Copyright 2003, Johns Hopkins University, 10/19/2003 Medicare Risk Adjustment Development by Johns Hopkins Chad Abrams, MA Cabrams@jhsph.edu Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health 624 N Broadway #600 Baltimore, Maryland 21205 June 6, 2004 San Diego CA
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Copyright 2003, Johns Hopkins University, 10/19/2003 Medicare Risk Adjustment Development by Johns Hopkins Chad Abrams, MA Cabrams@jhsph.edu Johns Hopkins.
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1) The frailty variable increases explanatory power AND provides greater predictiveaccuracy
Data Source: 1996-97 Medicare 5 Percent Sample
Copyright 2004, Johns Hopkins University, 5/20
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2) Be careful. Higher R2and improved accuracy for top quintiles may result in substantial overpayment for first
quintile.
Data Source: 1996-97 Medicare 5 Percent Sample
Copyright 2004, Johns Hopkins University, 5/20
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3) Sometimes the kitchen-sink approach works
Data Source: 1996-97 Medicare 5 Percent Sample
Copyright 2004, Johns Hopkins University, 5/20
16Comparison to CMS 61-Disease Model and HCC
Data Source: 1996-97 Medicare 5 Percent Sample*61-Disease Model the then “current” model as of Nov. 2001.** HCC model results from Pope et all Dec 2000
Copyright 2004, Johns Hopkins University, 5/20
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The Goal--
Ideally, payment models should pay appropriately for sick individuals while at the same time removing or reducing traditional incentives for promoting biased selection
Copyright 2004, Johns Hopkins University, 5/20
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How are we doing?
•Current technologies probably not adequate
•Re-insurance and/or carve-outs are still necessary to assure adequate payment for treating high cost patients
•R-squared is probably NOT the correct criteria for evaluating model performance
Copyright 2004, Johns Hopkins University, 5/20
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Conclusions
•The type of variables included matters • In general, disease specific markers
–do not provide adequate payment for the sick, and
–possibly lead to substantial overpayment for healthy
individuals
•Markers such as “hospital dominant” (likely to lead to a hospitalization) and “frail-symptoms” (a proxy for ADLs) successfully target the sick without falsely identifying healthy