Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

A primary purpose of the juvenile justice system is to hold juvenileoffenders accountable for delinquent acts while providing treatment,rehabilitative services, and programs designed to prevent future involve-ment in law-violating behavior. Established in 1899 in Chicago, IL, inresponse to the harsh treatment children received in the criminal justicesystem, the first juvenile court recognized the developmental differencesbetween children and adults and espoused a rehabilitative ideal. However,since the passage of revised death penalty statutes in the last quarter ofthe 20th century, and during recent periods of increased violent crime, ashift in the juvenile justice system toward stronger policies and punish-ments has occurred.This shift includes the waiver or transfer of morejuvenile offenders to criminal court than in the past. Increasing numbersof capital offenders, including youth who committed capital offenses priorto their 18th birthdays, are now subject to “absolute” sentences, includingthe death penalty and life in prison without parole.

Currently, 38 States authorize the death penalty; 23 of these permit theexecution of offenders who committed capital offenses prior to their18th birthdays.1 However, the laws governing application of the deathpenalty in those 23 States vary, and the variation is not necessarily tied torates of juvenile crime. Since 1973, when the death penalty was reinstat-ed, 17 men have been executed for crimes they committed as juveniles(see table 1), and 74 people in the United States currently sit on deathrow for crimes they committed as juveniles (Streib, 2000).2

Debate about the use of the death penalty for juveniles has grown moreintense in light of calls for the harsher punishment of serious and violent

Juveniles and the Death Penalty

Lynn Cothern

From theAdministratorThe appropriateness of the deathpenalty for juveniles is the subject ofintense debate despite SupremeCourt decisions upholding its use.Although nearly half the Statesallow those who commit capitalcrimes as 16- and 17-year-olds tobe sentenced to death, some ques-tion whether this is compatible withthe principles on which our juvenilejustice system was established.

This Bulletin examines the historyof capital punishment and SupremeCourt decisions related to its usewith juveniles. It also includes pro-files of those sentenced to death forcrimes committed as juveniles andnotes the international movementtoward abolishing this sanction.

I hope that this Bulletin enhancesour understanding of the issuesinvolved in applying the death penal-ty to juveniles so that we may focusour energy and resources on effective and humane responses to juvenile crime and violence.

John J.WilsonActing Administrator

John J. Wilson, Acting Administrator November 2000

juvenile offenders, changingperceptions of public safety, andinternational challenges to thedeath penalty’s legality. Proponentssee its use as a deterrent againstsimilar crimes, an appropriate sanc-tion for the commission of certainserious crimes, and a way to main-tain public safety. Opponentsbelieve it fails as a deterrent and isinherently cruel and point to therisk of wrongful conviction.Theconstitutionality of the juveniledeath penalty has been the subjectof intense national debate in thelast decade. Several Supreme Courtdecisions and high-profile caseshave led to increased public inter-est and closer examination of theissues by academics, legislators, andpolicymakers.

This Bulletin examines the statusof capital punishment in the sen-tencing of individuals who commitcrimes as juveniles.3 It examinesthe history of the death penalty,including the juvenile death penal-ty; provides a profile of those cur-rently on death row; notes State-by-State differences in sentencingoptions; and reviews the use of thedeath penalty in an internationalcontext.

History of the DeathPenalty

Approximately 20,000 peoplehave been legally executedin the United States in the

past 350 years (Streib, 2000). Exe-cutions declined through the1950’s and 1960’s and ceased after1967, pending definitive SupremeCourt decisions.This hiatus endedonly after States altered their lawsin response to the Supreme Courtdecision in Furman v. Georgia,4 a

contribution to acceptable goalsof punishment.

In Furman, the Supreme Courtruled that the death penalty wasarbitrarily and capriciously appliedunder existing law based on theunlimited discretion accorded tosentencing authorities in capitaltrials. As a result, more than 600death sentences for prisoners thenon death row were vacated.

In response, States began to revisetheir statutes in 1973 to modify thediscretion given to sentencingauthorities, and some States againbegan sentencing adult offendersto death. By 1975, 33 States hadintroduced revised death penaltystatutes.These statutes wentuntested until Gregg v. Georgia,5 acase in which the Supreme Courtfound, in a 7–2 decision, that the

5–4 decision that the death penalty,as imposed under existing law, con-stituted cruel and unusual punish-ment in violation of the 8th and14th amendments of the U.S. Con-stitution.To decide eighth amend-ment cases, the Supreme Courtuses an analytical framework thatincludes three criteria. A punish-ment is cruel and unusual if:

● It is a punishment originallyunderstood by the framers ofthe Constitution to be crueland unusual.

● There is a societal consensusthat the punishment offendscivilized standards of humandecency.

● It is (1) grossly disproportionateto the severity of the crimeor (2) makes no measurable

2 Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Table 1. Executions of Juvenile Offenders,January 1, 1973, through June 30, 2000

Date of Place of Age at Age at Name Execution Execution Race Crime Execution

Charles Rumbaugh 9/11/1985 Texas White 17 28

J.Terry Roach 1/10/1986 S. Carolina White 17 25

Jay Pinkerton 5/15/1986 Texas White 17 24

Dalton Prejean 5/18/1990 Louisiana Black 17 30

Johnny Garrett 2/11/1992 Texas White 17 28

Curtis Harris 7/1/1993 Texas Black 17 31

Frederick Lashley 7/28/1993 Missouri Black 17 29

Ruben Cantu 8/24/1993 Texas Latino 17 26

Chris Burger 12/7/1993 Georgia White 17 33

Joseph John Cannon 4/22/1998 Texas White 17 38

Robert A. Carter 5/18/1998 Texas Black 17 34

Dwayne A.Wright 10/14/1998 Virginia Black 17 26

Sean R. Sellars 2/4/1999 Oklahoma White 16 29

Christopher Thomas 1/10/2000 Virginia White 17 26

Steve E. Roach 1/19/2000 Virginia White 17 23

Glen C. McGinnis 1/25/2000 Texas Black 17 27

Gary L. Graham 6/22/2000 Texas Black 17 36

Source: Streib, 2000.

death penalty did not per se violatethe eighth amendment.The Greggdecision allowed States to establishthe death penalty under guidelinesthat eliminated the arbitrarinessof sentencing in capital cases.Thefollowing safeguards were developedto make sentencing more equitable:

● In death penalty cases, thedetermination of guilt or inno-cence must be decided sep-arately from hearings in whichsentences of life imprisonmentor death are decided.

● The court must consider aggra-vating and mitigating circum-stances in relation to both thecrime and the offender.

● The death sentence must besubject to review by the highestState court of appeals to ensurethat the penalty is in proportionto the gravity of the offense andis imposed even-handedly underState law.

By 1995, 38 States and the FederalGovernment had enacted statutesauthorizing the death penalty forcertain forms of murder.

History of the JuvenileDeath Penalty

T homas Graunger, the firstjuvenile known to be exe-cuted in America, was tried

and found guilty of bestiality in1642 in Plymouth Colony, MA(Hale, 1997). Since that execution,361 individuals have been executedfor crimes committed when theywere juveniles (Streib, 2000).

The Supreme Court decided itsfirst juvenile case—Kent v. UnitedStates,6 in which it limited the wai-

November 2000 3

based on the defendant’s age(Eddings was 16 at the time hemurdered a highway patrol officer).Without ruling on the constitu-tionality of the juvenile deathpenalty, the Court vacated thejuvenile’s death sentence on thegrounds that the trial court hadfailed to consider additional miti-gating circumstances. Eddings wasimportant, however, because theCourt held that the chronologicalage of a minor is a relevant mitigat-ing factor that must be consideredat sentencing. Justice Powell, inwriting for the majority, stated:

[Y]outh is more than a chrono-logical fact. It is a time of lifewhen a person may be themost susceptible to influenceand psychological damage. Ourhistory is replete with laws andjudicial recognition that minors,especially in their earlier years,generally are less mature andresponsible than adults.8

The Supreme Court rejected fiverequests between 1983 and 1986to consider the constitutionality ofimposing the death penalty upon ajuvenile (Jackson, 1996). It was notuntil 1987, in Thompson v. Okla-homa,9 that the Supreme Courtagreed to consider this specificissue.The 5–3 decision vacated thedefendant’s death sentence (at theage of 15,Thompson had partici-pated in the murder of his formerbrother-in-law). However, only fourjustices agreed that the executionof a 15-year-old would be crueland unusual punishment under allcircumstances (per se). Applyingthe standard eighth amendmentanalysis, Justices Stevens, Brennan,Marshall, and Blackmun opined thatthe execution would constitute

ver discretion of juvenile courts—in 1966. Initially, juvenile courts hadenjoyed broad discretion in decid-ing when to waive cases to crimi-nal court. However, waiver de-cisions were not consistent acrossStates, and legislatures began toreform the process by standardiz-ing judicial decisionmaking. Kentheld that juveniles were entitled toa hearing, representation by coun-sel, access to information uponwhich the waiver decision wasbased, and a statement of reasonsjustifying the waiver decision. Thecourt also laid out a number offactors that the juvenile courtjudge must consider in making thewaiver decision (Evans, 1992),including:

● The seriousness and type ofoffense and the manner inwhich it was committed.

● The sophistication and maturityof the juvenile as determined byconsideration of his or herhomelife, environmental situation,emotional attitude, and patternof living.

● The juvenile’s record and history.

● The prospects for protectingthe public and rehabilitating thejuvenile.

Juveniles were thus guaranteed cer-tain rights, but they still potentiallyfaced the same punishments, includ-ing capital punishment, as adults inthe criminal justice system.

In the 1980’s, the Supreme Courtwas repeatedly asked to rule onwhether the execution of a juve-nile offender was permissibleunder the Constitution. Eddings v.Oklahoma7 was the first case theSupreme Court agreed to hear

4 Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

cruel and unusual punishmentbecause it was inconsistent withstandards of decency and failed tocontribute to the two social goalsof the death penalty—retributionand deterrence. Justice O’Connorconcurred, but pointed out thatOklahoma’s death penalty statuteset no minimum age at which thedeath penalty could be imposed.Sentencing a 15-year-old underthis type of statute violated thestandard for special care and delib-eration required in capital cases.The outcome of the decision wasthat a State’s execution of a juve-nile who had committed a capitaloffense prior to age 16 violatedThompson unless the State had aminimum age limit in its deathpenalty statute (Jackson, 1996).

The next year, in Stanford v.Kentucky10 and Wilkins v. Missouri,11

the Supreme Court expressly held,in a 5–4 decision, that the eighthamendment does not prohibit thedeath penalty for crimes commit-ted at age 16 or 17. In both cases,the Supreme Court upheld thedeath penalty sentence.While theThompson plurality used the three-part analysis (see page 2) to deter-mine if sentencing a juvenile off-ender to the death penaltyconstituted cruel and unusualpunishment, the Stanford pluralitydid not.The Stanford pluralityrejected the third part of the test,namely, that the punishment is dis-proportionate to the severity ofthe crime and makes no measura-ble contribution to the deterrenceof crime.

In Stanford, the Court consideredthe evolving standards of decencyin society as reflected in historical,judicial, and legislative precedents;current legislation; juries’ and pros-

ecutors’ views; and public, profes-sional, and international opinions.The Court based its determinationof evolving standards of decencyon legislative authorization of thepunishment.The dissenting judgesargued that the record of Stateand Federal legislation protectingjuveniles because of their inherentimmaturity was not relevant inconstituting a national consensus.The justices also found that publicopinion polls and professionalassociations were an “uncertainfoundation” on which to base con-stitutional law. In the end, theCourt found that capital punish-ment of juveniles ages 16 or 17did not offend societal standardsof decency.

Profile of YouthAffected

Since the series of SupremeCourt decisions upholdingthe use of the death penalty

for juveniles, juvenile offenders havereceived the sentence of death fair-ly consistently, at least during thepast 20 years. Since 1973, 196 juve-nile death sentences have beenimposed.This accounts for less than3 percent of the almost 6,900 totalU.S. death sentences. Approximatelytwo-thirds of these have beenimposed on 17-year-olds and nearlyone-third on 15- and 16-year-olds(see table 2).

The rate of juvenile death sentenc-ing was initially somewhat erratic,fluctuating in the years followingFurman v. Georgia (1972), but be-came more consistent in the mid-1980’s. The rate dropped some-what in the late 1980’s, possiblybecause of cases pending beforethe Supreme Court (Streib, 2000).

In the 1990’s, however, the annualrate returned to a consistent 2–3percent of all sentences, despitethe dramatic increase in juvenilearrests for murder that occurredbetween 1985 and 1995.

Of the 196 juvenile death sen-tences imposed since 1973, 74 (or38 percent) remain in force and105 (54 percent) have beenreversed. Of the 17 executionsthat have occurred since 1973, 4took place this year. Many juvenilesare well into adulthood by thetime they face execution.Thelength of time on death row hasranged from 6 to 20 years (Streib,2000).

As of June 2000, 74 adults, rangingin age from 18 to 41 years old,remain on death row for crimescommitted as juveniles:

● All 74 offenders are male.

● Seventy-three percent commit-ted their crimes at age 17.

● Sixty-three percent are minorities.

● They are on death row in 16different States.

● They have been on death rowfor periods ranging from a fewmonths to more than 21 years.

Of their victims, 80 percent wereadults, 64 percent were white, and53 percent were female.Texas,with 24 offenders on death rowwho committed their crimes asjuveniles, holds 34 percent of thenational total of such offenders(Streib, 2000).

Little information exists to charac-terize juvenile capital offendersbeyond bare demographics.

November 2000 5

Although the 1976 Gregg decisionestablished that the court mustconsider mitigating circumstances,capital offenders are often repre-sented by public defenders orother appointed counsel who oftendo not have the time or resourcesto adequately investigate mitigatingfactors such as psychiatric history,

family issues, and mental capacity.Thus, a complete profile of capitaloffenders is difficult to obtain,because detailed informationabout them is seldom available.

The few researchers who haveexamined this information haveadded to the profile of juveniles

sentenced to the death penalty.In the mid-1980’s, Lewis andcolleagues (1988) conducted diag-nostic evaluations of 14 (40 per-cent) of the 37 juvenile offenderson death row in the United States.12

Through these comprehensiveassessments, Lewis and colleaguesfound that all 14 had sustainedhead injuries as children. Nine hadmajor neuropsychological dis-orders, 7 had had psychotic disor-ders since early childhood, and 7had serious psychiatric distur-bances. Seven were psychotic atthe time of evaluation or had beendiagnosed in early childhood. Onlytwo had IQ scores above 90 (100is considered average). Only threehad average reading abilities, andanother three had learned to readon death row. Twelve reportedhaving been brutally abused physi-cally, sexually, or both, and fivereported having been sodomizedby relatives.

Many of these factors, however,had not been placed in evidence atthe time of trial or sentencing andhad not been used to establishmitigating circumstances:

The time and expertise re-quired to document the nec-essary clinical informationwere not available. Further-more, the attorneys’ allianceswere often divided betweenthe juveniles and their families.[O]n several occasions, attor-neys who chose to make useof our evaluations requestedthat we conceal or minimizeparental physical and sexualabuse to spare the family. . . .Brain damage, paranoidideation, physical abuse, andsexual abuse, all relevant toissues of mitigation, were

Table 2. Death Sentences Imposed for CrimesCommitted as Juveniles, 1973–2000

Juvenile DeathSentences Percentage of Juvenile

Total Death (Age at Crime) Sentences as PortionYear Sentences* 15 16 17 Total of Total Sentences

1973 42 0 0 0 0 0.0%

1974 149 1 0 2 3 2.0

1975 298 1 5 4 10 3.4

1976 233 0 0 3 3 1.3

1977 137 1 3 8 12 8.8

1978 187 0 1 6 7 3.7

1979 152 0 1 3 4 2.6

1980 174 2 0 3 5 2.9

1981 229 0 2 6 8 3.5

1982 268 0 1 13 14 5.2

1983 254 0 4 3 7 2.8

1984 283 3 0 3 6 2.1

1985 268 1 1 4 6 2.2

1986 299 1 3 5 9 3.0

1987 289 1 0 1 2 0.7

1988 291 0 0 5 5 1.7

1989 263 0 0 1 1 0.4

1990 252 1 3 4 8 3.2

1991 264 1 0 4 5 1.9

1992 289 0 1 5 6 2.1

1993 291 0 1 5 6 2.1

1994 321 0 4 13 17 5.3

1995 322 0 2 9 11 3.4

1996 317 0 4 6 10 3.2

1997 274 0 4 4 8 2.9

1998 285 0 4 7 11 3.9

1999 300† 0 3 6 9 3.0

2000 150† 0 0 3 3 2.0

Total 6,881† 13 47 136 196 2.8

Note: Adapted from Streib, 2000.* Data for this column were taken from Snell, 1999.† Estimates as of June 2000.

either overlooked or deliber-ately concealed (Lewis et al.,1988:588).

In most cases, Lewis and colleaguesfound that the inmates and theirfamilies did not want to acknowl-edge past abuse or mental illness.Only 5 of the 14 inmates under-went any pretrial psychiatric evalua-tion, and the research team foundthese evaluations to be both in-complete and inaccurate. In manyinstances, the defendants were rep-resented by public defenders orcourt-appointed attorneys whowere insufficiently prepared fortrial.13

Amnesty International found simi-lar results. In 9 of 23 juvenilecases it examined, lawyershandling later appeals identifiedmitigating evidence that had notbeen presented at the trial orsentencing hearing (AmnestyInternational, 1991). A case inpoint is Dwayne Allan Wright,who was executed October 14,1998, in Virginia’s GreensvilleCorrectional Center for a crimehe committed at age 17.14 Thecourt nominated a clinicalpsychologist, whom the defenseaccepted, only to find out laterthat the psychologist was theauthor of a study that concludedthat mental illness and environ-ment are not mitigating factors inthe commission of crimes andthat “criminals act because theydevelop an ability to ‘get awaywith’ their crimes and ‘live ratherwell’ as a result” (Amnesty Inter-national, 1998:30).

The research of Robinson andStephens (1992) corroboratedthat of Lewis and colleagues.Robinson and Stephens applied

(see table 3). Since 1973, Alabama,Florida, and Texas have used thepenalty more than other jurisdic-tions. Of the juveniles sentencedto the death penalty, all 21 His-panic offenders were sentencedin Arizona, Florida, Nevada, andTexas.Ten of the eleven cases inLouisiana involved African Ameri-can offenders, and all Oklahomaoffenders were white. There werefour cases of female offenders, oneeach in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana,and Mississippi. The 13 youngestoffenders, who were age 15 at thetime of their crimes, came from10 different States (Streib, 2000).

The States have responded differ-ently to the requirement imposedby Thompson (see pages 3–4).TheSupreme Court of Louisiana heldthat Thompson prevents 15-year-old offenders from being executedin that State (State v. Stone15 andDugar v. State16).The same is truefor Alabama (Flowers v. State17),Florida (Allen v. State18), and Indiana(Cooper v. State19).The FloridaSupreme Court ruled that theFlorida Constitution also prohibitsthe death penalty for 16-year-olds(Brennan v. State20) (Streib, 2000).

Currently, 38 States and the FederalGovernment have statutes authoriz-ing the death penalty for certainforms of murder. In 16 of thosejurisdictions (40 percent), offendersmust at a minimum be age 18 at thetime of the crime to be eligible forthat punishment (see table 4). Fivejurisdictions (13 percent) have aminimum age of 17. Nineteen juris-dictions (47 percent) use age 16 asthe minimum age. In 7 of thesejurisdictions, age 16 is expressed inthe statute; in the other 12, age 16has been established by court ruling(American Bar Association, 2000).

5 descriptive categories to 91juveniles who had been sentencedto death between 1973 and 1991.The categories were based onmitigating circumstances that hadbeen established by the evidenceand were in addition to “youth”—a mitigating factor established inEddings v. Oklahoma. Robinsonfound that:

● Almost half of those sentencedhad troubled family historiesand social backgrounds andproblems such as physicalabuse, unstable childhoodenvironments, and illiteracy.

● Twenty-nine suffered psycho-logical disturbances (e.g., pro-found depression, paranoia,self-mutilation).

● Just under one-third exhibitedmental disability evidenced bylow or borderline IQ scores.

● More than half were indigent.

● Eighteen were involved in inten-sive substance abuse before thecrime.

Juveniles sentenced to death sharevarying combinations of these miti-gating circumstances, in addition totheir youthful age. In 61 of the 91cases (67 percent), one or morefactors in addition to “youth” waspresent.

State-by-StateDifferences inSentencing Options

T wenty-two States—morethan half of the 38 jurisdic-tions authorizing the death

penalty—have imposed the deathpenalty on offenders who commit-ted capital offenses before age 18

6 Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

November 2000 7

Significant State legislative activityconcerning the death penaltyoccurred in 1999.21 Both Nebraskaand Illinois mandated a compre-hensive evaluation of the deathpenalty. Although the Governorof Nebraska vetoed a proposedmoratorium on executions, legisla-tion was enacted that called for acomprehensive study to determinewhether the death penalty isapplied fairly. The Governor ofIllinois ordered an evaluation after13 death row inmates in the pastfew years were found not guiltywhen their cases were reexamined.Legislatures in Connecticut,

legislation that barred the imposi-tion of the death penalty onoffenders who were under age 18at the time they committed capitaloffenses. Similar bills were intro-duced in Indiana, Pennsylvania,South Carolina, South Dakota, andTexas. Bills that called for theexpansion of the death penalty tojuvenile offenders ages 16 and 17were rejected in several States,including California (American BarAssociation, 2000).

Maryland, Missouri, Montana, NorthCarolina, and Pennsylvania sawthe introduction—but not thepassage—of legislation calling formoratoriums on the death penaltyor authorizing studies of its use. In1999, 12 of the 38 States that cur-rently have the death penalty sawthe introduction of bills to abolishit—8 more States than in the previ-ous year (American Bar Associ-ation, 2000).

In 1999, many States also wereinvolved in reassessing their use ofthe death penalty for juveniles.Montana’s legislature approved

Table 3. State-by-State Breakdown of Juvenile Death Sentences, 1973–2000

Total TotalRace of Offender Sex of Offender Age at Crime Juvenile Juvenile

Rank State Black Latino White M F 15 16 17 Sentences Offenders

1 TX 23 16 10 49 0 0 0 49 49 48

2 FL 8 1 21 30 0 3 9 18 30 25

3 AL 11 0 10 20 1 1 9 11 21 20

4 MS 6 0 6 11 1 0 5 7 12 11

5 LA 10 0 1 11 0 2 5 4 11 11

6 GA 4 0 6 9 1 1 0 9 10 7

7 NC 5 0 2 7 0 1 0 6 7 6

7 OK 0 0 7 7 0 1 3 3 7 6

7 SC 3 0 4 7 0 0 3 4 7 7

8 OH* 5 0 1 6 0 0 1 5 6 6

8 PA 5 0 1 6 0 1 2 3 6 6

9 AZ 0 3 2 5 0 0 2 2 5 5

9 VA 3 0 2 5 0 0 2 3 5 5

10 MO 2 0 2 4 0 0 2 2 4 4

11 IN 2 0 1 2 1 1 0 2 3 3

11 KY 1 0 2 3 0 1 0 2 3 3

11 MD* 2 0 1 3 0 0 0 3 3 2

12 AR 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 2

12 NV 1 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 2

13 NE* 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1

13 NJ* 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1

13 WA* 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1

Total 95 21 80 192 4 13 47 135 196 182

Note: Adapted from Streib, 2000.* State statute no longer allows the death penalty for offenders who commit capital offenses before age 18 (American Bar Association, 2000).

InternationalContext

W ith increasing globaliza-tion and a developingworld economy, it is

difficult not to look beyond theborders of the United States tothe practices of other nations. Indeciding Stanford, for example, theSupreme Court considered theinternational context in determin-ing evolving standards of decency.

International law has expresslydetermined that the death penalty,specifically, the death penalty and

life imprisonment without possibil-ity of release for crimes commit-ted while a juvenile, is a humanrights issue (see pages 10–12 fora discussion of life imprisonmentwithout possibility of release(parole)). According to AmnestyInternational, since the adoptionof the Declaration of HumanRights 50 years ago, more thanhalf of the world’s countries haveabolished the use of the deathpenalty (Amnesty International,1998). Table 5 lists the document-ed executions of offenders inother countries who were underage 18 at the time of execution for

the period 1985–95. However, theextent of the international use ofthe death penalty for juveniles islargely unknown. If age at the timeof crime had been used, ratherthan age at execution, the numberswould be greater. Undocumentedcases would also increase the global number.

The United States has not adoptedseveral international bans on thejuvenile death penalty. Introducedon March 23, 1976, the UnitedNations’ (U.N.’s) InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights (ICCPR) states that the“sentence of death shall not beimposed for crimes committed bypersons below eighteen years ofage” (article 6(5)).The UnitedStates signed the ICCPR inOctober 1977, although theSupreme Court had recently, inGregg v. Georgia, permitted Statesto resume use of the death penal-ty. At the time of signing, theFederal Government expresslyreserved the right to impose thedeath penalty for crimes commit-ted while under age 18. Elevencountries objected to the UnitedStates’ reservation and, in 1995,the U.N.’s Human Rights Com-mittee, which monitors compliancewith the ICCPR, asked the UnitedStates to withdraw the reservation(Amnesty International, 1998). In1998, the United States was againasked to withdraw its reservation,this time by the U.N. Special Rap-porteur on extrajudicial, summary,or arbitrary executions, but theUnited States declined to do so.

Article 37(a) of the U.N. Conven-tion on the Rights of the Child(CRC) states that “neither capitalpunishment nor life imprisonmentwithout possibility of release shall

8 Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Table 4. Status of the Death Penalty, by AmericanJurisdiction

Death Penalty, Death Penalty,Minimum Age 18 Death Penalty, Minimum Age 16 (Total = 15 States Minimum Age 17 (Total = 18 Statesand Federal (civilian)) (Total = 5 States) and Federal (military))

California* Florida† Alabama*

Colorado* Georgia* Arizona‡

Connecticut* New Hampshire* Arkansas‡

Illinois* N. Carolina* Delaware‡

Kansas* Texas* Idaho‡

Maryland* Indiana*

Montana* Kentucky*

Nebraska* Louisiana‡

New Jersey* Mississippi‡

New Mexico* Missouri*

New York* Nevada*

Ohio* Oklahoma‡

Oregon* Pennsylvania‡

Tennessee* S. Carolina‡

Washington* S. Dakota‡

Federal* (civilian) Utah‡

Virginia‡

Wyoming*

Federal* (military)

Sources: Streib, 2000. Data on States with a minimum age of 16 were taken from American BarAssociation, 2000.* Express minimum age in statute.† Minimum age required by Florida Constitution per Florida Supreme Court in Brennan v. State,754 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999).‡ Minimum age required by the Constitution per the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815 (1988).

November 2000 9

be imposed for offences commit-ted by persons below eighteenyears of age.”22 China, which haslong upheld the death penalty andhistorically executed more peopleannually than any country in theworld, changed its laws in 1997 toconform to article 37(a) of theCRC. President Clinton signed theCRC in 1995 with a reservation toarticle 37(a).The Senate has notyet ratified the CRC. Of 154 U.N.members, the United States andSomalia are the only 2 countriesthat have not yet ratified the CRC.

Sentencing andProgram Options

A lthough researchers havebegun to analyze and evalu-ate the effects of program-

ming on serious, violent, andchronic juvenile offenders, few pro-grams target juvenile capital offen-ders per se. A literature search ofthe National Criminal JusticeReference Service (NCJRS) data-base reveals scant research onprograms for juvenile capital of-

fenders. One effective program isTexas’ Capital Offender Program,which originated in 1988 at theGiddings State Home and School.This structured, intensive, 16-weekprogram helps small groups ofjuvenile capital offenders gainaccess to their emotions throughrole-playing. The goal of this empa-thy training program is to addressoffenders’ emotional detachmentand inability to accept responsibili-ty for their crimes. Each parti-cipant is required to reenact thecrime committed, first as the per-petrator and then as the victim,in addition to other scenes fromtheir lives (Matthews, 1995).A qualitative evaluation foundthe program to be effective.Theyouth unanimously believed thatthe program gave them insight intotheir own and others’ feelings.A quantitative study would yieldmore information about the long-term effectiveness of this program.

The development of sentencingand program options for juvenilecapital offenders is difficult in lightof the lack of knowledge about this

small population. With greaterattention paid to assessing juvenilecapital offenders, correctional facili-ties could more effectively provideprograms that address offenders’needs. An additional difficulty is thedifference in how the courts han-dle juvenile capital offenders. Someyoung offenders are kept in juvenilecourt, while others are transferredto criminal court.These offendersface a variety of sentencing pat-terns, depending primarily on Statelaw, the local and national politicalclimate, and the skills of defensecounsel.

A review of individual juvenile andadult death penalty cases oftenreveals years of trauma and depri-vation prior to the commission ofcapital offenses. Public investmentin early intervention programs forchildren at risk of abuse, academicsupport for low-functioning stu-dents, and positive involvementwith caring adults will go a longway toward eliminating violentcrimes, including capital offensesand the resulting sentences thatdrain the Nation’s resources—both human and financial.

In recent years, various innovativeand effective interventions havebeen developed to prevent juve-nile delinquency. Minimizing riskfactors and maximizing protectivefactors throughout the develop-mental cycle from birth throughadolescence can give all youth abetter chance to lead productive,crime-free lives. Early interventionprograms and services for ju-veniles engaged in high-risk andminor delinquent behaviors aresignificantly reducing the numberof juveniles penetrating the juve-nile and criminal justice systems.Many interventions geared toward

Table 5. Documented Executions of JuvenileOffenders in Foreign Countries, 1985–1995

Age at Date of Country Name of Offender Execution Execution

Bangladesh Mohammed Sleim 17 February 27, 1986

Iran Kazem Shirafkan 17 1990Three unnamed males 16, 17, 17 September 29, 1992

Iraq Five Kurdish males 15–17 November–December 1987Eight Kurdish males 14–17 December 30–31, 1987

Nigeria Matthew Anu 18 February 26, 1989

Pakistan One male 17 November 15, 1992

Saudi Arabia Sadeq Mal-Allah 17 September 2, 1992

Yemen Nasser Munir Nasser 13 July 21, 1993al’Kirbi

Source: Streib, 1999.

1 0 Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Life in Prison Without Possibility of Release The justice system’s recent shift toward strongerpunishment policies has been marked not only byincreased use of the death penalty but by increasesin the number of offenders—including juveniles whocommitted offenses prior to their 18th birthdays—being sentenced to life in prison without the possi-bility of parole.

Only Washington, DC, Indiana, and Oregon ex-pressly prohibit courts from imposing life withoutparole on offenders younger than age 16 at the timeof their offense (Logan, 1998). A few States effec-tively disallow a sentence of life without parole forsuch offenders by setting a minimum age for waiveror establishing sentencing limitations. Several Statesfail to indicate whether life without parole can beimposed on those younger than age 16, and someStates do not use the sentence at all.

The overwhelming majority of American juris-dictions, however, allow life without parole foroffenders younger than age 16. Some even make itmandatory for defendants convicted of certainoffenses in criminal court. In Washington State,offenders as young as age 8 can be sentenced tolife.1 In Vermont, 10-year-olds can face the sentence.2

Assessing the Constitutionality of Lifein Prison Without Parole: SupremeCourt Standards

The eighth amendment to the U.S. Constitutionprohibits punishment that is cruel and unusual. TheSupreme Court has interpreted this prohibition tomean that punishment must be proportional to thecrime for which it is imposed.3

Proportionality analysis in cases involving life with-out parole has been far less clear than in casesinvolving the death penalty. Beginning in the 1980’s,the Supreme Court decided several cases focusingon the constitutionality of life sentences. In the firstof these, Rummel v. Estelle,4 the Court upheld theconstitutionality of a mandatory life sentence (withthe possibility of parole) imposed under a Texasrecidivist law. Holding that the State legislature knew

best how to punish recidivists, the Court held thatfindings of disproportionality with respect to sen-tence length should be “exceedingly rare.”5 Threeyears later, in Solem v. Helm,6 the Court reached adifferent result. Finding a sentence of life withoutparole disproportionate, the Court in Solem square-ly rejected the State’s argument that proportionalityanalysis does not apply to terms of imprisonment.

The Court identified three objective factors forcourts to consider when analyzing proportionality:

● The gravity of the offense and the harshness ofthe penalty.

● Sentences imposed on other criminals (for more and less serious offenses) in the same jurisdiction.

● Sentences imposed (for the same offense) inother jurisdictions.7

Unlike Rummel, the three-part test announced inSolem revealed the Court’s willingness to undertake adetailed analysis of the proportionality of a sentence’slength.

The Supreme Court’s consideration of the constitu-tionality of life without parole 8 years later (inHarmelin v. Michigan8) provided little clarification ofthe applicable standards. A majority of the sharplydivided Court rejected the petitioner’s claim thatlife without parole was an unconstitutional sentencefor the offense committed. Two members of themajority, however, held that proportionality analysisdid not even apply outside the context of deathpenalty cases. Three justices (concurring separately)disagreed with this conclusion. Applying the firstprong of Solem, these justices held that life withoutparole was not grossly disproportionate to the seri-ous crimes the petitioner had committed. The othertwo factors (intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictionalcomparisons), they held, applied only in “the rarecase in which a threshold comparison of the crimecommitted and the sentence imposed leads to aninference of gross disproportionality.”9 The four dis-senting justices agreed that the eighth amendment

November 2000 1 1

contains a proportionality requirement and foundthat it had been violated by the petitioner’s lifesentence.10

Despite disagreement among the justices, the deci-sion in Harmelin includes two important holdings:(1) the eighth amendment’s proportionality analysisapplies to capital and noncapital cases, and (2) incases involving statutorily mandated minimum sen-tences (even life without parole), courts or othersentencing authorities need not consider mitigatingfactors such as age (Logan, 1998).

Cases Involving Juveniles

Challenges of sentences of life without parole havemet with limited success in State courts and almostno success in Federal court in cases involving juve-nile offenders11 (Logan, 1998). Most Federal courtshave adopted a restrictive view when comparing thecrime committed and the sentence imposed (thefirst factor of the Solem test), focusing almost exclu-sively on the seriousness of the offense committedwithout considering offender culpability and individ-ual mitigating circumstances (Logan, 1998).12 TheNinth Circuit Court of Appeals in Harris v. Wright,13

for example, upheld a mandatory life sentence fora 15-year-old convicted of murder, finding that“youth has no obvious bearing” on proportionalityanalysis.14 It also held that although capital punish-ment must be treated specially,“mandatory lifeimprisonment without parole is, for young and oldalike, only an outlying point on the continuum ofprison sentences.”15 Like any other prison sentence,the court held,“it raises no inference of dispropor-tionality when imposed on a murderer.”16 Followingthe Supreme Court’s ruling in Harmelin, the Harriscourt held that a detailed analysis of proportionalitywas necessary only in the rare case in which “‘athreshold comparison of the crime committed andthe sentence imposed leads to an inference of grossdisproportionality.’”17

State courts have been somewhat more flexibleand willing to consider individual factors affectingan offender’s culpability than Federal courts. InCalifornia, for example, a court reviewing life with-out parole must consider circumstances of the

offense (e.g., motive, consequences, and extent ofthe defendant’s involvement) and characteristics ofthe defendant (e.g., age, prior offenses, and mentalcapacity).18 California courts also must compare thechallenged punishment with sentences imposedwithin and outside the State, as required by the sec-ond and third prongs of the Solem test.19 Courts inKansas similarly consider the nature of the offense,the “character of the offender,” and the Solem com-parative factors.20

Invalidating a mandatory life sentence imposed ontwo 14-year-olds convicted of rape, the KentuckySupreme Court in Workman v. Kentucky 21 held thatcourts retain the power to determine whether “anact of the legislature violates the provisions of theConstitution.” Although the court upheld theKentucky law mandating life without parole forthose convicted of rape as applied to adults, it heldthat a “different situation prevails when punishmentof this stringent a nature is applied to a juvenile.”22

Under all the circumstances of the case, the courtheld that life without parole for two 14-year-olds“shocks the general conscience of society todayand is intolerable to fundamental fairness.”23

In Naovarath v. State,24 a case involving the constitu-tionality of a life sentence imposed on a 13-year-oldconvicted of murder, the Supreme Court of Nevadaundertook a similarly close examination of offendercharacteristics. Proportionality analysis, the court inNaovarath held, required consideration of the con-vict’s age and his likely mental state at the time ofthe crime.25 Finding the sentence cruel and unusual,the court held that “children are and should bejudged by different standards from those imposedupon mature adults.”26

Other State courts have been less willing to considera juvenile’s age when assessing the constitutionalityof life sentences. The Washington State Court ofAppeals in State v. Massey,27 for instance, affirmed alife sentence for a 13-year-old convicted of murder,holding that proportionality analysis should notinclude consideration of the defendant’s age,“only abalance between the crime and the sentenceimposed.”

continued on next page

serious and chronic juvenile of-fenders have had positive effectson subsequent reoffense rates.23

Graduated sanctions systems,designed to place sentencedjuveniles—especially serious, vio-lent, and chronic offenders—intoappropriate treatment programswhile protecting the public safety,are being implemented in jurisdic-tions across the country. Theseprograms and services recognizethat children are malleable andthat research-based interventionsare able to affect the lives of juve-nile offenders positively and con-structively while helping to reducethe number of young people whocommit crimes that can put themon death row or subject them tolife in prison without possibility ofrelease.

Conclusion

Individuals who were juvenilesat the time they committed acapital offense continue to be

sentenced to the death penalty inthe United States.Although thenumber of juvenile offendersaffected by the death penalty issmall, these offenders serve as afocal point for often highly politi-cized debates about the constitu-tionality of the death penalty,public safety, alternatives availableto judges and juries in determin-ing the fates of these youth, and,most crucial, the effectiveness ofthe juvenile justice system in safe-guarding the due process rightsof youth.

1 2 Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Endnotes1 These States are Alabama,Arizona,Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, NewHampshire, North Carolina,Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, SouthCarolina, South Dakota,Texas, Utah,Virginia, and Wyoming.

2 The data in this Bulletin are currentas of June 2000 and, with the excep-tion of the sidebar on pages 10–12, aretaken from The Juvenile Death PenaltyToday, a report that first appeared in1984 and has been issued 57 times byDean and Professor of Law Victor L.Streib at the Claude W. Pettit Collegeof Law at Ohio Northern University inAda, OH (Streib, 2000). Streib statesthat the reports “almost invariablyunder-report the number of death-sentenced juvenile offenders due to

State law in Illinois requires a mandatory life sen-tence for any defendant convicted of killingmore than one person (even if convicted as anaccomplice).28 The Illinois Supreme Court has not,as yet, addressed the constitutionality of thesentencing law as applied to juveniles convicted asaccomplices in murder trials (Hanna, 2000).

Endnotes1 State v. Furman, 853 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash. 1993).2 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303 (Supp. 1997) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §5506 (1991).3 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (“It is a precept ofjustice that a punishment for crime should be graduated and propor-tioned to the offense”).4 445 U.S. 263 (1980).5 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.6 463 U.S. 277 (1983).7 Solem, 463 U.S. at 291–292.8 501 U.S. 957 (1991).9 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring).10 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1013 (White, J., dissenting).11 Data on life without parole cases involving juveniles currently are notbeing collected.12 See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 8 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 1993) (“‘[A]particular offense that falls within legislatively prescribed limits will notbe considered disproportionate unless the sentencing judge has abused

his discretion’”), quoting United States v. Vasquez, 966 F.2d 254, 261 (7thCir. 1992).13 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996).14 Harris, 93 F.3d at 585. See also Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 568(7th Cir. 1995) (refused to consider age of 15-year-old offender in chal-lenge of life sentence’s constitutionality).15 Harris, 93 F.3d at 585.16 Harris, 93 F.3d at 585.17 Harris, 93 F.3d at 583, quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J.,concurring).18 People v. Hines, 938 P.2d 833, 443 (Cal. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.855 (1998).19 People v. Thongvilay, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 749 (Cal. App. 1998).20 State v. Scott, 947 P.2d 466, 470 (Kan. Ct. App.), aff ’d in part, rev’d inpart. No. 75,684, 1998 WL 272730 (Kan. May 29, 1998).21 429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).22 Workman, 429 S.W.2d at 377.23 Workman, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968).24 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989).25 Naovarath, 779 P.2d at 946.26 Naovarath, 779 P.2d at 946–47. See also People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697,726–27 (Cal. 1983) (reversing life sentence imposed on 17-year-old,noting youth’s “unusual” immaturity).27 803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).28 In all 50 States, juveniles charged with acting as accomplices to murder may be transferred to criminal court. Unlike Illinois, however,34 States provide judges discretion when deciding on an appropriatesentence for such offenders.

November 2000 1 3

Prevention and Early Intervention ProgramsOJJDP is committed to interrupting the cycle of vio-lence through prevention and early interventionprograms such as nurse home visitation, mentoring,and family support services.

Prenatal and Early Childhood NurseHome Visitation

OJJDP is supporting implementation of the Prenataland Early Childhood Nurse Home VisitationProgram in six high-crime, urban areas. The programsends nurses to visit low-income, first-time mothersduring their pregnancies. The nurses help womenimprove their health, making it more likely that theirchildren will be born free of neurological problems.Several rigorous studies indicate that the nursehome visitation program reduces the risks for earlyantisocial behavior and prevents problems that leadto youth crime and delinquency, such as child abuse,maternal substance abuse, and maternal criminalinvolvement. Recent evidence shows that nursehome visitation even reduces juvenile offending.

Adolescents whose mothers received nurse homevisitation services more than a decade earlier were60 percent less likely than adolescents whose moth-ers had not received a nurse home visitor to haverun away, 55 percent less likely to have been arrest-ed, and 80 percent less likely to have been convictedof a crime. When the program focuses on low-income women, the public costs to fund the pro-gram are recovered by the time the first childreaches age 4, primarily because of the reducednumber of subsequent pregnancies and relatedreductions in use of government welfare programs.By the time children from high-risk families reach

age 15, the cost savings are four times the originalinvestment because of reductions in crime, welfareexpenditures, and healthcare costs and because oftaxes paid by working parents.

Youth Mentoring

Another effective intervention is to enlist caring,responsible adults to work with at-risk youth inneed of positive role models. Big Brothers/BigSisters (BB/BS) mentoring programs, for example,have been matching volunteer adults with youth tohelp youth avoid the risky behaviors that compro-mise their health and safety. A 1995 study of BB/BSprograms, conducted by Public/Private Ventures ofPhiladelphia, PA, revealed positive results. Mentoredyouth reported being 46 percent less likely to beginusing drugs, 27 percent less likely to begin drinking,and approximately 33 percent less likely to hitsomeone than were their nonmentored counter-parts. In addition, BB/BS programs had a positiveeffect on mentored youth’s success at school.

OJJDP’s Juvenile Mentoring Program (JUMP) pro-vides one-to-one mentoring for youth at risk ofdelinquency, gang involvement, educational failure, ordropping out of school. Among its many objectives,JUMP seeks to discourage use of illegal drugs andfirearms, involvement in violence and gangs, andother delinquent activity and encourage participa-tion in service and community activity. The JUMPnational evaluation will play an important role inexpanding the body of information about mentoring.Preliminary evaluation findings reveal that bothyouth and mentors view the experience as positive.

difficulty in obtaining accurate data” (p. 2). However, the juvenile executiondata are complete, the annual juveniledeath sentencing data are almost (95percent) complete, and the data forjuvenile offenders currently on deathrow are fairly (90 percent) complete.The report is available online atwww.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm.

3 Although 10 States classify all individ-uals age 17 or older as adults and 3other States classify all individuals age16 or older as adults for purposes ofcriminal responsibility (Snyder andSickmund, 1999), this Bulletin refers toall individuals under age 18 at the timethat a criminal offense was committedas “juveniles.”

4 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

5 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

6 383 U.S. 541 (1966).

7 455 U.S. 104 (1982).

8 455 U.S. 104, 116.

9 487 U.S. 815 (1988).

1 4 Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

10 492 U.S. 361 (1989).

11 492 U.S. 361 (the Stanford v. Kentuckyand Wilkins v. Missouri cases were consolidated).

12 These diagnostic evaluations involvedpsychiatric, neurological, psychological,neuropsychological, educational, andelectroencephalographic (EEG) exami-nations. Dr. Dorothy Lewis andcolleagues conducted psychiatric inter-views with the offenders; obtaineddetailed neurological histories; corrob-orated those histories when possiblethrough physical examinations, recordreviews, and specialized tests such asthe EEG; performed neurological andmental status examinations; deter-mined whether offenders had beenphysically and/or sexually abused asyouth through lengthy interviews;performed neurometric quantitativeEEG’s; and conducted neuropsychol-ogical and educational testing usingtests such as the WAIS, Bender-Gestalttest, Rorschach Test, Halstead-ReitanBattery of Neuropsychological Tests,and Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery.

13 For more information on inadequatelegal representation, see A BrokenSystem: Error Rates in Capital Cases1973–1995, which states that themost common errors found in capitalcases are “(1) egregiously incompetentdefense lawyering (accounting for 37%of the state post-conviction reversals)and (2) prosecutorial suppression ofevidence that the defendant isinnocent or does not deserve thedeath penalty (accounting for another16–19 percent, when all forms of lawenforcement misconduct are consid-ered” (Liebman, Fagan, and West,2000:5).

14 See Wright v. Angelone, No. 97–32(4th Cir. July 16, 1998).

15 535 So. 2d 362 (La. 1988).

16 615 So. 2d 1333 (La. 1993).

17 586 So. 2d 978 (Ala. Ct. Crim. Ap.1991).

18 636 So. 2d 494 (1994).

19 540 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989).

20 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999).

21 A report issued by the American BarAssociation in January 2000 detailsrecent legislative, judicial, and executivebranch activity relating to the deathpenalty (American Bar Association,2000).

22 G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N.GAOR, Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc.A/44/49 (1989).

23 Lipsey and Wilson (1998:338) reportthat in a meta-analysis of 200 studiesof intervention with serious offenders,the best programs “were capable ofreducing recidivism rates by as muchas 40%” and that the “average” inter-vention reduced recidivism rates byapproximately 12 percent. See alsoOffice of Juvenile Justice andDelinquency Prevention, 1998.

ReferencesAmerican Bar Association. 2000. AGathering Momentum: ContinuingImpacts of the American Bar AssociationCall for a Moratorium on Executions.Washington, DC: American BarAssociation.

Amnesty International. 1991. USA: TheDeath Penalty and Juvenile Offenders.New York, NY: Amnesty InternationalUSA Publications.

Amnesty International. 1998. On theWrong Side of History: Children and the Death Penalty in the USA. New York, NY: Amnesty International USAPublications.

Bassham, G. 1991. Rethinking theemerging jurisprudence of juveniledeath. Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics,and Public Policy 5(2):467–501.

Evans, K.L. 1992.Trying juveniles asadults: Is the short-term gain of retri-bution outweighed by the long-termeffects on society? Mississippi LawJournal 62(1):95–131.

Hale, R.L. 1997. A Review of JuvenileExecutions in America. CriminologySeries, vol 3. Lewiston, NY: EdwinMellen Press.

Hanna, J. 2000. Mandatory life term forteen rejected. Chicago Tribune (June 22).

Jackson, S. 1996.Too young to die—juveniles and the death penalty—a better alternative to killing our children: Youth empowerment. NewEngland Journal on Criminal and CivilConfinement 22(2):391–437.

Lewis, D.O., Pincus, J.H., Bard, B.,Richardson, E., Prichep, L.S., Feldman, M.,and Yeager, L. 1988. Neuropsychiatric,psychoeducational, and family charac-teristics of 14 juveniles condemned todeath in the United States. AmericanJournal of Psychiatry 145(5):585–589.

Liebman, J.S., Fagan, J., and West,V. 2000.A Broken System: Error Rates in CapitalCases 1973–1995. New York, NY:Columbia Law School.

Lipsey, M.W., and Wilson, D.B. 1998.Effective intervention for serious juve-nile offenders:A synthesis of research.In Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders:Risk Factors and Successful Interventions,edited by R. Loeber and D.P. Farrington.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications,Inc., pp. 313–345.

Logan,W.A. 1998. Proportionality andpunishment: Imposing life withoutparole on juveniles. Wake Forest LawReview 33:681–725.

Matthews, S. 1995. Juvenile capitaloffenders on empathy. ReclaimingChildren and Youth (Summer):10–12.

Office of Juvenile Justice andDelinquency Prevention. 1998. Seriousand Violent Juvenile Offenders. Bulletin.Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofJustice, Office of Justice Programs,Office of Juvenile Justice andDelinquency Prevention.

Robinson, D.A., and Stephens, O.H.1992. Patterns of mitigating factors injuvenile death penalty cases. CriminalLaw Bulletin 28(3):246–275.

November 2000 1 5

Snell,T.L. 1999. Capital Punishment 1998.Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofJustice, Office of Justice Programs,Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Snyder, H.N., and Sickmund, M. 1999.Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999National Report. Report. Washington, DC:U.S. Department of Justice, Office ofJustice Programs, Office of JuvenileJustice and Delinquency Prevention.

Streib,V.L. 1999. Juvenile Death PenaltyToday: Death Sentences and Executions forJuvenile Crimes, January 1973–June 1999.Ada, OH: Ohio Northern UniversityClaude W. Pettit College of Law.

Streib,V.L. 2000. The Juvenile DeathPenalty Today: Death Sentences andExecutions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1,1973–June 30, 2000. Ada, OH: OhioNorthern University Claude W. PettitCollege of Law.

Additional ResourcesAmnesty International. 1998. Betrayingthe Young: Human Rights Violations AgainstChildren in the U.S. Justice System. NewYork, NY:Amnesty International USAPublications.

DeMuro, P. 1999. Consider theAlternatives: Planning and ImplementingDetention Alternatives. Pathways toJuvenile Detention Reform Series, vol.4. Baltimore, MD:The Annie E. CaseyFoundation.

McCuen, G.E., ed. 1997. Death Penaltyand the Disadvantaged. Hudson,WI:Gary E. McCuen Publications.

Parent, D., Dunworth,T., McDonald, D.,and Rhodes,W. 1997. Key legislativeissues in criminal justice:Transferringserious juvenile offenders to adultcourts. Alternatives to Incarceration3(4):28–30.

Sanborn, J.B. 1996. Policies regardingthe prosecution of juvenile murderers:Which system and who should decide?Law and Policy 19(1 and 2):151–178.

Points of view or opinions expressed inthis document are those of the authorsand do not necessarily represent theofficial position or policies of OJJDP orthe U.S. Department of Justice.

Coordinating Council Members

As designated by legislation, the Coordinating Council’s primary functions are to coordinate all Federaljuvenile delinquency prevention programs, all Federal programs and activities that detain or care for

unaccompanied juveniles, and all Federal programs relating to missing and exploited children.The Councilcomprises nine statutory members and nine practitioner members representing disciplines that focus on youth.

Statutory Members The Honorable Janet Reno,Chairperson Attorney GeneralU.S. Department of Justice

John J.Wilson,Vice Chair Acting Administrator Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention

The Honorable Donna E. Shalala, Ph.D.Secretary U.S. Department of Health and Human

Services

The Honorable Alexis M. Herman Secretary U.S. Department of Labor

The Honorable Richard W. RileySecretary U.S. Department of Education

The Honorable Andrew CuomoSecretaryU.S. Department of Housing and

Urban Development

The Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey Director Office of National Drug Control Policy

Doris Meissner Commissioner U.S. Immigration and Naturalization

Service

Harris Wofford Chief Executive Officer Corporation for National and

Community Service

Practitioner Members Robert A. Babbage, Jr.Senior Managing Partner InterSouth, Inc.

Larry K. Brendtro, Ph.D.President Reclaiming Youth

The Honorable William R. Byars, Jr.Judge Family Court of Kershaw County,

South Carolina

John A. Calhoun Executive Director National Crime Prevention Council

Larry EchoHawk Professor Brigham Young University Law School

The Honorable Adele L. Grubbs Judge Juvenile Court of Cobb County,Georgia

The Honorable Gordon A. Martin, Jr.Associate Justice Massachusetts Trial Court

The Honorable Michael W. McPhail Judge Juvenile Court of Forrest County,

Mississippi

Charles Sims Chief of Police Mississippi Police Department,

Hattiesburg

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Washington, DC 20531

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AcknowledgmentsLynn Cothern, Ph.D., is Senior Writer/Editor for the Juvenile JusticeResource Center (JJRC) in Rockville, MD. Lucy Hudson, ProjectManager for JJRC, and Ellen McLaughlin,Writer/Editor for theJuvenile Justice Clearinghouse (JJC) in Rockville, MD, revised andupdated the Bulletin using source material provided by the author.Nancy Walsh, Senior Writer/Editor for JJC, wrote the sidebar onpages 10–12.