Copyright ANTHONY KEITH KNOPP 1973
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Copyright ANTHONY KEITH KNOPP 1973
"THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:" INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION
AND THL AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN MEXICO, 1914
by
ANTHONY KLITH KNOPP. B.A., M.A.T.. M.A.
A DISSERTATION
IN
HISTORY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved
May. 1973
20 \ 7 5 "THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:" INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION
1 9 7 3 AND THL AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN MEXICO, 1914
A/0,Zt> by
tO^^/j ANTHONY KLITH KNOPP, B.A.. M.A.T., M.A.
A DISSERTATION
IN
HISTORY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Approved
May. 1973
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to express my great debt to Professor David M. Vigness for
his unfailing good humor, frequent encouragement, and perceptive criti
cism in directing this dissertation. To Professors Lowell Blaisdell,
James Harper, Robert Hayes, William Tucker, and Ernest Wallace go my
wannest thanks for their aid and assistance.
n
TABLL OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ii
FORWARD iv
I. MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES: THE GROWTH OF
DISTRUST 1
II. HUERTA. WILSON. AND INTERVENTION AT VERACRUZ 28
III. OPINION IN THE AMERICAN PRESS 57
IV. THE AniTUDES OF AMERICAN ELITES 106
V. THE PROBLEMS AND OPINIONS OF FOREIGNERS IN MEXICO
AND THE REACTION OF THE EUROPEAN PRESS 136
VI. THE RESPONSE OF THE MEXICAN PEOPLE 167
VII. THE CLASH OF ARMS AND CULTURES IN VERACRUZ 219
VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND EPILOGUE 253
BIBLIOGRAPHY 266
m
FORWARD
Right here, wfien he searches for the w i l l of the people outside his own land , the Wilsonian is overwhelmed, or cer tain ultimately to be overwhelmed, even on the basis of his own principles of self-government, by a tangle of d i f f i cu l ties In applying his policy of judgment on revolutions against other constitutions than his own. In many Latin American countries, not to mention the rest of the world, governments have been republican only in form and le t ter . Once ensconced in constitutional authority, a government, that is to say a strong man, by control of electoral machinery, the police and the army, can extend his power under color of the constitution. To deny the right of revolution against such a regime would be to frustrate real self-government. Wilson's answer to this . . . presumably would have been that the revolutionary government might be recognized i f sanctioned by the will of the people. But what is the wil l of the people, 0 Robespierre, Napoleon I and Napoleon I I I , 0 Porfirio Diaz, and Zelaya, 0 Woodrow Wilson, Kerensky, Lenin, Gerardo Machado, Mussolini, 0 Adolf Hitler? At best the tasks and responsib i l i t ies of sitting in judgment on revolutions, even i f judgment could be pol i t ical ly unbiased, extend to inf in i te gradations, degrees, circumstances, d i f f icu l t ies , diplomacies, and inconsistencies. That is why traditional international practice had avoided the danger of dogma in dealing with this problem.^
Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. , 194jy, pp. 173-74.
IV
CHAPTER I
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES: THE GROWTH OF DISTRUST
On October 16, 1909, an event unique in the history of the
American Presidency occurred in the border-spanning cit ies of El Paso-
Juarez. William Howard Taft , twenty-seventh president of the United
States, became the f i r s t chief executive to travel beyond the bounda
ries of the United States during his tenn of off ice.
The purpose of President Taft's two brief excursions across the
border on that autumn day was to exchange greetings and expressions of
good will with the president of Mexico, Don Porfirio Diaz. Although
the meetings with Diaz were to be brief, the details had been carefully
arranged at the highest levels. I t was even specified that President
Taft would "be attired in frock coat; the President of Mexico in
uniform." At 10:30 in the morning President Diaz crossed the interna
tional bridge to El Paso and was escorted by a cavalry troop to the
chamber of commerce building for a preliminary meeting with Taft.
Doubtless the Diaz procession made quite an impression on the A-nericans,
as the Mexican president arrived in "a state carriage, with gold hubs 2
and gold-mounted doors, drawn by black horses with gay cockades.'
President Taft was impressed, as he wrote to his wife, by the Mexican
president's uniform "with decorations emblazoning his appearance, which
Henry Fowler Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (2 vols.; Hamden, Connecticut: Archen Books, 1964), I , 463.
New York Times, Oct. 17, 1909.
1
2
quite outshone your husband's civil garb." Taft also observed that
Diaz was "most remarkable in point of agi l i ty, quickness of perception 3
and dignity of carriage." After an exchange of greetings the two
presidents withdrew for a private r.onversotion.
President Taft made his f irst historic border crossing at noon
on the sixteenth and found "the l i t t l e Mexican frontier city" of Juarez
"a veritable cloud of waving colors." At the custom house Taft was
welcomed by Diaz, and again compliments were exchanged. The climax of
the exchange of presidential visits came that evening as President Taft
returned to Juarez for a state banquet. The New York Times rated the
banquet as "probably . . . the most notable feast ever served on the
American continent." The Mexicans made every effort to Impress their
American guests. Trainloads of flowers were brought from various parts
of the republic to decorate the banquet hall. Most impressive was the
silver and gold table service which had belonged to the Emperor
Haximillian and was valued at that time at one million dollars. The
congenial atmosphere created at the banquet culminated in an exchange 5
of laudatory toasts by the two presidents.
Upon returning to the special train after the banquet Taft's
aides expressed their concern about the day's events. "Thank God
we're out of Mexico and the day's over. We've been half crazy for fear
somibody'd take 9 shot at you," said John Hays Hammond. "Oh, is that
^Quoted in Pringle, William Howard Taft, I , 464.
New York Times. Oct. 17, 1909.
^Ibid.
3 what's been bothering you? Why should you have worried about that?
If anyone wanted to get me, he couldn't wery well have missed such an
easy target," quipped the president.
Beneath the exchange of compliments and pleasantries which com
prised the apparent essence of the precedent-setting goodwill visit to
Mexico lay the anxiety of both presidents toward the unsettling under-
currents of political activity already evident south of the Rio Grande.
The suggestion of the visit had come from Diaz. Taft wrote that he had
received a conniunication, perhaps directly from the old man, of an informal character, saying how glad he would be to have such a meeting brought about. He thinks, and I believe rightly, that the knowledge throughout his country of the friendship of the United States for him and his government will strengthen him with his own people, and tend to discourage revolutionists' efforts to establish a differeng government.
Taft's concern for the fate of two billion dollars in American invest-
ments In Mexico prompted him to respond favorably to the Diaz sugges
tion. The almost certain upheaval which would follow upon the removal
or death of the elderly Diaz caused the American president to remark,
"I can only hope and pray that his demise does not come until I am out
of office."^
President Taft's support for the Diaz regime would have come as
a surprise to one who had observed Mexican-American relations when
Diaz f i rs t took office over three decades earlier. Diaz came to power
through revolution, thus providing President Rutherford B. Hayes of
^Quoted in Pringle, William Howard Taft, I , 465.
^Ibid.. 462.
4
the United States with an excise for withholding recognition of the
new government until Diaz agreed to the satisfactory settlement of o
various border disputes. "The Mexican President's 'ace in the hole'
was his ability to bring a greater measure of order to Mexico than any g
preceding Mexican government. Accordingly, the United States extended
recognition to the Diaz government in 1878.
By the last two decades of Diaz's rule the disputes over border
violations provoked by bandits and Indians had been settled, and "the
relations of the United States with Mexico were almost consistently
friendly and represented a distinct advance over the yi^ry hostile re
lations which had existed up to this time." The concern which
caused President Diaz to remark, "Poor Mexico, so far from God - so
close to the United States." was forgotten in the desire to attract
foreign capital to Mexico. Diaz provided security for both American
investments and Americans in Mexico, and the business-oriented American
g . For the substance of the Issues related to the recognition of
the Diaz government see Stuart A. MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition towards Mexico (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, T933), pp. 67-82; Daniel Cosfo VII1egas, The United States Versus Porfirio Dfaz. trans, by Nettle Lee Benson TtTncoln, Nebraska! Qrnversity of Nebraska Press, 1963).
9 J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of Latin American Relations (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 351.
Pauline Safford Relyea, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico Under Porfirio biaz, 1876-1910, Smith College Studies in History, Vol. X, No. 1 (Northampton, Massachusetts: Department of History of Smith College, 1924), p. 7.
George I . Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," in The Politics of the Developing Areas, ed. by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 521.
5
administrations of that time reciprocated with the benefits that the
friendship of a powerful neighbor can provide. In 1907 Secretary of
State Ellhu Root, on a goodwill visit to Mexico, referred to President
Diaz as "one of the great men to be held up for the hero worship of
1? '
mankind." In the course of the visit Root praised Diaz for his
reasonable attitude in International politics and stated that as far
as Mexico and the United States were concerned there existed "no ques
tions or cause for the slightest concern as to their easy and satisfac-13
tory adjustment."
Yet. Mexican fear of the "Colossus of the North," never a dead
issue to the Mexican people, underwent a revival during the latter part
of the Diaz era. The Influx of American capital plus the seeming In
transigence of the American government on a number of Issues concerning
the two nations aroused the concern of various segments of the Mexican
public. This undercurrent of hostility was not shared by the D1az
government, but the government was unable to establish its own attitudes
in the minds of the public and those whose private interests were 14
engaged. Not surprisingly, the hostile public attitudes carried over into the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods.
The relationship between D1az and the American capitalists and
their government, unpopular though i t may have been, was by no means
(Juoted in Samuel Flagg Bemis. The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation (New York; W.W. NortonT Company, Inc., lM3) , p. 170.
^James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1932), p. TO.
Relyea, Diplomatic Relations, p. 85.
6
the major factor in the downfall of the Diaz regime. When the revolu-
tion finally came in 1911, it came because Diaz had done his work too
well. This paradox is explained by the fact that the consolidation of
the regime had been so successful that no need for alterations had
appeared. But the regime had become senile. Porfirio Diaz became a
victim of his early efficiency.
Early in his first term as president the wily Diaz inaugurated a
policy which he followed throughout his career. Those who offered
resistance were destroyed, while former enemies were given a place in
his army or administration. "Never before in Mexican history had there
been aught but exclusion of the vanquished political party. These and
others he won over by giving them privileges. Those he could not pur-
15 chase and corrupt, he exiled or had assassinated." This was to be
the pattern followed by Diaz in controlling opposition; it became known
as ^'ipan o palo," bread or club.
President Diaz offered the choice of bread or the club to almost
every element of Mexican society. Brigands and outlaws were offered
positions in the Rurales , a new police force. For those who accepted
the offer there was an attractive ranchp.ro uniform, high salary, and
self-respect. Those who remained outlaws were hunted down and killed,
and no one was better equipped for the job than the former bandits who
constituted the Hurales , Diaz presented similar opportunities to the
press, the bureaucracy, the haoendados (wealthy landholders), and the
^^Carleton Beals, Porfirio Diaz, Dictator of Mexico (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1932), p. 224.
Catholic Church.
The dictator's efforts to consolidate his power within the
military provides a prime example of the ultimate fai lure of the
pan o palo policy. The generals have been the traditional determiners
of the duration of Latin American dictatorships and, consequently, had
to be treated with the utmost deference. When Diaz had completed his
program of either buying off or crushing his opponents he turned his
attention to diminishing gradually the power of the generals.
Diaz's program of military reform divided Mexico into a number
of military zones. Since the state governors were no longer the
military conmanders of their states, the power of numerous military
chiefs could be weakened by "promotions" to governorships. In order
to deprive the generals of any opportunity to build up a force based on
personal loyalty the president ordered frequent transfers of military
commanders to distant regions of the Republic. Another maneuver con
sisted of depriving certain generals of any command at al l and sending
them on foreign missions. Crucial to Diaz's military system was the
pan o palo policy.
Diaz quieted rivals too dangerous to crush by providing them with unlimited opportunities for graft and plunder. Those that he was prepared to tackle he deliberately offended, then discharged and exiled. Gradually he ousted a quarter of the army's one hundred generals and dismissed some four hundred officers of lower rank.^''
1 fi * For a brief survey of the Diaz pan o palo policy see Henry
Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (Boston: Houghton Mif f l in Company. 1966), pp. 285-98. The details of this subject may be found in Daniel Cosfo Vi11egas, ed., Historia moderna de Mexico (8 vols.; Mexico: Editorial Hermes, 1955^^^F):
^^Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 104.
8
The generals who retained the confidence of the commander-in-chief
waxed fat on railroad and gambling concessions and other government
monopolies; "as Diaz himself cynically remarked, a dog with a bone in
18 its mouth neither kills nor steals." Many generals added to their
wealth by appropriating a goodly portion of the funds Intended for the
upkeep of their forces, leaving the "enlisted" personnel to exist on
tne edge of starvation.
Diaz had Indeed established total control over the Mexican
military, but his very success contained the seeds of his own destruc
tion. The president kept his loyal generals in office long past the
end of their period of useful service. Most of them were as old as the
aa' d Diaz at the time of the revolution. The ordinary soldiers felt
no sense of personal loyalty to their frequently-transferred commanders.
Finally, the generals had eaten so much "bread" from the military
appropriations that not enough remained to support an efficient fighting
force. When the revolution began, "the army in reality proved to be
but a fragile shell."^^
The ability of the Mexican dictator to provide "bread for the
generals, as well as the bureaucracy, press, Ruralea and others was
dependent upon the success of the economic theories adopted during the
latter part of the Diaz regime. During the nineties Diaz was attracted
to and surrounded himself with a new group of advisors. Led by
Jose Ives Limantour, this group of economic theorists and technocrats
^^Parkes, History of Mexico, p. ?86.
Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, p. 105.
9 developed a philosophy based on French I'ositivism and English Social
Darwinism. These Cientifiaoe (the term referred to their philosophy
of "scientificism")
saw the future of Mexico dependent on the scientific al location of scarce skil ls and scanty resources by an appointed e l i t e , drawn exclusively from the 'rational ' (science-minded) and productive Mexicans. The middle class--between the rude Indians and the arrogant aristocrat--was to act as a trustee for the rest of the nation until the national economic plant, created by self-interested bourgeoisie, pouredoout goods and services. These, trickling downward, would make liberal democracy a possibility.^^
On the surface the Cientifioo program for economic development
appeared to be incredibly successful. Investments poured into Mexico
from Europe and the United States. Foreign management personnel,
engineers, and other technical experts bought land, built railroads,
dril led oil wells, and opened mines. Revenue from these investments
enabled the government to balance the budget as well as to satisfy
the voracious appetites of those who might otherwise threaten the
internal security of the Diaz regime. Inasmuch as the total amount of
revenue was only a tiny fraction of the profits obtained by the foreign
investors, i t appeared that Diaz was able to satisfy everyone.
During the f i r s t two decades of his rule President Diaz had
probably received greater popular support than any previous Mexican
21 government, but this support diminished as the dictator consistently
deferred to the wishes of the foreign investors. Few Mexicans shared
^^Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,"T961), p. 54.
^^Ibid. , p. 53.
10
in the prosperity of the grafters and foreigners.
The monopoly in the economic world has its counterpart in an educational or other institutional monopoly in the social situation; the vast differences in economic power demonstrated by declining real wages in the face of un-paralled prosperity for the e l i te Is reflected in a social stratif ication which makes vertical mobility a rar i ty . And in Diaz's Mexico such was the case.22
The one element which the dictator had neglected to pac1fy--the
common people--rose up in revolution against Diaz and his entire
establishment. .
As the twentieth century began small groups of crit ics and ana
lysts, usually known as the "Precursors," sought to expose the weak-
nesses of the Porfirian structure. In 1906 the Flores Magon brothers
founded the Liberal Party and announced their support for such exten
sive reforms as to require a revolution. The Magonist liberals helped
organize labor groups, but found their strongest support in the rural ,
agrarian areas where the haoendadoe were extending their encroach
ment upon traditional village lands. Nevertheless, the scattered up-
risings instigated by the Liberals were rather easily crushed by Diaz.
"The restlessness bred in the cities by Diaz' endless stay in power,
the growing Influence of foreigners in the national economy, the
frustration*; on the middle class, which was not gaining real part ici
pation in power, the workers' mutinies, the farmers' rebellions, and
the l iberals' guerrilla warfare--all this added up to nothing more 23
than a state of mind."
22charles C. Cumberland, Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity (London, Oxford and New York: Oxford UnWersity Press, 1968), p. 233.
23victor Alba, The Mexicans: The Making of. a. Nation (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. lOTT The complete story of the early crit ics of the Diaz regime and the activit ies of the liberals is to be found in
11
The frustrations of the Mexican people were transformed into a
conscious wi l l through the efforts of a handful of Intellectuals who
attacked the dogmas of the Cientifioon. Their efforts culminated
in 1908 in the publication of Los grandes problemas nacionales (Th£
Great National Problems), by Andres Molina Enriquez. Molina Enriquez
proclaimed a nationhood based on the wfietizoe, who would receive the
necessary land by breaking up the latifundioe (vast rural properties).
The wide interest attracted by Los grandes problemas nacionales was
accelerated by the publication in the United States of an interview
between President Diaz and the American journalist James Creelman.
In a statement obviously intended for foreign consumption the dictator
declared that the Mexican people had reached the point where they
would be able to govern themselves democratically; thus polit ical 24 opposition could now be tolerated and even welcomed.
The Creelman interview proved to be a serious mistake, for among
those aroused to political action was Francisco I . Madero, the man
destined to bring about the overthrow of Porfirio Diaz. In 1908
Madero, scion of a wealthy Porfir ist family in Coahuila, published a
book entitled La_ Sucesion Presidencial de 1910 (The Presidential
Succesion of 1910), which, while accepting the inevitabil i ty of the
re-election of Diaz, recommended that the vice-presidency should be
subject to free selection by the Mexican people. Because of the
James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin, Texas: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1968).
^^Parkes, History of Mexico, pp. 314-15.
12
atmosphere created by Los grandes problemas nacionales and the
Creelman interview Madero's mild recommendations made him a national
f igure . Madero toured the nat ion, established a newspaper, founded
an t i - re -e lec t ion is t c lubs, and f i n a l l y found himself the nominee of
an an t i - re -e lec t ion is t convention for the presidency in 1910.
Shortly before the presidential e lect ion was to take place
President Diaz decided that Madero posed a su f f i c ien t threat to warrant
his imprisonment. His opposition el iminated, Diaz conducted the
elect ion and had himself declared the v ic to r by an overwhelming
major i ty. By th is time
everything the future was to bring was already foreshadowed: a f rustrated middle c lass, indignant at the arrogance of foreign cap i t a l ; a p ro le ta r ia t in constant protest ; a s t u l t i f i e d and down-trodden peasantry, which set o f f occasional sparks of rebe l l i on ; a certain number of theorists of change, which a l l the other groups confusedly hungered f o r ; and a few organized and m i l i t an t groups with programs fo r act ion. But the weight of the d ic ta tor ship and urban prosperity were so great that a l l th is d is content went underground; the surface showed no signs of eruption.25
Indeed, a l l seemed to be r i gh t in Mexico in 1910. In that year
Mexico celebrated at a cost of twenty m i l l i on pesos the one-hundredth
anniversary of Father Miguel Hidalgo y Cos t i l l a ' s declarat ion of
Independence from Spain. The true center of a t ten t ion , however, was
President Diaz, by that time "recognized around the world as the
maker of modern Mexico, the man who had somehow brought s t a b i l i t y and
progress to a land that had before him been a country of chaos and
^^Alba, Mexicans, p. 107.
13 26
confusion." Among the multitude of visitors paying tribute to
Diaz were American journalists and representatives of the government
of the United States, the journalists traveling at the expense of
the Mexican government. Not surprisingly, much fulsome verbiage was
produced for consumption by the American public. Curtis Guild, a
former governor of Massachusetts and at that time the special
ambassador of the United States to the Mexican independence celebra-27 tion, referred to Diaz as "the greatest statesman in the world."
The support of the American president for the Mexican dictator
had not diminished since their meeting in El Paso-Juarez. "My own
impression has been," wrote Taft early in 1911, "that Diaz has done
more for the people of Mexico than any other Latin American has done 28
for any of his people." Taft remained confident that Diaz would do
all that he could to support and protect American interests and
investments in Mexico. It required a specific warning by Henry Lane
Wilson, American ambassador to Mexico, to jolt Taft out of his com
placent view of the Mexican situation. During a visit to the White
House while on leave of absence Wilson "painted a most pessimistic
picture of the conditions . . .," as Taft recorded it afterwards.
He said that . . . ninety per cent of the people are in sympathy with the insurrectionist movement; that the anti-American riots some three months ago and the little insurrections occurring all over Mexico were merely
William Weber Johnson, Heroic Mexico: The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., Tg^68), p. 2.
Ibid., p. 5.
^ % o t e d in Pringle, William Howard Taft, II, 700.
14
symptomatic of a volcano-like condition which, with any leadership at all, would be certain to result in an explosion, throwing President Diaz over and producing a chaos in which the 70,000 Americans now in Mexico and the . . . invested capital owned by Americans would be certain to suffer. He regarded the situation as most critical, and could not tell when a catastrophe might ensue.2^
Ambassador Wilson's belated recognition of the true situation in
Mexico also provided an accurate prediction of the revolution, but
President Taft made no attenpt to Intervene in behalf of the "indis-
30
pensable" Porfirio Diaz. Nevertheless, Taft ordered the mobiliza
tion of 20,000 troops on the Mexican border in order to provide
better policing of the area. "Taft disavowed any intention of per
mitting the troops to cross the border; before doing so, he said, he
would ask for authority from Congress."
Although the United States remained neutral during the first
phase of the Mexican revolutionary struggle, the city of San Antonio,
Texas, provided a sanctuary where Francisco Madero and his
^Vingle, William Howard Taft, II, 701.
30 There is sharp disagreement among historians over the reasons for Taft's failure to intervene in a situation in which American lives and property appeared to be in danger. According to Howard F. Cline (United States and Mexico, p. 128) "President Taft made no overt and few covert attempts to influence the outcome of the Madero revolt, though his sympathies lay with Diaz." Taft apparently believed that the presence of American troops across the Rio Grande would have a restraining effect on the revolution. William Weber Johnson (Heroic Mexico, p. 47), on the other hand, maintained that Madero had "wery little difficulty with U.S. authorities" because "the United States was beginning to be disillusioned with Porfirio Diaz," due to the efforts of Diaz to balance the concessions awarded to American and European investors.
^Vringle, William Howard Taft, II, 701.
15
co-conspirators were able to plot the overthrow of Diaz. After
several abortive attempts to cross the border and begin the revolu
tion, a warrant was issued for Madero's arrest for violating American
neutrality laws. Madero, however, was able to enter Mexico before
32 American officials could capture him.
The revolution had begun in Mexico without the leadership of
Madero. In Baja California the Flores Magon socialist-anarchist
"liberals" attempted to establish a base for a revolution which would
be completely independent of Madero, whose moderate policies were
33 condemned by \}[\e MojQonistae. Small, brush-fire insurrections had
broken out in various parts of Mexico, several of them led by men who
would become prominent in the revolutionary movement. The guerrillero
leader in the north who achieved the greatest success in the early
stages was Pascual Orozco. The politically naive Orozco obeyed
Madero's call to arms, but his personal loyalty to Madero was highly
34 questionable.
Another northern rebel, Francisco (Pancho) Villa, "the Centaur
of the North," proved to be a much more loyal supporter of Madero than
the erratic Orozco. Like Orozco, Villa was an enemy of the wealthy
32 Charles Curtis Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (New York: Greenwood Press, 1952), pp. 119-29.
The whole story of the Flores Magon revolt may be found in Lowell L. Blaisdell, The Desert Revolution: Baja California, 1911 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962).
Michael C. Meyer, Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915 (Lincoln, Nebraska: UniversTty of Nebraska Press, 1967), pp. 26-37.
16
and tyrannical hacemladoQ who supported Diaz; he learned guerilla
tactics as a bandit, raiding the haoiendae. While probably sincere
in the expression of his desire to alleviate the conditions of the
peones (peasants). Villa was also Inspired by personal ambition for
glory and a sense of adventure. Far to the south, in the state of
Morel OS, a leader with singular devotion to the cause of the peon took
up the struggle against Diaz and his haaendado allies. Emiliano
Zapata, known as "the Attila of the South" in the Mexico City news
papers, raided and burned haciendas and sugar mills to enforce his
demand for land and liberty. Zapata's loyalty to Madero was as
35 tenuous is Madero's dedication to land reform. Zapata, Villa,
Orozco, th« Flores Magon brothers, all survived the first phase of
the revolution, Madero's brief term as President, and his tragic death.
On February 13, 1911, Francisco Madero finally crossed the Rio
Grande to provide leadership in the field for the revolution. Various
guerrilla bands already had scored scattered successes in the temporary
capture of a number of towns in the North. With a small force Madero
attempted to seize Casas Grandes, but was driven off by federal troops.
Despite the set-back the rebel forces gained in strength with the
addition of the troops of Villa and Orozco; Madero was soon able to
" 36 lay seige to the weakened federal garrison at Ciudad Juarez.
The seriousness of the rebel threat was evident now to the Diaz
'^^John Womack, Jr., Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 3-96.
^^Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, pp. 127-39.
17
regime. Somewhat earlier, Jose Yves Limantour, Diaz's financial
genius, had opened negotiations with the Madero family in New York.
Upon returning to Mexico Limantour effected a number of changes, but
the revolution had gone too far to be stopped so easily. Madero did
agree, however, to an armistice at Ciudad Juarez while negotiations
were conducted. Since the negotiations dragged on with no apparent
achievements, Madero's subordinates became restless. The loyalties
of the unpaid, poorly-fed men in the ranks were to their immediate
leaders, and the loyalties of the leaders, especially Orozco, were
subject to fits and whims. "With the connivance of Villa and other
37 leaders Orozco plotted to break the peace."
On May 8, 1911, a small detachment of the rebel forces outside
Ciudad Juarez exchanged Insults with the federal troops and finally
opened fire. At the instigation of Orozco and Villa the fighting soon
became general. Madero vacillated between ordering cease-fires and
attacks while the battle raged beyond his control. In two days the
federal garrison surrendered. The rebels had won the first major
battle of the revolution, but this same success demonstrated a
dangerous weakness in the Madero organization.
"The progress of the revolution following the capture of Ciudad
38 Juarez was nothing short of amazing." This major victory prompted
hundreds of Qefes (chiefs) and their followers in all parts of the
country to take up arms and ally themselves with the Madero
37 Johnson, Heroic Mexico, p. 61.
"^^Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 144.
18
organization. The various rebel bands seized a number of important
towns and cities. The situation had become so critical that Limantour
and other high officials of the Diaz regime recognized the need to
come to terms with the rebels. On May 21 representatives of the govern-
ment and the rebels meeting in Ciudad Juarez signed an agreement which
sealed the fate of the dictator and his government. According to the
provisions of the treaty, Diaz was to resign in favor of a caretaker
government under Francisco de la Barra, then foreign minister.
39 Madero presumably would beome president in the new national elections.
Thus, the long, stern rule of Porfirio Diaz came to an end in the same
city in which Diaz had heard his virtues extolled by the President of
the United States only eighteen months earlier. The indispensable
Diaz had failed to survive President Taft's term of office.
As Diaz embarked upon the Ypiranga at Veracruz for his voyage
to exile in Europe, interim President Francisco de la Barra assumed
control of the government. Madero soon arrived in Mexico City to a
triumphal welcome. The de la Barra government carried out the terms
of the treaty of Juarez, but attempted no reforms. Madero, always the
legalist, devoted much of his time in the succeeding months to organ
izing a new political party for the forthcoming elections.
For Madero, who had insisted on the ad interim government in order to obviate criticism that he had seized power through a military operation, the period from May to November was disastrous. Without official status and therefore powerless and unwilling to determine government policy, he was nevertheless held responsible for every ill-judged action of the government. More important still, by
39 Parkes, History of Mexico., p. 321.
19
his own actions he had lost popularity tremendously and now, when he needed the support of all elements of society, he found that a large proportion were either apathetic or openly hostile to him.^^
Initially, Madero's increasing difficulties did not Include
hostility from the United States government. President Taft immediate
ly recognized the new government when Madero took office in 1911.
Taft even went to the extent of offering Madero private use of American
railroad facilities for transporting Mexican troops across Texas to
41 quell the rebellion led by Pascual Orozco. Even Henry Lane Wilson,
the American ambassador who eventually became a harsh opponent of
Madero, was sympathetic to the new regime. When Madero arrived in
Mexico City from Ciudad Juarez, Wilson reported that "all danger
of . . . anarchy in the City of Mexico passed away," but warned that
"the attitude of the old aristocracy, which largely supported the
government is contemptuous, cynical and hostile."
Despite the friendly attitude of the American government.
President Madero's problems multiplied. Even as Madero took office,
Zapata had publicly disavowed the new regime and renewed his rebel
lion. In December of 1911 General Bernardo Reyes, a potent figure in
Monterrey during the Diaz era, crossed into Mexico from Texas, anti
cipating a nationwide response to his call for rebellion. Reyes'
supporters failed to materialize, so the elderly general surrendered
Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, pp. 170-71.
^^Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 129.
^^Quoted in Pringle, William Howard Taft, II, 705.
20 to the army. Nine months later another ex-member of the Diaz regime.
General Felix Diaz, took command of the port of Veracruz and called
for a rebellion against Madero. As in Reyes' case, the armed forces
did not rally to Diaz's side, and his capture came within a week.
Both Reyes and Diaz were assigned comfortable accommodations in the
43 military prison of Santiago Tlaltelolco in Mexico City.
A much more serious threat than those initiated by representa
tives of the old regime came from within the revolutionary family.
Pascual Orozco had never been happy serving under Madero, and, after
the triumph of the revolution, opined that he was being treated
shabbily. On March 3, 1912, Orozco declared his intention to over
throw Madero. With a force of 8000 men plus the financial support
of conservative elements in Chihuahua, Orozco headed south, defeating
44 the first force which Madero sent against him.
Faced with an increasingly serious situation in the field
President Madero turned to a career army officer. General Victoriano
Huerta. If Huerta had any true loyalty, it was demonstrated in the
emotional embrace he exchanged with Porfirio Diaz as the latter
departed in defeat for exile in Europe. During the period of the
interim government Huerta had been in charge of military operations
to "contain" the Zapatistas ^ and probably was responsible for pro
voking the southern agrarian army into open hostilities. Because
Madero suspected him of sabotaging Madero's efforts to make peace
Johnson, Heroic Mexico, pp. 86-90.
^^Meyer, Mexican Rebel, pp. 67-72.
21
with Zapata, Huerta was placed on the inactive list. Nevertheless,
the Orozco menace led Madero to offer command in the field to Huerta.
Huerta assured the President of his loyalty.
General Huerta proceeded cautiously against the Orozco forces
for the contending armies were approximately equal In strength.
DeMonstrating his experience and ability in military operations
Huerta achieved a series of victories over the rebels. After the
battle of Bachimba on July 4, Orozco had to disperse his forces and
rG?f rt to luerilla warfare. The "Hero of Bachimba" was rewarded for
his success by a promotion to general of division, but when he was
•;pable to account for the funds given him for army operations, he
was again placed on the inactive list.
"Probably the most important result of the unsettled conditions
accruing from the Orozco rebellion . . . was the attitude which
47 developed in the United States." Ambassador Wilson had become quite
hostile to Madero and his policies, and had concluded that the
Mexican president was either unable or unwilling to protect American
lives and property. In his reports to the State Department Wilson
claimed that Madero was "conducting a campaign against American
interests in Mexico," and predicted "confiscation, harassment, and
dislodgment through suborned judicial decrees" unless the Mexican
45 Johnson, Heroic Mexico, pp. 69, 84.
Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and Huerta (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), pp. 9-12.
47 Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 200.
22
government was "taught in due season that every American and eyery
40 Aiiirrican intcrpst in Moxico" iiiusl. b<.' itLsiLcd with respect. Wilson's
warnings were heeded by the adm1n1stration--both President Taft and
Secretary of State Philander C. Knox discussed the problems with the
Mexican ambassador in terms which contained some veiled threats.
Taft was s t i l l certain of his ultimate course: "I am not going to
intervene . . . until no other course is possible, but I must protect
our people in Mexico, as far as possible, and their property by
having the government understand there is a God In Israel and he is
49 on duty," he wrote privately.
The situation in Mexico warranted American concern. Despite
the victories by the government over three rebellions within one
year, distressing conditions existed which received l i t t l e attention
from President Madero. "The conservative elements intensified their
50 efforts to harass, discredit, and destroy the Madero regime." The
opposition press was scornful in its treatment of the president,
while the hacendados openly expressed fear that the government might
take steps toward land reform. An American journalist working in
Mexico reported, "as a matter of fact, I do not know any large
Interest in Mexico which was exerting its influence to strengthen the
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing OTTice, 1920), pp. 828-327"
^ V o t e d in Pringle, William Howard Taft, I I , 708-09.
^^Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I . Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York: AMS Press, 1955), p. 278.
51 Madero government." Yet Madero actually felt more secure because
23
of the rebellions. Hostile reactionaries had been crushed and the
army had proven its loyalty.
President Madero was gravely mistaken in his estimate of the
opposition to his government. A plot involving the incarcerated
Reyes and Diaz plus other military and civilian elements was discovered
by several individuals who were loyal to Madero, but the president
refused to take action. On February 9, 1913, the leaders of the
conspiracy launched their attack in Mexico City. Disaffected military
groups under the command of General Manuel Mondragon liberated Reyes
and Diaz and advanced with them on the Zocalo and the national palace.
General Lauro VIIlar, military commander at the national palace,
opened fire on the rebels, killing General Reyes in the first
fusillade. The rebel force at the Zocalo dispersed, while another
column under Generals Diaz and Mondragon took refuge in the Ciudadela,
52 a fortress and arsenal some blocks distant.
Upon receiving news of the rebellion. President Madero bravely
started out along the Paseo de la Reforma. Before he reached the
Zocalo, Madero was approached by General Huerta, "and once more, as
he had so often in the past, he effusively and abjectly assured
53 Madero of his loyalty." When they reached the national palace
^^Edward I. Bell, Political Shame of Mexico (New York: McBride, Nast. 1914), p. 219.
^^Johnson, Heroic Mexico, pp. 95-98.
^^Ibid., p. 98.
24 Madero's party discovered that General Villar had been wounded. At
the suggestion of his advisors Madero appointed Huerta to succeed 54
Villar. In doing so Madero signed his own death warrant.
The period from the beginning of the rebellion on February 9
until the death of Madero on February 22 became known in Mexican
history as la decena tragica. Ten days of fighting followed the
confrontation at the national palace, but it was a sham battle,
primarily of artillery, between the Diaz forces in the Ciudadela and
the loyalist government troops under Huerta's command. Henry Lane
Wilson, ex officio "Dean of the Diplomatic Corps," utilized his posi
tion to influence the diplomatic community against Madero. Wilson
made several efforts to persuade the president to resign. "Confident
that Diaz, if he should win, would follow the United States' guidance,
the ambassador once even told Madero to his face that he hoped the
Ciudadelan leader emerged triumphant because he would be 'pro-
American.'"^^
In the meantime the commanders of the opposing forces had worked
out a modus vivendi. On February 11 Diaz and Huerta conferred in
person; apparently they agreed to continue the battle until loyal
Maderieta troops could be replaced and the populace thoroughly dis
illusioned with the Madero government. Several days of artillery
^^Manuel Bonilla, Jr., El regimen Maderista (Mexico: Talleres Linotipograficos de El Universal, 1922), pp. 128-35.
^\owell L. Blaisdell, "Henry Lane Wilson and the Overthrow of Madero," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XLIII (September, 1962), 1317"
25 fire and mounting civilian casualties passed, but Madero adamantly
resisted all pressures for his resignation. Including more initiatives
by the American ambassador. The conspirators finally decided to re
move Madero from office by force. Ambassador Wilson had reached a
similar conclusion: "This situation is intolerable ... I am going
56 to establish order." Wilson urged his government to send Madero
"firm, drastic instructions, perhaps of a menacing character" to bring 57 the fighting to an end.
It is not known what role, if any, Ambassador Wilson played in
formulating the plot against Madero, but he certainly knew of it and
was kept informed of the developments. On February 18 Wilson was
able to inform Cuban Minister Manuel Marquez Sterling: "Tomorrow all 58 will be finished, Senor Minister." As Wilson had predicted, Huerta
launched a coup d' etat the following afternoon. Troops under the
command of General Aureliano Blanquet, a conspirator, replaced
loyalist troops at the national palace; Blanquet himself made the
president a prisoner. Huerta soon arrived and declared that he had
59 "assumed the executive power."
Ambassador Wilson was probably the first to be informed of the
success of the coup. Although elated by the fruition of his desires.
56 ' " ' Manuel Marquez Sterling, Los ultimos dias del President^
Madero: Mi gestion diplomatica en Mexico (Mexico: Exiitorial Porrua, S.A., 19581", p. 226.
57 Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 236.
^^arquez Sterling, Ultimos dias, p. 244. Jose Mancisidor, Historia de la revolucion mexicana (Mexico:
Editores Mexicanos Unidos, S.A., 1959)7 pp. 195-99.
26 Wilson recognized the need to bring about a formal agreement between
the organizers of the conspiracy. Accordingly the ambassador arranged
a meeting at the American embassy the following evening between Huerta
and Diaz. "There in the United States Embassy the Power was 60 divided." The "Pact of the Embassy" allowed Huerta to become
interim president, while Diaz received the r ight to appoint ministers.
Huerta agreed to support Diaz in the next presidential election.
Immediately after Huerta seized power appeals poured In from a
multitude of sources beseeching the new dictator to spare the l i f e of
Nadero. In order to obtain Madero's resignation Huerta had, in fac t ,
agreed that the ex-president would be allowed to go into exi le. The
state department warned Ambassador Wilson that "cruel treatment of
the ex-president would in jure, in the eyes of the world, the reputation
of the Mexican c i v i l i za t ion , and this government hopes to hear of no
such treatment and hopes to hear that he had been dealt with in a
manner consistent with peace and humanity." Not withstanding his
government's instructions Wilson made no real ef for t to Influence
Huerta in this matter. On February 22 Madero was k i l led 1n "mysteri
ous circumstances."
The events of the deoena tragica had far-reaching effects. For the United States, the chief immediate result was the refusal of the Wilson administration to recognize Huerta. The ambassador's role in the February happenings is very Important for an understanding of President Wilson's then comparatively novel and since famous policy of moral
^Miguel Alessio Robles, Historia pol i t ica de la revolucion (Mexico: Ediciones Betas, 1946), p. 43.
^^Johnson, Heroic Mexico, p. 116.
27
disapprobation. Had Huerta's own brutal acts been the only consideration, he might, on the basis of long standing precedents, have obtained recognition, despite Wilson's well-known aversion to him. But on this particular occasion, as distinguished from later Instances of nonrecognition, i t was the peculiar position in which the United States government found i tsel f that greatly complicated matters,"^^
^^Blaisdell, "Henry Lane Wilson," p. 135.
CHAPTER II
HUERTA, WILSON, AND INTERVENTION AT VERACRUZ
In the American presidential election of 1912 the Democratic
candidate, Woodrow Wilson, defeated both the incumbent, William Howard
Taft, and Taft's predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt. Wilson, a southern
er by birth, was raised in a strong Calvinistic Presbyterian atmosphere
and in adulthood became a devoted academician. Both critics and sup
porters later detected these two strains of Wilson's background in his
approach to foreign policy as president. In 1910 the Democratic poli
tical machine in New Jersey selected Wilson as the candidate for
governor because of his respectability. Once in office Wilson became
his own man and began a program of progressive reforms which gained
nationwide attention and contributed to his nomination in 1912.
Upon taking office in March of 1913, President Wilson was faced
with the necessity of making decisions concerning the Mexican prob
lem. Despite the proddings of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, who was
actively supporting the new Mexican regime of General Victoriano
Huerta, the Taft administration had not recognized the Huerta govern
ment. The administration, however, was not put off by any moral
scruples concerning Huerta; secretary of State Philander Knox indica
ted that Huerta's regime would be recognized as soon as the Mexicans
agreed to the satisfactory settlement of matters that were in dispute
between the two countries. When President Wilson took office
Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and Huerta (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1969T, p. 36.
28
29
negotiations had not been completed.
The murder of President Francisco Madero created a strong
feeling of revulsion in the new American president. Less than a week
after his inauguration President Wilson made a statement of his Latin
American policy. While declaring that his administration would make
every effort "to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence
of our sister republics in Central and South America," the president
announced that cooperation would be "possible only when supported at
every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon
law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force." In what obviously was
an attack on Huerta and his methods of obtaining power the president
continued, "We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the
power of government to advance their own personal interests or
ambition."2
Despite the threat implied in President Wilson's f i r s t state
ment of his slowly emerging Latin American policy, the Huerta govern
ment probably would have received recognition had the dictator been
able to restore peace to Mexico. But the Revolution soon began anew.
In the North, opposition coalesced under the leadership of Governor
Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila and became known as the
Quoted in Sanual Flagg Bemis, The. Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation (New York: W.W. Norton ft Company, Inc.,n'943), p. 175. Louis M. Teitelbaum disagreed with the dominant Interpretation of Wilson's statement: " I t was cited at a later time that Wilson rejected Huerta from the start. In the context of its moment the statement did l i t t l e more than just i fy nonaction; and neither Huerta nor his country was named" (Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution [1913-1916]: A History of United States-HeSTican RelationFTrom the Murder of Madero until V i l la 's PFovocation across the Border T ew York: Exposition Press, 1967J, p. W*
30
Constitutionalist movement. Carranza had been a federal senator
during the Diaz era, but in his quest of the governorship of Coahuila
in 1910 he obtained the hesitant support of Francisco Madero,
causing Diaz to deny Carranza the governship. Carranza then joined 3
the Madero revolt.
After the May 1911 rebel victory at Ciudad Juarez, Madero
appointed Carranza as secretary of war in the provisional cabinet.
In the elections Carranza became governor of Coahuila. When Madero
was ousted as president, Carranza refused to recognize the Huerta
regime and wrote to the other governors, inviting them "to place
themselves at the front of national sentiment, justly indignant, and
display the banner of legality in order to support the Constitutional
4
Government." Carranza's support grew slowly; he was forced to re
tire from Sal tillo, the state capital. In an attempt to rally
support Carranza proclaimed the Plan of Guadalupe on March 26, 1913.
This proclamation was a program for the reestablishment of constitu
tional government rather than a formula for social and economic
change. Carranza assumed the position of "First Chief of the Army
which will be Constitutionalist."^
When Carranza began his revolt, he had at his disposal only a
small body of troops under the command of General Pablo Gonzalez.
Alfonse Taracena, Venustiano Carranza (Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1963), p. 27.
^Ibid., p. 90.
5 Johnson, Heroic Mexico, p. 151.
31
Soon other small rebel bands agreed to accept the Plan of Guadalupe,
but Carranza had to visit the state of Sonera to find his most valuable
ally, the highly capable Alvaro Obregon. "The unconquered," as
Obregon came to be called, soon achieved a succession of unspectacu
lar but significant victories in the Northwest.
In Chihuahua the indomitable Pancho Villa organized guerrilla
bands into a formidable army. Carranza and Villa never trusted each
other, but an alliance was established when envoys from Carranza met
with Villa on August 9, 1913. Villa declared "categorically that he
would be the single and supreme Chief of the operations in the State
of Chihuahua," but he did agree to recognize Carranza "as Chief of
the Constitutionalist Army since it was necessary to maintain unity
among all the elements which are fighting the usurper Huerta." In
the South Emiliano Zapata, persistently in rebellion, now against
Huerta, proved to be even less cooperative than Villa. Trusting no
one, Zapata insisted that all revolutionaries endorse his own Plan of
Ayala, which called for radical land reform. The distrust among the
revolutionary leaders diminished the effectiveness of their operations
against the government, but their efforts provided President Wilson
with alternatives to what otherwise would have been the inevitable
recognition of Huerta.
Woodrow Wilson's first statement of his attitudes toward Latin
America was not the result of a carefully formulated policy. Indeed,
Federico Cervantes M., Francisco Villa y_ Iji revolucion (Mexico: Ediciones Alonso, 1960), p. 55.
32
Wilson had no foreign policy when he took office. Just before he
assumed the presidency Wilson confided to a friend that "it would be
the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with
foreign affairs." In his scholarly training and study Wilson had
been almost exclusively concerned with domestic issues, devoting
little attention to developments in foreign affairs. It would be a
mistake, however, to conclude that Wilson was totally unprepared to
meet the foreign problems of his presidency.
Whether he responded wisely or unwisely to the mounting international challenges of the years from 1913-1920, he executed policies that were on the whole firmly grounded upon a consistent body of principles and assumptions that supplied motive power and shaped and governed policy in the fields of action. These principles and assumptions were deeply rooted in Wilson's general thinking before 1913 about cosmology, ethics, the nature and ends of government, and the role of his own country in the creative development of mankind; they were in turn enlarged and refined as Wilson sought to apply them in practical affairs after his inauguration. Determining and controlling, they gave both strength and weakness to the diplomatist in action.^
The principles and assumptions upon which President Wilson was
to base his foreign policy was evident prior to his taking office.
The main undercurrent in Wilson's approach to foreign problems was
idealism, buttressed by the morality of the Christian principles by
There has been some disagreement over this point. In The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore: Johns HopKins Press, 1937) Harley Notter analyzed Wilson's writings and concluded that he had a complete foreign policy by the time he became president.
Ibid., p. 215. g Arthurs. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major
Foreign Policies (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1957), pp. 11-12.
33
which he was raised. This idealism, coupled with Wilson's "faith in
man's inherent goodness and in the possibility of progress," found
substance in his dedication to democracy as the highest form of
government. Wilson gave evidence of his idealism and devotion to
democracy when he attempted to democratize the social clubs while
president of Princeton University and in his efforts to achieve pro
gressive reforms as governor of New Jersey.
It was Inevitable that President Wilson would attempt to apply
his principles to foreign policy because "the American people, he
believed, had a peculiar role to play, indeed a mission to execute
in history" which was "to fulfill the divine plan by service to man
kind, by leadership in moral purposes, and above all by advancing
peace and world brotherhood." When Wilson's view of the Mexican
situation solidified and he determined that General Huerta was ob
structing the will of the people and denying Wilson's own grand plan
for the betterment of mankind, the American president found himself
increasingly Involved in policies and actions which he would be hard
put to justify.
As a novice in the field of International diplomacy, Wilson
demonstrated uncertainty and inconsistency in his efforts to trans-
lage his ideals into realities in Mexico. In part his efforts were
frustrated by those who either rpisunderstood or actively opposed the
president's "missionary" diplomacy. Only a few days after Wilson
^°Ib1d., p. 14.
^^Ibid., pp. 15-16.
34
had produced his first policy statement on Latin America, British
Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Gray informed the American State
Department of the intention of his government to extend recognition
12 to Huerta, an action completed before the end of the month. By
the end of the summer seventy-five percent of the countries which
normally maintained diplomatic relations with Mexico had recognized
the tiuerta regime.
Europeans followed the old rules; Wilson made up his own. That was a core issue in the subsequent Wilsonian conflicts with Huerta, with Huerta's domestic opponents, and with Europe. When Wilson formally announced the new departure on March 11, 1913, he did not foresee the snarls and entanglements that might ensue. He was against bad men and for constitutionalism, worthy attitudes but hard to fit to specific international situations.^^
President Wilson's hostility toward Huerta also found opposi
tion within the American "official family." The strong support for
Huerta from American Ambassador Henry Wilson was not surprising,
but the ambassador's recommendations were endorsed by Fred Morris
Bearing, the assistant chief of the Latin American division of the
State Department, who stressed that the death of Madero "has nothing
whatever to do with the expediency" of recognizing the Huerta
government. The legal precedents for recognition were set forth
12 British recognition of Huerta is treated in detail in Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, T^68Ti pp. 131-66.
^^Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 142.
^^Grieb, United States and Huerta, pp. 69-70.
35
by John Bassett Moore, counselor for the State Department. Moore
noted that
the government of the United States having originally set Itself up by revolution has always acted upon the de facto principle. We regard governments as existing or not existing. . . . Our depreciation of the political methods which may prevail in certain countries cannot relieve us of the necessity of dealing with the governments of these countries. . . . We cannot become the censors of the morals or conduct of other nations and make our approval or disapproval of their methods the test of our recognition of their governments without intervening in their affairs.15
Even among the president's closest advisors there was considerable
support for recognition because they doubted "whether the Mexicans
could ever organize a government" if Huerta was ousted.
Woodrow Wilson, however, had already made up his mind on the
question of recognition. "I will not recognize a government of
butchers," he remarked privately. Uncertain as to the proper means
to achieve the elimination of Huerta, Wilson's policy was subjected
to challenges by those who opposed, perhaps covertly, the president's
goals, and they were sometimes successful in obtaining temporary
modifications of policy. Colonel Edward M. House, the president's
closest advisor, was a strong proponent of recognition. Early in
May House presented to the president a plan proposed by Judge
Delbert J. Haff of Kansas City which called for the United States to
recognize Huerta provided that early elections were held. Haff's
15 Quoted in Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 72.
Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 73.
Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and th£ Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), p. 109.
36
proposal had the approval of several oil and mining companies which
had large interests in Mexico. Wilson, impressed by the proposal,
went so far as to draft notes to be sent to Mexico proposing mediation
and providing for recognition. Once again, however, the president
changed his mind and decided not to send the notes, "probably because
he felt still too ignorant about conditions in Mexico and was begin
ning to doubt the credibility and the integrity of Ambassador Wilson
and his ability to serve as an impartial mediator in the Mexican
18 struggle."
Wilson's growing distrust of the American ambassador plus his
inclination toward "personal" diplomacy led him to pursue extra-
diplomatic means to obtain an accurate assessment of the Mexican
situation. The president requested the services of William Bayard
Hale, a personal friend. A former clergyman and journalist. Hale
knew nothing of Mexico and could not speak Spanish; he was poorly
suited to the task Wilson had set for him. Biased by his associations
with American opponents of Huerta, Hale produced reports from Mexico
which confirmed all of the president's suspicions. Hale saw Mexico
in the midst of a "struggle between surviving mediaeval ism, with its
ideas of arisotracy, exploitation, and peionage, and modern civiliza
tion." Hale's evaluation of Huerta was less than encouraging:
General Huerta is an ape-like old man, of almost pure Indian blood. He may be said to subsist on alcohol.
Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 351-53. The text of Wilson's notes is found in Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1927-1939), IV, 248. 254.
37
Drunk or half-drunk (he is never sober), he never loses a certain shrewdness. He has been life-long a soldier, and one of the best in Mexico, and he knows no methods but those of force. It is now believed by some who come into contact with him that Huerta is finding the presidency a hard and uncongenial task. . . . But he is a hard fighter, glories in the exercise of power, and I see no signs that he will abandon his office, except, as is possible, to take the field for a few months, so as to render himself legally eligible to take the presidency again under the pretence of election.^^
A major theme in many of Hale's reports to the president was
the danger of retaining the unreliable Ambassador Wilson as the chief
diplomatic agent of the United States in Mexico. Hale expressed the
belief that the overthrow of Madero occurred solely because of the
encouragement and support which the ambassador gave to Huerta. After
presenting a rather impressionistic recapitulation of the decena
tragica^ Hale concluded, "it cannot but be a cause of grief that
what is probably the most dramatic story in which an American diplo
matic officer has ever been involved, should be a story of sympathy
with treason, perfidy and assassination in an assault on constitu-
20 tional government."
The administration was eager to accept Special Agent Hale's
conclusions because Hale's reports confirmed the president's own
intuitive judgement of the Mexican situation. The president and
Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan agreed that Ambassador
Wilson was to be recalled "for consultation." For his part the
^^Quoted in Link, New Freedom, p. 354.
^ % o t e d in Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 82.
38
ambassador strenuously objected to the sending of special agents to
Mexico. Wilson accelerated his petitions to the State Department,
urging recognition of Huerta, but soon recognized that he was being
Ignored. On July 16, 1913, Secretary of State Bryan ordered the
ambassador to return to the United States, where he presented his
report to Bryan and had an unproductive meeting with the president.
Shortly thereafter President Wilson requested the ambassador's resig
nation.
"Throughout the first five months of his difficulties with the
United States, Huerta exercised amazing restraint, less out of affec
tion for his northern neighbor than in the hope of some reconcilia-
21 tion." As time passed, however, and the United States showed no
signs of cooperation, the Mexican president and his ministers began
to show signs of hostility. Such an atmosphere was not conducive to
a friendly reception for the mediation proposal which President
Wilson had finally decided to offer
Accused by his critics of allowing policy to drift and failing
to provide adequate protection for Americans and their interests in
Mexico, the American president had determined to send another special
representative to Mexico to negotiate with the Huerta regime. On
22 July 28 Wilson summoned former Governor John Lind of Minnesota to
^^Michael C. Meyer, Huerta: A Political Portrait (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 117.
A sympathetic account of his life and mission to Mexico may be found in George M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 19357!
39
Washington and asked Lind to serve as the president's personal repre
sentative "To Whom It May Concern" and advisor to the American
embassy. Lind had played a part in Wilson's campaign for the presi
dency and was loyal to the president's policies, but was unqualified
otherwise for the task to which he was assigned. The president's
personal representative to Mexico knew nothing of the Mexican situa
tion and could not speak Spanish. He had a strong prejudice against
minority groups, which made it difficult for him to work with the
Irish Catholic Nelson J. O'Shaughnessy, American charge d'affaires.
In fact, Lind "was a rabid anti-Catholic, who later proposed that
the United States take an option on the Cathedral in Mexico City,
23 which he considered a suitable site for a new embassy."
President Wilson provided his personal representative with a
minimum of instructions; Lind's only directions were to obtain
Huerta's agreement to a proposal which the president had prepared.
Wilson the pedagogue was in evidence in the justification for the
proposal: "We are seeking to counsel Mexico for her own good and in
the Interest of her own peace, and not for any other purpose what-
24 ever." The president then offered to mediate between the opposing
Mexican factions provided that Huerta and the Constitutionalist
accept an armistice and agree to hold an early election in which
Huerta would not be a candidate but would agree to accept the outcome.
The Constitutionalists were not consulted about the proposal. In his
^^Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 92.
Quoted in Link, New Freedom, p. 357.
40
offer President Wilson demonstrated that
for the most part he conceived of the Revolution in sheerly polit ical terms, that is , in terms of the Mexican masses struggling for constitutional government and political democracy. Almost inevitably, therefore, he thought in terms of a political solution: the restoration of constitutional government through free elections. Events would later prove how romantic a and superficial this approach was, but i t governed al l of Wilson's early Mexican policy.25
John Lind was received coldly in Mexico. The Huerta government
suspected that Lind's mission was to be the precursor of armed inter
vention by the United States, and the Mexicans even threatened not to
receive Lind at a l l . Nevertheless, President Huerta was ready to
deal with Wilson's personal representative by the time Lind had
arrived in Mexico City, because the dictator's defiance of the United
States had already served to bolster his prestige. Wilson's proposal,
however, was unacceptable to Huerta since i t did not include recogni
tion of the Huerta regime. Despite renewal of the American offer,
including some "sweetening" in the promise of a loan, Huerta remained
adament.
25 Ibid., p. 350. In opposition to Link's view Doris A.
Graber believed that Wilson's "policy also accorded with the national interest of the United States because, with rare exceptions, no government could be stable in the long run unless it was based on a constitutional foundation and responsive to the will of the people. And unstable governments in the American sphere of interest menaced American security. Since dictatorship under Huerta could not possibly assure domestic tranquillity for any length of time, the United States must try all means in its power - progressing from a lesser to greater pressures - to dislodge Huerta" (Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Intervention Policies and Practices, Washington, D . C : Public AffaTFFPress, 1959, p. 167.
41
The loan offer, which Lind had made on his own initiative, completed a series of blunders, for the mention of money in such a delicate situation smacked of bribery and enabled the Huerta government to assume an air of shocked Indignation. This stance was added to Huerta's previous claim of saving Mexico from Gringo domination. Thus, President Wilson, much to his own consternation, in seeking to oust Huerta had inadvertently strengthened his adversary's position.2<^'
When the American president recognized that the Lind mission
had failed, he began the search for an alternative approach to the
Mexican problem. It was at this time that Wilson expressed an opinion
of his adversary:
Our friend Huerta is a diverting brute! He is always so perfectly in character: so false, so sly, so full of bravado (the bravado of ignorance, chiefly), and yet so courageous, too, and determined, — such a mixture of weak and strong, of ridiculous and respectable! One moment you long for his blood, out of mere justice for what he has done, and the next you find yourself entertaining a sneaking admiration for his nerve. He will not let go till he pulls the whole house down with him. He leaves only those who advise him to do what he wants to do. He has cold lead for those who tell him the truth. He is seldom sober and always impossible, and yet what an Indomitable fighter for his own hand! Every day the news from Mexico City unsettles the news of the day before. The whole thing is quick-silver. I dare not finish my message to Congress Intended for Tuesday till Tuesday's news comes, for fear the things I say in it might turn out to be untrue in fact! Any hour of the day or night I may have to revise my judgment as to what it is best to do.27
The message to congress to which President Wilson referred was
presented on August 27; the president had decided to take his case
to the people. Wilson explained that he believed that "it was our
^^Grieb, United States and HuerU, p. 99.
^^Quoted in Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wi1 son, Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1927-1939), IV, 273.
42 28 duty at least to volunteer our good offices. . . . " but acknowledged
the fai lure of the Lind mission. The president announced an embargo
on the exportation of arms to Mexico and proclaimed a policy of
patience and self-restraint. The president's policy was promptly
termed "watchful waiting" in the press. Later the term was to be
applied with scorn.
"Watchful waiting" provided Huerta with some breathing space
which he uti l ized in efforts to consolidate his position. "That is
substantially what I expected," Huerta remarked upon hearing a
sunmary of Wilson's address. "We never had any reason to doubt the
29 United States' friendship and disinterested motives." Furthermore,
i t appeared that the entire dispute between the United States and
Mexico might well dissolve after the national elections which had
been called for October 26. But there were growing d i f f icu l t ies ,
too. The Constitutionalists captured the major ra i l center of
Torreen, and Huerta's opponents in the /^faderieta-domlnated congress
escalated their attacks on the president. Huerta reacted by dissolv-
30 ing the Chamber of Deputies and arresting 110 of i ts members.
President Wilson, "shocked at the lawless methods employed by
General Huerta," refused to recognize the results of the Impending
national elections. The American president now was determined to
op
Link, New Freedom, p. 361.
^^Ib1d., p. 362.
'^^Meyer, Huerta, pp. 147-48.
^^Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 277.
43
bring down Huerta and his government. To accomplish this the president
believed that he would have to persuade foreign governments, particu
larly the British, to withdraw their support from Huerta. When John
Bassett Moore, the State Department counselor, persuaded Wilson not
to press his views through diplomatic channels, the president enun
ciated the same doctrine in a speech in Mobile, Alabama, on October 27.
Its theme was that businessmen (meaning British) had handicapped the development of Latin America (Mexico); foreign policies of nations (Great Britain) there had been based on material ("sordid") interests that had retarded growth of political liberty. The United States was going to stop all that. Wilson foreswore any annexationist designs on Latin America (Mexico).^2
There was little sympathy among the European powers for
President Wilson and his role in the Mexican imbroglio. The British
saw no reason to deviate from the time-honored practice of granting
de facto recognition and were both amused and provoked at Wilson's
moralistic approach to the Mexican situation. As if to underscore
the attitude of the British government, the new British ambassador
to Mexico, Sir Lionel Carden, presented his credentials to President
Huerta only one day after Huerta had dissolved the Chamber of
Deputies. European governments generally were concerned about the
well-being of their nationals and investments in Mexico. Perhaps a
remark made by Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany best expressed the attitude
of the European governments: "morality [is] all right, but what
about dividends?"'^'^
^^Cline. United States and Mexico, p. 149.
'^^Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 300.
44
Wilson had so far violated eyery rule of good diplomacy. He had opened negotiations without first obtaining support from groups and countries who might be affected. His first notes were strong and ominous, then they dribbled toward weakness: Time after time he said all patience was exhausted, but he always reopened negotiations. He had threatened, then failed to carry out his threats: Lind and others had told Huerta that if he stood as a candidate in October, Wilson would recognize the Constitutionalists or Intervene. Neither had happened.3'*
John Lind had remained in Mexico as a rather lonely "observer" at
steamy Veracruz, a far cry from the bracing Minnesota climate.
Embittered by his confrontation with Huerta, Lind soon became ena
moured of the Constitutionalist cause. In the middle of November he
sent a lengthy memorandum to the State Department which blamed the
problems of Mexico on the wealthy, the Catholic Church, and the army.
Lind concluded:
We could defeat but we could neither humble nor humiliate them. This can only be done by their own people, their own blood -- the people of the North. . . . To make a dog feel that he is really a cur he must be whipped by another dog and preferably by a cur. Consequently let this housedeaning bo done by home talent.^^
Lind urged the American government to provide extensive aid to the
Constitutionalists since the only al t«.'rnative would have to be
American military intervention.
President Wilson's considerations had already turned toward the
Constitutionalists as an alternative to Huerta. On October 17
William Bayard Hale received his second commission as confidential
agent from President Wilson: Hale was to travel to Nogales on the
Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 150.
"^^Quoted in Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 120.
45
Mexican border and negotiate with the provisional government of
Venustiano Carranza. The Constitutionalist leader was not in a re
ceptive mood, however, and he not only revised Wilson's offer of
mediation, but also insisted on unconditional recognition of his
36 government. President Wilson, greatly disappointed by Carranza's
attitude, on November 19 ordered Hale to terminate the discussions.
Despite lack of cooperation from Carranza, President Wilson
soon became reconciled to the necessity of supporting Huerta's
opponents, especially as the American president had not achieved
success in his diplomatic initiatives. At a January 2 meeting be
tween Wilson and John Lind at Pass Christian, Mississippi, on the
Gulf of Mexico, Lind attempted to impress upon the president the
wickedness of Huerta and urged more positive action, even if it meant
37 the seizure of the port city of Tampico. President Wilson took no
action at this time, but Huerta appeared to be hardening his attitude
in the face of "watchful waiting." On January 7 President Huerta
received a group of American visitors at the national palace and made
the following remarks:
Hell will hold both Woodrow Wilson and myself before I resign. . . .
The time has passed when I will give the slightest consideration that I leave the presidency.
Once I might have resigned at the bidding of almost anyone, but now, no. It is not a question of pride, ambition or pomp with me, but duty -- nothing else.
^^Luis G. Zorrilla, Historia de las relaciones entre Mexico y los Estades Unidos de America (2 vols.; Mexico: Editoria, Porrua, S.A., 1966), II, 253.
^^Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 299.
46
What does Woodrow Wilson know of Mexico or what kind of government its people need? Nothing. He does not understand that Mexico is like a snake with its life in its head. And they will have to batter this old head off my shoulders before they kill me or this government.^^
President Wilson also faced Increased pressure from European govern
ments to take some kind of action, especially after Huerta announced
on January 14 that he was suspending interest payments on the bonded
debt.
Confronted by increasing hostility from the Mexican dictator
and demands from many sources for action President Wilson reached a
decision early in February. The president announced that he was
lifting the arms embargo, hoping that it would enable the Constitu
tionalists to accelerate their military advances. Huerta also found
it easier to obtain arms, however, and "the immediate effect of the
President's action in lifting the arms embargo was a considerable
escalation of the intensity of the Mexican conflict, for both sides
39 were now better equipped."
The war for the control of northern Mexico had preceeded at a
slow but deadly pace, with victories and defeats for both sides. In
the spring of 1914 the Constitutionalists began a steady advance;
particularly successful was the "Division of the North" under the
leadership of Pancho Villa. Villa's troops scored a major victory at
Torreen on April 2, giving the Constitutionalists practically
^^New York World, January 8. 1914.
^^Grleb, United States and Huerta, p. 122
undisputed possession of the northern third of the country. The 47
army of the Northwest under General Alvaro Obregon also advanced in a
steady, if less spectacular, manner. The cautious General Pablo
Gonzalez, on the other hand, had accomplished little with his army of
the Northeast, but late in March a portion of that army laid siege to
Tampico, Mexico's second-ranking port. It was an Incident at Tampico
during the siege which set off a chain of events leading to American
military intervention at Veracruz.
On April 9, 1914, a whaleboat from the American gunboat Dolphin
put ashore at Tampico to take on gasoline supplies. Mexican federal
troops in Tampico were on alert against any possible infiltration or
attack by rebel forces; a small contimient of the nervous federals
arrested the unarmed American sailors from the whaleboat. The
Americans were brought before the Mexican colonel in command of that
sector of Tampico and were then permitted to complete loading the
gasoline and return to the Dolphin. When American officials pro
tested the arrest to General Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza, the military
governor, Morelos Zaragoza did not attempt to justify the actions of
41 his subordinates but apologized profusely to the Americans.
Although the release of the whaleboat's crew and the apology
from Morelos Zaragoza seemed to close ihe incident, at least as far
^^Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 19-24.
Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 19-24. An Affair of Honor is probably the definitive study of the American intervention.
48
as the American consul in Tampico and the cnptain of the Dolphin
were concerned, the commander of the American naval squadron at
Tampico, Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, was far from satisfied. Mayo
was incensed by the removal at gunpoint of American sailors from a
ship (the whaleboat) flying the American flag and construed the
Incident as an insult. He demanded a more formal apology, stipula
ting that Morelos Zaragoza would be required to "hoist the American
flag in a prominent position on shore and salute i t with twenty-one
42 guns." The Mexican military governor, claiming that he did not
have the authority to accede to Mayo's demands, requested and re
ceived a period of grace during '''hich he might con~,ult with higher
authorities.
Admiral Mayo had acted on his own ini t iat ive without referring
the matter to his superiors.
I t is clear that the admiral, in his demands, did not ask a factfinding, but rather a punishment, and his inf lex ib i l i ty placed the Mexicans in a d i f f icu l t position. They were being judged without a hearing, condemned without a t r i a l . Nor di'l Mayo forsee the results of his action--military threats and f inal ly the seizure of Veracruz.'*^
Nevertheless, both Secretary Bryan and President Wilson approved
Mayo's ultimatum and urged Charge O'Shaughnessy to press the issue
with President Huerta.
The Mexican dictator, confronted by the advancing Constitution
al ist army, could i l l afford to submit to the humiliation demanded by
Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 144.
^^Quirk, Affair of Honor, p. 25.
49
the Americans. In fact, Huerta probably welcomed the confrontation:
"If he could appeal properly to the Mexican sense of honor, he might
be able to shore up public support for his steadily weakening
44 regime." But because Huerta did not want an open conflict with
the United States, he approached the issue in a conciliatory manner
while refusing to agree to the salute.
In the midst of the crisis John Lind, who had left Veracruz
before the Tampico incident occurred, arrived in Washington. Lind
and Secretary Bryan met with the president on the morning of April 14.
Lind, expressing views which coincided with those of Wilson, main
tained that "watchful waiting" was not succeeding, since Huerta was
still able to obtain funds and arms and would probably be able to
hold out indefinitely despite defeats in the North. On the afternoon
of the same day the president ordered the entire Atlantic fleet into
Mexican waters.
It is uncertain what Wilson hoped to accomplish by this action. Ostensibly he would force the Mexicans to salute the American flag, to acknowledge that American honor had been sullied at Tampico. If no salute was forthcoming, these ships would be used in some as yet undetermined way to punish the culprits. Yet the conclusion is unavoidable that not even a sudden capitulation by Huerta on the matter of the salute would have stayed the Atlantic Fleet.'*-'
The president's conference with John Lind may have led him to conclude
that he would have to cut off Huerta's supply of arms in order to
achieve the downfall of that dictator.
^^Meyer, Huerta, p. 196.
^^Quirk, Affair of Honor, p. 53.
50
President Huerta was not moved by Wilson's decision to station
the f leet off the Mexican coast: "Is i t a calamity? No. I t is the
46
best thing that could happen to us," the dictator exclaimed, demon
strating his belief that American intervention would bolster the
Mexican government. Charge O'Shaughnessy in Mexico City had been
making every effort to achieve some sort of compromise through his
friendly personal relations with the Mexican president. On April 15
Huerta capitulated to O'Shaughnessy's persistence; the dictator
agreed to the f ir ing of simultaneous salutes to the flags of both
countries. President Wilson, however, bent on Huerta's humiliation,
continued to insist on a salute of apology. On April 18 the American
president personally composed a "final" ultimatum: i f Huerta would
not agree to f i re the salute by 6:00 p.m. on April 19 Wilson would
take the matter to Congress "with a view to taking such action as may
47 be necessary to enforce the respect due the nation's f lag."
Despite renewed efforts by O'Shaughnessy, Huerta would budge no
farther. A member of Huerta's cabinet later quoted the Mexican presi
dent's emotional response at the time: "The imposition of the United
States is not permitted! We are going where destiny takes us; but i t
48 is necessary, f i rs t of a l l , to save the honor of the Nation." Thus,
the issue was joined, and the spark to set off the conflagration was
near at hand.
^^Edith O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1916), p. 226.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 322.
^^Jose Bravo Ugarte, Historia de Mexico (3 vols.; Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1962). I l l , 460-61.
51
On April 19 the State Department received a message from Consul
William W. Canada reporting the Impending arrival of the freighter
Ypiranga at Veracruz with a cargo of arms for Huerta. It was clear
to President Wilson that, if Huerta were to be eliminated, such ship
ments of arms would have to be stopped. Thus on the afternoon of
April 20 the president met with a bipartisan group from Congress to
explain that he wanted congressional authorization for hostilities
against Huerta. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge felt that the president
could send troops without congressional action if he believed it
necessary to protect the lives and property of American nationals
residing in Mexico, but he thought that the justification made by
49 Wilson was "weak and insufficient." On the same afternoon Wilson
delivered his message in person to Con'jress, where the resolution
soon passed in the House of Representatives but was subject to debate
lasting into the night in the Senate.
About 2:30 a.m. on April 21 a cable was received from Consul
Canada bearing the news that the Ypinmga was due in port at Veracruz
that morning. Durinn a telephone conf«Tence with Secretary of State
Bryan and Secretary of the fJavy Josephus Daniels the president gave
the order for the navy to seize the customhouse at Veracruz to pre-
50 vent Huerta from obtaining the arms.
^^Henry Cabot Lodge, Tjie Senate .ijid League of; Nations (New York; C. Scribner's Sons, 1925), pp. 13-14.
^^Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 192477 pp. 151-53.
52
The order to seize the customhouse reached Rear Admiral
Frank F. Fletcher in the harbor of Veracruz at 8:00 a.m. Despite
the great strength of the American fleet, Fletcher was caught short-
handed because most of the ships stationed in Mexican waters were
with Admiral Mayo at Tampico, while the Atlantic fleet under Vice
Admiral Charles T. Badger was not due to arrive for another day. The
possibility of a storm, however, plus the impending arrival of the
Ypiranga persuaded Admiral Fletcher to land a force of sailors and
marines immediately. As soon as Consul Canada observed the landing
force leave the ships, he Informed General Gustave Maass, the Mexican
commander, of the American action and requested the Mexican general
to remain in Veracruz and "cooperate with the naval forces in main
taining order."
The American Invaders met no resistance during the initial phase
of the landing and soon secured the cu-.tomhouse. General Maass,
however, decided to offer a token resistance which included a part of
his small force plus as many civilian'; and prisoners as it was possi
ble to arm. General Maass soon received orders from the ministry of
war to withdraw, but it was too late to avoid bloodshed. Scattered
fighting broke out in several areas, forcing the Americans to extend
their occupation to the entire city since they could find no one to
cooperate in restoring order. Ely the middle of the second day the
city was entirely in American hands, .11 though sniping continued for
several more days. Nineteen Americans and over two hundred Mexicans
^ V i r k , Affair of Honor, p. 89.
53 were killed in the fighting.^^
Because the occupation force was unable to obtain the coopera
tion of Mexican officials in Veracruz, Admiral Fletcher found it
necessary to proclaim martial law. When it became apparent that the
occupation might be of considerable duration, an army brigade under
the command of Brigadier General Frederick Funston replaced the
sailors as the occupying force on April 30. The occupation force and
the citizens of the city settled down to await further maneuvers by
their respective governments.
The seizure of Veracruz had not proceeded as intended by
President Wilson; he had anticipated no resistance. A participant at
the president's interview with newspaper correspondents on April 23
later recalled
how preternaturally pale, almost parchmenty, Mr. Wilson looked when he stood up there and answered the questions of the newspaper men. The death of American sailors and marines owing to an order of his seemed to affect him like an ailment. He was positively shaken.^^
Nor had the president expected the apparent response of the Constitu
tionalists. First Chief Venustiano Carranza charged that the occupa
tion was a violation of Mexican sovereignty and demanded an immediate
withdrawal of American forces.
Carranza had assumed a hostile posture, the landing failed to
oust Huerta, and Wilson did not want any more blood on his hands from
The best source on the naval occupation of Veracruz, drawn largely from personal accounts and memoirs, is Jack Sweetman, The l-anding at Veracruz: 1914 (Anapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1968).
^^Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 330.
54
continued fighting. The president only needed to control Veracruz
to Insure Huerta's eventual downfall. For his part President Huerta
recognized the futility of continuing hostilities with the Americans.
Both sides, then, were amenable to an offer of mediation by Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile (the "ABC powers") which was made on April 25.
"The mediation attempt resembled nothing so much as an elaborate
quadrille from Alice in Wonderland in which nothing anyone did or
54 said made sense to anyone else." For several months the mediators
met at Niagra Falls and attempted, without success, to persuade the
opposing factions in Mexico to agree to a cease-fire and an interim
government acceptable to Wilson. The alleged insults that the United
55
States had suffered at Tampico were not even discussed. The dele
gates to the conference signed a number of meaningless protocols on
July 1, and the mediation came to an end.
President Wilson failed to attain either of the immediate
objectives which caused him to order the occupation of Veracruz.
Huerta never rendered the salute to tho American flag, while the
Ypiranga delivered its cargo of arms to Huerta at Puerto Mexico about
a month after the occupation. The president did secure, however, the
major objective of his early Mexican policy when the Mexican dictator
resigned on July 15 and left the country.
To award President Wilson alone the credit (or blame) for the
54 ^Quirk, Affair of Honor, p. 118.
Guy Renfro Donnell, "United States Intervention in Mexico, 1914" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas, 1951), pp. 339-40.
55
elimination of Huerta would be inaccur.ite. After the seizure of
Veracruz the Constitutionalist forces accelerated their attack on the
federal troops. As the Constitutionalists began to draw a noose
around the capital, Huerta abandoned the presidency; a month later
forces under the command of General Obergon entered Mexico City.
The triumph of the Constitutionalists did not end President
Wilson's search for a viable and democratic government for Mexico.
Even before the departure of Huerta Constitutionalist unity was disin
tegrating into factionalism. General Zapata had never truly accepted
Carranza's leadership, and General Villa gradually moved into a state
of open rebellion against the first chief. Faced with a chaotic
situation the military leaders of the victorious rebels agreed to meet
in convention at Aguacalientes. Here the Villa-Zapata supporters
gained the ascendancy and elected the independent General Eulalio
Gutierrez as interim president. Carranza refused to accept the
56 decision of the convention, so renewed hostilities became inevitable.
With Huerta removed. President Wilson was eager to withdraw the
American forces from Veracruz, but norio of the contending forces in
Mexico had demonstrated sufficient control over the nation to warrant
recognition. The forces of the convention were geographically inca
pable of replacing the Americans in V'^acruz, and General Funston
reported that refugees and others in the city were fearful of retri
bution if Carranza's forces were allowed to take over. As Carranza's
56 Quirk, Mexican Revolution, provides the most comprehensive account of the convention of Aguascal i ntes and the resulting struggle.
56
military situation deteriorated and he faced the loss of the capital
itself, the necessity of cooperating with the Americans became evi
dent if the first chief was to obtain Veracruz as his new base.
Accordingly, the required guarantees were given by Carranza and the
American troops embarked on army transports on November 23. 1914,
just over seven months after the navy and marines had first seized
the city.
CHAPTER III
OPINION IN THE AMERICAN PRESS
The story of the American intervention at Veracruz in 1914
appears to be complete in itself, following the rough logic or 11 lo
gic of the International politics of that era. This apparent inte
grity of the story has induced historians to present their versions
with little attention to the important and possibly crucial role
played by public opinion at various stages in the episode. Where i
historians have treated briefly with public opinion they have come to ;•
1 c totally different conclusions. 5
^ The significance of establishing the attitudes of the public lies j
SE; in the Impact that these attitudes may have had on the course of events. ^
X
The contradictory assertions of historians concerning the attitude of the public at the time of the intervention verge on the incredible. Ray Stannard Baker reported that the public was so aroused in support of President Wilson's action that it "looked as though it might get entirely out of hand. There were evidences of the development of the familiar war psychology" (Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters [8 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1927-1939], IV, 331). Robert E. Quirk confirmed Baker's view and stated that "there was, in fact, little opposition in the United States to Wilson's proposed course of action. . . . The newspapers of the country, both administration and opposition, gave the president their warm and wholehearted support" (An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz pTew York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962], pp. 58-59). Arthur S. Link gave a totally opposite evaluation, reporting that "it was difficult to find a responsible spokesman among any group or class in the United States who thought Wilson had acted wisely" (Wilson: The^New Freedom [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956J, p. 404). Link's view was endorsed recently by P. Edward Haley, who claimed that the intervention was "unpopular and misunderstood," and resulted in a "revulsion of opinion" (Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, T9T0^nr917 [Cambridge, Massachusetts: "ITIT Press, 1970], p. 134).
57
58
The significance of establishinti the attitudes of the public
lies in the impact that these attitudes may have had on the course of
events. "Public opinion is so apathetic and preoccupied, so change
ful and Impulsive, so ill-informed and misinformed, that critics are
apt to sneer at its power. Yet a giant who is fickle and ignorant
still has a giant's strength, and may use it with fightful effect."
All governments depend to some extend on public opinion: "The yellow
ing scroll of history reveals few if any instances when a ruler fla
grantly and persistently defied the will of his subjects without
2 courting disaster.
In a republic the government is most susceptible to the will of
the people who are the source of its existence and power. If it were
possible to determine both public opinion and its effect on the
American intervention, certainly such information and conclusions
would be valuable to the historian, not only in understanding the
specific episode of 1914, but also in comparing and evaluating public
opinion in similar situations. Unfortunately, the quantification of
public opinion from the pre-Gallup poll era is impossible. The
historian can only examine the evidence available and present his
findings.
"Under normal circumstances the American public has tended to
be indifferent to questions of foreign policy because of their
9 Thomas A. Bailey, The Mam jn^ thr Street: The Impact of
American Public Opinion oji Foreign Pol icy (Gloucester, MassacFusetts: Peter Smith, 1964
pimon 0 ) . p. 1.
59 3
remoteness from everyday interests and activities." In the case of
Mexico, however, circumstances were not normal, and
public opinion about the Mexican policy of the United States was sufficiently well-formed and vocal to be a factor in policy formulation. Because Mexico was an adjacent country where large numbers of Americans lived, worked, and invested their money, the American public was much more aroused about injuries to Americans 1n Mexico and along the Mexican border, than about events in small Caribbean republics farther to the south. At times, it tried to force the administration into a policy of armed intervention before varying types J of unarmed intervention and other measures had been ex- > hausted. And it heaped violent abuse and threats on J any president who failed to yield to public wishes. Supporters of a non-intervention policy were equally JJ vehement about their views. They hailed a president C who refused to intervene and condemned him severaly !* when he deviated from the course of non-intervention.** r The crisis of relations between the United States and Mexico J
Za 3a began with the overthrow of President Irancisco I. Madero by General K
Victoriano Huerta, who then had himself elevated to the presidency.
An«rican reaction during this initial phase focused on the question
of whether the Huerta dictatorship would be able to achieve a return
to the Porfirian days of peace and security for the lives and property
of Americans in Mexico. The Literary Digest reported that
some of the relief felt by residents of Mexico City, when General Huerta's ooup d' etat ended the seven days' artillery battle in the streets, was echoed at the time in the utterances of the press of this country. But on second thought observers are found
^[Gabriel A. Almond], The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.. [1950]), p. 70.
^Doris A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Intervention Policies and Practices TWashington, D . C : Public Affairs Press. 1959), p. 15?.
60 doubting whether this really means better days for Mexico, and some even fear that It will but usher in a long period of anarchy and military rule.^
The New York Evening Mail gave the opinion that the Mexican upheaval
had again demonstrated "the well-understood incapacity of the Mexican
people for self-government." while the New York Times declared that
"it is a situation not at all to our liking, compelled as we must be
for a considerable time to be in a state of readiness to take in
Mexico those measures which the ending of the most acute phase of the
trouble has for the time being made unnecessary." Many editors came
to the conclusion of the Philadelphia Record, that "the kind of
government Porfirio Diaz gave Mexico has been vindicated by the events
that have occurred since his abdication."
The wait-and-see attitude of the American press was severely
challenged by the assassination of former President Madero. As
Secretary of State Philander C. Knox wrote to Ambassador Henry Lane
Wilson in Mexico, "With practical unanimity the American press treated
as Inadequate the explanations made by the Huerta regime in regard
to the death of Madero . . . and is consequently expressing its horror
thereat." The Literary Digest confirmed the secretary's evaluation
of the reaction of the American press, but noted that many newspapers
^"Mexico's New Leadership," Litrrary Digest, March 1, 1913, p. 439.
^Quoted in "Mexico's New Leadership," pp. 439-41.
U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations'of the United States, 1913 (Washington, D . C : Government Printing OTfice, 1921), p. 747.
61
still believed that a strong dictatorship under Huerta would help
save Mexico from anarchy. While the American press did not "buy" the
official account of Madero's assassination, many editors agreed with
the opinion of the New Orleans Times-Democrat that Huerta's prelimi
nary success in pacifying Mexico Indicated "that the 'Man on Horseback,'
fearless, relentless, not too scrupulous, moving straight to his ends
by the shortest and most direct route," finally had arrived. In view
of such attitudes Increased opposition to any American Intervention
was not surprising. The New York Times declared that "the killing of
Mexicans by Mexicans is not a cause for foreign interference," and
the New York Tribune noted that Washington opinion seemed to indicate
that the possibility of intervention was "more remote than at any o
time in two years."
Discussion of the Mexican situation soon turned to the question
of recognition of the Huerta regime. American public opinion had
been aroused by the brutal murder of Madero, "and this bode ill for g
Huerta's relations with the United States." The New York Tribune, which only a short time earlier had indicated the expediency of
recognizing the new government, now suggested that "there will be no
making haste to recognize a government stained with the blood of
brutal murders." The Springfield Republican urged the United States
government to do nothing which could seem to be an endorsement of
% o t e d 1n "The Iron Hand in Mexico," Literary Digest, March 8, 1913, p. 497.
^Kenneth J. Grieb, The United S tates and Huerta (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of NeFraTRa Press7T969y.
62
"Huerta's act," but noted that the apparent pacification of Mexico
made It linpos*. Ihh* "h)t' our (lover ruiu'nl. Lo .r.suiiu* toward the only
government now existing in Mexico an attitude which would tend to
destroy it." The Republican saw a practical necessity for the United
States to retain diplomatic relations with Mexico: "Our Ambassador
must do business with the existing Government in Mexico City, for
the extraordinary conditions compel our representative to remain
there and to use all his influence for the upholding of an authority
competent to protect the lives and property of foreigners."
The New York World, which had strong ties with the incoming
administration of President Woodrow Wilson, joined in the condemna
tion of Madero's assassination, but noted: "If a government is a
fact and there is reason to believe that it can maintain itself, good
form does not permit annoying questions as to the methods by which it
was set up." The World concluded that recognition would be the "best
for all concerned." On the other hand an analysis of journalistic
attitudes by Current Opinion maintained that the chaotic situation
in Mexico had resulted in nearly "unanimous" comment in the press that
a costly Intervention might be necessary, although the article
12 admitted that many papers preferred a moderate wait-and-see policy.
At the time President Wilson took office the general attitude
of the American public, as expressed in the nation's press, was that
^ % o t e d in "Iron Hand in Mexico," pp. 497-98.
Quoted in Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 38.
^^"Down with the Monroe Doctrine," Current Opinion, April, 1913, p. 275.
63
the United States should deal cautiously with the deplorable Huerta
regime, but eventually offer recognition in order to protect American
Interests in Mexico. Therefore, the public considered the president's
first statement of policy toward Latin America on March 11, "variously
characterized by our press as a warning and as assurance," to be
13 "timely and felicitous." Few journalists read a specific threat to
Huerta in the president's statement. The New York Tribune declared
that the president's policy was "neither hostile nor partial to General
Huerta," but was "calculated to encourage the assertion of constitu
tionalism and peace, whether under him or another." Other editors
considered Wilson's statement as an indication of an intention to
proceed slowly on the issue of recognition for the Huerta regime.
During the months of April, May, and June of 1913 the Mexican
question languished in the American press and the minds of the public,
largely because the status quo had not provoked a crisis for American
interests in Mexico. Those who did have financial Interests in Mexico,
however, were disturbed by the apparent intention of the president to
let matters drift. The compromise proposal of Judge Delbert J. Haff,
which Included recognition of the Huerta government, was but one of a
number of attempts to modify the administration's policy made by
agents of the banking, railroad, oil, mining, and land-holding
Interests.
^^"Mr. Wilson's Word to Latin America," Literary Digest, March 22, 1913, p. 626.
^ % o t e d in "Mr. Wilson's Word," p. 627.
64
Early in June the Mexican dictator managed to secure a loan of
about 100 million dollars from an international consortium of bankers.
Including some Americans. American financiers immediately proclaimed
the loan which they had helped to arrange to be evidence of great
faith in the Huerta regime. The New York Commercial reported that
the loan was "regarded by Wall Street friends of Mexico as the final
establishment of the power and stability of the Huerta Administration."
The ability of Mexico to make such a loan provided evidence to the
Philadelphia Record that financiers judged the government "as likely
15 to be permanent as any Mexican administration." For a short period
it appeared that the bankers and their supporters might be able to
achieve a modification of the president's policy, but the president
soon recognized that he was not getting a complete picture of the
Mexican situation. The pressures from the financial Interests caused
Wilson to remark, "I have to pause and remind myself that I am
President of the United States and not of a small group of Americans
with vested interests in Mexico."
Political pressures for presidential action continued to Increase
in the United States: Senators Albert B. Fall of New Mexico and
Marcus A. Smith of Arizona reflected the concern of Americans living
near the Mexican border in their condemnation of the "deadly drifting"
of the Wilson administration and their call for the protection of
^^Quoted in "Lending Huerta Money," Literary Digest, June 14, 1913. p. 1318.
^^Joseph P. Tumulty. Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company. 192477 p. 146.
65
American lives and Investments in Mexico. When Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge called for armed intervention, Senator Fall soon endorsed
the proposal. Since the reports from William Bayard Hale in Mexico
confirmed President Wilson's inclination to refuse recognition to
Huerta, the president decided that it was essential to announce his
stand in order to allay political opposition. On June 20 Senator
Augustus 0. Bacon, acting as spokesman for the administration, stated
that the United States definitely would not recognize the Huerta
, 18 regime.
The Wilson administration had acted too late, however, to pre
vent a sharp division of opinion on the question of recognition from
forming in the United States, provoked in part by daily stories of
anti-American demonstrations in Mexico. The Washington Star
expressed regret that the United States had "practically cut itself
off from a position of influence at the Mexican capital by refusing
to recognize the newly established Government on the score of the
irregularity of its foundation. "This was a high moral ground,"
declared the Star, "but it did not make for the protection of American
citizens, which was and is to-day the main business of this Govern
ment with reference to the Mexican situation. It was, perhaps,
magnificent, but it was not diplomacy." The New York Sun complained
that "never before had the United States undertaken a moral scrutiny
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, L, 2232-36.
^^Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 83.
66
of the circumstances surrounding the accession of a new govern
ment."^^
In line with the press criticism. Vice President Thomas R.
Marshall notified the president that he and a number of senators were
receiving protests from their constituents. Wilson replied that in
his judgement
it would not serve any useful purpose to lay [the protests] before the Senate. I believe that I can say that the prospects for a settlement in Mexico are better than they have been for some time, and I think the more quietly we go about it the more likely success will be. It is at best a difficult and puzzling situation, and I am very much afraid of even seeming to play into the hands of some of our Republican friends of the Senate who are trying to make the situation Impossible.20
The president also had his supporters, as many editors commended the
Wilsonian policy of non-recognition. The New York Evening Post,
for example, noted that "the strange notion that the establishment
of peace and order in Mexico merely waits upon American recognition
of Huerta will not bear examination."*
The fruitless attempt by President Wilson, acting through John
Lind, to persuade Huerta to relinquish his office voluntarily was
interpreted as an offer of mediation by the American press and was
accorded a generally friendly, though pessimistic, reception. This
pessimism proved to be justified when the president announced the
failure of the Lind mission and took his case to the people In his
^^Quoted in "Our Call to Recognize Huerta," Literary Digest,
July 26, 1913. p. 120.
^°Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 265.
^^Quoted in "Our Call to Recognize Huerta," p. 120.
67
message to Congress on August 27. The Literary Digest surmised that
"while explaining to Congress his own attitude the President had at
the same time clarified and interpreted to Itself a hitherto some-
22
what confused public opinion." Eschewing the "extremes" of recog
nition and intervention, the great majority of the American press
endorsed the president's policy of strict neutrality toward the
opposing factions coupled with stern insistence on the protection of
Americans in Mexico. According to the Boston Transcript, "all that
the President said the nation says and the nation is behind the
23 President." Ray Stannard Baker, the prominent ex-muckraker,
recorded in his diary his own view that "President Wilson's note on
the Mexican situation . . . is a real inspiration. Here is a man who
would have the nation rely upon moral principles and the power of
24 justice and kindliness rather than upon force."
Strong support for President Wilson's policy continued when
Huerta affronted public opinion by closing the Mexican Congress and
arresting 110 deputies. The Brooklyn Eagle declared that Huerta's
"defiance of liberty is at once an explanation and a justification of
the policy the Washington Administration has pursued toward this
beneficiary of assassination."^^ The Literary Digest cited more than
^^"The Wilson Mexican Policy," Literary Digest, September 6, 1913, p. 361.
^"^Quoted in "Wilson Mexican Policy," p. 361.
Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 276.
^^Quoted in "Huerta As a Dictator," Literary Digest, October 25, 1913, p. 737.
68
a dozen newspapers which concurred in the opinion of the Brooklyn
Eagle, Including the New York Times, which had previously been an
outspoken critic of the president's policy.
President Wilson's honeymoon with public opinion over the Mexican
question did not continue uninterrupted however, especially after the
Mobile speech in which he virtually declared that an uncompromising
political idealism was the controlling factor in his policy. The
"moral principles and the power of justice and kindliness" which were
so attractive to Ray Stannard Baker seemed to journalistic skeptics
"an ineffectual substitute for a policy of common sense and compromise
that is free to adjust itself to the hard facts in the case." The
Philadelphia Inquirer remarked that the president was "dreaming a
26 beautiful dream" which did not seem to include any positive action.
In a speech made on November 20 before the Chamber of Commerce of
New York City, Joseph H. Choatej long a leader of the American Bar,
said, "I should like very much to discuss the policy of the United
States in regard to Mexico. I think I could occupy the whole evening
27 with it--if I only knew what that policy was." Dr. Theodore S.
Woolsey, professor emeritus of international law at Yale University,
believed that he understood the president's policy, but concluded
that Wilson had "started wrong" and felt obliged to persist in his
program of moral suasion to force Huerta to resign. The president
^^Quoted in "Idealism As a Mexican Policy," Literary Digest, November 8, 1913, p. 885.
^'^Edward G. Lowry, "What the President Is Trying to Do for Mexico," World's Work. January, 1914, p. 262.
69
had succeeded only in exposing his administration to
the derision of an uncharitable world. . . . In refusing ever to recognize Huerta, the Administration has violated our usage and the dictates of common sense. Is it honest enough and strong enough to correct its blunder? There is an obstinacy of strength; there is also an obstinacy of weakness.2^
The Wilson policy had its supporters as well as detractors. Harper's
Weekly remarked, "It is exciting to have in the White House a man
capable of focusing the most progressive moral principles of the time
and applying them successfully to the most complicated situatlon,--
fearless of mere conventional criticism, and confident of the triumph
of right ideas."^^
As the Mexican situation continued stagnant, the beginning of the
new year--1914--brought forth a spate of opposing articles. The
liberal World's Work January issue alone contained three articles on
the Mexican question. Edward G. Lowry and the editor, Arthur W. Page,
both endorsed President Wilson's decision to align himself "against
manifest destiny, Anglo-Saxon tendencies, the power of money, and the
precedents of diplomacy." The editor was certain that a majority of
the American people were opposed to taking territory from Mexico,
but many Americans thought that "sooner or later we shall be perma
nently in Mexico," since "the power of foreign investments would lead
us, protesting, into these acquisitions." The editor congratulated
President Wilson for "trying to lessen the power of money to lead us
^ % o t e d in "After Huerta, Who?" North American Review, January, 1914, p. 18.
^^Quoted in Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 291.
70 30 into expansion." The Nation, a crusading, liberal journal edited
by Oswald Garrison Vi l lard , also endorsed the president's policy and
noted the fol ly "of supposing that i f the United States had only
sharpened the edge of Huerta's sword, he would by this time have made
31 Mexico a land of smiling content."
Colonel George Harvey, editor of the North American Review, had
been an early supporter of President Wilson, but soon became a leading
opponent of the president's Mexican policy. Harvey, who had earlier
challenged the legal or moral right of an American president to deter
mine who would be president of Mexico, prophesied that Wilson's policy
would rivet Huerta in the presidential chair, "there to remain, in al l
probability until removed by force of arms." Even i f Wilson's policy
did effect the removal of Huerta there was no guarantee that a new
leader, such as Carranza, would be any more acceptable. "High-minded,
noble, and humane leaders such as President Wilson has in his mind's
eye there may be in Mexico; but i f so they have not yet put themselves
32 in evidence," wrote Harvey.
Apparently the press criticism had its effect on President
Wilson; the president became less conmunicative at his press confer
ences. Wilson found i t d i f f icu l t to try to settle the Mexican ques
tion while attempting to "steer our own public opinion in the right
^°"For a Permanent Mexican Solution," World's Work, January, 1914. p. 249.
" "The Blood-and-Iron Fallacy," Nation, January 1 , 1914, p. 4.
^^"After Huerta, Who?" pp. 17-22.
71 33
path." The president recognized the need to take some sort of
action to end the Impasse. Having already decided to shift his
policy from neutrality between the Mexican factions to virtually
complete support of the Constitutionalists, the president lifted the
arms embargo in early February in hopes of hastening an acceptable
conclusion to the civil war.
The removal of the arms embargo received a warm response from
several sectors of the public, especially members of the Senate
foreign relations committee, many of whom had long urged such action
34 on the president. The Literary Digest reported that a majority of
the press believed that Wilson's action, right or wrong, would speed
the elimination of Huerta while keeping within the strict limits of
neutrality. But many newspapers objected strongly to the change in
policy. The Detroit Free Press labeled the action as "barbarous and
suicidal," and the New York Sum felt that Latin Americans would regard
it as another attempt to advance American interests at the expense
35
of Mexican lives. A cartoon in the Philadelphia Public Ledger por
trayed Wilson handing arms and ammunition to a Mexican rebel whose
hands were dripping blood. "In the Interest of Peace," read the in-
36 scriptlon beneath the cartoon.
•^^Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 298, 305.
34 Link, New Freedom, p. 391.
35 Quoted in "Letting the Guns into Mexico," February 14, 1914,
p. 305.
^^Llnk, New Freedom, p. 390.
72
Soon after the removal of the arms embargo American news
papers reported to a horrified public the news of an atrocity appar
ently committed by elements of the Constitutionalist rebels newly
supported by President Wilson. According to the press, William
Benton, a Chihuahua rancher and British subject, approached General
Pancho Vil la to protest cattle stealing by Vi l la 's men. Accounts of
the meeting varied considerably, but the result was Benton's death.
This murder of a foreigner in Mexico provoked a new round of
journalistic outbursts hostile to the president's policy. The
Literary Digest reported that there had been
a wide-spread impression in this country that President Wilson expected Huerta's long-awaited collapse to be followed by a benign regime of order and justice under the 'Constitutionalists.' This hope. I t was generally believed, furnished the principal justif ication for the free-gun policy and the plan of 'watchful waiting.' But since the Constitutionalist party is apparently dominated by V i l l a , say many of our editorial observers, this hope goes glimmering and the policy of 'watchful waiting' finds i tsel f in a blind alley. According to this pessimistic view, no matter which side wins . . . the Mexican problem wil l be no nearer a solution.^^
Pancho V i l l a , a far more glamorous figijre than Carranza in American
eyes because of his colorful character and military successes, was
Incorrectly identified as the leader of the Constitutionalist move
ment by the sensation-seeking American public. Since Vil la was con
sidered to have been directly responsible for the ki l l ing of the
Englishman, as well as other provocations in the vicinity of the
border, the entire Constitutionalist movement was condemned. As far
^^"Mexico's Darkening Outlook," Literary Digest, March 7, 1914, p. 473.
73
as the Toledo Blade was concerned, the difference between Huerta and
Villa was "the difference between a dark night and a coal-hole." The
Chicago Tribune concluded that Villa had "made the position of the
American Government very nearly untenable, and the success of the
38
Constitutionalist movement a thing to be despaired of." Most news
papers confessed themselves to be at a loss for a solution to the
problem, but several reverted to advocating either recognition of
Huerta or Intervention.
Public opinion in the American Southwest was particularly dis
turbed by the border depredations of the Mexican rebels, or "bandits,"
and showed signs of chafing under the president's policy of watchful
waiting. After the killing of the British subject, a mass meeting in
El Paso formulated and published resolutions criticizing the State
Department for its "weak and vacillating" policy and requesting the
abandonment of a course "that is ruinous to all foreign interests in
Mexico and the Mexican people themselves." A Literary Digest exami
nation of Texas newspapers revealed strong insistence on armed inter-
39 ventlon as the only practical solution to the problem. An editorial
in the Los Angeles Times suggested that intervention would reestablish
peace and order and provide protection and Indemnification to foreign
40 citizens for losses sustained during the "carnival of anarchy."
•^Voted in "Mexico's Darkening Outlook," p. 473.
"^^"Mexico—Viewed from Texas," Literary Digest, March 14, 1914, p. 535.
^\os Angeles Times, March 29, 1914.
74
During February and March the Mexican question gained Increasing
attention in Congress, where It was fa- t becoming a partisan issue.
Congressman Frank Mondell, a Republican spokesman, did not advocate
intervention, but he was highly critical of President Wilson's
support for the rebels. "If we must choose," said Mondell on the
question of whom the United States should recognize, "let us choose--
if all are guilty, as some insist--between the guilty ones who main
tain order and protect life and property rather than those who commit
the crime without apology and make no pretense of protecting life and
41 property or maintaining order." The Republican leader in the House
of Representatives, Congressman James R. Mann, commented that "under
this administration Americans in Mexico have been robbed, raped,
murdered, and driven out of the country, without any apparent definite
42 policy being taken by our Government." The president s supporters
on the Democratic side responded as best they could, but they were
clearly on the defensive.
In the Senate, meanwhile, Albert B. Fall raised a strident
voice for intervention, listing the outrages against American lives
and property in Mexico during a three-hour speech. While Fall's
accusations were denounced by a portion of the press "as a deliberate
effort to arouse popular passion in favor of intervention," many
editors welcomed Fall's arraignment of the Mexican policy because it
^^U.S., Congress, House, 6.3rd Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, 1914, Congressional Record, LI, 4050.
42 Ibid., 4245.
75
cleared the air by providing specific instances of mistreatment of
Americans in Mexico. Even that staunch supporter of the president,
the New York World, declared that there had been "too much repres
sion," and that "the Mexican problem has not been made easier of
solution by Secretary Bryan's policy of secrecy and silence." The
Charleston News and Courier agreed that "the lid seems to have been
removed from the Mexican situation in Congress," but doubted that
43 a the president's crit ics had a better policy to offer as a substitute. y
Indeed, those who opposed the president's policy were hardly *
^^Quoted in "Lifting the Lid from the Mexican Kettle," Literary Digest. March 21, 1914, p. 601.
^^George Harvey, "We Appeal to the President to Save Mexico; to Save His Party; to Save Himself," North American Review, Apri l , 1914, pp. 481-501.
itii) i„
united in offering an alternate course of action. Republican Senators [J
Boies Penrose and John D. Works endorsed Senator Fall's demand for ,,
intervention, but Republican Representatives Mann and Mondell were 5j
opposed. Colonel George Harvey continued to call for recognition of 2j
Huerta and cited some eighteen American newspapers and a large number
44 of foreign journals in support of his position. Mexico, "A Weekly
to Promote Intelligent Discussion of Mexican Affairs," was also busy
printing compilations of articles critical of the president. Although
published in New York, Mexico may hav^ been financed by either the
American colony in Mexico or Huerta himself and, like the North
American Review, opposed intervention in Mexico. The March 7 issue
of Mexico warned that
76
those who have been led to believe by the constant reiteration of the words Watchful Waiting that the Administration was through caution or timidity keeping hands off a dangerous and complex situation in the belief that matters would somehow right themselves have been badly deceived. There has been much of watching, but little or no Inaction or waiting save for results of deliberately planned offensive efforts to destroy the Mexican Government. There has been no drifting save to the deadly consequences of a bitter and relentless warfare to overthrow the only government that stands between Mexico and anarchy.'^''
"Mr. Dooley," on the other hand, believed that President Wilson had
been to lax in defending American rights with the rebels:
"Yes« sir, said Mr. Dooley, "I'm sthrong f'r our Mexican policy."
"What is it?" asked Mr. Hennessy.
"I don't know," said Mr. Dooley. "In a gin'ral way it is to watch an' to wait -- watch till some frind iv ours gets kilt, sind a sharp reprimand to our ally like 'Well, I declare,' or 'Tut, tut,' an' thin wait till it happens again.'"^f
The president's policy found supporters in Democratic Senators
Benjamin F. Shively and Morris Sheppard. According to Senator
Shively the government was "exerting its energies to work out a solu-
47 tion without precipitating war and all that war means." The American
Review of Reviews noted that a "critical moment" had been reached,
"when many voices are raised in loud though discordant attacks upon
the firm position maintained at Washin'iton," and urged the public "to
heed calm counsels and to analyze the problem with some sense of
^^"Are They Free?" Mexico, March 7, 1914, p. 1.
^Sew York Times, March 15. 1914.
^^"Lifting the Lid," p. 602.
77
responsibility. "Armed Intervention," the editorial warned, meant
48 "not only technical but actual warfare." An editorial in the
Outlook claimed that the American people as well as President Wilson
were opposed to recognition of Huerta but hoped to avoid armed Inter
vention. The question was not "merely how to protect Americans for
the next few weeks or months, but how to aid Mexico to become a respon
sible country in which life and property will be permanently safe."
The Outlook offered a prophetic answer to its own question by suggest- y >*
ing adoption of the "A B C Doctrine" of "united representations and ' 49 'm
urging" by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. An article by J. Davenport tS
Whelpley in the Fortnightly Review also recommended "political inter- rN
ventlon by an allied diplomatic corps" and praised President Wilson :a
for taking the "larger view of the possible effects of armed inter- ^
ventlon in Mexico," which enabled him "to resist public clamour at 50 home and abroad."
President Wilson was determined not to be driven from his
position by opponents of his policy. The president held a news con
ference on March 2 in which he attempted to reassure the public that
the Mexican situation was not insolvable: "Instead of growing worse,
it is growing better," said the president. With determined optimism
48 "The Progress of the World," American Review of Reviews,
April, 1914, p. 387.
^^"The Anarchy in Mexico: Is There a Way Out?" Outlook, March 21, 1914, p. 622.
J. Davenport Whelpley, "The Injustice of War on Mexico," Fortnightly Review, April, 1914, pp. 687, 689.
78
Wilson reaffirmed his "watchful waiting" policy and tried to assure the
people that "nobody doubts that Mr. Huerta is eventually to retire,"
and that a "country of the size and power of the United States can
51 afford to wait just as long as it pleases." "Wilson had reached that
mood of the obstinate fighter when he would neither admit that things
were going against him nor accept any sort of suggestion that might
52 weaken his purpose."
At the time of the Tampico Incident, then, an intransigent
president bound to a rigid policy faced a divided and confused public
opinion. The American people for the most part were eager to support
the president, as they had demonstrated by rallying to several minor
shifts in policy during 1913. During the first few months of 1914,
however, conditions in Mexico seemed to warrant a more active policy,
at least in the eyes of the public. But the president, who sometimes
allowed his political struggles to become personal encounters, insis
ted on the overthrow of Huerta. The only option open to the president
appeared to be some form of intervention.
Wilson must have tried many times during March and early April of 1914 to discover some way to intervene and depose Huerta without risking a general war. And yet there seemed to be no way out. In these circumstances, as the necessity for military action grew increasingly pressing, the President for the first time thought searchingly about the Mexican problem, the meaning of the Revolution, and what he conceived to be his own large opportunities to serve the Mexican people. Actually, he was finding a moral justification for a program of larger participation in Mexican affairs; but with him the process of rationalization was unconscious, automatic, and completely satisfying.''^
^^Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 310.
^^Ibid., 310-11.
^\lnk. New Freedom, pp. 392-93.
79
The president discovered his opportunity in 1 ,e incident at Tampico.
54 "Newspapers of the past are the historian's staff of life."
They were practically the only means by which the public could obtain
news of current events in the years prior to radio and television.
The period 1910 to 1914 marked the high point of journalism in terms
of the number of newspapers published in the United States. The 1910
census recorded 2,200 daily English language newspapers and approxi-
55 mately 14,000 weeklies of general circulation. In large part the
American people had to form their opinions from the news accounts and
editorials in the daily newspapers. Fortunately for the pluralistic
American society the multitude of dailies provided a great diversity
of viewpoints. To understand the formation of public opinion on the
intervention at Veracruz, therefore, it is essential to examine the
daily press at the various stages of the crisis. Three newspapers were
selected because of their diversity in geographical location and
political orientation: the New York World, the New Orleans Times-
Picayune, and the San Francisco Chronicle.
The New Orleans Times-Picayune r.ame into existence in early
April, 1914, as the result of a merger of the New Orleans Times-
Democrat and the New Orleans Daily Picayune. ^ New Orleans, the chief
city of the South, had been the communications center for news from
54Qu1rk, Affair of Honor, p. 174.
^^Edwin Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretative History of Journalism (EnglewooB" CliffsTUew Jersey: Trentice-Hall, Inc., T962), p. 514.
^^For a brief period Including April of 1914, the newly merged newspaper bore the official title of The New Orleans Times-Democrat and the Daily Picayune, but it was and is not generally known by that tTtl?: — —
80
Latin America since the Mexican War. The ed i to r ia l outlook of the
Times-Picayune ref lected the Democratic p o l i t i c a l or ientat ion of the
South, but was not necessarily bound ideological ly to Wilsonian
idealism.
For the f i r s t few days the Tampico c r i s i s passed unnoticed in
the pages of the Times-Picayune. When the f i r s t reports appeared on
Apri l 12, they indicated that a high-level debate was in progress:
Some doubt was expressed as to whether the salute could h be demanded for what was termed an " irresponsible act" h> by a subordinate o f f i c e r , especial ly in view of the prompt > apology from Huerta. One o f f i c i a l , an author i ty on naval ••H precedents, said he knew of no instance in which a salute JJ had been given the American colors in l i ke circumstances.'' ' §
On Apr i l 17 the Times-Picayune gave the impression that the c r i s i s had ^. ten
passed as a resul t of Huerta's of fer to salute the f l a g , i f the salute >J
was returned: "
Huerta's offer and request for a return salute caused President Wilson to ask for opinions from the counsellor of the State Department and from Navy Department officials. All reported that it was the invariable custom in naval practice to return a salute, and cited precedents. ^
Despite the moderate, legalistic approach in the news columns,
the staff correspondence had a definitely warlike tone to it, as was
demonstrated in an article on April 15: "American blood flowing
through the veins of the men composing the Wilson administration is
red. . . . Unless the administration yields unduly to the peace pro
fessions of a few men, the Huerta government must apologize." An
^^New Orleans Times-Picayune, April 12, 1914.
^^Ibid., April 17, 1914.
81
editorial in the same issue seemed to take a more cautious approach:
"Admiral Mayo's demand Is entirely just i f ied , and Washington does
well to support i t . But the concentration of a f leet to enforce the
59 demand seems unnecessary."
The same Times-Picayune introduced the issue upon which the
editors were to focus their attention throughout the crisis: " I f our
government is f inal ly roused let us hope that i t wil l play no
favorites." The following day the editors continued on the same 'Jj
theme, insisting that there was "neither wisdom nor injustice in *
IS rebuking abuses in Huerta's territory while we tolerate flagrant ^
61
^^Ib id . , April 15, 1914.
^^ Ib id . , April 15, 1914.
^ Ib id . , April 16, 1914.
a: wrongs in the territory held by the Constitutionalists." Obviously .
the editors either lacked sympathy with the Wilsonian ideals, or else Xj
they were unaware that the Constitutionalist cause reflected those 5
ideals.
When the occupation of Veracruz took place, the Times-Picayune
editors immediately endorsed it. The news columns indicated the
belief that Huerta would appeal to thr nationalistic feelings of the
Mexican people as a whole for support, but an editorial on April 21
somewhat naively hoped that "every intelligent Mexican" would know
"that the American forces, if they enter Mexico, will go to no terri-
6? torial conquest." Despite their endorsement of the intervention
62 Ibid., April 21, 1914.
82
the editors were quite unhappy at its duration, and so indicated in
an editorial on the day following the withdrawals from Veracruz:
"Our seizure of Vera Cruz resulted from a quarrel with Huerta and his
faction. If Washington confined itself to the original issue, consis
tency required withdrawal from the port when Huerta and his 'govern
ed
ment' collapsed."
The San Francisco Chronicle, in the Far West and generally
representing the conservative Republican position, during the Tampico D
crisis struck an attitude very similar to that of the New Orleans >
;? Times-Picayune. The Chronicle remarked that "the arrest of a small J
detachment of United States marines [sic] at Tampico appears to have ^ » « J
been the mistake of subordinate Mexican officials and therefore not ^ (\A
an incident to be magnified into unduf importance." The Chronicle J
exhibited another similarity to the Times-Picayune by insisting that
United States policy be consistent toward all Mexican factions. The
Chronicle also demonstrated a tendency toward isolationism: Of course, it is proper and necessary that respect for the American flag should be enforced, but, considering the deplorable conditions of Mexico and our immeasurable superiority of strength, it is a case for lenity rather than severity. At any rate, we should, in respect to the Tampico incident, do nothing that we should not do in case of a similar act by a British or German subordinate officer. The American people do not wish to become embroiled in the contentions among Mexicans or to sacrifice American lives in attempts to end those contentions.^^
^^Ibid., November 24, 1914.
^^San Francisco Chronicle, April 13, 1914.
^^Ibid., April 16. 1914.
83
The Chronicle was clearly in disagreement with the interventionists
of i ts own party, such as Senators Fa l l , Penrose, and Works.
The abatement of the cr is is , treated l ightly i f at al l by the
historians of the intervention, appeared even more definite and per
manent in the Chronicle than i t had in the Times-Picayune. In a front
page news story on April 17 the Chronicle reported that
the United States Government tonight accepted General Huerta's offer to salute the Stars and Stripes as an *^ apology for the arrest of American bluejackets at 5 Tampico a week ago today. The Huerta Government's hi salute to the American flag will be answered with a ^ salute to the tri-color of the Mexican nation. *S
This arrangement . . . ended, in the view of a l l high 5; administration of f ic ia ls , the crisis that had arisen ^^ in the last few days resulting in the dispatch of ti American war vessels to Mexican waters.^^ ay
The conservative, business-oriented philosophy of the Chronicle Jjj
became apparent in an editorial from the same issue. The editors
may have been groping for a way to express their philosophy in this
particular situation. They began with a "good neighbor" approach,
claiming that Huerta's "surrender is not wery reassuring, as I t adds
another to the causes of dislike for us f e l t by our Latin-American
neighbors." The editorial quickly moved into the area of polit ical
philosophy:
This may be "dollar diplomacy," but no situation between us and Mexico can possibly necessitate dropping al l thoughts of profit and rallying to the national defense--unless we adopt what seems to be the opinion of the President that we are charged with moral responsibility for the character of Mexican governments and the legitimacy of their t i t les according to our own theories of political
^6ib id . , April 17, 1914.
84
ethics. We do not believe that the American people take that view.^^
The Chronicle had just begun to fight. On April 18 the editors
opened a campaign of "brass-knuckle" politics: "The fuss that Is
made over this trivial matter looks altogether too much like a deli
berate attempt to divert the thought of our people from the domestic
distress, which, as always before in our history, has resulted from CO
Democratic control of the Government." Inevitably the Chronicle n K
strongly opposed the occupation of Veracruz and continued to use the 1^
Mexican situation for political attacks on Woodrow Wilson. Even •S
when the troops were finally withdrawn from Veracruz the paper was 5;
critical of the particular time chosen to make the withdrawal: gj
The occupation of Vera Cruz was the crowning folly of fa a succession of inexcusable mistakes; its evacuation -jj at the present time is merely correcting one error by falling into another. No one denies that Vera Cruz under American rule has been the one spot in Mexico where life and limb and property have been safe, but for that very reason the withdrawal of our troops should not have been delayed till a time when all three are more unsafe than ever.^'"^
Chronicle editorials were not noted for their subtlety.
The New York World representing the East and the nation's
largest city, was the famous Pulitzer paper operating in 1914 under
the leadership of Frank I. Cobb. Cobb had become the guiding light
of the World even before the death of Joseph Pulitzer in 1911 and
^^bid.
^^Ibid. , April 18, 1914.
^^Ibid. , November 25, 1914.
85
was particularly responsible for the oditorial page. "The World
helped to 'discover' Woodrow Wilson as a presidential candidate, and
Cobb and Wilson became close friends." Naturally the World was a
consistent supporter of the president.
Although the Tampico incident received front page coverage in
the World from the beginning, the newspaper was slow to recognize its
significance. There were no stories in depth for the first few days,
and no editorials until April 15. The World had several juicy crime tj
stories and the attempted assassination of the mayor to hold its >
attention. Even in the first news stories, however, the more sensa- |5
tional approach of "yellow journalism" was in evidence: "No official ,
will deny that Admiral Mayo may not open fire with his big guns. They 3
71 ?•
assert that full redress will be obtained." The early editorials Jj
merely criticized Huerta's censorship policies.
On April 15 the Mexican crisis became the lead story on the
front page of the World, and the editorial staff began searching for
a position upon which it could take a stand. An editorial stated that it is fair to assume that the whole Atlantic fleet has not been sent to Tampico to compel a recalcitrant Mexican commender to fire a salute of twenty-one guns to the American flag. . . . Like everybody else. The World is in the dark, but it assiimes that the President nasTmportant information as to < onditions in the City of Mexico and that he is taking intelligent precautions.'2
The following day the World, apparently having discovered what
Emery, Press and America^ p. 504.
' New York World, April 13.
7^Ibid., April 15, 1914.
86 President Wilson's policy was, hastened to endorse it:
A long series of deliberate insults to the United States on the part of the de facto Government of Mexico has necessitated a demonstration in force to exact suitable reparation. If that reparation is refused, the United States will seize Vera Cruz and Tampico and hold them until Huerta comes to his senses.''^
On April 17, when Huerta offered to salute the flag if the
salute were returned, and it looked as though the crisis had passed,
the World suddenly shifted to a peace-minded and even isolationist .'TJ
position. An editorial insisted that i*
the policy of "watchful waiting" that the jingoes jeer JJ at again becomes the only policy that the Government J? must follow. . . . Mexico will continue to stew in its 5: own juice, and on the whole that is the best thing that r^ can happen to Mexico at this time.'^'^ Jjj
But when the situation changed again and intervention appeared immi- ^ •<
nent, the World also changed its tone: "To take measures for the
deliverance of Mexico from the grip ot a murderous tyranny is not to
make war in our usual meaning of the term. It is to police our own 75 neighborhood. It is to restore constitutional government. The
World's position read suspiciously like an endorsement of the "imperial
istic" Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
Just before and during the occupation of Veracruz most of the
first three or four pages of the World were devoted to military
preparations and articles that indicated impending war. By April 22
^^Ibid., April 16, 1914.
^^Ibid., April 17, 1914.
^^Ibid., April 20, 1914.
87
the editorials were claiming that a state of war existed in fact, as
a result of the occupation of Veracruz. On April 24 the World urged
the president onward:
The best way to deal with Huerta is to supplant his authority with the authority of Major Gen. Leonard Wood. . . . Whether wr are to have a long war or a short war may hinge wholly on the quickness and decisiveness with which the Administration acts.''^
President Wilson did not send troops on to Mexico City, but the
World continued to support his policy and display its usual aggres- 0
siveness through use of special correspondents on the scene in Mexico >
and exclusive Interviews with those involved. The World obtained some- ^
thing of a "scoop" by writing a letter to General Huerta and publish- ^
ing his personal reply, which stated that the Mexican dictator had no ^
intention of changing his policy. Si
News and editorials constituted two distinct categories of news
paper material concerning the intervention in Mexico in the three
newspapers. The greatest similarities among the New Orleans Times-
Picayune, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the New York World appeared
in the news coverage. The Tampico incident caught the newspapers by
surprise, but the story was on Page One as soon as a crisis was evident.
All three papers jumped to the hasty conclusion that the crisis had
ended when Huerta agreed to a reciprocal salute. Press coverage
expanded tremendously when President Wilson ordered the fleet into
Mexican waters; the first two or three pages were devoted almost solely
to discussions of military preparations, diplomatic exchanges, and the
'^^Ibid., April 24, 1914.
88
views of prominent personalities. The Times-Picayune led the way in
the early days of the crisis, but was soon outdistanced by the World,
thanks to its superior facilities and aggressive operations.
Significant geographical differences were not readily apparent
In either the news coverage or the editorials of the three newspapers.
The editorial approach of each paper was quite different, but for
political reasons. The World was determined in its support of the
president, and urged expansion of the intervention for the sake of
pacification of Mexico. The Times-Picayune took a "moderate" position
and supported Wilson while endorsing the view of the Republican C^ •".«,
senators that all parties in Mexico should be treated with equal firm- r*
ness. The Chronicle opposed the intervention in order to oppose ^
Wilson. There were similarities, however: all three papers demon- i<
strated a paternalistic attitude toward the Latin American republics,
and all three would undoubtedly have supported intervention solely to
protect American lives and property. Only the World supported the
Wilsonian ideals which prompted the intervention.
While the preceding examination of the three newspapers provides
some insight into the treatment of the developments concerning the
American intervention at Veracruz from diverse viewpoints, it does not
reflect all opinions in the American press. Current Opinion reported
that a series of bitter attacks on thr administration's foreign policy,
especially after the Tampico incident, had furnished ample proof that
the "honeymoon" period of the Wilson presidency had come to an end.
The New York Evening Post expressed the belief that sending the fleet
to Mexico had needlessly created a great danger, since the Tampico
89
incident looked "like finding a quarrel in a straw." The New York
Times disagreed with this view, insisting that the United States was
not making war, but attempting to avert i t by convincing Huerta that
his "hostile disposition" might render Intervention inevitable.
The Outlook also supported the president:
No American . . . is indifferent where the honor of his country is at stake. President Wilson's vigorous support of Admiral Mayo's demand that apology and reparation be made for insult to the American flag has the support ;JJ of press and people almost w i thout d i s s e n t . As wi th men, 5J so w i th n a t i o n s , there are times when lack of s e l f - 'i^ asser t ion Involves loss of manhood.^^ *
When i t temporar i l y seemed t h a t the Tampico d ispute might be ^ s:
set t led by an exchange of sa lu tes some j o u r n a l i s t s who had supported i .
the p r e s i d e n t ' s strong stand a t the beginning of the inc iden t expressed aj
concern t h a t the United States might back down. The San Francisco 2J
Examiner, the o r i g i n a l member o f the Hearst c h a i n , feared t h a t " the
magnif icent American f l e e t " had apparent ly been assembled " f o r the 79 r id icu lous purpose of s a l u t i n g the Mexican f l a g . " The other Hearst
papers adopted the same l i n e , but used more vehement language. Wi l l i am
Randolph Hears t , the m u l t i - m i l l i o n a i r e exponent of ye l low j o u r n a l i s m ,
had vast landed es ta tes in northern Mexico, and had been urging the
occupation of Mexico by the United States since November of 1913 and
possibly e a r l i e r . On A p r i l 17 a headl ine on the e d i t o r i a l page of the
^^"The American Navy Moves in Force Upon Mexican P o r t s , " Current Opinion, May, 1914, pp. 3 2 9 - 3 1 .
^^"Mexico and American Nat ional Honor," Out look, A p r i l 2 4 , 1914, p. 880.
'^^Quoted in G r i e b , United States and Huer ta , p. 1 5 1 .
90
New York American proclaimed: "The Fleet Steams to Tampico. For
What? To Salute Huerta and Endorse His Record." The editorial i t
self declared that "after a brief apparent manifestation of
enlightened patriotism, a flickering w1ll-o'-wisp of sturdy American
ism, the Administration had disappointed and disheartened the country
by sinking back into its attitude of torpid resignation to whatever
may come from Mexico, and from the arrogant chief of that country's
government." 0
William Randolph Hearst's campaign for war with Mexico followed >
a closely the strategy he uti l ized so successfully in pushing the g
nation toward war with Spain in 1898. A typical ploy consisted of j^
emphasizing distorted accounts and rumors of mistreatment of Americans S
in Mexico while phrasing statements by Mexican off icials in a manner J
which made them appear arrogant or insulting to the United States.
By April 21 i t appeared that Hearst might well have his way. An
editorial heading in the New York Evening Journal of that date
declared: "There is L i t t le Doubt that the War is Coming--Less Doubt
That I t Will Be a Good Thing for Everybody, MEXICO ESPECIALLY." The
editorial writer, possibly Editor Arthur Brisbane, who believed in
telling the public what he thought they wanted to hear, was adamant
in his insistence on the course that the United States should follow. "We shall free Mexico," read the edi tor ia l ,
from a Spanish system, complicated by Indian bloodthir-stiness, and solve the problem for Mexico and the
^ New York American, April 17, 1914.
91
Mexicans by making of that country UNITED STATES TERRITORY and of the people United States c i t i zens .
What we have done for Texas, formerly part of Mexico, we shall do now for a l l of Mexico that remains.
The thing cannot be done half way. The war w i l l mean not merely conquering Mexico to turn the country over la ter to some new co l lec t ion of bandits. I t w i l l mean conquering, annexing, c i v i l i z i n g Mexico - and solving the Mexican problem, to the happiness of Mexico and to the benefit of the whole world."^
While Hearst endorsed the intervention at Veracruz, he refused
to accept Wilson's posi t ion that the f i gh t was with Huerta alone.
According to an ed i to r ia l In the New York Journal, "Senator Lodge was JjJ
expressing the o p i n i o n and the w i l l o f the whole American people i n 5:
h is statement t h a t the Un i ted Sta tes goes to war WITH A COUNTRY, not g
82 •' with an ind iv idua l . " Not surpr is ing ly , Hearst was Infur iated by J»
• <
President Wilson's decision to accept mediation by the ABC powers.
In an ed i tor ia l for the New York Evening Journal Hearst personally
took the Wilson administration to task as "va in , opinionated, obs t i
nate men who think more of the i r own pride and prejudices than they
do of the nation's welfare. "These gentlemen," Hearst continued, "have
never been disturbed by the murder of American men and women and
children in Mexico. They have never bnen moved by any outrage to our
nation and to the c i t izens of our nation. They seem to be merely
personally resentful a t Huerta," who apparently realized " that these
incompetents at Washington had neither the courage, nor the character,
nor the pa t r io t i c sentiment to enforce any demands." The Hearst
^^New York Evening Journal, Apr i l 21 , 1914.
^^New York Journal, Apr i l 22, 1914.
" New York Evening Journaj, April 27, 1914.
^^Emery, Press^ and America, p. 33: .
92
journalistic technique was evident in a news Item in the same issue
of the Evening Journal which declared that "no cessation was apparent
today in the country wide opposition, verbal and penned, to President
Wilson and Secretary Bryan for accepting the offer of the three
83 South American republics."
Hearst was Joined in his attacks on the president for stopping
short of the conquest of Mexico by a number of major dallies, including
the Chicago Inter Ocean, the Chicago Tribune, and the Louisville
Courier-Journal. The sometimes bombastic Colonel Henry Watterson,
who owned and edited the Courier-Journal for fifty years, had made his ci a:
paper a leading voice in the new South. r* s Watterson enhanced his position by exchanging f i re with g other leading editors, and by his picturesque and power- g ful comments, particularly in the f ield of polit ics. ^ Although often verbose and sometimes florirf, he was telling in his attacks upon those with whom he disagreed.'^**
In 1918 Watterson was to win the Pulitzer Prize for editorial writing.
The Kentucky Colonel did not spare the Wilson administration in his
conments on the Mexican crisis:
Let us not deceive ourselves or be deceived. I t is war. The cant of the hour makes many protestations: that we have no quarrel with the Mexican people; that we want no foot of Mexican terri tory; that we seek only good neighborhood; that peace and order are our sole objective points. But al l the same, i f the flag goes up across the Rio Grande i t will never come down . . .
Man proposes, God disposes. The peacemaker's house of cards fa l ls with a crash. Mr. Bryan's hope of next
93 year's Nobel prize goes glimmering. Andrew Carnegie's picture is turned to the wall. I t is war.
Yea, ver i ly , we are in for i t . Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are marching. They may not be just shouting the battle-cry of freedom. War never ends where i t is started. Militarism in the saddle knows not where to stop, and southward the star of empire takes its way. The whine of the upl i f t crowd may please, or fool , the Pharisaic, but i t is war, and war, as Forrest observed, means fighting, and fighting means k i l l ing , and when i t is over comes the for fe i t , the indemnity, and i t is not worth our while, nor will i t pay us, to l i e about our peaceful intentions and pious pruposes, thinking to placate or bamboozle the rest of Latin America. Sound the bold anthem, "On to the Isthmus."«^
Despite the eagerness of Hearst, Watterson, and their colleagues p
for the conquest of Mexico, the majority of the press gave the presi- 5: r
dent's course their unqualified approval during the period inmedlately ^
following the intervention. The Literary Digest identified twenty- g <
three major dailies which gave unqualified approval to the president s
action. The New York Times was confident that the group "that accepts
the President's view, trusts him, agrees with him, supports him"
included "almost the whole body of American people." "Come," requested
the Philadelphia Inquirer, "let us not quibble over this matter. We
are going to war in support of a policy of the Administration - - a
policy which began with the practical ordering of Huerta to quit the
Presidency of Mexico a year ago. In brief, this is President Wilson's 86
personal war on Huerta." While many editors were unwilling to accept
this distinction between war on Huerta and war on Mexico, there was
^^Quoted in "Our War on Huerta," Literary Digest, May 2, 1914, p. 1032.
^^Ibid. , pp. 1029, 1032.
94
near unanimity in supporting the president once hostilities began.
Hearst, Watterson, and company may have thought that the president
did not go far enough, but they were strong in their support of the
Intervention when it began.
There were, however, a few voices of dissent in the American
press. Both the New York Tribune and the New York Globe believed
that the president had made "the mistake of loosing forces that he
87 r^ will not be able to control." Oswald Garrison Villard, the pacifist r
c> editor of both the New York Evening Post and the Nation found evidence ^ in "the mass of the American people" of "a profound distaste for the ^
&:
whole sorry business, a conviction that somehow, somewhere a blunder J" had been committed, and that we were going to war for no just cause ^
88 ' and with a people against whom we had no just quarrel." Villard •<
also sent to President Wilson a critical telegram in which he referred
to the "immoral position in which we find ourselves in Mexico." The
president replied that he did not see what other course was open to us or how we could have avoided taking such steps as we have taken. The next move is for Huerta. It depends upon him how far this thing shall go. I sincerely pray God it may not have to go to the length of definite war. ''
Despite the criticism in the press from some quarters President
Wilson believed that he had broad support from the American people.
The president was reassured in his belief by an old friend, the wealthy
^^Ibid, p. 1032.
^^"Mexico," Nation, April 30, 1914, p. 487.
^^Quoted in Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 332.
95
Cleveland H. Dodge, who wrote, " I t is needless to say that I h e a r t i l y
approve of every step you have taken, and in sp i te of Hearst 's
ravings, Mr. Root's bathos, and the Evening Post 's groanings, I know,
Qn from a l l I hear, that you have the American people s o l i d l y with you."
The major organs of the nat ion 's press had indeed demonstrated
strong support for the president as reflecting the will of the people.
Before such a conclusion can be drawn, however, i t is essential to a
take note of the a t t i t u d e s and opinions of the regional and local 5?
press, the small d a i l y and weekly newspapers which may r e f l e c t public *
opinion more accurate ly because the personnel was more l i k e l y to C a:
have been In contact with persons outside the journalistic profession. h*
* • »
A study of the press in the Pacific Northwest has provided use- ^ 33
fu l information concerning the a t t i t u d e s in that region toward Wilson's i^
Mexican pol icy . Pr ior to the Tampico incident the press in Washington,
Oregon, and Idaho had r e f l e c t e d much of the uncerta inty about the
president's pol icy observed in the national press. By Apr i l 14 the
press, having become aware that a major c r i s i s was developing,
inmediately divided along par t isan line", in approval or condemnation
of the president 's course, usual ly based upon the previous posi t ion
held by each paper. This sharp d i v i s i o n demonstrated " that the only
conclusion to be drawn up to the time [Wilson] went before Congress
was that the Northwest was t o t a l l y s p l i t regarding the wisdom of his
dealings wi th Huerta."^^ ^^ibi^.
^^David P h i l i p Glaser , "Pac i f ic Northwest Press Reaction to Wilson's Mexican Diplomacy 1913-1916" (unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n . Universi ty of Idaho, 1965) , p. 130.
96
The political split among the newspapers of the Pacific North
west over the president's Mexican policy ended abruptly when the
sailors landed at Veracruz. Such newspapers as the Boise Idaho Daily
Statesman and the Portland Morning Oregonian, both of which had
earlier criticized Wilson's policies, stated that they would stand
behind the president despite regret over the cr isis. Thirty-five of
the thirty-seven newspapers examined in the study declared their
support for the president during the cri t ical period following the Pt
92 ^ intervention. President Wilson, however, managed to alienate a f-
sizeable part of the press during the succeeding weeks when he conti- "
a* nued to insist that the insult to American honor at Tampico was the
. • ,
sole motive for ordering the occupation of Veracruz. Had the presi- £
dent proclaimed his action essential to enlightened self-interest by 33
protecting American lives and property, or had he even announced his
true intent to remove Huerta as a threat to peace and democracy, the
commander-in-chief might well have maintained nearly unanimous support
in the Pacific Northwest. "When i t became apparent that the President
was reluctant to use force in reaching an ultimate decision and had
allowed his idealism to draw him into negotiations which did not
achieve a flag salute, he alienated permanently a sizable [sic] por-03
tion of the Pacific Northwest press."
A survey of Southern public opinion has confirmed the near
unanimity of press support for President Wilson's decision to intervene.
^^Ibid., p. 132.
^•^Ibid., p. 148.
97 The Wilmington Star wrote that "President Wilson is the man who is In
charge of the flag, and not to follow him is not to salute the flag."
The previously critical Montgomery Advertiser congratulated the presi
dent for becoming "as active and as vigorous as his most canny critic 95 could have wished him." The Pensacola Journal and the Mobile
Register joined the Advertiser in issuing strong endorsements of the
intervention.
Southern newspaper support for the president before and after the 5?
crisis period was quite substantial, although most indicators point ^^
to partisanship as the reason. Any Democratic president, but espe- C> a:
daily one raised in the South, could count on the implicit faith of r» Ki
most Southerners. Even in the South, however, there was some signi- aj
fleant opposition to Wilson's policies. After the Tampico incident ^
had occurred the Memphis Commercial-Appeal declared that the affair
was "as serious as a Mexican invasion on United States territory.
Patience has ceased to be a virtue. Further patience would be a
weakness!" The Jackson Clarion-Ledger warned its readers that i f
action were not taken against Huerta, the United States would appear to the world as "a nation of gas bags, incapable of defending our own
people and country."
Robert Hoyt Block, "Southern Opinion of Woodrow Wilson's Foreign Policies, 1913-1917" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1968), p. 52.
^^Ibid . , p. 58.
^^Ib id . , p. 52.
98 In common with the newspapers of other sections which had
criticized the president's slowness to act, those in the South ex
pressed great unhappiness over the decision to accept mediation. The
Montgomery Advertiser considered the only basis for ending the f ight
ing to be "Huerta prisoner or Huerta dead."^^ The preponderance of
opinion, however, in the South as elsewhere was with the president on
the mediation issue.
As in the case of the examination of the New Orleans Times- t ! K
Picayune, the New York World, and the San Francisco Chronicle, the *
surveys of the press of the Pacific Northwest and the South demon- ^ i
strated no significant differences. One section of the United States, p.,
however, did manifest a distinctive reaction--the Southwest. "Proxi- atj
mity to a bone of contention or to a particular foreign nation has S
98 often accounted for our sectional vagaries."
The people of the border country generally expressed sympathy
for the rebel cause, possibly for the yery practical reason that the
rebels controlled the territory along the border. But they would have
welcomed American intervention in Mexico i f i t was done to provide
protection for their interests and to end the violence. Thus, the
dispute between Huerta and Wilson over an incident in the distant gulf
coast port of Tampico in i t i a l l y offered l i t t l e to concern the South
west. Although the Tampico story appeared in the pages of the El Paso
Morning Times beginning on April 11, there were no editorials on the
^^Ibid., p. 71.
98 Bailey, Man in the Street, p. 106.
99 subject until April 19. Asserting that the American government had
been "most lenient in dealing with the Mexican situation," the
Morning Times claimed that "the limit has been reached in the Wilson
policy of 'watchful waiting,'" and that Huerta and his associates
should be "made to realize they can not trifle longer with American
99 honor and dignity."
By April 20 the citizens of the Southwest were seriously *<%
alarmed by the growing crisis despite statements in the Morning Times D
that the mayor and the sheriff were not worried. The army was placed > •-<
on alert , the sheriff readied a 500 man posse, and preparations were 12
made in case i t became necessary to declare martial law. A thinly ^^
disguised front-page editorial nervously sought to assure both §
Mexicans and Americans of a continued course of friendship between '<^
the two peoples. The editor of the Morning Times hoped
that the friendliness will become more firmly cemented than ever . . . in spite of Huerta's apparent effort to bring about s t r i fe . The Times does not believe the constitutionalists will be led into opposition to the United States by Huerta. They are certainly aware that Huerta is simply trying to use them as tools to save his own hide.^^^
The San Antonio Light, however, was crit ical of the president's policy,
which had been "such as to cause the Mexican people to believe the
United States was merely bluffing." The Light claimed that
the people of Texas, who understand the Mexican character, have always known that the Administration would ultimately precipitate the exact thing i t has tried to
99,
' ib id. , April 20, 1914.
El Paso Morning Times, April 19, 1914.
100.
100
avoid. The probability now is that al l parties to the dispute will realize their mistake too late to prevent an International calamity.^°^
In contrast with the Light and much of the press in other sections of
the country the Morning Times was eager to accept President Wilson's
explanation that the intervention was aimed at Huerta alone.
Such was the concern over possible reaction in northern Mexico
to the crisis that Governor Oscar B. Colquitt of Texas sent a tele-
gram on April 20 to Congressman John Nance Garner urging that the S
Mexican towns along the Rio Grande be seized by American troops i f
102 '' the crisis became more intense. El Pasoans saw ample cause for in
a: concern when it was reported that troops under the command of General r-
a, ,
Pancho Vil la were headed for Ciudad Juarez, but a columnist for the tt Xi
Morning Times maintained that ^
the people of El Paso have positively refused to get excited and discussed the situation in the best of humor. El Paso's business man do not anticipate any trouble here or in Juarez, and they say that i f any boozing American or Mexican tries to start something the police and soldiers will promptly land the disturbers in j a i l .
The April 23 edition of the Morning Times also included the reassuring
report that some 600 Americans of Mexican descent had offered their
services to the United States. Mr. J. A. Escajeda, spokesman for the
group, denied the rumors that Mexican-Americans would rise up and
incite riots in El Paso, and insisted that "quite on the contrary.
^^Voted in "Our War on Huerta," p. 1032.
^^^Donnell, "United States Intervention In Mexico," p. 201
101
We are ready to shoulder a r i f l e and march in the ranks with the
103 American soldier who is of Anglo-Saxon or Celtic or ig in ."
Despite the ef forts of the Morning Times and others to assure
the public that there was l i t t l e danger of an outbreak of hos t i l i t i es
along the border, the sporadic shooting and other incidents in various
locations continued to alarm many c i t izens. Hysterical rumors c i r
culated through El Paso concerning a conspiracy among Mexican servants
104 to poison their American employers. Texas congressmen received
urgent telegrams from the mayor, county judge, and president of the
chamber of commerce of San Antonio demanding that suff ic ient troops
be kept a t Fort Sam Houston in the face of other telegrams from
Bracketvil le, Eagle Pass, Brownsville, and El Paso appealing for Jj
105 '^
troops or more troops. The panic along the f ront ier over the i^
possibil ity that the revolutionaries and the federals might unite to
attack border c i t i es enraged General Tasker H. Bl iss, who wrote
General Hugh Scott: Every time a Mexican gets "tanked up" with mescal and informs the by-standers in forcible but rude and impol i t e language what he proposes to do to the Gringos when the proper time comes, everybody In the community thinks that Huerta is just around the corner. They make no attempt to employ additional policemen or to swear in deputy sheriffs or to stop the lucrat ive sale of arms and animjnition or do anything to help themselves . . . . A one-eyed, one-legged, rheumatic, octegenarian Mexican
^°^E1 Paso Morning Times, April 23, 1914.
^^Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho V i l l a : A Study jn^ Unconventional Diplomacy J) thaca. New York: CorneTl University Press, 1961), p. 83.
^^^El Paso Morning Times, April 25, 1914.
102 with a wooden gun, would make them throw up their hands. Every old woman in South Texas who has lost a hair pin, claims that a detachment of Mexican troops came over and robbed her. The situation thus far , is one that calls for horse whips, cold douches or whatever remedies are resorted to in lunatic asylums.'Of>
Certainly a great deal of the tension was relieved in El Paso
at least when General Vi l la upon his arrival in Ciudad Juarez
announced that he had come to the border not to attack El Paso, but
to make sure that hosti l i t ies did not occur in that vicinity. The r i
editors of the El Paso Morning Times were so carried away by their '^>
gratitude to Vil la that they proposed "the moving of General "
Francisco Vi l la 's army by special train from Ciudad Juarez to * -I
Galveston, under proper and necessary restrictions, the loading of ^ :»
that army on American transports at Galveston and its quick trans- u <
portation to Vera Cruz, and the restoration of the control of that
city to Mexican hands."
While there was both support for and opposition to President
Wilson's decision to intervene in Mexico, as exemplified by the
El Paso Morning Times and the San Antonio Light, the press and
people of the Southwest offered a distinctive reaction to the cr isis.
The volatile situation created a high degree of nervousness among
border residents. The possibility of violence caused Southwesterners
to devote considerable attention to American policy toward the
Constitutionalists: pro-rebel Americans favored active support of
^^^Quoted by Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 157.
^^^El Paso Morning Times, April 26, 1914.
103
their cause, while anti-rebel Americans called for military action
against al l Mexican factions. All border residents demanded protec
tion against violence.
In view of the dangers posed by the cr isis, the American press,
reflecting similar attitudes in al l sections of the nation with the
exception of the small jingoist minority, eagerly grasped at the possi
bi l i ty of a peaceful solution presented by the offer of mediation
from the ABC powers. Much of the press had accepted reluctantly the V
decision to Intervene, although they did stand behind the president ^
once he had acted. Thus, many of these same newspapers were quite ;i 5^
willing to give mediation a t r ia l since i t would preclude a renewal u
of hostilities and the United States had nothing to lose. Many news- O
papers concurred in the opinion of the Philadelphia Public Ledger that J
whether mediation failed or succeeded "in the present a f fa i r , our
attitude will result in a better understanding between the United 108 States and the three most powerful South-Amerlean republics."
Naturally, the jingoists and pacificists reversed their posi
tions of support for or opposition to the president's Mexican policy.
Jingoists l ike William Randolph Hearst joined the editors of the
Dayton Journal and others in the claim that "every red-blooded
American hides his face in shame" when contemplating the president's
decision to accept mediation. On the other hand the president gained
support from some of the crit ics of the intervention. Oswald
Garrison Villard and the New York Evening Post were elated:
^^%oted in "Letting South America into Our Mexican Quarrel," Literary Digest, May 9, 1914, p. 1095.
104
The great thing is that time for thought has been gained, time for negotiation, time for humane instincts to reassert themselves. The fighting has been checked. Opportunity for reason to utter i ts voice has been secured. The whole Christian world will look on with devout hope that the effort now making to find a peaceful solution may in the end succeed.
In reply to the jingoists the Evening Post called on al l "patriotic
Americans" to "frown upon al l talk of hurt honor demanding bloodshed,
to insist upon inf inite patience and the display of a conciliatory
spirit even under great provocation, and to go on hoping t i l l hope >
creates the thing i t contemplates--namely, peace again lying l ike
109 1 level shafts of light across the land." n
The American press, reflecting a variety of views among Americans, ' I u
soon divided over President Wilson s gradually emetgn.g Mexican polic^. 9 13
Opposition to and support for the president fluctuated with the evo- <
lution of the Mexican policy, but the worsening situation in Mexico
and the failure of the president's policies to achieve positive results
emboldened the crit ics and added to their numbers.
Patriotic fervor temporarily united the press and public behind
the president during the week of the infervenlion crisis ending with
the acceptance of mediation by the ABC powers. The regional press
also indicated the broad base of the president's support. The support
of the intervention should not be construed as an endorsement of the
president's motives, for many editors favored intervention to protect
American lives and property, while others were determined to support
their president "right or wrong."
^°^Ib1d., pp. 1096-97.
105 The press
has long given us the bulk of our information about the outside world, and this is a frightening responsibility. Without sound information there can be no sound public opinion, and without sound public opinion there can be no intelligent foreign policy.^^°
Opinion in the press, however, is not necessarily identical to public
opinion. National surveys have demonstrated that editors often
regard the leading of public opinion as their chief function. To ^ pi
test the depth of the president's support, therefore, i t is necessary i>J
to look beyond the press. ^
^^%a11ey, Man in the Street, p. 304.
CHAPTER IV
THE ATTITUDES OF AMERICAN ELITES
During times of crisis the American public has almost always
rallied behind its leaders, especially the president. In view of
the opinions expressed in the press i t would be d i f f icu l t to come to
a different conclusion regarding the attitude of the general public
during the week following President Wilson's announcement that he 3
Intended to use force in behalf of American national honor.
I t was an era of national naivete in which the spir i t of ^ patriotism was waxing, in which people could be stirred n to action by magical words about the Maine^ Cuba, or ^ the Philippines, and in which foreigners, especially Filipinos or Latin Americans, were thought to be inferior i,j to Americans. I t was easy for the president to capi- w tal ize on these national emotions, and had he decided ^ to occupy large parts of Mexican territory he would have < found the country largely with him.*
But this was an emotional response to an international cr is is , and
American public opinion has been notoriously f ickle .
The mass mood, when i t fluctuates violently, is more l ikely to do so regarding foreign affairs than domestic affairs. . . . in regard to faraway foreign af fa i rs , we are usually less keenly or protractedly interested, and less able to see how a proposed move is going to affect us directly. We are also less well informed, and hence more liable to be led astray by a propagandist , who knows that we have l i t t l e or no firsthand evidence against which to check his story.^
Robert E. Quirk, An Affair o£ Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc . ,T5F2) , p. 58.
Thomas A. Bailey, The Maji in the Street; The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy To'loucester, Massachusetts: Peter ^ni tFr i964) , pp7 167-68.
106
107
While the greater part of the public may react to developments
in foreign affairs by fluctuations in mood, significant segments of
the public play a larger role in foreign policy formulation by vir
tue of their greater Interest and organization. These influential
elements constitute the "elites" of American public opinion. A study
of American Information on foreign affairs has indicated that thirty
per cent of the public are "unaware of almost any given event in 3 l>S
American foreign policy." Forty-five per cent are "aware but ^ '"}
uninformed," retaining l i t t l e information. This group "cannot frame
intelligent arguments" about the issues of foreign policy. The ^
remaining twenty-five per cent show "knowledge of foreign problems." " il
This last group contains not only the e l i tes, "the articulate policy- 2
bearing stratum of the population which gives structure to the public," <
but also the "attentive public" which is "informed and interested in
foreign policy problems, and which constitutes the audience for the
foreign policy discussions among the el i tes."
The mass of the American public responded to the stimulus of the
intervention at Veracruz, but when the sensational aspects diminished
the majority of the public returned to its apathy. Thus, when
President Wilson agreed to mediation by the ABC powers, the interven
tion lost its attraction to much of the general public, and "public
opinion" on policy toward Mexico once again became the property of
Martin Kriesberg, "Dark Areas of Ignorance," in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, ed. by Lester Markel (New York: Harper & Bros., M g ) , p. 51.
^Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950, p. 138.
108 the elites and their audience, the attentive public. Because this
was the group which would react to developments for the duration of
the occupation of Veracruz and attempt to Influence President Wilson's
policy, i t is Important to explore its response to the intervention.
American public opinion elites are not necessarily social or
economic elites now, nor were they in 1914. The press, especially
the publishers and editors of popular newspapers and magazines, con
stituted a most Important sector of the communications e l i tes, as
demonstrated in the preceding chapter. The very prominence of the 4
press, however, has tended to obscure the continued decisive impor- '^
'4 tance of more Intimate forms of communication In the shaping of
5 popular attitudes." The influential leaders of community, regional,
and national organizations such as churches, unions, fraternal orders, <
veterans' groups and other special Interest associations not only
were able to play a major role in the formation of public opinion,
but also they were able to speak to formulators of policy with the
authority of the numbers which they represented.
President Wilson's decision to Intervene in Mexico was greeted
by a variety of expressions from numerous organizations. Many groups
proclaimed an unqualified endorsement of the president's action.
Early in May the annual reunion of the United Confederate Veteran
Association passed a resolution recognizing "the great wisdom and
discretion of the President of the United States" in his dealings
with Mexico, and promising to "heartily support such action as he
^Ibld. , p. 140.
109 shall take, in every possible way." In his reply to the veterans
the president wrote that the resolution was "enough to hearten any
man." In the f i r s t few days after the intervention began, the
president received a number of telegrams supporting his action from
local groups of the Grand Army of the Republic. In North Carolina
2000 veterans of the Spanish-American War volunteered their services
for the confl ict, and every manber of that state's third regiment
7 ?S
voted to volunteer for Mexican service. The pledge of support from i
the Americus Association of Elizabeth, New Jersey, stated that
"Huerta . . . has from time to time made the lives of our citizens
dangerous and their financial interest interfered with, which forced
U.S., Congress, House, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, Appendix, p. 674.
' Robert Hoyt Block, "Southern Opinion of Woodrow Wilson's Foreign Policies, 1913-1917" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1968), p. 59.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, 63rd Conq., 2nd sess.. May 19, 1914, Congressional Record, L I , 8801.
^Ibid., 7142,
1
8 •'•''^
our President to land our soldiers." The president also received :3 ::> 4
encouragement from several ethnic groups. Several Mexican-Americans 1
from New Mexico offered their services for military action to
President Wilson even before the intervention began, claiming that 9
the president had "been right from the beginning and is right now."
A large number of Mexican-Americans in El Paso volunteered to fight
when the troops were landed. The April 25 edition of the Irish-
American (New York) asserted that the president would be backed up
^^Iri.h-American (New York), April 25, 1914, p. 3.
^ ^ Qu irk, Affajf o£ Honor, p. 58.
^^U.S., Congress, House, oBrd Coru., 2nd sess., May 3, 1914, Congressional Reiord, L I , 8113.
•nf 1!: n
110
by an "efficient majority" of responsible citizens, but the editors
were clearly unhappy about the violence at Veracruz.
Despite the wide variety of expressions of support for President
Wilson, i t is not at al l certain that sources of those expressions
actually agreed with Wilson's idealistic goals. Most of the letters
and published statements indicated that their authors supported the
president's action because they hoped i t would provide protection for
American interests in Mexico, or because they were spoiling for a
chance to flex the muscles of America's military might, or merely
because they wanted to support their president. Nor was i t clear that ^
a majority of the special interest groups supported the president. ^
I t was not surprising that William ("Big Bi l l") Haywood and the 'J3 9
socialist International Workers of the World (Wobblies) would con- <
demn the intervention, threatening a general strike, but even
respectable labor groups expressed concern over the direction of the
president's policy. At a meeting on April 19 the Chicago Federation
of Labor, "representing over 250,000 working men and women," resolved
to recormend that the president "exhaust every possible means to pre
vent the United States from becoming involved in the struggle with Mexico," because "the burden and suffering of war are always placed
12 upon the working classes."
I l l
Besides those questioning the tenets of the president's policy
there were also those groups, especially women's organizations, which
withheld corrwent until the ABC mediation offer had been accepted.
These groups wanted to support their president, but could not bring
themselves to endorse bloodshed. Soon after the ceasefire began,
representatives of the Georgia branch of the United Daughters of the
Confederacy joined the executive branch of the Georgia Federation of It
Women's Clubs in passing a resolution praising Wilson's Mexican ''* 1 " "''
diplomacy. A telegram sent on April 29 by about 150 "mothers, '* a
wives, and sisters of American boys" from Hartford, Connecticut, to ^
Republican Senator Frank B. Brandegee commended the president for ,*
accepting mediation, and urged
^^Block, "Southern Opinion," p. 68.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 30, 1914, Congressional Record, L I , 7469.
^^Mattie Belle Kellering to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, April 29, 1914, 812.00/11776, U.S., Department of State, Records of th£ Department of State Relating to th£ Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, Microcopy No. 274 (Washington, D.C: National ArcTi'ives Microfilm Publications, 1959).
t?
:ai
every effort for [the] suppression of hysterical war J spir i t and consummation of [a] speedy peace. [The] offenses committed are more than atoned for by [the] Mexican and American homes already bereaved. Public and international sentiment demand generous action by [the] United States.*'*
The Daughters of the /^erican Revolution, however, sought to ut i l i ze
the mediation for the advancement of the status of women. Regent
Mattie Belle Kellering notified Secretary Bryan that
i t was the consensus of opinion that the factors in Mexico will not be reconciled through the offices of a man. . . . Should peace be made . . . i t is believed that i t can only be done through the efforts of a woman.*''
112
Church groups generally proved to be unsympathetic to President
Wilson's decision to intervene. Prior to the actual intervention
the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, which claimed
to represent seventeen million Christians, issued a circular letter
condemning any action by the United States that might lead to war with
Mexico. As soon as the intervention began the Massachusetts
Federation of Churches sent a telegram to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
protesting against "a war with the Mexican people." ' The leading '"«
is Catholic journal, the Jesuit America, maintained that while the people -^
were "determined to stand by the President in his di f f icul t ies," they ^
were "not on the whole enthusiastic over the war."^^ Catholics *
generally regarded President Huerta as a defender of the Catholic '^
Church in Mexico against the attacks of the irreligious rebels. .3
American Catholics blamed the often authenticated incidents of mis
treatment of members of the clergy on the anti-clerical policies of
First Chief Carranza. After Huerta resigned and Carranza seemed to
be in control in Mexico City, James Cardinal Gibbons and other
Catholic leaders unsuccessfully attempted to persuade President Wilson
to intercede with Carranza for the protection of Mexican clerics.^^
'°Guy Renfro Donnell, "United States Intervention in Mexico, 1914" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas, 1951), pp. 200-201.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 23, 1914, Congressional Record, L I , 7116.
^^"Judgments on the War," America, May 2, 1914, p. 49.
19 Louis M. Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution 1913-1916): A History of United States-Mexican Relations from the lurder of Madero Until V i l la 's PTovacation across the Border (New York: Exposition Press, 1967), p. 141.
iii<
i>
113
When the American troops evacuated Veracruz, Rev. R. H. Tierney, the
editor of America, protested that the United States had "entered
Mexico when its law-abiding citizens had some semblance of protection;
we left it when they had none." The San Antonio Knights of Columbus
insisted that it was the duty of the American government "to repair
20
the evils i t s support had made possible." Rev. Francis C Kelley,
president of the Catholic Church Extension Society, echoed the demands
of the Knights of Columbus when he wrote: •<
What American Catholics want is the promise that a ' government which already has intervened in Mexican jj a f f a i r s to the extent of t e l l i n g the Mexican people what they should not do, w i l l inform one and a l l of the factions that the thing they must do, i f they want recognition by th is nat ion, is to guarantee . . . »5 l i be r t y of conscience. j The President can do that . He ought to do i t . He can ! do no less. We'll forget what is past, but the future we are determined, shall not be marked by the John Lindisms of the past, by which I 'nean--the unpardonable blunders of narrow-mindedness and prejudice.2*
Various peace organization joined the re l ig ious groups in thei r
opposition to the intervent ion. A telegram to Senator Lodge from
Edwin D. Mead, chief d i rector of the World Peace Foundation, sent
during the debate on President Wilson's pro[KS!ls for action against
Huerta, urged "avoidance of any steps involving war un t i l [ the] whole
complex Mexican s i tuat ion can be examined by [a] commission of inquiry
[so] that Congress and [ the] people may have f u l l and accurate
^^"Mexico and Ourselves," America, December 12, 1914, p. 223.
^Vrancis Clement Kelley, T]ie Book of Red and Yellow; Being a Story of Blood and a Yellow Streak (Chi'fago: Catholic Church Extension Society of the United States of Americn, [1915]), pp. 87-88.
1
l a
114 22
knowledge of facts." The New York Peace Society and the Rhode
Island Peace Society both passed resolutions condemning the presi-
23 dent's action. Moorefield Storey, president of the Anti-Imperialist
League, also protested against the intervention. Storey later wrote
that he had lost confidence in Wilson and could no longer regard him
as an honest and sincere man, because the president had acted "in
absolute violation of his statement that he respects the rights of
small nations as well as those of the most powerful." Andrew J
Carnegie, founder of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ** i
wrote a personal note to President Wilson stating: "Such a war as ^
seems pending will in after days be held akin to the fabled war of
broken.
Despite the general opposition from religious and pacifist
organizations to the intervention on humanitarian grounds, some
church groups ral l ied to the president's side. Reflecting the staunch
support for the president in the South, several Baptist publications
declared their support for the intervention, even though they
22 U.S., Congress, Senate, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 24, 1914, Congressional Record. L I , 7181.
23 Justin Louis Kestenbaum, "The Question of Intervention in Mexico, 1913-1917" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University, 1963), pp. 78-79.
William Frank Marina, "Opponents of Empire: An Interpretation of American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1921" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Denver, 1968), pp. 265-66.
25 Arthur S. Link, Wilson; The New Freedom (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p.'404.
the two kings to decide which end of the egg should f i r s t be j
.25 iJ C
rrwj
115
continued to express their abhorrence of bloodshed. The Dallas
Baptist Standard echoed the president when it wrote, "Our government
is not intervening in Mexico solely because the flag was Insulted.
This is but the culmination of a series of injustices." The
Richmond Religious Herald commended the administration for having
26
shown "an admirable degree of patience." Some of the Protestant
support for the intervention was probably based on hopes for the
destruction of the Catholic establishment by the successful revolu- ^
tionaries. Whatever the motives of the various church groups for ^
the positions they took at the time of the intervention, they were
submerged in manifestations of support for the president's decision to
accept mediation. For example, the previously critical Congrega- in tionalist and Christian World described the mediation offer as "a
27 sudden burst of sunshine through dark clouds."
As In the case of the church and peace organizations, the
response from academe was mixed, but generally hostile. Charles W.
Eliot, former president of Harvard University, attended a meeting
early in May of "two or three hundred serious minded men" on the
subject of American policy toward Mexico. Eliot wrote to the presi
dent that "the majority thought that the Tampico incident was no
satisfactory cause for war." The demands which John Lind had pre
sented to President Huerta sometime earlier were discussed at the
meeting, and Eliot reported, "so far as I could judge, there was not
^^Quoted in Block, "Southern Opinion," pp. 60-61.
^^Quoted in Kestenbaum, "Question of Intervention," p. 82.
'"J
^^Ibid.. pp. 86-87.
^^The papers presented by the participants at the Philadelphia meeting may be found in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, LIV W l y , 191477
n.
i
116 a man In the room who thought i t possible for any Mexican government
28
to accede to the terms therein laid down." Just prior to the inter
vention President Wilson's Mexican policy had been roundly condemned
at the meeting of the Academy of Political and Social Science held in
Philadelphia. Dr. Leo S. Rowe believed the president's Idealistic
policies to be inspiring but untenable. "President Wilson's consti
tutional standards mean either a prolonging of the state of anarchy
in Mexico, the outcome of which must be the complete disappearance of
every vestige of c iv i l izat ion, or armed intervention by the United
States," Dr. Rowe prophetically remarked. "The real solution is the
elimination of demands for a Constitutional election, and this does J
not, of necessity, mean the formal recognition of President Huerta," i
he concluded. Dr. Simon N. Patten of the University of Pennsylvania •
and Dr. Leslie C Wells of Clark College agreed that the United 29 States did not have the right to interfere in Mexico.
Albert Bushnell Hart, eminent historian and Eaton Professor
of the science of government at Harvard University, had been the
leading academic proponent of President Wilson's policy toward Mexico,
particularly the non-recognition of Huerta. But the president's
decision to abandon watchful waiting in favor of military intervention
caused Hart to join the opposition. "Are we to tel l our children in
years to come," asked Professor Hart,
117 that in 1914 the people of the United States had no better reason for entering a neighboring country and ki l l ing its people than a dispute about a salute? We al l stand by our Government in every attempt to keep peace or even to compel peace; but as James Bryce says somewhere: "You do not need a steam hammer to crack nuts.""*^
The president's decision to intervene did have its academic supporters,
however. Benjamin Ide Wheeler, president of the University of
California, believed that intervention was both inevitable and
necessary. "Now that we have landed," wrote Wheeler,
A number of diplomatic experts, including three former ambassa
dors to Mexico, joined the scholars in opposing the intervention.
Since former Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson had continuously denounced
the president's policy after the ambassador had been relieved of his
position, his denunciation of the intervention came as no surprise.
Powell Clayton, who had served eight years in Mexico around the turn
of the century, maintained that he had always been opposed to inter
vention in Mexico "under any circumstances," preferring to let the 32
Mexican people fight out their own civi l war. John W. Foster, who
^^Albert Bushnell Hart, "The Second Mexican War," Independent, May 4, 1914, p. 196.
^^Benjamin Ide Wheeler, "Firmness and Strength," Independent, May 4, 1914, p. 193.
^^Powell Clayton, "Commercial Intervention - Not Mil i tary," Independent, May 4, 1914, p. 193.
n.
if.
I hope our Government will proceed with firmness and * overwhelming strength. This will be better both for i us and for Mexico. J
•»
It will save lives, it is the one sure way to peace.
We have assumed before the world some disagreeable ; responsibilities which we cannot either relinquish • or shirk."* !
118 also had served as secretary of state in the Benjamin Harrison
administration, wrote to Ellhu Root that he was "sick at heart that
we seem to be plunged into a bloody and costly war, after all our
labors to establish a basis of peace for all nations."^"^
The leadership groups, or "elites," are not constituted solely
of special interest organizations and experts. Political organiza
tions and Ideologically inspired elements can often produce a more
powerful force in influencing public opinion and affecting national J
policy because of their enduring concern for partisan and philoso- > I
phical Issues as well as their broad constituencies. If the United > 1
•
States of America in 1914 were diviyied into two halves on the basis a
of the philosophical positions of liberalism and conservatism it J
would be possible to state that the li-berals usually supported
President Wilson on most Issues, including his Mexican policy, while
the conservatives usually opposed him. Many liberals, including the
president, were sympathetic to the aims of the Mexican Revolution
and hoped to see Huerta replaced. When the president opted for
Intervention, however, a major part of his liberal support deserted
him, as was demonstrated in editorials in the Nation and other
liberal journals. Others, including the editors of the New York
World, retained their confidence in the ability of the president to
do the right thing. The issue was complicated by a further dicho
tomy within the ranks of the liberals over the role of the United
States in world affairs as exemplified in the Progressive movement.
^^Kestenbaum, "Question of Intervention," pp. 78-79.
119
American Progressives, liberal reformers in domestic affairs,
desired to lift the masses of the world to a higher level of existence,
while at the same time permitting them to be expoited through impe-34 rialistic designs. Prompted by a strong sense of national honor,
many Progressives supported the intervention, despite their political
opposition to the president dating from their support of Theodore
Roosevelt and the Progressive Party in 1912. For example, the
members of the Minnesota State Progressive Conference, claiming to be ;
"patriots above partisans," resolved at the time of the intervention w J
to "support President Wilson and Congress in their efforts to uphold J 35 and defend our national honor." Senator Albert J. Beveridge of
34 The source for this view of the Progressive movement is William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXIX (December, 1952), 483-502. Leuchtenburg 's thesis was that "the Progressives, contrary to the orthodox accounts, did not oppose imperialism but, with few exceptions, ardently supported the imperialist surge or, at the very least, proved agreeably acquiescent."
35 Kestenbaum, "Question of Intervention," p. 79.
^^Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era (New York: Literary Guild, 1932), p. 448.
Indiana, an outstanding exemplar of the Progressive leader, opposed ; i
Wilson on Mexico from the beginning, believing that it was a mistake '
not to have recognized Huerta. Yet, if Mexico was unable to esta
blish a stable government, Beveridge concluded that "we ourselves
must go there and administer her affairs for the next two or three
generations." Hence, Beveridge did not oppose the initial phase
of the intervention at Veracruz, since it might be expected to lead
120 to a restoration of order.
William Allen White, editor of the Emporia Gazette and one of
the founders of the Progressive Party, also endorsed intervention in
behalf of national honor. "Saluting the flag is a mighty small
penance to put on Huerta," wrote White.
What we ought to do is make him eat it--and that with a forty-foot flagpole wrapped in barbed wire. . . . By the time Huerta got ten or twenty feet of flagpole through his system he would be getting an idea of the if dignity of our American government through his head.^^ ;|
A number of major Progressive leaders, however, were quite opposed to > i
White's bel l icose posi t ion. Senator Robert M. La Fo l le t te of '
^'^William Al len White, "Make Him 'Swaller' I t , " Cal i fornia Outlook, Apr i l 25, 1914, p. 2.
^^George E. Mowry, The Cal i fornia Progressives (Berkeley, Cal i forn ia : University of Cal i fornia Press, 1951), pp. 227-28.
•
'»
Wisconsin and Governor Hiram Johnson of California were anti-
imperialist, in contradiction of the prevailing Progressive attitude,
and already were showing signs of the pacifism which they were to -J,
display during World War I.
With few exceptions, the California Progressive leadership was ardently devoted to peace with both Mexico and Germany. Though they supported a moderate preparedness program, the great majority of them was firmly against anything that smacked of militarism.
Governor Johnson and other California Progressive leaders combined to
indict the Mexican intervention as a "'deliberate conspiracy to force 38 this country into war' with that hapless nation."
The imperialist Progressives were bitterly disappointed by
President Wilson's decision to accept mediation. Senator Beveridge
121 claimed that mediation endangered the Monroe Doctrine. Former
President Roosevelt attacked Wilson's "mushy amiabi l i ty" in f a i l i n g 30
to fol low up the in tervent ion.^ ' ' William Allen White also los t his
enthusiasm for the president 's Mexican pol icy. In his autobiography
White wrote that "Wilson was being noble and puffing and huffing at
the j ob , t reat ing the Mexican government as though they were l i t t l e
brown brothers." The short - l ived support of the imper ia l is t Pro-'%
gressives proved to be of small consolation to President Wilson. '*• ''<
The president received l i t t l e encouragement from the extreme » I
l e f t at the time of the intervent ion. During 1913 some of the "}
39 Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism," p. 493.
40 William Allen White, The Autobiography pX William Allen White
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1946), p. 501. 41
"President Wilson and Mexico," The New Review: A Monthly Review of International Socialism, October, 1913, pp. 805-09.
socia l is ts were w i l l i ng to give cred i t to Wilson's " f i rm and unyield- *
ing a t t i tude" toward Huerta as well as his "unselfishness of purpose." * ii
The soc ia l is ts feared, however, that the president was seeking only J
"a stable and orderly government;" such "const i tu t iona l " remedies as
the president desired, they believed, would not restore t ranqu i l i t y
to Mexico un t i l land reform occurred. While the soc ia l is ts opposed
the intervent ion, they absolved the president of some of the blame
because he was " jus t a puppet of the Rockfeller interests" and "a
helpless pawn in the hands of capi ta l ism." The cap i t a l i s t interests
presumably would welcome a Const i tu t iona l is t triumph on the grounds
that i t would provide new opportunit ies for economic explo i tat ion in
122 42
Mexico. Add i t iona l ly , the New York Call joined radical unionists
in condemning the intervention in an ed i to r ia l en t i t led "Helping the
Jingo Exploiters Will Further Enslave American Workers."
The anarchists were even less tolerant of the president's
actions in Mexico than the soc ia l i s ts . Emma Goldman, editor of
Mother Earth, denounced the invasion of Veracruz as "the act of a
big ru f f ian bul ly ing a smaller one." Goldman considered the "Wilson-, | i
Huerta war" to be "a quarrel between two thieves," which ought to be ''* •' '»i
fought out by the two individuals themselves, and blamed Wilson for >
44 '
being too weak to res is t pressure from American cap i ta l i s t s . '
Most of the extremists remained unconvinced of President Wilson's
dedication to the goals of the Mexican Revolution despite statements
I 'J ".I
by the president advocating land reform. Many American radicals did 11
not even trust Carranza, preferring to offer moral support to the
Flores Magon and Zapata factions. In the final analysis, American
radicals could not bring themselves to accept the policies of anyone
who had not totally severed all connections with capitalist elements.
In contrast with the liberals and extreme leftists, American
conservatives hoped for the defeat of the revolutionary forces, fearing
the institutionalization of assaults on American interests if the
Constitutionalists triumphed. Many conservatives wanted to see Huerta
42 William Woodrow Anderson, "The Nature of the Mexican Revolu
t ion as Viewed From the United States, 1910-1917" (unpublished Ph.D d isser ta t ion. University of Texas, 1967), pp. 91-92.
^^New York Ca l l , Apr i l 22, 1914, p. 1.
^^Mother Earth, May, 1914, pp. 67-68.
i»
123 remain as president, since Huerta had promised to preserve order,
but continued revolutionary successes led other conservatives to call
for military intervention to end the "anarchy." A few extremists
demanded complete military occupation of Mexico, but here the ideolo
gical line blurs, since a number of Progressives urged a similar
course of action. Besides, some of the opposition of the conservatives
to the "watchful waiting" policy was motivated by partisan considera
tions; the conservatives were usually Republicans, and their leaders
were usually members of congress, another e l i te group.
Undoubtedly the single most powerful e l i te in the United States
is the Congress. Congress did not speak with one voice on the Mexican
policy, however, as was demonstrated in statements by numerous
Republicans recorded in the preceding chapter. As the months wore
on during 1913 and early 1914, even some Democrats joined in the
criticism of the president's deliberate "watchful waiting" policy.
When Republican Senator Albert B. Fall called for the use of force
in Mexico to protect American investments. Senator William J. Stone
of Missouri, the ranking Democrat on the senate Foreign relations
45
committee, co-sponsored Fall 's b i l l . By the spring of 1914 a num
ber of influential Democrats were attacking a policy which seemed
to be accomplishing nothing.
The frustration of inaction gave way to excitement in Congress
when the president appeared before a joint session to announce his
intention to in i t ia te hosti l i t ies and to ask for congressional
^ New York Times, July 23, 1913.
124
approval. When Wilson entered the house chamber, the visitors in
the galleries defied the rules by joining in the applause: "over
on the Democratic side of the floor, behind the front benches, where
half the senators sat, cries of approval went up. The 'Yip! yip!
yip!' of the old 'Rebel yell' was heard again." Many congressmen
lost much of their enthusiasm, however, when they heard the president
present the narrow grounds upon which he intended to take action.
Wilson, hoping to avoid total war, asserted that the quarrel was with
Huerta alone over Insults to American honor. No reference was made
to the attacks on American lives and property.
Despite some loss of enthusiasm for the president's limited
enterprise, the House of Representatives quickly passed the resolu
tion approving the use of force by the overwhelming margin of 337 to
47 37. Nearly all of those who voted against the resolution were
Republicans, led by Representative James R. Mann of Illinois, the
minority leader. The opponents of the resolution claimed that making
what was essentially a declaration of war over a trivial incident
would be dishonorable. Republican Representative James Madden warned
his colleagues that "war means widows; it means orphans; it means
devastation, destruction of property, maimed men, it means the shedding
of blood of our best youth and bleaching their bones on the plains
Quoted in Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1927-1939), IV, 325-26.
^^U.S., Congress, House, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 20, 1914, Congressional Record, LI, 6958.
125
of Mexico. Are we ready for such conflict over such a trivial
OM48 cause?
Almost al l of those who spoke in behalf of the resolution were
southern Democrats, a number of whom had recently spoken against
intervention and in favor of "watchful waiting." Oscar W. Underwood,
the majority leader, attempted to secure support for the president's
reversal of policy by reminding the Republicans of Democratic support
for McKinley when the latter "asked the Congress to hold up hands 4g for the honor of the American f lag."
Passage of the resolution proved to be somewhat more d i f f icu l t
in the Senate, not only because of the greater opportunities for
extending debate, but also because a group of prestigious Republican
senators presented a tempting substitute resolution. Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, ranking Republican on the foreign relations committee,
sponsored the substitute measure because he believed the Wilson
resolution to be "most unsatisfactory, in reality a declaration of
war against an individual," and claimed that his resolution would
"speak of protection of the lives and property of American citizens
50 as the true and international ground" for American intervention.
Senator Elihu Root, former Secretary of State, delivered the most
impressive speech favoring the Lodge substitute. " I f there were
nothing else but the incident referred to in the [Wilson] resolution.
^^Ibid. , p. 6946.
^^Ibid. , p. 6957.
^^Henry Cabot Lodge, lhe_ Senate and the League of Nations (New York: C Scribner's Sons, 1925), p. 17.
126 would the American government have thought for a moment of treating
this poor, weak country in this peremptory way?" questioned Root in
rhetorical manner. Yet Root called for action:
Lying behind the insult to our flag . . . are years of violence and anarchy in Mexico. Lying behind i t are hundreds of American lives sacrificed, millions of American property destroyed, and thousands of Americans reduced to poverty to-day through the destruction of their property. . . .
I t is a justif ication lying not in Victoriano Huerta or in his conduct alone, but in the universal condition of affairs in Mexico.'*
Senate Democrats made few replies to the speeches of those who
favored the Lodge substitute resolution because they knew that they
had the votes to pass the original measure and they did not want to
see debate drag on indefinitely at a crit ical time. Militant
Democratic senators had spoken earlier through the press, though not
many went as far as Senator William E. Chilton of West Virginia, who
said "I'd make them salute the flag i f we had to blow up the whole
52 place." Nevertheless, the minority was able to forestall a vote
until April 22, the intervention having already occurred, when a
slightly modified version of the president's resolution passed by a
53 vote of seventy-two to thirteen." Every Democrat in the Senate
voted in favor of the resolution. Faced with a cr is is , the members
of the president's party in Congress stood behind their leader.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 21, 1914, Congressional Record, L I , 6986-87.
Quoted in Baker, Woodrow Wilson, p. 320.
^^U.S., Congress, Senate, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 22, 1914, Congressional Record, L I , 7014.
127 The Republicans, however, were seriously divided: the majority of
congressional Republicans quietly voted to support the president,
while a minority in the house of representatives opposed military
action and a minority in the senate pushed for a total involvement.
President Wilson continued to receive strong support in
Congress when he decided to accept the ABC mediation offer. The
leading members of the foreign relations committees of both houses,
including even Senator Lodge, approved acceptance. "That fact,"
wrote Lodge, "in i tsel f a good thing, shows our readiness for a
peaceful solution but also, which is inf initely more important, im
proves our relations with three most important South Amer. states
and unites them with us." Lodge was led to believe that the mediation
54 would be concerned with the general pacification of Mexico. There
were s t i l l some senators, however, who believed that the president
had blundered. Republican Senator Joseph L. Bristow of Kansas asked,
"How can the United States arbitrate with a bandit whom we do not
recognize to be anything more or less than a murderer?" Senator
Wesley L. Jones of Washington, another Republican, declared that "our
hands are put to the plow down there in Mexico now, and I do not see
55 how we are going to turn the plow around in the furrow and back out."
Congressional opposition to President Wilson's Mexican policy
was at low ebb during the week of the intervention cr is is , but two
developments during the following month revitalized the president's
54 Lodge, Senate and League of Natjojis^, p. 19.
^ New York Times, April 26, 1914.
128 opponents. The f i r s t of these developments was the indication,
bolstered by General Pancho Vi l la 's friendly attitude toward the
United States during the crisis week, that the president had decided,
perhaps even made a "deal," to support Vil la as Huerta's replacement.
In congressional debate Senator Henry F. Lippitt of Rhode Island
declared that "the suspicion that our Government is aiding or abetting
or conniving at or even condoning the atrocities of the villainous
Villa 1s so sickening a suggestion to me that I have been loath to
believe that i t can possibly be true." But Senator Lippitt was con
vinced that the "perfect carnival of crime and carnage" in northern
Mexico was due to the arms and ammunition "put into the hands of
Mr. Villa and his associates with the consent and the approval and
the encouragement of the President of the United States." Criticism
of the possibility of an alliance with Vil la was not limited to
congress; as the Literary Digest noted, "Critics of the President are
asking i f an Administration that has so sternly refused to recognize
Huerta's bloodstained dictatorship will now make a virtual al ly of the
57 no less ensanguined Vi l la ." The subject was hotly debated in the
press.
The second dissent-provoking development was the publication of
an Interview with President Wilson in the May 23 issue of the
Saturday Evening Post. In the interview the president declared. "My
^^U.S.. Congress, Senate, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., May 5, 1914, Congressional Record, L I , 8153.
^^"Shall We Join Hands with Villa?" Literary Digest, May 23. 1914. p. 1235.
129
ideal is an orderly and righteous government in Mexico; but my
passion is for the submerged eighty-five per cent of the people of
that Republic, who are now struggling toward l iberty." Wilson was
determined not to turn back from the enterprise he had begun until
he had assurances "that the great and crying wrongs the people have
endured are in process of satisfactory adjustment." Such an adjust-
5ft ment would necessarily involve a cure for the evils of latifundia.
President Wilson's statements in the interview, designed to
clarify his position to the public, were in sharp contrast with his
declaration at the beginning of the intervention. The president
claimed at that time that his purpose was "to compel the recognition
of the dignity of the United States. That is al l we want," he told
59 reporters. Thus, the May 23 interview resulted in confusion as
well as dissent. When a Louisiana congressman asked his colleague's
consent to print a resolution which he described as "endorsing
Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policy," Republican Representative Mann
immediately asked, "What is the President's policy?" el icit ing
"uproarious laughter" from the Republican side of the aisle. Pro
tests came from newspapers and others who believed that the United
States had enough economic problems of its own without meddling in
those of other nations. The New York Evening Sun doubted that "the
^Samuel G. Blythe, "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with President Wilson," Saturday Evening Post, May 23, 1914, pp. 2-4.
^^Link. New Freedom, p. 403.
^ New York Times, June 23, 1914.
130 common sense of this country" would respond to a policy "which seeks
to upset in Mexico conditions which it is bound to perpetuate in the
United States." The Albany Knickerbocker Press asked what sanction
the president had "to try a socialistic experiment by force in
Mexico."^^
President Wilson was well aware of the attacks on his policies.
To a friend in Alabama Wilson wrote,
I feel as i f I ought, amidst my present perplexities and the unconscionable pressures of such a fluid matter as the Mexican situation, to put up in the office the sign that was put up on the organ le f t of a country church for the defense of the organist. On i t was written "Don't shoot; he is doing his damnedest." '"
But the president s t i l l had most of his support, and some elements
saw cause in his recent statements to justify greater dedication to the
president's policy. The New York World rhapsodized over the presi
dent's new position; "not since the United States Government under
the leadership of Abraham Lincoln destroyed human slavery has i t under
taken a nobler mission than the emancipation of the Mexican masses CO
from a tyranny that is letter better than slavery."
The events of the intervention during the summer months of 1914
continued to provoke controversy. The mediation dragged on to an
unproductive conclusion, Huerta resigned and fled the country, and
the victorious Constitutionalists began fighting among themselves. The
^^Quoted in "The Key to President Wilson's Mexican Policy," Literary Digest, May 30, 1914, p. 1297, 1299.
^^Quoted in Block, "Southern Opinion," pp. 72-73.
" Quoted in "Key to Wilson's Mexican Policy," p. 1297.
131 debate over American policy toward Mexico, nearly submerged in an
atmosphere of unity during the week of cr is is, again demonstrated
the sharp division within the country. The end of the mediation
was variously described in the press as "a confession of signal
fai lure, or a triumph 'prodigious and unprecedented in the history of
international relations.'" Wilson's crit ics complained that the con
cluding protocol contained no apology from Huerta for the insult to
American honor. The editors of the New York Journal of Commerce
wrote, "The mediators virtual ly wash their hands of the whole
64 business." The New York Times, on the other hand, praised the
result of the mediation as "such a triumph for President Wilson's
much misunderstood policy as to astonish even the stanchest supporters
of the President."^^
The resignation of Huerta was greeted by the New York Times
as yet another triumph for the president. "The wisdom of the
President's course has . . . been clearly proved," wrote the same
editors who had attacked the president's policy in its early stages.
"The outlook is hopeful. 'Watchful waiting,' the joke of the shallow-
minded, has had its reward." The American Review of Reviews noted
"even our seizure of Vera Cruz, which was a highly objectionable
performance . . . i l lustrates the principle that mistakes and blunders
are not always fatal when there is firmness and strength of will
^Quoted 1n "Moving Toward Peace In Mexico," Literary Digest, July 4, 1914, p. 6.
^^Quoted in Baker. Woodrow Wilson, IV, 351.
^^Ibid.
132 controlling the larger purposes." The American Review of Revjews
expressed hope that the United States would assume a form of protec
torate over Mexico. The president's critics agreed that continued
Intervention in Mexican affairs would probably be necessary, parti
cularly in light of the factional quarrels developing among the
Constitutionalists. They blamed Wilson's meddling for the continued
chaos and destruction of property.
The guns of August in Europe beginning World War I effectively
restricted the role of public opinion for the duration of the occu
pation of Veracruz. This provided "further evidence that our people
not only tire of old sensations but that they can sustain only one C O
big sensation at a time." Americans, usually willing to tackle any
problem with the expectation that it can be brought to a swift con
clusion, had generated such optimism at the beginning of the inter
vention. When it became clear that the intervention would produce
neither a salute to the flag nor a restoration of peace and order in
Mexico, much of the general public reacted by returning to the mood
of indifference which characterized the period prior to April of 1914.
Public opinion on Mexico was again the almost exclusive property of
the elites, and they were sharply divided on the issue, as was demon
strated in the press.
The announcement of the intention to evacuate Veracruz caused
considerable bewilderment among various segments of the press. "Why
^^"The Progress of the World," American Review of Reviews, August, 1914, pp. 132-33.
^^Bailey, Man in the Street, p. 125.
133 we are leaving Mexico is as mysterious as why we ever entered that
country," declared the Baltimore American, and the New York Globe
remarked that "as there was no satisfying explanation for the occupa
tion, the unities are preserved by the lack of any satisfying expla
nation for the evacuation." The New York Evening Sun referred to the
evacuation as "the most puzzling act of the Wilson Administration."^^
A number of those who had originally supported the intervention joined
the Outlook in questioning the president's decision:
What reason justif ied or made necessary our continued military occupation of Vera Cruz for [the past] four months which does not exist now? The fa l l of Huerta . . . removed the argument for retention of troops in support of the Administration's "Huerta must go" policy. I f the presence of troops at Vera Cruz has been of use in protecting American and foreign l i f e and property what good reason is there to suppose that such need has ceased to exist?
The Outlook concluded that Veracruz was "an outpost of American influ
ence," and that i t was a "blunder" to abandon i t "under the present
condition of turbulence and factional warfare." Even the New York
World, long-time champion of the president's Mexican policy, called
the American withdrawal an abandonment rather than an evacuation:
Setting out to establish constitutional government in Mexico, we are leaving Mexico to its own resources at a time when its internal affairs are more chaotic than they were when we interfered with them. Have we served the Mexicans? Have we served ourselves? Have we served mankind?^*
^^Quoted in "Our Evacuation of Vera Cruz," Literary Digest, December 5, 1914, p. 1104.
^^"The Problem of Vera Cruz," Outlook, November 25, 1914, p. 666.
' ^Quoted in "Evacuation of Vera Cruz," p. 1105.
134 Despite the numerous attacks from diverse sources on his
decision to evacuate Veracruz, the president s t i l l retained many
defenders. The Nation said that the evacuation was "like a fine
gesture of confidence . . . an appeal to the Mexicans of a sort which
they would be truly dense i f they did not appreciate."^^ Others
believed that the purpose of the intervention had been accomplished
by the removal of Huerta; hence there was no need to stay longer in
Veracruz. The Springfield Republlean found justif ication for the
evacuation policy in three facts: f i r s t , "all Mexicans were humi
liated by our prolonged occupation of their port;" second, "all
Latin-American nations . . . would have bitterly misconstrued a longer
stay;" and third, "the evacuation diminishes apparently the chances
that our Government might become deeply involved in the domestic
73 disturbances of Mexico while the world-war continued to rage."
While many American elites gave strong endorsement to President
Wilson's decision to intervene, s t i l l other elites provided an oppo
sition greater than that reflected in newspaper editorials. Patriotic
organizations, veteran's assemblies, and ethnic groups sent messages
of support to the president and Congress, but church and peace groups,
spokesmen for the academic community, and ideological liberals and
radicals attacked the intervention. Democrats were nearly unanimous
in their support for the president, but Republicans and Progressives
were seriously divided. In fact, there were dissidents from the
^^"Mexico," Nation, November 26, 1914, p. 619.
" Quoted in "Evacuation of Vera Cruz," p. 1105.
135
majority position in nearly ewery e l i te . The hostile elites con
tinued to exert pressure against the president's policy long after
the crisis had subsided, and they were joined by large segments of
the press which again moved into opposition.
The American people were clearly willing to follow strong
presidential leadership, but President Wilson failed to provide the
guidance and information upon which the public might form positive
opinions. A confused public gradually lost interest in the Mexican
problem. When the president took strong action to defend American
honor, the general public was behind him; but when he vacillated as
to both motive and continued course of action, he was subjected to
attacks upon his policy.
CHAPTER V
THE OPINIONS OF AMERICAN OBSERVERS,
FOREIGN COLONIES IN MEXICO, AND THE EUROPEAN PRESS
Among the influences on public opinion and policy formation
during periods of international crises are the at t i tudes of foreign
observers and resident aliens in the affected area. These elements
are frequently regarded as "experts," sometime with j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,
by the International public and expecially by the government and the
public of the i r own nations. Thus, a l ien observers and members of
foreign colonies can const i tute a powerful " e l i t e " in the formation
of public opinion, depending on the degree of uni ty in thei r expres
sions.
The opportunit ies provided during the Por f i r io Diaz regime for
foreign economic explo i ta t ion in Mexico brought large numbers of
foreigners from many nations to Mexico pr ior to the Revolution, and
many were s t i l l there when the American intervention at Veracruz
occurred. By v i r tue of proximity and economic t ies Americans formed
the largest group of foreign observers and residents in Mexico.
Estimates of the number of Americans residing in Mexico in 1910 range
from 30,000 to 60,000, but the t r ibu la t ions of the Revolution created
a steady exodus, reducing these numbers to a range of from 10,000 to
20,000 six months before the intervent ion. Specific evidence of
"The American Exodus From Mexico," L i terary Digest, September 13, 1913, p. 405.
136
137 the dramatic decrease in the number of American residents in Mexico
can be found in the example of the consular d i s t r i c t around San Luis
Potosi, where the total number f e l l from 1,500 to 600 between 1910
and 1912.^
The American residents, whose livelihoods depended on the eco
nomic understandings with the old regime, were naturally unsympathetic
to a revolution which threatened the status quo. The emergence of
Victoriano Huerta as a dictator in the pattern of Porf ir io Diaz
encouraged the Americans to support the Mexican president as the man
to end chaotic conditions and protect American Interests. In conse
quence, the American colony in Mexico City quickly endorsed the
recotranendation of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson and demanded recogni-3
tion and support for the provisional government. When a committee
composed of Americans from Mexico visited Secretary of State Bryan to
request protection for their property, however, Bryan offered them no
encouragement and advised them to leave Mexico. "The Secretary of
State simply did not understand that many of these people had Invested
everything they owned in Mexico and were small businessmen, not large 4
corporations seeking a p ro f i t . "
President Wilson also turned a deaf ear to the American residents
^Frederick C Turner, "Anti-Americanism in Mexico, 1910-1913," Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVII (November, 1967), 504.
^Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 349.
^Kenneth J . Grieb, The United States and Huerta (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of NiFraska Press, 19697. P- 48.
138 of Mexico as well as others who were acquainted with the situation
In that country. Veteran Washington journalist Charles W. Thompson
reported that nobody who was competent to tel l him the truth about
Mexico could get his ear, could even get to his presence. I t soon became a stock joke among people who came to Washington, eager to lay their knowledge of Mexican conditions before him, that the only way to get to him was to tel l [Wilson's secretary Joseph] Tumulty that you had never been in Mexico.'^
Repulsed by their own government, which had actively solicited
private American investment in Latin America under President Taft's
"Dollar Diplomacy," the American residents in Mexico soon launched an
attack on President Wilson's policy. On July 23 the Mexican Herald,
spokesman for the American colony, condemned the president's idealism:
"The fact is , as we have said . . . , that President Wilson has the
same infirmities as Senor Madero; l ike the latter he considers himself
predestined to implant democracy in America; in his theoretical
visions, he dreams of the government of the majority and the harsh
voice of a military dictator gets on his nerves as certain crude
expressions would get on the nerves of a blond miss who reads the Bible
on Sundays."
In the August 27 address to Congress which inaugurated the
"watchful waiting" policy. President Wilson requested al l Americans
to leave Mexico at once. Widespread protests erupted among the
^Charles W. Thompson, Presidents I've Known and Two Near Presidents (Indianapolis, Indiana^ Bobbs-Merrill Company, T9^9), p. 261.
W i c a n Herald, July 23, 1913.
^Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc. , 1927-1939), IV, 274.
139 American residents in reaction to the new phase of the president's
policy. James A. Scrymser, president of the Mexican Telegraph
Company, characterized Wilson's decision as "cruel ," and stated that
i t had "ruined the credit of Americans in Mexico." Dr. John W. Butler,
superintendent of the Methodist Episcopal Mission in Mexico, reported
to the home board that "American missionaries of a l l denominations
are reluctant to leave Mexico." Sebastian Camacho, president of the
Mexican senate, telegraphed to a friend that "the American colony in
Mexico wi l l suffer enormous damage to i ts interests and i ts well-
being should Americans be forced to abandon a country in which . . . o
they are considered and esteemed on a l l sides."
Angered by a policy which would have l e f t many American residents
destitute, twenty-one members of the American colony in Mexico City
presented to President Huerta a document in which they eulogized the
Mexican dictator and attacked President Wilson's policy of non-
recognition. Heading the l i s t of signers was the name of Major g
Cassius C. G i l le t te , a retired army of f icer . I f there were any
organized campaign by members of the American colony to affect
American policy and public opion, i t almost certainly centered around
Major G i l le t te . Mexico, the propaganda weekly sponsored by either
Huerta or the American colony, featured art ic les by Gi l le t te c r i t i ca l
of American policy. The ubiquitous major was one of the main speakers
at the Philadelphia meeting of the American Academy of Pol i t ical and
%oted in "American Exodus," p. 405.
^"Huerta As a Dictator," Literary Digest, October 25, 1913, p. 739.
140
Social Science in April of 1914 and joined in the general condemna
tion of Wilsonian policy.
Opposition to the president's policies of non-recognition and
"watchful waiting" was not completely unanimous among Americans
living in Mexico. In an August 28 letter to a Georgia congressman,
George Robinson Hackley declared his support for the president and
denounced those in the American colony "who desiring to stand in with
and profit through the present Government, are willing to overlook,
for expediency and, in many instances, to my amazement and horror,
sanction the awful guil t Involved in its establishment and, therefore,
openly and dogmatically espouse i t , at the same time shamelessly and
unpatriotically knocking and sneering at our own Government." Even
Hackley was willing to admit, however, that he was "one of the few
Americans who sincerely and heartily approve and applaud the course
of our Government."
If the American residents in Mexico were provoked by President
Wilson's fai lure to recognize Huerta, they nearly panicked when
rumors of the possibility of American intervention to remove Huerta
loomed up in late 1913. On November 17 Edith O'Shaughnessy, wife of
the American charge d'affaires, wrote.
People are in a panic here. . . . The telephones are being rung al l day by distracted fathers and husbands, not knowing what to do. They cannot leave their daily bread. They are not men who have bank accounts in
^^"Scientists Assail Wilson," Mexico, April 11, 1914, pp. 7-8.
^^U.S., Congress, House, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess.. Congressional Record, Appendix, p. 668.
141 New York or In any other town, and to them leaving means ru in . They come with white, harassed faces! "Is i t true that the Embassy is to be closed to-night?" What do you advise?" "Can't we count on any protec
tion? are a few of the questions asked.*2
Mrs. O'Shaughnessy herself f e l t "the cruelty and the usefulness of
our policy more and more eyery day. The 'fine idealism' does not
prevent the inhabitants from being exterminated. Why don't we come
in? Or--hands off , and give Huerta a chance!"^"^
Opposition to intervention had been proclaimed by American resi
dents from the beginning of the Revolution. Reports from Protestant
missionaries during 1911 and 1912 warned that intervention would
occasion the suffering and death of Americans already In Mexico.
Similar anti-intervention appeals also came from secretaries of the
Young Men's Christian Association in Mexico.^^
Most American residents in Mexico probably would have accepted
either of the alternatives proposed by Mrs. O'Shaughnessy: recogni
tion of Huerta or total intervention for pacification, despite the
dangers which intervention would pose. Thus, the members of the
American colony were able to reconcile themselves to either of the
contradictory positions which divided the Republicans in the House
of Representatives from those in the Senate. But they clearly pre
ferred recognition of the Mexican dictator. President Huerta had the
12 Edith O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1916), p. 57.
^'^Ibid., p. 88.
14 Frederick C Turner, The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism (Chapel
Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), p. 226.
142 abi l i ty to be quite charming when he chose, and he often appeared to
have genuine affection for the members of the American colony.^^ The
Mexican president seemed to be making every effort to protect the
Americans in Mexico, but this policy may well have been a shrewd
attempt to play on International public opinion. What the Americans
feared most was an Intervention which would remove Huerta, who had
provided them with some measure of security in the areas he controlled,
and leave them to the tender mercies of the Constitutionalists.
Former residents of Mexico and observers who had been in Mexico
produced a number of books during and after the Huerta period in
v^ich they commented unfavorably on American intervention directed
at Huerta. Edward I . Bell , an American who had worked as a journalist
in Mexico, discounted the possibility of co-operation with Huerta,
but proposed an attempt
to solve the Mexican problem peaceably with the help of men who were deeply, v i ta l ly interested in the welfare of the country, and who could exert a powerful influence toward satisfactory readjustment even 1n a situation so d i f f icu l t . Beyond question the man to be consulted f i rs t was Limantour, . . .*^
Frederick Starr, who seemed to favor any leader capable of
stabilizing the situation in Mexico, was more adamant in his opposition
to intervention.
^^Leone B. Moats, Thunder in Their Veins: A Memoir of Mexico, ed. by Russell Lord (New York: Century Co., 1932, pp. I l l , 139.
^^Edward I . Bell , The Political Shame of Mexico (New York: McBride, Nast & Company,T5"14), p. 419. JosF"lves Limantour was the financial genius of the Diaz regime.
143 Should we intervene? Must we intervene? No, a thousand times no, for their sake and for ours, we should keep hands off. Every right thinking American who knows Mexico, and who knows the points involved, must thank the President for his insistency upon maintaining peace. We may regret the exact form of his policy, we may feel that he has made mistakes, but his fundamental principle Is r ight,--there ought to be no war,—and intervention is war. '"
Arthur Thompson, author of T]ie Conspiracy Against Mexico, argued that
intervention would accomplish nothing of benefit to either the United
18 States or Mexico.
Two former residents of Mexico, writing after the occupation of
Veracruz had occurred, claimed that there had been no need for the
intervention. Randolph Wellford Smith, an anti-Carranza supporter of
the Mexican Catholics and exiles, concluded that there was "not to be
the least doubt in the minds of the thousands of Mexicans and
Americans who were forced out of Mexico, that Huerta, strong Indian
that he was, would have restored order and brought about a return of
the prosperity that had existed durimj the Diaz regime, i f the United
19 States had been restrained from interference." Leone B. Moats, the
wife of an American businessman, was in Mexico until the intervention.
Obviously sympathetic to Huerta, Mrs. Moats later claimed that the
Mexican dictator "could have enforced peace in Mexico, with the United
Frederick Starr, Mexico and th£ United States: A Story of Revolution, Intervention and War~(C"hicago: Bible House, 1914), p. 435.
^^Arthur Thompson, The Conspiracy Against Mexico (Oakland, California: [ n . p . ] , [n .d . ] ) .
^^Randolph Wellford Smith, Beniiihted Mexico (New York: John Lane Company, 1916), p. 221.
144
States non-partizan; but he could not fight both the rebels in his
own country and a President of the United States, morally inflamed."^^
While the books by American residents and observers in Mexico
reflected the attitudes of the American colony, their impact on
International public opinion was necessarily limited to those elements
which would purchase or read a work of this nature. The American
residents, however, were able to convey their views to the peoples of
the United States and Mexico through the newspapers of both countries.
The letters to the editor and accounts in news stories also demonstra
ted that the opposition to intervention continued up to the day of
the occupation. In an April, 1914, letter published in the Houston
Chronicle, P. W. Warner wrote, "I wish to say right here that I, as
well as thousands of other Americans who have left our homes and farms
in Mexico, know that intervention would be a great calamity to all of
us instead of the blessing that many suppose, and we therefore hope
and pray that President Wilson will stand firm upon his policy of
non-intervention, as he has been doing, for we feel certain that an
invasion of the country would cause a general uprising of the whole
people of that nation, and the destruction of thousands of Americans'
homes there, besides properties worth millions of dollars." Warner
concluded by claiming that "it was the continual fear of interven
tion more than any other thing that caused so many of us to leave
our homes there during the past year."
p. 11.
Moats, Thunder in Their Veins, p. 113.
^^Quoted in "Do not Invade Mexico," Mexico, April 11, 1914,
145
A much more cynical motive for opposition to American inter
vention was recorded by Gregory Mason, "ace" reporter for the Outlook,
who was on special assignment in Mexico. Mason wrote that "several
American wholesale employers of peon labor in Mexico frankly admit
that they prefer ten years of anarchy followed by 'the good old days
of peon labor' to intervention of any kind which would mean the
77 restoration of peace and a higher wage scale." The Mexican press
also published indications of the opinions of the American residents,
although these newspapers were probably more interested in embarras
sing the American government than in ingratiating the American colony
with the Mexican public. El Imparcial. for example, published a
letter on January 1, 1914, from George C. Ascher, a mining engineer.
Ascher claimed that Carranza and the American trusts desired interven-
23 tion, but that the American people "rejected the politics of Wilson."
The plight of American residents of Mexico in the areas where
anarchic conditions prevailed was reported in the American press and
helped to stoke the fires of opposition to President Wilson's
"watchful waiting" policy. When the president's only response was to
reconmend that the Americans leave Mexico, much of the American press
24 reacted with even greater hostility to the president's policy.
Stimulating the sympathy of Americans for their compatriots in Mexico
were such magazine articles as "Bringing 60,000 Americans Out of
^^Gregory Mason, "With Villa in Chihuahua," Outlook, May 9, 1914, p. 76.
23EI Imparcial, January 1, 1914, p. 6.
^^"American Exodus," pp. 405-06.
146 Mexico," by Charles Jenkinson, the special representative of the
American Red Cross. The art ic le described what the Red Cross had done
"to relieve American citizens who were cut off from escape—some
dangerous experiences in the work of rescue--sudden changes in for
tune of some of the refugees."
The members of the American colony had l i t t l e warning of the
Impending intervention because the censorship policies of the Huerta
regime kept the news of the furor over the Tampico Incident from the
public until just a few days before the occupation of Veracruz. Mrs.
O'Shaughnessy, who knew about the cr is is , wrote that "the great
potentialities are hidden, l ike a smoldering, unsuspected f i r e . There
fs a throbbing, an unrest--but the great public doesn't yet know 26
whence i t comes." When the crisis became known to the American
residents, many expressed great fear of anti-American reprecussions 27
directed against them. The Mexican Herald put on a brave front by
stating that " i t seems to be pretty clearly understood that the
present tense situation was precipitated by an incident with which
the large American colony here had no possible connection and that
25 Charles Jenkinson. "Bringing 60,000 Americans Out of Mexico,"
World's Work. February, 1914, p. 460. 26
O'Shaughnessy. Diplomat's Wife, p. 270. 27 Claude Guyant (Ensenada) to Secretary of State William Jennings
Bryan, April 20, 1914, 812.00/11573, and Alphonse J. Lesplnasse (Frontera) to Bryan, April 21, 1914. 812.00/11597, U.S., Department of State. Records of the Department of State Relating to th£ Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. Microcopy No. 274 (Washington, D.C: Nat1onal~iBirchives Microfilm Publications, 1959). Unless otherwise indicated, al l correspondence of the Department of State will be from the 812.00 f i les and will be identified only by the slash number.
147
any demonstration of resentment toward them would be unjust." Fur
ther on In the editorial page the Herald admitted that "the position
of Americans resident in Mexico and of an American newspaper published
in Mexico under present conditions, is one that naturally calls for
2ft
discret ion and becoming neut ra l i ty of action and expression."
When the actual Intervention occurred most Americans believed
themselves to be in great danger of bodily harm, and many of them
blamed the pol ic ies of the American government for their p l igh t . On
Apri l 21 Mrs. O'Shaughnessy wrote. We might a l l be massacred. I t is due to the essential meekness, want of national s p i r i t , want of whatever you w i l l in the Mexicans, that we are not, not because a paternal government is watching over i t s public servants in foreign parts.2^
The O'Shaughnessys were soon handed their passports, and they imme
diate ly entrained for Veracruz, accompanied by a handful of other
Americans. Other t ra ins transported hundreds of Americans to the
occupied c i t y .
Joining the exodus from Mexico City was Paul Hudson, editor of
the Mexican Herald, who had prudently decided to transfer the opera
t ion of his newspaper to Veracruz. In i t s f i r s t issue in Veracruz on
Apri l 25 the Herald reported that p rac t ica l l y a l l windows in i t s
building 1n Mexico City had been broken by a mob and that unsuccessful
30 attempts had been made to set the building a f i r e . Freed from the
^^Mexican Herald, Apr i l 21 , 1914.
^^O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 286.
^^Mexican Herald, Apr i l 25, 1914.
148
major constraints of Mexican censorship. Editor Hudson introduced the
new Herald position on intervention in a front page editorial in the
same issue.
It is Impossible to disguise the concern felt by all Americans who have interests in this country regarding the next move in the present tense situation. Not one among the many we have seen here and elsewhere but believes that the least backward step at this time will spell the end of all possibility for Americans to live or do business in this country for many years to come. . . . That a backward step by the United States will be construed, not as an act of consideration, but of weakness, that will encourage growing enmity and aggression toward Americans, there is no doubt.^^
Speaking for the American colony, the Mexican Herald expressed
great disappointment over President Wilson's decision to accept
mediation by the ABC powers. On May 8 the Herald published a lengthy
front page editorial which stated.
Having intervened in Mexico we can see no possible advantage, either for Mexicans or Americans, in postponing the completion of the work that must be done by the United States. No settlement by mediation will afford more than temporary respite. The period of truce would complete the ruin of American industry in this country and the inevitable end be but a little while postponed.
Having started intervention we have got to see it through. To save our business, to save our prestige, to save our honor, we must do it now!3 2
By the following week Editor Hudson and the Herald had reached the
point of recommending that the United States "accept the responsibility
33 of the regeneration" of Mexico.
^hbid.
' ^Mexican Herald, May 8, 1914.
^"^Ibid., May 16, 1914.
149 Most American residents of Mexico must have joined in the
disappointment expressed by the Mexjcan Herald, upon learning that
the United States would carry the Intervention no farther than
Veracruz. Many of these Americans had expected President Wilson to
provide them with some protection against the inevitable anti-
American violence. Thousands of Americans from all parts of the
Mexican republic made their way with great difficulty to the American O A
border on various ports. The members of the American colony in
Tampico, however, were already at a port which had American naval
vessels in the harbor, but these Americans faced a particularly
trying situation, and they and their difficulties had an impact on
public opinion especially worthy of note.
Prior to the Tampico incident rebel forces had been closing in
on that city. The American residents of Tampico believed in common
with Americans throughout Mexico that American naval forces would be
used to protect their properties against the assaults by the rebels.
When protection was not forthcoming hundreds of refugees from the
surrounding area poured into Tampico, overcrowding hotels and private
homes. Clarence Miller, the American consul, urgently requested the
state department to provide a ship for evacuation purposes, but
34 A personal account of the seemingly typical problems of the Americans in Guadalajara and Manzanillo can be found in William Brownlee Davis, Experiences and Observations of an American Consular Officer During the Recent MexTcan RevolLrtTorrsTcHria Vista, California: Ipubllshed by authorji r920), pp. 18-27. Accounts of the experiences of Americans in other towns can be found in the Mexican Herald and the 812.00 files of the Department of State.
150
Secretary of State Bryan, after consultation with President Wilson,
refused, informing Miller that the naval vessels then at Tampico
would have to suffice. "Both Bryan and Wilson showed a curious lack
of concern for the safety of American nationals throughout Mexico,
whether at Tampico, or with the mining companies of Chihuahua, or In
35 comnerce in the capital."
By April 20 there were more than 1000 American refugees in
Tampico in addition to the permanent American colony. The crisis
resulting from the Tampico incident convinced these Americans that
intervention would occur at Tampico; they were equally certain that
the naval forces at Tampico would be essential to their protection in
view of the growing anti-Americanism. When the orders came to transfer
nearly all of the naval forces to Veracruz the Americans knew that
they were being left alone and unprotected to face the wrath of the
Mexicans. Accordingly, "the leaders of the American colony met to
formulate a bitterly worded protest to the United States government
36 for deserting them and their valuable properties."
When news of the seizure of Veracruz reached Tampico, General
Ignacio Morelos Zaragoza called on the Mexican citizens to resist with
force the anticipated invasion at Tampico. A large number of Mexicans
decided not to wait for the invasion and, incited by impassioned
orators, they began to vent their anger on the American residents.
Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 18.
36. 'Ibid., p. 72.
151 Mobs roamed through the streets, shouting insults to the "gringos"
and breaking windows. About midnight a mob of some 3000 Mexicans
began stoning the Southern Hotel, where approximately 330 Americans
37 had gathered. One of the distraught Americans trapped in the
Southern took the time to jot down a bit of doggerel in honor of the
occasion:
We were crowded in the Southern Like a flock of frightened sheep. We had heard the news from Vera Cruz And no one thought of sleep. For a crowd of fish-eyed Mexicans Was thirsting for our gore And brickbats, stones and epithets Were hurling against the door.
Our pickets on the Southern roof Strove with distended ears To catch some sigh of Mayo's men Or hear the Jackies' cheers; But Daniels slept in Washington And Bryan lectured peace. No hope for us that Uncle Sam Would aid in our release.^8
Admiral Henry T. Mayo, who had remained with a few ships close
to Tampico, wanted to come to the aid of the Americans, but was per
suaded that action by American naval forces would only worsen the
situation. Instead, the commanders of ther German and British naval
vessels at Tampico offered to evacuate the Americans. The German
admiral warned the Mexicans surrounding the Southern Hotel that unless
they dispersed within fifteen minutes he would land marines. When
^^El Paso Morning Times, April 26, 1914; Quirk, Affair of Honor p. 110.
^^Quoted In Michael C Meyer, Huerta: A Political Portrait (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 201.
152
the mob withdrew, German sailors escorted the Americans to safety
aboard ships. The American refugees believed that they had been
brought out temporarily while the navy launched an attack on the city;
when they learned that they were to be transported to the United
States they complained bitterly to Admiral Mayo.
With almost no money and only the clothes they wore, the refu
gees arrived at Galveston, Texas, after having to spend several
uncomfortable days in quarantine. The angry refugees were not molli
fied by the offer of funds for transportation to their homes in the
United States. A "Statement of Facts Given to the People of the
United States by 372 Tampico Refugees Aboard the Steamship 'Esperanza,'
Lying in Quarantine in Galveston Harbor" was sent to many congress
men and newspapers. The refugee statement declared that "the
American administration, not content with subjecting 2,000 of their
citizens and countrymen to these dangers and insults, must force them
to drink the cup of its dregs, to assassinate the last vestige of
pride for their citizenship and flag by permitting, if they knew it
at all, the spectacle of" the rescue of the refugees by the German
40 navy.
The refugees from Tampico were not alone in their protests
against the American government's handling of the intervention.
Arriving in the United States on May 4 from Veracruz, Mrs. O'Shaughnessy
^^El Paso Morning Times, April 26, 1914; Quirk, Affair of Honor, pp. 111-12.
^ % . S . , Congress, House, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess.. May 7, 1914, Congressional Record, LI, 8232-33.
153 recorded that New Orleans was "taxed to its utmost now by the
thousands of refugees from Mexico, most of them cursing the adminis
tration, as far as I can gather, during the hundred and forty-f ive
hours of travel since leaving Mexico."^^ From Veracruz Vice Admiral
Charles T. Badger reported that "refugees yery generally do not wish
to leave Mexico but to be protected in their lives and property
there."^^
The statement by the Fi^pej^nir.a refugees, plus a number of letters
from other Americans who had been in Tampico, provoked congressional
debate led by Senators Lodge and Fal l . By late May a large propor
tion of the refugees had returned to Tampico, which had fallen to the
rebels, who "put themselves out to show their friendliness for
Americans" and "assure them that they will be given every protection
44
i f they return." Nevertheless, the entire episode and the resul
tant publicity did l i t t l e to enhance the prestige of the Wilson
administration.
Although most Americans were forced to flee Mexico because of
the intervention, a number of hardy souls never le f t the towns in
which they had been l iving, and others returned as soon as the ant i -
American manifestations had diminished. In Mexico City 625 Americans
41 O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 353.
42 Vice Admiral Charles T. Badger to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, April 26, 1914, /11760.
^"^U.S., Congress, Senate, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., April 29, 1914, Congressional Record, L I , 7410-11.
^Sexican Herald, May 28, 1914.
154 signed their names to a list of those who were determined to remain
under any circumstances. In early June Americans were able to hold
a golf tournament in the capital. On August 1 the Mexican Herald
returned to Mexico City, by then in the hands of the triumphant
rebels, noting that there was "no question about it being the duty
of every resident foreigner here, always to support and encourage
duly organized government and help rally to its standard, if not the
political, the equally important material elements and the moral 45
support . . . necessary to its success.
While the editor of the Mexican Herald may have been convinced
that complete occupation of Mexico was no longer necessary, a more
likely explanation is that prudence dictated a modification of edi
torial comment. Other American residents and refugees were not at
all reluctant to inform American government officials of their dis
pleasure over the dicision to evacuate Veracruz. In a letter to
Consul William W. Canada at Veracruz, William M. Miller, an American
living in the vicinity of Veracruz, warned that Carranza would not
bring peace to Mexico. "Let the American troops stay until there has
been some semblance of a stable government established," urged Miller.
"I do not wish to see intervention which a removal of the American
troops at this time may precipitate; owing to the unsettled conditions
here, the absence of the American troops at this time would remove the
ii46 last restraint against those who oppose law and order."
^^ibid.. May 16, 1914; June 11; July 31.
^^William W. Miller to William W. Canada (Veracruz), July 15, 1914, /12553.
155 James E. Long, a refugee residing in Eau Claire, Wisconsin,
took his complaint right to the top. In a letter to President Wilson,
Long wrote that the executive order to evacuate Veracruz "takes away
the last hope of protection for your, for my countrymen, who from
stern necessity are compelled to remain there, please Mr. President,
put yourself for a moment in their place, where neither life, liberty
or property is safe, and if you do, you can not do otherwise than
agree that it is a duty, an obligation, to retain our men in Vera Cruz
until such a time as that country can hold its elections and establish
47 a reasonable Government for themselves."
Americans were not the only aliens in Mexico, nor were they the
only aliens concerned with and distressed by the American Intervention
at Veracruz. Mexico City has long been known as a cosmopolitan cen
ter; in 1914 newspapers were published in the native languages of the
American (and English), French, and German colonies. A newspaper was
also published especially for the Spanish colony, which probably had
the largest representation in Mexico after the Americans. In the
northern states of Sonera and Chihuahua large numbers of Chinese
served as cheap labor, and in the capital there was a small colony of
the increasingly influential Japanese.
During the Revolution a developing sense of nationalism in
Mexico resulted in a by-product of zenophobia which, while directed
primarily against Americans, "became manifest with varying intensity
^^James E. Long to President Woodrow Wilson, September 16, 1914, /13259.
156
in respect to other foreign nationals."^® When blinded by national
istic fervor, many Mexicans, especially those of the lower classes,
were either unable or unwilling to discriminate among foreigners.
Non-American foreign nationals had good reason to fear an intervention
which they opposed. These dangers may have been alleviated to some
extent, however, by Mexican recognition of the differences in attitude
and approach between the Americans and other foreign nationals. Just
prior to the intervention an American well acquainted with the situa
tion wrote.
No other foreigners who go to Mexico for business ends feel called upon to bring in reforms and introduce new modes of life and action. Even the English do not do so. As for the Germans, French, and Italians, they adapt themselves to the conditions of the country as far as possible; they adopt the local methods of doing business. They gain a larger return with less output of capital, force, and energy, with less wear and tear, than we do; and between them and the Mexicans a much better feeling exists than between these and ourselves. Naturally, because of the difference, all foreigners are looked upon with something of dislike and suspicion; but the difference in feeling between the Mexicans toward continental Europeans and ourselves is very marked.'•5
The Spaniards were the Immigrants most adapted to Mexican cus-
tomes and most attached to the Mexican people, but they were subjected
50 to a special persecution during the Revolution. A combination of
nationalism and envy, because the Spaniards were the principal owners
of mercantile establishments and had the best homes, led General
48 Turner, Mexican Nationalism, p. 208.
Starr, Mexico and the United States, p. 357.
50 ' Angel Lascurain y Oslo, La segunda intervene ion americana (Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1957), pp. 46-4/.
157 Pancho Vi l la to confiscate the property of the Spaniards and drive
51 them out of Chihuahua on foot. Frightened by Vi l la 's action, the
Spaniards in other parts of Mexico were determined to demonstrate
their loyalty to their adopted country, and the American intervention
provided an excellent opportunity.
In several editorials in mid-April, 1914, El Correo Espanol,
the spokesman for the Spanish colony in Mexico City, blamed the United
States for the depredations by the revolutionaries. These editorials
claimed that the proponents of the Monroe Doctrine had to accept the
responsibility for protecting the lives and interests of foreigners,
and at the same time accused the Americans of casting covetous eyes
52 on Mexican terri tory. Upon receiving news of the Tampico crisis
El_ Correo Espanol warned its readers that
a diplomatic incident even more gross than the blowing-up of the Maine was for the Spaniards is at the point of drawing this country into an armed conflict with the republic of the United States. . . . Again the strong, the r ich, the powerful, sating its ambitions at the expense of the poor and broken.
I t is the same colossus that annihilated our colonial power. I t 1s the imperialist yankee who extends, slowly but constantly, his octopus tentacles across the Arnerlcan continent.
El Correo Espariol announced that its position, "for historical reasons,
53 for humanity and for justice," was on the side of Mexico.
^^O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 93.
^^El Correo Espanol. April 15. 1914; April 16; April 20.
^^Ibid. , April 21. 1914.
158
El Correo Espanol attacked the actual Intervention as "barbar
ous aggression" and praised the action of one Pedro Alonso, a
Spaniard living in Veracruz, who joined in the Mexican resistance
to the occupation. The ABC mediation proposal, however, which caused
"the most pessimistic hearts to swell with hope," received a strong
54 endorsement. The pro-Mexican stance of the Spanish colony newspaper
undoubtedly reduced any xenophobic attitudes held by the citizens of
the capital toward the members of that colony, and the friendly atmos
phere was reinforced by notices appearing in El Imparcial to the
effect that a number of Spaniards had assisted in the defense of
55 Veracruz.
The French colony in Mexico, which may have numbered over 4,000,
was third in size after the American and Spanish colonies, and had
its own newspaper, Le Courrier du Mexique. The French nationals, who
believed that they played a major role in the Mexican economy, com
plained that "the United States ignore systematically the share taken
56
by France in the development of Mexico." As in the other foreign
colonies the French residents and Le Courrier du Mexique gave strong
support to President Huerta. To the American suggestion that some
country might have to set Mexico's house in order for her, the French
newspaper tersely replied that " i f the United States would keep her
own house in order by preventing her lawbreakers from unlawfully
^ I b i d . , April 23, 1914; April 28.
^^El Imparcial. April 23, 1914.
^^Mexlean Herald, April 9, 1914.
159
supplying the Mexican lawbreakers with arms and ammunition, Mexico
would soon have her house in order also and keep it so."
When the intervention began Le Courrier du Mexique published an
article written by J. L. Regagnon, the editor, and authorized as
reflecting the opinion of the French colony. Regagnon denounced "the
war which the Americans have just provoked In such a perfidious
manner at Veracruz" as "unjust and hatefully criminal." Regagnon also
accused the Americans of having fomented the civil war for the pur
pose of weakening and dividing Mexico in order to annex parts of that
58 nation.
In contrast to the Spanish and French, the British colony
issued a statement of neutrality through its commission, although
the colony "could not witness the present events without vividly
recalling the welcome and reception that they had always received in
Mexico and the many proofs of the intimate congeniality that exists 59 between the British and the Mexicans." Among all foreign groups
the British residents were in the greatest danger, because they were
the most easily mistaken for Americans. Mrs. Rosa E. King, the
English owner of Bella Vista Hotel in Cuernavaca. was subjected to
stone-throwing by a mob on the night of April 21. but when a friend
informed the Mexicans that Mrs. King was an English citizen they
inwediately ceased their hostilities. '''U'oa MexiooV they shouted.
^ Quoted in Mexico, April 11, 1914, p. 11.
^%oted in El Imparcial, April 23. 1914, p. 2.
^^Ibid., April 23, 1914.
160 and before they streamed on they added, with Mexican courtesy,
*Viva la ingUea (Englishwoman)!'" Mrs. King believed that "it should
be said on behalf of the Mexicans that, considering the provocation
they were enduring, they treated all foreigners yery well at this
critical t1me."^°
Japan profited greatly from the hostility between President
Wilson and the Huerta regime, and the influence of that nation
Increased significantly in Mexico during the period prior to the
intervention. When the intervention began, the Japanese residents of
Mexico City demonstrated in support of Mexico with flags and lanterns
and cheered in front of the foreign office. The Mexican foreign
minister, appearing on a balcony, addressed the demonstrators and
called for close union between Mexico and Japan. Mrs. O'Shaughnessy
recorded on the night of April 21 that
a mob, rather inoffensive, is howling outside, waving Mexican flags and exhorting in loud voices. I can't hear anything from the window except something about Viven loe Japoneses, and a few remarks not flattering to toe Gringos.^^
The Japanese were easily distinguishable by race as new-found
friends of Mexico; the Europeans were not so fortunate. Thousands
of Europeans, encouraged and assisted by the diplomatic officials
and naval officers of their respective countries, fled the capital
for the protection of Veracruz. During the days following the
^ Rosa E. King, Tempest Over Mexico: A Personal Chronicle (Boston: L i t t le , Brown, and Company, 1935), p. 129.
^^El Paso Morning Times, April 26, 1914.
^^O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 289.
161 intervention most British residences were entered and searched, and
Mexican authorities seized the arms and ammunition stored at the
emergency centers of the foreign colonies. A number of British sub
jects lost their jobs in the mines at Pachuca to Mexicans and joined
the exodus.
Greater difficulties were encountered by Ivor Thord-Gray, a
soldier-of-fortune of mixed nationality serving with General Lucio
Blanco's rebel forces, who nearly met assassination at the hands of
some of his fellow officers who considered him a gringo spy. Thord-
Gray recalled that "after the occupation of Veracruz by the U. S.
forces I became, for a while at least, a mere tolerated alien. I was 64 not a companero^ not even a friend in the eyes of some." Even a
German citizen, walking near the cathedral in Mexico City, was
assaulted by a group of twenty men and boys. The German was able to
convince the mob that he was not an American only by displaying the
tattoo of a German flag on his arm. I t is impossible to determine
to what extent the difficulties of the Europeans were due to general
xenophobia in contrast to being mistaken for Americans. For example,
Europeans traveling to Veracruz were cheered at the stations along
the railroad tracks by Mexicans who had turned out to shout "death to
the gringos." Americans who remained in Mexico City tried to pass
63 Mexican Herald, April 21, 1914; April 25; April 26; May 1.
^Ivor Thord-Gray, Gringo Rebel (Coral Gables. Florida: University of Miami Press, 1960). pp. 203-04. 218.
^ W i c a n Herald. May 1, 1914.
162 themselves off as Europeans by wearing miniature flags of those
nations on their coats.
Whatever the reason for the discomfiture suffered by the
European nationals in Mexico, the press of their respective nations
placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of Woodrow Wilson. The
European press had opposed Wilson's policies from the time he took
office, when much of the press called for American intervention to
protect foreign investments, through the occupation of Veracruz,
which many regarded as self-serving. A major facet of the press cr i
ticism in 1914 concerned the dangers to European nationals resulting
from President Wilson's policies. Since the Monroe Doctrine pre
cluded action by the European powers to protect their nationals in
Mexico, the Europeans held Wilson responsible for the failure to pro
vide such protection.
The greatest single crisis involving the protection of European
nationals developed in February, 1914, when General Pancho Villa exe
cuted William S. Benton, a British subject, on the flimsiest of
charges. The death of Benton because a cause celehre in England, 68
where it was regarded as outright murder. The British government
agreed to let the United States government make representations to
Villa, but the rebel leader refused to permit an investigation.
Great indignation swept through the British colony over the Benton
^^Mexican Herald,, April 21, 1914; April 25. April 26; May 1.
^'^"Europe Urging Us to Invade Mexico," Literary Digest, March 8, 1913, p. 504.
^^Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 139.
163
k i l l ing . A mass meeting of the colony in Mexico City cal led for
action by the B r i t i sh government to protect the l ives and property
of B r i t i sh subjects.^^
The European response to the Benton a f f a i r was that since Wilson
had encouraged and supplied V i l l a , the American president bore some
of the respons ib i l i ty for V i l l a ' s consequent acts. The London Sunday
Times wrote.
The nation which demands respect for the Monroe Doctrine has a par t icu lar obl igat ion to the other Powers. In regard to the murder of foreign residents in Mexico, the obl igat ion is made heavier by the fac t that the Government which upholds the Monroe Doctrine is del iberately conniving at a supply of arms and ammunition to the fact ion by whom these murders are being committed. This fac t surely imposes d i rec t responsib i l i ty on the Government in question.^0
The London Financial News cal led Wilson's policy of supporting the
rebels "American Aid for Assassins." Reports from Germany indicated
that public opinion would force the government to take drast ic action
i f even one German c i t i zen were k i l l ed in Mexico.
The Tampico Incident e l i c i t ed a wry comment from the London
Chronicle to the ef fec t that the arrest of a few marines had provoked
President Wilson to a greater extent than a l l the many a t roc i t ies of
the c i v i l war. The London Times ci ted the mistreatment of foreigners
by the rebels in i t s claim that the president's f i rm stand on the
°^Raymond Carl Gerhardt, "England and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920," (Unpublished Ph.D. d isser ta t ion , Texas Tech Universi ty, 1970), p. 325.
70Quoted in "B r i t i sh Press on Benton's Fate," L i terary Digest, March 7, 1914, p. 481.
^^Baker, Woodrow Wilson, IV, 309.
164 Tampico issue was "cur iously Inconsistent with the way in which he
turned the other cheek a f ter the one had received General V i l l a ' s
72 rebuffs." The Manchester Guardian claimed that " In tervent ion,
which murder and robbery fa i led to bring about, is apparently to be
the punishment for a merely symbolic s l igh t on American dignity."^"^
The occupation of Veracruz produced renewed concern for
European nationals in the press. The Paris Journal predicted that
whatever happens, foreigners w i l l be the v ict ims. President Wilson takes care to mention that he w i l l be unable to protect them or thei r in terests . This statement, coming af ter the Benton murder and the outrages on Spaniards, is tinged with irony.
The Paris Liberte claimed that American intervention exposed French-
74 men in Mexico to greater danger than ever before.
Elements of the B r i t i sh press, on the other hand, supported
Wilson's decision to intervene because i t was "regarded as the begin
ning of a general cleaning up of Mexico and not merely the el imination
of Huerta." American Ambassador Walter Hines Page reported that most
of the newspapers c r i t i c i z e d Wilson's " t im id i t y " and expressed
approval of the tougher stance advocated by Senate Republicans. Page
noted that "the B r i t i sh do not forget Benton and the expectation of
punishment of V i l l a crops out of many newspaper a r t i c les and is often
^^Quoted in Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. 149.
^^Quoted in "The American Navy Moves in Force Upon Mexican Ports," Current Opinion, May, 1914, p. 330.
' ^ ^ o t e d in "American Intervention in Mexico: A Poll of the European Press," Outlook, May 2, 1914, pp. 17-18.
75 '"
heard in conversation." Failure to extend the intervention beyond
Veracruz provoked much adverse comment from those in England who
desired to have the outrages committed against their nationals
avenged. On May 11 Ambassador Page reported that "a rising tide of
general criticism is again visible here of our longer waiting to do
what the critics in and out of Parliament regard as inevitable."^^
The foreign residents of Mexico, whether American, European,
or Asian, deplored the Mexican policies of President Woodrow Wilson.
Nearly all of these foreigners supported the Huerta dictatorship,
because the Mexican president promised to protect foreigners and their
property and gave eyery Indication of trying to carry out that promise.
The pro-recognition and anti-intervention positions of the foreign
residents were published, especially in the United States, by former
residents and observers who wrote books, magazine articles, and
letters to newspapers and congressmen. If the opinions of the foreign
residents and observers did not achieve a modification of Wilsonian
policy, they did contribute to a somewhat distorted impression of the
unpopularity of that policy.
The occupation of Veracruz caused great hardships for many of
the foreigners in Mexico. The foreigners, including the Americans,
believed that the United States should not have Intervened in the
first place, but that once the decision had been made, the interven
tion should not have been limited to Veracruz. Many American
75
'Page to Bryan, May 11, 1914, /11902.
Walter Hines Page (London) to Bryan, April 22, 1914, /11614.
76.
166
residents believed that total occupation of Mexico, together with
the establishment of some form of protectorate, was not only best for
Mexico, but also the only means by which foreigners could preserve
their positions and property. The European press, which frequently
expressed concern for the well-being of their nationals in Mexico,
agreed with the views of the foreign residents and added these argu
ments to their already numerous objections to President Wilson's
policies.
CHAPTER VI
THE RESPONSE OF THE MEXICAN PEOPLE
The antagonistic response of the people of any nation to foreign
Interference in their national affairs should not come as a surprise
to the perpetrators of such interference. The fact that President
Woodrow Wilson was surprised and disappointed by the hosti l i ty and
resistance of the Mexicans to the intervention at Veracruz is evidence
of his failure to comprehend the real i t ies of the Mexican situation.
The American President apparently either ignored the rising tide of
anti-Americanism in Mexico during the early years of the Revolution
or presumed that i t was directed solely against the economic exploiters
The Mexican hostil i ty toward the United States was based in part on
the historical reali ty of the dismemberment of the Mexican nation
after the war of 1848, but i t also resulted "from resentment against
American feelings of superiority, and from dislike of the treatment
given to Mexican citizens in the United States." A catalytic factor
in the growth of anti-Americanism during the regimes of Francisco I .
Madero and Victoriano Huerta was the effort "of Mexican factions to
win popular support through appeals to xenophobic nationalism. In
the short run this anti-Yankeeism prepared Mexicans for resistance to
Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policy."
Frederick C Turner, "Anti-Americanism in Mexico, 1910-1913," Hispani£ American Historical Revjew^ XLVII (November. 1967), 502.
167
168 Anti-American manifestations increased in frequency when It
became evident that President Wilson would not recognize the Huerta
government, even though many Constitutionalists were pleased to see
Huerta weakened. "The non-recognition policy cut the United States
off from those Mexicans who were willing to continue Porfirio Diaz's
policy of encouraging American business interests in exchange for
cordial American friendship." While "Huerta's later defeat within
Mexico reduced evidences of the support which he once had, . . . one
should not underestimate the size or the power of the faction which
the United States antagonized by its opposition to him."
Many Mexicans who were neutral in the struggle between Huerta
and the Constitutionalists, and even many who opposed Huerta, resented
any American attempts to tamper with Mexican domestic affairs, includ
ing nonrecognition. These Mexicans considered nonrecognition and
other unfriendly manifestations by the United States government as a
portent of Intervention. Consular dispatches from Yucatan, the state
which had demonstrated the strongest separatist tendencies during the
nineteenth century, reported that Mexicans viewing motion pictures had
hissed scenes in which the American flag appeared, while others
threatened the welfare of American residents if the United States inter
vened. "As the revolutionary struggle continued and fears of American
intervention mounted, reports of deep hostility toward Americans came
from Acapulco, Veracruz, Aguascalientes, and what is now Piedras
^Ibid., p. 511.
169 H3 '
Negras." Even at a remote campfire in rural Mexico, John Reed, the
American journal is t , encountered two peons who expressed anxiety
over the possibi l i ty of Intervention. " ' I t is said, ' remarked the
ole man quaveringly, ' that the United States of the North covets our
country—that Gringo soldiers w i l l come and take away my goats in
the end. . . . ' " ^
Numerous books and plays published in Mexico during the Huerta
administration helped to Inflame the Mexican sense of nationalism by
portraying the United States as seeking to destroy Mexican indepen
dence. "A number of plays and short stories such as Tenorlo-Sam and
Fil iberto C. Gonzalez' Provectos de un yankee. produced 1n the atmos
phere of revolutionary xenophobia, showed Uncle Sam bested by a
Mexican Indian g i r l and described vil lainous Americans speaking yery
bad Spanish and trying to grab Mexican ter r i tory .^ Serious non-
f ic t ion works by prominent Mexican figures also attacked nonrecogni
tion and warned of the possibi l i ty of intervention. Enrique E.
Schulz, a noted engineer and professor of geography, claimed that the
growing conf l ic t between the United States and Mexico was not merely
3 Frederick C Turner, The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism (Chapel
H i l l , North Carolina: UniversTty of NortF Carolina Press, 1968), p. 210.
John Reed, Insurgent Mexico (New York: International Publishers, 1969), pp. 170.
n*urner, "Anti-Americanism," p. 516, referring to Tenorio-Sam. Humorada satlr ica de autores mexicanos, escrita en un acto dIvTdo en tres cuadros, sobre el drama de Zor i l la y con1:ra la tragi-comedTa" yankee. Estrenada en el Teatro Principal de Mexico, con ex 1 to e'xtra-ordinario. la noche del 28 de Febrero de 1914 (Mexico, 1914}; and h l i be r t o C. Gonzalez, Proyectos de un yankee (Mexico, 1914).
170 a special case resulting from particular circumstances, but rather
part of an enduring threat to Mexican sovereignty caused by the
proximity of a powerful nation to a weaker one. Schulz' El porvenir
de Mexico y_ sus_ relaciones con los Estados Unidos, completed in
February of 1914, called for national reunification to resist
American economic and political aggression.^
"What right has the Government of the United SUtes, morally
and legally speaking, to judge whether or not a president of another
Republic is popular, a dictator, or tolerant?" asked Gonzale G.
Travesi, a Mexico City journalist. In La revolucion de Mexico y el
imperialismo yangui. Travesi believed that nonrecognition played
into the hands of "the millionaires of Wall Street," who sought to
benefit their financial interests by an armed intervention.^
President Wilson also came under sharp attack by Emeterio de la
Garza, Jr., for meddling in Mexican affairs and supporting the Villa
faction. De la Garza, probably a conservative Maderista himself,
claimed that his close ties with both Huertlsta and Carrancista
leaders would enable him to arrange peace between the warring factions.
De la Garza placed some faith in the "moral solidarity" of Latin
American peoples to discourage American intervention, but also found
it necessary to condemn "the attitude of his Excellency Woodrow
Enrique E. Schulz, El porvenir de Mexico y sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos ([Mexlcoj: TipografTa Economica, 1914), pp. 55-58.
Gonzalo G. Travesi, ti. revolucion de Mexico y_ el_ imperial ismo yangui (Barcelona: Casa Editorial Maucci, 1914), pp. 248-49.
171 Wilson" as "neither good, nor neutral, nor imparcial, nor just ,
neither in principle nor in relation to the Mexican Nation."^
Enrique E. Schulz, Gonzalo G. Travesi, and Emeterio de la Garza,
Jr. were probably quite sincere in their published beliefs and do not
deserve to be classified as propagandists; Mexican Senator Rafael de
Zayas Enriquez may have been equally sincere, but he was undoubtedly
a propagandist for the Huerta regime. Zayas Enriquez' The Case of
Mexico and the Policy of President Wilson contained a number of tor
tuous arguments in behalf of President Huerta's legal position and
also ably defended the position that "an intervention would be d i f f i -
cult in theory. Ineffective in practice." Zayas Enriquez noted that
"whether our government is legal or i l legal is a question which i t
behooves only ourselves, the Mexicans, to decide." The Mexican sena
tor, whose articles appeared in the propaganda weekly Mexico, pub
lished for American consumption, suggested that " i f the Wilson policy
has not as its sole aim an armed intervention and the conquest of
Mexico, or a section of i t , Mr. Wilson should direct al l his energies
towards the resumption of an harmonious modus vivendi with Mexico; he
should abandon his hostile attitude and avail himself of the best 9
diplomatic assistance."
^Emeterio de la Garza, J r . , Mexico: Manifiesto del licenciado Emeterio de la Garza. Jr . . convocan fo"~a uin congreso de paz: estudio y resolucTFn'^e'TasdiTTcultides y problemas nacfonaies internacionales ([NPW York]: [n .p . ] . p. 31).
^Rafael de Zayas Enriquez. The Case of Mexico and the Policy of President Wilson, trans, by AndreTrlBo'n (New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1914), pp. 182. 199.
172 The propaganda efforts of the Huerta regime were not limited
to the published works of Zayas Enriquez. President Huerta and his
cohorts made extensive and often astute efforts to influence public
opinion in both Mexico and the United States. Evidence of Huerta's
efforts to manipulate public opinion appeared with increasing fre
quency as the dictator's di f f icult ies mounted. Huertista agitators
attempted to whip up anti-American hatreds and turn them to Huerta's
benefit at a night ral ly of some 3000 residents of Nuevo Laredo in
August of 1913. The dictator's spokesman declared that armed conflict
with the United States was inevitable, since "the noble and i l lus
trious Huerta would brook no insult or humiliation from the Yankees."
President Huerta clearly hoped that the anti-American sentiment
which he was helping to stimulate could be turned against the
Constitutionalists, who were receiving encouragement from the Wilson
administration. Querido Moheno, leader of the Huerta faction in the
Chamber of Deputies in 1913 and later cabinet minister, announced
that the secession of Sonora under Carranza was nothing more than a
preliminary step in a scheme by former President Theodore Roosevelt
and the "Yankee bankers" to dismember Mexico. Such claims may
have had a temporary impact on some elements, but they did not deter
an increasing number of Mexicans from joining the Constitutionalist
movement.
10 Quoted in Turner, "Anti-Americanism," p. 512.
^ h b i d . , p. 510.
173 The efforts of the Huerta regime to exacerbate the attitudes
of Mexicans toward the United States met with greater success. "Fears
of actually precipitating United States intervention limited the
extent of xenophobia, however, as did individual attitudes caused by
isolation, economic interests, or personal friendships."^^ William
Brownlee Davis, the American Consul at Guadalajara, remarked on one
aspect of this phenomenon.
The continued nonrecognition by President Wilson of the Huerta Government; the permitting by the Washington Government of exportation of arms and munitions to the Carrancistas . . . added to the already highly pitched anti-American sentiment, made the life of an American citizen at Guadalajara anything but pleasant. Nevertheless, our personal friends among the Mexicans (and 1 think such was the case with nearly all my countrymen) continued to treat us with as much courtesy as formerly, though at times with visible effort."*3
The Mexican daily newspapers reflected the anti-Americanism and
fear of intervention found among the general public. In the early
weeks of the Huerta regime El Independiente. which later served as
the official organ of the government, noted the American military
preparations near Mexico "simply and solely in connection with our
political contests." The article warned that the Mexican people were
"face to face with a grave risk which compromises our autonomy and
brings us to the verge of a terrible situation. The danger must not
12 Turner, Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism, p. 203.
William Brownlee Davis, Experience and Observations of an American Consular Officer During'ln'e Recent Mexican Revolutions (Chula Vista, California: [published by author], 1920), p. 17.
^Stanley Robert Ross, "El historiador y el periodismo mexicano, Historia Mexicana, XIV (January-March, 1965).
174 be exaggerated, but i t must not be lost sight of, for perhaps we are
playing our last card." El Independiente concluded by expressing the
hope "that the Government's patriotism and a serious effort at paci
fication may remove us from proximity to the abyss of intervention;
that the gravity of the menace which hovers over our l i f e as an
1 5
independent nation may restore our reason."
American meddling in Mexican affairs came under attack by the
provincial as well as the metropolitan press. La Revista de Yucatan
a daily established at Merida in 1912 by Carlos P. Menendez, a dedi
cated and independent journalist, warned the Wilson administration
that "one of the great poetical moralists of Greece has said, 'Do
not undertake to prop up the house of your neighbor without his con
sent, for perhaps in your attempt you may bring i t down upon your
head.'"^^
The growth of hosti l i ty toward Wilsonian policy can be observed
in the editorial evolution of one of the major Mexico City dal l ies.
El Pais. Trinidad Sanchez Santos, the fearless and able founder of
i ] Pais, was persecuted by the Madero administration and died in
prison,^^ so the frequent endorsement of President Huerta's policies
by the paper came as no surprise. In mid-summer of 1913, however.
^^Quoted in "Mexican Fear of Intervention," Literary Digest, March 22, 1913, p. 632.
^^Jose Bravo Ugarte, Periodistas y periodicos mexicanos (Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1966), p. 86.
^^Quoted in "Our Latin-American Crit ics," Literary Digest, October 18, 1913, p. 674.
^^Henry Lepidus, Thp Hj^tory_ of Mexican Journal ism, University
175 El Pais warned that "Mexico ought not to provoke war with the
United States, simply because we should be compromising our national
ity as a free people." The editorial further declared that " i f ,
owing to oversensitiveness on the point of honor, an attack be made
upon Americans, war will come, intervention will be a fact , and we
shall have to lament then the horrors of a war, fiercer and more
bitter than any other, only because we did not know how to be calm
and prudent and because we gave loose re1n to an unreflecting patrio-
19 tic sentiment." When the Mexican version of patience proved
fruit less. El Pais adopted a tougher stance in a tongue-in-cheek
editorial on President Wilson's state of the union address:
"President Wilson's words are so Injurious and depressing and at the
same time the charges made against the Mexican President are so
unjust that i t is preferable to pass them by in silence in order not
20 to awaken anti-American sentiment in Mexico."
of Missouri Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, No. 4; Journalism Series, No. 49 ([Columbia, Missouri]: University of Missouri Press, 1928), p. 69. Francisco Bulnes, however, blamed Sanchez Santos for the overthrow and murder of Madero, because the editor of El Pais, "the leading newspaper agitator of this hemisphere, and without a doubt of the entire world" had "annihilated a political party, a faction, an individual with a word, usually of ridicule or infamy'; (The Whole Truth About Mexico: President Wilson's Responsibility, trans, by Dora Scott [New Yorkl M. Bulnes Book Company, 1916J, p. 219.
^^Quoted in "Mexico's Desire for Peace With Us," Literary Digest, August 9, 1913, pp. 203-04.
^ ^ o t e d in Guy Renfro Donnell, "United States Intervention in Mexico, 1914" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1951), p. 123.
176 "Like al l effective dictators, Huerta ful ly appreciated the
value of a controlled press and initiated a policy of censorship soon
21 after coming to office." As in his other propaganda efforts,
Huerta hoped to u t i l i ze the press in manipulating public opinion
against the internal and external threats to his rule. Before his
position became precarious, however, the dictator permitted newspapers
of a "frankly hostile attitude" to operate without Interference.
When the political and military situation deteriorated, Huerta merely
closed the smaller dailies which refused to cooperate. Employing a
different expedient with the larger and more important papers, Huerta
followed the precedent set by Porfirio Diaz of purchasing their
loyalty through government subsidies. El Pais neither needed nor
accepted subsidies, but i t generally supported the government's
22 policies because i ts management held similar political convictions.
An analysis of the Mexican press prior to Huerta's seizure of
power would show that i t was not necessary to suborn the preponderant
number of newspapers. The tabloid-style journals which specialized
in political satires and cartoons had attempted to identify President
Madero with supposed American acquisitiveness, and the elimination of
Madero resulted in the substitution of Carranza and Vil la for
Madero. La Satira, Multicolor, U Guacamaya, and Ef Mero Petatero
published frequent cartoons which portrayed President Wilson as the
^^Michael C Meyer, Huerta: A Political Portrait (Lincoln Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 132.
^^Ibid. , pp. 132-33.
177 unscrupulous mastermind of the revolutionary scheme. ^ Since the
Wilson administration made no effort to disguise its sympathies for
the rebels, the journalistic propaganda found some acceptance among
the general public.
I t was a genuine worry to the Constitutionalists that the deep latent feeling against the gringos might be roused up on behalf of Huerta against themselves. Carranza was particularly sensitive to popular feel ing.2'*
The dally newspapers attempted to substantiate the propaganda
claims of the tabloids "by charging that the rebels planned to sell
part of Mexico to the United States."^^ The two major proponents of
that falsehood were El Pais and El Imparcial. Rafael Reyes Spindola,
the father of modern journalism in Mexico, founded El Imparcial in
1896, giving i t an American format and an educational mission.
Spindola found i t prudent to accept a subvention from the Diaz regime,
and El Imparcial soon became the off icial organ of that goverrwent.
By 1914 Spindola's newspaper was in the hands of Salvador Diaz Miron,
*fho strongly supported President Huerta and continued to accept
subsidies.^^
23 ' ' Manuel Gonzalez Ramirez, ed., Fuentes para la historia de la
revolucloli mexicana. Vol. 11: La caricatura politica (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1955), Figures 383-417.
24 Louis M. Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution (1913-1916): A History of United States-MexTciTn Relations from the Murder of"Madero until VTTla's PTovocation across the Border (New York; Expositlo'n Press, 1967), p. 66.
25 Kenneth J. Grieb, The United States and Huerta (Lincoln,
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 196977 p. 58.
26 Lepidus, Mexican Journalism, pp. 65-66.
178 In common with the other elements of the Huertista press.
El Imparcial made every effort to place President Wilson and his
policies in a bad light. A favorite technique for El Imparcial was
to cite foreign newspapers, especially those from the United States,
which offered comments critical of American policy. On January 10,
1914, for example. El Imparcial published excerpts from a press
suwnary in the Literary Digest which quoted a number of comments from
newspapers critical of President Wilson's state of the union
27
address. President Huerta undoubtedly found such information use
ful in molding public opinion both in Mexico and in the United States,
for he made every effort to persuade reporters in the United States
to come to Mexico as his guests. Among the more prominent foreign
correspondents in Mexico City in 1914 were James Creelman of the New
York Evening Mail, Frederick Splinstone of Leslie's Weekly (at
Huerta's invitation), and Ernest King of the New York World, all of
whom made statements favorable to the Huerta government. The
American correspondents and their views received front-page publicity 28 1n Ef Imparcial.
While President Huerta was eager to Influence the American press
In favor of his government and policies, at the same time he permitted,
and even may have encouraged, the Mexican press to print articles
which seemed to demonstrate growing American imperialistic designs on
^^El Imparcial, January 10, 1914.
28lbid., February 5, 1914; February 23; February 25; March 1.
179 Mexico. Thus, the January 12 Issue of El Imparcial reported the
"absurd proposal of a Yankee newspaper" under the heading "El Cor.
Roosevelt -- gobernador de Mexico!!!" and the January 20 issue
repeated Washington rumors of plans by President Wilson for inter
vention as published in another American newspaper. ^
During the late fal l and winter of 1913-1914 President Wilson
decided that the Mexican dictator would have to be deposed and issued
pronouncements to that effect. Events following Wilson's statements
revealed anew the fu t i l i ty of a policy of pronouncements
and threats unaccompanied by measures of force. No uprising against Huerta occurred in Mexico City. On the contrary, the dictator grew stronger. The business and banking interests, the Church, and the large landowners realized that he alone coule save them from the fury of the Constitutionalists, and they finally began to support the provisional government in a substantial way.3°
Huerta, who had already closed the Mexican Congress, took the oppor
tunity to rid himself of additional political opponents. In December
La Nacion, the Catholic party organ, "launched a series of editorials
condemning dictatorship, the electron control, and many Huerta poli-31 cies," only to be closed by government decree on December 22.
President Wilson finally took positive action in early February,
1914, by lift ing the embargo on the sale of American arms to forces
in Mexico, a move designed to aid the Constitutionalists. The rebel
^ Ibid. , January 12, 1914; January 20.
^^Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, T5B"6), p. 387.
31 Grieb, United States and Huerta, p. I l l .
180 leaders, of course, were delighted. General Pancho Villa shouted,
"The war will soon be over! The war will soon be over!" when he 32
heard the news. The Mexico City press, however, exploded with
exclamations of outrage and dismay. El Pais proclaimed that "Mr.
Wilson has thrown off the mask of puritanism and has declared himself
the friend and protector of the reljels." This editorial claimed that
the American president was motivated by a desire to benefit commercial
interests from the United States and noted that "the accumulation of
elements of destruction in our territory is a labor which will soon
facilitate the American intervention in our affairs." El Pais con-
cluded that "the only thing that Mr. Wilson will obtain. Is to place
in high relief the figure of General Huerta who, due to American
intrigues, symbolizes today, in the Western Hemisphere, the soul of
the Latin race."^^
El Imparcial eagerly joined El Pais in denunciation of
President Wilson's latest move. "Wilson Shamelessly and Disgrace
fully Declares himself an Accomplice of Bandits," cried a heading for
the lead story on February 5. The story concluded with the warning
that "if society In the United States should approve the stupendous
decision of the man at the White House, i t would deserve the contempt
and execration of all honest countries." An accompanying cartoon
portrayed a professional Wilson observing his reflection as a pig in
34 a mirror, while a Mexican peon exclaimed, "How well you look!" On
32Quoted in Link, New Freedom, p. 391.
^^Quoted in the Mexican Herald, February 5, 1914, p. 4. 34
El Imparcial, February 4, 1914.
181 the other hand. El Independiente, the spokesman for the Huerta
regime, claimed that Wilson's decree completely lacked importance
since the rebels had been able to obtain arms i l legal ly for some
time. "What Wilson had done was to remove his mask," concluded 35
I i Independiente.
During the weeks following the l i f t ing of the arms embargo much
of the Mexican press increased their vituperative attacks on President
Wilson. Mrs. Edith O'Shaughnessy, wife of the American charge
d'affaires, recorded that her husband had
protested to the Foreign Office regarding the scurrilous language the Imparcial has used about the President, the Imparcial being a government organ. "Wicked Puritan with sorry horse teeth," "Exotic and nauseous Carranzista pedagogue," are samples of its style.^6
Miguel Odorica, city editor of El Pais, chose this period as the
opportune time to observe the forces of the potential enemy in the
harbor of Veracruz. In a series of reports entitled "Face to Face
With the Phantom," Odorica sought out "the sinister figure of Uncle
Sam, who looks on us as an assured and easy prey." Recalling the
American invasion in 1847, which "had as principal impulse, the
insatiable thirst of gold," the Mexican editor warned that "at the
present time, i t is our petroleum--liquid gold a thousand times more
valuable--which has awakened American avarice, and perhaps in the
silence of President Wilson's cabinet is being plotted a new
35 El Independiente, February 6, 1914.
^^Edith O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife, jn. Mexjco. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1916), p. 187.
37 ^^^ partition of our territory."
In Veracruz editor Odorica found i t necessary to go outside
the harbor to observe the American battleships. "Suspicious and
sulky, conscious of the sinister role they are playing in these
historical moments, they perhaps fe l t Insecure inside the bay and
preferred to stay outside hidden by the strong sea-wall, like three
evil-doers who hide at the turn of a street and await, knife in hand,
the coming of their victim." Despite the obviously imaginative
propaganda in his writing, Odorica was able to strike a responsive
chord in his readers when he claimed that the American marines
looked
at us with their blue eyes in which we read the racial contempt with which they have always scorned us. For them we have always been and continue to be the "greasers." A scarcely contained anger shines in our eyes. Hate makes our blood boil and it augments as we realize our powerlessness; understanding that in this condition we cannot board the man-of-war, we peremptorily give the order to return. Pessimism possesses us; the sadness inspired in us by their greatness is infinite.^^
A further installment of Odorica's observations in Veracruz con
tinued to emphasize racial and cultural differences. The Mexican
journalist foresaw a future belonging to the Americans: "They are
the conquerors, the modern Romans. We feel decadent, old, puny
sprouts of old races which also know epochs of supreme splendor."
Still, "hope and our invincible faith cry to us that they will not con-
39 quer, because they are not in the right and they have no heart."
^^Quoted in the Mexican Herald, February 14, 1914,
^Qlbid., February 16, 1914.
^^Ibid., February 17, 1914.
183 The emotional message of Miguel Odorica and likeminded
colleagues of the Mexican press was that American intervention was
near at hand. Some Mexicans began to prepare for that eventuality.
On March 4 William P. Blocker, American vice consul at Ciudad
Porfirio Diaz (now Piedras Negras) reported the appearance of circu-
lars entitled "La Intervencion Americana" in his area. These f l i e r s ,
authored by Francisco Naranjo, son of a Mexican general, recormended
a number of means for resisting the anticipated aggressors, including
the propagation of smallpox, yellow fever, and other diseases.
Blocker reported the distribution of similar f l iers in Torreon,
Monterrey and Sa l t i l lo , and expressed concern that they might produce
i l l feeling among the peones. On March 9 Mrs. O'Shaughnessy noted
that i f the report of a recent border incident were accurate, the
act "would be resented by al l classes here, and eyery class really
hates us."^^
The Mexican milieu has provided a unique means for gauging pub
lic opinion, particularly that of the "common" people outside the
cit ies. The corrida was a popular ballad on almost any subject which
touched the lives of the pueblo^ written and sung by travelling
trovadores (minstrels) who had their corridas printed in broadside
William P. Blocker (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, March 4, 1914, 812.00/11114, U.S., Department of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, T9T0-1929), Microcopy No. 274 "n^ashington, WTT: National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1959). Unless otherwise indicated, a l l correspondence of the Department of State will be from the 812.00 f i les and will be identified only by the slash number.
O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 216.
184 form for sale. While the corridista might
try to influence the thinking of listeners and even Inject a measure of propaganda into his interpretation of events, he must proceed with extreme caution lest he diverge too sharply from the mainstream of existing public opinion. Above all he must identify himself with the pueblo and take care that the opinions he expresses are acceptable to the pueblo; otherwise he finds himself without an audience and his broadsides remain unsold.
Such immediate economic dependence upon his audience, with the corridista*s resulting sensitivity to the changing moods of public opinion, justi f ies our belief that the corrido, when properlv Interpreted, is a significant historical document." 2
The threat of American intervention always provoked a spate of
aorridoe which offered vehement denunciations. Prior to the interven
tion at Veracruz most corridas expressed great confidence in the
abil i ty of the Mexicans to repel American aggression. In La llegada
de buques americanos a_ Tampico, the corridista declared:
Of fighting against the gringos we are always desirous, in order to give them a proof that we are not afraid.
Regarding the arrival of the American f lee t , the same corridista
stoutly maintained:
The gringo ducks don't frighten us even though they send battleships we know that they are l ike melons, big but r1pe.'*3
^^er le E. Simmons, The Mexican CORRIDO as a. Source for Interpretive Study of Modern Mexicbni870-1950) (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 36.
^^Quoted in Simmons, Mexican CORRIDO, pp. 431, 448.
185 History, President Wilson's policies and the speculations by
the press raised public consciousness of the possibility of American
intervention to a peak by April of 1914. News of the Tampico incident
was withheld from the public by Huerta's censors until April 15, and
then only the most sketchy details appeared,^^ but by April 18 i t was
apparent to the public that some sort of crisis was developing. Ivor
Thord-Gray, the soldier-of-fortune serving with General Lucio Blanco's
rebel forces, recorded that
every one seemed to be running around with his nerves on edge. .About noon April 18, a rumor was flying around Culiacan that Mexico and the United States were at loggerheads over something unpleasant, no one knew what, but i t created quite a furor and nervous tension among the officers.'•s
Pronouncements from the Constitutionalist hierarchy concerning
the Tampico crisis gave l i t t l e indication of the uproar which the
intervention would produce. General Jesus Carranza, brother of First
Chief Venustiano, told a reporter that the rebels would join American
forces to drive Huerta out of Mexico i f the dictator provoked inter-
46 ventlon. A few days later General Carranza changed his statement,
probably to conform with the position of the First Chief. Don
Venustiano blamed the Tampico dispute on Huerta's bungling, but re
fused to make a statement. General Pancho V i l l a , however, declared
that i t was "Huerta's bull that is being gored" and that the quarrel
^^El Diario, April 15, 1914; El Imparcial, April 15, 1914.
^^Ivor Thord-Gray, Gringo Rebel (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1960), p. 201.
^^Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, p. 121.
186 was between "Huerta, the traitor, and Wilson, the great President of
47 the American people." In contrast to the seemingly pro-American
attitude of the Constitutionalist leadership, Ivor Thord-Gray recalled
that "the anti-American element among the rebels was constantly advo
cating joining hands with Huerta in order to make war on the United 4ft
States i f its army moved into Mexico."
The rebel Voz de Sonora found the incident an excuse for a
sarcastic suggestion: "If Washington is determined to make Huerta
salute the United States flag i t will be very easy to accomplish i t .
No more will be necessary than to paint a bottle of whiskey among the 49 stars of the flag and the dictator will salute."
As the fateful day of intervention approached, the metropolitan
press exhibited the symptoms of the nervous tension found among those
who were aware that a serious crisis existed. In reporting the approach
of the /^erican fleet El Imparcial sought to assure its readers that
this development would not cause the government to modify its
"Honorable and Serene" policies. In a front-page editorial published
about the same time as American sailors began to occupy Veracruz,
El Imparcial patriotically but pessimistically quoted Spartacus: "If 50 we are not able to conquer, we know how to die!"
Quoted in Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1927-1939), IV, 321.
^^Thord-Gray, Gringo Rebel, p. 234.
^Voted in "How Much Unity Is There of Mexican Spirit?" American Review of Reviews, June. 1914, p. 749.
^^El Imparcial, April 17. 1914; April 21.
187
Despite the ominous developments of the previous week and the
"nervous tension" they created, the news that United States forces
had attacked and occupied Veracruz shocked and outraged most Mexicans.
"The newspapers in Mexico City now vied in publishing the most scurri
lous and inflamatory attacks on the United States and Woodrow
51 Wilson." The April 21 headline for El Imparcial declared. "The soil
of the fatherland is defiled by foreign invasion! We may die, but
let us kill!" For several days that paper urged attacks against the
52 "pigs of Yanquilpidi.^." A banner headline across the front page of CO
La Patria called for "Vengeance! Vengeance! Vengeance!" An edi-
torial in El Pais charged President Wilson with an "infamous disre
gard" for the international practice which required a prior declara-54 tion of war.
El Independiente, the daily with the closest ties to the govern
ment, was probably the most vicious in its attacks on the Americans,
n a series of headlines which occupied half of the front page on
April 22, E1 Independiente accused the "horde of bandits" of landing
"without a declaration of war, feloniously and advantageously," and
assured readers that "the brave costenos made the foreign thieves bite
the dust they had stained with their impure blood." Relying either
Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York; W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 107.
^^El Imparcial, April 21, 1914; April 24.
^'^Quoted in Quirk, Affair of Honor, p. 107.
^^Quoted in Donnell, "Intervention in Mexico," p. 219.
188 on rumors or its editors' imagination. El Independiente claimed that
rederal troops had invaded Eagle Pass, Texas, while rebel forces had
seized Brownsville. Texas, and had penetrated Arizona. This wishful
thinking by El Independiente was indicative of the hopes that
President Huerta had for rallying the rebels to the cause of national
unity against the American aggressors--under Huerta's command. El_
Independiente revealed the government's plan in another headline:
"The Federal bullets will no longer spill brothers' blood, but will
perforate blond heads and white breasts swollen with vanity and
cowardice."
Whether or not the Mexican people were uniting behind Huerta
was not immediately clear, but they certainly demonstrated overwhelm
ing opposition to the American intervention. In Mexico City many
ciMzens made known their anger through street demonstrations and
violence, ''orter's Hotel, "The Meeting Place for Americans," was
entered by a mob which insulted guests and broke windows. Windows
were broken at the American Club and numerous Amerlean-owned businesses,
and Fiske's Curiosity Shop was looted. Groups of school children,
government employees, and women and girls paraded in front of the
American consulate general shouting "death to the Gringos," while a
group of boys broke windows and stole the coat of arms from the
building. Other mobs trampled on the American flag and dragged a
bronze statue of George Washington from its pedestal and through the
streets, replacing I t with a bust of Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla,
^^El Independiente . April 22, 1914.
189 the hero of Mexico's fight for independence.^^
Some cabinet ministers and deputies actually abetted the
rioters in the capital , but such was the chaotic state of off icial
policy that they could not be said to be acting on Huerta's orders.
Eduardo Iturbide, the ambitious pro-American governor of the Federal
District , later claimed that he was responsible for breaking up a
number of demonstrations and arresting the trouble-making deputies.
Iturbide also sought to halt the publication of Inflammatory articles
in Ef Imparcial.
whose director was Diaz Miron, a man who was well known in Mexico because he had murdered four or five persons and everybody said that he was a man to fear. . . . He told me that I had no right to stop i t and that i f I intended to carry out my object i t would be done over his dead body. Then I explained to him that I had come there with an object and that I would regret having to k i l l him, but that i f i t were necessary to do so in order to gain that object, I most certainly would k i l l him. He did not publish the ar t ic le , and I stayed until i t was taken out and destroyed.^^
The riots and demonstrations lasted less than a week in Mexico
City, but they were accompanied and succeeded by other manifestations
of patriotism. A wel1-publ1 shed instance involved an offer to the
government of 200,000 pesos by three ladies from Sonora who were
5R temporarily residing in the capital. Such a large number of
^^Mexican Herald, April 25, 1914; William W. Canada (Veracruz) to Bryan, April 24, 1914, /11689, and April 25, /11720.
' Quoted in Randolph Wellford Smith, Benighted Mexico (New York: John Lane Company, 1916), pp. 134-38.
^^Gustavo Casasola, Historia grafica de la revolucion mexicana, 1900-1960 (4 vols. ' Mexico: Editorial F. T r i l l as , S.A., 1960), I I , 770.
190 Individuals and groups, including student organizations, labor
commissions, journalists and other professionals, volunteered to
serve against the invaders that it was possible to suspend the leva
(a form of conscription) for several days. "For the first time since
he came to power Huerta had more recruits than he could actually use
in the ranks of the federal army." The most significant private
source of patriotic support was the Comite Civil de la Defensa
Nacional, organized by Samuel Espinosa de los Monteros, a partisan
leader from the Diaz era. This committee not only offered its ser
vices to the government for recruitment, but also published material
urging Mexicans to forget internal disputes and unite against the
59 Invaders.
Additional support came from the Catholic Church. The Reverend
Francis Clement Kelley, president of the Catholic Church Extension
Society, who had met and consulted with the Catholic hierarchy in
Mexico, asserted that the Mexican bishops were opposed to American
intervention. Kelley wrote that the bishops "are patriotic Mexicans
who fear for the independence of their beloved country, who dread the
shedding of their countrymen's blood, and who prefer to suffer even
death rather than see the foot of an Invader step in emnity upon the
soil of Mexico."^^ The Centre de Estudiantes Catolicos Mejicanos
provided more practical aid in preparing to resist the invaders by
^^Meyer, Huerta, pp. 201-02.
60. ^"Francis Clement Kelley, The Book of Red and Yellow: Being a Story of Blood and a Yellow StreaTr(Chicago: Catholic Church Extension Society of the United States of America, [1915]), p. 87.
191 recruiting volunteers for military service, organizing patriotic
demonstrations, and even sending a commission to try to secure the
cooperation of the revolutionaries. ' All of these efforts contributed
to the strengthening of Huerta's position; the Mexican President now
enjoyed greater public enthusiasm than at any time previously.
The reaction to the American intervention from the other parts
of Mexico under government control corresponded to that in the capi
ta l . Reports of anti-American r iots, sometimes encouraged by local
of f ic ia ls , confirmed the impression of government confusion and inde
cision in the capital regarding these manifestations. An American
engineer fleeing to the safety of occupied Veracruz took time to
copy one proclamation posted by local of f ic ia ls , which read:
To arms, citizens of Cordoba! K i l l , yes, and throw to the buzzards the meat of the damned Yankees, who, in cowardly fashion, have invaded our sacred soil of Mexico; God and Justice are on our side.
We will imitate the example of our forefathers in defending the country until we conquer or die. Kill in whatever way you can; this will be our revenge! Viva Mexico I f'2
In contrast, the Congress of the state of Puebla called on the c i t i
zens to
. . . be serene and dignified, as corresponds to the justice of our cause and the nobility of our origin; and when in the ardor of your sentiments you proclaim our right, shout with just indignation against the
^^Antonio Rius Facius, La juventud catolica y la revolucion mejicana, 1910-1925 (Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1963), pp. 70-72.
^^Quoted in Jack Sweetman, The Undina §1 ^ § £ 1 ^ : , l i l l ^,^ ,^ (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 219-30,
192 invader Government which abused our sovereignty; but not against its people, who perhaps are not culpable of the acts of their leaders.
Respect the lives and property of all foreigners.^^
The treatment given by provincial officials to representatives
of the American government varied to the same degree as the exhorta
tions and remonstrances to the public. Both Consul Wilbert L. Bonney
at San Luis Potosi and Vice Consul John R. Silliman at Saltillo were
arrested by federal officers and forced to leave the country as the
condition for their release. The strongest reprisals were directed
against Consul General Philip C Hanna at Monterrey. Hanna reported
that on April 21 a mob organized and led by a military officer tore
down and burned the American flags at the consulate, making prisoners
of the occupants. The following morning the consulate was searched
and Hanna was conveyed to the state government palace where he was
"considerably insulted and greatly humiliated." That evening Hanna
was taken before a military court and accused of being in sympathy
with the rebels. The American consul was saved from whatever fate
awaited him at the hands of the federals by their evacuation of the
65 city early the next day. The victorious Constitutionalist
commanders were "most cordial and friendly and they . . .all expressed
^^Periodico Qficial del Gobierno del Estado de, Puebla, April 28, 1914, p. 540.
^Charles C Cumberland, "Huerta y Carranza ante la ocupacion de Veracruz," Historia Mexicana, VI (April-June, 1957), 538.
^^U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914 (Washington, D T . : Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 659-60.
193 their deep regrets at the way our flag and people and . . . Consul
General were insulted by the so-called Federals." Hann's great
sense of re l ief and gratitude to the rebels were apparent in his
advice to the state department that "for us to ever have needless
difference with them would be kindred to a crime."^^ I t is worthy of
note that President Wilson took no action regarding these outrages
against American of f ic ia ls , which were much more serious violations
of International law than was the Tampico incident.
Demonstrations and mob violence in other c i t ies, often with the
encouragement or tacit consent of local o f f ic ia ls , sometimes resulted
in property damage and even injury to American citizens. Consul J.W.
Germon at Progreso reported gunfire and the smashing of doors and
windows in American residences and business establishments. Germon
claimed that "although Governor Cortez offered apparent protection,
nevertheless i t is reported that Governor's son and secret police
headed mob." In fairness to the Mexican of f ic ia ls , however, i t must
be admitted that any off icial who chose to interfere with the mobs
would have been placing himself in great pol i t ica l , i f not physical,
danger. The governor of Baja California admitted as much to Consul
Claude Guyant at Ensenada when he assured the consul "that he could
control the soldiers but was not able to promise the same with regard
to the rabble of the town."^^ Similarly, the commander of military
^Shi l ip C Hanna (Monterrey) to Bryan, May 1 , 1914, /11797
^^J. W. Germon (Progreso) to Bryan, April 23, 1914, /11783.
^^Claude Guyant (Ensenada) to Bryan, May 4, 1914. /11932.
194 forces sent to disperse a mob attacking the consulate at Aguascalientes
requested that Consul Gaston Schmutz accede to the mob's demand that
the Mexican flag be raised over the consulate because the officer
"could not control the mob with his troops."^^ S t i l l , some off icials
were able to quell disturbances when pressed to do so by American
representatives. Consul William E. Alger reported that a destructive
mob at Mazatlan was "dispersed by mounted force." The governor made
a formal apology, but Alger Informed him that any repetition of the
"outrage" would compel the taking of measures to "insure respect."
Some American off icials were inclined to place the blame for
the demonstrations and the violence on the head of Victoriano Huerta.
Captain W. A. Burnside, the American military attache, accurately
claimed that the Mexican president was "taking advantage of the cir
cumstances to try to unite his people in order to arouse enthusiasm."
This observation, however, led Captain Burnside to rather dubious
conclusions, accusing Huerta of encouraging the army officers and agi
tators who were "inciting the people to murder Americans." Burnside
also asserted that "the Indian is being given to understand that he is
to have an opportunity to satisfy his cruel nature."
The inconsistency found in the actions of federal off icials in
various localit ies would appear to contradict Captain Burnside's
assessment. Consul Alphonse J. Lespinasse at Frontera (now Alvaro
^^Gaston Sclmutz (Aguascalientes) to Bryan, April 22, 1914, /11919.
^^Willaim E. Alger (Mazatlan) to Bryan, April 24, 1914, /11697.
^ W. A. Burnside to Warcolstaff, April 26, 1914, /11784.
195 Obregon) reported while he was not allowed to send telegrams and
American citizens were not being permitted to leave for the United
States, "no disorders have occurred in this port," and Americans "so
far have not been maltreated or even molested," and that the authori
ties were providing protection.^^ Mrs. Leone B. Moats noted that in
Mexico City "Huerta had warned the citizens that any act of violence
against Americans would be immediately and severely punished, and 73
they took him at his word."
Although the hostil i ty of the Mexicans under federal control to
the intervention was overwhelming, the reaction varied not only from
one locality to another, but from one individual to another. On
April 22 Enrique E. Schulz, the harbinger of disaster for Mexico's
national integrity, added a postscript to the book which he had com
pleted in February. Schulz accused the United States of "a brutal and
Inopportune aggression," and claimed that the intervention demon
strated "once again, haw certain it is that the neighboring Nation
neither is nor able to he anything other than the sworn enemy of our
74 well-being and tranquility," Andres Iduarte, a Mexican intellectual
who was s t i l l a child during the revolutionary era, recalled in his
autobiography that the one time he saw his father ready to fight was
^^Alphonse J. Lespinasse (Frontera) to Bryan, May 2, 1914, /11864 and /11865.
^\eone B. Moats, Thunder fn Their Veins: A Memoir of Mexico, ed. by Russell Lord (New York: Century Co., 19327, p. 141.
^^Enrlque E. Schulz, El porvenir de Mexico y sus relaciones con los Eatados Unidos ([MexicoJT TipografiF Economica, iy i4; , pp. aw-w.
196 when the father heard from a friend that the Americans were treating
the Mexicans in Veracruz "with complete contempt." On the other
hand, Iduarte mentioned the position of one of his uncles, "who said
in his counter-revolutionary f u r y : - l prefer the kick of the white
man to the kick of the Indian."^^
In addition to the influence of political Ideology, ties of
personal friendship and concern for Americans as individuals affected
the reaction of some Mexicans. Mrs. Leone Moats recorded the case of
an American residing in Mexico City who received offers of refuge in
case of attack from his Mexican neighbors on each side. Mrs. Moats
commented: "The Mexicans do these kind of things often, and always
spontaneously." Consul William Brownlee Davis found a similar
situation at Guadalajara: "I did not have a personal enany among the
entire Mexican population; and many Mexicans, by telephone or personal
visi ts, tried to assure me that they would exert their utmost in my
behalf in any event."^^
Despite the occasional, perhaps even frequent, instances of
Mexicans offering help or protection to individual Americans during
the early days of the intervention, Mexican public opinion appeared
ready to coalesce around President Huerta as the symbol of resistance
75 ' Andres Iduarte, un niho en la revolucion mexicana (Mexico:
Editorial Ruta, 1951), pTTTJ:
Moats, Thunder in Their Veins, p. 141.
William Brownlee Davis, Experiences and Observations of an American Consular Officer During th6 Recent Mexican Revolutions "(Thula Vista, California: Ipubllshed by authorjr i920) , p. 19.
197 to the Yankee invasion, which most people saw as the beginning of
war. The Intervention and the correspondingly favorable sentiment
for Huerta posed a dilenma for the Constitutionalist leaders: how
chould they resist Huerta's appeals for national unity, which would
mean the demise of the Revolution, and at the same time avoid being
labeled as gringo sympathizers? Equally dangerous was the division
among the Constitutionalist hierarchy which became apparent in the
reaction to the intervention.
The American state department, hoping to avoid difficulties
with the Constitutionalists over the Intervention, authorized Special
Agent George C Carothers to explain the objectives and limited scope
of the American action to First Chief Venustiano Carranza. The rebel
leader, however, quickly recognized the dangers inherent in appearing
to acquiesce in a foreign invasion. In his reply to Carothers,
Carranza angrily warned that the intervention might "indeed drag us
into an unequal war . . . which until today we have desired to avoid,"
and demanded the immediate evacuation of American forces from
Veracruz.
In announcing his opposition to the intervention, Carranza had
the support of most of his generals, in a telegram sent from Culiacan
on April 21, General Alvaro Obregon expressed his belief that "if the
United States declares war on Huerta, bombarding Mexican ports, we
78 Foreign Relations. 1914, pp. 483-84.
198
ought to declare war on the United States."^^ Generals Manuel Chao,
Maclovio Herrera, and two others congratulated Carranza for his
"dignified reply" to the American government, and joined the First
Chief in blaming Huerta for provoking the intervention.^^
The endorsement of Carranza's stand by General Herrera came as
a surprise, because Herrera belonged to the Division of the North,
Pancho Villa's personal army. General Villa and his astute chief of
staff. General Felipe Angeles, refused to support Carranza on the
Intervention issue, thus widening the breach already in evidence
between the First Chief and his most successful general. Villa was
well aware of Carranza's position on the intervention, since the two
rebel leaders were meeting in Chihuahua at the time, but two days
later Villa was in Ciudad Juarez meeting with Special Agent Carothers.
Carothers reported that he and Villa discussed the difficulties over
dinner, and that Villa
said there would be no war between the United States and the Constitutionalists; that he is too good a friend of ours and considered us too good friends of theirs for us to engage in a way which neither side desired; that other nations would laugh and say, "The little drunkard has succeeded in drawing them in"; that as far as he was concerned we could keep Vera Cruz and hold it so tight that not even water could get in to Huerta and that he could not feel any resentment. He said that no drunkard, meaning Huerta, was going to draw him into a war with his
79
la revol Quoted in Juan Barragan Rodriguez, mstor ja. d e j e jerc i to y_ de. ucion const i tuc ional is ta (2 vo l s . ; Mexico: Edi tor ia l Sty le ,
1946), I , 463.
^^Is idro Fabela, ed . , Documentos histor icos de. la. revolucion mexicana (21 v o l . ; Mexico: Fondo de Lultura Economica and^Editorial Jus, 1960-71), I I , 92-93.
199 friend; that he had come to Juarez to restore confidence between us."*
General Villa wished to make i t clear that he was repudiating
the position taken by First Chief Carranza. In a personal message to
President Wilson, Villa recognized that the situation had been
:aggravated" by Carranza's note, but claimed that the note "was
entirely personal, and the attitude of one person, whatever his
momentary authority, cannot carry such weight as to bring on a war 82 between two countries desiring to continue at peace. Naturally,
President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan expressed pleasure over
Villa's statements, but Bryan's expression of gratitude Included a
thinly-disguised warning for Carranza: "Public opinion in the United
States has been greatly disturbed by General Carranza's attitude and 83 had felt a very considerable degree of resentment about i t . "
General Villa clearly believed that Carranza would have to modify
his position. An American correspondent reported that
when the test of mastery came between Villa and Carranza over the question of the attitude of the Constitutionalists toward the United States, Villa took Carranza aside. . . . "See here," said Vil la, bluntly waving his big hands like an angry bear; "I and my men put you where you are, up in the clouds. Don't forget we can pull you back to earth again."e**
Whatever the reason, Carranza found i t prudent to adopt a more
81 Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 485.
^^Ibid., p. 488.
^^Ibid., pp. 486-87.
^Vegory Mason, "Campaigning in Coahuila," Outlook, June 20, 1914. p. 397.
200 conciliatory attitude toward the United States, although he never
formally repudiated his first statement.^^
One can reasonably conclude that, but for the former bandit, Francisco Villa, the results of the occupation of Veracruz would have been far different from what they actually were. . . .With the nominal head of the Constitutionalist Party openly resentful, with the Constitutionalist general who was next to Villa himself in prominence frankly advocating war with the United States, one word could have precipitated disaster. That word was not spoken. Instead, the whole weight of his Influence was thrown toward maintaining peace with the United States.^^
Pancho Villa was not representative of rebel officers in his
desire to retain friendly relations with the United States. General
Obregon undoubtedly spoke the truth when he claimed that his own
troops would "fight the invaders until they have exhausted every effort
87 to resist." Practically the only issue among the rebel officers
concerning the intervention was the question of joining with Huerta
to fight the Yankees, a source of much dissention. When confronted
with invitations from Huerta's generals to join forces, however, the
major Constitutionalist commanders rejected the possibility of such a
88 "despicable" alliance unanimously. Thus, the dictator failed to
achieve the national unification which a distraught public opinion
might have made possibile.
^^Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 496.
^^Clarence C Clendenen, The United States, a ^ A Study 2£ Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 91.
^^Quoted in Louis Hostetter (Hermosillo) to Bryan, April 24, 1914, /11668.
^^Thord-Gray, Gringo Rebel, pp. 209, 216-18, and Meyer, Huerta, p. 203.
201 Reports from rebel-controlled areas told of anti-American
demonstrations and occasional violence, but there were marked di f fer
ences from the situation in the federal areas. In almost eyery
instance local Constitutionalist off ic ials put forth great effort to
protect the lives and property of Americans, and no consular repre
sentative was subjected to arrest or mistreatment. Some rebel o f f i
cials took i t upon themselves to in i t iate a policy of providing pro
tection for Americans prior to receiving instructions from the
hierarchy. On April 21 Special Agent Carothers reported that the
"officials in Juarez are using al l precautions to prevent any clash
or disturbance and are very conservative and reserved."
Apparently there was some cause for concern in Ciudad Juarez:
a Mexican-American Informed an El Paso newspaper columnist that he
had been in Ciudad Juarez on the morning of April 22
and heard enough to convince me that Vil la will not be able to hold his men unless he consents to lead them against the Americans i f the fighting extends beyond Vera Cruz. There is a report over there that Vil la and Carranza have sold out to the American government. Of course, there is no truth in the report, but the masses of the Mexican people are yery credulous.^^
Whatever steps were taken by General Vi l la and local off icials to assure
tranquility in Juarez must have been successful, since Consul Clement S.
Edwards was able to report on April 24 that "Juarez is quiet. No ant i -
American feeling is noticeable. No change in the attitude or movement
®^George C. Carothers to Bryan, April 21, 1914, /11596
^^El Paso Morning Times. April 23, 1914.
202 of troops. . . . The usual cordiality is extended by all officials."^^
Although rebel officials generally provided much greater pro-
lection for Americans than did their federal counterparts, they were
by no means pleased with the intervention. The governor of Durango,
for example, discussed the Intervention at length with Consul
Theodore G. Hamm, and obviously made quite an Impression. "His
indignant protest was most significant," Hamm reported,
in that it voiced the views of the greater part of the local revolutionary leaders of prominence. The Governor expressed his views in no uncertain terms in this wise: After practically completing our victory over the Huerta Government we can not welcome the United States stepping in to take a hand and afterwards being accorded by History the full glory of the overthrown [sic] of the Dictator, and any outside assistance is entirely gratuitous.^2
Despite his stated objections to the intervention, the governor
jf Durango provided ample protection to the consul and the other
Americans in his state. Colonel Ricey, the nephew of First Chief
idiranza, was equally solicitous of the welfare of the American consul
oi Matamoros, but did not seem in the least disturbed by the inter
vention. Consul Jesse J. Johnson reported to Secretary Bryan that
Ricey "assured me that if any Mexican should dare utter one word
insulting to me, he would be shot down in my presence. . . . They
93 have the highest regard for President Wilson and yourself."
The efforts of rebel officials, regardless of their attitudes
^^Clement S. Edwards (Ciudad Juarez) to Bryan, April 24, 1914, /n685.
^^Theodore G. Hamm (Durango) to Bryan, April 24, 1914, /11837.
^^Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 487-88.
203 toward the intervention, to protect Americans were noted in many
localities. A report in the El Paso Morning Times Included state
ments from American refugees to the effect that
the general calm which has prevailed In the different Mexican towns . . . continues. . . . There have been no general outbreaks of the Mexicans, and the town and military officials have been discouraging demonstrations by Issuing proclamations to the people giving notice that any attack on the Americans will be dealt with severely by the military authorities.^'*
Consul Blocker at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz noted the contrast in the treat
ment accorded Americans by the federals and the rebels: "American
refugees ... say federals were very insulting and threatened to take
their cars, but upon reaching Carrancista lines they were respected
95 and given safe escort to the border."
Apparently the position taken by General Villa and the modifica
tion of the positions taken by the other Constitutionalist leaders,
together with news that the intervention was limited to the occupation
of Veracruz, soothed a hostile populace in the rebel areas. In late
May, Zach Lamar Cobb reported than an American named Louis Jordan had
just returned from a tour of southern Coahuila. Most of the time
Jordan
went across country in a coach alone and unarmed . . . stopping at various ranch houses of Mexicans. He reports most friendly receptions and a general understanding by all the people of that immediate section of the true relations between our Government and the Mexican people. Many asked if the troops were still
^^El Paso Morning Times, April 27, 1914.
^^William P. Blocker (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) to Bryan. April 27, 1914, /11738.
204 at Vera Cruz and after being Informed that they were, replied that they believed that Huerta had wanted to provoke intervention.'^^'
Rebel newspapers may have constituted an additional pacifying
influence in certain areas. The Chihuahua Vida Nueva, for example,
published the false report that the Mexican flag was being
displayed from all the main buildings of Vera Cruz, as a proof that, notwithstanding the occupation of the port by American marines, the sovereignty of Mexico was unas-sailed.
This news has f i l led with joy the hearts of all true Mexicans, who see in this action on the part of the United States a disposition to refrain from injuring the feelings of the people of Mexico, although to punish the usurper, Huerta, they had been compelled to Invade Mexican soil.
In an unofficial manner i t is also known that . . . the government of the United States is willing to turn over Vera Cruz to the constitutionalists, to be used as a base of operations from which to direct a campaign against the city of Mexico.^^
The belligerent attitude in the federal areas, and especially
Mexico City, also diminished when i t became apparent that the American
forces would not move beyond Veracruz. But there were special cir
cumstances in the federal areas which contributed to that modification
of attitude. Patriotic young men who enlisted in the army in order
to combat the Invader found themselves shipped off to fight the
Constitutionalists, and Huerta soon had to reinstate the unpopular
leva,^^ A further disillusioning development was the refusal by all
^^Zach Lamar Cobb ty Bryan, May 24, 1914, /12049.
^^Quoted in the El Paso Morning Times, April 27, 1914, p. 3.
^ W i c a n Herald, May 2, 1914.
205 Important Constitutionalist leaders to join with Huerta, despite
claims to the contrary which appeared for several days in the metro-
99 poll tan dail ies. There was some basis for the press assertions
that the rebel leaders were ready to join them, since General Emiliano
Zapata at f i r s t indicated he might end his rebellion in order to
fight the Americans, declaring that the Invasion made his "blood
boil." but he f inal ly rejected the offers of the federals.^^^
On April 28 President Huerta accepted the Argentina-Brazil-
Chile offer of mediation, even though he must have realized that the
Americans did not intend to advance beyond Veracruz. The dictator's
decision meant that he was willing to sacrifice "the probability of
war as a propaganda weapon" for the remote possibility of persuading
the Americans to evacuate Veracruz through mediation. "Huerta thus
committed a serious error and excessively weakened his position in
Mexico; from then on al l his efforts to convince the constitution
alists that i t was a patriotic duty to help their government proved
fu t i le ; and to the same extent that the power of Huerta diminished,
that of Carranza prospered."
In an art ic le for the Outlook, Andre Tridon reported that in
Mexico City "the A B C idea was welcomed enthusiastically by every
one," and noted that "any scheme that holds out the hope of peace is
^^El Imparcial, April 22, 1914 (Extra); El Independiente, April 23. 1914.
^°°John Womack, J r . , Zapata and th^ Mexican Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969). p. 186.
^^^Cumberland, "Huerta y Carranza," pp. 546-47.
206 considered a blessing by conmercial Mexico." Tridon admitted,
however, that "the mob only sees in the A B C plan one way of avenging
the 'Yankee outrages,' since the Latin American mediators were pre
sumed to be sympathetic to the Mexican position.^^^ In the rebel
territories news of the mediation lessened the anti-American atti
tudes. Alfred Gordon Brown, an unofficial substitute for Consul
Alger at Mazatlan, reported that
the day after the receipt of this notice there seemed to be a strong sentiment in this city of friendship to all Americans. In fact I talked to several Mexicans and they said very little about intervention, taking it for granted that that scare had all passed.*"'^
According to Consul Hamm the conditions in Durango were "vastly
Improved because of reassuring news relative to international
situation." Hamm claimed that anti-American sentiment was "disappear-
. . r 111 04
ing on the surface.
As the weeks passed, however, and the Americans did not withdraw
from Veracruz, Mexican xenophobia received a new impulse. On June 2
a new daily newspaper appeared in Mexico City for the f i rs t time.
Veracruz, a socialist organ, lasted only three weeks, but there was
ample time to produce much invective directed against Americans. While our brothers prepare the gun in order to defend the national integrity, i t would be a crime of perverted patriotism to remain inactive. We will wield the pen while they succumb. Afterwards we shall go to substitute for them,
lO^Andre Tridon, "The A B C Plan As Seen in Mexico City," Outlook, May 30, 1914, p. 235.
^^^Alfred Gordon Brown (Mazatlan) to Bryan, May 4, 1914, /11979.
^^^Theodore G. Hamm (Durango) to Bryan, May 4, 1914, /11810.
207 wrote the editors in justifying their new journalistic endeavor. "We
105 thirst for yankee blood.""' This and other Issues of Veracruz
included the enlightening characterization of Uncle Sam as "stinking
satyr, vile and illegitimate fruit of the Insane union of a cowardly
thief and a harpy," as well as a colorful description of President
Wilson as several different kinds of pig and worm. ^^
The "Mexican stand-off" at the mediation table also encouraged
the metropolitan tabloids to renew their scurrilous attacks on
President Wilson. A cartoon in the May 17 issue of La Guacamaya
portrayed the combat between David (the Mexican people) and Goliath
(a hideous Wilson). David hurled the slingshot of "justice," while
Goliath wielded the blood-dripping sword of "ambition." The
short-Hved Chapultepee denounced "the duplicity, lack of gentleman-
liness, honesty, the hypocrisy and wickedness, of the Ogre of the
White House, of the octopus of the American capitol, of the pig 1 fift
Mr. Wilson." The normally sedate Revista de Revistas published a
cartoon in the May 10 issue which showed a grinning Wilson adding a
large ink blot labeled "Veracruz 1914" to the pages of "Gringo
History," which already contained blots entitled "47" and "Maine."
The Revista de Revistas, which usually abstained from discussing
political developments, produced a series of emotional appeals to
^Q^Veracruz, June 2, 1914.
106 Ibid., June 2, 1914; June 17.
^^^Gonzalez Ramirez. La caricatura politica, figure 412.
^^Chapultepee, July 7, 1914.
208 nationalism throughout the month of May, including articles on the
invasion and occupation and extensive discussions of the War of
1847.'°'
News of the intervention at Veracruz did not appear In many pro
vincial newspapers until after the agreement to accept mediation.
Thus, the provincial press was producing Invocations to nationalism
at the time when emotions had temporarily subsided in the capital and
some of the rebel-controlled areas. No word on the intervention
appeared in El Mensajero of San Juan Bautista (now Villahermosa) until
May 4, and then only in the form of condensations of articles which
had appeared in the Veracruz newspapers. Due to the small size of this
frequently daily paper and the temporary absence of its editor,
Mariano Olivera, editorial comment did not appear until several days
later. Olivera, who claimed to be neutral concerning the Internecine
strife which plagued his country, asserted that neither Huerta. nor
the rebels, nor Wilson was the guilty party. "The blame Is collective,
the fault of the whole Nation, which still does not even appear to be
a Nation."^^^
El Mensajero editorials in succeeding weeks focused criticism on
American imperialism. The intervention at Veracruz, claimed the
editor, was part of a pattern of American expansionism dating back a
^^^"Frente al enemigo." Revista de Revistas. April 26, 1914 (Extra); "ta invasion norteamericana en 1847," May 3;"El conflicto con los Estados Unidos," May 10; "La invasion norteamericana en 1847, May 17; "El ejercito norteamericana y la cuestibn de Mexico," May 24.
^^^El Mensajero (San Juan Bautista). May 4. 1914; May 7; May 12.
209 century, and the editorials detailed numerous examples. ^^ These
editorials provoked a reply from J. M. Merino, a politician of some
prominence, whose article f i rst appeared in the Tabasco Grafico and
was reprinted in El Mensajero. While admitting that the intervention
was "odious," Merino maintained that " i t is not true that yankees
have stolen what Is now the American Southwest from us since they paid
with their blood and their money." Merino also noted that "our civil
wars effect the Interests of our neighbors, not only their material
Interests but also those purely moral," and claimed that the United
States acted "almost always impelled by high sentiments of ideas of
112 justice,' By way of reply to the pro-American position of Merino,
11 Mensajero reprinted from La Campana (Merida) an article entitled,
"The yankee-phile Mexicans are more despicable than the vile
gringos."^^-^
From exile in the United States a small group of Mexican radicals
proclaimed their condemnation of all parties involved in the interven
tion controversy. On May 6 Special Agent Barnes of the Justice
Department reported to his superiors that meetings of "Colorados
Anarchistas (Reds)" were being held in private homes in Los Angeles
at which speakers urged burning and destroying property in retaliation
for the intervention. Barnes noted that the ringleaders were staunch
^^^Ibid., May 14, 1914; May 21; May 22.
^^^Ibid., June 2, 1914.
^^^Ibid., June 8, 1914.
210 supporters of the Flores Magon brothers, who had recently been
released from federal prison and were then residing In Los Angeles.^^^
Enrique and Ricardo Flores Magon wasted little time in reorganizing
their activities and renewing publication of their newspaper, La
Regeneracion. While recognizing that all factions in Mexico claimed
to be opposed to the intervention by the "yellow dogs," La Regeneracion
asserted that the rebels hoped to benefit from it, having already
"sold out" to American capitalists. Ricardo Flores Magon frequently
maintained that the mediation was "a farce planned by Wilson to gain
time and better prepare the invasion of Mexico by his forces." The
extent of the Flores Magons' dedication to anarchism was apparent in
the discussions of the intervention: the real enemy, both foreign
and domestic, was "that three-headed monster: Government, Capital,
Clergy."^^^
In the eyes of the Constitutionalists, Huerta's resignation as
President on July 15 removed whatever excuse may have existed for the
occupation of Veracruz. The distrust between Villa and Carranza had
developed Into an open feud, and the First Chief was particularly
eager to gain possession of Veracruz, the source of import duties
which would strengthen him in any conflict with Vil la. On July 29,
Special Agent Leon J. Canova, another of Wilson's amateur diplomats,
reported to his government that Carranza was resentful of the continued
occupation of Veracruz and advised that the troops be withdrawn.
ll^Attorney General to Bryan, May 11, 1914, /11916.
^ La Regeneracion (Los Angeles). July 4, 1914; July 11.
^^^eon J. Canova to Bryan, July 29, 1914. /12726 and 812.404/5.
211
In conjunction with First Chief Carranza's expressions con
cerning Veracruz, the Constitutionalist press launched a propaganda
campaign designed to focus pressure from Mexican public opinion on the
American government. At the beginning of August the Voz de Sonora,
owned and published by Jose Maria Maytorena, governor of Sonora, pro
duced an editorial ent i t led, "And These, for What Are They Waiting?"
The editorial Inquired,
what are they looking for, these greedy ravens of rapine and prey? Upon what or upon whom will f a l l the rage of these gold seekers, who only go to other shores and countries In search of the coveted metal, because they on their flags . . . have: Time is money.**^
Several days later Consul Hostetter reported the occurrence of some
anti-American incidents and claimed that "this condition of ant i -
Americanism we have not ever experienced before, but the articles
118 published against Americans is the direct source." From Tampico
Consul James Bevan reported that "Inflammatory anti-American news
paper articles are being published in Victoria relative to Vera Cruz
119 situation, inciting considerable anti-American feeling."
The attitude of the Zajpatistas^ the independent rebel faction,
displayed a sharp contrast to that of the Carrancistas, La Voz de
Juarez (Cuernavaca), edited by the I l l - fa ted Paulino Martinez, was
actually the voice of General Emiliano Zapata. The August 6 issue
offered high praise to President Wilson:
^^^Quoted in Louis Hostetter (Hermosillo) to Bryan, August 2, 1914, /12790.
^^®Lou1s Hostetter (Hermosillo) to Bryan, August 6, 1914, /12832.
^^ James Bevan (Tampico) to Bryan, August 28, 1914, /13025.
212 The trumpets of liberty sounded In the North of the Republic, the groans of the oppressed resounded in the soul of one impassioned by Justice, Woodrow Wilson. . . . And suddenly the trumpets sounded almost at the gates of the capital, the professor Wilson has given a sublime lesson to old Europe.^20
Later that same month General Zapata sent a personal letter to President
Wilson which promised that if the president did not Interfere with the
realization of the ideals of the Mexican people General Zapata would
be "one of the most sincere sympathizers upon whom you can count in
this sister Republic."^^^
Despite the attitude of General Zapata, who continued to oppose
the Constitutionalist leadership, the pressure continued to build for
the withdrawal of the American forces from Veracruz. An exchange of
letters in September by Generals Obregon and Villa indicated the
severity of the problem. Obregon claimed that the occupation was "the
only thing that at present offends our dignity as patriots" and
called the situation "humiliating." Obregon suggested that Villa Join
him in requesting that Carranza take up the matter of evacuation with
the ^erican government. Villa replied that he would "accept with
enthusiasm your patriotic idea ... for it is really humiliating and
shameful for our beloved country that invading forces still remain in
123 Vera Cruz when there exists no justification for it." Shortly after
^^^La Voz de Juarez, August 6, 1914.
^^^Quoted in Fabela, ed., Documentos Historicos, II. 170.
^^^Foreign Relations. 1914, p. 595.
^^•^Ibid., p. 596.
213 the exchange of l e t t e r s F i rs t Chief Carranza publ lca l ly demanded
that United States forces r e t i r e from Veracruz.^^^
Carranza's demand for United States withdrawal was made on
September 13, only three days before the annual celebration of
Mexican independence. On the night of the f i f t een th the F i rs t Chief
received a telegram from Washington, informing him that the American
government had agreed to withdraw the troops from Veracruz.^^^ The
news brought about a dramatic reversal in at t i tudes toward the United
States and President Wilson. The orator at the celebration in Mexico
City declared,
The las t shadow, the darkest of a l l , having vanished from our national l i f e , we now render homage to a great and sincere man, the great representative American. . . . l e t us give a hearty cheer for Professor Woodrow Wilson.*26
The oratory at the Mexico City celebration provided a stark contrast
with the at t i tudes which s t i l l prevailed in those areas which had not
received word of the impending American evacuation. Consul Marion
Letcher reported that the speaker at the independence celebration at
Parral "made a most b i t t e r and host i le anti-American speech in which
he called upon Mexicans to r i se and dr ive the Americans from Vera
127 Cruz." Consul Alonzo B. Garrett reported that an August 16 meeting
^^^Mexican Herald, September 13, 1914.
^^^Casasola, Histor ia Graf ica. lU 866.
^^^Quoted in John R. Sil l iman (Mexico City) to Bryan, September 16, 1914, /13195.
^'^^Marion Letcher (Chihuahua) to Bryan, October 1 , 1914, /13431.
214
in Saltillo "soon degenerated Into an anti-American demonstration
and a howling mob of fifteen hundred persons traversed the principal
streets of the city yelling 'Mueran los Gringoes' 'Mueran los
Estranjeros' and Incidentally hurling Insults at any hapless
128 American they encountered on the way."
As news of the American agreement to evacuate Veracruz spread
throughout Mexico it was greeted in much the same manner as at the
independence celebration in the capital. Pancho Villa sent a personal
letter of congratulations to President Wilson, commending the presi
dent "for this action, which, as have all those dictated by the
American Government of which you are the distinguished head ... so
faithfully Interpreted the sentiments and aspirations of the patriotic
Mexican people."'^^ Zach Lamar Cobb Informed the state department
that the news had
had a most beneficial effect and will help greatly in solving future problems. The Mexican people are impressed as never before with the sincerity of our government. No American has ever received the appreciative praise that is now being given the President.^^o
Consul Blocker at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz reported that the news was
received "Joyfully" in his district.^^^
^^^Alonzo B. Garrett (Nuevo Laredo) to Bryan, August 19. 1914. /12989.
^^^General Francisco Villa to President Woodrow Wilson, September 17, 1914, /13258.
^^^Zach Lamar Cobb to Bryan, September 17, 1914, /13206.
^^^Wllliam P. Blocker (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) to Bryan. September 17, 1914. /13207.
215 President Wilson genuinely hoped to evacuate the American
forces from Veracruz as soon as possible; he Informed Secretary Bryan
that for the United States "to linger longer In our departure . . .
would make a very bad impression not only in Mexico, but in Latin
1 32 America generally." ^ The troops were not withdrawn at that time,
however, since the United States found it necessary to request guaran
tees from Carranza concerning both the treatment of Veracruzanos who
had held public positions during the occupation and the question of
double collection of duties on goods which had entered Veracruz.
Carranza refused to provide the guarantees, so the troops remained.
First Chief Carranza's pride, whether patriotic or personal,
would not permit him to accept the American conditions, but his need
for Veracruz was so great that he could not afford to offend the
Americans. In the meantime EJ Democrata, the Constitutionalist re
placement for El Imparcial, sought to assure the public that the
evacuation of Veracruz was at hand. On September 20 El Democrata
claimed that "at the end of the month the Jarooho port will be under
the control of the Mexican government," and on October 3 predicted
133 that the evacuation would occur eight days later. By early
November the situation was critical for Carranza: the majority of the
rebel military leaders meeting in a convention at Aguascalientes had
organized a government in opposition to the First Chief, and General
Zapata joined in support of the new government of the Convention.
^^^President Woodrow Wilson to Bryan, October 2. 1914, /13407.
^ - El Democrata, September 20, 1914; October 3.
216 General Eulalio Gutierrez, president of the Convention, informed the
American government that he would accede to President Wilson's request 1 "iA
for guarantees. Faced with pressure from the military forces of the
Convention advancing toward Mexico City from the North, Carranza
also finally agreed to provide the guarantees so that he might obtain
Veracruz as a refuge when he retreated from the capital.^"^^
The Americans were also under some pressure, since Mexican public
opinion, as President Wilson had feared, was turning hostile. On
November 3 members of the Masonic Order posted manifestos in Mexico
City calling for Mexicans to unite against the Americans. The delay
in the evacuation of Veracruz, read the manifesto, "constitutes an
affront to this republic and a tutelage which we spurn."^^^ Consul
Wilbert L. Bonney at San Luis Potosi reported on November 7 that "the
continuance of American troops in Vera Cruz is now placing us in
danger."^^^
Considering the vast amoung of indignation vented on the United
States over the occupation of Veracruz, there was remarkable little
reaction to the evacuation. The actual reembarkation, of course, was
rather anti-climatic, since it had been predicted and negotiated for
over two months. Furthermore, the renewal of civil war in Mexico com
pletely absorbed the attention of all concerned with national politics.
^^^Zach Lamar Cobb to Bryan, November 4, 1914, /13685.
^ ^ V i r k , Affair of Honor, pp. 166-68.
^^^Quoted in the Mexican Herald, November 4, 1914, p. 6.
^^^Wilbert L. Bonney (San Luis Potosi) to Bryan, November 7, 1914, /13709.
217
But the Mexican public did not forget the American interven
tion at Veracruz. I t confirmed the suspicions of many Mexicans
regarding American Imperialism. Xenophobic, particularly anti-
American, attitudes had developed during the early years of the revo
lutionary period, and the hostile posture of the American government
toward the Huerta regime did l i t t l e to relieve Mexican anxieties. As
a justif ication for intervention the Tampico incident was viewed as
wholly inadequate by the Mexican people, who appeared ready to ral ly
around the beleagured President Huerta during the f i rs t few days of
the intervention. Had Huerta declared war against the United States
when the intervention began, public pressure might well have united
the nation temporarily in the face of a common enemy.
Huerta did not opt for war, however, because such action would
have been mi l i tar i ly disastrous, and he soon discovered that he could
not obtain the support of the rebels. The Constitutionalists provided
greater protection against mob action for American citizens and govern
mental representatives, and in some areas there was l i t t l e evidence
of hostil i ty toward the United States. The pro-American stance taken
by General Pancho Vi l la was undoubtedly the most important factor in
limiting the Constitutionalist reaction to a few notes of protest.
The acceptance of mediation by the Huerta regime significantly
diminished both the crisis and the public support which had accrued
to the dictator. Although the duration of the occupation of Veracruz
provoked sporadic displays of anti-American activity, f i r s t from
those loyal to Huerta and later from the Constitutionalists, no
serious repercussions ensued. President Wilson found i t d i f f icu l t to
218 extract himself from the never-lessening Mexican turmoil, and gaine((
an extra measure of i l l -w i l l for the United States t)efore the prema
turely announced evacuation actually occurr^.
CHAPTER VII
THE CLASH OF ARMS AND CULTURES IN VERACRUZ
Veracruz was the f i r s t municipality established in Mexico by the
Spanish oonciuictadores at the beginning of the assault on the Aztec
kingdom in 1519. The wisdom of Hernan Cortes in founding a city at
that location was confirmed by history, for Veracruz became not only
the principal port of the nation, but also the choice base for foreign
Invaders of succeeding centuries. Hence, Veracruz had ample oppor
tunity to earn the encomium of "thrice heroic."
Historically aware of the humiliation caused by the American
invasion of 1847, Veracruzanos joined in the anti-American agitation
which developed during the early years of the Revolution. In 1911
Consul William W. Canada reported that the two leading dallies of
Veracruz, La opinion and El Dictamen, "seized upon eyery opportunity
to incite Mexicans against Americans."
By the time Miguel Odorica, city editor of El Pais, arrived in
the port city in early 1914 to face the "phantom" of the American
naval presence, however, there was l i t t l e indication of anti-Americanism.
Odorica
^William W. Canada (Veracruz) to Secretary of State Philander C Knox, March 20, 1911, 812.00/1110, U.S., Department of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, T9lM'929, Microcopy No. 274 (Washington, D.C: National Archives Microfilm Publications. 1959). Unless otherwise indicated, a l l correspondence of the Department of State will be from the 812.00 f i les and will be Identified only by the slash number.
219
220 had believed that Veracruz would present a somber aspect, like, that of a besieged city whose Inhabitants live in perpetual alarm under the formidable threat of hundreds of monstrous fire-mouths, and that the usual indolent "jarocha" merriment would be eclipsed by the somber humor and the natural hate awakened In us by the contact of the Yankees.
But nothing of this kind occurs in Veracruz. On the contrary, it seems that the inhabitants are merrier than ever; and the men of the low class night by night occupy the seats on the promenades, in comfortable Indolent positions, or fill the third rate theaters madly applauding the extravagant contortions of the Cuban dancers which shake in furious "rumbas."
Veracruz seems a place apart from the trouble that shakes the whole nation and apparently nothing disturbs the equanimity of its Indolent and happy people.2
Editor Odorica quickly discovered the solution to the paradox of
a contented population In a port menaced by foreign warships: "A
golden Pactole flows from the prodigal hands of the foreign marines,
especially the Americans, and every body here receives some benefit
from this Immense floating population." Odorica sought to comfort him
self by recalling the valiant resistance of the Veracruzanos to earlier
invasions and assuming that they would respond in the same manner 3
should the Americans invade.
Approximately six weeks after Odorica confronted the "phantom"
at Veracruz, an anonymous member of the staff of the Mexican Herald,
probably Editor Paul Hudson, visited the port city and reported
observations which confirmed those of Odorica. The "chispazos"
(gossip) column, which Included nearly all editorial comment, noted
^Quoted in the Mexican Herajj., February 14, 1914.
^Ibld.
221 the presence of American warships in the harbor and claimed that
any early resentment at th is ocular demonstration of the power of the United States seems to have been supplanted by a general Interest in annexing as much as possible of some $4,000 a day in gold d is t r ibuted by the American f l e e t .
A large proportion of the population that Is not busy se l l ing cur ios, food and drinks to the v i s i t o rs appears to be engaged In exchanging gold for s i l ver or vice versa on the narrow margin of twenty-f ive to f i f t y points profit.*^
The Herald reporter observed that the Veracruzanos received
news of the progress of the Revolution by whispers from mysterious
sources, "but Veracruz does not care very much, anyhow, being more
blase or f a t a l i s t i c , or something, even than our big town up on the 5
h i l l . " Writ ing well a f ter the occupation had occurred. Consul Canada
also maintained that
as a r u l e , the Mexicans in th is c i t y for some time have displayed no desire to mingle in the po l i t i cs of the country. They long for peace to be established and are w i l l i ng to support whatever fact ion seems most l i k e l y to be able to bring about the paci f icat ion of the country.^
Undoubtedly President Huerta's action in si lencing the Veracruz press
early in 1914 contributed to the self-centered a t t i tude of the people
and reduced the potential for anti-American ag i ta t ion .
Even Consul Canada recognized, however, that some Veracruzanos
"of a less pract ical nature, more visionary and i dea l i s t i c , " were
^ I b i d . , March 29, 1914.
^ Ib id .
^William W. Canada (Veracruz) to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, June 10, 1914, /12311.
222
concerned about national self-respect and had "stated that they would
resist a foreign foe to the last , either by sacrificing their lives
or by withdrawing and fighting in the mountainous parts of Mexico."^
When *#ord reached the port city of the quarrel developing between the
United States and Mexico over the Tampico Incident, these Mexicans
made their feelings known. Consul Canada reported that the anti-
American feeling in Veracruz was "getting worse daily." The New York
World explained the reason for Canada's concern: "At Vera Cruz crowds
gathered near the American consulate. They hissed the consul . . . o
and jeered the American f lag."
When the f i r s t boatload of American sailors and marines reached
a Veracruz pier at exactly 11:20 on the morning of April 21, they
were greeted by a small group of Americans who cheered the invading
forces. One enthusiastic woman even produced a small American flag 9
with which to welcome the landing party. Mexicans, too, gathered to
observe the landing operations; as soon as they "began to realize the
Import of the landing, however, the atmosphere of festivity began to
change." The crowds retreated to various vantage points from which
they continued to watch silently the American operations. As word
spread through the c i ty , Veracruz began to close down as though for
^Ibid.
^William W. Canada (Veracruz) to Bryan, April 15, 1914, /11517; New York World, April 16, 1914.
^Jack Sweetman, fhe Landing at Veracruz 1911 (Annapolis. Maryland: United States Naval Insti tute, 1968). p. td.
223 in
the night.'"
The initial apathy of the Veracruz populace may be attributed
to the incredulity of the Veracruzanos at the American decision to
attach their city. Since the trouble with the Americans had occurred
at Tampico, the Veracruzanos saw no reason to expect a retaliation
directed at their port. The consternation wrought by the landing,
however, did not long delay angry reaction by a number of citizens
and a few small military detachments. General Gustavo Maass, the
military commander at Veracruz, provided only a token resistance,
really little more than a rearguard action, but the valiant battle
waged by the few against hopeless odds added new names to the
Veracruz pantheon. Leading the list was a new "child hero,"
Virgilio Uribe, a naval cadet who was killed while defending his
academy. His "martyrdom" called to mind the ninos heroes of
Chapultepee during the 1847 war.
Most of the heroes of the defense of Veracruz died in the invasion,
and their feelings were recorded only in the sacrifice of their lives.
Some of the defenders, whose actions may have been equally heroic, sur
vived the invasion. Their attitudes and emotions were recorded over
fifty years after the event. Pablo Huerta Valdes was a member of the
^Robert E. Quirk, Am Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 93'
^^La Opinion, April 26, 1914. For a popular account of the heroic actions of Uribe and Lieutenant Jo se Azueta see the portions of the corrida. La heroica ace ion del capitan Azueta in Merle E. Simmons, The Mexican CORRIDO a^ jL Source;"Tor InterpreTTvF'Study of Moderm Mexico TTl^O-l^Sor (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 579.
224
Volunteers of Veracruz and Agustin Huerta Rodriguez was a soldier
of the nineteenth batalHon of the regular army. The military orga
nizations to which the two men belonged were the only ones, besides
the corps of naval cadets, which remained to engage the invaders in
battle. Huerta Valdes reported on April 20 to his commander,
Lleutenanat Colonel Manuel Contreras, rumors that the Americans would
attack the next day. Contreras' reply reflected the lack of suspi
cion in the city: "Don't worry Pablo, those ships, with those cannons
which we see In the bay, have virgin cannons: they have never sinned,
12 nor will they sin in Mexican territory."
Agustin Huerta Rodriguez recalled that neither he nor his com
rades of the nineteenth batallion had any knowledge of the reason for
the invasion: "The presence of the gringo troops was sufficient so
that we would defend ourselves as we ought to." The humiliation and
frustration of the disastrous battle were etched in the mind of the
patriotic Huerta Rodriguez. The "coward" General Maas had fled the
city and all was confusion. "It was very painful to see the impossi
bility of defending ourselves." In the evening the Mexican troops
received the order to save themselves as best they could, because
there was no more ammunition. "We cried; there was no means of con-
13 tinuing to defend our fatherland."
As the small military forces retired, the burden of defense, or
perhaps guerrilla harassment, fell to the civilians, many of whom had
^^Maria Luisa Melo de Remes, Veracruz Martir: La infamia de Woodrow Wilson (1914) (Mexico: [n.pT. 1966), p. 53.
^'^Ibid., pp. 78-79.
225
been fighting from the beginning. Cristobal Martinez was typical of
the Veracruzafiop who took up arms to resist the invaders. After pro-
viding for the safety of his family, Martinez returned to his home,
from which he observed with mounting anger the advance of the American
sailors.
The f ir ing that followed gave Martinez al l the encouragement he needed. . . . Traditionally, Veracruz has the highest homicide rate in Mexico; Its inhabitants should not be expected to take the long view."
From a second-story window Martinez opened f i re on the sailors in the
street, but soon found i t necessary to move his sniping operation to
the roof.
Soon American marksmen appeared on the tops of nearby buildings. The volume of Martinez's f i re made him a prominent target. Eventually, as he rose to peer over the parapet, one of the marines on the roof of the Consulate put a bullet through his brain.*'*
Thus did a sizeable portion of population of Veracruz express their
opinions: several hundred paid the same price as did Martinez.
Not a l l Veracruzanos responded to the invasion with the same
patriotic fervor as those who sacrificed their l ives. Most citizens,
perhaps demonstrating greater prudence than valor, sought the security
of their homes. The rayador, criminals released from prison and armed
to fight the invader, expended at least as much effort in looting and
destruction as they did in fighting. Consul Canada later expressed the
view that "the majority of the people, whatever their sentiments, did
15 not think of resisting."
^^Sweetman, Landing a t Veracruz, pp. 73-74.
^^William W. Canada (Veracruz) to Bryan, June 10, 1914, /12311.
226 The American sailors and marines had l i t t l e knowledge of the
true purpose of the intervention, but many of them were eager to get
a chance at some action. The sailors who remained on the ships per
formed with professional s k i l l , bu': those in the landing party were
i l l - t rained as an Invasion force and would have suffered far more
than the nineteen deaths that occurred had the resistance been better
organized. Most of the "bluejackets" fought as well as they could,
and at times with great valor, but the cond1tions--lack of training
and an elurive enemy who sniped from obscure locations--sometimes
provoked indiscriminate f ir ing by the sailors resulting in death and
Injury for c ivi l ian nonparticipants.
The nervous sailors were indeed prone to shoot and ask questions
later in fighting an enemy for whom they had small regard. Admiral
Charles T. Badger wrote, "I rather think that as increasing numbers of
our men were killed or wounded, i t fared rather badly with those dis
covered with arms in hand on the spot from which the shooting came."
The sailors fought as though they were in the in i t ia l encounter of a
war, but the evidence shows that few would have agreed with the a t t i
tude of the sailor whose letter to his parents was published in the
Chicago Tribune:
Murder and plunder was al l we wanted and we more than gave i t to them. For eyery one of our fellows killed we shot down like dogs ten Mexicans. . . . We had about
^She actions of the American sailors, both individually and as a group, are documented throughout Sweetman, Landing at Veracruz.
^^Quoted in Sweetman, Landing at Veracruz, p. 118.
227
150 prisoners, of which we court-martialed about 80 and shot them the same night. That's biz. Show no mercy is our policy now.'"
According to Ensign Paul F. Foster, the acting provost marshal
during the earliest days of the occupation, American naval forces
actually behaved in commendable fashion during and after the fighting,
despite provocations and their desire for military action. Ensign
Foster later related that he could not recall "any incidents or alle
gations of crimes or serious misbehavior against our sailors or
marines.
Not surprisingly, some minor thefts by the bluejackets occurred
during the fighting. Although these incidents were few in number and
Involved icems of little value, they provided grounds for moral
accusations against the invaders by the inhabitants of the city. In
the corrida, La heroica accion del capitan Azueta, the corridista
alleged that the gringos had plundered the city:
It is said that the yankees went searching for the federals, not being more than a pretext for sacking the houses. They said that they wanted the ammunition in the business establishments, and thus they were plundered of all the supplies.''^
The Mexicans also found cause for complaint in the efficient but
sometimes ruthless search for snipers which resulted in civi l ian
^%oted in "Ethics for Fighting Men," America, May 23, 1914, pp. 134-35.
^^Sweetman, Landjng^ at Veracruz, p. 144.
^%cted in Simmons, Mexjcaji COFUUDO, p. 427.
228 casualties and destruction of property. La Opinion protested that
the precautions observed by the American forces in order to stop possible aggressions have reached, in some of these cases, the very l imit which legally could be per-mitt^xi armies of occupation belonging to a civilized nation. . . . There were patrols which exercised their functions to the yery extremity, pointing their guns at passers-by, saying "Hands up," which many of our inhabitants did not understand and subjecting them to death for unjustifiable lack of knowledge of a strange language.'^
Meanwhile the Veracruz press returned to print in force with the
removal of the iron-handed control of President Huerta. Five normally
daily newspapers. Including the Mexican Herald, joined La Opinion in
resuming publication, but al l did not survive the period of occupation.
The jarocho press does not appear to have been intimidated by the
presence of the occupation force, but i t did present a diversity of
views on the intervention. Los Sucesos, an undersized paper given to
sensationalism, struck hard at the Americans. In its f i rs t appearance
after the seizure of Veracruz, the headlines of Los Sucesos proclaimed
that the port was "under the oppressive yoke of the invader" who had
loosed "the fury of 'manifest destiny' . . . over Mexico." "We envy
22 the dead!" lamented the paper.
In somewhat less strident tones La Opinion echoed the protest of
Los Sucesos against "this unjustified invasion" even before the fight
ing had ceased. In a mood of bitter fatalism La Opinion noted the
23 logic of the idea that such action was "the right of the strongest."
^ \ a Opinion. April 23, 1914.
^^Los Sucesos, April 24, 1914.
^^La Opinion. April 22, 1914.
229
A sharply contrasting position was taken, however, by La Union, whose
director, Pedro S. Garcia de la Lama, had languished for some time in
the "fetid and f i l thy" prison of San Juan de Ulua at the whim of the
Mexican dictator. Persuaded by his own experience that nearly anything 0
was preferable to the Huerta dictatorship, Garcia de la Lama attempted
to convince the \yi\v'y^iZimae that the American invasion, "though by al l
means regrettable," was not "a transgression against our sovereignty
. . . but an intervention against Militarism." As the days passed
La Union moved from an attitude of tolerance toward the intervention
to a position of open support. The May 7 issue published a l i s t of
individuals slated for execution which had been lef t behind by the
federal military authorities and stated that "fortunately the demo
cratic President Wilson has come to cut off the slaughter with his 25
opportune intervention for Humanity and for Civil ization."
The persuasive powers of La Union may not have succeeded in
inducing the v^y\ic^^up.<mcn to welcome the invaders, but they did become
less apprehensive when the fighting ended and they learned that their
lives and property were safe. Consul Canada reported that when the
shooting ceased his office was f i l led with a throng of excited women
who believed
that their relatives and friends who had been detained by the American authorities as a precautionary measure would be immediately executed. I t was an agreeable surprise for them when those arrested were given their
24i_3 ypjop^ Apy.il 24, 1914 (notice of intention to resume publication); l\pri1 26.
^^ Ib id . , May 7, 1914.
230 freedom. The hosti l i ty towards the Americans was also dissipated when i t was seen that they did not sack the town and that when they entered the houses, they took only the firearms, leaving the valuables untouched.'"'
Some of the American military personnel were considerably less
happy over the return to peaceful conditions, not from any blood
thirsty desire to persecute the people of Veracruz, but because they
were cut short from the action which they had anticipated. When
Charge d'affairs and Mrs. Nelson O'Shaughnessy reached Veracruz,
Mrs. O'Shaughnessy asked Captain Henry McL. Huse, Admiral Fletcher's
chief-of-staff , whether a state of war existed between the United
States and Mexico. "I don't know," Hus6 replied. "They say not; but
when one armed force opposes another armed force, and many are k i l led,
we are rather of the opinion that i t is war." I t was not war, and
for the most part, the men of the navy recognized that their job at
Veracruz was completed, although they saw the possibility of action
at other Mexican ports.
On April 30 the army replaced the navy as the occupying force
at Veracruz. The brigade under the command of General Frederick
Funston had come to Mexico to fight and expected to march on Mexico
City. Great was the disappointment of the soldiers, particularly the
officers, when i t became apparent that they would not be permitted to
proceed beyond Veracruz. Funston attempted to persuade his superiors
^^William W. Canada (Veracruz) to Bryan, June 10, 1914, /12311; Clarence C Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (New York: Macmillan Company, 1969), p. }M^eT.
^^Edith O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife j j i Mexico (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1916), p. 309.
231 to change the orders, but without success.^^ The cantankerous but
able Major Smedley Darlington Butler of the Marines, now under army
command, gave vent to his Indignation for the benefit of Mrs.
O'Shaughnessy: "In the good old days in Nicaragua, i t was otherwise.
You took what you needed. This government . . . is too pious . . . to
29 suit me." An unidentified marine from the ranks raised the issue
while conversing with an American correspondent: "But why act as i f
we were afraid of the spiggoties? Let's go out after them or go
30 home. Yours to say, Woodrow."
The invasion of Veracruz was a magnet which attracted many
American war correspondents, including the very best. I t would be
d i f f icu l t to overstate the influence of these journalists on American
public opinion, since their observations, laced with strong doses of
opinion, were published through press syndicates and in popular maga
zines, thus reaching far more people than anyone else could hope to
in the days before radio. Clearly the most famous of these war
correspondents were Jack London and Richard Harding Davis. Prior to
1914 Jack London had become nearly as well known for his advocacy of
Socialism as for his widely-read novels. During the earliest years of
the Mexican Revolution, London had encouraged the rebels and condemned
his own country for imprisoning the Flores Magon brothers. By the time
of the intervention, however, London had undergone a remarkable
^ % i r k . Affair of Honor, pp. 123, 126.
^^O'Shaughnessy, Diplomat's Wife, p. 327-28.
^^Frederick Palmer, "Mexico: Army Housekeeping," Everybody's Magazine, August, 1914, p. 205.
232 change In alt i tude; his articles reporting on the intervention
formally for Coll ier 's Magazine revealed his transformation into a
full-fledged imperialist.^^
War correspondent London spent a frustrating six weeks in
Veracruz due to the lack of military action and suffered an attack of
dysentery for his trouble. Just before returning to the United States,
London presented his views on the Mexican situation to Hamilton Peltz of
the New York Herald (the war correspondents having taken to interview
ing each other in their desperate search for news). "In my opinion,"
said London, "Washington's treatment of the Mexican problem is a
sequence of stupid and stupendous blunders." The converted imperialist
maintained that "once having landed at Veracruz . . . we should have
had sufficient forces available to push on directly to Mexico City."
For a solution, London insisted that
no halfway measure will suffice. I f we must have quiet Instead of a turbulent neighbor to the south of us, we must assert and maintain our right to a guardianship. We must pacify Mexico by force of arms and dominate i t and police i t as we did Cuba and the Philippines. . . . Mexico must be held with the iron hand and the hand that would school her to civi l ization must grasp the rod as well as the lamp of enlightment.^^
The Socialists were quick to react to Jack London's almost incre
dible reversal of position on Mexico. William C Owen, editor of the
English language page of La Regeneracion, quoted from the interview
with Peltz and expressed his belief that London had sold out to the
-^^Richard O'Connor, Jack London: A Biography (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 351-61.
^^Quoted in the Mexican HerAld, June 16, 1914.
233 capitalists. "One handles this subject with profound reluctance,"
wrote Owens, "but one has to handle i t ; for, while l i t t l e men's sins
may be properly ignored, the treasons of those who would mould a
nation's thought are devastating crimes which call to heaven."^^
Richard Harding Davis was at least as disappointed as Jack
London in the lack of action after he arrived in Veracruz. "Not that
I want to catch bullets in my teeth," wrote Davis, "but I did expect
quick action and something to write about." "Richard-the-1ion-
Harding" was particularly infuriated by President Wilson's decision to
accept mediation and claimed to speak for all of the war correspon
dents when he maintained that " i f Wilson and Huerta ran for President,
Huerta would get all our votes. He may be an uneducated Indian but
34 at least he is a man; and what Wilson is , I can't guess." Davis
headlined his dispatch on the subject: "Six Thousand Sturdy Men in
Khaki, Fit to Have Marched on Mexico City, Doomed to Idleness that May
Cost Many Lives by Disease.""^
Unhappy with the unpleasant climate of Veracruz and the enforced
inactivity of the war correspondents, Davis organized an excursion to
Mexico City with two of his colleagues, Medill McCormick and Frederick
Palmer. Davis and McCormick actually reached the capital, but
President Huerta immediately ordered them returned to Veracruz. The
^^La Regeneracion, July 4, 1914.
^^Gerald Langford, The Richard Harding Davis Years: A Biography of a Mother and Son (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 287:
"^^oted in Sweetman, UndMna a^ Veracr^ p. 154.
234
incident served only to relieve the monotony.^ Correspondent Palmer
confirmed the reports of London and Davis regarding atmosphere of
impatience among the Americans in Veracruz. Palmer wrote.
There was not an American on the way to Vera Cruz at the end of April who was not afraid that he would reach the theatre late. Once he had arrived, he shared the impatience of the rest of the audience. He wanted the war to start immediately, as any accommodating war ought to, without consulting a mere President of the United States.*''
With no war to report, the American correspondents devoted their
dispatches to the description and praise of the activities of the
military government and the conduct of the soldiers in Veracruz.
Frederick Palmer claimed that "Vera Cruz is the mirror of American
qualities and ethics. One comes to Vera Cruz to get acquainted with
38 the United States." The occupation force did indeed make prodigious
efforts at cleaning up Veracruz, particularly in the areas of health,
39 sanitation and justice. Reports of the improvements and reforms
proved to be a source of pride to many back in the United States. The
liberal Survey claimed that " i t is hard not to let a l i t t l e boastful-
ness creep in when one undertakes to describe the work of American
40 soldiers in Vera Cruz."
3 "How Davis Got a Story," Literary Digest, May 23, 1914, pp. 1284-88, and Richard Harding Davis, 'When a War Is Not a War," Scribner's Magazine, July, 1914, pp. 41-52.
*^^Palmer, "Army Housekeeping," p. 198.
F r e d e r i c k Palmer, "Mexico: Watchful Perspiring at Vera Cruz," Everybody's Magazine, July, 1914, p. 66.
^^The activit ies of the military government are thoroughly described in Chapter IV of Quirk. Affai£ of Honors.
^^"Beating Swords into Shovels at Vera Cruz," Survey, October 3, 1914, p. 3.
235
The American correspondents believed that the Vp.vacruzanos
were properly grateful for the reforms and improvements in their
cities. Frederick Palmer maintained that "if the native sentiment
at Vera Cruz is characteristic of all Mexico, we could, after occupy
ing the country, take the first honest vote of the Mexican people
ever allowed, and receive a mandate to stay." This attitude was due,
wrote Palmer, to the fact that "even Greasers can accommodate them
selves to kindness." But the Veracruzanos were not all that
enchanted by American rule, as Palmer himself recognized after he had
been in the city for a longer period of time. In an article for the
July issue of Everybody's Magazine Palmer wrote that
though the prople of Vera Cruz enjoy the blessings of the order and justice we bring, and profit by our generosity, it is going too far to say that they want us to stay. They recognize our strength; but the very fact fact of our conscious superiority is irksome. Their ways are not ours; and they like their ways because they are theirs.^^2
A large number of Veracruzanos were indeed bewildered by an
American obsession for sanitation which conflicted with their tradi
tions. A reporter for the Mexican Herald encountered a street
cleaner fending off an attack by a hungry zopilote (buzzard) who nor
mally performed that function. The Mexican informed the reporter that
the attack by the usually cowardly zopilote was the fault
of the Americanos. The teniente is the devil of a master who makes us work night and day to clean the city.
^^Frederick Palmer, "Mexico: The American Spirit in Vera Cruz," Everybody's Magazine, June, 1914, pp. 807-08.
^^Palmer, "Watchful Perspiring," p. 78.
236
so that the unlucky birds of Veracruz go hungry. It is a disagreeable task, senor, but what can a gentleman do when the Americanos offer a man six dollars for a cart and two dollars for himself. Truly it is not any of my affair if they care to throw away their money in the streets, and wliy should I not be the gainer?
The street cleaner "could not understand the Americanos."^"^
Nor could the vendors at the market understand the American
obsession for cleanliness. "They did not mind the flies. There had
always been flies, and long after they were all dead, there would still
be flies." Because the Mexicans did not understand the reasons for
the screens and other sanitary measures, "the military authorities
encountered great difficulty in enforcing their regulations." On
the other hand certain aspects of American military government were
highly popular with the citizens of the city. In the administration
of justice, for example, the Americans not only rendered prompt and
fair decisions, but the judges were incorruptible, a circumstance
45 almost unknown under Mexican administration. Of course, there were
a number of merchants who cared little how the city was administered
as long as they were able to garner large profits by catering to the
needs and desires of the occupation force. These Mexicans "did not
know at adulthood how to speak middlingly their national language,
46 but in a moment they impressed on their minds the foreign idioms."
^•^Mexican Herald, May 17, 1914.
^^Quirk, Affair of Honor, p. 133.
^^Ibid., p. 143.
^^Justino N. Palomares, La invasion yangui en 1914 (Mexico: [n.p.], 1940), p. 58.
237
On the other hand, many merchants, businessmen and civil ser
vants saw the Intervention as being potentially disastrous to their
economic and even their physical well-being. As a result of the
Incidence of collaboration with the enemy during an earlier invasion,
a law had been enacted which provided for severe punishment for any
Mexican who held a position under an occupation government. In case
there was anyone who was unaware of this law. El Dictamen called it to
his attention on July 17. Martial law was the result of the inability
of the military authorities to secure sufficient numbers of Mexican
civilians to fill the civil service positions. Those Veracruzanos
who engaged in commerce feared that if they paid taxes to the
Americans, they would be forced to pay them again to the Mexican
government when the troops were withdrawn. "Despite the attempts made
by the officials of the military government to govern the city of
Veracruz within the political framework to which the inhabitants of
the city were accustomed, to maintain the existing tax structure, and
to preserve the local institutions, the unpopularity of the imposed
47 government failed to diminish."
An additional factor beyond the control of the occupation govern
ment which compounded the unhappiness of the Veracruzanos was the un
sympathetic attitudes of some of their fellow Mexicans. Mexicans who
arrived in Veracruz soon after the occupation began reported that
^^Guy R. Donnell, "The United States Military Government at Veracruz, Mexico." in Essays in Mexican History, ed. by Thomas E. Cotner and Carlos E. Castaneda (Austin, Texas: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1958). pp. 236, 239, 241.
238
there was "an extremely bitter feeling, in the capital and other
parts of the republic," against the people of Veracruz. They were
"accused with being Carrancistas or Maderistas and entirely too
friendly toward the Americans, who would all have perished, even
though it were at the hands of the women alone ... had they attempted
to invade any other city of this size of the republic, or the popu
lation would have given up their lives defending the national soil."^^
Accusations in a similar vein by the Mexico City press, particu
larly El_ Imparcial, provoked an angry response from the Veracruz
press. An editorial in La Union blasted "the subsidized press" for
continuing "in an infamous toll of deciving the people." The editor
ials maintained that the metropolitan newspapers were continuing "in
their criminal mission" by falsifying the news and keeping the public,
"that eternal victim," in Ignorance. The heading for an editorial
49 published a week later in La Union declared; "we are not traitors."
El Dictamen provided a lengthy defense for Veracruz,
which has seen the municipal government resign, the public employees resign, not accepting any direct charge from American hands; which has endured the slanders of the metropolitan politicians; which has suffered with stoicism, in the midst of painful impotence, the first blow of the unjust provocation.
This Veracruz, on perceiving with her name the cruel epithet of traitor, becomes angered and is roused to rebellion in the sacred name of patriotic honesty.^^
48, Mexican Herald, April 28, 1914.
^^La. Union. April 29, 1914; May 6
^^El Dictamen, May 1, 1914.
239 The Mexican government not only attempted to shift the blame
for the capture of Veracruz to the unhappy inhabitants of that city,
but also demonstrated its indifference to the plight of the
VeracruBonoi^ by instituting a blockade to keep foodstuffs from reach
ing the city by land. The shortage of food and the corresponding
rise in prices brought charges in the press against profiteers as well
as appeals for relief to the military government, which soon began
importing food by sea. Many Veracruzanos gave the credit for the
relief to Junta Privada de Beneficencia, a philanthropic organization
51 formed by wealthy citizens.
The Veracruzanos may have recognized Huerta as the real culprit
behind the food shortages, but those who were addicted to the popular
vices of the city were well aware that the military government was
responsible for depriving them of their pleasures. During the course
of the occupation the authorities outlawed gambling, bull fighting,
lotteries, and the use of marijuana and cocaine. Of course, many
citizens strongly approved of efforts to eliminate some vices, but
American attempts to control other ones, such as prostitution, brought
complaints from both sides. Foreign prostitutes protested vigorously
against their exclusion from the Veracruz trade, while the inhabitants
of a section of the city strongly objected to the inclusion of their 52 neighborhood in the zone where prostitution was permitted.
51 " guirk. Affair of Honor, pp. 125-26; La Union, May 1, 1914; ta. Opinion, May 4; Ef Dictamen, May 7.
^^Quirk, Affair of Honor, pp. 137-38; El Dictamen, June 15, 1914.
240
The freedom and frequency with which the VnracnAzanor publicly
protested unsatisfactory conditions would seen to indicate that they
found aspects of American rule irritating, but did not regard the
government as repressive. Veracruz newspapers published the objec
tions of citizens to the use of supposed nwrtirtas in the police
force, as well as their own protests over isolated incidents of occa
sional mistreatment of citizens by American soldiers. Elements of
the press also took note of American efforts at fairness in the admi-
nistration of justice. La Union reported an incident which resulted
in the arrest of two American soldiers by the military authorities,
and concluded that "this incident is proof that the military authori
ties do not tolerate any abuse, on the contrary, they regidly punish
54 those who try to break the martial law."
While many Veracruzanor. continued to fear the invaders throughout
the occupation, person-to-person contacts between soldiers and
Mexican civilians, such as in the baseball games between military
teams and the Mexican team "Aguila," served to relieve tension. A
growing appreciation of the soldiers as individuals was demonstrated
by a reporter for La Voz del Pueblo who showed affection for a Mexican
baby. "The foreign soldier," wrote the reporter, "will perhaps wish
that that caress which he gives to a Mexican child be extended for
another, the same as his sighs for reaching the cold region where the
^^La Union, May 8, 1914; El Dictamen, June 28;Los. Sucesos.,
August 25.
^^La Union, May 9, 1914.
241 rosy cheek which forms his memories exists."^^
Still, there are those in Veracruz who opposed and disliked the
Americans not because of the way the military authorities administered
their city, or from any feeling of personal dislike of individual
soldiers, but because the Americans had invaded the city without justi
fiable cause. This attitude of bitterness and frustration coupled
with pride in the heroic resistance to the invader was captured in
two novels written by Veracruzanos in 1914. Satanas: Novel a
Historica Sobre la_ Invasion de Veracruz er[ 1914, by Alfonso Lopez
Ituarte, told the story of a homely Indian who was caught up in the
turmoil of the Revolution, eventually landing in the prison of San
Juan de Ulua. Satanas was one of the rayados released from prison
to fight the Invaders, and he soon found himself in the streets of
the city, where he manned the machine gun which had fallen from the
hands of the martyred Lieutenant Jose Azueta. At this point, halfway
through the book, the author digressed to provide a partially docu
mented narrative of the actual invasion, returning only occasionally
56 to Satanas, who eventually died at the hands of the Americans.
The second novel, Dom Pascual: o !§. Invasion de Veracruz por
los Americanos en 1914, by Alberto A. Rodriguez, related the adven
tures of an officer in the local volunteer force and his family
during the first days of the intervention. The author explained that
^^La Voz del Pueblo, May 16, 1914, p. 2. , •»
^^Alfonso Lopez Ituarte, Satanas; Noyela historica sobre l_a invasion de Veracruz en. l?1i (Veracruz: Editorial Citlatepetl, Ln.d.J).
242
one of his reasons for adopting the narrative style was "to repre
sent public opinion by means of my characters." Utilizing techniques
similar to those of Lopez Ituarte, Rodriguez interspersed conments
and documentation concerning the historical personages and events
throughout his novel. Rodriguez made Consul Canada the special
target of his most vituperative prose, accusing the consul of being
"the cause of the outrages and oppressions of the yankees."
Both of the novels on the invasion recounted all of the rumors
of American atrocities. Including the killing of innocent civilians
and the looting of homes, and attempted to make them appear to be
part of a deliberate plan. Since the novels must have been written
after the actual fighting had ceased, it is apparent that the burning
hatreds of the two authors did not diminish under the benevolent rule
by the military authorities. The continued existence of this atti
tude in some elements of the Veracruz population was confirmed by a
visitor on a mission for one of the rebel factions. Martin Luis
Guzman, probably the major intellectual adviser to General Pancho Villa,
arrived in the port city in August. Guzman found
a Veracruz of impotence, humiliation, tragedy. As they set foot on it once again, the North American troops tinged its atmosphere with an imponderable air of conflict. The heroic response floated anew over its blackened roofs, raising once more the cruel question of all heroisms that have gone down to defeat: why is it that a quality may be useless even when it is great?^^
^^Alberto A. Rodriguez, Don Pascual: o Ij. invasion d£ Veracruz por los Americanos en 1911 (MeHo): Libreria de la Vda. de Ch. Bouret,
1920T7 pp. ii. 318.
^ W t i n Luis Guzman, The EjiC[1e and the Serpent, trans, by Harriet de Onis (Garden City, New York: Dolphin Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc. , 1965), p. 185.
243 While in Veracruz, Guzman visited his former teacher, Delfino
Valenzuela. Guzman recalled that Valenzuela spoke "in a melancholy
tone" of the American occupation and quoted the elderly educator's
observations:
This military occupation is a preview of what may happen on a larger scale. From the material standpoint, the North Americans have made, or pretend to make, certain contributions, certain unimportant external improvements. For Instance, they have screened the market place and meat market to do away with the f l i es . I t is not much. But spiritually . . . To understand what this means spir i tual ly--leaving out the basic factor of the humiliation--al l you have to do is observe what happens when one of the officers or soldiers of the invasion dismounts at the door of a store or bar; the bystanders fight for the honor of holding the horse's bridle, and for the t ip . When the officer or soldier comes out, he gets on his horse and throws the lackey a coin.^'^
An editorial in the September 15 edition of El Dictamen proved
that Delfino Valenzuela was not alone in his concern over the ultimate
effect of the occupation on Veracruz and its inhabitants. The edi
torial noted the profitable and superficially beneficial changes which
had occurred, as well as the favorable attitude of the Veracruzanos
who profited from them, but remarked that "this, in spite of every
thing, does not resemble the Mexican Republic." In conclusion the
editorial compared the profiteers of Veracruz to the "uneasy Judas 60
before the seductive g l i t ter of the thirty coins."
For those who grieved over the changing, and perhaps decadent,
l i fe -s ty le of Veracruz, the news of the planned evacuation of the city
^^Ibid., pp. 188-189.
60 El Dictamen, September 15, 1914.
244 came as a godsend. Only one day after publishing the rather morose
editorial of September 15, El Dictamen was able to report that the
news of the impending evacuation had fallen on the port city "like a
soft and sweet bomb-shell of dynamite," causing "the joyful overflow
of people, with abundant reason." Even in the midst of these ecstatic
outbursts. El Dictamen could not resist an attack on its political
enemies: "The city of Veracruz 1s s t i l l victim of another occupa
tion: that of those 'Mexicans' who received the cable from Washington
with a marked expression of ill-humor; but this evacuation will happen,
i t will be obliged to be simultaneous."^^ In a letter to First Chief
Carranza, Guillermo Q. Carballo, a native of Veracruz and an enthu
siastic revolutionary, reported that in the areas of the city where
"the flower and cream of huertismo" congregated, the news caused "a en
veritable panic among the traitors."
The ill-humored "Mexicans" to whom El Dictamen referred where
the Huertista and anti-revolutionary refugees who had fled to the
safety of occupied Veracruz and now feared retribution at the hands
of the victorious rebels when the Americans departed. As early as
May 6 the Mexican Herald reported the arrival in the port city of a
train loaded with some 200 Mexicans, the majority of whom stated "that
they had come here for protection, as they believed Veracruz under
the rule of the Americans about the safest place in the republic at
^ h b i d . , September 16, 1914; September 17.
^^Isidro Fabela, ed., Documentos historicos de la revolucion mexicana (21 vols.; Mexico: Fonda de Cultura Economica and Editorial Jus, 1960-71), I I , 115-16.
245 CO
the present time." As the Huerta dictatorship began to crumble,
former government ministers and other off icials joined the growing
refugee community. This situation led to one of the very few
instances of interference by the military authorities with freedom
of the press in Veracruz. When Querido Moheno, ex-minister of
comnerce and labor, arrived in the c i ty . El Dictamen published hand
bi l ls "which were construed as Invitations to the people to violence
and acts of lawlessness against ex-Minister Moheno." The authori
ties ordered the newspaper closed for a brief period and imprisoned
the editor, Heriberto Jara. Editor Jara was released after a few
days, but "upon his release, and somewhat stupidly, i t would seem,
Jara made another attempt; this time he was jailed for an extended
period. "^^
From the attitude exhibited by Heriberto Jara, who was counted
as a spokesman for the Carranza element in Veracruz, the refugees
were well aware of what they could expect at the hands of the
Carrancistas when the Americans evacuated the city. Equally fearful
of repercussions from the victorious rebels were those Veracruzanos
who had accepted employment under the occupation government in viola
tion of Mexican law. The issue of American responsibility for the
protection of these Mexican employees was raised as early as July,
when the employees of the lighthouse service in Veracruz received
^^Mexlcan Herald, May 6, 1914.
^^Ibid. , July 11, 1914.
65 Clendenen, Blood on the Border, p. 167.
246
notification from the Huerta government that they had been dis
charged from their positions for lending their services to the
Americans. A report by an American naval officer noted that Ef
Imparcial had published an account of the Mexican government's
action and had referred to the employees as traitors. The officer
concluded that "in view of this apparent attitude on the part of the
Huerta Government, and which it is possible may also be the attitude
of any Mexican Government which may hereafter be established in
Mexico City; it is believed that there exists a possible element of
danger to the lives of these employees, when the protection now
afforded them by our forces is removed." The officer believed the
United States was "obligated to take measures for the protection of
their lives when our protection is withdrawn."
When the announcement of the imminent departure of the
Americans was made on September 15, many more Mexican employees of the
occupation government expressed concern over their predicament. On
September 17 Major Charles Miller, who was in charge of education in
Veracruz, received a petition signed by forty-three women teachers
requesting that the /Vnerican authorities take steps to safeguard their
jobs after the American withdrawal. General Funston asked
Washington to obtain guarantees from the Constitutionalists, prior to
^Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison to Bryan, August 6, 1914, /12781.
(unpubl
^^Guy Renfro Donnell, "United States Intervention in Mexico, 1914" ished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas. 1951), p. 276.
247
evacuation, which would protect the Mexican employees, but Secretary
of War Lindley M. Garrison informed Funston that the United States
would neither assume any responsibility for the safety of Mexican
citizens, nor provide for their transportation out of the country,
Funston's announcement of this decision
virtually paralyzed the city government, for most of the Mexican employees began to make plans to leave. They had been led to believe, when they had accepted positions with the Americans, that they would be protected. Now it seemed that they were being thrown to the wolves. Morale disintegrated, and no one cared to perform the duties of his office.^8
President Wilson, however, had decided to insist on guarantees
for the Mexican employees and those who had paid taxes to the occu
pation government. For a time Carranza refused to provide the
guarantees, so the troops remained in Veracruz while the employees
and taxpayers worried over their eventual fate. Because the Americans
could not assure them of continued protection, these Mexicans attempted
to ingratiate themselves with the new Mexican government. On
November 9 General Candido Aguilar, commander of the Constitutionalist
forces in the state of Veracruz, received a petition signed by a large
number of Veraerv.zaivDs who had served in the employ of the Americans.
The petitioners stated that they did not wish their situation to be a
69 hindrance to the withdrawal of the American troops.
On the same day the Mexican Herald reported that a large number
of the port merchants had signed a petition which claimed that the
^ % i r k . Affair of Honor, pp. 161-62.
^^Fabela, Documentos historicos, pp. 153-55; the Mexican Herald. November 9, 1914.
248 United States was mistaken in its view that the people of Veracruz
were reluctant to assume the burden of double taxation. The petition
stated that the people would willingly make such payments to assure
the removal of American troops. Consul Canada and other American
authorities in Veracruz suspected the spontaneity of the merchants'
petition, and after several days of investigation learned that the
petition
was conceived by Lieutenant Colonel Martinez of General Aguilar's forces. ... It was signed first by warm sympathizers of Carranza and other signatures were obtained by inspiring fear. . . . Nobody here believes guarantees promised are worth anything.^°
But the petitions had served their purpose: the Americans found it
more difficult to justify the continuance of the occupation.
While the Constitutionalists and the Americans disputed the
issue of guarantees, days turned into weeks and the people of
Veracruz began to believe that the announcement of the withdrawal
had been a deception. In the November 15 edition of Ej Dictamen
which announced that General Funston had set November 23 as the day
for the evacuation, an editorial noted that
the pessimist sentiment predominates in all the spirits. In spite of the reiterated protestations of the American government, the "visible" elements of Veracruz do not want to believe in the evacuation of the port.^^
Carranza had finally agreed to provide the guarantees, and it soon
became apparent that the scheduled date for the withdrawal would be
^^William W. Canada (Veracruz) to Bryan, November 11, 1914, /13755.
^^El Dictamen, November 15, 1914.
249
observed. The fifteen thousand refugees in the port were terror-
stricken. It was obvious that the Constitutionalists were eager to
get their hands on these enemies; in September General Aguilar had
told General Funston that he "wanted to throw a tight cordon of troops
around the city so that none could escape." Consul Canada reported
that he was beseiged by "panic stricken" political refugees, priests,
nuns and many Americans "soliciting transportation" to American
ports. Their fears were increased by the "alleged continued prepara
tion of lists to be summarily dealt with after evacuation including
women who have befriended American soldiers."^ Fortunately for the
refugees. General Funston received permission to charter ships for
their evacuation.
Both the American soldiers and the Mexican civilians were eager
for the long-planned evacuation to begin. On the morning of
November 23 a number of men "armed with guns, stakes, knives, razors,
etc., that they were going to place at the orders of General Aguilar"
visited the Constitutionalist camp outside Veracruz, "because in the
port the news had spread that the revolutionaries would take the plaza
by force, if it happened that the invaders were not withdrawn." Their
services were not required, however, as the American troops withdrew
as planned and in an efficient and orderly manner. An observer of
the dramatic entrance of the Mexican forces into the city claimed that
"to describe the unbounded joy of the people of Veracruz would be
impossible." The same observer felt obliged to admit that "if the
^^Quirk, Affair of Honor, p. 161; William W. Canada (Veracruz) to Bryan, November 19, 1914, /13827.
250 humble people received us with visible demonstrations of satisfaction,
not so the merchants, who in spite of having addressed themselves to
General Aguilar presenting to him their affection, the day of our
entrance into the port they closed their establishments, fearful that
our soldiers might conmlt some misbehavior."^^
The lack of cordiality on the part of the merchants did not
dampen the spirits of the jarocho press. In a burst of ebullient
prose the November 24 edition of El Dictamen declared that
yesterday morning shined radiant and brilliant in our sky. The people of Veracruz, excited, counted minute by minute the time which elapsed in order to see their beloved port free from the American forces which occupied it."**
Consul Canada reported that General Aguilar had congratulated his
troops for their "good behavior" and had stated that "those committing
offenses against order would be executed." Canada claimed that "several
75 patriotic manifestations" had taken place "without disorder."
Most accounts of the evacuation have confirmed Consul Canada's
view that all took place in good order, but General Funston later
related a different version, one which indicates the extreme of the
bitterness that remained in the hearts of a number of those on both
sides. During a visit to his friend William Allen White, the famous
editor of the Emporia Gazette,
73palomares, Invasion yangui, pp. 77-83. Palomares claimed that about 10,000 men from Veracruz offered to help General Aguilar force the Invaders to evacuate the city. This figure is an obvious exaggeration.
^^El Dictamen. November 24, 1914.
^^William W. Canada (Veracruz), November 24, 1914, /13889.
251 Funston broke out with dazzling, wrathful profanity, Mexican-Engl1sh*F11ipino-Spanish, a fireworks of rage. The gist of i t was this (after he had cussed himself into something l ike repose, tears f i l l ed his eyes):
"Bi l ly, you won't believe i t . I never thought I would have to do i t . God knows i t cut my heart out, but I had to ret ire American troops in order under the sniping f i re of those [here he burst into a set piece of pyrotechnic profanity] . . . greasers from windows as we embarked. God, Bi l ly , fancy that! Fancy the American flag with me in charge of i t , going meekly out of a d i r ty , stinking greaser hole--withdrawing my command under f ire."^^
The clash of arms and cultures in Veracruz produced an unpleasant
atmosphere for those who survived the in i t ia l assault of the Interven
tion. The Veracruzanost many of whom had been content to profit from
the presence of the American warships in the port, were stunned by
the attack on their c i ty , but managed to provide a valiant resistence
in keeping with their history. For the most part the citizens
stoically endured this latest in a series of foreign occupations,
although they obviously suffered from frustration and humiliation, and
especially from the knowledge that a number of their fellow citizens
in other parts of Mexico regarded them as traitors.
For the Americans the intervention and occupation was nearly as
frustrating as i t was for the Veracruzanos, The brief fight against
hidden snipers offered l i t t l e satisfaction to those sailors and
marines who sought action, and the army soon discovered that i ts sole
assignment was dull occupation duty in the unpleasant summer climate
of Veracruz. Action-hungry war correspondents found no war to report
^^William Allen White, The Autobiography of William Allen White (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946), p. 502.
252
and proclaimed their unhappiness in their dispatches.
Not everyone, however, was unhappy about the occupation. Some
of the American military officials received satisfaction from intro
ducing reforms, while some of the Vr)vi,-ruzcnuj:^ appreciated the bene
fits they received from the reforms. City merchants and entrepre
neurs were happy to obtain their share of the military payroll, and
Mexican refugees were relieved to find a place of refuge, even though
temporary. A few, like the director of La Union, actually welcomed
the intervention.
Whatever their attitude toward the intervention and occupation
of Veracruz the participants on both sides were relieved to see it
come to an end, excepting the Mexican refugees. For soldiers and
civilians alike it had been a depressing experience which did little
to establish international goodwill.
CHAPTER I I I
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND EPILOGUE
The bonds of Mexican-American f r iendship, ris exemplified by
the cordial exchange of v i s i t s between Presidents William Howard Taft
and Por f i r i o Diaz in 1909, proved to be too weak to res is t the stress
of both the xenophobic nationalism of the Mexican Revolution and the
p o l i t i c a l idealism of President Woodrow Wilson. Culminating in the
American intervention at Veracruz in 1914, these stresses rendered
asunder the bonds of a superf ic ial fr iendship of diplomatic expediency.
President Wilson refused to recognize the government of General
Victoriano Huerta, a government which Wilson believed had been founded
on an Immoral basis. Since Huerta showed no inc l ina t ion to abandon
power on his own accord, Wilson f i n a l l y resorted to the fa te fu l act
of m i l i t a r y intervent ion.
The r ights and obligations of the United States regarding i t s
neighbor were not nearly as clear to the American public as they were
to the president. A s p l i t over American policy became evident in the
ed i to r ia l pages of the nation's press as soon as i t became apparent
that President Wilson had decided not to recognize the Huerta govern
ment. I r on i ca l l y , that port ion of the press which opposed intervention
supported the president on the grounds that his policy of "watchful
wai t ing" would keep the United States from unnecessary involvement in
the revolut ionary turmoil of Mexico. The in tervent ion is t press
opposed the president because he was f a i l i n g to provide the t rad i t iona l
253
254
0l*9tect1on afforded the lives and property of Americans in under
developed countries.
While President Wilson's policy continued to receive editorial
endorsements from the relatively small element which was concerned
about the morality of the Mexican government, his support from the
less idealistic press began to ebb as "watchful waiting" produced no
results. A large part of the noninterventionist press was d is i l lu
sioned by Wilson's apparent alliance with the Mexican rebels, and the
Tampico incident prompted renewed demands for intervention. The
actual intervention, which appeared to the public as the beginning of
a war with Mexico, received overwhelming patriotic support from the
press. Journalistic support diminished hardly at all when the crisis
ended in mediation, but the failure of the mediation to provide a
satisfactory solution to the Mexican guestion resulted in a renewal
of dissent. At the time of the evacuation of Veracruz sharp debate
over the merits of President Wilson's policies and actions character
ized the attitude of the press.
The strong journalistic support for President Wilson during the
actual intervention crisis was echoed by a large number of the
influential elements which constituted the "elites" of American pub
l ic opinion, but as in the case of the press, such expressions were
often accompanied by a justif ication at variance with that of the
president. Furthermore, a significantly large number of elites
voiced their opposition to the intervention from the start , and their
dissent was augmented by s t i l l others when the crisis--but not the
trouble--ended. The most bitter criticism during the crisis came from
255 the academic, humanitarian, ideological and political e l i tes , but
even among these there were wide areas of disagreement.
Foreigners, Including Americans, who were residing in Mexico
were nearly unanimous in their opposition to President Wilson's
policy and their support for President Huerta. When the occupation
of Veracruz occurred, the Americans indicated a willingness to
support total intervention, but the Europeans and Asians were outraged.
European newspapers reflected the disapproval of their nationals in
Mexico, while the opinions of American refugees found their way into
the pages of the American press.
Public opinion in Europe went far beyond the expression of
concern for the fate of European nationals in Mexico, but the a t t i
tudes of these elements remain to be examined. Likewise, the publics
of other Latin American nations fe l t a strong sense of Involvement in
the quarrel between a sister republic and the dominant power in the
western hemisphere, but their opinions are s t i l l to be analyzed.
Furthermore, a study of international public opinion on the Pershing
expedition into Mexico in 1916 and President Wilson's relations with
the Carranza government would provide a more complete perspective
for judging President Wilson's Mexican policy.
Among the Mexican people the pro-Huerta and anti-American
elements bi t ter ly denounced President Wilson's meddling in Mexican
af fa i rs . President Huerta played on Mexican fears of American inter
vention, fears that proved to be justif ied by the occupation of
Veracruz, an act which produced a new high in public support for the
Mexican dictator. Even the rebels, who had enjoyed the benefits of
256
President Wilson's pre-intervention campaign to force Huerta's resig
nation, found i t necessary to take the patriotic stance of opposition
to the Intervention. There was, however, the notable exception of
General Pancho V i l l a , who helped to modify the response of the rebels.
For whatever reason, the anti-American demonstrations in the rebel-
held areas were fewer in number and more restrained than those in the
remainder of the country. Throughout the country xenophobic tensions
diminished when Huerta agreed to mediation, but occasional hostile
manifestations occurred until the troops were withdrawn from Veracruz.
The participants in the intervention at Veracruz, of course,
held the strongest views regarding the occupation. The Veracruzanos
were surprised by the American attack on their c i ty , but a significant
number, including some small military detachments, rall ied to provide
a brief though bloody resistance to the invaders. The American
military forces and especially the war correspondents expressed frus
tration at the decision to limit the intervention to Veracruz and
unhappily endured the drudgery of occupation duty. Despite the bene
f i t s of eff icient and honest administration by the Americans, most
Veracruzanos eagerly welcomed the evacuation, excepting the Huertista
refugees and those who had cooperated with the occupation government.
In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, historian William Appleman
Williams wrote that
in the realm of ideas and ideals, American policy is guided by three conceptions. One is the warm, generous, humanitarian Impulse to help other people solve their problems. A second is the principle of self-determination applied at the international level , which asserts the right of every society to establish its own goals or objectives, and to realize them internally through
257 the means i t decides are appropriate. These two ideas can be reconciled; indeed, they complement each other to an extensive degree. But the third idea entertained by many Americans is one which insists that other people cannot really solve their problems and Improve their lives unless they go about i t in the same way as the United States.*
Clearly, Wilsonian policy toward Mexico embodied all three of these
concepts. But "the ordinary citizen is not apt to be aroused from
his apathy by theoretical arguments,"^ and in 1914 a number of
Americans were actively opposed to one or more of the president's
principles. Thus, President Wilson was confronted by strong opposi
tion to his Mexican policy except at the time of the intervention
crisis.
The president was not unconcerned about public opinion, and he
evidently believed that he would have public support in refusing to
recognize the Huerta regime, especially after the nearly universal
outcry over the brutal murder of President Madero. As the months
passed, however, great division over the Mexican policy appeared, and
as the historian Thomas A. Bailey has noted, "The dangers of flying
in the face of public opinion are so apparent that in time of crisis
the administration is strongly tempted to resort to deception rather 3
than to defiance." Through deception President Wilson sought united
William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, Ohio: World PublishingTompany, 19^9), pp. 13^TT:
Thomas A. Bailey. Th^ Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy TGIoucester, Massachusetts; Peter Smith, 1964), p. 121.
^ Ib id . , p. 11.
258 backing for action against Huerta in the form of the intervention at
Veracruz. Disparate elements were free for a time to read into the
president's action whatever they chose, and most believed that Wilson
had seen the wisdom of their positions.
Woodrow Wilson may have been sufficiently concerned about public
opinion as to attempt to deceive the American people—and perhaps
h1mself--for a time, but he must have suspected that the fruitless
mediation conference would not long sustain public support. Since
the 1890's Americans had often demonstrated enthusiastic support for
foreign adventures which either enhanced American honor or produced
morally and economically satisfying results within a short span of
time. The intervention at Veracruz produced none of these results in
any obvious form, so i t is unlikely that the episode accrued to the
benefit of President Wilson's prestige with the American public.
The American president showed l i t t l e i f any concern for the
opinions of Americans and other foreigners residing in Mexico; he
seemed to regard them a l l , often unfairly, as economic exploiters
committed to the suppression of the peasant class in Mexico. Nor was
the president moved by the protests in European nations over the
plight of their nationals owing to American policies and actions.
Although Wilson professed to be acting in the interests of the
suppressed majority of Mexicans, he acted without their consent under
the assumption that they would naturally approve such just and huma
nitarian actions. The president obviously underestimated the strength
of nationalism and the depth of xenophobia in Mexico, just as he was
to do in Europe in 1919. Even the careful cultivation of the
259 Constitutionalist leadership could not deflect a hostile reaction to
the intervention from those who Wilson sought to help.
Mexican public opinion on American policies and actions before
and during the intervention accrued to the benefit of the Huerta
regime, but this advantage was probably offset by the damaging effects
of American actions. During the summer and fa l l of 1914 the focus of
public attention in Mexico shifted from the occupation of Veracruz to
the struggle between the forces of Huerta and those of the Constitu
tionalists and later to the dissension among the Constitutionalists.
Similarly, public attention in the United States during this period
was attracted to the beginning of World War I in Europe.
The Impact of the American intervention in Mexico on public
opinion did not terminate with the departure of the occupation force
from Veracruz. Both short and long term repercussions resulted. In
the United States the Intervention and President Wilson's entire
handling of Mexican affairs became the subject of debate during the
1916 presidential election. In a pamphlet which was probably written
in connection with the campaign. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge described
the unfortunate conditions prevailing in Mexico and declared that
"the responsibility for the Mexican conditions rests chiefly upon
our government and the deaths of American citizens and soldiers al l
l i e at the doors of this administration."
In the same election year Henry Morris produced a book with much
the same message as appeared in the pamphlet by Senator Lodge. Morris
^Henry Cabot Lodge, The Story of Mexico ([New York]: National Hughes Alliance. [1916]), pp. 22-23.
260 wrote.
From somewhere, from out of the mysterion*; nebular nowhere, accusing fingers point to those who, however unwittingly, however good intentioned, nevertheless have contributed to the relentless ravishment of Mexico, and to the snuffing out of countless lives. Who are they? Ask political Washington.
Morris revealed evidence of his own dispassionate logic when he
declared that "your average Mexican resents meddling. Then he murders.
But baste him with a 'big stick,' then he will eat out of the hand 5
that smites him." In yet another book published in 1916 Caspar
Whitney claimed that
the president has "service for humanity" but none for Americans. In his burning desire to effect a "spiritual union" with the Mexicans he had abandoned 20,000 of his own people and departed from the long maintained American principle against meddling with the domestic affairs of a neighbour.'
The blend of fact, opinion, and propaganda culminated in the
condemnation of President Wilson's Mexican policy that appeared in the
Republican platform. Significantly, the campaign attacks on the
Mexican policy by Republican candidate Charles Evans Hughes reflected
the advice of former Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson. The Democrats and
Wilson himself defended administration policies, but i t is unlikely
that the president gained many votes on this issue in his victorious
campaign.
^Henry Morris, Our Mexican Muddje (Chicago: Laird & Lee [ I n c . ] , 1916).
^Caspar Whitney, What's the Matter with Mexico (New York: MacMillan Co., 1916), p. 169.
^Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 232, 237, 239.
261 Tracts opposed to President Wilson's Mexican policy continued
to appear even after the president's reelection. In a book published
in 1920 George Agnew Chamberlain, former ambassador to Mexico, claimed
that
tLnc® TlLT"" ^'^^Inning to realize that the vacil lations of 1914 were disastrous far beyond their apparent range. ' '
These vacillations laid bare the hypocrisy which says one thing on theory and reverses I tself in the face of hard facts; they inaugurated the so-called policy of hands off , whatever the provocation; they persuaded
the ignorant Mexican that we were really as weak as his leaders asserted and convinced the leaders that they could go the l imit; they disappointed the American people who fe l l Into apathy at the loss of a chance to start the Mexican machine on a straight track and, worst of a l l at the present juncture of world af fa irs , they planted the seed of ridicule among the too-hopeful provisions of the project for a league of nations.'
And Wilson's old nemesis, Henry Lane Wilson, was s t i l l available for
such remarks as: "We intervened at Vera Cruz without reason or right
and retreated amid execrations and ridicule."^
Mexican exiles hastened to join the post-intervention anti -
Wilson campaign. In 1916 Francisco Bulnes, historian and former
member of the Diaz regime, published The Whofe Ijqjth^ Abo^
President Wilson's Responsibility. Bulnes claimed that the president's
decision to extend de facto recognition to the Carranza government
o George Agnew Chamberlain, Is Mexico Worth Saving (Indianapolis,
Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 192077 p. 139.
9 Henry Lane Wilson, "How to Restore Peace in Mexico," in Mexico
and the Caribbean: Clark University Addresses, ed. by George H. Blakeslee (New York: G.E. Stechert and Company, 1920), p. 147.
262 of the ultra-despotic type, after having refused to recognize the Huerta Government because i t was dictatorial , has practically acknowledged that his effort to implant l iberty in Mexico has been a complete fa i lure . I t is even worse. President Wilson has not recognized a de facto government but a de facto anarchyy hoping to transform i t Into something bearing some resemblance to a government, in order to save himself from the severe arraignment that awaits him at the hands of humanity.*o
Manuel Calero, former cabinet member and ambassador to the United
States under Madero, also produced an anti-Wilson book on the eve of
the 1916 presidential campaign. Calero provided a history and a
harshly cr i t ical analysis of American policy and maintained that
Wilson's actions had been opposed by a majority of Americans. Calero
also claimed that early efforts to overthrow Huerta were "frustrated,
due to the intrusion of President Wilson. 'Huerta, right or wrong,'
said everybody, 'rather than accept a foreign imposition.'"
Short-term repercussions were also fe l t in Mexico. In an early
novel of the Revolution, Esteban Maqueo Castellanos attacked the
leadership of Venustiano Carranza, claiming that Carranza did nothing
except "protest tepidly, without condemning the aggression nor anathe
matizing the invader."^^ On the other hand, Jose Perez Moreno, a
Mexican novelist of a later period, portrayed his youthful rebel heroes
^^Francisco Bulnes, The Whole Trutti About ^ ^ ^ President
WilsonJ. S n ^ ^ ^ '''^'' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Book Company, 1916), pp. 34-35.
^^Manuel Calero, The MexJ^an Pohcx of President Woodrow MJison as i t ^^S.^^^^^^^'^^^^^^'' ^ ' ' ' ' '^ ^'^^ * Thompson, 1916), p. TF..
^^Estaban Maqueo Castellanos, La ruina de la casona (Mexico: Eusebio Gomez de la Puente, 1921), p. 509.
263 as recognizing Carranza's stature as a leader in part because of his
1 '\ refusal to support the American Invasion. In the eyes of s t i l l
other novelists the reputation of Victoriano Huerta was permanently
tarnished by the fai lure of the dictator to drive the American inva
ders from Veracruz.
The passage of time gradually reduced the anti-American antago
nisms in Mexico generated by the invasion, just as the potency of the
intervention as a political issue diminished in the United States.
An event occurred in 1933, however, which revitalized the dormant
hosti l i t ies of the Mexican people over the occupation of Veracruz:
newly-inaugurated President Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated
Josephus B. Daniels to be ambassador to Mexico. Both Roosevelt and
Daniels had forgotten that Daniels, as secretary of the Navy in April
of 1914, had transmitted the order to invade Veracruz. Daniels claimed
that the forgetfulness "was proof that neither of us nor Wilson had
entertained any but friendly feeling for Mexico and had believed we
were really aiding liberty-loving Mexicans to free themselves from
15 the Huerta reign of absolutism."
But many Mexicans had not forgotten the intervention. Mexican
^^Jose Perez Moreno, El tercer canto del gallo (Mexico: Aguilar, 1957).
^^harles Leonard Kargleder, "Selected Mexican Leaders as Characterized in Certain Novels of the Revolution" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Alabama, 1968), p. 204.
^^Josephus Daniels, Shirt-Sljeve DMomat (Chapel H i l l , North Carolina: University of N^PWCarolina Press, 1947), p. 4.
264
and American off ic ials were sufficiently concerned over the possi
b i l i t y of trouble as to require Ambassador Daniels to travel to Mexico
City by train Instead of the preferred route by sea to Veracruz. The
Mexican government provided special protection for the ambassador's
arr iva l . There was Indeed some cause for concern: news of the
appointment of Daniels provoked public demonstrations and the stoning
of the American Embassy. The Conmunist Party of Mexico, deeply
involved In the anti-Daniels agitation and violence, spread handbills
insisting that "THE APPOINTMENT OF DANIELS IS A SLAP AT THE MEXICAN
PEOPLE AND THE SPITTING UPON THE MEMORY OF THE DEAD WHO DEFENDED
VERACRUZ." ^
Fortunately for the improving relations between the United
States and Mexico the uproar over the Daniels appointment proved to
be of brief duration. In succeeding years Mexican scholars, journal
ists, and propagandists continued to cite and describe the intervention
at Veracruz in books and newspaper art icles, often of an anti-
imperialist or anti-American nature. Their impact was lessened,
however, by the "good neighbor" atmosphere of improved relations.
Half a century after the intervention, however, Veracruzanos who had
fought to repel the invasion of 1914 s t i l l retained much bitterness
^^Ibid. , p. 9.
^^For examples see Miguel Alessio Robles, Historia politica de la revolucion (Mexico; Ediciones Betas, 1946), pp. 105-09; Justine N. Palomares, La invasion Yangui en 1914 (Mexico: [n.p.J, 1940); Ciro de la Garza I r i y J M , Wfllkn y. Hue^aTl l i l lR^ 1. Veracruz; Ensayo de divulgacion historica (Mexico: [ n . p . ] , 1933), pp. 21, 38-39; Ef Popular. April 23, 1948, p. 2; Ef Nacional, April 21, 1947, p. 3.
265 in their minds and hearts. In the mid-1960's one participant,
Augustin HJierta Rodriguez, declared his feelings:
Never will we be able to forget i t ! I t is impossible. And while I l ive , I wil l always give my sons lectures about what we did, so that they might do i t when the opiH)rtunity presents i tsel f . I cry on remembering i t ! . . . I cry! The Yankees will say now that we are good friends, good neighbors, and many times even cousins; but they can never be so, because they are very ambitious. That ambition that the governments of the United States have of taking possession of the whole world! Now you see what is happening right now with Vietnam and what happened in Puerto Rico. . . . They will always Invent a pretext for trampling under foot weak peoples, without prior declaration of war, as they did here in Veracruz.*'^
The American Intervention at Veracruz lef t a legacy of hatred which,
for some Mexicans at least, s t i l l exists.
^^Maria Luisa Melo de Remes, Veracruz martir; La infamia de Woodrow Wilson (1914) (Mexico: [n .p . ] , 1966), p. 80.
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« -• • •
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Issays And Articles In Collections
Blanksten, George I. "The Politics of Latin America." The Politics of Developing Areas. Edited by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960.
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Wilson, Henry Lane. "How to Restore Peace in Mexico." Mexico and the Caribbean; Clark University Addresses. Edited by George H. Blakeslee. New YorF: G.E. Stechert and Company, 1920.
Periodicals
"After Huerta, Who?" North American Review, January, 1914, pp. 17-22.
"The American Exodus from Mexico." Literary Digest, September 13, 1913, pp. 405-06.
"American Intervention in Mexico: A Poll of the European Press," Outlook. May 2, 1914. pp. 17-18.
"The American Navy Moves in Force upon Mexican Ports." Current Opinion, May, 1914, pp. 329-31.
"The Anarchy in Mexico: Is There a Way Out?" Outlook, March 21, 1914, pp. 621-22.
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, LIV T7uTy7 1^14).
"Are They Free?" Mexico, March 7, 1914, p. 1.
"Beating Swords into Shovels at Vera Cruz." Survey, October 3, 1914, p. 3.
274 Blaisdell , Lowell L. "Henry Lane Wilson and the Overthrow of Madero."
Southwgstern Social Science Quarterly. XLIII (September, 1962), 126-3b.
"The Blood-and-Iron Fallacy." Nation, January 1 , 1914, p. 4.
Blythe, Samuel G. "Mexico: The Record of a Conversation with President Wilson." Saturday Evening Post, May 23, 1914, pp. 2-4.
"British Press on Benton's Fate." Literary Digest. March 7, 1914, p. 481.
Clayton, Powell. "Commercial Intervention--Not Military." Independent, May 4, 1914, pp. 193-94.
"El conflicto con los Estados Unidos." Revista de Revistas, May 10, 1914, pp. 1-3.
Cumberland, Charles C "Huerta y Carranza ante la ocupacion de Veracruz." Historia Mexicana, VI (April-June, 1957), 534-47.
Davis, Richard Harding. "When a War Is Not a War." Scribner's Magazine, July, 1914, pp. 41-52.
"Do Not Invade Mexico." Mexico, April 11, 1914, p. 11.
"Down with the Monroe Doctrine." Current Opinion, Apri l , 1913, p. 275.
"El ejercito norteamericana y la cuestion de Mexico." Revista de Revistas. May 24. 1914. p. 5.
"Ethics for Fighting Men." America. May 23. 1914, pp. 134-35.
"Europe Urging Us to Invade Mexico." Literary Digest, March 8, 1913, pp. 504.
"For a Permanent Mexican Solution." World's Work, January, 1914, pp. 249-50.
"Frente al enemigo." Revista de Revistas, April 26, 1914 (Extra), p. 1.
Hart, Albert Bushnell. "The Second Mexican War." Independent, May 4, 1914, pp. 195-96.
[Harvey, George]. "We Appeal to the President to Save Mexico; to Save His Party; to Save Himself." North American Review, Apri l , 1914, pp. 481-501.
"How Davis Got a Story." Literary Digest, May 23, 1914, pp. 1284-88.
275 "How Much Unity Is There of Mexican Spirit?" American Review of
Reyjews, Juno. 1914, pp. 748-49.
"I^erta As a Dictator." Literary Digest, October 25, 1913, pp. 737-39.
"Idealism As a Mexican Policy." Literary Digest. November 8. 1913, pp. 855-57.
"La invasion norteamericana en 1847." Revista de Revistas, May 3, 1914. pp. 8-10.
"La Invasion norteamericana en 1847." Revista de Revistas. May 17, 1914, pp. 9-10.
"The Iron Hand in Mexico." Literary Digest, March 8, 1913, pp. 497-99.
Jenkinson, Charles. "Bringing 60,000 Americans out of Mexico." World's Work, February, 1914, pp. 460-66.
"Judgments on the War." America, May 2, 1914, p. 49.
"The Key to President Wilson's Mexican Policy." Literary Digest, May 30, 1914, pp. 1297-99.
"Lending Huerta Money." Literary Digest, June 14, 1913, p. 1318.
"Letting the Guns into Mexico." Literary Digest, February 14, 1914, pp. 305-06.
"Letting South America into Our Mexican Quarrel." Literary Digest, May 9, 1914, pp. 1095-98.
Leuchtenburg, William E. "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXIX (December, 1952), 483-502.
"Lifting the Lid from the Mexican Kettle." Literary Digest, March 21. 1914, pp. 601-03.
Lowry, Edward G. "What the President Is Trying to Do for Mexico." World's Work, January, 1914, pp. 261-66.
Mason, Gregory. "Campaigning in Coahuila." Outlook, June 20, 1914, pp. 397.
Mason, Gregory. "With Vi l la in Chihuahua." Outlook, May 9, 1914, pp. 75-78.
"Mexican Fear of Intervention." Literary Digest, March 22, 1913, p. 632.
276 "Mexico and American National Honor." Outlook, April 25. 1914
pp. 880-81. •
"Mexico and Ourselves." America. December 12. 1914, pp. 222-23.
"Mexico." Nation, April 30. 1914, p. 487.
"Mexico." Nation, November 26, 1914, p. 619.
"Mexico's Darkening Outlook." Literary Digest. March 7, 1914, pp. 473-75.
"Mexico's Desire for Peace with Us." Literary Digest. August 9, 1913, pp. 203-04.
"Mexico's New Leadership." Literary Digest, March 1 , 1913, pp. 439-41.
"Mex1co--V1ewed from Texas." Literary Digest, March 14, 1914, pp. 535-
"Mr. Wilson's Word to Latin America." Literary Digest, March 22, 1913, pp. 626-27.
Mother Earth, May, 1914, pp. 67-68.
"Moving Toward Peace in Mexico." Literary Digest, July 4, 1914, pp. 6-7.
"Our Call to Recognize Huerta." Literary Digest, July 26, 1913, p. 120.
"Our Evacuation of Vera Cruz." Literary Digest, December 5, 1914, pp. 1104-05.
"Our Latin-American Crit ics." Literary Digest, October 18, 1913, p. 674.
"Our War on Huerta." Literary Digest, May 2, 1914, pp. 1029-32.
Palmer, Frederick. "Mexico; The American Spirit in Vera Cruz." Everybody's Magazine, June, 1914, pp. 806-10.
Palmer, Frederick. "Mexico; Army Housekeeping." Everybody's Magazine, August, 1914, pp. 198-205.
Palmer, Frederick. "Mexico: Watchful Perspiring at Vera Cruz." Everybody's Magazine, July, 1914, pp. 65-80.
"President Wilson and Mexico." New Review: A Monthly Review of International Socialism, October, 1913, pp. 805-1597
"The Progress of the World." American Review of Reviews, Apr i l , 1914, pp. 387-89.
277 "The Progress of the World." American Review of Reviews, August,
1914, pp. 131-35.
"The Problem of Vera Cruz." Outlook, November 25, 1914, p. 666.
Ross, Stanley Robert. "El historiador y el periodismo mexicano." Historia Mexicana, XIV (January-March, 1965), 347-82.
"Scientists Assail Wilson." Mexico, April 11, 1914, pp. 7-8.
"Shall We Join Hands with Villa?" Literary Digest, May 23, 1914, pp. 1235-38.
Tridon, Andre. "The A B C Plan as Seen in Mexico City." Outlook, May 30, 1914. pp. 235-36.
Turner. Frederick C "Anti-Americanism in Mexico, 1910-1913." Hispanic American Historical Review, XLVII (November, 1967), W^TF!
Wheeler, Benjamin Ide. "Firmness and Strength." Independent, May 4, 1914, p. 193.
Whelpley, J. Davenport. "The Injustice of War on Mexico," Fortnightly Review, Apri l , 1914, pp. 686-93.
White, William Allen. "Make Him 'Swaller' I t . " California Outlook. April 25, 1914, p. 2.
"The Wilson Mexican Policy." Literary Digest, September 6, 1913, pp. 361-62.
Newspapers
Chapultepee (Mexico City) , July 7, 1914.
El Correo Espanol (Mexico City) , April 15-28, 1914.
El Dqnocrata (Mexico Ci ty) , Sept. 20, Oct. 3, 1914.
El Diario (Mexico Ci ty) , April 15, 1914.
El Dictamen (Veracruz), May 1-November 24, 1914.
El Paso Morning Times, April 19-27, 1914.
El Imparcial (Mexico Ci ty) , January 1-Apr1l 24, 1914.
El Independiente (Mexico Ci ty) , February 6, April 22-23, 1914.
Irish-American (New York), April 25, 1914.
278 El Mensajero (San Juan Bautista), May 4-June 8, 1914.
Mexican Herald (Mexico City and Veracruz), July 23, 1913; February 5-November 9, 1914.
El Nacional (Mexico City), April 21, 1947.
New Orleans Times-Picayune, April 12-21, November 24, 1914.
New York American, April 17, 1914.
New York Call. April 22, 1914.
New York Evening Journal. April 21, 27, 1914.
New York Journal, April 22, 1914.
New York Times, October 17, 1909; July 23, 1913; March 15, April 26, 19T2r~
New York World, January 8, April 13-24, 1914.
La Opinion (Veracruz), April 26-May 4, 1914.
Periodico Official del Gobierno del Estado de Puebla, April 28, 1914.
El Popular (Mexico City), April 23, 1948.
La Regeneracion (Los Angeles), July 4, 11, 1914.
San Francisco Chronicle, April 13-18, November 25, 1914.
Los Sucesos (Veracruz), April 24, August 25, 1914.
La Union (Veracruz), April 24-May 9, 1914.
Veracruz (Mexico City), June 2, 1914.
La Voz de Juarez (Cuernavaca), May 16, August 6, 1914.
Unpublished Materials
Anderson, William Woodrow. "The Nature of the Mexican Revolution as Viewed from the United States. 1910-1917." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas. 1967.
Block, Robert Hoyt. "Southern Opinion of Woodrow Wilson's Foreign Policies. 1913-1917." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1968.
279 Donnell, Guy Renfro. "United States Intervention in Mexico, 1914."
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas, 1951.
Gerhardt, Raymond Carl. "England and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Texas Tech University, 1970.
Glaser, David Philip. "Pacific Northwest Press Reaction to Wilson's Mexican Diplomacy 1913-1916." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Idaho, 1965.
Kargleder, Charles Leonard. "Selected Mexican Leaders as Characterized in Certain Novels of the Revolution." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Alabama, 1968.
Kestenbaum, Justin Louis. "The Question of Intervention in Mexico, 1913-1917." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University, 1963.
Marina, William Frank. "Opponents of Empire: An Interpretation of American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1921." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Denver, 1968.
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