Contrasting Mimaṃsa theory of language with that of the Sphoṭavadins Bhartṛhari Mandana Misra

Rohini Bakshi, 495334

Contrast the Mīmāṃsā theory of language with that of the

Sphoṭavādins (Bhartṛhari, Mandana Miśra), and demonstrate how

their respective theories are related to their differing

interpretations of the ontological and epistemological

dimensions of the Veda.

Name: Rohini Bakshi

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Student ID: 495334

Course Title: Religious and Philosophical Ideas of Ancient andMedieval India (2010-11)

Course Code:15PSRC049_A10-11

Essay Number: Two

Introduction

Indian sages have been studying language since the beginning

of their own oral and written history … and Vedic ritual

language formed the basis of early linguistic debates about

the nature of language and it relationship to human

consciousness.1 Vedic hymns related to Vak (RV10.125 and 10.71;

AV 4.1.1-2,) show the important status of speech since ancient

times. This focus on language continued well into the middle

of the first millennium C.E. when the six darsanas

(perspectives) of Indic thought articulated their

philosophical ideas in foundational texts, and debate between

rival systems leads to an increasing levels of subtlety and

sophistication in concepts.2 Of these, two particular groups

with variant goals, focused inordinately on language. Their

theories form the subject of this essay.

“In India, philosophy of language formed part of a

comprehensive theory of knowledge, i.e. the theory of pramanas,

for one of the ways of knowing what is the case is to rightly

understand what is said by an expert and trustworthy person

(apta).”3 Given the importance of verbal testimony (sabda-

pramana) all the darsanas developed a stand on language and the

relationship between word (sabda) and meaning (artha).

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Interestingly, it was not the theory of pramanas that motivated

the two groups that exerted the most energy on language -

Sphotavadins and the Purva-Mimamsakas, because they both held that

dharma (virtue) cannot be known by ordinary cognition. 4 Rather,

their theories of language were closely linked to their

ontological beliefs and the epistemological dimensions of the

Veda.

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1 Beck, Guy, 1993. Sonic Theology; University of South Carolina Press,pg 502 Arnold, D, 2005. Buddhists, Brahmans and Belief, Columbia UniversityPress pg - 1-23 Matilal, B.K, 1985. Logic, Language and Reality, Motilal Banarasidass (pgxi)4 Ganganath Jha points out, “Purva Mimamsa has never claimed to be adarsana … it does not take cognizance of any philosophical topicexcept that of pramanas, and these also are brought in …negatively, to show that Dharma is not in the purview of theordinary pramanas, perception and the rest.” (Jha 1942, pg 4) Thegrammarians agree with this view, and establishing theories ofcognition is not for them. “The Vakyapadiya does not contain asystematic discussion of the different means of valid knowledge.Bhartrhari is chiefly concerned with the upholding of the authorityof the science of Grammar.” (Iyer, 1966, pg 42)

In this essay, we will first outline the ontological and

epistemological beliefs as held by Purva-Mimamsa and the

Sphotavadins (Bhartrhari & Mandana Misra). We will then explore

their respective theories of language and try to gain an

insight into what bearing the former had on the latter.

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Broadly this essay finds that the Sphotavadins was concerned

with the origin and manifestation of language, on establishing

the authority of grammar, and with how human beings

communicate with one another. Language had mystical and

soteriological dimensions. Bhartrhari equated the

undifferentiated word principle (sabdatattva) from which language

emanates with Brahman. Therefore it transcended all scriptures,

even the Veda.

By contrast, Purva-Mimamsa being an exegesis of the Veda put

the text centre-stage and every aspect of its language theory

was designed to reinforce its belief in the eternality and

intrinsic validity of the Veda. One acquired svarga (heaven)

and apavarga (liberation) by following the injunctions of the

Veda. How one read the Veda and knew the Vedic sacrifice was

of utmost importance. Put another way, the Mimamsaka had a

bespoke theory of language, tailored in every way to fit Vedic

exegesis, especially the interpretation of injunctions.

Ontological and epistemological dimensions of the Veda

Purva-Mimamsa

Mimamsakas believe in the law of karma, in unseen power

(apurva), in heaven and hell, liberation, and in the ultimate

authority of the eternal, authorless (apauruseya) Veda.5 For

them the Veda is not the work of anyone, human or divine.

Sages are only ‘seers’ not authors of the Veda.6

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5 Sharma, C, 1987. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, MotilalBanarasidass, pg 2336 Eponyms like Kathaka, Jaminiya etc were attributed to teachers whotaught that section of the Veda very well. (Jha, 1942, pg 126-127)

It was neither composed nor uttered by God who in fact is

ruled out as an unnecessary hypothesis. The correct

performance of the Vedic sacrifice had long since been

established to be powerful enough to command the gods7 which

would explain why ‘God’ was unnecessary.

Mimamsakas do not believe in the cyclical character of the

cosmos. Division of time such as yuga, manvantara, kalpa and so on

do not exist for them. They do not believe in pralaya (cosmic

dissolution) which subscribers believe takes place at the end

of a cosmic cycle. For them the cosmos is eternal and has

always been full of differentiation as we see it now. “The

universe was never different from what it is now’ (na kadacid

anidrsam jagat).8 Time is not cyclical, but linear and the

universe is uncreated, imperishable and eternal, as is the

Veda which upholds its existence through sacrifice. As the

Veda is eternal, so too is every phoneme (varna) of its every

word.

Veda is seen as broadly divided into injunctions (vidhivada) and

explanations (arthavada).9 Vidhivada deals primarily with

injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions (pratisedha) – from which

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merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) accrue. So action becomes

the Veda’s final import. There are no internal contradictions

in the Veda and its injunctions can never be contradicted by

any subsequent knowledge. Hence Vedic testimony (vedavakya) is

valid in itself. The Mimamsakas believed in the intrinsic

validity of cognition (svatah pramana) and this self-validity

applies even more so in the case of the Veda, which are

considered to be free of any human agency.

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7“The sacrifices were no more considered as a means of winning thefavour of the gods and of impelling them to fulfill the profferedrequest... (they) were considered to hold good as magic rites, theexact execution of which could enforce the wished for result,independent of the will of the gods.” Frauwallner, E. (1973)‘History of Indian Philosophy’ Volume 1, trans. V. M Bedekar,Motilal Banarsidass, pg 288 Iyer, S, 1969. Bhartrhari, Deccan College Centenary Series, Pune pg949 Sharma, C ibid., pg 220

Sphotavadins

For Bhartrhari too, the Veda is apauruseya and eternal but not

in the same sense as for the Mimamsaka. It is a manifestation,

and a means of attaining Brahman. It is clubbed with smrti as

agama,10 and is respected deeply as the source of all

traditional sciences including grammar. However, Bhartrhari’s

cosmogonic source and soteriological goal is what he calls

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Sabda-Brahman which is the eternal and undifferentiated word-

principle (sabdatattva) as Brahman. The word- principle contains

within itself the seeds of the whole cosmos, which emanates

from it. The Veda is but a symbol (anukara) of it. The cosmos

and all differentiation proceed from Sabda-Brahman. And all the

words (language) expressive of the objects of experience

proceed from the Word-Principle.11

Bhartrhari believed in the cyclic view of creation and

dissolution and in the emergence of sruti (Veda) and smrti (other

scriptures written by men) at the end of every pralaya

(dissolution) and at the beginning of every creation. The Veda

is ‘One’ at the time of every creation and later diversified

due to the incapacity of man and again becomes ‘One’ at the

time of dissolution (pralaya). The diversification consists of

the splitting up into Rk, Yajus, Saman and Atharvan, their

rescensions as well as the many different ways in which the

text has been handed down, namely, samhita, pada, krama etc.

At the time of creation, rsis who had acquired dharma in their

previous lives see the ultimate and eternal word principle

(nitya-vak) in the form of mantras. The ultimate word principle

which is one and without any inner sequence cannot be imparted

to others in that condition. Only a symbol or an image of it

can be imparted, and that is the Veda.

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10 Agama has been taken … in the sense of tradition – chiefly writtentradition – Sruti and Smriti, but it also includes the beliefs andconducts of cultured people (sista) coming down from time immemorial

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even if not committed to writing. It has been declared to besomething eternal, something that shines uninterruptedly like one’sown conscience. (Iyer, ibid, pg 92)11 Iyer, 1969, ibid., pgs – 146, 59, 83-85

The emergence and transmission of the Veda and the role of the

rsis are deeply connected, because it is through their

austerity (tapas), shining intelligence and insight (prajna)

that they ‘see’ the Veda as whole and undiversified at every

creation.

Grammarians’ Theory of language: Sphotavada

Sphotavada’s chief exponent was Bhartrhari (in his work

Vakyapadiya), and it was re-established by Mandana Misra in

Sphotasiddhi’ “…sphota is one of the most important contributions

of India to the central problem of semantics in general

linguistics.”12 The essence of sphota is that the ‘word’ is a

‘Beduetungstrager’13 a meaning-bearing entity, mainly in the form

of a sentence (and secondarily in the form of words and

phonemes) and exists over and above sounds. It is an

indivisible entity which already exists in everybody and is

not the mere collection of sounds that is uttered by a speaker

and heard by the hearer.

When the speaker utters a sound by with his vocal chords, he

manifests this sphota, and when the hearer hears it, the same

indivisible entity which is in him also is awakened and he

understands the meaning that the speaker wants to convey, and

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which is eternally associated with the word which has been

awakened.14 That which awakens this sphota (nimitta)15 is the

manifested sound (dhvani). This entity (sphota) has its roots

deep in the (individual) Self not only in this life, but of

previous lives also. It is the very essence of the Self, and

part of the personality we inherit from our previous lives.

Sphota is derived from the root sphut, which means to burst, or

explode. In its linguistic sense it means ‘that from which the

meaning bursts forth, i.e. shines forth’.16 According to

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12 Kunjunni Raja, 1963, Indian Theories of Meaning, Adyar Library andResearch Centre, Chennai, pg 9713Brough, J, TPS, 1951, pg 3414 Iyer, S, 1966 (Trans.) Sphotasiddhi of Mandana Misra, Deccan CollegeCentenary Series, Pune pg 315 Iyer, 1969, ibid., pg 152

Bhartrhari, speech and thought are two aspects of the same

speech principle. A sentence is an undivided utterance and its

meaning is also grasped as an entity. It is ‘an instantaneous

flash of insight’ (pratibha). Words are unreal (asatya)

abstractions from the sentence – an artificial construction of

grammarians. “Just as the letters in a word are in themselves

meaningless, so also are the words in a sentence.” (Vakyapadiya

2.416) Once the sentence meaning has been understood, a

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grammarian can analyse (apodhara) words, suffixes, prefixes,

roots, stems, phonemes, etc but these are merely analytical

tools and have no meaning of their own.

The real, indivisible word existing within us is compared to

the egg yolk of a pea-hen. “All the variety and

picturesqueness of the colours of the fully grown peacock is

already in it in a potential state.”17 The root of language is

deeper within us than our intellect. It is rooted in the self

and comes from a sequenceless inner subtle word (akrama vak).

This is the pasyanti stage in Bhartrhari’s threefold

presentation of speech. As soon as it enters the buddhi (organ

of intellect), differentiation takes place. Although still

inaudible, it now stands in relation to what it conveys i.e.

words have formed in the mind and the speaker knows what he

wishes to convey. Now it is vacaka (the expressive word). This

is the madhyama stage. From the buddhi, through sakti (special

power) of association and co-operation, the inaudible

expressive word is transferred by prana (living breath) to

different speech organs sthana (the throat, mouth, palate,

teeth, lips etc.) and is manifested as the ordinary words I

speak and you hear, which are called dhvani (sounds). Dhvani is

divided into prakrta-dhvani that sound which first manifests the

sphota, and vaikrta-dhvani, secondary sounds.18 This then is the

final vaikhari stage.

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16 Kunjunni Raja, ibid., pg 98

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17 Iyer, 1969, ibid., pg 15318 Iyer, 1966, ibid., pg 24

These three hypostasies are presented in Vakyapadiya (1.143):

Vaikharya madhyamayas ca pasyantyas caitad adbhutam/

Anekatirthabhedayas trayyva vacah param padam//

(This [science of grammar] is the supreme and wonderful source

of knowledge for the three-fold speech, which combines [in

itself] many ways – that of the manifested [speech] that of

the middle [speech] and that of seeing [speech])19

The sentence is an indivisible unity (eko ‘navayah sabdah) -

(Vakyapadiya 2.1)20. It is external in that it is heard by the

hearer ‘outside’ but is it internal in that it existed in both

the speaker and the hearer before manifestation. Whatever be

the form of sphota (word, sentence etc.) it is manifested by

the sound. The cognition produced by each sound taken by

itself is indiscernible (anupakhyeya) because it is not enough

to identify the sphota. But each cognition is helpful in giving

rise to the final clear perception of sphota. It is grasped

clearly in the final cognition, the seeds of which had been

sown by the sounds including the final one and which has

gradually attained maturity.21

Each sound uttered by the speaker reveal the whole of it, the first

one vaguely, the second one more clearly and so on until the

last one, helped by the impressions left by the previous

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cognitions reveals it in all its clarity and distinctness. The

process is compared to the learning of a Vedic passage by

heart by reading or reciting it repeatedly. Each subsequent

recitation leaves a clearer impression of the passage than the

one left by the preceding recitation.

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9 Isayeva, N, 1995, From Early Vedanta to Kashmir Shaivism, State Universityof New York Press, pg 8520 Iyer, 1969, ibid., pg 16121 Iyer, 1969, ibid., pg 162

The last recitation helped by these impressions fixes the

passage fully and clearly in the memory. In the same way each

later sound manifests the sphota more clearly than the

preceding one and leaves a clearer impression of it.22

While admitting that phonemes (varnas) existed, he was opposed

to the Mimamsaka view of their identity and eternality. For

them, the g in gauh and the g in gamanya were identical – but

not so for Bhartrhari. According to him, what the person

wishes to express determines his effort to convert it into

sound. Hence the n in nadi is different from the n in dina, but

is mistaken to be the same because they sound alike. To the

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identity and eternality of the varna held by the Mimamsakas,

Mandana Misra tried to establish ‘padasphota’ in Sphotasiddhi.

This work deals mainly with the question whether the word

which conveys meaning is an entity over and above phonemes.23

Error plays a key role in Sphotavada. Mandana Misra elaborates

by quoting Bhartrhari in Sphotasiddhi. Sphota is gleaned after a

series of errors. These errors are universal and fixed. One

man might mistake a rope for a snake another for a little

stream. But in the case of sphota, there is no such variance.

Ka 21 of Sphotasiddhi explains this error. Several analogies are

used for this. From a distance a tree is mistaken for an

elephant – but as one comes closer, the error is corrected.

The cognition of lower numbers leads to the cognition of

higher numbers. Before the cognition of sphota takes place

certain verbal elements which are unreal but appear to be part

of the sphota are erroneously cognized.23a : g, au and h=unreal;

gauh=sphota.

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22 Iyer, 1966, ibid., pg 1223 ibid., pg 3-423a ibid., pgs19-21

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Purva-Mimamsa Theory of Language

Mimamsa initiated the detailed study of sentences and

developed elaborate canons of interpretation earning it the

name Vakyasastra.24 This study flows directly from their raison

d’etre - exegesis of the Vedas. It was based on words, word

meanings and their relationship. It is only through words of

the Vedas that dharma can be known. Vedic injunctions tell us

how to achieve dharma and svarga. Therefore words are real, and

the relationship between words (sabda) and their meanings

(artha) is permanent, inborn and “does not owe its origin to

any person, it is primordial, original, self-sufficient, not

dependent upon any other means of cognition.25

Of the six kinds of valid cognitions classed by Mimamsa26 we

are concerned in this essay by verbal cognition as in

scriptural injunction.27 ‘Dharma-adharma’ being super-sensuous,

cannot be apprehended by ordinary means of cognition. Hence

sastra, (scriptural injunction) is the only way to know it.

Sabda stands for the Vedic word, and artha for dharma-adharma.

Mimamsa language theory proceeds from this.

The Word

The word is defined as a unit composed of a number of letters

(varna). For instance ‘gauh’ (cow) has the components g, au and

h. These component varnas are eternal. The word unit is never

found to be anything entirely different from the varnas.

Mimamsa rejects the postulation of any entity distinct from

the component letters (e.g. sphota). The varnas uttered in

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sequence each leave a trace or impression behind, and the last

component letter

24 Kunjunni Raja, ibid., pg 725 Jha, G, 1942, Purva Mimamsa In Its Sources, Benares Hindu University pg11126 Perception, Inference, Scriptural, Analogical, Presumptive andNegational 27 Jha, G, ibid., pg 110

along with the impressions of the preceding letters bring

about the meaning of the word.28 The process is compared to

sequential acts in a Vedic sacrifice which combine to produce

a final result. The impression or residual trace is compared

to an apurva (unseen power) generated by every act of the

ceremony which ultimately brings about the reward of heaven to

the performer.29

Mimamsa has to accommodate both the universal and the

particular in the application of its theory of language. The

concept of the universal is recognized30 and is relevant in

the conduct of a Vedic sacrifice. If one is instructed to put

in ‘rice’ (vrihi) surely it cannot refer to a particular grain

of rice. Similarly in the injunction ‘one should erect an

altar like the Shyena bird’, it would have to be taken in the

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sense of the universal, rather than a particular bird. At

the same time, the word is ultimately taken as denoting a

particular rather than a universal, because without this,

actions or injunctions would not be possible. Words like

killing, chopping, washing cannot be applied to a universal.

The apparent contradiction is resolved in Sabara’s commentary of

Jaimini’s sutra 1.3.35, which explains that words denote

universals or classes and through these also individuals.31

The Sentence

Since Vedic injunctions are in the form of sentences,

establishing their validity, becomes centrally important.

Mimamsakas says that the sentence has a group of words (each

with its own denotative meaning) along with a word denoting

action, and the meaning of the sentence is based upon that.

“hence the sentence cannot have any separate meaning, entirely

apart from the meaning of the words composing it.”32

28 Jha, G, ibid., pg 11329 Iyer, 1966, ibid., pg 730 Kunjunni Raja, ibid., pg 7231 Jha ,ibid., pg 11432 Jha, ibid., pg 123

The comprehension of the meaning of the sentence is derived

from the meaning of the words, and no separate power of expression

need be postulated for the sentence as a whole (e.g. sphota).

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“If every word has its own definite meaning, how is it

possible for a sentence, which is only a collection of words

to have a unified meaning?33 Unlike Sphotavada, where sentence

meaning is unified and pre-exists in a potential state,

Mimamsakas had to establish that the meaning of the sentence

is comprehended on the meaning of the component words, and

that the sentence had no meaning apart by itself.34

Anvitabhidhana and Abhihitanvaya

There was disagreement in the Mimamsa school about how

sentences convey meaning. Prabhakara and Kumarila Bhatta, two

of the schools most prominent exponents, proposed very

different theories. Both stand apart from sphota in that they

regarded words as real, eternal and actual constituents of

language. On word meaning and sentence meaning though they had

differences. What bearing this has on interpretation Vedic

injunctions is difficult to fathom, except perhaps that

Anvitabhidhana is truer to the eternal word and doesn’t

superimpose anything ‘pauruseyic’ (arising from human agency)

on the sentence – like tatparya (intention).

This debate has attracted a lot of scholarly attention and at

the very least is “…evidence of a very vigorous argument and

debate in linguistic topics in ancient India.”35 Prabhakara

held that words convey a meaning only in the context of a

sentence. Each word has its own meaning, but it is understood

only insofar as it is related to other words in the sentence.36

This is Anvitabhidhana.

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33 Kunjunni Raja, ibid., pg 19134 Jha, ibid., pg 12635 Brough, J, TPS, 1953, pg 16436 Jha, ibid., pg 137

According to Kunjunni (1963-pg194) among modern linguists

Wundt represents Anvitabhidhana. “…in determining the nature of a

sentence, no addition to what is expressed by the words should

be assumed.” In it, unitary sense arises directly from the

collection of words. The words convey meanings only as

connected to one another through factors such as akanksa

(expectancy), yogyata (consistency) and samnidhi (proximity).

The words convey their syntactic relation. The verb is the

principal word as it command action. No word can be

comprehended as having an independent meaning when isolated

from a sentence.37

Kumarila on the other hand proposed that the unitary sense of

the sentence arises indirectly through the recollection of the

meanings of the individual words (Abhihitanya). Each individual

word has a meaning which can be and is comprehended

separately. We then put these meanings together according to

akanksa, yogyata and samnidhi, and arrive at the meaning of the

sentence. The sentence meaning (vakyartha)38 becomes more than

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the sum of the word meanings. Additional signification arises

from the association of word meanings (samsarga) and the

purport of the speaker (tatparya). The sentence does not have a

meaning of its own independently.

Features of Mimamsa Language

The Veda being eternal, so too was its language. Therefore the

origin of language did not pre-occupy the Mimamsakas. Language

comes from elders (Vrddhavyavahara) and can be traced back to

any conceivable period of human society.

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37 Kunjunni Raja, ibid., pgs 197-198, 20838 ibid., pg 208

The ‘eternality of words’ and their meanings could not be

traced to a person (pravaha-nityata)39 in quite the same way that

they the Veda is apauruseya.

Of importance to them is vakyasesa (context) - especially in

understanding what the Vedas say. Thus in the Vedic sentence

akta sarkara upadadhati (the smeared pebbles are placed nearby, the

meaning of akta or ‘smeared’ is to be understood from the rest

of the passage tejo vai ghrtam (clarified butter (ghee) is the

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brilliance); from this it is known that the pebbles are to be

soaked in ghee.

Understanding of the Veda determined their stand on other

linguistic features. A classic example is homonyms. Mimamsakas

assume ‘monosemy’ in the language system as far as possible.

This makes sense when we realize how confusing vedic

injunctions would potentially become if one word had many

meanings. Kunjunni quotes the Mimamsa–sutras in saying “as far

as possible we should explain away all instances of multiple

meaning” This tallies with the belief in the permanence of the

relationship between word (sabda) and meaning (artha).

Even in the case of synonyms expect for the most commonly used

ones like e.g. hasta, pani, kara for hand, Kumarila points out that

it is unnecessary to have more than one name for an object.

The connection between sabda and artha must be accepted as

invariable and constant as far as possible. The same applied

to homonyms. 40

Acquisition of language

Mimamsakas dwell on how a child acquires language, believing it

to be eternal and handed down by tradition in an unbroken

chain. Prabhakara says language is acquired by Vrddhavyavahara –

or the usage of words by elders.

39 ibid., pg 2040 ibid., pgs 31, 42, 43

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From sentences in the imperative mode that we observe visible

activity on the part of the listener. Therefore, such

sentences are of great importance in the natural method of

learning a language.41 From several observations the listener

is able to understand the meaning of single words through a

process of assimilation and elimination (avapodvapa)

Kumarilabhatta specifies three stages a) pratyaksa, (direct

perception) – child hears speaker, and sees listener act, b)

anumana (inference) – child infers what the listener has

understood from the utterance and c) arthapatti, (postulation) –

child knows that the activity of the listener is explained by

the relationship existing between the utterance and the

meaning.

For Bhartrhari language is innate. It is apprehended by pratibha

(comprehension, brilliance) which includes intelligence of a

high order, intuitive knowledge, the instinct of animals and

birds and the spontaneous activities of new-born babies. It is

found in all beings from animals and birds at one end and Rsis

like Vasistha at the other. Pratibha arises from a variety of

reasons – svabhava (nature) as in animals and birds; abhyasa –

like the knowledge of an expert who can tell a genuine

precious stone or coin; and sabdabhavana – because of which

babies are able to make sounds with their vocal organs and

even to breathe.42

Conclusion

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In this essay, we examined two fundamentally differing

language theories – Sphotavada and that of Purva-Mimamsa, and

tried to understand how they are related to the ontological

and epistemological dimensions of the Veda. The Mimamsa theory

is single-mindedly driven by its belief in the

indestructibility, eternality and intrinsic validity of the

Veda.

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41 ibid., pgs 26-2742 Iyer, 1969, pg 87-91

Dharma can only be known and achieved through scriptural

injunctions, so understanding them correctly was the primary

function of language. The Veda was the be-all and end-all of

Mimamsa, making any transcendent linguistic entity redundant.

For this reason, Mimamsakas took strong exception to the idea

of sphota.

Sphotavada had an emanationist theory – whereby language

proceeded from a mystical origin (Sabdabrahman) and is manifest

in the words you and I speak. The Veda, which was respected as

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the source of grammar, was in the final analysis a symbol of

Sabda-Brahman, which was anathema to Mimamsa. Bhartrhari did

not polemicize the issue, and in fact worked with a spirit of

accommodation, believing that grammar was relevant to all the

darsanas, unlike Mandana Misra, whose Sphotasiddhi was a polemic

reply to Mimamsa’s objection to sphota. 43

The contribution of ancient Indian philosophers and

grammarians to linguistics has been widely recognized by

scholars like Brough, Biardeau, Kunjunni and Coward. Indeed,

Purva-Mimamsakas initiated a skilful use of linguistic study in

the defence of Brahmanical orthodoxy,44 while credit for

positing the theoretical indivisibility of a sentence as an

expression of thought goes to Bhartrhari45 and Mandana Misra.

In the middle of the first millennium C.E. concepts and

theories in Indic thought were developed with the awareness of

rival schools. As mentioned earlier, It led to fruitful debate

and increasing subtlety and sophistication in argument. This

is certainly evident in debate between Sphotavadins and Purva-

Mimamsakas.

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43 ibid, pgs 76 &160; 44 Natrajan, K, 1995, pg xx; 45 Shastri, G, 1959, pg 83;

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Rohini Bakshi, 495334 24

Contrasting Mimaṃsa theory of language with that of the Sphoṭavadins Bhartṛhari Mandana Misra

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