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Rules of exponentsA Review of the Operations of the Voting Section

of the Civil Rights ...

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Angara v. Electoral Commission

Peo v VeraYNOT VS IACSALONGA VS CRUZ PANOJAVIER V COMELEC

SupremacyPEOPLE V VERA

Summary: People vs. Vera

justiciabilityheard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal casePolitical QuestionAccused is informed why he is proceeded against. Held: YES. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personaland substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained.SupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial Review

Ynot vs. IAC

justiciability

Section 5 [2] (a), the decision of lower courts declaring a law unconstitutional is subject to review by the Supreme CourtPolitical QuestionAccused is informed why he is proceeded against. Held: YES. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personaland substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained.SupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial Review

Ynot vs. IAC

justiciabilitySection 5 [2] (a), the decision of lower courts declaring a law unconstitutiona

l is subject to review by the Supreme CourtPolitical QuestionAccused is informed why he is proceeded against. Held: YES. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personaland substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained.SupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial Review

Ynot vs. IAC


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justiciabilitySection 5 [2] (a), the decision of lower courts declaring a law unconstitutional is subject to review by the Supreme CourtPolitical QuestionFacts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos andcarabeef from one province to another.SupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial Review

Salonga v Cruz Pano

justiciabilityFACTS: A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro ManilaPolitical QuestionFacts: one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen killedhimself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion ofa small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb.Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property..SupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial Review

Salonga v Cruz Pano

justiciabilityBombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had beenlinked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.Within the next 24 hours, arrest,search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor LovelySupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial Review

Javier v Comelec

Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trialfor thesemurders. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting theOpposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.SupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial Review

Javier v Comelec

Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trialfor thesemurders. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting theOpposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.Supremacy

The Exercise of Judicial Review

Salonga v Cruz Pano

justiciabilityBombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had beenlinked to the various bombings in Metro Manila.Within the next 24 hours, arrest,search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salon


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ga, who were apparently implicated by Victor LovelySupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply.An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannotagain be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law atleast when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an iaSupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILpeo v ferrer

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissingthe information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for beingan officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judgeSupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILpeo v ferrer

2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without anyforms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organiza

tional guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.SupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILpeo v ferrer

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefitof the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislativedetermination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons,groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)Supremacy

The Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILBAYAN v. ZAMORA

A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act Facts:The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted toa series of conferences and negotiations which culminatedSupremacyThe Exercise of Judicial ReviewKILBAYAN v. ZAMORA

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?HELD:Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving fore

ign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To acertain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes requiredSupremacyEstrada pardon barred him from running

Estrada pardon barred him from running, lawyers sayFormer president Joseph Estrada


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Two private lawyers on Tuesday asked the Sandiganbayan to clarify whether or notthe presidential pardon given to former president Joseph Estrada after his conviction for plunder in 2007 allowed him to run for elective office.Estrada, who ran but lost a presidential bid in 2010, has again filed a certificate of candidacy this time for mayor of Manila.

SupremacyEstrada pardon barred him from running

In A Motion for Determination and Interpretation of Judgment in the Plunder Casein Relation to the Conditional Pardon, lawyers Fernando Perito and Nepthali Aliposa said Estrada may have violated the conditions of the pardon granted by thenpresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo when he decided to again seek elective position or office.SupremacyEstrada pardon barred him from running

to no longer seek any elective position or office. Hence, the pardon did not restore his right to run for any elective office.Furthermore, the Sandiganbayans imposition of the accessory penalty of perpetual a

bsolute disqualification from holding public office was not expressly erased by the pardon.

SupremacyComelec warns vs. double-registrants

Javier vs. COMELEC

JAVIER VS. COMELEC

G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22, 1986FACTS:1. The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent Arturo Pacificadorwere candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa election in May 1984;2. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvassof the election returns, Javier went to the COMELEC to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival;3. On May 18, 1984, the S

Supremacy

Comelec warns vs. double-registrants

Javier vs. COMELEC

JAVIER VS. COMELECG.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22, 1986

FACTS:second Division of the COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate


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until further orders;4. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediatelyconvene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petition filed by Javier with the COMELEC;


Javier vs. COMELEC


FACTS:second Division of the COMELEC directed the provincial board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidateuntil further orders;4. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediatelyconvene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petition filed by Javier with the COMELEC;


Javier vs. COMELEC


FACTS:ISSUE:Was the Second Division of the COMELEC, authorized to promulgate its decision ofJuly 23, 1984 proclaiming Pacificador the winner in the election ?APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSITUTION:The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution are Art. XII-C, secs. 2 and 3, which provide:


Javier vs. COMELEC


FACTS:

Section 2. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial


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and city officials.

SupremacyRandy David Vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo In Congress

Facts : On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency.Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrest and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implementedUndeterred by the announcements that rallies and public protest would not be allowed, members of Kilusang Mayo Uno and National Federation of Labor Unions, marched. During the dispersal of the rallyist along EDSA,SupremacyRandy David Vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo In Congress

Facts :Police arrested without warrant petitioner Randolf S. David, a Proffesor of theUniversity of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.Issue: Whether the issuance of PP 1017 is Constitutional, Whether the provisionof PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, and provision declaring nationalemergency under section 17, article VII of theSupremacyRandy David Vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo In Congress

Facts :Constitution is Constitutional. Whether G.O. No. 5 is Constitutional Whether the dispersal and warrantless arrest, the warrantless search are Constitutional.Held:

PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitute a call by the Presidentfor the AFP to prevent or suppress Lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by section 18, article VII of the constitution. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power to issue decrees to direct AFP toSupremacyRandy David Vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo In Congress

Facts :enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as decrees promulgated by the President; and to impose standards on media or any formof prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Courtalso rules that under section 17, article XII of the constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.Supremacy


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bAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

Facts :Bayan members assembled at Plaza Ferguson in Ermita, Manila several meters awayfrom the US embassy

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005SupremacybAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

Facts :Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.

SupremacybAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

iSSUES::Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL


The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreementor treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law Notice can be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements thatare policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement th

ese policymaking agreements are merelySupremacybAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN ET AL V ERMITA

submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.


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submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.

The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-USMutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate

SupremacyDEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC

Is there a law which would provide for the mechanism for the people to proposeamendments to the Constitution by peoples initiative?

While Congress had enacted RA 6735 purportedly to provide the mechanisms forthe peoples exercise the power to amend the Constitution by peoples initiative, the Supreme Court in MIRIAMSupremacyDEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 & June 10, 1997, the Supreme Court held that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to

the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fataland cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry the purposes of this act.

Supremacy

LIM V EXEC SECRETARY

FACTS :Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, inBalikatan 02-1. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into bythe Philippines and the United States in 1951.Supremacy

LIM V EXEC SECRETARY


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On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.Petitioners contend that the RP and theUS signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorizeAmerican soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory.

ISSUE :Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA.RULING :Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sol

e encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Case DigestFRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESG.R. NO. 160261

NOV. 10, 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congres

sabi... insufficient in substancesecond impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the MemberISSUE:Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

HELD:While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the Houseof Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations

Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Case Digest


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These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSISPetitioner: Manila Prince HotelRespondent: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),

Facts:- The shares (31% to 50%) of Manila Hotel Corporation were sold by GSIS throughpublic bidding.- There were twoManila Prince Hotel vs. GSISbidders Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (Filipino firm) and Renong Berhad (Malaysian firm)- Renong Berhad bade higher than

- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the highest bidder, MPHC sent a managers check amounting to the same bid by RB.- GSIS refused toManila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS

accept offer.- Petitioner prayed for writ of mandamus and prohibition. Lower court issued a restraining order preventing GSIS and Renong Berhad from consummating the sale.

- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the highest bidder, MPHC sent a managers check amounting to the same bid by RB.- GSIS refused toSupremacy

LAMIBINO ET AL V COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group)commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what- Invoked by petitioners: Section 10 of Article XII. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dic

tates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associationsat least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments.

Issue: Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 ConstitutionHeld:A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except bythe authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system


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of government, assigns to the differentHeld: (CONT)departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authorityadministered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,

Held: (CONT)Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce aconstitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions - whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question - has resulted in a political crisis.Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato

Issue: whether the petitioner has the requisite personality to questionthe validity of the contract in this caseHeld:

Yes. Kilosbayans status as a peoples organization give itthe requisite personality to question the validity of the contract inthis case. The Constitution provides that the State shall respect therole of independent peoples organizations to enable the people to pur

sue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate andcollective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means,that their right to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged.

Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato

These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only realparties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, mayinvoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of the Court, even in c

ases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the veryheart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-ma

king in the courts from decision-makingKilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato

in the political departments of the government and bars the bringingof suits by just any party.

It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in thepast accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving paramount public interest. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) incases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions.Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato


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Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim ofillegal disbursement of public funds. or where a tax measure is ass

ailed as unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to question the validityof election laws because of their obvious interest in the validity of such laws. Concerned citizens can bring suits if the constitutionalquestion they raise is of transcendental importance which must be settled early. Legislators are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives qua legislators.Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato

Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these variouslitigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but theydo not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayers suits asset forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, to wit:

While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure ofpublic moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege

that their tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or

Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Moratothat there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Besides, the institution of a taxpayers suit, per se, is no assurance ofjudicial review. The Court is vested with discretion as to whether ornot a taxpayers suit should be entertained.

Petitioners suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers suits.

or

Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. MoratoThus, petitioners right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invokedbecause they do not complain of any infringement of their rights aslegislators.

TECSON V COMELEC

7. To what citizenship principle does the Philippines adhere to? Explain,and give illustrative case.


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Held: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soliwhich determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.Supremacy


was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidentialform of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petitionSupremacy

LAMBINO ET AL V COMELEC

due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVIISupremacy


of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative; (2) Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaringRA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals toSupremacy



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amend the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. T

Supremacy


he Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the PeopleSupremacy


The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.Supremacy


2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and


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revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution maySupremacy


propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and theexecutive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not NecessaryEven assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change t

Supremacy

OPOSA V FACTORAN

Oposa vs. FactoranFact:a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippin

e rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

Supremacy

oposa v factoran

The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the

plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, andentitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasurethat is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resourcebut are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them allSupremacy

oposa v factoran


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before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for thatjudgment be rendered:1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approvingnew timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimentalSupremacy

oposa v factoran

consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?HELD:YES

Petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it thecorrelative duty toSupremacy

oposa v factoran

refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a causeof action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative dut

y.Supremacy

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS


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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSISPetitioner: Manila Prince HotelRespondent: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Manila Hotel Corporation, Committee on Privatization and Office of the Government Corporate CounselFacts:- The shares (31% to 50%) of Manila Hotel Corporation were sold by GSIS throughpublic bidding.Supremacy


- There were two bidders Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (Filipino firm) and Renong Berhad (Malaysian firm)- Renong Berhad bade higher than Manila Prince Hotel

Supremacy


Corporation.- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the highest bidder, MPHC sent a managers check amounting to the same bid by RB.- GSIS refused to accept offer.- Petitioner prayed for writ of mandamus and prohibition. Lower court issued a restraining order preventing GSIS and Renong Berhad from consummating the sale.

- Invoked by petitioners: Section 10 of Article XII. TSupremacy



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he Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, whenthe national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capitalSupremacy


is wholly owned by Filipinos. (Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares

of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.)- The answer of the respondents are the following:1. Section 10 of Article 12 is not self-executing. For the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under which business maybe done.

2. Granting the provision is self-executing, the Manila Hotel Corporation is notpart of national patrimony. The mandate of the Constitution is addressed to theState, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separateand distinct from the Philippines as a State.3. The Constitutional provision cannot be invoked because what is sold is only 51% of the total shares of the corporation, not the building or the land where it

is built.4. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSISpremature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.5. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken pl

ace.MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSISpremature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.5. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS


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KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATOG.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3%of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminaannually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million.Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contractof Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the lawregarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of thecase Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because theywere not parties to the contract

ISSUES:Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

HELD:NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense beregarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not.

PACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

The petitioning colleges and universities request that Actbe declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachersparents of liberty and property without due process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; andPACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power anddiscretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative#

It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant toconsider petitioners demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where,as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrongnor allege anyfrom the enforcementPACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

2706 An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schoolsIt is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediatelyin danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is n


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ot sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke thejudicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public.

PACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

Bona fide suit.Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.a hypothetical threat being insufficientIn this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretaryof Education have transcended the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed toPACU vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable forbeing capricious, or pain nuisance; and it is one of our decisional practices thatunless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it. (Santiago v Far Eastern

We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the hands of the Secretary of Education complete control of the various activitiesof private schools, and why the statute should be struck down as unconstitution

al.KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA

Facts:

This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, whichseeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine GamingManagement Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the online lottery system, also known as lotto.

Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns,and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as membersof the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacitiesas members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.

Issue:

whether petitioners have legal standing to bring the suit

Held:

Yes. A partys standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA

This technicality may be brushed aside if the transcendental importance to the p


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ublic of the case demands that it be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if the Court must, technicalities of procedure.

KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA

This technicality may be brushed aside if the transcendental importance to the public of the case demands that it be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if the Court must, technicalities of procedure.

Ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, andnon-profit civic organizations are allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before the Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions,KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA

The instant petition is of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category evenhigher than thoseinvolved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even inthe remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive andKILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA

retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggeringas the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion,the Court

hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to takeadvantage of.

KILOSBAYAN V GUINGONA

DUE PROCESS ANDDUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

Facts:Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963to be applicable in the city of Manila.

They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because itwould impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests wouldfill upa form specifying their personal information.There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due processErmita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)


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and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because itwould impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests wouldfill up

a form specifying their personal information.There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due processErmita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)Issue:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due processclause?Held: No. Judgment reversed.Ratio:"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, theJudiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine

of standing is built on the principle of separation of powersSparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicialbranch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

TANADA V TUVERA

II. Legal StandingLegal Standing, or locus standi, is the right of appearance in a court of justiceon a given question.[21] It satisfies an important requirement before a questioninvolving the constitutionality or legality of a law or other

UP studygovernment act may be heard and decided by a court: that it must be raised by the proper party.[22] Stated otherwise, a court will exercise its power of judicial reviewwhich is the power of courts to determine the constitutionality or legality of contested executive and legislative acts[23] only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.[24]The traditional rule is that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power.

TANADA V TUVERATanada v TuveraReal parties in interest are the proper parties in cases that do not also invok

e the power of judicial review. In cases that invoke the power of judicial review, the proper parties are those with standing. In Morato, even though the powerof judicial review was invoked,Court ruled that because no constitutional question was actually involved, the issue was not whether petitioners had legal standing but whether they were the real parties in interest.

Tanada v Tuvera(uOn this premise the Court declared that the petitioners were not the proper parties because [i]n actions for the annulment of contractsthe real parties are those


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who are parties to the agreement or are bound

either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contractor who claim a right to take part in a public biddingbut have been illegally excluded from it.[27] This ruling in Morato, however, issandwiched between prior and subsequent Supreme Court decisions which directly contradict it.[28] In fact, the argument that actions for annulment of governmentcontracts may be instituted only by those bound by it was rejected as early as1972 in City Council of Cebu City v. Cuizon,[29]in which legal standing was granted to city councilors who assailed aTanada v Tuveragovernment contract even though no constitutional question was involved. Fairlyrecently in 2005, Cuizon was cited in Jumamil v. Caf,[30]also a case where no constitutional question was involved, in ruling that [a] taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity.

Also, citizens standing (which was asserted in Morato) is granted in public suitsbecause in those cases the people are regarded as the real party in interest.[32]Thus, even if no constitutional question is involved, any person with legal standingalthough notTanada v Tuvera

a real party in interestmay invoke the power of judicial review.Tanada v TuveraLAMBINO VS. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]Monday, January 19, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed apetition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that thepetition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the presentbicameral- pr

esidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petitioncomplies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative; (2)Whether or Not this Court should revisit its rulingin Santiagodeclaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential termsand conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion indenying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC didnot grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is dec


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eptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment andrevision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not NecessaryEven assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

BACKGROUNDRaul Lambino of Sigaw ng Bayan and Erico Aumentado of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) filed a petition for people's initiative before the Commission on Elections on August 25, 2006, after months of gathering signatures all over the country. Lambino claimed that the petition is backed by 6.3 million registered voters.

The COMELEC denied the petition, reasoning that a lack of an enabling law keepsthem from entertaining such petitions. It invoked a 1997 Supreme Court ruling (Santiago vs. COMELEC), where the Supreme Court declared RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.COMELEC's ruling prompted Lambino and Aumentado to bring their case before the Supreme Court.However, the Supreme Court upheld COMELEC's ruling on the petition for people'sinitiative. The decision came out on October 25, 2006, with a close 8-7 vote.

SUMMARY OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONThe Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of theConstitution for conducting a peoples initiative.

The Constitution requires that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."Lambino's group failed to include the full text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets-- a fatal omission, according to the Supreme Court ruling, because it means a majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheetscould not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes.A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. Only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. A peoples initiative may proposeonly amendments to the Constitution."A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself." -- Supr

eme CourtThe Supreme Court sees no need to revisit an earlier ruling since the present case (Lambino vs. COMELEC) can be resolved on some other grounds.In a 1997 ruling on Santiago vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court ruled that RA 6735 (the law regulating the people's right of initiative) was inadequate to cover thesystem of initiative on constitutional amendments.In the present case, the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution on conducting a people's initiative. That alone warrantsthe petition's dismissal.An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the its outcome of the pr


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esent petition.The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Lambino Group's petition for people's initiative.COMELEC merely followed the Supreme Court's earlier ruling on Santiago vs. COMELEC

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC (PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE)Lambino, et al. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, 25 October 2006) Digest

On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado (Lambino Group)commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 orthe Initiative and Referendum Act. The proposed changes under the petition willshift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters; and (b) COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the petition for lack of an enablinglaw governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the Su

preme Courts ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Elections. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition.1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on direct proposal by the peopleSection 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text ofthe proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text.The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon

a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.This means two essential elements must be present.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, thepetition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before not after signing.

Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft ofthe proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omi


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ssion is fatal.An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text ofthe proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden fromthe people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiativesArticle XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoples initiative.Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Groups

initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revisionof a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, whil

e amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60%is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree asan additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment andnot a revision.The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provisionbeing amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word republicanwith monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radicallyoverhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisio


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ns of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus,constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions tothe constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish suchfar reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmentalplan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of itsBranches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group initiativeis a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. Ashift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentarysystem is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive

branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise,the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revisionof procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes arecalled revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the cges. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an ion, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that theexpress intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contra

dict the Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language ofthe Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from suchcategorical intent and language.3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessaryThe petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, ArticleXVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is, therefore, no need to revisit this Courts rulingin Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present


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petition. It settled that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of astatute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provision must first be complied with even before complying with RA 6735. Worse, the petition violates the following provisions of RA 6735:a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the petition as signatories. The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition or the amended petitionfiled with the COMELEC. Only Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed the petitionand amended petition.b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government

ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS APOLONIO EXEVEA

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR, Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A.Lumiqued, petitioners,vs.

Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992;HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, Senior DeputyExecutive Secretary of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO,Private Respondent, respondents.ROMERO, J.:Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel duringan administrative inquiry?Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12,1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this pet

ition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.

The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Disciplineof the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989, 1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday.

In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, 2 private respondentaccused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government "by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification of accounting entries inorder not to reflect on 'Cash advances of other officials' under code 8-70-600of accounting rules."The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, 3 charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous comp


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laints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as RegionalCashier without just cause.ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS APOLONIO EXEVEA

The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department ofJustice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice SecretaryEduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea ascommittee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoenadirecting Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondent's complaints.The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, 4 Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondent's execution of an affidavit of desistance. 5

Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters.He submitted, however, that such consumption was warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of the five service vehicles issued under his name and intendedfor the use of the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR. He added that thereceipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned overto him by drivers for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify that the same were validly issued by theestablishments concerned in order that official transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that

he and his companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a vulcanizing shop who readily furnishedthem with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own receiptso that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the ownerof said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990. 6 With respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amountwas actually only P6.60. Any error committed in posting the amount in the booksof the Regional Office was not his personal error or accountability.To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification 7 of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F.

Almora that he had no outstanding cash advances on record as of December 31, 1989.In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that private respondent was not terminated from the service but was merelyrelieved of her duties due to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required applications for leave of absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval of her application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her second application for leaveof absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head office or upon her return to work. He also asserted that no medical certificate sup


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ported her application

ARSENIO LUMIQUED VS APOLONIO EXEVEA

for leave of absence.In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent wascorrupt and dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from June 22 to November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned the amount on January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued asserted that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs that would not require handling of cash and money matters.Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, butLumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel.The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appearedon the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, 8 alleging that he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently becausethe investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992, 9 State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sa

cred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date was upon the request of respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that respondent advised the Investigating committee of his confinement and inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel. The records likewise do not show that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of respondent'scondition on any reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23, 1992, respondent was already being assisted by counsel.Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficiency, completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together with the documentary evidence annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted is already possible.Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed much longer.

Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered areport dated July 31, 1992, 10finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. It made the following findings:After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsifiARSENIO LUMIQUED VS APOLONIO EXEVEA

ed is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different gasoline stations where the respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes "G-1" to "G-15" sh

ow that the actual average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 litersonly at a purchase price of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what he actually spends. While only 15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern and the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government has, nevertheless, been established.That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment


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of an average consumption of 108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was beingused by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also admitted having signed the receipts.Respondent's act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money byfalsifying receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also acriminal offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash advances totaling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences (sic).On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondent's act in relieving the complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). The recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or almostsix months after the respondent's order relieving the complainant was issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of the respondent who is a head ofoffice.The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respondent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only tohave the cases against him dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno

Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal

ATENEO V COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiationrites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol M

edical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillocreated a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which wastasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstancessurrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension.The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, founda prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then requiredto file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a D

isciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However,in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they arecurrently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the c


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harges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered

ATENEO V COURT OF APPEALS

Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students tosubmit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in

this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions inacademic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or offic

ial designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case

GOLDBERG V KELLY

People on welfare speaking through lawyers claimed their right to be heard.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).Although the Goldberg decisions place in history has shifted dramatically o

ver the past forty three years, it holdings still ring true. Justice Brennans desire to see those men and women suffering in poverty granted, at the very least,the decency of community and fellowship is an embrace of our potential as a society. His words, using the legal theories of process and notice as a vehicle, f

or at least one shining moment remain rightly focused on the humanity and decency society rightfully owes the individual who are, for legitimate reasons, unableto propel themselves forward on their own. And aside from the economic benefit, Brennans decision in Goldberg v. Kelly solidified what poverty lawyers had spent long fought for: the ability of poor people simply to be heard.

GOLDBERG V KELLY

Social Changes Prior to Goldberg


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Social welfare programs had long been the bastion of the church and private charity. Hanson, Ph.D., John E., The Federal-State Public Welfare Programs 1935-1995, The Social Welfare History Project (last accessed February 2, 2013) (available at http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/programs/federal-state-public-welfare-programs/). While some state and local governments ran modified benefit programs to certain sects of people, wholesale welfare programs were not embracedby the federal government until the need for such programs became overwhelming.Id. During the Great Depression, as unemployment rates reached 25 percent andhundreds of thousands of Americans found themselves homeless, these private charities could no longer handle the need. Incorporated in the New Deal employmentprograms, President Roosevelt in 1935 created a federal program of benefits forimpoverished children and widowed women. Id. The program grew, and eventuallybecame Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), the nations first robust federal welfareprogram. Michael Katz, In the Shadow Of the Poorhouse: A Social History Of Welfare In America, New York: Basic Books (1998).

The ADC operated by adding federal aid to an impoverished single mothers'pension programs, others. However, the program was not funded through the federal treasury; instead, federally administered ADC aid was contingent on state contributions.

UP V HON. LIGOT-TELANConstitutional Law II: Dea-n Pangalangan

Connection of privilege to right.Driver's license: While originally deemed to be a privilege, it is connected toprotected rights of property (when it becomes essential to the livelihood) and liberty