Corrective taxation and behaviour – the saliency of tax instruments 12-07-2018
OUTLINE
Introduction
The purpose of taxation
Properties of a good tax system
Economic efficiency, equity, administrative efficiency,
flexibility
PART 1: Theoretical considerations
The rationale for corrective taxation
PART 2: Corrective taxation in theory and practice:
Tobacco and alcohol taxes
Sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs)
Purpose of taxation
Broad tax policy objectives:
Revenue raising
Social objectives
Market failures
Behavioural changes
Tax incentives
International competitiveness
Properties of a good tax system
Equity
Promote fair income distribution
Benefit approach – benefit taxes (user charges)
Ability-to-pay approach – horizontal versus vertical equity
Economic efficiency
Minimisation of distortive effect on taxpayers’ choices
Administrative efficiency
Minimisation of administrative and compliance costs
Flexibility, simplicity, transparency
Flexibility
Facilitate macroeconomic stability and economic development
Corrective taxation and behavioural
change
Taxes meant to change behaviour
Examples: "Sin taxes" on tobacco and alcohol products
Themes:
How do consumers respond to such taxes?
Do such taxes have the intended effects on behaviour?
Theoretical rationale
Adam Smith (1776) supported taxation of goods such as
tobacco, alcohol and sugar as they are not necessities.
Corrective (or “Pigouvian”) taxes:
Correct for the presence of externalities or internalities in a
market:
externality: costs imposed on others
internality: costs imposed on the individual themselves
Examples: excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco, motor fuels
Attempts by taxpayers to avoid or reduce their tax liabilities
can result in unintended consequences – may cause
inefficiencies
Results: Misallocation of resources / adverse effects on social
welfare
Avoiding such unintended effects should be an important
consideration in the design of taxes
Historical example: The window tax (Oates and Schwab,
2015)
Behavioural responses and efficiency
Externalities associated with alcohol
and tobacco
Tobacco (see Ekpu and Brown (2015), Black et al (2015)):
Direct costs of smoking: costs related to smoking-related illnesses
Indirect costs: costs of second-hand smoking, loss of productivity due to illness and absent smokers, smoking-induced fires, etc.
Intangible costs: emotional pain of illness and loss of life
Alcohol
Direct costs of alcohol consumption: cost of policing, healthcare, expenses related to fatal and non-fatal traffic accidents, violence and property damage, ‘avoidable’ illnesses such as liver and cardiovascular disease
Indirect costs: loss of productivity due to illness and absence from workplace, etc.
Intangible costs:emotional pain, depression, regret associated with alcohol-related harm.
An estimation of tangible external costs of alcohol consumption in SA – 1.5% of GDP [Parry (2009) in Black et al (2015)].
Cigarette consumption in Africa
Source: Blecher and Ross (2013)
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Design of corrective taxes – South Africa (I)
Cigarettes:
Blecher (2015) indicates that health consequences are not related to nicotine content; rather the quantity smoked and duration of smoking.
Taxation effective in reducing smoking (tax increases price, which reduces quantity).
SA: uniform specific tax on cigarettes - same tax applied to every cigarette. Tax set such that it is 50% of retail price.
Easier to administer
Predictable and stable revenue streams
Specific taxes should be updated regularly (especially during inflationary times)
Design of corrective taxes – South Africa (II)
Alcohol:
Blecher (2015): clear relationship between alcohol
consumption and alcohol-related diseases and injuries. But,
there is also a link between the dosage of alcohol and harm
caused.
SA: tax is applied to volume of alcohol, instead of volume of
beverage – such a system on beer and spirits (wine has a flat
tax).
Excise taxes on alcohol are levied as specific taxes
but specific taxes can be eroded by inflation
Behavioral response to corrective taxes
– Elasticities
South Africa evidence:
Cigarettes:
Average price elasticity of demand ranges between 0.5 and 0.7 (Van Walbeek, n.d.).
Alcohol:
Estimated price elasticities: normal beer: ‐0.40; light beer: ‐0.47; low-price wine: -1.08; medium-price wine: ‐0.84; high-price wine: ‐0.42 and spirits: ‐0.75 (National Treasury study - see Van Walbeek and Blecher, n.d.).
Van Walbeek and Blecher (n.d.): estimated price elasticities for alcohol for the whole population using NIDS waves 1 and 3 data: -0.52, -0.56, respectively. They also found the poor has more
price elastic demand.
Excise taxes on cigarettes – empirical
evidence from SA
People respond to changes in price of cigarettes, the poor and young typically more responsive.
Marked decrease in aggregate and per capita consumption of cigarettes since 1993 (when the govt. raised real excise taxes on cigarettes (Van Walbeek & Blecher, n.d.).
Claims that taxes would increase illicit trade not supported by empirical research. Excise revenue from cigarettes on average 0.7% below budget (2000–2012). Study of Van Walbeek (2014) finds no evidence of increased illicit trade in cigarettes between 2002-2009, although large increase in illicit trade in 2010-2011, but in 2012 illicit market share decreased.
Incentive to shift to another form of tobacco (pipe, cigarette tobacco) mitigated by similar increases in excise taxes to that of cigarettes (Van Walbeek, n.d.)
[See Economics of Tobacco Control Project, UCT, for other (recent) research publications on tobacco taxation: http://www.tobaccoecon.uct.ac.za/etcp/publications]
Excise taxes on alcohol – impact in SA
According to Blecher (2015), producers could choose not to pass
tax differences between high and low alcohol beer to consumers -
might absorb higher taxes on beer with higher alcohol content, but
instead choose to save the taxes on those with lower alcohol
content.
Could opt to advertise or promote to lower-tax products, which
ceteris paribus, would increase profits.
Producers could also choose to reduce the alcohol content.
The dose tax system has caused a significant shift in advertising
from higher alcohol to lower alcohol beers.
Unintended effects?
Substitution of illicit and cheaper products
Adverse impact of tax hikes on income distribution within
households (see Black & Mohamed, 2006).
Externalities associated with sugar
consumption
Health risks:
Increased risk of excessive calories intake (leads to obesity)
Obesity increases risk of heart disease, type 2 diabetes, strokes
Tooth decay in children
Health costs are mainly carried by the individual; however, external
costs are borne by society (e.g. public health costs).
Full costs of sugar consumption are not taken into account by the
individual at the point of consumption.
Taxation of food and beverage
products (e.g. SSBs)
Target primarily goods with high fat/salt/sugar content.
Non-alcoholic beverages: SSBs (soft drinks/sodas, cordials, sugar-added
juices)
Do particular health taxes change consumption behaviours?
Source: Wright et al (2017)
Do particular health taxes change
consumption behaviours?
Mexico
Price elasticities: Colchero et al. (2016)
Soft drinks was -1.06 and -1.16 for SSBs ((soft drinks, fruit juices, fruit
drinks, flavoured water and energy drinks),
Price increase in soft drinks associated with larger quantity consumption of
water, milk, snacks and sugar, and decreased consumption of other SSBs,
candies and traditional snacks.
Imposed a 10% tax on SSBs in January 2014 at the end of that year, there
was a 5.5% drop in sales. Over two years (to 2016), a further decrease to
9.7%, with the largest drop amongst the most socio-economic
disadvantaged households (Editorial, The Lancet Diabetes &
Endocrinology, 2017).
Price elasticities of demand
(urban households in Chile)
Source: Guerrero-López et al (2017)
Study concludes: “…subsidies to non-sweetened beverages and tax to soft
drinks could lead to increases in the substitutions for other healthier
beverages.”
Design of corrective taxes – South Africa
Sugar beverage levy (SBL) (1 April 2018)
Health promotion levy: first 4 grams of sugar per 100ml are to
be exempt. Thereafter, a tax of 2.1 cents per gram of sugar will
be levied.
Approximately 10% of a can of Coca Cola
Products containing intrinsic sugars, e.g. 100% fruit or
vegetable juices, are exempt from paying the SBL
“Over the MTEF period, R368 million is allocated to begin a public
awareness campaign to complement the health promotion levy on sugary
beverages and to establish a health technology assessment unit. The unit
will analyse the cost effectiveness of various health interventions.”
(National Treasury, 2018: 60)
Design of corrective taxes: UK
SSBs:
Tax on soft drinks, paid by producers and importers of soft
drinks – from April 2018
main rate charge: 18p/litre for drinks with 5-8g of sugar
per 100ml
higher rate charge: 24p/litre for drinks with >8g sugar
per 100ml
Source: HM Treasury, 2018 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/soft-drinks-
industry-levy-comes-into-effect)
Corrective taxation: important considerations
Pass through of tax?
Distributional effects?
Tax revenues?
Do producers respond to incentives?
Unintended effects – substitutions?
Economic concerns – employment?
Changing behaviour - other options?
What options (other than taxation) could be considered?
- Information?
- Regulation?
- Nudges?
1) Galizzi, M. M. 2012. Label, nudge or tax? A review of health policies for risky behaviours. Journal of Public Health Research, Volume 1:e5: 14-21).
2) Arno, A. & Thomas, S. 2016. The efficacy of nudge theory strategies in influencing adult dietary behaviour: a systematic review and meta-analysis. BMC Public Health, 16:676.
References
Black, A., Calitz, E. and Steenekamp, T. 2015. Public Economics, 6th edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa.
Blecher, E. 2015. Taxes on tobacco, alcohol and sugar sweetened beverages: Linkages and lessons learned. Social Science & Medicine. 136-137: 175-179.
Blecher, E. and Ross, H. 2013. Tobacco use in Africa: Tobacco control through prevention. American Cancer Sciety. Available: https://www.cancer.org/content/dam/cancer-org/cancer-control/en/reports/tobacco-use-in-africa-tobacco-control-through%3Dprevention.pdf.
Colchero, M. A., Salgado, J. C. Unar-Munguía, M., Hernandez-Avila, M. and Rivera-Dommarco, J. A. 2016. Price elasticity of the demand for sugar sweetened beverages and soft drinks in Mexico. Economics and Human Biology, 19: 129–137.
Editorial. 2017. Sweet success: will sugar taxes improve health? The Lancet Diabetes & Endocrinology. 5(4): 235.
Ekpu, V. U. and Brown A. K. 2015. The Economic Impact of Smoking and of Reducing Smoking Prevalence: Review of Evidence. Tobacco Use Insights, 8 (2015), pp. 1–35.
Guerrero-López, C. M., Unar-Munguía, M. and Colchero, M. A. 2017. Price elasticity of the demand for soft drinks, other sugar-sweetened beverages and energy dense food in Chile. BMC Public Health, 17:180.
National Treasury. 2017. Budget Review 2017. Available: www.treasury.gov.za.
National Treasury. 2018. Budget Review 2018. Available: www.treasury.gov.za.
Oates, W. E. and Schwab, R. M. 2015. The window tax: a case study in excess burden. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29(1): 163-180.
Van Walbeek, C. 2014. Measuring changes in the illicit cigarette market using government revenue data: the example of South Africa. Tobacco Control.
VanWalbeek, C. n.d. Tobacco Excise Taxation in South Africa. World Health Organization. Available: http://www.who.int/tobacco/training/success_stories/en/best_practices_south_africa_taxation.pdf.
Van Walbeek, and Blecher, C. n.d. The economics of alcohol use, misuse and policy in South Africa. World Health Organization. Available: http://www.dpru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/405/People/the-economics-of-alcohol-policy-in-south-africa.pdf.