time. For while a dynamic configuration of this

sort may update and adapt, in certain respects, in response to

circumstances (to various degrees, in different kinds of

species and individuals), it nevertheless retains an invariant

core structure — a characteristic form — against which such

changes take place, and are made possible. Thus, each subject

is endowed with a perspective whose specific character is

unique, and in being so endowed it is differentiated from any

other subject.

That each subjective perspective is individuated in terms of

a characteristic form is, in turn, instrumental in explaining

why perspectives do not combine. To see why this is so, recall

first how the combination problem arises in the context of

perspectives. Suppose that a given perspective P is a compound

made of other, more limited perspectives, say Q and R. As seen

36 Whitehead (1985) provides a detailed elaboration of the idea that even the simplest of subjects, or what he calls occasions of experience, are engaged in at least some of these mental operations, and the idea can also be traced to Leibniz and his metaphysics of monads.

62

earlier, this seems to imply that viewing reality from

viewpoint P consists, in part, in viewing reality from

viewpoint Q. The trouble, however, is that the vista which P

opens up transcends the limitations (or boundaries) of viewpoint

Q, and therefore that it presupposes the elimination of such

limitations. Thus, on the assumption that Q is a compositional

component of P, it follows that Q must be both present and

absent — a contradiction. In essence, this is the problem

pointed out by Coleman but we are now in a position to say a

little more about the nature of the problem.

Each perspective can be thought of as an opening to the

world from a given point of origin and, as shown above, it is

the form, or shape, of that opening — the dynamic

configuration giving it structure — which defines how things

are viewed from this particular point of origin. Thus, we can

think of a perspective as an angle whose conscious point of

origin is its vertex and whose form is limited by the rays

emanating from that vertex. Now, if the perspective is to have

parts each proper part must correspond to a division of the

original angle brought about by the introduction of a ray on

the interior of that angle (there is no other way to dissect

63

an angle). Let us, then, think of P as our original

perspective and of Q as a division within P (see figure 1).

But now we are facing the problem just mentioned, for it

follows from the simultaneous existence of P and Q that in

viewing things from viewpoint P, which opens up the entire

original angle, one also views things from viewpoint Q, which

excludes the complement P-Q from sight. The result, as before,

is a contradiction. The moral, then, is that subjective

perspectives are gestalts, namely, structural totalities which

cannot be explained in terms of the combination of parts,

because, when it comes to perspectives, the very existence of

parts excludes the existence of the whole.

If this analysis is sound, it precludes the existence of

strict compositional relations between non-identical

64

perspectives. Nevertheless, this need not preclude the idea

that all relative perspectives depend, for their existence, on

the perspectival nature of the absolute. This is where the

notion of generic character comes into play. As mentioned

above, this notion designates a set of features that are

common to all perspectives and without which there would be no

perspectives in the first place. The idea, then, is that all

relative selves inherit the generic character of their

individual perspectives from the fact that the absolute within

which such selves are constructed is, itself, a self, endowed

with a perspective of its own. In order to illustrate this

idea, I shall focus on two basic features which I take to be

generic in this sense, highlighting the manner in which each

one of them can be thought of as issuing from the subjectival

nature of the absolute.

The first feature to consider is sentience. Clearly, each

perspective requires the manifestation of sentience since each

individual take on reality involves experience. Yet, according

to the present model (see section 7.1) the individual

experiences which relative subjects enjoy or suffer are

undergirded by the reality of an undifferentiated cosmic

65

consciousness — an intrinsically sentient universal medium

against which such individual states of consciousness emerge

as local interference patterns. In other words, without the

absolute's intrinsic capacity for experience there would be no

individual experiences at the level of relative subjects, and

hence no individual perspectives either.

The second feature I would like to consider may be

identified as core-subjectivity. As noticed above, every

perspective has a point of origin which is the position from

which it casts its unique angle on reality. In the

phenomenological literature this conscious point of origin is

identified as ipseity, or I-ness, by which is meant an

implicit sense of self which serves as the dative (or the

indirect object) of experience, namely, as that to whom things are

given, or disclosed, from a perspective (see Sokolowski 2000,

112; Zahavi 2005, 124-125).37 Cosmpospychism, however, takes a

step further in that it holds that the ultimate source of the

implicit sense of self which lies at the basis of each

relative perspective is the absolute's own core-selfhood.

37 The same literature identifies this present, tacit sense of self as core,or basic, or minimal self, in order to distinguish it from a more extended sense of self which involves additional ingredients such as autobiographical memory and a moral conscious.

66

The gist of this idea can be stated as follows. First, we

hold that the absolute's cosmic consciousness is a medium of

subjective receptivity, a universal core-selfhood. When a

relative subject is constructed within the absolute this

receptivity, or interiority, of the underlying oceanic

consciousness is imparted to it, furnishing it with a

subjective dimension, that is, with the capacity to experience

things as a self. However, each relative subject has a mind of

its own: a spatiotemporally bounded meshwork of regimented

mental activity with a crystallized ego-structure and a unique

perspective. As mentioned before (see section 7.2), this leads

to a reflexive preoccupation with the vicissitudes, the

contents, and the interests of that individual ego which, in

turn, serves to obscure the connection to the cosmic

consciousness that grounds all relative subjects and binds

them together. Under such circumstances, the subjective

receptivity which lies at the heart of an individual's

consciousness is constrained to function as a localized

ipseity, that is, as the first-person addressee of the

experiences of that particular subject. As a result, each

relative subject enjoys an individual sense of selfhood

67

(however dim or minimal it may be in simple subjects) despite

the fact that, ultimately, all of these core-selves are

grounded in an undivided universal selfhood.38

One objection which might be raised against cosmopsychism in

this regard is that its position on core-selfhood makes all

subjects dissolve in the absolute; in other words, that on

this account there is, really, only one subject — the absolute

— with multiple windows on the world.39 This is a legitimate

concern but I believe that the theory on offer does more than

enough to assuage it. Relative subjects are grounded in the

subjective aspects of the absolute but they are nevertheless

real enough. They have minds of their own with all the regular

attributes of individual subjects, including private

experiences, unique epistemic outlooks, and a core sense of

self which resonates with these private mental realities.

Moreover, under ordinary conditions there is an epistemic

barrier which prevents relative subjects from suspecting that

they are anything but self-contained egos: they appear to

themselves as separate entities, clearly demarcated from one38 The position defended here resembles, in certain respects, the classical Hindu doctrine concerning the Atman, or universal self, which is believed to be the foundation and true essence of all individual selves. It also bears similarity to Teilhard de Chardin's notion of a cosmic conscious centre "radiating at the core of a systems of centres" (1959, 262). 39 I thank Sam Coleman for raising this concern.

68

another as well as from pure objects.40 Thus, I cannot see

anything of substance which individual subjects must possess

and that the present theory fails to confer upon them. To be

sure, cosmopsychism is committed to the idea that the absolute

enjoys ontological priority over all relatives but priority

should not be confused with exclusivity, and if priority

monism is a defensible position I see no particular fault with

this commitment.

In summary, the discussion of sentience and of core-

subjectivity illustrates the sense in which, from a

cosmopsychist standpoint, all perspectives can be said to

inherit their generic character from the subjectival nature of

the absolute. At the same time, as shown earlier, each

perspective possesses a specific character which cannot be

derived from any other perspective (or a combination thereof).

This completes the argument in favour of the claim that [AP]

is a partial ground for [RP]. It also establishes

cosmopsychism as a variant of foundational panpsychism,

situated comfortably between the unpalatable extremes of40 This leaves room for the idea that there are non-ordinary conditions under which this epistemic barrier breaks down, opening a gate to the realizationthat one's own self is not as separate an entity as one would imagine. Yet,even this need not be interpreted as the annihilation of one's individual self but, rather, as the affirmation of the underlying unity which binds oneself to the rest of reality.

69

constitutive panpsychism and emergent panpsychism. In doings

so, it constitutes a response to Coleman's dilemma, opening a

new avenue for dealing with the subject combination problem

and the problem of entailment associated with it. I turn next

to make some final comments on these thorny issues.

7.4. Explanatory Yield of the Theory

It is time now to focus on the explanatory profile, power,

and promise of the theory, that is, on the manner in which it

confronts the challenges facing panpsychism. As mentioned

earlier, a major challenge for panpsychism has to do with the

difficulties faced by constitutive panpsychism in the form of

various combination problems and, in particular, in the guise

of the subject combination problem. The solution to the subject

combination problem should now be clear: the cosmopsychist

framework developed in these pages postulates no compositional

relations between subjective perspectives, hence, within this

framework, the problem simply does not arise. This fact serves

to obviate not only the original subject combination problem

but also its mirror-image, the so-called decomposition problem.41

41 In using this terminology I follow Chalmers (forthcoming). Mathews (2011)

70

The latter is considered a particularly formidable obstacle to

cosmopsychism because it concerns the derivation of subjects

from the absolute. However, on the present model no such

derivation is called for. By denying that perspectives enter

into compositional relations with each other we renounce

composition as well as the inverse operation of decomposition.

For the two are mutually specifying: to say of any perspective

P that it is decomposable, molecule style, to compositional

pieces is to suggest that it is, presently, composed of such

pieces, and as we saw, this assumption is contradictory.

Future work will do well to focus on a host of related

questions. For instance, on the question whether cosmopsychism

is vulnerable to other combination problems such as, for

example, the quality combination problem. Such future work

will also have to investigate whether any of these additional

combination problems is nearly as troublesome as the subject

combination problem is. But in the meantime, the fact that the

present theory offers a coherent solution to a problem which

is, arguably, the most difficult of all combination problems

ought to count for something.

labels this problem the combination problem in reverse, while Nagasawa and Wager (forthcoming) call it the derivation problem.

71

There is, however, one problem which cannot be delayed due

to its special affinity to the subject combination problem.

This is the problem of the entailment of macro-subjects, or,

alternatively put, of the conceivability of panpsychist zombies

(Goff 2009). Earlier we saw that one of the ways to formulate

the crisis of constitutive panpsychism is to point to the

absence of entailment of macro-subjects from facts about

micro-subjects. A more vivid way of illustrating the same

point consists in noticing that constitutive panpsychism does

not eradicate the possibility of panpsychist zombies. It

remains to see, then, how cosmopsychism handles this problem.

To my mind, the most suitable response to the problem of

entailment is to insist, cautiously, that, with the right kind

of macro-level organization in place, micro-level facts plus

facts about cosmic consciousness entail macro-level

consciousness. Collaterally, this means a denial of the

conceivability of panpsychist zombies. To be sure, one can

imagine a panpsychist zombie scenario but, we should stress,

such imagining is based on an incomplete picture. Once the

relevant facts about macro-level organization are taken into

consideration, and seeing that they yield a necessitation of

72

macro-level consciousness, it will no longer be possible to

coherently imagine panpsychist zombies under such conditions.

The discussion in section 7.2 outlines the manner in which

a solution to the entailment problem might be reached.

According to this line of thought, the key to macro-level

experience is esonectic binding. If a macro-level system is

esonectic then, in a cosmopsychist world, it is, necessarily,

an abode of macro-level experience. This, however, is but a

general sketch of a solution. A fully satisfactory solution

would depend on the availability of a viable scientific

account detailing the principles of organization responsible

for the fact that certain macro-level cohesive systems are

loci of unified macro-level experiences, while others are not.

At the present, however, we are nowhere near this point. There

are many rival empirical theories of consciousness championing

many different principles of macro-level coherence and

integration, and they share next to nothing by way of basic

principles. In the absence of such a theory, any claim to have

solved the entailment problem would be an exaggeration.

However, this does not mean that we have no solid reasons to

believe that the problem can be solved, or that principles of

73

material organization would play a pivotal role in such a

solution. On the contrary, as the discussion in section 7.2

surmises there are compelling reasons to believe that

organization is a key factor in explaining why some macro-

level systems exemplify macro-level phenomenal consciousness

while others do not.

It may be objected that putting our faith in the power of

material organization to do the work required to achieve

macro-level experiential integration is no more promising, or

less problematic, than the belief of many physicalists that

material organization is the key for explaining the emergence

of consciousness from insentient matter. Such an objection,

however, is based on a failure to appreciate how disanalogous

the situations in these two cases are.

The physicalist who puts her faith in the power of

organization to explain phenomenal consciousness expects it to

constitute, or generate, experience. This expectation, however,

is highly problematic insofar as it is hard to see how any

kind of organization, no matter how complex, could turn a dead

and numb matter into an intrinsic locus of experience. The

transition from insentient matter to sentience involves a

74

mysterious ontological discontinuity — a passage from a world

lacking an intrinsic dimension of being to one in which such a

dimension is present. But, and this is the point, the

existence of an intrinsic dimension to reality is something

that seems to have nothing to do with structural principles of

material organization.

In contrast, our present appeal to organization is not

based on the expectation that principles of material

organization will account for the generation of experience

but, rather, on the more modest expectation that such

principles will play a crucial role in explaining the

propagation, integration, and up-scaling of experience. The

transition from a world populated with cosmic consciousness,

as well as with simple and small scale loci of experience, to

one populated with complex, macro-level conscious beings,

involves no ontological discontinuity of the sort mentioned

above, and to all appearances it seems to have much to do with

the structural constraints imposed on the distribution,

concentration, and integration of consciousness across the

cosmos.

8. Conclusion

75

Cosmopsychism, as presented and defended in this paper, is a

holistic alternative to the atomistic mindset prevalent in

contemporary panpsychism. It argues that there is only one

ultimate, absolute cosmic consciousness, and seeks to explain

familiar macro-level consciousness as rooted in such cosmic

origins. It is driven by the conviction that a holistic turn

is well-motivated both scientifically and philosophically. In

particular, it is motivated by the conviction that such a

shift is instrumental in confronting the notoriously difficult

subject combination problem. The result is a view which breaks

away from contemporary panpsychism in some fundamental

respects. Apart from the difference just mentioned, a major

breakaway consists also in the rejection of constitutive and

emergentist varieties of panpsychism, and in urging a third

option, described here as foundational panpsychism.

Nevertheless, cosmopsychism retains the fundamental

assumption, shared by panpsychist theories of all

denominations, that reality’s ontological ultimates are

subjects of experience. Thus, while it challenges some ideas

cherished by most contemporary panpsychists, it does not break

76

rank with panpsychism as such.

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