Top Banner
CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY AND VALUATION Aswath Damodaran Spring 2016 Aswath Damodaran 1
26

CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

May 29, 2018

Download

Documents

vuphuc
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Page 1: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

CORPORATEFINANCELECTURENOTEPACKET2CAPITALSTRUCTURE,DIVIDENDPOLICYANDVALUATION

AswathDamodaran Spring2016

Aswath Damodaran 1

Page 2: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

CAPITALSTRUCTURE:THECHOICESANDTHETRADEOFF“Neitheraborrowernoralenderbe”Someonewhoobviouslyhatedthispartofcorporate finance

Aswath Damodaran 2

Page 3: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

3

Firstprinciples

Aswath Damodaran

3

Page 4: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

4

TheChoicesinFinancing

Aswath Damodaran

4

¨ Thereareonlytwowaysinwhichabusiness canraisemoney.¤ Thefirstisdebt.Theessence ofdebt isthatyoupromise tomakefixed

paymentsinthefuture (interestpaymentsandrepayingprincipal). Ifyoufailtomakethosepayments,youlosecontrolofyourbusiness.

¤ Theother isequity.Withequity,youdogetwhatever cashflowsareleftoverafteryouhavemadedebtpayments.

Page 5: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

5

GlobalPatternsinFinancing…

Aswath Damodaran

5

Page 6: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

6

AndamuchgreaterdependenceonbankloansoutsidetheUS…

Aswath Damodaran

6

Page 7: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

7

Assessingtheexistingfinancingchoices:Disney,Vale,TataMotors,Baidu &Bookscape

Aswath Damodaran

7

Page 8: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

8

Page 9: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

9

TheTransitionalPhases..

Aswath Damodaran

9

¨ Thetransitionsthatweseeatfirms– fromfullyownedprivatebusinessestoventurecapital,fromprivatetopublicandsubsequentseasonedofferingsareallmotivatedprimarilybytheneedforcapital.

¨ Ineachtransition,though,therearecostsincurredbytheexistingowners:¤ Whenventurecapitalistsenter thefirm,theywilldemandtheir fair

shareandmoreoftheownershipofthefirmtoprovideequity.¤ Whenafirmdecides togopublic,ithastotradeoffthegreateraccess

tocapitalmarketsagainsttheincreased disclosure requirements (thatemanate frombeingpubliclylists),lossofcontrolandthetransactionscostsofgoingpublic.

¤ Whenmakingseasoned offerings, firmshavetoconsider issuancecostswhilemanagingtheirrelationswithequityresearch analystsandrat

Page 10: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

10

Measuringafirm’sfinancingmix…

Aswath Damodaran

10

¨ Thesimplestmeasureofhowmuchdebtandequityafirmisusingcurrentlyistolookattheproportionofdebtinthetotalfinancing.Thisratioiscalledthedebttocapitalratio:DebttoCapitalRatio=Debt/(Debt+Equity)

¨ Debtincludesallinterestbearingliabilities,shorttermaswellaslongterm.Itshouldalsoincludeothercommitmentsthatmeetthecriteriafordebt:contractuallypre-setpaymentsthathavetobemade,nomatterwhatthefirm’sfinancialstanding.

¨ Equitycanbedefinedeitherinaccountingterms(asbookvalueofequity)orinmarketvalueterms(baseduponthecurrentprice).Theresultingdebtratioscanbeverydifferent.

Page 11: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

11

TheFinancingMixQuestion

Aswath Damodaran

11

¨ Indecidingtoraisefinancingforabusiness,isthereanoptimalmixofdebtandequity?¤ Ifyes,whatisthetradeoffthatletsusdeterminethisoptimalmix?

n Whatarethebenefits ofusingdebtinsteadofequity?n Whatarethecostsofusingdebtinsteadofequity?

¤ Ifnot,whynot?

Page 12: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

12

TheIllusoryBenefitsofDebt

¨ Atfirstsight,thebenefitofdebtseemsobvious.Thecostofdebtislowerthanthecostofequity.

¨ Thatbenefitisanillusion,though,becausedebtischeaperthanequityforasimplereason.Thelendergetsbothfirstclaimonthecashflowsandacontractuallypre-setcashflow.Theequityinvestorislastinlineandhastodemandahigherrateofreturnthanthelenderdoes.

¨ Byborrowingmoneyatalowerrate,youarenotmakingabusinessmorevaluable,butjustmovingtheriskaround.

Aswath Damodaran

12

Page 13: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

13

CostsandBenefitsofDebt

Aswath Damodaran

13

¨ BenefitsofDebt¤ TaxBenefits:Thetaxcodeistiltedinfavorofdebt,withinterestpaymentsbeingtaxdeductible inmostpartsoftheworld,whilecashflowstoequity arenot.

¤ Addsdisciplinetomanagement:Whenmanagersaresloppyintheirprojectchoices,borrowingmoneymaymake themlessso.

¨ CostsofDebt¤ BankruptcyCosts:Borrowingmoneywill increaseyourexpectedprobability andcostofbankruptcy.

¤ AgencyCosts:What’sgoodforstockholders isnotalwayswhat’sgoodforlenders andthatcreatesfrictionandcosts.

¤ LossofFutureFlexibility:Usingupdebtcapacitytodaywillmeanthatyouwillnotbeabletodrawonitinthefuture.

Page 14: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

14

TaxBenefitsofDebt

Aswath Damodaran

14

¨ Whenyouborrowmoney,youareallowedtodeductinterestexpensesfromyourincometoarriveattaxableincome.Thisreducesyourtaxes.Whenyouuseequity,youarenotallowedtodeductpaymentstoequity(suchasdividends)toarriveattaxableincome.

¨ Thedollartaxbenefitfromtheinterestpaymentinanyyearisafunctionofyourtaxrateandtheinterestpayment:¤ Taxbenefiteachyear=TaxRate*InterestPaymentThecaveatisthatyouneedtohave theincometocoverinterestpaymentstogetthistaxbenefit.

¨ Proposition1:Otherthingsbeingequal,thehigherthemarginaltaxrateofabusiness,themoredebtitwillhaveinitscapitalstructure.

Page 15: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

15

TheEffectsofTaxes

Aswath Damodaran

15

¨ Youarecomparingthedebtratiosofrealestatecorporations,whichpaythecorporatetaxrate,andrealestateinvestmenttrusts,whicharenottaxed,butarerequiredtopay95%oftheirearningsasdividendstotheirstockholders.Whichofthesetwogroupswouldyouexpecttohavethehigherdebtratios?

a. Therealestatecorporationsb. Therealestateinvestmenttrustsc. Cannottell,withoutmoreinformation

Page 16: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

16

Debtaddsdisciplinetomanagement

Aswath Damodaran

16

¨ Ifyouaremanagersofafirmwithnodebt,andyougeneratehighincomeandcashflowseachyear,youtendtobecomecomplacent.Thecomplacencycanleadtoinefficiencyandinvestinginpoorprojects.Thereislittleornocostbornebythemanagers

¨ Forcingsuchafirmtoborrowmoneycanbeanantidotetothecomplacency.Themanagersnowhavetoensurethattheinvestmentstheymakewillearnatleastenoughreturntocovertheinterestexpenses.Thecostofnotdoingsoisbankruptcyandthelossofsuchajob.

Page 17: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

17

DebtandDiscipline

Aswath Damodaran

17

¨ Assumethatyoubuyintothisargumentthatdebtaddsdisciplinetomanagement.Whichofthefollowingtypesofcompanieswillmostbenefitfromdebtaddingthisdiscipline?

a. Conservativelyfinanced(verylittledebt),privatelyownedbusinesses

b. Conservativelyfinanced,publiclytradedcompanies,withstocksheldbymillionsofinvestors,noneofwhomholdalargepercentofthestock.

c. Conservativelyfinanced,publiclytradedcompanies,withanactivistandprimarilyinstitutionalholding.

Page 18: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

18

BankruptcyCost

Aswath Damodaran

18

¨ Theexpectedbankruptcycostisafunctionoftwovariables--¤ theprobabilityofbankruptcy,whichwilldependuponhowuncertain

youareaboutfuturecashflows¤ thecostofgoingbankrupt

n directcosts:LegalandotherDeadweightCostsn indirectcosts:Costsarisingbecause peopleperceive youtobeinfinancialtrouble

¨ Proposition2:Firmswithmorevolatileearningsandcashflowswillhavehigherprobabilitiesofbankruptcyatanygivenlevelofdebtandforanygivenlevelofearnings.

¨ Proposition3:Otherthingsbeingequal,thegreatertheindirectbankruptcycost,thelessdebtthefirmcanaffordtouseforanygivenlevelofdebt.

Page 19: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

19

Debt&BankruptcyCost

Aswath Damodaran

19

¨ Rankthefollowingcompaniesonthemagnitudeofbankruptcycostsfrommosttoleast,takingintoaccountbothexplicitandimplicitcosts:

a. AGroceryStoreb. AnAirplaneManufacturerc. HighTechnologycompany

Page 20: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

20

AgencyCost

Aswath Damodaran

20

¨ Anagencycostarises whenever youhiresomeone elsetodosomethingforyou.Itarisesbecauseyourinterests(as theprincipal)maydeviate fromthoseofthepersonyouhired(astheagent).

¨ Whenyoulendmoneytoabusiness, youareallowingthestockholders tousethatmoneyinthecourseofrunningthatbusiness. Stockholdersinterestsaredifferent fromyourinterests, because¤ You(aslender)areinterested ingettingyourmoneyback¤ Stockholders areinterestedinmaximizing theirwealth

¨ Insomecases, theclashofinterestscanleadtostockholders¤ Investinginriskierprojects thanyouwouldwantthemto¤ Payingthemselves largedividends whenyouwouldratherhavethemkeepthecash

inthebusiness.¨ Proposition4:Otherthingsbeingequal,thegreatertheagencyproblems

associatedwithlendingtoafirm,thelessdebtthefirmcanaffordtouse.

Page 21: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

21

DebtandAgencyCosts

Aswath Damodaran

21

¨ Assumethatyouareabank.Whichofthefollowingbusinesseswouldyouperceivethegreatestagencycosts?

a. ATechnologyfirmb. ALargeRegulatedElectricUtilityc. ARealEstateCorporation¨ Why?

Page 22: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

22

Lossoffuturefinancingflexibility

Aswath Damodaran

22

¨ Whenafirmborrowsuptoitscapacity,itlosestheflexibilityoffinancingfutureprojectswithdebt.

¨ Thus,ifthefirmisfacedwithanunexpectedinvestmentopportunityorabusinessshortfall,itwillnotbeabletodrawondebtcapacity,ifithasalreaduseditup.

¨ Proposition5:Otherthingsremainingequal,themoreuncertainafirmisaboutitsfuturefinancingrequirementsandprojects,thelessdebtthefirmwilluseforfinancingcurrentprojects.

Page 23: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

23

Whatmanagersconsiderimportantindecidingonhowmuchdebttocarry...

Aswath Damodaran

23

¨ AsurveyofChiefFinancialOfficersoflargeU.S.companiesprovidedthefollowingranking(frommostimportanttoleastimportant)forthefactorsthattheyconsideredimportantinthefinancingdecisionsFactor Ranking (0-5)1.Maintainfinancialflexibility 4.552.Ensurelong-term survival 4.553.MaintainPredictable SourceofFunds 4.054.Maximize StockPrice 3.995.Maintainfinancial independence 3.886.Maintainhighdebtrating 3.567.Maintaincomparabilitywithpeergroup 2.47

Page 24: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

24

Debt:Summarizingthetradeoff

Aswath Damodaran

24

Page 25: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

25

TheTradeoffforDisney,Vale,TataMotorsandBaidu

Aswath Damodaran

25

Debt trade off Discussion of relative benefits/costs Tax benefits Marginal tax rates of 40% in US (Disney & Bookscape), 32.5% in India (Tata

Motors), 25% in China (Baidu) and 34% in Brazil (Vale), but there is an offsetting tax benefit for equity in Brazil (interest on equity capital is deductible).

Added Discipline

The benefits should be highest at Disney, where there is a clear separation of ownership and management and smaller at the remaining firms.

Expected Bankruptcy Costs

Volatility in earnings: Higher at Baidu (young firm in technology), Tata Motors (cyclicality) and Vale (commodity prices) and lower at Disney (diversified across entertainment companies). Indirect bankruptcy costs likely to be highest at Tata Motors, since it’s products (automobiles) have long lives and require service and lower at Disney and Baidu.

Agency Costs Highest at Baidu, largely because it’s assets are intangible and it sells services and lowest at Vale (where investments are in mines, highly visible and easily monitored) and Tata Motors (tangible assets, family group backing). At Disney, the agency costs will vary across its business, higher in the movie and broadcasting businesses and lower at theme parks.

Flexibility needs

Baidu will value flexibility more than the other firms, because technology is a shifting and unpredictable business, where future investment needs are difficult to forecast. The flexibility needs should be lower at Disney and Tata Motors, since they are mature companies with well-established investment needs. At Vale, the need for investment funds may vary with commodity prices, since the firm grows by acquiring both reserves and smaller companies. At Bookscape, the difficulty of accessing external capital will make flexibility more necessary.

Page 26: CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 …people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/cfspr16/Session16.pdf · CORPORATE FINANCE LECTURE NOTE PACKET 2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDEND POLICY

26

6 ApplicationTest:Wouldyouexpectyourfirmtogainorlosefromusingalotofdebt?

Aswath Damodaran

26

¨ Considering,foryourfirm,¤ Thepotentialtaxbenefitsofborrowing¤ Thebenefitsofusingdebtasadisciplinarymechanism¤ Thepotentialforexpectedbankruptcycosts¤ Thepotentialforagencycosts¤ Theneedforfinancialflexibility

¨ Wouldyouexpectyourfirmtohaveahighdebtratiooralowdebtratio?

¨ Doesthefirm’scurrentdebtratiomeetyourexpectations?