1 Corruption and bad governance – hindrances for women’s political representation in Europe Aksel Sundström and Lena Wängnerud The Quality of Government Institute University of Gothenburg P.O. Box 711 SE 405 30 Gothenburg SWEDEN [email protected][email protected]Abstract: While much of the recent literature on descriptive representation of women focus on the role played by political parties, we argue for the relevance of studying factors exogenous to parties, especially the importance of corruption and bad governance. We hypothesize that in contexts of low quality of government – understood as the levels of corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government services – informal institutions are strong which favor clientilism and the advancement of candidates with access to traditional networks and hence will have a negative impact on the proportion of elected women. We develop and test this argument on a new, previously never used, dataset on the proportion of female locally elected councilors in 167 regions of 18 European countries. Using a novel measure on regional governance we perform a multi-level analysis with regional-level control variables such as gender equality culture, economic and human development, as well as the national-level controls of gender quotas and types of electoral system. The results show that levels of corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government substantially affect the proportion of female local councilors. The article contributes by presenting evidence indicating that corruption and bad governance are important determinants for female political presence in contemporary Europe. Thus, getting rid of corruption and bad governance is not only a matter for countries in less affluent parts of the world and hindrances to women’s political representation are not eliminated by the reformation of political parties only. Keywords: Women’s descriptive representation; sub-national variation; Europe; corruption; quality of government. Prepared for the 63 rd PSA annual international conference, Cardiff, 25-27 March, 2013.
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1
Corruption and bad governance – hindrances for
women’s political representation in Europe
Aksel Sundström and Lena Wängnerud The Quality of Government Institute
Abstract: While much of the recent literature on descriptive representation of women focus on the role played by political parties, we argue for the relevance of studying factors exogenous to parties, especially the importance of corruption and bad governance. We hypothesize that in contexts of low quality of government – understood as the levels of corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government services – informal institutions are strong which favor clientilism and the advancement of candidates with access to traditional networks and hence will have a negative impact on the proportion of elected women. We develop and test this argument on a new, previously never used, dataset on the proportion of female locally elected councilors in 167 regions of 18 European countries. Using a novel measure on regional governance we perform a multi-level analysis with regional-level control variables such as gender equality culture, economic and human development, as well as the national-level controls of gender quotas and types of electoral system. The results show that levels of corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness of government substantially affect the proportion of female local councilors. The article contributes by presenting evidence indicating that corruption and bad governance are important determinants for female political presence in contemporary Europe. Thus, getting rid of corruption and bad governance is not only a matter for countries in less affluent parts of the world and hindrances to women’s political representation are not eliminated by the reformation of political parties only.
Prepared for the 63rd PSA annual international conference, Cardiff, 25-27 March, 2013.
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INTRODUCTION
Parties are becoming the key variable in research on women’s political representation,
especially in research focusing Europe. Once described as “the secret garden of politics”
(Gallagher & Marsh, 1988) parties’ candidate selection procedures are by now relatively well
documented. We know which parties that have introduced gender quotas. There is also
research mapping out aspects of centralization and formalization of recruitment.1 Moreover, it
has been demonstrated that, for the advancement of women, it is important that the party
organization has ties with organizations outside the party because these provide more points
of access for women (Kittilson, 2006: 48-49).
There is little doubt that parties, how they organize, are decisive for the
advancement of women. We see a risk, however, that whilst research on parties is becoming
increasingly specialized other explanatory factors are falling into the background. In this
paper we pick up the theme of what provides points of access for women but in contrast to
much ongoing research we focus on factors exogenous to parties. The core idea is that male-
dominated networks that exclude women from political institutions may be upheld by factors
such as corruption and bad governance in contexts outside the party organization.
Our research draws on insights gained in studies mostly based on countries outside
Europe. For example, cross-national comparative research have established that societies that
elect few women tend to be more corrupt than societies that elect a large number of women
(Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et. al., 2001). Through a case-study on Thailand Bjarnegård
(2009) demonstrates how informal recruitment to political positions serves to protect corrupt
interactions between men in power and she argues that women are excluded since they are not
trusted with the sensitive nature of exchanges. We believe that much could be gained by
taking this research into account in studies on women’s political representation in Europe.
Recent studies show that corruption and bad governance is more widespread and varies within
countries in Europe to a larger degree than previously recognized (Charron et al., 2011). At
the same time, while research holds that the proportion of women still is low in a number of
political institutions throughout Europe, few comparative studies have analyzed the variance
in women’s representation beyond national-level institutions.
This study breaks new ground by focusing on the sub-national level in Europe. We
hypothesize that low quality of government – understood as the levels of corruption, partiality
and ineffectiveness of government services (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008) – has a negative
1 For recent publications see Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009; Paxton et al., 2010; Tripp & Kang, 2008. 2 The distinction originates from Pitkin (1967). A review of research on politics and gender discussing this
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impact on the proportion of elected women. With new, never previously used data on
women’s local representation, we can empirically test this claim. We have constructed a
comprehensive dataset over the proportion of female locally elected councilors in 167 NUTS-
regions in 18 European countries in the most recent elections available. Using a novel
measure on regional governance, the European Quality of Government Index (Charron et al.,
2011), we perform a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analysis with regional-level control
variables such as gender equality culture, economic and human development, as well as the
national-level controls of gender quotas and types of electoral system. Our findings underpin
the notion that quality of government is the new “secret garden of politics” that needs to be
mapped out in greater detail. The results show that levels of corruption, partiality and
ineffectiveness of government substantially affect the proportion of female local councilors
and hence are important determinants for women’s political representation in contemporary
Europe.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: First we discuss recent trends in
research on women’s political representation and make a distinction between descriptive
versus substantive representation of women. Thereafter we pick up findings in current
scholarship on gender and corruption and show how this strand of research is relevant for
understanding inclusion/exclusion of women in political institutions. In the section on
methodology we argue for the advantage of studying the sub-national level in Europe and we
present our new dataset over locally elected councilors. The section on result reports the
findings from our empirical analysis. In the concluding section we argue that hindrances to
women’s political representation are not eliminated by the reformation of political parties
only.
DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN
A much-used distinction in scholarship on politics and gender is that between descriptive and
substantive representation of women.2 The first strand of research, descriptive representation,
focuses on variations in the number of women elected to political institutions, foremost
parliaments, across time and across different parts of the world. The second strand of
research, substantive representation, focuses on effects of women’s presence in political
institutions. While there are reasons for expecting a link between descriptive and substantive
representation of women, we believe that it is useful to separate between them and focus in 2 The distinction originates from Pitkin (1967). A review of research on politics and gender discussing this distinction is found in Wängnerud (2009).
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this article explicitly on the descriptive representation. The research focusing on descriptive
representation represents a more mature research field, partly because of the longer history of
this tradition (e.g. Duverger 1955) and partly because in research on descriptive
representation there is a distinct dependent variable: What is to be explained is the numerical
distribution of seats between women and men.
The sizeable literature on causes behind the election of large numbers of women
reveals a shift, at least in Western democracies, from system-oriented towards strategy-
into processes endogenous to parties; factors such as party-ideology and organizational
structure are brought forward. In contrast, system-oriented explanatory models dig into
processes exogenous to parties; factors such as electoral system and gender equality culture
are brought forward. Our study is a call for a shift back to system-oriented research but with
focus on other aspects than in previous scholarship. While research on parties is important to
understand women’s representation it needs to be recognized that there is variation that hardly
can be explained by ideology or organizational factors alone. Figures from the dataset used in
this article can serve as an illustration. For example, how come that in Greece there are
differences from regions with an average of 12 per cent female local councilors to regions
with the proportion exceeding 24 per cent? Italy is another country displaying large variation
at the subnational level; from regions with an average of 10 per cent female local councilors
to regions with an average of 28 per cent.
Our suggestion is that much could be gained by taking findings in research on
gender and corruption into account when trying to explain variation in women’s descriptive
representation. Pippa Norris (1993) has worked out a comprehensive model of parliamentary
recruitment in Western democracies emphasizing the political system, the party context, and
supply and demand factors in the recruitment process. This model, however, do not include
the kind of factors we are interested in. In order to test the credibility of our perspective we
will include a number of determinants proposed in previous research such as gender equality
culture, electoral system, levels of economic and social development, and gender quota
strategies. Our choices of independent variables will be thoroughly discussed in the section on
methodology.
RESEARCH ON GENDER AND CORRUPTION
Previous research on the relationship between gender and corruption has mainly been focused
on individual differences in tolerance to corruption and the relationship between national
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shares of female politicians and corresponding degrees of corruption. In our focus on the
descriptive representation of women we deal foremost with the latter scholarship.
In their seminal study Dollar and colleagues (2001), demonstrate that higher rates
of female participation in government are associated with lower national levels of corruption.
They measure corruption with data from the International Country Risk Guide and claim to
have included a range of variables in their analysis to control for various underlying
institutional characteristics that could be responsible for a spurious correlation. The
association between the presence of women and levels of corruption has since then in many
ways been reproduced (e.g. Treisman, 2007). Studying national differences in the Corruption
Perception Index, Swamy et al. (2001) also proposes that countries with a greater
representation of women have lower levels of corruption. This has in turn produced an
underlying assumption among a number of policy-makers that the presence of women can be
a quick fix to reduce corruption (e.g. World Bank, 2001).
As a contrast Sung (2003) launched a rivalling explanation, the “fairer system”
thesis. This argument contends that “liberal democratic institutions and spirit increase female
participation in government and restrain systemic corruption, but the latter two factors are not
causally related” (Sung, 2003: 708). Data from Freedom House and Fraser Institute is used to
back up the theoretical argument in the article. According to Sung (2003: 718) the effect of
female participation is lost when controlled for liberal constitutionalism, as gender equality
and low corruption both are seen as effects of a fair system. These findings have later been
tested and largely supported, also with new indicators used as a proxy for gender inequality
(Branisa & Ziegler, 2010).
While Vijayalakshmi (2008) find no effect on corruption from having a larger share
of female politicians in the local self-government of India, a different result is reported by
Beaman et al. (2012). In this experimental study the authors investigate the effect from a
scheme of randomized quotas of reserved seats for women to local village-assemblies in
India. Accordingly, the villages having had a female leader from this randomized scheme
report less instances of bribery. It is noted by Pande and Ford (2012: 20) that, regarding the
results from this study, “it is possible that inexperience rather than preferences limits
corruption on the part of women”.
Continuing this debate on the causality between gender and corruption, Alhassan-
Alolo (2007) investigates the issue empirically and points out that women in some ways can
be shown to be as corrupt as men. Rather than an inherent trait, women's, in some aspects lack
of engagement in corrupt behaviour, is argued to be a matter of possibilities. A similar line of
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reasoning has been put forward by Goetz (2007) who argues that the opportunities for
corruption are shaped by gender. Following from this argument is an assumption that women
in power act as corrupt as men if only they are given the chance. Goetz point out that there are
a number of myths surrounding women and corruption and concludes: “To expect that
women’s gender alone can act as a magic bullet to resolve a corruption problem that is much
bigger than they are, that is systemic, is unrealistic to say the least. It reflects not just wishful
but almost desperate thinking” (Goetz, 2007:16). Wängnerud and Grimes (2012) however
argues that the relationship between corruption and representation of women is probably
interlinked in a relationship of feedbacks, where a high share of elected women and low levels
of corruption can be believed to be part of a positive spiral.
Acknowledging that the relationship between the representation of women and
corruption is contested and possibly more complex than simply an effect from one variable in
one direction to another variable, our focus in this article is more limited. We are interested in
examining to what extent levels of corruption and bad governance can explain the variation in
the share of elected women on the local level in Europe. Having this delimitation, we draw on
theoretical work from scholars developing why corruption can be believed to affect the
processes of recruitment to political positions.
Clientelism – the mechanism excluding women in corrupt contexts
The argument put forward by Bjarnegård (2009) contends that certain aspects of clientelism
affect the political representation of women. Criticizing assumptions in earlier research that
has viewed women on elected seats as an antidote for corruption, she argues that the
association that has been identified in previous writings in fact is misguiding and that these
studies “tap into something larger than corruption, namely clientelism and change over time”
(Bjarnegård, 2009: 68). Clientelism is a label for exchanges of personal favors for political
support. Corruption, here understood as monetary-based exchanges, can be part of the
interactions going on but the concept of clientelism is more multifaceted. For the
advancement of this study, most important to note is that in clientelist systems the protection
of one group often leads to the exclusion of another. Moreover, Bjarnegård (2009: 27) notes
that clientelism as a political practice highlights the interplay between formal and informal
political institutions. When formal institutions are weak certain types of informal institutions
may grow strong. The gender dimension ticks in since “in clientelist systems, opportunities
for electoral corruption are gendered in that only those with access to networks, those with
connections within the local or national elite, those with resources to finance corrupt behavior,
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and those who are already influential in society are in positions to be considered assets in
clientelist networks and are the only ones who will be trusted with the sensitive nature of the
exchange” (Bjarnegård, 2009: 38).
Stockemer (2011) studies women’s descriptive representation in national legislative
assemblies in the African countries and find that levels of corruption have some explanatory
power. He develops the theoretical underpinnings of the argument proposed by Bjarnegård
and presents a mechanism of four components to why candidate recruitment processes might
tend to “weed out” female candidates in high corrupt environments (Stockemer, 2011: 697); 1.
Under-institutionalized parties in corrupt settings are organized on the basis of personal
connections and lack transparent rules of candidate selection. 2. In such situations political
seats can be bought and public officials are elected based on traditional – and often male-
dominated – clientelistic networks. 3. When promotion to higher office is contingent upon
personal connections rather than merit, women must become either patrons or clients in the
male-dominated patronage networks. 4. Women are often excluded from these corrupt
networks based on tradition and culture and also often lack the resources to buy themselves
into these networks. Taken together, this reasoning lead Stockemer (2011:697) to hypothesize
that corruption “reinforces traditional networks and prevents women from gaining human and
financial resources” and will thus have a negative impact on the proportion of female
representatives.
In addition to the argument proposed by Bjarnegård (2009) and Stockemer (2011)
we draw on the work by Kittilson (2006), whom we believe capture something important
when she finds that a decisive factor for the political representation of women is that the party
organization has ties with organizations outside the party. Our suggestion is that the
underlying factor is about transparency. Closely-knit networks, protecting more or less illegal
activities, may have a hard time to survive in settings where parties are involved with a broad
spectrum of organizations. Based on the discussion above we have reason to believe that party
recruitment processes will be less transparent and clouded within clientilistic relationships in
contexts where partiality and corruption is widespread. This will lead to less ties with
organizations outside the party and, indirectly, hinder women in their advancement to elected
seats.
We have argued that what we are looking for are factors exogenous to parties. What
is described above is a situation where parties can be the hub for corrupt activities. Our line of
reasoning is grounded in the distinction between formal and informal political institutions.
Bjarnegård (2009:70) notes that informal political institutions often go hand in hand with
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weak formal political institutions such as bureaucracies and rule-of-law. Parties may be
permeated by corrupt activities but it is reasonable to regard clientelism and related
illegitimate behaviour as a system-factor anchored in a societal context characterized by low
quality of government. For this reason we find it plausible to believe that when corruption,
partiality and ineffectiveness is prevalent in government then will these processes be more
present in party recruitment processes.
We have been inspired by Bjarnegårds study on Thailand. However, we disagree
with her assumption (2009: 97) that low quality of government is most likely to be found in
semi-democracies. In accordance with Sung (2003) Bjarnegård puts great hope in political
liberalization processes; it is anticipated that liberal democracy/high levels of democracy is
the denominator for good governance as well as for gender equality. In contrast, we argue that
male-dominated closely-knit networks with informal patterns of recruitment can be a
hindrance for the advancement of women also in political institutions in European countries.
Following this reasoning, our intention is to test this claim empirically. We therefore
hypothesize that low quality of government – understood as high levels of corruption,
partiality and ineffectiveness of government services – will have a negative impact on the
proportion of female local councilors in the European regions.
DESIGN AND DATA
In this study we break new ground by focusing on the gender composition of elected officials
on the sub-national level and by studying regions rather than nations. The kick-off for our
study is recent publications showing that corruption and bad governance is more widespread
and varies to a larger extent within countries in Europe than previously recognized (Charron,
et al., 2011). While the proportion of women still is low in a number of political institutions
throughout Europe, few comparative studies have analyzed the variance in descriptive
representation beyond national-level institutions. This insight informed us to collect data on
the proportion of female local councilors in the European regions (see Sundström, 2013).
Even though European countries are heterogeneous, they are, from a global perspective, quite
similar in terms of culture, modernization and liberal democratic institutions. Much research
in the field of gender and corruption is focused on regions like Asia, Africa and Latin
America. Yet, we argue that it is urgent to recognize that “the misuse of public power for
private good” – the standard definition of corruption – has a negative effect on social and
economic development also in established democracies. This leads us to a research design
with several opportunities. Most important, our focus on regions allows us to move beyond
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the ecological fallacies sometimes present in cross-country studies where researchers ignore
variances within countries and make inferences regarding nations based on observations not
valid for the entire country (Rydgren 2007).
Explaining female local councilors in the European regions
The dependent variable of our study is the proportion of female locally elected councilors
aggregated to a mean of each region. Since the construction of this variable required a
comprehensive collection of new data by the authors, the following sections will briefly
describe the procedure in which this was done. It should be noted that previous scholarly
comparisons of subnational representation of elected women have provided little insights in
the variation across and within countries.3 At best, some reports have provided an overview of
the national averages of locally elected women (see CEMR, 2008). Yet, no relatively recent
source of data exists to date that describe the variance within countries in this matter. The
dataset utilized in this article therefore contribute by providing a unique picture of the
proportion of women in the locally elected assemblies in the European regions.
The authors performed the collection of data in the 18 countries included in this study
with the purpose of finding the most recent figures (as of March 2013) on the gender
composition of locally elected councils. The first priority was to obtain the official sources of
data from statistical offices and electoral institutions. In some instances – when statistics from
official channels were not sufficiently comprehensive – experts, such as scholars specialized
on elections or statistical consultants, provided the figures (for a comprehensive description of
sources, see Appendix 2).
What constitute a local councilor is difficult to assess across these diverse
institutional settings. In 15 out of the 18 countries studied in this report we have found figures
on categories that we believe are highly comparable: They broadly correspond to municipal
councils – that is, a local deliberative assembly constituted by councilors elected by direct
universal suffrage. Three countries (France, Slovakia and Romania) provided some challenges
in meeting these requirements. For both France and Romania data on municipal councilors is
not available for researchers. Instead we use figures on their intermediary-level councils. In
Slovakia national authorities have not collected data on the gender composition of local
councilors. Instead of excluding the country from this comparison we include figures on the
3 There exist exceptions; Rigon and Tanzi (2012) study the variation of the share of female municipal councilors in Italy. Wängnerud and Sundell (2010) and Svaleryd (2009) provide an insight to the variance of elected women at the subnational level of Sweden.
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sex ratio of mayors of the municipalities in the country (for more information of the local
assemblies in each of these countries see Table 1 and Sundström 2013).4
The regions in this study are based on the system of NUTS (the Nomenclature of
Territorial Units for Statistics) and their levels differ in the countries we analyze. In Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Sweden and U.K., we study NUTS 1 regions. In
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, and Spain, we study regions at the level of NUTS 2. Figures on local councilors in
each municipality or local division are aggregated to an average value for each NUTS region
in this study. This is a common procedure of reporting statistics in many of these countries
and most often the authors have not been forced to make this calculation, but instead relied on
official aggregates.
In all, we believe that our dependent variable is operationalized in a way that we
measure the concept that we are interested in. The percentage of elected women is a standard
operationalization in the literature on descriptive representation. It should be acknowledged
that it constitutes some challenge to compare local councilors across these institutionally
diverse contexts as the mandates and responsibilities of these councilors possibly differ across
countries. However, we are not aiming to explain the effects from having a certain share of
locally elected women but are instead interested in explaining the reasons to why this variance
exists. Assuming that the processes of clientilism and recruitment to the position of councilor
are relatively similar although these councils might have different responsibilities, we believe
that the specific differences between the countries are less relevant.
Since the electoral cycles in the countries we study are not synchronized, the year
when the most recent elections were held varies across our sample from 2009 to 2012 (see
Table 1 for details). In three countries, Portugal, Netherlands and Denmark (and also in a few
Austrian regions), elections were held in 2009. Since the data on regional quality of
government was collected during 2009 and we would like the dependent variable to be
measured after our main independent one, this is not perfect. However, we argue that this
does not constitute a problem. Quality of government is known to be a “sticky” concept and it
is unlikely that this measure would fluctuate rapidly over time.
4 In the analysis that follows in this paper we will discuss how we perform the same models for the dependent variable but with these cases excluded and how this does not seem to alter our main findings in a significant manner.
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Table 1 Comparing local councilors across 18 countries
Country Name of local councils Number of local authorities
Year from which the data is collected
France Department councils (conseil general) 101
2011
Germany Local council (gemeinderat) appr. 14000 2011 Italy Local council (consiglio comunale) 8094 2011 Spain Local council (concejal) 8117 2011 UK Local authority councils 466 2010 Hungary Municipal body of representatives
(képviselõ-testület) 3175
2010 Czech Republic Municipal council (zastupitelstvo
obce) 6250
2010 Slovakia Local council (obecné zastupiteľstvo
in municipalities and mestské zastupiteľstvo in cities). Figures refer to elected mayors (starosta in municipalities and primátor in cities).
2792 (2909 mayors)
2010 Portugal Parish assembly (assembleia de
freguesia) 4259
2009 Romania County council (consiliul judeţean) 41 2012 Sweden Municipal assembly
(kommunfullmäktige) 290
2010 Denmark Municipal council
(kommunalbestyrelse) 98 2009
Belgium Municipal council (conseil communal/ gemeenteraad ) 589
2012
Austria Municipal council (Gemeinderat) 2357 2009-2012 Netherlands Local council (gemeenteraad) 418 2009 Poland Municipal council (rada gminy) 2479 2010 Bulgaria Municipal council (obchtinski savet) 264 2010 Greece Municipal council (dimotiko
simvoulio) 325
2010
Studying the distribution of our dependent variable we can conclude that there exist a large
variance in the share of locally elected women between countries, but more importantly, also
within the nations of this study. The difference between the regions with the lowest and the
highest share of women exceed ten per cent in a majority of the countries in our sample. In
Denmark for example the region of Syddanmark has an average of 28.5 per cent women in
their local assemblies, compared to 38.6 per cent in Hovedstaden. In Greece, the 12.3 per cent
female share of the councilors in the region of Kentriki Ellada stands in contrast to the region
of Attica and its mean proportion of 24.3 per cent. Also in Italy is this difference clearly
visible. While Emilia-Romagna has 28.2 per cent women as an average in its councils, the
region of Campania has only 10 per cent. The variance in the share of female locally elected
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councilors is graphically illustrated in Figure 1 and listed in Appendix 1 (the darker the
shading in Figure 1, the higher the average number of women elected).
Figure 1 Female locally elected councilors in the European regions (percent)
Comments: For the details of each country, see appendix.
Regional measure of Quality of Government
While there is no dearth of indicators for levels of corruption or the quality of government of
countries (e.g. the International Country Risk Guide rating, the Corruptions Perception Index
and the World Bank Good Governance Indicator), there is a clear lack of reliable data on the
sub-national level. We utilize the most comprehensive regional governance indicator that
exists to date, EQI, the European Quality of Government Index. This index was assembled in
2009 by scholars at the Quality of Government Institute, at the University of Gothenburg,
with funding from the European Commission (see Charron et al. 2011). The investigators
focused on 18 countries and surveyed approximately 34 000 citizens on three different types
of government services (law enforcement, health care and education). Participants were asked
how they would evaluate these services numerically according to three aspects, their quality,
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impartiality and corruption. In total, the survey consisted of 16 independent questions related
to the three pillars of good governance, which were then combined to a regional index.
Moreover, the researchers combined the regional scores with external measures on quality of
government in order to complement the regional scores from the survey with a country-
context. To do so, the researchers introduced a component controlling for these regions’
deviation from the national average of the established World Bank’s World Government
Indicator (WGI).5 The final index is standardized so that the mean is 0 with a standard
deviation of 1. In all, the EQI gauge the quality, impartiality and corruption of government in
these regions. Higher numbers correspond to little corruption, partiality and ineffectiveness
and lower numbers equals less quality of government (see also Charron & Lapuente, 2013).
We include all regions from the 18 countries that have been covered by the EQI, with the
exception of Bolzano in Italy as this region did not have an official figure for its share of
female local councilors.6
National-level control variables
Our model includes a rigorous test for alternative explanations for the variance of our
dependent variable. We use both national-level and regional-level variables for this purpose.
The three national-level controls are type of elections system, legislative gender quota on the
subnational level and voluntary party gender quotas. The first control variable has a long
history in research on women’s representation. The seminal contribution by Duverger (1955)
stressed the importance of election systems in determining the share of elected women. Also
Norris’ (1993) model of parliamentary recruitment in Western democracies emphasizes the
importance of the political system. Numerous studies find that women’s presence is favored
by electoral systems with party lists, proportional representation (PR), and large district
magnitudes. In a single-member system, a woman has to be the number-one choice for her
party in order to take part in the race. In a PR system with large district magnitudes, a woman
can be placed further down on the party list and still be elected. This argument also contends
that since PR systems tend to produce a larger number of parties and an increased possibility
of new parties entering politics the idea of gender equality is more likely to be spread amongst
parties due to the diffusion of ideas coupled with strategic considerations of not losing the
5 For a more detailed description on the survey and the creation of the index, see Charron et al. 2012. For extensive sensitivity tests between national WGI scores and the regional measure of quality of government, see Charron (2010). 6 In our multivariate analysis we also ”loose” four french territories as missing cases, as no data on HDI and educational attainment was available for these regions.
for this aspect we control for election system and create four dummy variables (Mixed-
Member Proportional system, Two-Round System, Party-List proportional system and First
Past the Post system).7
Not surprisingly the effect from gender quotas has been shown to play an important
role for determining female representation. The two last decades of research on women’s
representation have shown that the number of elected women has often not increased steadily
but rather grown in “punctuated and sometimes dramatic increases” (Kittilson, 2006: 10). It is
widely known that an increased feature, especially in more recent democracies, has been the
design of quota provisions for women through legislation (Dahlerup, 2006). To gauge this
effect we have created dummy variables for countries having legislative quotas on the
subnational level.8
Besides the importance of legislative acts some studies also point to acts by parties,
such as the implementation of gender quotas or other voluntary gender-specific measures
within parties, as important determinants of the number of women elected (Freidenvall, 2006;
Studlar & McAllister, 2002). It should be noted that the number of women elected has also
increased in parties that have never adopted quotas. Thus, one can expect a “contagion effect”
in party systems where one party has adopted voluntary quotas (such as a zipper system for
party lists); that is a positive impact on the share of female candidates also in other parties
(Kittilson, 2006). To measure this effect we introduce dummy variables for countries having
political parties that have adopted voluntary gender quotas.9
Regional-level control variables
We also include four regional-level controls in our model, gender equality culture (measured
as the female share of labor paticipation), regional GDP per capita, human development and
educational attainment. Related to the control for political culture it has been stated that
“societies that elect large numbers of women tend to be more gender equal also in other
respects than societies that elect few women” (Wängnerud, 2009: 51). The concept of gender
equality culture – where women have opportunities for upward mobility – has been widely
acknowledge to correlate with the number of women in elected seats (Inglehart & Norris,
2003: 138). Although a “culture of equality” is a concept that is quite difficult to gauge
7 Data is taken from the Electoral System Design database at http://www.idea.int/esd/ 8 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project at http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview 9 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project at http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview
15
empirically, a reasonable alternative is to use a measure on women’s participation in the labor
force (see Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2008; Stockemer, 2011). This measure has shown to be
significant in previous analyses of women’s participation in local politics, comparing national
averages, in Europe thus it makes sense to include this factor as a control (Wide, 2006: 144).
The indicator included in our analysis measure the ration of women to men active in the labor
market.10
Numerous studies have found that modernization in a broad sense often tend to
correlate with high gender equality and a high presence of elected women (Berg, 2007;
Inglehart et al., 2002; Ingelhart & Norris, 2003). It has been found that countries with higher
economic development and a highly educated population tend to elect a larger share of
women. To account for these effects, regional measures of GDP per capita, level of education
and a human development index are included as indicators of modernization.11 The measure
for GDP per capita has been averaged for the years 2007-2009 and, as this is the standard
procedure when dealing with skewed variables, logarithmically transformed. The indicator for
education is a measure of the percentage of the population having completed a tertiary
education. The Human Development index is a composite measure that also takes into
account life expectancy.
Potential endogeneity
Before we report the findings from our empirical test, a discussion on the possible challenge
of endogeneity between the share of locally elected women and regional quality of
government is warranted. With the debate on the causal relationship between gender and
corruption in mind one could believe that the proportion of women in local parliaments would
affect the governance in these regions. In order to address this potential problem in our
analysis we would, ideally, need time series data on both women’s representation and regional
governance. As this data does not exist we have tried our best to measure our dependent
variable after the data on governance and corruption. We are therefore humble with our
claims and do not attempt to end any debate on causality between gender and corruption.
However, we still believe that providing a robust result of correlation in this cross-regional
sample is a substantial contribution in itself.
10 The information is retrieved from Eurostat regional statistics at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/regional_statistics 11 The data was generously available from the data used by Charron et al. (2012) and originated from the official figures reported to the Eurostat database.
16
METHOD
To gauge the effect of corruption and quality of government on our dependent variable we
firstly analyze the bivariate relationship between the proportion of elected women and
regional quality of government. Secondly, we proceed to build a multi-level model. We have
four regional level covariates (Female labor force participation, GDP per capita, Human
Development Index, and educational attainment) and three national level factors (the electoral
system type, legislative gender quotas on the subnational level and voluntary party quotas).
Having data structured across two different geographical stages we deem hierarchical linear
modeling (HLM) to be the appropriate method. In our analysis we cluster regions within
countries. Our multi-level model covers 167 European regions in 18 countries. For summary
statistics of the variables included in the model, see Table 2 in the appendix.
It should be noted that the dependent variable we analyze below is the one where
we included 18 countries, and thus also the three countries (Slovakia, Romania and France)
that admittedly are a bit differently measured. Our rationale for this is based on thorough
analysis and several tests to ensure that these three countries do not alter our results in any
significant aspects. We have run the same model using a slightly altered dependent variable
(having only one of these countries, two of them or none of them) and basically find the same
results as in the results reported below. The relationship that is presented in the results section
is thus also evident when we analyze the regions in the other 15 European countries. This
further strengthens our belief to assume that the same process of corruption and partiality as
affecting the recruitment of women is present in country councils as in municipal councils. In
the literature on women’s representation the “Scandinavian exception” is used to signal that
the Nordic countries are difficult to compare with other settings (see Rosenbluth et al. 2006).
We see no problem of including the regions of Denmark and Sweden in this analysis. They
represent roughly five per cent of our sample and do not drive our results in any significant
aspect.
RESULTS
From the scatterplot reported in Figure 2 it is evident that we have a strong bivariate
relationship between regional quality of government and the average proportion of locally
elected women in these entities. This relationship is positive and based on this first analysis it
is apparent that the regions with less partiality, corruption and ineffectiveness tend to be the
17
ones with a higher share of female councilors. However, in order to complement this picture
with even more robust results we proceed to report findings from the multivariate model.
Figure 2. Bivariate relationship: female councilors and quality of government
Our multivariate HLM analysis basically confirms the findings that regional quality of
government has a substantially strong effect on women’s representation in the European
regions. As evident in model 2 of Table 2, when only the effect from EQI is reported, this
relationship is positive and significant on the 99.9 per cent level. When our regional-level and
national-level control variables are introduced this effect is slightly decreased, but still strong.
In our full analysis, model 4 of Table 2, we still observe positive coefficients from EQI on our
dependent variable, when all our independent variables are taken into acount. More
specifically, the size of the coefficient can be interpreted as that a one-point increase in
regional governance would predict an increase of approximately 2.7 higher percent of female
councilors as an average. Taking our country-level variations in to account we can also see
that our model explain a large share of variances within countries.
The statistics reported in Table 2 indicate that our model indeed has a good fit and
explain a substantial part of the variance in the proportion of locally elected women in the
European regions. The control variables show surprisingly little significant effects but most of
18
them have the anticipated sign of direction. GDP per capita seem to have a strong and
significant effect. Test for multicollinearity indicate that regional HDI and GDP per capita are
highly correlated, and VIF values from the variable HDI indicate that this might influence our
model. However, this does not seem to significantly alter the general trend of our results. Table 3. Results from the multivariate HLM analysis
Log restricted-likelihood -508.08503 -499.09244 -489.3808 -472.48312 AIC 1022.17 1006.185 994.7616 970.9662 BIC 1031.524 1018.657 1019.706 1011.5 Observations 167 167 167 167 Number of groups 18 18 18 18
Comments: The three dummy variables for election system have the fourth dummy, for countries with a First Past The Post election system, as a reference category. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** = p<0.001, ** = p<0.01, * = p<0.05
19
CONCLUSION
The empirical analysis performed in this article substantiates the suggestion that corruption,
partiality and ineffectiveness of government services is an important factor when investigating
the variance in the representation of women. In this study we have analyzed a novel dataset on
the proportion female locally elected councilors in Europe. Regional figures on governance
quality exert a substantial influence on women’s representation at the local level.
We contribute in two aspects to the theoretical discussion on gender and politics.
Firstly we argue that, as factors exogenous to parties (such as bad governance) affect the
proportion of elected women, hindrances to women’s political representation are not
eliminated by the reformation of political parties only. This should hopefully inform the
future discussion on gender and representation. Secondly we specifically contribute to the
debate on gender and corruption. Sung (2003: 718) observes that “gender equality and
government accountability are both great achievements of modern liberal democracy” and
thus downplay the possible effect from corruption on women’s representation. In the previous
literature of country comparisons such reasoning is difficult to question. However, studying
female descriptive representation on the regional level we can move beyond the prior focus on
national level institutions. If Sung was right then we should not observe such a wide variance
of elected women within the regions in the (democratic) countries we study. Controlling for
regional-level and national-level factors that can be seen as possible determinants of women’s
representation our models still indicate a significant and substantially important impact from
our regional measure of quality of government. The results of our model show that quality of
government is an important determinant for women’s political representation in Europe. Thus,
modernization and democratization, as most commonly understood, cannot be the only
driving forces behind the advancement of women.
Our empirical analysis rests on a cross-sectional dataset. Though we do not claim to
propose a ”final” answer to the debate of causality between the representation of women and
levels of corruption, our findings clearly has advanced this field of research. For future
empirical research it would be worthwhile to study how this relationship holds in a time-series
analysis. This would of course require a continuous effort as regional data on governance
currently is not available. The test performed in this article constitutes for now a significant
contribution.
20
REFERENCES
Alatas, V.; L. Cameron; A. Chaudhuri; N. Erkal; L. Gangadharan (2009), “Gender and Corruption:
Insights from an Experimental Analysis”, Southern Economic Journal 75(3), 663–680.
Alhassan-Alolo, N. (2007), "Gender and corruption: testing the new consensus Public Administration
and Development, 27, 227-237.
Beaman L., E. Duflo, R. Pande and P. Topalova (2011), “Political Reservation and Substantive
representation: Evidence from Indian Village Councils”. In “India Policy Forum 2010-11” (eds) S.
Bery, B. Bosworth, A. Panagariya, Vol 7, Sage Publications.
Beaman L., E. Duflo, R. Pande and P. Topalova (2012), “Female leadership raises aspirations and
educational attainment for girls: a policy experiment in India”. Science feb 3.
Berg, J. (2007) “Gender attitudes and modernization processes”, International Journal of Public
Opinion Research 19(1): 5-23.
Bjarnegård, E. (2009), “Men in Politics: Revisiting Patterns of Gendered Parliamentary Representation
in Thailand and Beyond”, PhD Thesis at the Department for Political Science, University of
Uppsala.
Branisa, B. and M. Ziegler (2010), “Reexamining the link between gender and corruption: The role of
social institutions”, Discussion Paper No. 24, Courant Research Centre.
Charron, N. (2010), “Assessing The Quality of the Quality of Government Data: A Sensitivity Test of
the World Bank Government Indicators.” QoG Working Paper.
Charron, N. and V. Lapuente (2013) “Why do Some Regions in Europe have Higher Quality of
Government?” Journal of Politics.
Charron, N. L. Dijkstra and V. Lapuente (2012) “Regional Governance Matters: Quality of
Government within European Union Member State” Forthcoming in Regional Studies.
Charron, N., V. Lapuente and B. Rothstein (2011) “Measuring Quality of Government and Sub-
national Variation” Report for the EU Commission of Regional Development. European
Figures refer to elected member of the municipal councils (kommunfullmäktige) in 2010. The data was provided
by Mr. Jonas Olofsson [[email protected]], at the unit for Democracy Statistics of Statistics Sweden
(SCB).
United Kingdom Figures refer to members of the local authority councilors elected in 2010. Data for most of the regions was
provided by the UK Local Government Association, especially by Mr. Stephen Richards,
[[email protected]], and are available at their webpage [http://www.local.gov.uk/web/guest/local-
government-intelligence/-/journal_content/56/10171/100325/ARTICLE-TEMPLATE]. Figures for Wales was
provided by Mr. Lee Owens [[email protected]], at WLGA, the Welsch Local Government Association.
Figures for Scotland was provided by Mr. Tony McNair [[email protected]], at COSLA, the Convention of
Scottish Local Authorities. Figures for N. Ireland was provided by Ms. Diana Stewart
[[email protected]], at the Local Government Staff Commission in Belfast.
34
Appendix 2. Political and administrative systems
Austria Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist for the national or sub-national level. Three parties have
adopted voluntary party quotas. The Social Democratic Party of Austria, Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs
(SPÖ) has a quota on 40% of women of their party list. The Austrian people’s Party, Österreichische Volkspartei
(ÖVP) has a quota on 33.3 % of women of their party list. The Greens-Green Alternative, Die Grünen-Die
Grünen Alternativen (GA) has a quota on 50 % of women of their party list. 12
Administrative structure: Austria is a federal state composed of 2 357 municipalities (Gemeinden) and regions.
The municipal council (Gemeinderat) is the deliberative body of the municipality. Its members are elected by
direct universal suffrage based on the proportional representation system for a five or six-year term depending on
the region. Responsibilities include; Water, Sewage, Public order, Urban planning and land development, Social
services, Roads and household refuse, Urban transport, Health, Culture and Safety.13
Belgium Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. Two parties have voluntary party quotas. The Labour Party,
Partij van de Arbeid, (PvdA) has lists where gender but also ethnicity is considered. The congresss of the party
has the last say on the composition of lists. The Green Left, GroenLinks (GL) has quotas for women.14
Administrative structure: Belgium is a federal state composed of 589 municipalities (gemeenten), provinces,
regions and communities. The municipal council (conseil communal in French and gemeenteraad in Dutch) is
elected by direct universal suffrage for a six-year term. It is the municipality’s legislative body and decides on
local policy. Each municipality has a public centre for social welfare. Responsibilities for municipalities include;
Culture, Environment, Public order, Waste management, Local finance and taxation Registry office, Sports and
youth, Spatial and urban planning, Housing, Water and sanitation, Road management and mobility, Social
policy, Local economy, , Education, and Employment.15
Bulgaria Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quota or voluntary party quotas exist.16
Administrative structure: Bulgaria is a unitary state composed of 264 municipalities (obshtina), Bulgaria's main
administrative and territorial entity. It is an independent legal entity with its own property and budget. The
municipal council (obchtinski savet) is the municipality's deliberative body. Its members are elected by direct
universal suffrage for a four-year term. The region of Sofia is both a municipality and an administrative entity.
Responsibilities include; Household refuse, Sports and leisure, Social services, Environment Water supply and
12 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=14]. 13 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Austria.htm]. 14 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=21]. 15 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Belgique.htm]. 16 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/country.cfm].
35
sewage, Culture, Public Services, Education, Health (medical and social care, sanitation, hygiene, etc.), the
Tourism, Road, park and lighting maintenance, Transport, Building and maintenance of public buildings, and
Territorial development.17
Czech Republic Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. The Social Democrats, Česká strana sociálně demokratická
(ČSSD), adopted a voluntary quotas stating that one fourth of the elected must be women. The Social
Democratic Women's Organization has the right to nominate extra women if a local party organization has failed
to nominate 25 percent women among its top candidates.18
Administrative structure: The Czech Republic is a unitary state composed of 6250 municipalities (obec) and
regions. The municipal council is the municipality’s deliberative assembly and is composed of members elected
by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term. It appoints the members of the municipal committee. The City
of Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, is divided into metropolitan districts, each made up of its own
elected local council. Responsibilities for municipalities include; Local development, Agriculture and forest
management, Municipal police, Municipal budget, Water supply and sewage, Household refuse, Public
Transport, Primary education, Social services, Spatial planning, Housing, Cooperation with other municipalities
and regions.19
Denmark Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist currently. The voluntary quota of 40 % women in the
Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti), was the first party quota introduced (in 1977). This was
abandoned in 1996.20
Administrative structure: Denmark is a unitary state composed of 98 municipalities (kommuner) and regions.
The municipal council is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage for four years via a system
of proportional representation. It is in charge of the municipal budget, the running of local institutions and the
adoption of local policies. Responsibilities for municipalities include; Assistance to the unemployed, Child care,
Care for the elderly, Integration of refugees and immigrants, Culture and sports, Environmental protection and
waste management, Economic development and Primary education.21
France Gender quotas: Legislated candidate gender quotas exist as the law (n°88-227, Article 9-1) states that he
difference between the numbers between men and women of candidates a party present cannot be greater than
17 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Bulgarie.htm]. 18 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=60]. 19 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [www.ccre.org/en/membres/Republique tcheque.htm]. 20 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=63]. 21 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Danemark.htm].
36
two % in single member constituencies. Non-compliance with this rule is met by economic sanctions, affecting
the financial subsidies to the party. For regional and municipal councils (having more than 3500 inhabitants)
there is a requirement of the alternation of the sex of candidates on lists. If a list does not meet these
requirements it is invalidated. However no quotas exist for the intermediary level of the general councils. The
Socialist Party, Parti Socialiste (PS), have adopted voluntary quotas of 50 % women for candidate lists.22
Administrative structure: France is a unitary state composed of 36 682 municipalities, 101 departments
(including five overseas departments) and 22 regions. On the intermediary level the department councils (conseil
général) is the department's deliberative body. It is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage
for a six-year term and half of it is renewed every three years. The council elects its president among its
members and is composed of specialised committees. Mandatory responsibilities for department councils
include; Education, culture and heritage, Economic development, Social and health action, Urban and equipment
planning and Environment.23
Germany Gender quotas: No legislated candidate gender quotas exist in Germany. However, four parties have adopted
voluntary quotas for candidate lists. The Christian democratic Union, Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU),
state that at least 33 % of candidates on lists should be women. If the lists fail to meet this requirement, the
internal election procedure is repeated. The Alliance 90/The Greens, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, has a 50 % quota
for women on party lists. The Left Party, Die Linkspartei, reserve the two first and then every other place on lists
for women. The Social Democratic Party of Germany, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)
stipulates that at least 40 % of candidates on lists and boards must be of each gender.24
Administrative structure: Germany is a federal republic composed of about 14,000 municipalities (Gemeinden),
districts and federal states. There are two types of local structures depending on the legal system of the Land:
The magistrate system and the council system. The local council (Gemeinderat) is the central body within the
municipality. It is elected at the universal direct suffrage for a mandate that can vary between four and six years.
This legislative body takes most decisions and has a monitoring function. Mandatory responsibilities for
municipalities include; Water management, Social aid and youth, Urban planning, and Building and maintenance
of schools. Optional responsibilities for municipalities include; economic development, infrastructures, energy,
culture and sport.25
Greece Gender quotas: Legislated Candidate Quotas exist for the national level. At the sub-national level there are also
candidate quotas. In Law 3852/2010, Article 18, Paragraph 3, it is stated that the number of candidates in
community, municipal and regional elections must be equal at least to one-third (1/3) of the total number of
22 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=53]. 23 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/France.htm]. 24 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=61]. 25 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Germany.htm].
37
members the council has. Also voluntary party quotas exist. The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Panellenio
Sosialistiko Kimena, PASOK) has a quota on a minimum of 40 % women on party lists.26
Administrative structure: Greece is a unitary state composed of 325 municipalities (dimos) and self-governed
regions. The municipal council (dimotiko simvoulio) is composed of members elected by direct universal
suffrage for a four-year term. This deliberative assembly, headed by the mayor, is the decision-making body of
the municipality. Responsibilities include; Social welfare, Agriculture, Building permits and urban planning
applications, Issuing of professional licenses, Livestock and fisheries, Infrastructure, Health care, Education and
Transport.27
Hungary Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. The party Politics Can be Different, Lehet Mas a Politika
(LMP), regulates candidacy to the national and European parliament so that a maximum of two repeated
candidates of the same sex are allowed to follow on lists. The Hungarian Socialist Party Magyar Szocialista Párt
(MSzP) has a quota for women set to 20 %.28
Administrative structure: Hungary is a unitary state composed of 3175 municipalities (települések), cities, cities
with county rank, capital city districts and counties. The body of representatives is the municipality's legislative
body. It is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage for four years and is responsible for the
management and control of the municipality. Its decisions are presented in the form of resolutions and decrees. A
municipality can become a city at the initiative of its body of representatives, depending on its level of
development and its impact at the regional level. Responsibilities for municipalities include; Social services,
Primary schools, Maintenance of roads, Public areas, cemeteries and sewage, Water resources, Local
development, Urban planning, Protection of the environment, Housing, Public transport, Fire services and
Culture.29
Italy Gender quotas: Legislated candidate quotas exist as 12 out of 20 regions have adopted gender quotas in their
regional laws, while 7 regions have applied Old State Law. The Democratic Party, Partito Democratico (PD),
has adopted a “zipper” system for the gender composition on party lists, which also states that 50 % of the
candidates on lists should be women.30
Administrative structure: Italy is a unitary state composed of 8 094 municipalities (comuni), provinces and
regions. The local council is elected by direct universal suffrage for a period of five years. It is the municipality’s
main legislative and decision-making body. The council notably votes the municipal budget. Each municipality
26 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=89]. 27 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Grece.htm]. 28 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=100]. 29 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Hongrie.htm]. 30 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=110].
38
is linked to a province but can directly deal with its region and/or the national government. Responsibilities for
municipalities include; Public services, Land development, Environment, Social services, Urban planning,
Economic development and Culture.31
Netherlands Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. Two parties have voluntary party quotas. The Labour Party,
Partij van de Arbeid, (PvdA) has lists where gender but also ethnicity is considered. The congresss of the party
has the last say on the composition of lists. The Green Left, GroenLinks (GL) has quotas for women.32
Administrative structure: The Netherlands is a unitary state composed of 418 municipalities (gemeenten) and
provinces. The local council (gemeenteraad) is the municipality's deliberative body. Its members are councilors
elected for a period of four years via the proportional representation system. The local council is in charge of the
college of mayor and aldermen, makes all main municipal decisions and has the power to pass by-laws.
engineering, Culture and sports, Employment, Law and order and Primary education.33
Poland Gender quotas: Legislated Candidate Quotas exist for the national level. At the sub-national level there are also
candidate quotas. In the Electoral Law it is stated that the number of candidates of either gender on the electoral
lists may not be lower than 35% of the overall number of candidates on the list. If a list falls short of meeting this
requirement, the committee notifies the authorized person of the necessity to amend the list within 3 days.
Should this fail to result in a properly structured list, the committee refuses to register the entire list. No
voluntary party quotas exist.34
Administrative structure: Poland is a unitary state composed of 2 479 municipalities (gminy), counties and
regions. The municipal council (rada gminy) is composed of councilors elected by direct universal suffrage for a
four-year term. In addition to its legislative powers, the council votes the municipal budget and determines local
taxes. In Poland, 65 urban municipalities have a special status whereby they are responsible for competences
usually exercised by counties. The capital city of Warsaw, which is divided into 18 districts, also has this special
status and thus exercises the competences of both a municipality and a county. Responsibilities include; Pre-
school and primary education, Housing, Social services, Environment, Culture and Public transport.35
Portugal
31 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Italie.htm]. 32 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=164]. 33 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Pays-Bas.htm]. 34 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=179]. 35 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Pologne.htm].
39
Gender quotas: A legislated candidate quotas exist as it is stated in Decree 72 of the law that lists for candidates
(for the elections to the national parliament, European parliament and local governments), shall have at least 33
percent of both men and women. Small municipalities can be exempted. There are also financial sanctions for
non-compliance to this rule. The lists in multi-member constituencies cannot have more than two consecutive
names of the same sex. No voluntary party quotas exist.36
Administrative structure: Portugal is a unitary state composed of 4259 parishes (freguesias), municipalities and
autonomous regions. The parish assembly (assembleia de freguesia) is the deliberative body of the parish and is
composed of councilors elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term via a system of proportional
representation. Responsibilities for parishes include; Environment, Culture, Residence permits and Pet licences,
Health, Road and park maintenance, Education, Social facilities for children and the elderly.37
Romania Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. Both the Social Democrat party, Partidul Social Democrat
(PSD) and the Democratic Party, Partidul Democrat (PD) have adopted a 30 % quota for women of party lists. 38
Administrative structure: Romania is a unitary state composed of municipalities, towns, cities and 41 counties
(judete). Responsibilities for counties include; Public health, Social assistance, Water supply, Sewage,
Transport and transport infrastructure, Urban planning and landscaping, Regional development, Economic,
environmental and social development, Management of public services, Education and Cooperation between
local and national authorities.39
Slovakia Gender quotas: A legislated candidate quotas exist as it is stated in Decree 72 of the law that lists for candidates
(for the elections to the national parliament, European parliament and local governments), shall have at least 33
percent of both men and women. Small municipalities can be exempted. There are also financial sanctions for
non-compliance to this rule. The lists in multi-member constituencies cannot have more than two consecutive
names of the same sex. No voluntary party quotas exist.40
Administrative structure: Slovakia is unitary state composed of 2 792 municipalities (obce), cities and self-
governing regions. The local council (obecné zastupiteľstvo in municipalities and mestské zastupiteľstvo in
cities) is the local authority’s deliberative body and is composed of members elected by direct universal suffrage
for a period of four years. The mayor (starosta in municipalities and primátor in cities) is the municipality’s
highest executive body and statutory representative. He/she is elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year
mandate and chairs both the local council and the municipal board. Responsibilities for municipalities include;
36 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=184]. 37 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Portugal.htm]. 38 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=189]. 39 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Roumanie.htm]. 40 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=184].
40
Health, Culture and sports, Water supply, Sewage and municipal waste, Local development, Housing, Pre-school
and primary school, Public transport, Environment, Social assistance, Road maintenance and Participation in
regional planning.41
Spain Gender quotas: Legislated candidate quotas exist as it is stated in the Equality Law (Ley de Igualdad) that a
"principle of balanced presence” should come in to affect and that party lists are required to have a maximum of
60 percent of either men or women among candidates to the Lower house. Previously there were not strong
sanctions in place to enforce this rule, but this is expected to change. The Ley de Iguldad also addresses regional
and local elections, although villages with less than 3,000 inhabitants are not obliged to comply with the law.
Several Autonomous Communities has adopted quotas to the regional elections. The Electoral Commission does
not approve party lists that do not meet the requirements. Seven parties have adopted a 40 % quota for either
men or women on the party lists, including; Canarian Coalition, Coalición Canaria (CC), Nationalist Galician
Block, Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), Republican Left of Catalonia, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
(ERC), Initiative for Catalonia-Green, Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (ICV), Socialist Party of catalonia, Partit
dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), United Left, Izquierda Unida (IU), Spanish Socialist Worker Party, Partido
Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE).42
Administrative structure: Spain is a unitary state composed of 8 117 municipalities (municipios), county
councils, Canary Island county councils, Balearic Island county councils, autonomous cities and autonomous
communities. The local council is the local authority’s deliberative body and is composed of councilors elected
by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term. This assembly approves the local budget, urban planning, by-
laws and municipal rules. Responsibilities for local authorities include a number of services depending on the
size of the authority. In every local authority responsibilities include; Street lighting, Urban traffic, Food
security, Water supply, Road maintenance and Sewage and waste management. In local authorities of over 5
000 inhabitants services also includes; Green areas. Public libraries and Local police. In local authorities of over
20 000 inhabitants services also includes; Social services, Fire prevention and Sporting facilities. In local
authorities of over 50 000 inhabitants services also includes; Protection of the environment and Transport.43
Sweden Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. The Moderate Party, Nya Moderaterna (M), regulated the
party list for the European Parliament election, stating that the top four positions must have an equal gender
composition. The Green Party, Miljöpartiet (Mp) has adopted a 50 % quota to their party list, plus minus one
person. The Left Party, Vänsterpartiet (V) sets a minimum 50 5 share of women to their lists. The Social
41 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Slovaquie.htm]. 42 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=72]. 43 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Espagne.htm].
41
Democrat party, Socialdemokraterna (S) adopted a zipper system, where women and men alternates each other
on party lists.44
Administrative structure: Sweden is a unitary state composed of 290 municipalities (kommuner), county councils
and regions. The municipal assembly (kommunfullmäktige) is composed of members elected by direct universal
suffrage for a four-year term. This assembly is the municipality’s decision-making body but can delegate
important decision-making powers to the municipal executive committee and to the specialized committees. It
also levies taxes and adopts the municipal budget. Responsibilities for municipalities include; (Mandatory)
Primary and secondary education, Refuse collection and waste disposal, Social services, Childcare and pre-
school, Care for the elderly, Support for the physically and intellectually disabled, Primary healthcare, Spatial
planning, Rescue and emergency services, Environmental protection, Water supply and sewerage and Road
maintenance. (Optional competences); Housing, Culture, Employment, Energy, Industrial and commercial
services.45
United Kingdom Gender quotas: No legislated candidate quotas exist. The Labour Party, regulates candidacy as each candidate
has two votes, one for a man and one for a woman. The candidate with the most votes is elected. The Liberal
Democrats has adopted a target of having 40 % women as candiates and have previously adopted “zipper”
systems for lists to the European Parliament 46
Administrative structure: The United Kingdom is a unitary state with certain characteristics of a federal state,
having 446 local authorities. In general, councilors are elected for a four year term, based on either a first-past-
the-post voting system or a proportional system. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have a
number of local authorities with slightly differing responsibilities and structure. Local competences are not
uniform throughout the United Kingdom as they are wholly transferred (devolved) to Scotland, while other
arrangements are applied to Wales and Northern Ireland. English local governments remain directly accountable
to the UK government and parliament. There are two tiers of local government in parts of England (counties and
districts) and a single tier in other parts of England and all of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (councils). In
general, responsibilities for local authorities include, for counties; Social services, Highways and transport,
Licensing, Building control, Environmental health, Local planning, Waste collection, Housing and Park and
leisure services.47
44 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=197]. 45 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [www.ccre.org/en/membres/Suede.htm]. 46 The information is retrieved from The Quota Project [http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?ul=en&country=77]. 47 The information is retrieved from The Council of European Municipalities and Regions [http://www.ccre.org/en/membres/Royaume-Uni.htm].